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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 






EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 




DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD CHTD. and SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD, CHTD., INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD LAW 
OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional Limited 
Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, CHTD., 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative capacity of 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, CHTD., and 




EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42698 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
000002
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
' 
HONORABLE JASON D. SCOTT 
J. KAHLE BECKER 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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Date: 9/10/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :06 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 42 Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
4/11/2011 NCOC CCHEATJL New Case Filed - Other Claims Deborah Bail 
COMP CCHEATJL Complaint Filed Deborah Bail 
SMFI CCHEATJL Summons Filed Deborah Bail 
MISC CCHEATJL Plaintiff's Undertaking Deborah Bail 
APPL CCHEATJL Application For Order For Examination Of Debtor Jason D. Scott 
NOTD CCHEATJL Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Marcy Fox Jason D. Scott 
4/13/2011 ORDR CCNELSRF Order of Recusal Deborah Bail 
CHJS. CCNELSRF Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification Mike Wetherell 
DISF CCNELSRF Disqualification Of Judge - Self Mike Wetherell 
NOTR CCNELSRF Notice Of Reassignment to Judge Micke Mike Wetherell 
Wetherell 
CHJS DCOATMAD Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification Timothy Hansen 
DISF DCOATMAD Disqualification Of Judge - Self Timothy Hansen 
DCOATMAD Notice of Reassignment Timothy Hansen 
4/14/2011 NOAP CCLATICJ Notice Of Appearance (J. Kahle Becker for Timothy Hansen 
Eugene and Janet Rice and Michael Rice) 
AFOS · CCWRIGRM (3) Affidavit Of Service (04/11/11) Timothy Hansen 
4/18/2011 DISF DCOLSOMA Disqualification Of Judge - Self Timothy Hansen 
CHJS DCOLSOMA Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification Michael McLaughlin 
DISF DCOLSOMA Disqualification Of Judge - Self Michael McLaughlin 
4/19/2011 HRSC TCHOCA Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause Michael McLaughlin 
04/29/2011 09:30 AM) 
4/22/2011 MOTN CCHEATJL Motion To Exclude Plaintiff's Undertaking And Michael McLaughlin 
Cross Examine Plaintiff And His Sureties 
AFSM CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Eugene Rice In Support Of Motion Michael McLaughlin 
AFSM CCHEATJL Affidavit Of J Kahle Becker In Support Of Motion Michael McLaughlin 
4/25/2011 AFOS CCSIMMSM (3) Affidavit Of Service 4-21-11 Michael McLaughlin 
4/26/2011 NOTC CCHOLMEE Notice of Filing Cash Bond and Withdrawal of Michael McLaughlin 
Plaintiffs Undertaking ($3,500.00) 
MOTN CCLATICJ Motion to Dissolve of Temporary Restraining Michael McLaughlin 
Order and to Dismiss Complaint 
4/28/2011 ANSW CCHEATJL Answer, Counterclaim, And Joinder Of A Party (J Michael McLaughlin 
Kahle Becker) 
MOTN CCHEATJL Motion For Leave To Add Claims For Punitive Michael McLaughlin 
Damages 
SMFI CCHEATJL Summons Filed Michael McLaughlin 
4/29/2011 DCHH TCHOCA Hearing result for Order to Show Cause held on Michael McLaughlin 
04/29/2011 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Fran Morris 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:500 
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Date: 9/10/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :06 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 42 Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
5/4/2011 MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion for a Protective Order Michael McLaughlin 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of Janet Rice in Support of Motion for Michael McLaughlin 
Protective Order 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of Eugene Rice in Support of Motion Michael McLaughlin 
MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion to Shorten Time Michael McLaughlin 
5/9/2011 OBJE MCBIEHKJ Objection to Motion for Protective Order Michael McLaughlin 
AFOS CCLATICJ Affidavit Of Service 04/29/11 Michael McLaughlin 
5/16/2011 NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
5/19/2011 NOTC CCSIMMSM Notice of Association of Counsel ( Fuhrman for Michael McLaughlin 
Dennis Sallaz) 
5/23/2011 BREF. CCSWEECE Post- Hearing Brief For Order To Show Cause Michael McLaughlin 
AFFD CCSWEECE Affidavit Of J Kahle Becker In Support of Michael McLaughlin 
Post-Hearing Brief For Order to Show Cause 
AFFD CCSWEECE Affidavit Of Eugene Rice In Support of Michael McLaughlin 
Post-Hearing To Show Cause Brief 
MEMO CCVIDASL Post Hearing Memorandum Michael McLaughlin 
5/24/2011 HRSC TCHOCA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/01/2011 09:00 Michael McLaughlin 
AM) Defendant's Counterclaimants'/Protective 
Order 
MOTN CCNELSRF Motion to Strike Michael McLaughlin 
5/26/2011 NOTC CCWRIGRM Notice of Association of Counsel (Vernon K Smith Michael McLaughlin 
w/lver Longeteig, atty for Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz) 
RSPS CCRANDJD Response to Motion to Strike Michael McLaughlin 
MOTN TCHOCA Motion to Shorten Time Denied Michael McLaughlin 
6/1/2011 NOTH CCAMESLC Notice Of Hearing (Motion to Strike 07/01/2011 Michael McLaughlin 
09:00AM) 
6/6/2011 AFFD CCSWEECE Affidavit In Support of Objection To Motion For Michael McLaughlin 
Protective Order 
6/9/2011 RPLY CCRANDJD Reply to Counterclaim and Plaintiff Counterclaim Michael McLaughlin 
and Demand for Jury Trial 
6/14/2011 DEOP DCABBOSM Memorandum Decision re: Writ of Michael McLaughlin 
Possession/Temporary Restraining Order 
6/16/2011 HRVC TCHOCA Hearing result for Motion held on 07/01/2011 Michael McLaughlin 
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated Defendant's 
Counterclaimants'/Protective Order at Defense 
Request 
NOWD CCWRIGRM Notice Of Withdrawal of Motion for Protective Michael McLaughlin 
Order 
MOTN CCWRIGRM Defendants Motion for Forfeiture of Bond Placed Michael McLaughlin 
by Dennis Sallaz as Security for Temporary 
Restraining Order 
' 
AFFD - CCWRIGRM First Affidavit of J Kahle BeckerAffidavit Michael McLaughlin 
BREF CCWRIGRM Brief in Support of Defendants Motion Michael McLaughlin 
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Date: 9/10/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :06 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 42 Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
6/16/2011 MEMC CCWRIGRM Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees Michael McLaughlin 
6/17/2011 NOTS CCNELSRF Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
6/20/2011 · MOTN CCHEATJL Motion For Reconsideration And Motin To Defer Michael McLaughlin 
To The Primary Jurisdiction Of the Idaho 
Transportation Department 
OBJT CCHEATJL Plaintiffs Objection To Motin To Forfeit Bond Michael McLaughlin 
MISC CCHEATJL Plaintiffs Withdrawal Of Notice Of Hearing Michael McLaughlin 
6/23/2011 RSPN CCSWEECE Response To Motion to Reconsider Order to Michael McLaughlin 
Show Cause 
AFFD CCSWEECE First Affidavit Of J Kahle Becker In Support Of Michael McLaughlin 
Defendants Response To Plaintiffs Motion To 
Reconsider Order To Show Cause 
6/27/2011 NOTS CCHEATJL Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
7/1/2011 NOTC CCWRIGRM Notice of Filing Discovery Michael McLaughlin 
7/7/2011 MOTN CCRANDJD Motion for Stay Michael McLaughlin 
MEMO CCRANDJD Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay Michael McLaughlin 
NOTS CCHEATJL (2) Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
7/8/2011 AFFD CCKHAMSA 1st Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker In support of Michael McLaughlin 
motion for Summary Judgment On Promissory 
Notes 
AFFD CCKHAMSA 1st Affidavit of Eugene Rice In support of motion Michael McLaughlin 
for Summary Judgment On Promissory Notes 
MOTN CCKHAMSA Counterclaimant's Motion For Summary Michael McLaughlin 
Judgment on Promissory Notes 
MISC CCKHAMSA Counterclaimant's Brief Support of Motion For Michael McLaughlin 
Summary Judgment on Promissory Notes 
7/13/2011 HRSC MCBIEHKJ Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/25/2011 Michael McLaughlin 
10:00 AM) 
RESP CCNELSRF Response To Plfs Motion to Stay Michael McLaughlin 
8/8/2011 NOTS CCNELSRF Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
8/10/2011 MOTN CCVIDASL Motion to Strike or in the Alternative Motion for a Michael McLaughlin 
More Definite Statement 
AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Michael McLaughlin 
Defendants Motion to Strike or in the Alternative 
for a More Definite Statement 
BREF CCVIDASL Brief in Support of Defendants Motion to Strike or Michael McLaughlin 
in the Alternative for a more Definite Statement 
NOHG. CCVIDASL Notice Of Hearing Re Motion to Strike (8.25.11 @ Michael McLaughlin 
10:00 am) 
8/11/2011 NOTC CCRANDJD Notice of Opposition to Motion for Summary Michael McLaughlin 
Judgment 
AFFD CCRANDJD Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Michael McLaughlin 
Judgment 
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Date: 9/10/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :06 AM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 42 Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
8/11/2011 MEMO CCRANDJD Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Michael McLaughlin 
Summary Judgment 
MOTN CCHEATJL Motion To Compel And If Deemed Necessary To Michael McLaughlin 
Enlarge Number Of Interrogatories 
AFSM CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To Michael McLaughlin 
Compel And If Deemed Necessary To Enlarge 
Number Of Interrogatories 
NOHG CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing RE:Motion To Compel And If Michael McLaughlin 
Deemed Necessary To Enlarge Number Of 
Interrogatories (Aug 25 2011@1 Oam) 
8/12/2011 NOTS CCMASTLW Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
8/15/2011 NOTC CCMASTLW Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Compel Michael McLaughlin 
8/18/2011 MEMO CCLATICJ Memorandum in Opposition to Michael McLaughlin 
Defendants'/Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike or 
in the Alternative for a More Definite Statement 
MEMO CCLATICJ Memorandum in Opposition to Michael McLaughlin 
Defendants'/Counterclaimants' Motion for Leave 
to Add Claims for Punitive Damages 
REPL CCVIDASL Counterclaimants Reply to Counterdefendants Michael McLaughlin 
Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Promissory Notes 
MISC MCBIEHKJ Response to Defendants Response to Motion for Michael McLaughlin 
Stay 
8/25/2011 DCHH TCHOCA Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael McLaughlin 
08/25/2011 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Mia Martorelli 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 100 
MINE· TCHOCA Motion for S/J Taken Under Advisement Michael McLaughlin 
8/26/2011 NOTC DCABBOSM Notice of Tele Status Conference Michael McLaughlin 
HRSC DCABBOSM Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone Michael McLaughlin 
09/15/2011 03:45 PM) 
9/6/2011 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
9/8/2011 NOTS CCLATICJ Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
9/14/2011 DEOP DCLYKEMA Memorandum Decision (Re: Motion for Summary Michael McLaughlin 
Judgment) 
REPL CCNELSRF Verified Reply to Counterclaim and Third Party Michael McLaughlin 
Complaint (Fuhrman for Dennis) 
9/15/2011 DCHH TCHQCA Hearing result for Status by Phone scheduled on Michael McLaughlin 
09/15/2011 03:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Mia Martorelli 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 50 
9/16/2011 HRSC TCHOCA Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference Michael McLaughlin 
08/09/2012 01 :30 PM) 
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Date: 9/10/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :06 AM . ROA Report 
Page 5 of 42 Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
9/16/2011 HRSC TCHOCA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/20/2012 09:00 Michael McLaughlin 
AM) 10 days 
9/20/2011 ORDR DCABBOSM Scheduling Order Michael McLaughlin 
9/21/2011 NOTS CCLATICJ Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
9/29/2011 ANSW CCHOLMEE Answer to Third Party Complaint and Demand for Michael McLaughlin 
Jury Trial (Becker for Eugene & Janet Rice) 
NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
9/30/2011 NOTS CCVIDASL Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
10/7/2011 AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Motion to Michael McLaughlin 
Consolidate 
MOTN CCWRIGRM Motion to Consolidate Michael McLaughlin 
BREF CCWRIGRM Brief in Support of Motion to Consolidate Michael McLaughlin 
NOTH CCWRIGRM Notice Of Hearing Michael McLaughlin . 
HRSC CCWRIGRM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Michael McLaughlin 
11/15/2011 02:00 PM) Motion to Consolidate 
10/13/2011 NOTS CCNELSRF Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
10/24/2011 CERS CCNELSRF Amended Certificate Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
11/7/2011 NOTS CCMASTLW Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
11/8/2011 MEMO CCMASTLW Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Michael McLaughlin 
Consolidate 
AFFD CCMASTLW Affidavit of William Fuhrman Michael McLaughlin 
11/14/2011 NOTS CCPINKCN Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
11/15/2011 DCHH TCHOCA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Michael McLaughlin 
on 11/15/2011 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Mia Martorelli 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion to Consolidate/ 50 
11/28/2011 ORDR TCHOCA Order on Defendant's Motion to Consolidate is Michael McLaughlin 
Denied 
12/16/2011 NOTS CCSWEECE Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
12/28/2011 NOTS CCHEATJL Notice Of Service-Interrogatories Michael McLaughlin 
1/3/2012 NOTS CCMASTLW Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
1/18/2012 NOTS CCTOLEIL Notice Of Service Of Answers And Responses To Michael McLaughlin 
Defendant Roy Rice's Fourth Set Of 
Interrogatories And Fifth Set Of Requests For 
Production Of documents To Dennis Sallaz 
2/10/2012 MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion to Compel Michael McLaughlin 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of First Michael McLaughlin 
Motion to Compel 
BREF MCBIEHKJ Brief in Support of First Motion to Compel Michael McLaughlin 
HRSC MCBIEHKJ Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Michael McLaughlin 
03/29/2012 09:00 AM) 
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Date: 9/10/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :06 AM ROA Report 
Page 6 of 42 Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
2/27/2012 NOTS TCORTEJN Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
3/5/2012 MISC CCAMESLC Defendant's Disclosure of Expert RepOort of Michael McLaughlin 
David H Leroy 
3/19/2012 NOSV CCBOYIDR Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
3/22/2012 MEMO CCWRIGRM Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Roy Michael McLaughlin 
Rices First Motion to Compel 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of William A Fuhrman in Opposition to Michael McLaughlin 
Defendant Roy Rices First Motion to Compel 
3/29/2012 DCHH TCHOCA Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Michael McLaughlin 
on 03/29/2012 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 100 
4/25/2012 DEOP DCABBOSM Memorandum Decision re: Defendant's Motion to Michael McLaughlin 
Compel 
5/14/2012 MOSJ CCKHAMSA Motion For Summary Judgment Michael McLaughlin 
AFFD; CCKHAMSA Affidavit Of William A. Furhman In Support OF Michael McLaughlin 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
NOHG CCKHAMSA Notice Of Hearing On Plaintiff/ Michael McLaughlin 
Counterdefendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
HRSC CCKHAMSA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Michael McLaughlin 
Judgment 06/14/2012 03:00 PM) 
MEMO CCKHAMSA Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Michael McLaughlin 
Judgment 
NOTS CCWRIGRM Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
5/15/2012 NOSV CCWEEKKG Notice Of Service of Plaintiff Dennis J. Sallaz's Michael McLaughlin 
Supplemental Answers & Responses to 
Defendant Roy Rice's First Set of Interrogatories, 
Requests for Production of Documents & 
requests for Admission 
5/18/2012 NSSC CCHOLMEE Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel (McCarthy for Michael McLaughlin 
Eugene Roy Rice and Janet Rice) 
5/21/2012 NOTS CCPINKCN Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
AFFD. CCWRIGRM Affidavit of Eugene Rice in Support of Objection Michael McLaughlin 
and Response to Counterdefendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
5/23/2012 MOTN CCWRIGRM Counterclaimants Motion to Amend Scheduling Michael McLaughlin 
Order 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Michael McLaughlin 
Counterclaimants Motion 
BREF CCWRIGRM Counterclaimants Brief in Support of Motion to Michael McLaughlin 
Amend Scheduling Order 
MOTN CCWRIGRM Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Pleadings and Michael McLaughlin . 
Exhibits From Sallaz v Sallaz Divorce 
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Date: 9/10/2015 
Time: 11 :06 AM 
Page 7 of 42 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene. Rice, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
5/23/2012 AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Motion to Michael McLaughlin 
Take Judicial Notice 
NOTH CCWRIGRM Notice Of Hearing (06/14/12@ 3:00pm) Michael McLaughlin 
5/24/2012 HRVC TCHOCA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Michael McLaughlin 
scheduled on 06/14/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
5/25/2012 MOTN CCSULLJA Motion for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Michael McLaughlin 
Damages 
AFSM' CCSULLJA Affidavit of J. Kathie Becker In Support Of Motion Michael McLaughlin 
for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Damages 
BREF CCSULLJA Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Add Michael McLaughlin 
Claims for Punitive Damages 
NOHG CCSULLJA Notice Of Hearing (06/14/12@ 3:00 PM) Michael McLaughlin 
NOTS CCSULLJA Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
HRSC CCSULLJA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Michael McLaughlin 
06/14/2012 03:00 PM) Counterclaimants' Motion 
for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Damages 
RQST CCSWEECE Request for Telephonic Status Conference Michael McLaughlin 
5/29/2012 HRSC TCHOCA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Michael McLaughlin 
Judgment 06/14/2012 03:00 PM) 
5/30/2012 MOTN CCHEATJL Motion To Strike The Affidavit Of Eugene Rice In Michael McLaughlin 
Support Of Objection And Response To 
Counterdefendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
MEMO CCHEATJL Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Strike The Michael McLaughlin 
Affidavit Of Eugene Rice In Support Of Objection 
And Response To Counterdefendant's Motion For 
Summary Judgment 
NOHG CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing On Motion To Strike The Michael McLaughlin 
Affidavit Of Eugene Rice In Support Of Objection 
And Response To Counterdefendant's Motion For 
Summary Judgment (June 14 2012@3pm) 
6/1/2012 NTCH CCWEEKKG Notice Of Telephonic Conference Hearing Michael McLaughlin 
(06/05/12@ 3pm) 
HRSC CCWEEKKG Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Michael McLaughlin 
06/05/2012 03:00 PM) Notice of Telephonic 
Status Conference 
OBJT CCSWEECE Counterclaimants Objection and Response to Michael McLaughlin 
Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewoods Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD · CCSWEECE Affidavit of J Kahle Becker In Support of Michael McLaughlin 
Counterclaimants Objection and Response to 
Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewoods Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
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Date: 9/10/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :06 AM ROA Report 
Page 8 of 42 Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
6/5/2012 DCHH TCHOCA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Michael McLaughlin 
on 06/05/2012 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Notice of Telephonic Status 
Conference 
HRVC TCHOCA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Michael McLaughlin 
on 06/14/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Counterclaimants' Motion for Leave to Add 
Claims for Punitive Damages 
HRVC TCHOCA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Michael McLaughlin 
scheduled on 06/14/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
6/6/2012 NOHG CCDEREDL Amended Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Michael McLaughlin 
Summary Judgment/Motion to Strike (6-28-12@ 
9AM) 
HRSC CCDEREDL Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Michael McLaughlin 
Judgment 06/28/2012 09:00 AM) Motion to 
Strike Affd · 
MOTN CCWRIGRM First Motion for Sanctions Michael McLaughlin 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of First Michael McLaughlin 
Motion for Sanctions 
BREF CCWRIGRM Brief in Support of First Motion for Sanctions Michael McLaughlin 
NOTH· CCWRIGRM Notice Of Hearing (06/28/12@ 9:00am) Michael McLaughlin 
AMEN CCWRIGRM Amended Notice of Hearing (06/28/12@ 9:00am) Michael McLaughlin 
6/7/2012 SMFI TCORTEJN Summons Filed Michael McLaughlin 
AFOR CCPINKCN Affidavit Of Return (06/07/2012) Michael McLaughlin 
6/8/2012 NOSV CCWEEKKG Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
6/13/2012 MOTN TCORTEJN Motion to Continue Trial Michael McLaughlin 
AFFD, TCORTEJN Affidavit of William A Fuhrman in Support of Michael McLaughlin 
Motion to Continue Trial 
NOTH, TCORTEJN Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Continue Trial Michael McLaughlin 
(06/28/2012 at 9am) 
6/14/2012 MOTN CCKHAMSA Motion to Amend Counterclaim, For Dismissal Of Michael McLaughlin 
Quiet Title & Slander OPf Title Claims Or 
Alternatively To Dismiss Third Party Complaint 
AFFD CCKHAMSA Affidavit Of Tim Birkle In Support Of Michael McLaughlin 
Counterclaimants' Objection And Response To 
Counterdefendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
AFFD CCKHAMSA Affidavit Of Skye Hallett In Support Of Michael McLaughlin 
Counterclaimants' Objection And Response To 




Time: 11 :06 AM 
Page 9 of 42 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code · User 
"6/14/2012 AFFD CCKHAMSA Affidavit Of J. Kahle In Support Of Motion To 
Amend Counterclaim, For Dismissal Of Quiet 
Title & Slander Of Title Claims Or Alternatively To 
Dismiss Third Party Complaint 
NOHG CCKHAMSA Notice Of Hearing (06/28/12@ 9:00 AM) 
BREF CCKHAMSA Brief In Support Of Motion To Amend 
Counterclaim, For Dismissal Of Quiet Title & 
Slander Of Title Claims Or Alternatively To 
Dismiss Third Party Complaint 
NOTS CCKHAMSA Notice Of Service 
6/18/2012 OBJE CCHOLMEE Counterclaimants Objection and Response to 
Counterdefendants Sallaz & Gatewoods Motion to 
Strike the Affidavit of Eugene Rice in Support of 
Objection 
AFFD CCHOLMEE Affidavit of Gabriel McCarthy in Support of 
Counterclaimants Objection and Response to 
Counterdefendants Sallaz & Gatewoods Motion to 
Strike the Affidavit of Eugene Rice in Support of 
Objection 
NOHG CCHOLMEE Notice Of Hearing Re Objection and Response to 
Motion to Strike 6.28.12@900AM 
6/19/2012 NOTC CCKINGAJ Notice of Taking Audio-Visual Deposition of 
Eugene (Roy) Rice 
6/21/2012 OBJC CCSULLJA Counterclaimants' Objection and Response to 
Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood's Motion to 
Continue Trial 
AFFD CCSULLJA Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of 
Counterclaimants' Objection and Response to 
Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood's Motion to 
Continue Trial 
MOTN CCBOYIDR Motion for Leave to File Over-Length Brief 
MOTN CCBOYIDR Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Skye Hallett in 
Support of Counterclaimants' Objection and 
Response to Counterdefendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Skye Hallett in Support of 
Counterclaimants' Objection and Response to 
Counterdefendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
MOTN CCBOYIDR Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Tim Birkle in 
Support of Counterclaimant's Objection and 



















Date: 9/10/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :06 AM ROA Report 
Page 10 of 42 Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
6/21/2012 MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike the Michael McLaughlin 
Affidavit of Tim Birkle in Support 
Counterclaimants' Objection and Response to 
Counterdefendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Opposition to Michael McLaughlin 
Defendants-Counterclaimants' First Motion for 
Sanctions 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Opposition to Michael McLaughlin 
Defendants-Counterclaimants' Motion for Leave 
to Add Claims for Punitive Damages 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Opposition to Michael McLaughlin 
Defendants-Counterclaimants' Motion to Amend 
Scheduling Order 
RPLY CCBOYIDR Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Michael McLaughlin 
I Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Opposition to Michael McLaughlin 
Defendants-Counterclaimants' Motion to Take 
Judicial Notice of Pleadings and Exhibits from 
Sallaz v Sallaz Divorce 
OBJE CCBOYIDR Objection to Hearing on Motion to Amend Michael McLaughlin 
Counterclaim, for Dismissal of Quiet Title & 
Slander of Title Claims or Alternatively to Dismiss 
Third Party Complaint 
AFFD CCBOYIDR Affidavit of William A Fuhrman Dated June Michael McLaughlin 
21,2012 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Opposition to Michael McLaughlin 
Defendants-Conterclaimants' Motion to Amend 
Counterclaim, for Dismissal of Quiet Title & 
Slander of Title Claims or Alternatively to Dismiss 
Third Party Complaint· 
6/25/2012 MEMO CCWRIGRM Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Michael McLaughlin 
Continue Trial 
MEMO CCWRIGRM Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Michael McLaughlin 
Strike the Affidavit of Eugene Rice in Support of 
Objection and Response to Counterdefendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
AMEN. CCWRIGRM Amended Notice of Taking Audio-Visual Michael McLaughlin 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
6/28/2012 ANSW TCORTEJN Marcy Fox Answer to Counterclaim (Pros Se) Michael McLaughlin 
DCHH TCHOCA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Michael McLaughlin 
scheduled on 06/28/2012 09:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Mia Martorelli 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 50/Motion to Strike Affd and 
Motion to Continue Trial/ 
6/29/2012 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Michael McLaughlin 
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7/3/2012 CHRT CCMORRPH Changed Assigned Judge: Retired (batch 
process) 
7/5/2012 MODQ CCSWEECE Motion For Disqualification of Judge Melissa Moody 
AFSM CCSWEECE Affidavit of Iver Longeteig Supporting Motion for Melissa Moody 
Disqualification of Judge 
7/6/2012 DCJOHNSI Notice of Reassignment Melissa Moody 
MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion for Disqualification Melissa Moody 
7/25/2012 DEOP DCABBOSM Memorandum Decision Re: 11 motions Melissa Moody 
7/27/2012 ORDQ CCKHAMSA Order For Disqualification Of Judge Under Melissa Moody 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(E) 
HRVC CCKHAMSA Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Melissa Moody 
08/20/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 1 O days 
HRVC CCKHAMSA Hearing result for Civil Pretrial Conference Melissa Moody 
scheduled on 08/09/2012 01 :30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
CJWO CCKHAMSA Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/0 Thomas F. Neville 
Cause 
NOTR CCKHAMSA Notice Of Reassignment To Judge Thomas F. Thomas F. Neville 
Neville 
ORDR DCJOHNSI Order of Recusal Thomas F. Neville 
CHJS DCJOHNSI Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification Ronald J. Wilper 
DISF DCJOHNSI Disqualification Of Judge - Self Ronald J. Wilper 
DCJOHNSI Notice of Reassignment-Wilper Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTC DCJOHNSI Notice of Status Conf Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC DCJOHNSI Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/28/2012 03: 15 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) 
7/31/2012 MOTN CCWRIGRM Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision re Ronald J. Wilper 
Defendants/ CounterclaimantsThird Party 
Defendants First Motion for Sanctions 
MEMO CCWRIGRM Memorandum in Support of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
8/3/2012 AFFD CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Dennis J Sallaz In Support Of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
To Reconsider Memorandum Decision RE 
Defendant/Counterclaimants/Third-Party 
defendnat's First Motion For Sanctions 
NOTC CCSWEECE Notice of Firm Name Change Ronald J. Wilper 
8/28/2012 HRHD DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Status scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
08/28/2012 03:15 PM: Hearing Held-in 
chambers, off record 
8/30/2012 AMEN CCVIDASL Amended Counterclaim Ronald J. Wilper 
8/31/2012 MOTN CCSWEECE Counterclaimants Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Ronald J. Wilper 
Dennis Sallaz in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
Memorandum Decision RE · 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third-Party 
Defendants First Motion for Sanctions 
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8/31/2012 MEMO CCSWEECE Memorandum In Support of Motion to Strike the Ronald J. Wilper 
Affidavit of Dennis Sallaz in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider Memorandum Decision RE 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third-Party 
Defendants First Motion for Sanctions 
NOHG CCSWEECE Notice Of Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCSWEECE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/17/2012 03:30 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) Counterclaimants Motion to Strike 
MOTN CCSWEECE Motion For Additional Sanctions Ronald J. Wilper 
BREF CCSWEECE Brief In Support of Motion for Additional Sanctions Ronald J. Wilper 
AFSM CCSWEECE Affidavit of Kahle Becker In Support Of Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Additional Sanctions 
NOHG CCSWEECE Notice Of Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCSWEECE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/17/2012 03:00 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) Counterclaimants Motion for Additional 
Sanctions 
9/6/2012 HRSC DCABBOSM Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/19/2013 09:00 Ronald J. Wilper 
AM) 
HRSC DCABBOSM Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference Ronald J. Wilper 
06/11/2013 03:30 PM) 
ORDR DCABBOSM Order Setting Proceedings and Trial Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTH CCMEYEAR Notice Of Hearing (09/17/2012@ 3:30 pm) Ronald J. Wilper 
9/10/2012 OBJT CCRANDJD Objection and Response to Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Reconsideration of Sanctions 
REPL CCSWEECE Verified Reply to Amended Counterclaim and Ronald J. Wilper 
Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
OBJT, CCSWEECE Objection to Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Ronald J. Wilper 
Dennis Sallaz in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
Memorandum Decision RE 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third-Party 
Defendants First Motion for Sanctions 
AFFD CCSWEECE Affidavit of Dennis J Sallaz RE Objection to Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for Additional Sanctions 
OBJT CCSWEECE Objection to Motion for Additional Sanctions Ronald J. Wilper 
9/13/2012 REPL· MCBIEHKJ Reply in Support of Motion to Reconsider Memo Ronald J. Wilper 
Decision 
9/14/2012 AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of William Fuhrman in Support of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
for Summary Judgment 
MOTN CCNELSRF Motion to Compel Ronald J. Wilper 
MEMO CCNELSRF Memorandum In Support of Motion to Compel Ronald J. Wilper 
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9/17/2012 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
09/17/2012 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Counterclaimants Motion for 
Additional Sanctions-SO 
DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
09/17/2012 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Counterclaimants Motion to 
Strike/Reconsider Memorandum Decision-SO 
9/19/2012 HRSC CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Ronald J. Wilper 
10/03/2012 10:00 AM) 
9/20/2012 HRVC DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Ronald J. Wilper 
on 10/03/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
9/21/2012 NOHG CCDEREDL Notice Of Hearing (10-15-12 @2PM) Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCDEREDL Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment 10/15/2012 02:00 PM) 
9/25/2012 NOID. MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Intent To Take Default as to Marcy Fox Ronald J. Wilper 
9/26/2012 ANSW CCMEYEAR Answer of Marcy Fox to Amended Counterclaim Ronald J. Wilper 
(Marcy Fox Pro Se) 
NOTS CCMEYEAR Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
9/27/2012 NOTS CCDEREDL Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
RESP CCDEREDL Counterclaimants Response to Motion to Compel Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD CCDEREDL Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants Response to Motion to Compel 
MOTN CCDEREDL Counterclaimants Rule 56(f) Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Continuance 
BREF CCDEREDL Brief in Support of Counterclaimants Rule 56(f) Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for Continuance 
AFFD CCDEREDL Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants Rule 56(f) Motion for 
Continuance 
NOHG CCDEREDL Notice Of Hearing (10-15-12 @2PM) Ronald J. Wilper 
10/1/2012 MOTN CCWEEKKG Motion to Compel Responses to Plaintiffs Ronald J. Wilper 
Second Set of Discovery 
MEMO CCWEEKKG Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Ronald J. Wilper 
Responses to Plaintiffs Second Set of Discovery 
AFFD CCWEEKKG Affidavit of Erika P. Judd In Support of Motion to Ronald J. Wilper 
Compel Responses to Plaintiffs Second Set of 
Discovery 
NOTH CCWEEKKG Notice Of Hearing (10/15/12 @2PM) Ronald J. Wilper 
10/9/2012 OBJT CCRANDJD Objection to Counterclaimants Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Continuance 
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10/9/2012 RSPN CCSWEECE Counterclaimants Response to Dennis Sallazs Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Compel 
AFFD CCSWEECE Affidavit of J Kahle Becker In Support Of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants Response to Dennis Sallazs 
Motion to Compel 
AFFD CCSWEECE Ssecond Affidavit of J Kahle Becker In Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants rule 56(f) Motion for 
Continuance 
NOTS CCSWEECE Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
10/11/2012 REPL CCMEYEAR Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Ronald J. Wilper 
Compel 
REPL CCMEYEAR Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Ronald J. Wilper 
Compel Responses to Plaintiff's Second Set of 
Discovery 
AFFD CCMEYEAR Affidavit of William A Fuhrman in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Compel Responses to Plaintiff's 
Second Set of Discovery 
AFFD CCMEYEAR Second Affidavit of Erika P Judd in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Compel Responses to Plaintiff's 
Second Set of Discovery 
10/12/2012 NOWD CCKINGAJ Notice Of Withdrawal of Objection to Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants' Rule 56(f) Motion for 
Continuance 
NOHG CCKINGAJ Amended Notice Of Hearing (10/15/2012 @2:00 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) 
10/15/2012 AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of Vernon K Smith in Support of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
to Compel 
DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Ronald J. Wilper 
scheduled on 10/15/2012 02:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: t. fisher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
MEMO CCWRIGRM Memorandum of Attorney Fees re Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants Motion for Additional Sanctions 
10/22/2012 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Granting Rule 56(f) Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTS CCHEATJL Notice Of Service Of Responses To Defendant Ronald J. Wilper 
Roy Rice's Fifth Set Of lnterrrogatories And Sixth 
Set Of Requests For Production Of Documents 
To Dennis Sallaz 
NOTS CCHEATJL Notice Of Service Of Obection To Production Of Ronald J. Wilper 
Documents Requested 
10/24/2012 NOTS CCRANDJD Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
10/29/2012 MOTN CCNELSRF Motion to Disallow Memorandum of Atty Fees Ronald J. Wilper 
RE:Counterclaimants' Motion for Additional 
Sanctions 
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10/29/2012 AFSM CCNELSRF Affidavit of William A. Fuhrman In Support Of Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Disallow Memorandum of Atty Fees 
RE:Counterclaimants' Motion for Additional 
Sanctions 
NOTS CCNELSRF Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
11/5/2012 RSPN. CCWEEKKG Response to Motion to Disallow Memorandum of Ronald J. Wilper 
Attorney's Fees RE: Counterclaimant's Motion for 
Additional Sanctions 
AFFD CCWEEKKG Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Response to Motion to Disallow Memorandum of 
Attorney's Fees RE: Counterclaimant's Motion for 
Additional Sanctions 
11/6/2012 NOTS CCVIDASL Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
11/8/2012 MOTN CCNELSRF Motion to Strike Defs Counterclaimants' Ronald J. Wilper 
Response to Motion to Disallow, Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Response to 
Motion to Disallow 
REPL, CCNELSRF Reply in Support of Motion to Disallow Ronald J. Wilper 
Memorandum of Atty Fees RE: Counterclaimants' 
Motion for Additional Sanction 
11/9/2012 MISC DCJOHNSI Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions to Ronald J. Wilper 
Compel 
11/13/2012 NOTO CCSULLJA Notice Of Taking Deposition of Janet Rice Ronald J. Wilper 
11/14/2012 AMEN CCWRIGRM Second Amended Notice of Taking Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
11/15/2012 NOTC CCNELSRF Notice of Vacating Audio-Visual Deposition of Ronald J. Wilper 
Eugene (Roy) Rice 
11/16/2012 NOTC CCSWEECE Counterclaimants Notice of Compliance RE: Ronald J. Wilper 
November 9, 2012 Memorandum of Decision and 
Order - Dennis sallz and Sallaz and Gatewoods 
Motions to Compel 
11/23/2012 NOTS CCMEYEAR (2) Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
11/26/2012 MEMO CCHEATJL Memorandum And Affidavit Of Attorneys' Fees Ronald J. Wilper 
RE: Motions To Compel 
11/27/2012 MOTN CCWEEKKG Motion to Compel Discovery Responses from Ronald J. Wilper 
Marcy Fox 
AFFD CCWEEKKG Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
to Compel Discovery Responses from Marcy Fox 
NOTH CCWEEKKG Notice Of Hearing (12/13/12 @3:00pm) Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCWEEKKG Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Ronald J. Wilper 
12/13/2012 03:00 PM) 
MOTN TCLAFFSD Counterclaimants' Motion To Disallow Ronald J. Wilper 
Memorandum Of Attorney's Fees Re: Motions To 
Compel 
11/29/2012 MOTN CCMEYEAR Second Motion to Compel Ronald J. Wilper 
BREF CCMEYEAR Brief in Support of Second Motion to Compel Ronald J. Wilper 
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11/29/2012 AFFD CCMEYEAR Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Second Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Compel 
NOTH CCMEYEAR Notice Of Hearing (12/13/2012@ 3:00 pm) Ronald J. Wilper 
12/3/2012 NOTS CCNELSRF (3) Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
12/6/2012 OBJE CCDEREDL Marcy Fox Verified Objection to Motion to Compel Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD CCRANDJD Affidavit of William A Fuhrman in Opposition to Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants' Second Motion to Compel 
MEMO CCRANDJD Memorandum in Opposition to Counterclaimants' Ronald J. Wilper 
Second Motion to Compel 
12/7/2012 REPL CCMEYEAR Reply in Support of memorandum and Affidavit of Ronald J. Wilper 
Attorneys' Fees Re: Motions to Compel 
AFFD CCMEYEAR Affidavit of William A Fuhrman in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees Re: Motions to 
Compel 
MOTN CCNELSRF Second Motion to Amend Counterclaim and to Ronald J. Wilper 
Add Additional Counterdefendants 
AFSM CCNELSRF Affidavit of J Kahle Becker In Support Of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
to Second Motion So Amend Counterclaim and to 
Add Additional Counterdefendants 
BREF CCNELSRF Brief in Support of Second Motion to Amend Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaim and to Add Additional 
Counterdefendants 
NOHG CCNELSRF Notice Of Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/27/2012 11 :00 Ronald J. Wilper 
AM) Second Motion to Amend Counterclaim and 
to Add Additional Counterdefendants 
12/10/2012 REPL CCMEYEAR Reply to Dennis Sallaz's Response to Second Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion 
AFFD CCMEYEAR Second Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Second Motion to Compel 
12/11/2012 MOTN TCLAFFSD Motion For Additional Sanctions Ronald J. Wilper 
AFSM TCLAFFSD Affidavit Of William A. Fuhrman In Support Of Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion For Additional Sanctions 
MEMO TCLAFFSD Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Additional Ronald J. Wilper 
Sanctions 
NOTH TCLAFFSD Notice Of Hearing On Motion For Additional Ronald J. Wilper 
Sanctions (December 27, 2012 at 11 :00 AM) 
12/12/2012 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
12/13/2012 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Ronald J. Wilper 
on 12/13/2012 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Second Motion to Compel-SO 
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12/18/2012 NOTC CCRANDJD Notice Vacating Hearing on Motion for Additional Ronald J. Wilper 
Sanctions 
12/19/2012 NOTS CCDEREDL Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
12/20/2012 AFFD CCHEATJL Affidavit Of William A Fuhrman RE: Second Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion To Amend 
NOTC CCHEATJL Notice Of Opposition To Counterclaimants' Ronald J. Wilper 
Second Motion to Amend Counterclaim And Add 
Additional Counterdefendants 
12/21/2012 NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
RESP CCNELSRF Response To Dennis Sallaz's Objection to Ronald J. Wilper 
Second Motion to Amend Counterclaim and Add 
Additional Counterdefendant's 
AFSM CCNELSRF Second Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker In Support Of Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Second Motion to Amend Counterclaim 
and Add Additional Counterdefendant's 
12/24/2012 NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service (3) Ronald J. Wilper 
12/27/2012 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
12/27/201211:00AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Second Motion to Amend 
Counterclaim and to Add Additional 
Counterdefendants-50 
1/3/2013 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Granting 2nd Motion to Amend Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaim and Add Addi Counterdefendants 
1/8/2013 SMFI TCLAFFSD (2) Summons Filed Ronald J. Wilper 
AMEN TCLAFFSD Second Amended Counterclaim Ronald J. Wilper 
1/18/2013 NOTS CCGDULKA Notice Of Service of Responses to Defendant Ronald J. Wilper 
Roy Rice's Eighth Set of Interrogatories, Ninth Set 
of Requests for Production of Documents, and 
Requests for Admission to Dennis Sallaz 
REPL CCGDULKA Verified Reply to Second Amended Counterclaim Ronald J. Wilper 
and Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial 
1/22/2013 MOTN CCVIDASL Second Motion for Protective Order Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants Second Motion for Protective 
Order 
BREF CCVIDASL Brief in Support of Second Motion for Protective Ronald J. Wilper 
Order 
NOHG CCVIDASL Notice Of Hearing Re Second Moiton for Ronald J. Wilper 
Protective Order (Wrong Year for Hearing Date) 
1/23/2013 HRSC DCJOHNSI Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/04/2013 03:00 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) for Protective Order 
1/24/2013 NOHG CCVIDASL Notice Of Hearing Re Second Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Protective Order (2.04.13 @ 3:00 pm) 
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1/24/2013 NOAP CCBOYIDR Notice Of Appearance (Smith for Marcy Fox) Ronald J. Wilper 
1/28/2013 OBJE MCBIEHKJ Objection to Hearing on Second Motion for a Ronald J. Wilper 
Protective Order 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of Wm Fuhrman in Support of Objection Ronald J. Wilper 
to Hearing 
1/30/2013 HRVC DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
02/04/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated for 
Protective Order 
AMEN CCOSBODK Second Amended Notice Of Hearing Re Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants Second Motion For Protective 
Order 
HRSC CCOSBODK Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/11/2013 01:30 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) Second Motion For Protective Order 
2/1/2013 NOTS CCVIDASL Notice Of Service of Counterdefendants Third Set Ronald J. Wilper 
of Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents and Second Set of Requests for 
Admissiions to Counterclaimants 
2/5/2013 ANSW CCGDULKA Answer to Third Party Complaint and Demand for Ronald J. Wilper 
Jury Trial (Becker for 
Defendants/Counterclaimants) 
2/8/2013 AFOR TCLAFFSD (2) Affidavit Of Return (2/6/13) Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD TCLAFFSD (2) Affidavit Of Due Diligence - Not Served Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTC TCLAFFSD Notice Of Vacating Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
HRVC TCLAFFSD Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
02/11/2013 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Second 
Motion For Protective Order 
2/11/2013 AMEN CCTHIEKJ Third Amended Notice of Taking Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
2/12/2013 NOTS CCREIDMA Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTC CCDEREDL Fourth Amended Notice of Taking Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
2/14/2013 NOTC TCLAFFSD Notice Of Taking Continued Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition Of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
2/15/2013 AMEN TCLAFFSD Amended Notice Of Taking Continued Ronald J. Wilper 
Audio-Visual Deposition Of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
2/26/2013 NOTs· CCHEATJL Notice Of Filing Discovery Ronald J. Wilper 
2/28/2013 NOTC MCBIEHKJ Notice of Filing Discovery Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTO' CCHEATJL Second Amended Notice Of Taking Continued Ronald J. Wilper 
Audio-Visual Deposition Of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
MOTN CCPINKCN Rices' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Ronald J. Wilper 
AFSM · CCPINKCN Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Rices' Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
BREF CCPINKCN Brief in Support of Rices' Motion for Parti_al Ronald J. Wilper 
Summary Judgment 
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2/28/2013 NOTH CCPINKCN Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Partial Ronald J. Wilper 
Summary Judgment (04/03/13 at 3:00 p.m.) 
HRSC CCPINKCN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment 04/03/2013 03:00 PM) 
3/1/2013 NOTS CCVIDASL Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
3/7/2013 MOTN CCPINKCN Third Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Ronald J. Wilper 
Shorten Time 
AFFD CCPINKCN Affidavit of Eugene Leroy Rice in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants' Third Motion for Protective 
Order 
AFFD CCPINKCN Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants' Third Motion for Protective 
Order 
NOTC CCDEREDL Notice Vacating Audio-Visual Deposition of Ronald J. Wilper 
Eugene Roy Rice 
HRSC CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing Scheduled (Motion For Ronald J. Wilper 
Protective Order 03/25/2013 02:00 PM) 
3/11/2013 MOTN CCVIDASL Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of Steve Sumner Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD CCVIDASL Second Affidavit of William A Fuhrman in Support Ronald J. Wilper 
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCVIDASL Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment 
NOHG CCVIDASL Notice Of Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCVIDASL Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment 04/08/2013 11 :00 AM) 
MOTN CCVIDASL Motion for Leave to File Over Length Brief Ronald J. Wilper 
MOTN CCVIDASL Motion for Sanctions Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of William A Fuhrman in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for Sanctions and in Opposition to Third 
Party Motion for Protective Order 
NOTH CCVIDASL Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Sanctions Ronald J. Wilper 
3/13/2013 MOTN CCMEYEAR Motion to Stay Proceedings and for Protective Ronald J. Wilper 
Order 
AFFD CCMEYEAR Affidavit of Dennis J Sallaz in Support of Moiton to Ronald J. Wilper 
Stay Proceedings and for Protective Order 
AFFD CCMEYEAR Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
MEMO CCMEYEAR Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Ronald J. Wilper 
Proceedings and for Protective Order 
NOTH CCMEYEAR Notice Of Hearing (03/27/2013@ 3:00 pm) Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTS CCMEYEAR Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC: CCMEYEAR Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/27/2013 03:00 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) Motion to Stay Proceedings 
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Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
3/13/2013 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Granting Leave to File Over-Length Brief Ronald J. Wilper 
3/18/2013 OBJT CCREIDMA Objection to Third Motion For A Protective Order Ronald J. Wilper 
3/20/2013 MEMO CCMEYEAR Memorandum in Opposition to Rices' Moton for Ronald J. Wilper 
Partial Summary Judgment 
OBJT CCTHIEKJ Counterclaimants' Objection to Dennis Sallaz's Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Stay Proceedings and for Protective 
Order and Counterclaimant's IRCP 36(a) Motion 
and Motion to Shorten Time 
AFFD CCTHIEKJ Affidavit Of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants' Objection to Dennis Sallaz's 
Motion to Stay Proceedings and for Protective 
Order and Counterclaimant's IRCP 36(a) Motion 
and Motion to Shorten Time 
3/21/2013 NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
MOTN CCHOLMEE Counterclaimants Second Rule 56(f) Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Continuance 
MOTN CCHOLMEE Counterclaimaints Secon Rule 56(f) Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Continuance 
NOHG CCHOLMEE Notice Of Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
3/25/2013 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Granting Motion to Shorten Time Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Second Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Third Motion for Protective Order 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Second Affidavit of Eugene Leroy Rice in Support Ronald J. Wilper 
of Motion 
MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion to Strike Affidavit of Steve Sumner Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Moiton to Ronald J. Wilper 
Strike 
OBJE MCBIEHKJ Objection and Response to Renewed Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Second Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Objection and Response 
DCHH' DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order Ronald J. Wilper 
scheduled on 03/25/2013 02:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: and Motion for Sanctions-50 
ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Granting Overlength Brief Ronald J. Wilper 
OBJE CCHOLMEE Objection to Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
REPL. CCHOLMEE Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
NOHG CCWEEKKG Notice Of Hearing (04/08/13 at 11 am) Ronald J. Wilper 
3/26/2013 AFFD CCHEATJL Affidavit Of William A Fuhrman In Support Of Ronald J. Wilper 
Motions To Strike 
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Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
3/26/2013 NOTS CCMEYEAR (2) Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
3/27/2013 AFFD CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Erika P Judd In Response To IRCP Ronald J. Wilper 
36(a) Motion 
DCHH CCTHERTL Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
03/27/2013 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 - Motion to Stay 
Proceedings 
4/1/2013 MEMO CCSWEECE Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Partial Summary Judgment 
MOTN CCKHAMSA Counterclaimant's Motion To Strike The Third Ronald J. Wilper 
Affidavit Of William A Furhman And Motion To 
Shorten Time 
OBJE CCBOYIDR Objection to Counterclaimants' Second Rule 56(f) Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for Continuance 
OBJE CCBOYIDR Objection to Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike Ronald J. Wilper 
the Affidavit of Steve Sumner 
AFFD CCBOYIDR Thrid Affidavit of William A Fuhrman in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
NOSV CCBOYIDR Notice Of Service of Responses to Defendant Ronald J. Wilper 
Roy Rice's Third Set of Requests for Admission 
to Dennis Sallaz 
4/2/2013 OBJT CCHEATJL Objection To Counterclaimants' Motion To Strike Ronald J. Wilper 
The Third affidavit Of William A Fuhrman And 
Motion To Shorten Time 
4/3/2013 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order on Motion to Shorten Time Ronald J. Wilper 
ORDR DCJOHNSI Order on Motion for Protective Order/Sanctions Ronald J. Wilper 
RPLY CCHEATJL Counterclaimants' Reply To Sallaz's Objection To Ronald J. Wilper 
motion To Strike The Third affidavit Of William A 
Fuhrman 
DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment scheduled on 04/03/2013 03:00 PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
4/5/2013 AMEN CCVIDASL Fifth Amended Notice of Taking Audio Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
4/8/2013 NOTS MCBIEHKJ (3)Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment scheduled on 04/08/2013 11 :00 AM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: & Motion for Continuance & Motions 
To Strike-50 
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Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
4/8/2013 MOTN CCHEATJL Motion For Issuance Of A Contempt Citation, Or Ronald J. Wilper 
Issuance Of An Order To Show Cause 
AFSM CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Vernon K Smith In Support Of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
For Issuance Of A Written Charge Of Contempt, 
And Issuance Of A Show Cause Order 
HRSC CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing Scheduled (Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
04/22/2013 03:00 PM) 
4/9/2013 AFFD CCOSBODK Second Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
To Stay Proceedings And For Protective Order 
4/10/2013 RSPN CCTHIEKJ Counterclaim's Response to Dennis Sallaz's Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for Contempt and For a Show Cause 
Hearing 
AFFD CCTHIEKJ Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaim's Response to Dennis Sallaz's 
Motion for Contempt and For a Show of Cause 
Hearing 
AFFD CCTHIEKJ Second Affidavit of Eugene Rice in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Objection and Response to Counterdefendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
4/11/2013 MEMO DCJOHNSI Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions Ronald J. Wilper 
4/15/2013 MOTN CCVIDASL Counterclaimants Third Motion for Continuance Ronald J. Wilper 
and Moiton to Shorten Time 
4/17/2013 NOHG CCHOLMEE Amended Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Partial Ronald J. Wilper 
Summary Judgment 
HRSC CCHOLMEE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/29/2013 04:00 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) for Partial Summary Judgment 
4/19/2013 HRVC DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
04/22/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
NOHG CCOSBODK Second Amended Notice Of Hearing Re Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
For Partial Summary Judgment (5.9.13 @ 
3:00pm) 
NOHG CCOSBODK Amended Notice Of Hearing Re Motion For Ronald J. Wilper 
Issuance Of Contempt Citation Or Issuance Of 
And Order To Show Cause (5.9.13 @ 3:00pm) 
NOHG CCOSBODK Amended Notice Of Hearing Re Motion To Strike Ronald J. Wilper 
Affidavit (5.9.13@ 3:00 pm) 
HRVC CCOSBODK Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
04/29/2013 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
4/22/2013 NOTS CCTHIEKJ Notice Of Service of Supplemental Responses to Ronald J. Wilper 
Rice's Eighth Set of Requests for Admission and 
Roy Rice's Ninth Set of Request for Admission to 
Dennis Sallaz 
4/23/2013 AFSM CCSWEECE Affidavit of Counsel In Support Of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Steve Sumner and Counterclaiminats Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
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Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
4/24/2013 NOHG CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing (Motion for Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment May 09 2013@3pm) 
5/3/2013 MOTN CCPINKCN Motion for Protective Order Re: Subpoena Duces Ronald J. Wilper 
Tecum for Dennis Sallaz 
NOTH CCPINKCN Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Protective Order Ronald J. Wilper 
Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum for Dennis Sallaz 
(05/09/13 at 3:00 p.m.) 
MOTN CCPINKCN Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Protective Order Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum for 
Dennis Sallaz 
MOTN CCPINKCN Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of Eugene Ronald J. Wilper 
Rice inSupport of Objection and Response to 
Counterdefendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
NOTH CCPINKCN Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Strike the Second Ronald J. Wilper 
Affidavit of Eugene Rice inSupport of Objection 
and Response to Counterdefendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (05/09/13 at 3:00 p.m.) 
MOTN CCPINKCN Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Motion to Ronald J. Wilper 
Strike the Second Affidavit of Eugene Rice 
inSupport of Objection and Response to 
Counterdefendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
5/6/2013 MOTN CCHEATJL Motion For Protective Order RE: Subpoena Ronald J. Wilper 
Duces Tecum For Dennis Sallaz And Marcy Fox 
MOTN CCHEATJL Motion To Shorten Time For Hearing On Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
For Protective Order RE: Subpoena Duces 
Tecum For Dennis Sallaz And Marcy Fox 
NOHG CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing (RE Motion For Protective Ronald J. Wilper 
Order May 9 2013@3pm) 
NOTO CCPINKCN Notice Of Taking Deposition of Skye Hallett Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTO CCPINKCN Notice Of Taking Deposition of Heather Skinner Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTO CCPINKCN Notice Of Taking Deposition of Sarina Fifer Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTO CCPINKCN Notice Of Taking Deposition of Renee Baird Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTO CCPINKCN Notice Of Taking Deposition of Doug Eisenberg Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTO CCPINKCN Notice Of Taking Deposition of Tim Birkle Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTO CCPINKCN Notice Of Taking Deposition of Patrick Oar Ronald J. Wilper 
5/7/2013 OBJT CCGDULKA Counterclaimants' Objection to Dennis Sallaz's Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of Eugene 
Rice and Motion to Shorten Time 
AFFD CCGDULKA Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimants' Objection to Dennis Sallaz's 
Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of Eugene 
Rice and Motion to Shorten Time 
5/8/2013 MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion to Strike Affd of J Kahle Becker Ronald J. Wilper . 
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Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
5/8/2013 REPL MCBIEHKJ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Rqnald J. Wilper 
Strike the Second Affd of Eugene Rice 
AMEN CCHEATJL Third Amended Notice Of Taking Continued Ronald J. Wilper 
Audio-Visual Deposition Of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
5/9/2013 ORDR DCABBOSM Order Shortening Time for Hearing on Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Protective Order re: Subpoena Duces tecum for 
Den"nis Sallaz and Marcy Fox 
ORDR DCABBOSM Order Shortening Time for Hearing on Motion to Ronald J. Wilper 
Strike the Second Affidavit of Eugene Rice in 
Support of Objection and Response to 
Counterdefendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
05/09/2013 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion To Strike Affidavits, Motion For 
Issuance Of Contempt Citation Or Issuance Of 
An Order To Show Cause and Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Motion to Strike Second Affidavit of Rice 
Motion for Protective Order-100 
HRSC DCJOHNSI Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/10/2013 10:00 Ronald J. Wilper 
AM) continued hearing on motions 
5/10/2013 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper . 05/10/2013 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: continued hearing on motions-200 
5/14/2013 AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Support of Renewed Ronald ~- Wilper 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Pomissory 
Notes 
BREF CCVIDASL Counterclaimants Brief in Support of Renewed Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Pormossory 
Notes 
NOTO CCHOLMEE Notice Of Taking Continued Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
5/15/2013 MOTN CCPINKCN Motion to Strike Counterslaimants' Brief in Ronald J. Wilper 
Support of Renewed Motion for summary 
Judgment on Promissory Notes 
5/16/2013 MISC DCJOHNSI Notification of Stop Order Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTC CCNELSRF Notice of Cancellation of Depo of Doug Eisenberg Ronald J. Wilper 
5/17/2013 NOTO CCNELSRF Notice Of Taking Deposition of Anita Johnson Ronald J. Wilper 
5/20/2013 NOTS CCOSBODK Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
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Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
5/21/2013 AFFD CCPINKCN Affidavit of J Kahle Becker in Preparation for Ronald J. Wilper 
Status Conference and in Support of Request for 
Restraining Order 
HRSC DCJOHNSI Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/22/2013 09:30 Ronald J. Wilper 
AM) 
AFFD CCMEYEAR Affidavit of William A Fugrman Re: Status Ronald J. Wilper 
Conference 
AFFD CCMEYEAR Affidavit of Erika P Judd Re: Status Conference Ronald J. Wilper 
5/22/2013 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Status scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
05/22/2013 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
5/23/2013 NOTC CCBOYIDR Notice of Cancellation of Deposition of Tim Birkle Ronald J. Wilper 
5/24/2013 AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of Dennis Sallaz in Opposition to Rices Ronald J. Wilper 
Renrwed Moiton for Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of Vernon K Smith in Opposition to Rices Ronald J. Wilper 
Renewed Moiton for Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCVIDASL Memorandum in Opposition to Counterclaimants Ronald J. Wilper 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Promissory Notes 
NOTC CCWEEKKG Notice of Taking Continued Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
5/29/2013 NOTS CCMEYEAR Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTC CCMEYEAR Notice of Taking Continued Deposition of Renee Ronald J. Wilper 
Baird 
5/30/2013 NOTS CCHEATJL Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
5/31/2013 DEOP DCABBOSM Memorandum Decision and Order on Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterclaimant's/ third-Party Defendants' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment 
NOTC CCOSBODK Notice Of Taking Continued Audio Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition Of Eugene Rice 
AMEN CCOSBODK Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Skye Ronald J. Wilper 
Hallett 
AFOR CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Return 05.15.13 Ronald J. Wilper 
6/3/2013 HRSC DCJOHNSI Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/04/2013 04:00 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) 
NOTC· CCMARTJD Notice of Status Conference (6.4.13@4pm) Ronald J. Wilper 
6/4/2013 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Denying Issuance of Contempt Citation, or Ronald J. Wilper 
issuance of an OSC 
ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment Re: Promissory Notes and Denying 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Sumner 
ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Dismissing Motion to Quash and Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Protective Order 
000028
Date: 9/10/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :06 AM ROA Report 
Page 26 of 42 Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
6/4/2013 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Granting in Part/Denying in Part Motion to Ronald J. Wilper 
Strike Affidavits of Birkle and Hallett 
ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Striking 1st Affidavit of Rices in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Ojbection and Response to Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Status scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
06/04/2013 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
6/5/2013 NOTC CCPINKCN Notice of Taking continued Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
AMEN CCPINKCN Amended Notice of Taking Continued Deposition Ronald J. Wilper 
of Renee Baird 
ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Granting/Denying Motion to Strike 2nd Ronald J. Wilper 
Affidavit of Rice 
6/6/2013 MEMO CCNELSRF Defs I Counterclaimant's Pre-Trial Memorandum Ronald J. Wilper 
MISC CCNELSRF Counterclaimant's Exhibit and Witness List Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTC CCREIDMA Amended NoticeOf Taking Deposition of Heather Ronald J. Wilper 
Skinner 
NOTC CCREIDMA Amended Notice of Taking Continued Ronald J. Wilper 
audio-Visual Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
6/7/2013 MEMO DCLYKEMA . Memorandum Decision and Order on Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterdefendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
6/10/2013 MOTN CCMEYEAR Motion to Reconsider June 7, 2013, Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Summary Judgment as to Civil Raceteering 
NOTC CCMEYEAR Notice of Association of Counsel (Nicholas A Ronald J. Wilper 
Warden for (Eugene Rice and Janet Rice) 
NOTH CCMEYEAR Notice Of Hearing (06/27/2013@ 3:30 pm) Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCMEYEAR Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/27/2013 03:30 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) for Reconsideration 
HRVC DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
06/27/2013 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated for 
Reconsideration 
6/11/2013 MISC CCMEYEAR Counterclaimant's Proposed Jury Instruction and Ronald J. Wilper 
Special Verdict Form 
DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Civil Pretrial Conference Ronald J. Wilper 
scheduled on 06/11/20.13 03:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
MISC CCKINGAJ Plaintiff/Counterdefendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs' Ronald J. Wilper 
Pretrial Witness & Exhibit Disclosure 
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Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code· User Judge 
6/11/2013 MISC CCKINGAJ Plaintiff/Couterdefendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs' Ronald J. Wilper 
Proposed Jury Instructions 
NOTC DCJOHNSI Notice of Withdrawal of Attorney Ronald J. Wilper 
6/13/2013 NOTC TCLAFFSD Ninth Notice Of Taking Continued Audio- Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition Of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
MISC TCLAFFSD Defendants / Counterclaimants I Third Party Ronald J. Wilper 
Defendants' Pretrial Exhibit Disclosure 
6/14/2013 ORDR DCABBOSM Order Regarding the Conduct of Trial Ronald J. Wilper 
MOTN CCVIDASL Motion for Sanctions Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of William A Fuhrman in Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for Sanctions 
MEMO CCVIDASL Memorandum in Opposition to Counterclaimants Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Reconsider June 7 2013 Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Civil Racketeering . 
6/17/2013 HRSC DCJOHNSI Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/17/2013 11 :30 Ronald J. Wilper 
AM) 
CONT DCJOHNSI Continued (Jury Trial 06/19/2013 08:30 AM) Ronald J. Wilper 
DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
06/17/2013 11:30 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
HRVC DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
06/19/2013 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
6/20/2013 DEOP DCABBOSM Amended Memorandum Decision and Order on Ronald J. Wilper 
Counterdefendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
ORDR DCABBOSM Order Appointing a Discovery Master Ronald J. Wilper 
6/28/2013 MOTN CCNELSRF Motion for Mediation Ronald J. Wilper 
RESP CCMEYEAR Rice's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Mediation 
7/2/2013 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Denying Motion for Mediation w/o Prej Ronald J. Wilper 
NOTC CCOSBODK Notice Of Joinder In Motion For Mediation And Ronald J. Wilper 
Reply To Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Response To Plaintiffs Motion For Mediation 
7/26/2013 NOTS CCKINGAJ Notice Of Service of Counterdefendants' Fourth Ronald J. Wilper 
Set of Interrogatories & Requests for Production 
of Documents & Third Set of Requests for 
Admissions to Counterclaimants 
7/29/2013 NOTS CCMEYEAR Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
7/31/2013 NOTO CCSWEECE Notice Of Taking Continued Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
NOTC CCKINGAJ Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel (Warden / Ronald J. Wilper 
Eugene & Janet) 
8/9/2013 NOTS CCREIDMA Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
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Date Code User Judge 
8/21/2013 NOTC CCREIDMA Notice Of Taking Continued Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
8/23/2013 NOTS CCMEYEAR Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
9/6/2013 AMEN CCSWEECE Amended Notice of Taking Continued Ronald J. Wilper 
Audio-Visual Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
9/9/2013 NOTD CCBOYIDR Notice Vacating Audio-Visual Deposition of Ronald J. Wilper 
Eugene (Roy) Rice 
9/10/2013 NOTD CCBOYIDR Notice Of Taking Deposition Ronald J. Wilper 
9/12/2013 NOTD. TCLAFFSD Notice Of Taking Continued Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition Of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
10/23/2013 NOTC CCOSBODK Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Steve Sumner Ronald J. Wilper 
10/28/2013 MOTN CCNELSRF Motion for Reconsideration Ronald J. Wilper 
AFSM CCNELSRF Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Reconsideration Ronald J. Wilper 
MEMO CCNELSRF Memorandum In Support Of Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Reconsideration 
NOHG CCNELSRF Notice Of Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/13/2013 03:30 Ronald J. Wilper 
PM) Motion for Reconsideration 
10/30/2013 AFFD TCRUDZES Second Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
for Reconsideration 
10/31/2013 MISC CCREIDMA Response To Dennis Sallaz's Motion to Ronald J. Wilper 
Reconsider June 20, 2013 Order Denying Motion 
For Summary Judgment and Order Denying 
Motion to Strike Certain Rice Affidavits in Support 
Thereof 
AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit Of Karissa Armbrust In Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Response to Motion to Reconsider 
AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit Of Thomas J. Wiggs In Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Response to Motion to Reconsider 
AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit Of Janet Rice in Support of Response to Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Reconsider 
AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit Of Eugene "Roy" Rice In Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Response to Motion to Reconsider 
AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker In Support of Ronald J. Wilper 
Response to Motion to Reconsider 
11/8/2013 REPL MCBIEHKJ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Reconsideration 
AFCO MCBIEHKJ Third Affidavit Of Counsel in Support of Motin for Ronald J. Wilper 
Reconsideration 
11/12/2013 MISC CCSWEECE Certificate of Compliance Ronald J. Wilper 
11/13/2013 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Ronald J. Wilper 
11/13/2013 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion for Reconsideration-50 
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11/25/2013 MEMO DCJOHNSI Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions Ronald J. Wilper 
12/3/2013 NOTO CCNELSRF Notice Of Taking Continued Audio-Visual Ronald J. Wilper 
Deposition of Eugene (Roy) Rice 
12/13/2013 REQU CCVIDASL Request for Status Conference Re Trial Setting Ronald J. Wilper 
and Pretrial Procedures 
AMEN CCVIDASL Amended Notice of Taking Continued Audio Ronald J. Wilper 
Visual Deposition of Eugene Rice 
12/16/2013 NOHG CCHOLMEE Notice Of Hearing on Request for Status Ronald J. Wilper 
Conference Re Trial Setting and pretrial 
Procedures 1.21.14@330PM 
HRSC CCHOLMEE Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Ronald J. Wilper 
01/21/2014 03:30 PM) Request for Status 
Conference Re Trial Setting and Pretrial 
Procedures 
1/7/2014 ROST CCOSBODK Eugene And Janet Rices Request For Trial And Ronald J. Wilper 
Waiver Of Jury Trial 
AFFD CCOSBODK Affidavit In Support Of Request Ronald J. Wilper 
1/21/2014 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Ronald J. Wilper 
on 01/21/2014 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Request for Status Conference Re 
Trial Setting and Pretrial Procedures -50 
1/24/2014 ORDR DCVOLLCC Amended Order Setting Proceedings and Trial Ronald J. Wilper 
{PTC 06/10/2014 03:30 PM, JT 06/18/2014 09:00 
AM) 
HRSC DCVOLLCC Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Ronald J. Wilper 
06/10/2014 03:30 PM) 
HRSC DCVOLLCC Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/18/2014 09:00 Ronald J. Wilper 
AM) 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Jason D. Scott 
06/10/2014 03:30 PM) 
2/24/2014 AFOS CCOSBODK Affidavit Of Service 2.14.14 Ronald J. Wilper 
3/6/2014 MOTN CCNELSRF Renew Motion for Mediation Ronald J. Wilper 
3/19/2014 CCCHILER Notice of Reassignment Jason D. Scott 
3/25/2014 MOTN TCLAFFSD Eugene & Janet Rice's Renewed Motion For Jason D. Scott 
Leave To Add Claims For Punitive Damages 
BREF TCLAFFSD Eugene & Janet Rice's Brief In Support of Jason D. Scott 
Renewed Motion For Leave To Add Claims For 
Punitive Damages 
3/27/2014 NOHG CCOSBODK Notice Of Hearing Re Renewed Motion For Jason D. Scott 
Mediation (4.21.14 @ 3pm) 
HRSC CCOSBODK Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/21/2014 03:00 Jason D. Scott 
PM) Renewed Motion For Mediation 
3/31/2014 NOTH CCREIDMA Notice Of Hearing (4/21/14@ 3 pm) Jason D. Scott 
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3/31/2014 HRSC CCREIDMA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/21/2014 03:00 Jason D. Scott 
PM) Renewed Motion for Leave to Add Claims 
for Punitive Damages 
4/7/2014 MOTN TCLAFFSD Defendants/Counterclaimaints' Motion In Limine Jason D. Scott 
Re: Exclusion Of Plaintiffs' "Expert" Testimony of 
Doug Eisenberg 
AFSM TCLAFFSD Affidavit Of J. Kahle Becker In Support Of Motion Jason D. Scott 
In Limine Re: Exclusion Of Plaintiffs' "Expert" 
Testimony of Doug Eisenberg 
MOTN TCLAFFSD Defendants/Counterclaimaints' Motion In Limine Jason D. Scott 
Re: Speaking Objections And Testimonial 
Questions 
AFSM TCLAFFSD Affidavit Of J. Kahle Becker In Support Of Motion Jason D. Scott 
In Limine Re: Speaking Objections And 
Testimonial Questions 
NOTH TCLAFFSD Notice Of Hearing (4.21.14 at 3:00 PM) Jason D. Scott 
4/9/2014 STIP CCSWEECE Stipulation for Mediation Jason D. Scott 
4/14/2014 MEMO CCTHIEKJ Memorandum in Opposition to Jason D. Scott 
Defendants-Counterclaimants' Renewed Motion 
for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Damages 
OBJT CCTHIEKJ Objection to Defendants/Counterclaimants' Jason D. Scott 
Motion in Limine RE: Speaking Objections and 
Testimonial Questions 
4/15/2014 RSPN CCTHIEKJ Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine RE: Jason D. Scott 
Speaking Objections and Testimonial Questions 
REPL CCTHIEKJ Reply to Defendant/ Counterclaimants' Motion for Jason D. Scott 
Limine RE: Exclusions of Plaintiffs' "Expert" 
Testimony of Doug Eiseberg 
4/16/2014 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order Referring Case to Mediation Jason D. Scott 
4/17/2014 REPL CCHOLMEE Eugene and Janet Rice's Reply Brief in Support Jason D. Scott 
of Renewed Motion for Leave to Add Claims for 
Punitive Damages 
4/21/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
04/21/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: (less than 100) Renewed Motion For 
Mediation 
4/22/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Jason D. Scott 
on 06/10/2014 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
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4/22/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
04/21/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: (less than 100) Renewed Motion for 
Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Damages And 
Defendants/Counterclaimaints' Motion in Limine 
re: Exclusion of Plaintiffs' "Expert" Testimony of 
Doug Eisenberg and 
Defendant/Counterclaimaints' Motion in Limine 
Re: Speaking Objections and Testimonial 
Questions 
5/1/2014 DEOP DCABBOSM Memorandum Decision and Order Granting 
Counterclaimant's Permission to Seek Punitive 
Damages 
ORDR DCABBOSM Order Granting Motion in Limine 
5/7/2014 AMEN CCHEATJL Third Amended Counterclaim 
5/12/2014 NOTS TCLAFFSD Notice Of Service 
AMEN CCTHIEKJ Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim 
5/14/2014 MISC CCVIDASL Errata Sheet 
5/15/2014 MOTN TCLAFFSD Motion To Compel, For Sanctions, For Relief 
From Scheduling Order, And Reappointing The 
Rule 53 Special Master 
AFSM TCLAFFSD Affidavit Of J. Kahle Becker In Support Of Motion 
To Compel And For Sanctions 
AFFD TCLAFFSD Affidavit Of John L. Runft 
AFFD TCLAFFSD Affidavit Of Eugene Rice 
NOTH TCLAFFSD Notice Of Hearing (5.29.14 at 3:00 PM) 
HRSC TCLAFFSD Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 
05/29/2014 03:00 PM) and For Sanctions, For 
Relief From Scheduling Order and Reappointing 
the Rule 53 Special Master 
5/22/2014 OBJT CCHEATJL Objection To Defendants/Counterclaimants' 
Motion To Compel, For Sanctions, For Relief 
From Scheduling Order, and Reappointing The 
Rule 53 Special Master 
AFCO CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Counsel RE:Rice Motion 
OBJT CCHEATJL Objection To Defendnats/Counterclaimants' 
Motion To Compel, Motion FOr Sanctions, Motion 
For Relief From Scheduling Order, And Motion To 
Reappoint Special Master James B Lynch 
AFFD CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Vernon K Smith 
AFFD CCHEATJL Affidavit Dennis J Sallaz 
AFFD· CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Patrick Oar 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Judge 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
Jason D. Scott 
000034
Date: 9/10/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :06 AM ROA Report 
Page 32 of 42 Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code. User Judge 
5/23/2014 MOTN CCREIDMA Motion to Strike Exhibits 1-4 and 8 Attached to Jason D. Scott 
the May 22,2014 Affidavit of Vernon K. Smith & 
Motion to Shorten Time 
AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Motion Jason D. Scott 
to Strike Exhibits to May 22,2014 Affidavit of 
Vernon K. Smith 
5/29/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Jason D. Scott 
on 05/29/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <100 and For Sanctions, For Relief 
From Scheduling Order and Reappointing the 
Rule 53 Special Master 
5/30/2014 AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of Eugene Rice Jason D. Scott 
6/3/2014 AFFD CCJACKKS Affidavit of William A Fuhrman re: Pretrial Jason D. Scott 
Attorney Conference 
AFFD TCLAFFSD June 3, 2014 Affidavit Of J. Kahle Becker Jason D. Scott 
MISC, TCLAFFSD Counterclaimants' Rule 16 Report And Jason D. Scott 
Counterclaimant's June 3, 2014 Exhibit & Witness 
List 
6/4/2014 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order on Counterclaimants' Motions to Compel, Jason D. Scott 
for Sanctions, for Relief from Scheduling Order, 
and Reappointing Rule 53 Special Master and 
Motion to Strike 
ORDR DCABBOSM Order Jason D. Scott 
6/5/2014 PTMM CCHEATJL Counterdefendants' Pretrial Memorandum Jason D. Scott 
WITN CCHEATJL Plaintiff/Counterdefendants/Third Party Plaintiffs Jason D. Scott 
Pretrial Witness And Exhibit Disclosure 
MEMO CCTHIEKJ Plaintiff- Involuntary Plaintiff and Third Party Pre- Jason D. Scott 
Trial Memoranda 
6/10/2014 MISC, CCMURPST Counterclaiments' Rule 16(e) Report Jason D. Scott 
CCMCLAPM Plaintiff/Counterdefendants/Third Party Proposed Jason D. Scott 
Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form 
MISC CCMCLAPM IRCP 16(e) Attorney Conference Jason D. Scott 
CONH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Jason D. Scott 
on 06/10/2014 03:30 PM: Conference Held 
6/11/2014 CONT CCSTOKSN Continued (Jury Trial 06/30/2014 09:00 AM) 15 Jason D. Scott 
days 
ORDR DCABBOSM Amended Order Regarding the Conduct of Trial Jason D. Scott 
6/13/2014 RPLY CCMARTJD Reply to Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim Jason D. Scott 
and Third Party Complaint 
OBJT CCMURPST Defendant/Counterclaimaints' Objections to Jason D. Scott 
Sallaz' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special 
Verdict Form 
6/17/2014 MOTN CCREIDMA Counterdefendants' Motions in Limine Jason D. Scott 
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6/17/2014 AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Jason D. Scott 
Counterdefendants' Motions in Limine 
MEMO CCREIDMA Memorandum in support of Counterdefendants' Jason D. Scott 
Motions in Limine 
MINL CCMCLAPM Defendants/Counterclaimaints Motion in Limine Jason D. Scott 
RE: Exclusion of Certain Plantiff/Counter 
Defendants Exhibits 
MINL CCMCLAPM Defendants/Counterclaimaints Motion in Limine Jason D. Scott 
RE: Exclusion of Certain Plantiff/Counter 
Defendants Witness Doug Eisenberg and Nicole 
Hastings 
AFSM CCMCLAPM Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker In Support· Of Jason D. Scott 
Defendants/Counterclaimaints Pre-Trial Motion in 
Limine 
NOHG CCMCLAPM Notice Of Hearing RE: Jason D. Scott 
Defendants/Counterclaimaints Motion in Limine 
RE: Exclusion of Certain Plantiff/Counter 
Defendants Exhibits 6.30.14@ 8:30 AM 
6/19/2014 NOTC TCLAFFSD DefendanUCounterclaimaints Notice Of Non Jason D. Scott 
Objection To Portions Of Counterdefendants 
Motions In Limine 
AFSM TCLAFFSD Second Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Jason D. Scott 
Counterdefendants Motions In Limine 
6/23/2014 OBJE CCSCOTDL Objection to Defendants/Counterclaimants Motion Jason D. Scott 
in Limine re: Exclusion of Certain 
Plaintiff/CounterDefendant's Exhibits 
OBJE CCSCOTDL Objection to Defendants/Counterclaimants Motion Jason D. Scott 
in Limine re: Exclusion of 
Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants Witnesses Doug 
Eisenberg and Nicole Hastings 
AFFD CCSCOTDL Affidavit of Counsel re: Objection to Jason D. Scott 
Defendants/Counterclaimants Motion in Limine 
re: Exclusion of Certain . 
Plaintiff/CounterDefendants Witnesses Doug 
Eisenberg and Nicole Hastings 
6/24/2014 RSPN CCHEATJL Defendnats/Counterclaimants' Response To Jason D. Scott 
Counterdefendants' Motion In Limine 
6/27/2014 MOTN CCHOLMEE Motion for Protective Order Re Subpoenas Duces Jason D. Scott 
Tecum 
AFFD CCHOLMEE Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion Jason D. Scott 
NOHG CCHOLMEE Notice Of Hearing 6.30.14@830AM Jason D. Scott 
MOTN CCHOLMEE Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Motion Jason D. Scott 
ORDR CCSTOKSN Order Shortening Time for Hearing on Motion for Jason D. Scott 
Protective Order Re: Subpoenas Duces Tecum 
RPLY CCSTOKSN Reply Memorandum in Support of Jason D. Scott 
Counterdefendant's Motions in Limine 
AFOR CCGARCOS (2) Affidavit Of Return (Non Service) Jason D. Scott 
000036
Date: 9/10/2015 
Time: 11 :06 AM 
Page 34 of 42 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
6/27/2014 MOTN CCGARCOS Defandants/Counterclaimants Response to Jason D. Scott 
Motion for Protective Order RE: Subpoenas 
Duces Tecum (Kahle Becker for Eugene and 
Janet Rice) 
. 6/30/2014 SUPP CCSTOKSN Plaintiff/Counterdefendants/Third Party Plaintiffs' Jason D. Scott 
First Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions 
EXHI · CCSTOKSN Supplement Exhibit List Jason D. Scott 
NOTC CCSTOKSN Notice of Intent to Present Portins of Eugene Rice Jason D. Scott 
Video Depos 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/01/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/02/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) day 3 
JTST CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
06/30/2014 09:00 AM: Jury Trial Started 15 
days RE:Defendants/Counterclaimaints Motion in 
Limine RE: Exclusion of Certain Plantiff/Counter 
Defendants Exhibits& Motion for Protective Order 
7/2/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/01/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel1 
Court Reporter: D. Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <200 (day 2) 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/07/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) day4 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/08/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) day 5 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/09/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) day6 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/10/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) day 7 
DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/02/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <200 pages day 3 
7/3/2014 BREF CCHOLMEE Bench Brief RE Use to Prior Swon Testimony on Jason D. Scott 
the Elmo System 
7/7/2014 OBJT CCSTOKSN Objection to Use of Discovery Deposition Jason D. Scott 
Testimony of Roy Rice by Def. as Taken by 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/3rd party Plaintiffs 
NOTC CCSTOKSN Notice of Objection to Rice Video Depostiion Jason D. Scott 
Excerpts 
7/8/2014 MOTN. CCSTOKSN Counterdefendants' Motion in Limine Re: Jason D. Scott 
Evidence of Mr. Rice's health 
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7/8/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/07/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <200 pages day4 
RESP CCVIDASL Response To Motion in Limine Re Roy Rices Jason D. Scott 
Health 
RESP. CCVIDASL Response and Notic~ of Compliance with Jason D. Scott 
Objections to Experpts of Roy Rice Video 
Deposition 
DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/08/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <200 day 5 
7/9/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/09/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <200 day 6 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/14/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) day 8 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/15/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) day 9 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/16/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) day 10 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/17/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) day 11 
7/10/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/10/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <200 day 7 
7/11/2014 OBJT TCLAFFSD Objection To Counterdefendants Excerpts Of Roy Jason D. Scott 
Rice Video Deposition 
7/15/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/14/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: < 200 pages day 8 
DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/15/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: D. Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <200 day 9 
7/16/2014 NOTC TCLAFFSD Notice Of Non Supplementation Of Discovery Jason D. Scott 
Responses Regarding Insurance Coverage 
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Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/16/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: D. Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <200 day 1 O 
Memorandum of Case Law a Lien Cannot Exist Jason D. Scott 
without an Underlying Debt 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/17/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <100 day 11 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/21/2014 09:00 Jason D. Scott 
AM) day 12 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
07/21/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: D. Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: day 12 
Order Jason D. Scott 
Judgment Jason D. Scott 
Jury Instructions Jason D. Scott 
Special Verdict Form Jason D. Scott 
STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Jason D. Scott 
Affidavit Of Amount Due And Application For Pre Jason D. Scott 
Judgment Interest 
Response and Objection to the Affidavit of J Jason D. Scott 
Kahle Becker as to his Claimed Amount Due and 
Application for Pre Judgment Interest 
Motion for Entry of Judgment for Jason D. Scott 
Plaintiff-involuntary Plaintiff, Notwithstanding the 
Jury Verdict 
Counterclaimants' Memorandum Of Costs And · Jason D. Scott 
Attorney Fees on Promissory Note Claim 
Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Jason D. Scott 
Counterclaimants' Memorandum 
Response and Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Jason D. Scott 
JNOV 
Counterdefendants' Motion For Attorney Fees Jason D. Scott 
And Costs 
Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Jason D. Scott 
Counterdefendants' Motion For Attorney Fees 
And Costs 
Counterdefendants' Memorandum In Support Of Jason D. Scott 
Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs 
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8/11/2014 HRSC CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing Scheduled (Motion Jason D. Scott 
09/30/2014 03:00 PM) Motion For Judgment 
Notwithstanding The Verdict 
NOTH TCMEREKV Notice Of Hearing On Post-Trial Motions 9.30.14 Jason D. Scott 
@3:00 PM 
8/12/2014 RSPN CCHEATJL Response And Objection To Counterclaimants' Jason D. Scott 
Motion for Attorney Feess And Costs On 
Promissory Note Claim 
8/14/2014 NOHG CCSCOTDL Notice Of Hearing (9-30-14@ 3PM) Jason D. Scott 
MISC TCMEREKV Defendants'/Counterclaimants'/Third Party Jason D. Scott 
Defendants' Response And Objection To 
Counterdefendants' Motion For Attorney's Fees 
And Costs 
AFFD TCMEREKV Affidavit Of J. Kahle Becker In Support Of Jason D. Scott 
Objection To Counterdefendant's Motion For 
Attorney's Fees And Costs 
9/23/2014 REPL CCMCLAPM Reply Memorandum in Support of Jason D. Scott 
Plaintiffs-Involuntary Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of 
Judgment Notwithstanding Jury Verdict 
REPL TCMEREKV Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Jason D. Scott 
Attorney Fees And Costs 
9/30/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
09/30/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: (<100) Motion For Judgment 
Notwithstanding The Verdict AND Post-Trial 
Motions 
10/16/2014 DEOP DCABBOSM Memorandum Decision and Order on Post-Trial Jason D. Scott 
Motions 
JDMT DCABBOSM Amended Judgment Jason D. Scott 
MOTN CCRADTER Counter claimant's Motion for Execution on Bond Jason D. Scott 
Placed by Dennis Sallaz 
BREF CCRADTER Brief in Support of Counterclaimant's Motion Jason D. Scott 
11/10/2014 OBJT CCMCLAPM Objection to Motion for Execution Bond Jason D. Scott 
11/14/2014 APPL CCRADTER Counterclaimant's Application and Affidavit for Jason D. Scott 
Writ of Execution 
MOTN CCRADTER Counterclaimant's Motion for Writ of Execution Jason D. Scott 
11/17/2014 MOTN CCHEATJL Motion To Return Cash Undertaking Posted By Jason D. Scott 
Daryl S. Sallaz 
AFSM CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Daryl S. Sallaz In Support Of Motion Jason D. Scott 
To Return Cash Undertaking Posted By Daryl S. 
Sallaz 
11/18/2014 EXAC CCNELSRF Execution Issued - Ada Co. Jason D. Scott 
NOHG CCTHIEKJ Notice Of Hearing (12.2.14@ 3:00pm) Jason D. Scott 
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11/18/2014 HRSC CCTHIEKJ Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/02/2014 03:00 Jason D. Scott 
PM) Motion for Execution on Bond Placed 
11/19/2014 MOTN TCHOLLJM Motion To Vacate And Reset Defendant's Motion Jason D. Scott 
For Execution on Bond 
OBJT CCMCLAPM Objection to Daryl Sallazs Motion for Return of Jason D. Scott 
Bond. 
MOTN CCMCLAPM Motion to Vacate and Reset Hearing Date Jason D. Scott 
12.16.14@3:00 PM 
11/20/2014 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order Vacating and Resetting Defendant's Motion Jason D. Scott 
for Execution on Bond 
11/26/2014 NOTA TCWEGEKE NOTICE OF APPEAL Jason D. Scott 
APSC TCWEGEKE Appealed To The Supreme Court Jason D. Scott 
12/5/2014 SRWW CCMCLAPM Sheriffs Return On Writ & Writ Jason D. Scott 
12/16/2014 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
12/16/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: {<50) Motion for Execution on Bond 
Placed 
12/18/2014 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order Granting Counterclaimant's Motion for Jason D. Scott 
Execution on Bond place by Dennis Sallaz 
12/23/2014 NOWA CCLOWEAD Notice Of Withdrawal Of Counsel Jason D. Scott 
12/26/2014 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order Allowing Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley Jason D. Scott 
PA to Withdraw as Counsel 
ORDR CCSTOKSN Order for Examination of Debtor Jason D. Scott 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Debtors Examination Jason D. Scott 
01/26/2015 02:00 AM) 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Debtors Examination Jason D. Scott 
01/27/2015 02:00 PM) 
CONT CCSTOKSN Continued (Debtors Examination 01/26/2015 Jason D. Scott 
02:00 PM) 
1/26/2015 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Debtors Examination scheduled Jason D. Scott 
on 01/26/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <200 
1/27/2015 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Debtors Examination scheduled Jason D. Scott 
on 01/27/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: <200 
2/2/2015 NOTO TCHOLLJM Notice Of Taking Audio Visual Deposition Jason D. Scott 
Duces Tecum Of Sallaz-Schild Law, PLLC 
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2/2/2015 NOTD TCHOLLJM Notice Of Taking Audio Visual Deposition Jason D. Scott 
Duces Tecum Of Ray Schild 
2/9/2015 NOTC TCLAFFSD Notice Vacating Deposition Of Tuckers & Jason D. Scott 
Associates 
NOTC TCLAFFSD Notice Of Subpoena Duces Tecum & Taking Jason D. Scott 
Deposition Of DL Evans Bank 
2/20/2015 AFOR CCGARCOS (2) Affidavit Of ~eturn 2/19/2015 Jason D. Scott 
2/23/2015 MOTN· CCHOLDKJ Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Vacate Jason D. Scott 
Depositions 
MOTN CCHOLDKJ Motion to Disqualify J Kahle Becker and Set Jason D. Scott 
Aside Judgment Under IRCP 60(b)(3), 60(b)(6) 
2/24/2015 MOTN CCREIDMA Counterclaimants Motion to Strike and Objection Jason D. Scott 
to Motion to Disqualify, Quash, and Set Aside 
Judgment 
AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Jason D. Scott 
Counterclaimant's Motion to Strike and Objection 
to Motion to Disqualify, Quash, and Set Aside 
Judgment 
MOTN CCREIDMA Counterclaimants Motion to Compel Rule 69 Jason D. Scott 
Deposition of Marcy Fox and for Sanctions 
Against Marcy Fox and Vernon K. Smith 
AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Jason D. Scott 
Counterclaimants Motion to Compel Rule 69 
Deposition of Marcy Fox and For Sanctions 
Against Marcy Fox and Vernon K. Smith 
NOTH CCREIDMA Notice Of Hearing (4/6/15@ 3 pm) Jason D. Scott 
HRSC CCREIDMA Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Jason D. Scott 
04/06/2015 03:00 PM) re: Counterclaimant's 
Motion to Compel 
NOTH TCLAFFSD Notice Of Hearing On Motions (4.6.15 at 3:00 Jason D. Scott 
PM) Motions to Disqualify & Set Aside & Motion 
To Quash 
2/25/2015 NOTC CCVIDASL Notice of Objection to Document Production Jason D. Scott 
Request Pursuant to Supoena Decus Tecum 
MOTN CCVIDASL Ex Parte Motion to Vacate Depositions and Jason D. Scott 
Quash Subpoenas 
2/27/2015 AFOR CCRADTER Affidavit Of Return 2.20.15 Jason D. Scott 
3/2/2015 SRWW CCVIDASL Sheriffs Return On Writ & Writ Jason D. Scott 
3/9/2015 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order Granting Temporary Stay on Ex Parte Jason D. Scott 
Motion to Quash Subpoenas, Vacate Depositions 
(DENIED) 
3/10/2015 MOTN CCHEATJL Counterclaimant's Motion For Levy on Dennis Jason D. Scott 
Sallaz's Safe Deposit Box 
AFFD CCHEATJL Affidavit Of J. Kahle Becker In Support Of Jason D. Scott 
Counterclaimant's Motion For Levy on Dennis 
Sallaz's Safe Deposit Box 
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ROA Report 
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Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
3/19/2015 AFFD CCMARTJD Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Jason D. Scott 
Counterclaimants Motion for Levy 
NOHG CCMARTJD Notice Of Hearing re Motion for Levy Jason D. Scott 
(4.6.15@3pm) 
3/20/2015 ORDG CCNELSRF Order Granting Counterclaimant's Motion for Levy Jason D. Scott 
on Dennis Sallaz's Safe Deposit Box 
3/24/2015 OBJT CCGARCOS Response and Objection to Motion to Compel Jason D. Scott 
Rule 69 Deposition of Marcy Fox, and Objection 
to Any Sanctions to be Imposed Against Marcy 
Fox or Vernon K. Smith 
NOTH CCMYERHK Notice Of Hearing Objection To Document Jason D. Scott 
Production Request Pursuant To Subpoena 
Decus Tecum (4.6.15 @3 pm) 
3/31/2015 AFSW CCMYERHK Counterclaimants' Application And Affidavit For Jason D. Scott 
Writ Of Execution 
4/6/2015 AFFR CCMARTJD Affidavit Of Return 3.24.15 Jason D. Scott 
EXAC CCBOYIDR Execution Issued - Ada Co. Jason D. Scott 
DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Jason D. Scott 
on 04/06/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:(< 100) re: Counterclaimant's Motion 
to Compel & Motion to Disqualify and Set Asise & 
Motion to Quash and Motion for Levy on Safety 
Deposit Box And Objection To Document 
Production Request Pursuant To Subpoena 
Decus Tecum 
4/8/2015 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order on Motions Jason D. Scott 
NOTC CCSTOKSN Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Jason D. Scott 
Marcy Fox 
NODT TCLAFFSD Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of Jason D. Scott 
Marcy Fox 
4/13/2015 MQTN CCGARCOS Counterclaimaint's Motion in Limine RE: Speaking Jason D. Scott 
Objections During Rule 69 Depositions 
NOTH CCGARCOS Notice Of Hearing Jason D. Scott 
HRSC CCGARCOS Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine Jason D. Scott 
04/30/2015 10:00 AM) 
4/28/2015 SRWW CCMARTJD Sheriffs Return On Writ & Writ Jason D. Scott 
4/30/2015 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order on Counterclaimant's Motion in Limine Re: Jason D. Scott 
Speaking Objections during Rule 69 Depositions 
DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on Jason D. Scott 
04/30/2015 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Cromwell 




Time: 11 :06 AM 
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Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User Judge 
5/1/2015 APPL CCSNELNJ CounterClaimant's Application and Affidavit for Jason D. Scott 
Writ of. Execution 
5/5/2015 NOTH CCSNELNJ Notice Of Hearing (5/26/15 @ 3 p.m) Jason D. Scott 
HRSC CCSNELNJ Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Jason D. Scott 
05/26/2015 03:00 PM) Motion for Protective 
Order 
5/6/2015 EXAC CCDEALCH Execution Issued - Ada Co. Jason D. Scott 
5/8/2015 AFRT CCLOWEAD Affidavit of Return (5-6-15) Jason D. Scott 
NOTC CCLOWEAD Notice of Rule Q9 Deposition Duces Tecum of Jason D. Scott 
Sallaz-Schild Law, PLLC 
5/12/2015 MOTN CCSNELNJ Motion for Protective Order Jason D. Scott 
5/18/2015 MOTN CCSNELNJ Counterclaimant's Objection to Saliaz Schild Law, Jason D. Scott 
PIie's, Motion For Protective Order 
AFFD CCSNELNJ Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker In Support of Jason D. Scott 
Counterclaimant's Objection to Saliaz Schild Law, 
PLLC'S Motion for Protective Order 
5/26/2015 MOTN CCBARRSA Counterclaimant's Motion for lnjuction Jason D. Scott 
AFSM CCBARRSA Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker In Support Of Motion Jason D. Scott 
for lnjuction 
MOTN CCBARRSA Counterclaimant's Motion to Shorten Time Jason D. Scott 
NOHG CCBARRSA Notice Of Hearing (05/26/15 @ 03:00 pm) Jason D. Scott 
AFOS CCHOLDKJ Affidavit Of Service 5.15.15 Jason D. Scott 
STIP CCHOLDKJ Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel Jason D. Scott 
MOTN CCHOLDKJ Motion for Extension of Time, Motion to Shorten Jason D. Scott 
Time for Hearing, and Motion for Protective Order 
DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Jason D. Scott 
on 05/26/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: (<100) Motion for Protective Order 
HRSC CCSTOKSN Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Jason D. Scott 
06/17/2015 01 :30 PM) Deposition 
5/29/2015 MOTN CCSNELNJ Counterclaimant's Motion to Contest Claim of Jason D. Scott 
Exemption 
AFFD CCSNELNJ Affidavit of J. Kahl Becker in Support of Jason D. Scott 
Counterclaimant's Motion to Contest Claim of 
Exemption 
NOTC CCSNELNJ Notice of Rule 69 Deposition Duces Tecum of Jason D. Scott 
Sallaz-Schild Law, PIie 
6/3/2015 NOTH CCGRANTR- Notice Of Hearing Jason D. Scott 
HRSC CCGRANTR Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/08/2015 02:00 Jason D. Scott 
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Case: CV-OC-2011-07253 Current Judge: Jason D. Scott 
Dennis J Sallaz, etal. vs. Eugene Rice, etal. 
Dennis J Sallaz, Marcy Fox vs. Eugene Rice, Janet Rice, Michael Rice 
Date Code User 
6/4/2015 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order on Pending Motions 
MOTN CCVIDASL Motion for Entry of Satisfaction of Judgment 
Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing 
NOTC CCBARRSA Notice of Non-Opposition to Shorten Time 
6/5/2015 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order Granting Motion to Shorten Time 
6/8/2015 DCHH CCSTOKSN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
06/08/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: (<50) Counterclaimant's Motion to 
Contest Claim of Exemption 
6/9/2015 ORDR CCWATSCL Order for Entry of Satisfaction of Judgment 
CDIS CCWATSCL Civil Disposition entered for: Rice, Eugene, 
Defendant; Rice, Janet, Defendant; Rice, 
Michael, Defendant; Fox, Marcy, Plaintiff; Sallaz, 
Dennis J, Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/9/2015 
STJD CCWATSCL Satisfaction Of Judgment 
HRVC CCWATSCL Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled 
on 06/17/2015 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Deposition 
CERT· CCWATSCL Certificate Of Mailing 
6/10/2015 ORDR CCSTOKSN Order for Surrender of Funds 
CERT· CCSTOKSN Certificate Of Mailing 
6/11/2015 MOTN CCSTOKSN Motion to Reconsider Analysis as to the Final 
Judgment on Appeal 
6/12/2015 ORDR DCABBOSM Order 
7/2/2015 SRWW CCMYERHK Sheriffs Return On Writ & Writ Ada 
7/22/2015 NOTA TCWEGEKE Amended NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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IVER J. LONGETEIG 
5304 Turret 
Boise, Idaho 83 703 
ISB No. 1051 
(208) 342-5995 
Fax: (208) 424-6972 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
• .NO .. --------;:,F1~LE~u~Lf;r+----A.M .. ----P.M.--+4-----
APR 1 1 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JERI HEATON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, ) 





COUNT ONE - CLAIM AND DELIVERY 
For cause of against the Defendants, Plaintiff alleges: 
I. 
At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff and all of the Defendants were residents of Boise, 
Ada County, Idaho. 
II. 
At all times relevant hereto ( except as may be specified), Plaintiff was the sole owner of a 
1954 Cadillac, VIN 546265334. 





In approximately July, 1991, Defendant Roy Rice offered to loan Plaintiff a certain sum 
of money to make a real estate purchase. In exchange, Plaintiff gave Roy Rice a lien on the 1954 
Cadillac as security. However, the transaction never closed and Roy Rice at no time loaned 
Plaintiff any money. 
IV. 
Thereafter, on approximately July 20, 1995, Defendant, Roy Rice, affixed his signature to 
the Idaho Certificate of Title releasing his lien. A copy of the relevant Certificate of Title is 
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A". 
V. 
In January or February, 2011, the 1954 Cadillac was stolen by Defendant's from locked 
storage. Prior thereto, Defendant's had executed a false Application for Certificate of Title and 
filed the same with the Idaho Transportation Department on September 17, 2010. The falsities 
contained in the Application were: (1) "the vehicle described below is owned by me" and (2) "ifl 
am applying for a duplicate title, it is because the original has been lost unless otherwise 
indicated." A copy of the Application for Certificate of Title is attached hereto and marked as 
Exhibit "B". Plaintiff at all times has and continues to posses the original title to said 1954 
Cadillac, see exhibit "A'. 
VI. 
In compliance with Idaho Code §8-302, the following is stated: 
1) The property is a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado convertible, kept by Plaintiff as a collectible 
item, with an actual value of $75,000.00. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 2. 
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2) Plaintiff does not know the location of the property. 
3) The residence address of the Defendants is 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 83705. 
4) The Defendants have contacted car dealers in an attempt to sell the vehicle and are in 
the process of doing so. 
5) The property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute. 
COUNT TWO - DAMAGES 
VII. 
Plaintiff realleges all allegations contained in the complaint. 
VIII. 
If Defendants cannot redeliver the 1954 Cadillac to the Plaintiff, he has been damaged in 
the amount of $75,000.00, together with all damages or injury to the vehicle. 
IX. 
With regard to both counts, Plaintiff has been required to retain the services oflver J. 
Longeteig, a licensed attorney, and has agreed to pay him a reasonable fee therefor. This fee 
should be paid by Defendants. 
X. 
With regard to both counts, this court has all necessary and proper jurisdiction to enter the 
relief sought herein, and venue is proper. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment as follows against the Defendants: 
1. For the return of the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado convertible; 
2. If that return in not made by the date ordered, for damages in the amount of 
$75,000.00, and any and all other loss and damage incurred; 




3. For his attorney's fees and costs; 
4. For such further and additional relief as the court should deem proper. 
ft,-. 




County of ADA ) 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby states and represents that 
he has read the foregoing complaint, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true 
and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
DATED this//ZIDay of April, 2011. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 4. 
N~fmlaho 
Residing at: BOISE 
Commission expires: /~ -~/-;Ml" 
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CASE NO: CVOC1107253 
PLAINTIFF: DENNIS SALLAZ 
COUNSEL: IVER J. LONGETEIG 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
5304 N TURRET WY 
BOISE, ID 83703 
TEL: 342-5995 
DEFENDANT: EUGENE & JANET RICE 
MICHAEL RICE 
COUNSEL: J. KAHLE BECKER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1020 W MAIN STREET, STE 400 




J. KAHLE BECKER (ISB # 7408) 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-1403 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: kahle(@,kahlebeckerlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
• ~:21.~Y, __ _ 
APR 28 2011 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH. Clark 
8y KATHY BIEHL _.., 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 










EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband ) 
and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, ) 
Defendants. 




DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD Chtd. and SALLAZ AND 
























Case No. CV OC 1107253 
ANSWER,COUNTERCLAIM,AND 
JOINDER OF A PARTY 




COME NOW Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, and Michael Rice 
(hereafter "Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, J. Kahle Becker, and 
hereby answers Plaintiff's Verified Complaint as follows: 
I. Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint not 
otherwise specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendants admit the allegations contained in Paragraph I of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
3. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph II of Plaintiff's 
Complaint, Defendants deny that Plaintiff was the sole owner of said Cadillac to the 
extent that the term "sole owner" implies that there were no other ownership or security 
interests in said Cadillac since Defendant Roy Rice had the right of first lien on said 
Cadillac. Furthermore, Defendants deny that Plaintiff is the current owner of the Cadillac 
or has any interest therein. Moreover, any interest Plaintiff claims to have in said 
Cadillac, which Defendants deny Plaintiff has, was transferred to Marcy Fox by the 
instrument attached as "Exhibit A" to the Complaint. Defendants deny the remaining 
allegations in paragraph II of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
4. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph III of Plaintiff's 
Complaint, Defendants admit that Defendant Roy Rice had a lien on said Cadillac. 
Defendants deny all other allegations contained therein. 
5. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph IV of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
6. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph V of Plaintiff's 
Complaint, Defendants admit that a copy of an Application for Certificate of Title 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, P. 2 
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executed by Defendant Michael Rice is attached to Plaintiffs Complaint as "Exhibit B." 
Defendants deny that "Exhibit A" is the original title for said Cadillac; on its face 
"Exhibit A" indicates that it is a duplicate title. Defendants deny all other allegations 
contained in paragraph V of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
7. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph VI of Plaintiffs 
Complaint, Defendants admit that Defendants' address is 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 83705, 
Defendants admit that the Cadillac has not been taken pursuant to tax, assessment, or 
fine. Defendants admit that an agent & client of Dennis Sallaz, "Doug Eisenberg" has 
contacted Defendants purporting to be interested in acquiring said Cadillac Eldorado. 
See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 and 8.4(a). With respect to the remaining 
allegations contained in paragraph VI of Plaintiffs Complaint Defendants are without 
information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth or veracity thereof and therefore 
deny the same. 
8. Paragraph VII of Plaintiffs Complaint is an incorporation paragraph and 
therefore Defendant incorporates the above responses in responding to Paragraph VII of 
Plaintiffs Complaint 
9. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph VIII of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
10. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph IX of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
11. Defendants admit that this Court has jurisdiction and that venue is proper. 
Defendants deny all other allegations contained in paragraph X of Plaintiffs Complaint 
and further deny that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief. 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, P. 3 
000055
• • 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims for damages, if any, are barred and or/reduced by a set-off for 
various amounts due and owing by Plaintiff to Defendant. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by application of the doctrine of estoppel, equitable 
quasi-estoppel, and judicial estoppel. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims and damages, if any, are barred or reduced by Plaintiff's failure 
to exercise his duty under Idaho law to mitigate or reduce his damages. In asserting this 
defense, Defendant does not admit any fault or responsibility, or that Plaintiff has 
suffered any damages. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's conduct made it impossible for Defendant Eugene "Roy" Rice to meet 
the terms of the agreement at issue in this matter. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced in that the damages sought 
by Plaintiff could have been avoided if Plaintiff had acted reasonably prior to filing this 
action. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims for damages are barred and/or reduced by the doctrine of 
latches. 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, P. 4 
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EIGTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's damages, if any, are barred or reduced due to Plaintiff's own breach of 
the subject contract including but not limited to Plaintiff's failure to make payment on 
said lien. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit due to the assignment of whatever 
ownership interest Plaintiff may have had in the subject Cadillac to Marcy Fox as 
reflected in "Exhibit A" to the Verified Complaint. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is not the real party in interest due to the assignment of whatever 
ownership interest Plaintiff may have had in the subject Cadillac to Marcy Fox as 
reflected in "Exhibit A" to the Verified Complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot satisfy 
the requirements of LC. 8-302(l)(a). 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's damages, if any, are barred or reduced by the application of the 
doctrine of unclean hands. Specifically, Plaintiff violated several Rules of Professional 
Conduct by entering into this transaction and forged Defendant Roy Rice's signature on 
the duplicate title attached as "Exhibit A" to Plaintiff's Complaint. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's damages, if any, are barred or reduced because Plaintiff caused 
Defendants Rice to sign certain contracts for the loan of money under duress. 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, P. 5 
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THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs damages, if any, are barred or reduced because the alleged release of 
lien was not supported by adequate consideration. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims, if any, are barred or reduced because Plaintiff has failed to post 
the undertaking required by I.C. § 8-303. Plaintiff cannot list himself as a surety. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff owes Defendants Eugene and Janet Rice, as well as his ex-wife 
Renee Baird, sums far in excess of the damages sought in this Complaint and has not paid 
taxes in approximately 4 years; it is therefore highly unlikely that Plaintiff is worth in 
excess of $150,000. Moreover, Plaintiff has made no showing that either he or his 
brother "Daryl Sallaz" is a "sufficient surety" within the meaning of I.C. § 8-303 and 
Defendants assert the affirmative defense to any claims for immediate possession that 
Plaintiff is not a "sufficient surety" within the meaning ofl.C. §§ 8-303 or 12-614. 
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims, if any, are barred or reduced because Plaintiff has failed meet 
the requirements of I.C. § 8-302( d) by failing to state that the property was not seized 
under an execution against the property of the Plaintiff. 
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims, if any, are barred because of Plaintiff or his agent's forgery of 
Defendant Eugene "Roy" Rice's signature. The signature on "Exhibit A" to Plaintiffs 
Complaint is not that of Defendant Eugene "Roy" Rice. Defendant Eugene "Roy" Rice 
denies he ever signed any documents releasing said lien and relinquishing his interest to 
Plaintiff. See Idaho Code§ 49-518. 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, P. 6 
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SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims, if any, are barred because of Plaintiffs "Exhibit A" to 
Plaintiffs Complaint is not the actual legal title for said Cadillac and the purported 
release reflected on "Exhibit A" appears nowhere in the Idaho Transportation 
Department's records for said Cadillac. See Idaho Code§ 49-518. 
EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims, if any, are barred or reduced because Plaintiff has failed to 
perform all of the conditions, covenants, and promises required of him in accordance 
with the terms of the lien. 
NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims, if any, are barred or reduced because Plaintiff has by his own 
acts, omissions, or conduct waived whatever rights he may have in the subject Cadillac. 
TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendant asserts the affirmative defense of in pari delicto, in equal fault or 
wrong. By making this defense Defendants do not hereby admit to any wrongdoing. 
TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims, if any, are barred or reduced by the doctrine of bad faith. 
TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims, if any, are barred because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies. 
As discovery in this matter has not as yet commenced, Defendants specifically 
reserve the right to amend their Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint to assert additional 
affirmative defenses as the same may become known . 
. ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, P. 7 
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Defendants have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection 
with defending this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 120(3), and 12-
121. Should this matter be resolved at the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, those 
fees and costs are $5,000. 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
COMES NOW Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, (hereafter 
"Counterclaimants"), by and through their counsel of record, J. Kahle Becker, and hereby 
state and allege the following in support of these Counterclaims and adds Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd. as a Counterdefendant. 
PARTIES 
1. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is an individual residing at 2679 Palouse, 
Boise, ID 83705. 
2. Counterclaimant Janet Rice is an individual residing at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 
83705. 
3. Eugene and Janet Rice are husband and wife and the marital estate of 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice resides at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 
83705. 
4. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is an individual 
residing at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
5. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered is 
an Idaho S-Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. 
Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, P. 8 
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6. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is an individual 
who was a representative of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered, an Idaho S-
Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, 
ID 83705. 
7. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is the Personal 
Representative of and Attorney for the estate of his deceased grandmother, Bessie 
B. Matcham. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
8. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the above named Counterdefendants 
pursuant to LC. § 5-514 and other applicable laws and rules. 
9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to and by 
virtue of Idaho Code § 1-705 and other applicable laws and rules. The damages 
herein exceed $10,000. 
10. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404, venue is proper in Ada County since all of the 
parties reside therein. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
11. Dennis Sallaz was Counterclaimants' Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice's 
personal and business attorney for approximately 25 years. 
12. Dennis Sallaz owns 90% of the interest in Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
13. Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. was Counterclaimants' Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet 
Rice's personal and business attorney since it was founded in 2003. 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, P. 9 
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14. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis 
Sallaz. 
15. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. 
16. Counterefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. formed many 
business entities on behalf of Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice including but 
not limited to: R-R Investments, Inc., Capital Broadcasting, Inc., Western 
Broadcasting, Inc., New Communications, Inc., Far Less Auto Rental, Inc., A 
Fantasy Limos, Inc., B B Auto Sales and Repairs, Inc., Aztec Precast, Inc., 
Ultimate Arms, Inc., Luxury, Inc., Clearwire Wireless Communications, Inc., 
Advanced Technology Systems, Inc., and Real Properties, LLC. 
1 7. Counterdefendants Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood represented these and other 
entities as well as Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice in litigation as well as 
many personal and business transactions. 
18. To Counterclaimants knowledge there has never been a formal engagement letter 
between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
19. Counterclaimants have been billed by Counterdefendants for legal services and 
Counterclaimants have paid said bills. 
20. Counterclaimants have also allowed Counterdefendants and their agents to take 
approximately $60,000 worth of items from Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" 
Rice's former business "A Vista Pawn." 
21. Said items were to serve as a retainer in the event legal services were ever 
required from Counterdefendants. 
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22. Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were married on July 4, 1996. 
23. Real Homes, L.L.C. was formed on January 19, 2001. A copy of the Articles of 
Organization filed with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State on January 19, 
2001 is attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and a copy of the Operating Agreement is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit B." 
24. Dennis Sallaz's then wife, Renee Baird, was listed as a manager of Real Homes, 
L.L.C. in the Articles of Organization filed on January 19, 2001 and in the 
Operating Agreement. 
25. Renee Baird moved out of the Sallaz residence in August of 2003. 
26. On September 12, 2003, Dennis Sallaz filed Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State for Real Homes, 
L.L.C. stating that management was henceforth vested in members and that 
Dennis J. Sallaz was a manager and member/owner. A copy of the Amended and 
Restated Articles of Organization filed with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of 
State on September 12, 2003, is attached hereto as "Exhibit C." 
27. Renee Baird did not sign or approve the Amendment to the Articles referred to in 
preceding paragraph. 
28. Dennis Sallaz signed documents as an owner and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
29. Glen Treferen is a longtime friend of Dennis Sallaz, client of Dennis Sallaz, and 
client of Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. 
30. Throughout the existence of Real Homes, L.L.C., until its conveyance to Real 
Properties, LLC on January 6, 2006, Glenn Trefren signed documents as an owner 
and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
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31. Glen Treferen had no ownership interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. or in any assets 
thereof. 
32. Throughout the existence of Real Homes, L.L.C., until 2005, Renee Baird signed 
documents as an owner and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
33. On February 10, 2004 Real Homes, L.L.C. conveyed 15584 Riverside Rd, 
Canyon County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz, husband and wife for $105,000. 
The alleged purpose of this conveyance, as explained to Counterclaimants, was to 
enable the Sallazes as title holders to obtain a loan using the property as collateral 
on the understanding that the proceeds would be used to improve and benefit the 
property. The promise to use the proceeds allegedly was the consideration for the 
conveyance. 
34. Renee Baird signed the quitclaim deed, which conveyed 15584 Riverside Rd, 
Canyon County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz, as President of Real Homes, 
L.L.C. 
35. The petition for the divorce of Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird was filed on May 
27, 2004. 
36. During the Divorce proceedings, Dennis Sallaz was in need of money. 
37. Dennis Sallaz withdrew approximately $65,000 from the Real Homes checking 
account and placed some of this money in his or Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 's 
trust account. 
38. Dennis Sallaz executed two promissory notes with Counterclaimant Roy Rice for 
$10,000 and $10,800 at 12% interest. Those promissory notes are attached hereto 
as "Exhibit D" and "Exhibit E." 
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39. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 
2002 Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an ATV trailer which are owned by 
Counterclaimants. The Bill of Sale for said A TV's and A TV trailer is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit F." 
40. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said ATVs and ATV 
trailer to Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz, pp. 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
41. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of a Winnebago Motorhome 
VIN 1GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first 
lien holder on. A copy of the title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit H." 
42. Dennis Sallaz used his position as Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" and Janet 
Rice's longtime personal and business attorney to influence and induce 
Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice to enter into a business transaction for the 
purchase of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
43. Defendant Sallaz did not inform Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice that they 
should obtain independent legal counsel. 
44. Dennis Sallaz created an entity which became "Real Properties, LLC" as a vehicle 
for Counterclaimants to purchase "Real Homes, L.L.C." 
45. Counterefendants did not inform Counterclaimants that Renee Baird had not 
approved the September 12, 2003 Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization for Real Homes, L.L.C. 
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46. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants of Renee Baird's interest in 
Real Homes, L.L.C. or the assets thereof. 
47. Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated January 6, 2006 and the 
Representations of Counterdefendants, Counterclaimants believed they 
purchased I 00% of the rights, title, and interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. for 
$250,000 by way of their interest in Real Properties, LLC. The Purchase and 
Sale Agreement is attached hereto as "Exhibit I" and lists the real property 
purportedly transferred in an attachment thereto. 
48. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
purportedly on behalf of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
49. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz represented and warranted to Counterclaimant 
that they had full authority to transfer the ownership and assets of Real Homes, 
L.L.C. to Real Properties, LLC in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
50. One of the parcels listed as an asset of Real Homes, L.L.C. in the Purchase and 
Sale Agreement was 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID. 
51. Dennis Sallaz represented to Counterclaimants that title to 15584 Riverside Rd, 
Canyon County, ID reverted to Real Homes, L.L.C. upon the filing of the deed 
of trust securing the loan described above and that Real Homes owned said 
property at the time of the sale to Real Properties, LLC on January 6, 2006. 
52. Based on the representations of Dennis Sallaz, Counterclaimant Eugene Rice 
believed he purchased 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID in addition to 
other properties described in the attachment to the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
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"Exhibit I," when the entity Dennis Sallaz created for Counterclaimants "Real 
Properties, LLC" purchased Real Homes, L.L.C. on January 6, 2006. 
53. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz warranted to Counterclaimants that Real Homes, 
L.L.C. had title to and full authority to transfer the ownership of 15584 Riverside 
Rd, Canyon County, ID in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
54. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Counterclaimants, through Real 
Properties, LLC, expended $63,402.82 to extinguish the debt owing on 15580 
Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID and prevent a foreclosure sale of the same. 
55. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Counterclaimant Eugene Rice 
made an advance payment to Dennis Sallaz in the sum of $5,000 at closing. 
56. Counterclaimants, through Real Properties, LLC, expended in excess of $140,000 
which funds were to be utilized in maintaining and improving the subject 
properties. 
57. Glenn Trefren converted approximately $50,000 of said $140,000 in funds, or 
materials purchased by said funds, to his own use. 
58. On October 30, 2007 Magistrate Judge David C. Epis issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in Renee L. Baird-Sallaz v. Dennis J Sallaz, Ada 
Co. Case No. CV-DR-04-0I075M. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order is attached hereto as "Exhibit J." 
59. The Order declared that Renee Baird owned 100% of Real Homes, L.L.C. and 
neither Dennis Sallaz or Glenn Trefren had authority to transfer the Real Homes, 
L.L.C. or, consequently, any assets thereof to Real Properties, LLC. 
60. Dennis Sallaz did not inform Counterclaimants of this Order. 
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61. The Order created a cloud on the title of the properties purportedly transferred to 
Counterclaimants via their ownership of Real Properties, LLC. 
62. In the Summer of 2009, Counterclaimants found out there were some issues with 
the Real Homes, LLC/Real Properties, LLC transaction when they discovered 
Renee Baird had filed a Lis Pendens on the subject properties. 
63. At the urging of Counterdefendants and based on their representations that, Judge 
Epis misconstrued the Real Homes, L.L.C./Real Properties, LLC transaction and 
that Renee Baird had no interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. or the assets thereof, on 
November 4, 2009 Eugene and Janet Rice filed an action to quiet title, seek 
declaratory relief, and pursue other causes of action in what became known as 
Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
64. Dennis Sallaz, Renee Baird, and Glen Treferen were Defendants in Canyon 
County Case No. CV 09-11855 and were represented by independent counsel. 
65. On or about August 2, 2010, Renee Baird and Eugene and Janet Rice settled all 
claims which existed between them by and through the Mutual Release and 
Settlement Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit K." 
66. Pursuant to the settlement reached between the parties thereto, title to the 
Riverside parcels and714 Smith were quieted. 
67. During settlement conversations Counterclaimants had with Renee Baird, they 
learned of fraudulent, malicious, negligent, and wrongful acts of 
Counterdefendants. 
68. Thereafter, Counterclaimants began investigating the actions of 
Counterdefendants with respect to the Real Homes L.L.C./Real Properties LLC 
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transaction described above as well as other matters associated with their 
relationship with Counterdefendants. 
69. Counterclaimants learned that Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and 
fraudulently withheld information relevant to Counterdefendants' deceitful and 
fraudulent "legal representation" of Counterclaimants. 
70. Counterdefendants continue to conceal, misrepresent, and fraudulently withhold 
information relevant to their deceitful and fraudulent "legal representation" of 
Counterclaimants. 
71. Dennis Sallaz was unhappy with the settlement reached between 
Counterclaimants and Renee Baird in the Canyon County Case No. CV 09-
11855. 
72. Dennis Sallaz continues to litigate Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855 and 
has asserted false counterclaims through his longtime friend, client, and associate 
Glen Treferen. 
73. Dennis Sallaz's current attorney in the present action, J. Iver Longeteig, is Glen 
Treferen'sattomey in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
COUNTI 
ACTION AGAINST DENNIS SALLAZ FOR COLLECTION 
ON PROMISSORY NOTES 
74. Counterclaimants restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate 
them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
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7 5. That Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz signed the promissory notes attached hereto 
as "Exhibit D" and "E." 
76. That Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz received $10,800 and $10,000 from 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice pursuant to said promissory notes and 
testified to the receipt of said funds in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. 
77. There is now a balance due and owing for the principal amount of $20,800. 
78. That by law and by the terms of the agreement, Counterclaimants are entitled to 
an interest charge of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance. 
79. That per the terms of said promissory notes, principal and interest on said 
promissory notes are due on demand. 
80. That on or about March 24, 2011 due demand has been made upon 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz prior to the filing of this action. 
81. That Counterdefendant Sallaz refused or neglected to pay to Counterclaimants 
the above-mentioned sum despite demands made by Counterciaimants. 
82. The terms of said promissory notes provide "if action is commenced to enforce 
payment of this note, I agree to pay such sums as the Court may affix as 
attorney's fees." 
83. Counterclaimants are entitled to and hereby request a judgment for the principal 
and interest due on said promissory notes. 
84. Counterclaimants further request an award of post judgment interest. 
85. That as a result of Counterdefendant Sallaz's failure or refusal to pay said sum, 
Counterclaimants have been required to retain an attorney for the collection of 
this outstanding amount and has and will incur attorney's fees and costs of suit, 
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which Counterclaimants are entitled to recover of and from said Counterdefendant 
pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121 and Rule 54 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Counterclaimants are informed and 
therefore allege that the sum of $5,000.00 is a reasonable sum to be awarded to 
Counterclaimants for attorney's fees herein, in the event the matter is uncontested 
and a greater sum if contested. 
COUNT II 
ACTION TO RECOVER SUMS DEPOITED IN TRUST ACCOUNT 
86. Counterclaimants restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate 
them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
87. On or about January 14, 2011, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
l.5(f) Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice requested an accounting of all 
sums obtained, received, or held by Counterdefendants on behalf of 
Counterclaimants or any entities Counterdefendants formed or represented on 
their behalf. 
88. On or about January 14, 2011, pursuant to IRPC l.5(f) and l.8(c) 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice requested an accounting of all gifts from 
Counterclaimants which were obtained, received, claimed, or held by 
Counterdefendants. 
89. On or about February 16, 2011 Counterdefendants responded that they did not 
have any funds in their trust account belonging to Counterclaimants. No 
accounting or other documentation was produced to support this denial. 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, P. 19 
000071
• • 
90. On or about February 16, 2011 Counterdefendants responded that they did not 
have any record or recollection of any gifts obtained, received, or claimed to be 
from Counterclaimants. No accounting or other documentation was produced to 
support this denial. 
91. Counterclaimants are aware of and Counterdefendants have admitted to owing 
Counterclaimants approximately $60,000 for items taken from Counterclaimant's 
former business "A Vista Pawn, Inc." 
92. This debt was assigned to Counderdefendant Dennis Sallaz in his divorce from 
Renee Baird. 
93. Collection of this $60,000 is the subject of one of the counts in Canyon County 
Case No. CV 09-11855 and, at this time, those sums are not being sought herein. 
94. Counterclaimants had an ownership interest in a business entity named "R-R 
Investments, Inc." See R-R Investments, Inc. 1990 Annual Report Form attached 
hereto as "Exhibit L." 
95. The "R&R" in "R-R Investments, Inc." was meant to stand for Roy Rice and as 
such the entity was regularly referred to by Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants as simply "R&R." 
96. Counterdefendants provided legal advice in forming and were the registered agent 
for "R-R Investments, Inc." 
97. Counterdefendants altered corporate filings with the Office of the Secretary of 
State for "R-R Investments, Inc." without the authorization or signature of 
Counterclaimants. See Articles of Amendment for R-R Investments, Inc. attached 
hereto as "Exhibit M." 
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98. Counterdefendants or their agents forged the signature of Defendant Michael Rice 
in fraudulently "authorizing" the Articles of Amendment which purported to 
change the corporate name of "R-R Investments Inc." to "Rentals and Royalties, 
Inc." See Articles of Amendment for R-R Investments, Inc. attached hereto as 
"Exhibit M." 
99. Michael Rice's purported signature was insufficient authority to amend the 
articles of R-R Investments, Inc. 
100. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants of the amendments referred 
to in the preceding paragraphs and "Exhibit M." 
101. The whereabouts of and the value of the assets of R-R Investments, Inc. are 
unknown due to the negligent, willful, fraudulent, and reckless actions of 
Counterdefendants. 
102. Counterdefendants engaged in complex litigation which became known as the 
"Sumner Matter" concerning stock in several radio stations and loans made to 
Steve Sumner and various entities he controlled. 
103. The Sumner Matter involved loans to a "Steve Sumner" made by 
Counterclaimants through what Counterclaimants believed was Capital 
Broadcasting Inc., Western Broadcasting, Inc., and/or R-R Investments, Inc.; 
business entities created by Counterdefendants for Counterclaimants. 
104. In exchange for these loans, Counterclaimants supposedly received 1000 shares 
stock in each of the corporations which purportedly owned said radio stations. 
See "Exhibits N and O" attached hereto. 
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105. These shares were to have constituted the entirety of the ownership of Capital 
Broadcasting Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc and based on representations 
made by Counterdefendants secured the loans which became the primary issue in 
the Sumner Matter. 
106. "Rentals and Royalties, Inc." was also a party to the Sumner Matter. 
107. Counterdefendants made statements and acted as though they were representing 
Counterclaimants and their interests in the entities involved in the Sumner Matter 
including "R-R Investments, Inc." which unbeknownst to Counterclaimants had 
been changed to "Rentals and Royalties, Inc." 
108. Counterdefendants settled the Sumner Matter for approximately $387,000 without 
informing Counterclaimants of said settlement or the amount of their interest 
therein. 
109. A letter to Van Bishop referring to the Sumner Matter and the involvement of 
"Rentals and Royalties, Inc." is attached hereto as "Exhibit P" and illustrates that 
Counterdefendants referred to "Rentals and Royalties, Inc." as "R-R." 
110. The settlement agreement in the Sumner Matter also included a Confidentiality 
Agreement, attached hereto as "Exhibit Q," which stated "The parties do further 
stipulate and agree that none of the terms of this settlement or any agreements or 
payments herein, including the aforesaid Promissory Note, require the filing by 
any of the parties of a federal 1099 form or any other notification either to the 
United States, or any department thereof or any state or any department thereof 
and none of the parties shall make said filing without the written consent of all 
parties." 
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111. Counterdefendants made material misrepresentations to Counterclaimants 
regarding the status of settlement negotiations of the Sumner Matter which made 
it impossible for Counterclaimants to verify the precise nature of or status of this 
very complex case. 
112. The Confidentiality Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit Q" made it impossible 
for Counterclaimants to verify the precise nature of or status of this very complex 
case. 
113. Counterdefendants comingled said settlement funds which were due to 
Counterclaimants with funds of their own. 
114. Counterdefendants comingled said settlement funds which were due to 
Counterclaimants with the estate of Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz's deceased 
grandmother Bessie B. Matcham. 
115. Dennis Sallaz is the Personal Representative of and Attorney for his 
grandmother's estate. 
116. Counterclaimants discovered that Counterdefendants had in fact settled the 
Sumner Matter during their investigation following the settlement of their claims 
against Renee Baird in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
117. In addition to other sums and property described herein, Counterclaimants are 
owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of the Sumner matter. 
118. Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice are entitled to and hereby request this 
Court issue an order for the above balance, as well as any additional sums 
determined by the trier of fact to have been wrongfully withheld by 
Counterdefendants, plus pre and post-judgment interest. 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, P. 23 
000075
• • 
119. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover its attorney's fees and cost 
of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 




120. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
121. It would be unjust for Counterdefendants to retain or benefit from the sums and 
property obtained from Counterclaimants described herein. 
122. Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice are entitled to and hereby request this 
Court issue an order of restitution for the above balance, wrongfully withheld 
sums mentioned herein, and wrongfully withheld property described herein plus 
pre and post-judgment interest. 
123. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3 ), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 




LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
124. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
125. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
126. In connection with the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction described above, 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz entered into a business transaction with 
Counterclaimants in violation ofldaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a). 
127. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) Counterdefendants Dennis 
Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. had a duty to advise and give 
Counterclaimants and give reasonable opportunity to obtain independent legal 
counsel, to inform Counterclaimants in writing of the essential terms of the 
transaction, including but not limited to whether Counterdefendants were 
representing Counterclaimants in the transaction. 
128. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. breached their 
duty to advise Counterclaimants to obtain independent legal counsel. 
129. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd fraudulently and 
knowingly concealed the material misrepresentations described herein. 
130. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. engaged in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4. 




131. Counterdefendants had a duty to notify Counterclaimants of the receipt of funds 
which Counterclaimants had an interest in. See Idaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct l.15(a). 
132. Counterdefendants breached their duty to notify Counterclaimants of the receipt 
of funds which Counterclaimants had an interest in. This breach was a violation 
of Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(a). 
133. After a reasonable request, Counterdefendants had a duty to provide an 
accounting for fees and costs claimed or previously collected. See Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct l .5(f). 
134. Counterdefendants breached their duty to provide an accounting for fees and costs 
claimed or previously collected. 
135. This failure to provide an accounting for fees and costs was a violation of Idaho 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5( f). 
136. Counterdefendants had a duty of competent and diligent representation as well as 
adequate communication. See Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, and 
1.4. 
13 7. Counterdefendants breached their duties of competent and diligent representation 
as well as adequate communication by the actions described herein. 
138. Counterdefendants had a duty not to solicit substantial gifts from 
Counterclaimants. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.8(c). 
139. Counterclaimants breached their duty to not solicit substantial gifts from 
Counterclaimants and violated Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.8(c). 
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140. Counterdefendants had a duty not to engage in a conflict of interest transaction 
which there was a significant risk the representation of Counterclaimants was 
materially limited by Counterdefendants' responsibilities to other clients as well 
as Counterdefendants' own self interest. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
l.7(a)(2) 
141. Counterdefendants breached this duty and engaged in a conflict of interest 
transaction which there was a significant risk the representation of 
Counterclaimants was materially limited by Counterdefendants' responsibilities to 
other clients as well as Counterdefendants' own self interest. 
142. If this Court determines the statute of limitations has run on any of the 
counterclaims asserted herein, Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. had a duty to advise Counterclaimants as to the statute of 
limitations on said claims. 
143. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. breached their 
duty to advise Counterclaimants of the statute of limitations on said claims. 
144. By reason of the foregoing negligent actions, Counterclaimants have suffered 
general and special damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact including 
but not limited to the following damages: 
a. Counterclaimants have expended m excess of $25,000 in 
attorney's fees as a direct and proximate result of the negligent, 
willful, and malicious actions described herein. Those fees 
continue to accrue. 
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b. Counterclaimants executed promissory notes in favor of 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz for the principal amount of 
$20,800 and interest at 12% per anum. 
c. Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the 
settlement of the Sumner Matter. 
145. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover its attorney's fees and cost 
of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 
12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those costs are 
$5,000. 
COUNTV 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
146. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
147. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
148. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. had fiduciary 
duties to Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice in connection with the 
legal representation and business transactions described herein. 
149. These fiduciary duties include but are not limited to the duty of loyalty, the duty 
to avoid self dealing, the duty to avoid comingling assets, the duty to keep and 
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render accounts, the duty to furnish information, the duty to exercise reasonable 
care and skill, and the duty to take and keep control. 
150. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. were negligent, willful, reckless, outrageous, malicious and 
fraudulent and therefore breached said fiduciary duties. 
151. Counterdefendants negligently, fraudulently, and willfully concealed their 
deceitful and wrongful actions from Counterclaimants. 
152. By reason of the foregoing negligent, willful, and malicious actions, 
Counterclaimants have suffered general and special, damages in amount to be 
proven by the trier of fact including but not limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $25,000 in 
attorney's fees as a direct and proximate result of the negligent, 
willful, and malicious actions described herein. Those fees 
continue to accrue. 
b) Counterclaimants executed promissory notes in favor of 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz for the principal amount of 
$20,800 and interest at 12% per annum. 
c) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the 
settlement of the Sumner Matter. 
153. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
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154. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
155. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
156. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd fraudulently and 
knowingly failed to inform Counterclaimants of the statute of limitations on any 
claims asserted herein which this Court rules the statute of limitations has run on 
said claims. 
157. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants were willful, reckless, outrageous, 
malicious and fraudulent. 
158. By reason of the foregoing Counterclaimants have suffered the damages including 
but not limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $25,000 in 
attorney's fees as a direct and proximate result of the negligent, 
willful, and malicious actions described herein. Those fees 
continue to accrue. 
b) Counterclaimants executed promissory notes in favor of 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz for the principal amount of 
$20,800 and interest at 12% per anum. 
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c) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the 
settlement of the Sumner matter. 
159. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3 ), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VII 
CONVERSION 
160. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
161. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 
2002 Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an ATV trailer which are owned by 
Counterclaimants. The Bill of Sale for said ATV's and ATV trailer is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit F." 
162. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said A TVs and A TV 
trailer to Counterclaimant Eugene Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz pp 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
163. Accordingly, the Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the 
Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce awarded the proceeds of this sale to Dennis Sallaz. 
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164. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of a Winnebago Motorhome 
VIN 1GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien 
holder on. The title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
165. Counterdefendants are in possession of funds described herein which are due and 
owing to Counterclaimants. 
166. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz has not extinguished Counterclaimant's lien on 
said Motorhome. 
167. Counterdefendants wrongfully refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted 
wrongful dominion over said funds, A TVs, trailer, and Motorhome. 
168. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said funds, ATVs, 
trailer, and Motorhome and for general and special damages incurred by reason of 
said wrongful possession. 
169. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VIII 
CLAIM AND DELIVERY 
170. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
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171. Counterdefendant Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 
Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an ATV trailer which are owned by 
Counterclaimants. The Bill of Sale for said ATV's and ATV trailer is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit F." 
172. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said ATVs and ATV 
trailer to Counterclaimant Eugene Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz pp 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
173. Prior to filing this complaint, demand has been made by counsel for 
Counterclaimant for the return of said A TVs and A TV trailer. 
174. Counterdefendants refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted wrongful 
dominion over said ATVs and ATV trailer. 
175. Counterclaimants are entitled to immediate possession and control of said ATVs, 
and A TV trailer. 
176. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said ATVs and ATV 
trailer and for general and special damages incurred by reason of said wrongful 
possession. 
177. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 




FORECLOSURE OF LIEN 
• 
1 78. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
179. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of a Winnebago Motorhome 
VIN 1GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien 
holder on. The title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
180. Prior to filing this complaint, demand has been made by counsel for 
Counterclaimant for the return of said Motorhome. 
181. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz has not extinguished Counterclaimant's lien of 
$8,500 on said Motorhome. 
182. Counterdefendants refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted wrongful 
dominion over said Motorhome. 
183. Counterclaimants are entitled to immediate possession and control of said 
Motorhome. 
184. Alternatively, Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of damages of $8,500 
plus pre and post-judgment interest. 
185. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said Motorhome and 
for general and special damages, including but not limited to pre and post-
judgment interest, incurred by reason of said wrongful possession and failure to 
satisfy said $8,500 lien. 
186. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
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connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those costs 
are $5,000. 
COUNTX 
AIDING AND ABETTING IN THE COMISSION OF A TORTIOUS ACT 
187. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
188. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimant and 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz. 
189. The foregoing actions by Counterefendant Sallaz were willful, reckless, 
outrageous, malicious, fraudulent, and tortious. 
190. Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and fraudulently and wrongfully 
withheld information regarding their willful, negligent, and fraudulent actions 
described herein. 
191. Counterdefendant Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. aided and abetted in the 
commission of said willful, reckless, outrageous, malicious, fraudulent, and 
tortious acts. 
192. As a result of the foregoing, Counterclaimants suffered and are entitled to an 
award of general and special damages in an amount to be proven by the trier of 
fact. 
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193. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaim.ants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those costs 
are $5,000. 
COUNT XI 
VIOLATION OF THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
I.C. § 48-601 et seq. 
194. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the 
preceding paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set 
forth. 
195. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
196. Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and fraudulently and wrongfully 
withheld information regarding their willful, negligent, and fraudulent actions 
described herein. 
197. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants violated provisions of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act I.C. 48-601 et seq including but not limited to: 
a) Passing off goods or services as those of another; 
b) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the 
source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods; 
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c) Causing likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding as to 
affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, 
another; 
d) Engaging in acts or practices which is otherwise misleading, false, 
or deceptive to the consumer; and 
e) Engaging in any unconscionable method, act or practice in the 
conduct of trade or commerce as provided in LC. 48-603(c); 
198. As a result of the foregoing, Counterclaimants suffered and are entitled to an 
award of general and special damages in an amount to be proven by the trier of 
fact. 
199. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
COUNT XII 
QUIET TITLE 
200. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the 
preceding paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set 
forth. 
201. Eugene "Roy" Rice was the first lien holder on a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VIN 
546265334 which was owned by Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz. 
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202. Said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado is the same Cadillac Eldorado that is the subject of 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
203. Dennis Sallaz failed to satisfy said lien on the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
204. In January or February, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice lawfully 
repossessed the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
205. On or about February 1, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice was issued a 
Certificate of Title by the Idaho Department of Transportation for the 1954 
Cadillac Eldorado which is attached hereto as "Exhibit R." 
206. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is the lawful owner of said 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado. 
207. Dennis Sallaz attached a false certificate of title for said Cadillac Eldorado to his 
Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
208. Dennis Sallaz or his agent forged the signature of Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" 
Rice on said false certificate of title in purporting to release said lien. 
209. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice did not release his lien in favor of Dennis 
Sallaz. 
210. On or about January 4, 2011 Dennis Sallaz purported to assign whatever interest 
he allegedly had to "Marcy Fox" by way of an Assignment of Title on the false 
title attached to Dennis Sallaz's Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
211. On or about March 20, 2011 Dennis Sallaz filed an application for Title Stop 
stating "My car was stolen out of a locked storage lot within the last 20 days and a 
duplicate title was forged and filed with the Idaho Department of Transportation 
in the name of Eugene Leroy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice on February 1, 2011 (see 
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attached). The original title was never lost. The application for duplicate title was 
fraudulent and there was not any valid debt owed at the time of theft and no 
repossession has been done and it is imperative that this title be frozen pending 
the filing of a theft report and court action." 
212. The representations in the application for title stop were false. 
213. Dennis Sallaz has filed a Complaint for claim and delivery and has obtained a 
Temporary Restraining Order preventing Counterclaimants from disposing of said 
1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
214. The above referenced actions by Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz have created a 
cloud on the title of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and have prevented 
Counterclaimants from disposing of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
215. By reason of the foregoing claimants have suffered general and special damages 
and are entitled to an order quieting title for said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado in the 
name of Eugene "Roy" Rice. 
216. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code § § 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 




SLANDER OF TITLE 
• 
217. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the 
preceding paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set 
forth. 
218. Eugene "Roy" Rice was the first lien holder on a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VIN 
546265334 which was owned by Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz. 
219. Said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado is the same Cadillac Eldorado that is the subject of 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
220. Dennis Sallaz failed to satisfy said lien on the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
221. In January or February, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice lawfully 
repossessed the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
222. On or about February 1, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice was issued a 
Certificate of Title by the Idaho Department of Transportation for the 1954 
Cadillac Eldorado which is attached hereto as "Exhibit R." 
223. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is the lawful owner of said 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado. 
224. Dennis Sallaz attached a false certificate of title for said Cadillac Eldorado to his 
Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
225. Dennis Sallaz or his agent forged the signature of Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" 
Rice on said false certificate of title in purporting to release said lien. 
226. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice did not release his lien in favor of Dennis 
Sallaz. 
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227. On or about January 4, 2011 Dennis Sallaz purported to assign whatever interest 
he allegedly had to "Marcy Fox" by way of an Assignment of Title on the false 
title attached to Dennis Sallaz's Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
228. On or about March 20, 2011 Dennis Sallaz filed an application for Title Stop 
stating "My car was stolen out of a locked storage lot within the last 20 days and a 
duplicate title was forged and filed with the Idaho Department of Transportation 
in the name of Eugene Leroy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice on February 1, 2011 (see 
attached). The original title was never lost. The application for duplicate title was 
fraudulent and there was not any valid debt owed at the time of theft and no 
repossession has been done and it is imperative that this title be frozen pending 
the filing of a theft report and court action." 
229. The representations in the application for title stop were false. 
230. Dennis Sallaz has filed a Complaint for claim and delivery and has obtained a 
Temporary Restraining Order preventing Counterclaimants from disposing of said 
1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
231. The above referenced malicious actions by Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz have 
created a cloud on the title of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and have prevented 
Counterclaimants from disposing of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
232. By reason of the foregoing malicious actions and Counterdefendant's slander of 
title claimants have suffered general and special damages. 
233. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
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cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
234. Counterdefendants by their conduct, have engaged in an extreme deviation from 
reasonable standards of conduct, and have engaged in gross, willful, outrageous, 
malicious, wrongful and wanton conduct, and, therefore, Counterclaimants 
reserve the right to seek leave of the Court to amend their Counterclaim to plead 
for the recovery of punitive damages against Counterdefendants and in such 
amounts as will be proven at trial. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants pray that this Court: 
A. That Counterefendants be restrained by Injunction from disposing of, 
injuring, or concealing the said funds, Motorhome, ATV' s and A TV 
trailer from Counterclaimant. 
B. That an Order be issued requiring Counterdefendants to return said funds, 
Motorhome, ATV' s and ATV trailer to Counterclaimants. 
C. That in the event Counterdefendants have lost, concealed, or refuse to 
return said funds, Motorhome, ATV's and ATV trailer to Counterclaimant 
that an Order be issued that Counterclaimants be awarded $7,500 for said 
ATVs and ATV trailer, $8,500 for said Motorhome, and $427,000 plus pre 
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and post judgment interest. 
D. That Counterclaimants be awarded general and special damages against 
Counterdefendants jointly and severally. 
E. Counterclaimants pray that this Court enter judgment against 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz for the principal and interest due on the 
two promissory notes; 
F. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for sums due and 
owning from Counterclaimants' trust account. 
G. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
unjust enrichment against Counterdefendants; 
H. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
legal malpractice against Counterdefendants; 
I. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
breach of fiduciary duties against Counterdefendants; 
J. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
fraud against Counterdefendants; 
K. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
Conversion against Counterdefendants; 
L. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
Claim and Delivery against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
M. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claim to 
foreclose on their lien against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
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N. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
aiding and abetting the commission of a tortious act against 
Countderdefendant Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd.; 
0. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against 
Counterdefendants; 
P. Issue an Order quieting title to the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VIN 
546265334 in Counterclaimants' name and dissolving the Temporary 
Restraining Order. 
Q. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
Slander of Title against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
R. Award Counterclaimants their costs and attorney's fees in connection with 
this action; and 
S. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, costs and fees under and 
pursuant to Idaho law, from the date of entry of judgment in this matter 
until full satisfaction of the judgment. 
T. A ward Counterclaimants any other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
DATED this 7!1J day of April 2011. 
Attorney for 
Defendants/Counterclaimants 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
• 
VERIFICATION 
EUGENE RICE after being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
That he is one of the Defendants and Counterclaimants in the foregoing 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, that he has read 
the ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY and believes 
the facts stated therein are true based upon his own information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Defendant/Counterclaimant has set his hand and seal 
the day and year first above written 
~ er~" . 0 :·~~· ~~ GENE "ROY" RI~; 
/ 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this .. :J.itSday of April 2011. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residi~g ~t: Nc:er{J;, 
Comm1ss1on exp1res 3--f\- B 
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ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
• 
VERIFICATION 
JANET RICE after being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
That she is one of the Defendants and Counterclaimants in the foregoing 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY, that she has read 
the ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JOINDER OF A PARTY and believes 
the facts stated therein are true based upon her own information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Defendant/Counterclaimant has set her hand and seal 
the day and year first above written 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this d·~day of April 2011. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: ~rcn pS· 
Commission expires 3-t q - (-3;> 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
• 
VERIFICATION 
MICHAEL RICE after being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
That he is one of the Defendants in the foregoing ANSWER, that he has 
read the ANSWER and believes the facts stated therein are true based upon his own 
information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Defendant has set his hand and seal the day and year 
first above written. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this _J]_ day of April 2011. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: }J:x::y,~, 
Commission expires·:::\9 -- b 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this P'j' day of April 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND JO IND ER OF A 
PARTY was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Iver J. Longeteig 
5304 Turret 
Boise, ID 83 703 
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ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION 
\I/~ LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
~ To the Secretary of State of Idaho 
1 (, Corporations Division 
~r:,'.,' 700 West Jefferson Room 203 
(,r' ... ~ P. 0. Sox 8:3720 • Boise, ID 83720-0080 
,,1,, .• ~ 
, .• / G.:: ·'<-<tS. --$' ~-w. ~ name ofthe limited liability company rs: __ Re_a_l_Hcme_. _s_1_._1._c_. --------
! ~ - . 
f Th~t}idd'ress of the initial registered office is: 10oo s · RDosevel t St · 
~~ Co . (net a PO Sex) 
Boise, ID 83705 
------------------ and the name of the initial registered 
agent at that address is: ___ De_nn_is_J_. _sa_1_1_az ______________ _ 
Signature of registered agent: --------------------
3. The latest date certain on wtiich the limited liabiiity company will dissolve: 1-1-2011 
4. ls management of the limited liability company vested in a manager or managers? 
ll Yes D No (check appropriate bcx) 
5. If management is vested in one or more manager(s), list the name(s) and address{es) of at 
least one initial manager. If management is vested in the members, list the name(s} and 
address( es) of at least one initial member. 
Name: Address: 
Renee L. Baird 1000 S Roosevelt St Boise, ID 83705 
6. Signature of at least one person listed in #5 above: 
~:i~-i =::, 
81/19/2881 89188 
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· OPERA TING-AGRE;EM:ENT 
01! 
l.U;ALBOMES, LLC 
· DATED EF:F!!:CTIV'!; JANDA.RY 19, ZOO] 
.. .. . -
I U: ..:'.i..:'.iblc:53 
• N0.255 i,;26 
000838 . , 
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OPERA.mW AGREEMENT OF REAL HOMES, LLC 
an Idaho Limited. Liability Compa.".ly 
, NO. 2G5 
.The u.,-,denign.ed n::ember~,.desiring to form a liin.hed Habiliro; company under the Idaho 




1. I Name. The name of the limited liability company (th~ ''LLC") i~ RE.AL ;!OM.ESi 
. l .2 ,t.Ji.f cles of Or<?:a.nizatio11 .. Articles of organizatfon. were filed with th.e ldaho Secretary 
of Seate on .January 191 2001. · · · . 
l .3 ~riooipaJ Place 9fBuainess: The principal office of the LLC shall initially be located 
at J OOQ S .. Roosevclr Street, 13_oise, ldaho 83 705. The member,1 ~ay relocate1 ~e prir..cipaJ crffice or 
e~tabtish additional offices from time !o timl! in the.ir discretion. . 
1.4 _Regi..'ltered Office an'd :Registered Ag_e.m. The LI-C's lrutial r·eg1stered office shall be 
at l 000 S. Rca~evelt Street, Boise, Id.aha ·83705, and the name of its .initial registered agent at such 
address shall be-Dennis J. ~anaz . . The members. r:nAY change, the registered office and regi&te:r~d 
a.gent frol1l thne to time in their discrc"tion. · · 
.U Bu~Puo;o". Th~!J,Cisorganizedto~--,.P'-;d._~ 
and to pngage many other Iawfo! business. . · . . . · 9 
1.6 Agreemen.t;. The members. executing the Operating Agreement hereby agree ta the 
te·rms c:.nd conditions ofthe Operating Ag:re.ement, as it may from time to time ~e amended according 
to i~ tc.nn.s. To the ement aay provision of the Open.ring Agreement is prolubited or ineffective 
under the Act., the O pe;rm:ir,g.Agre.emi::nt shall be considered amended to the: smallest degree possible 
in order to make the Operating Agreement effective -under th~ Ar:t. In the evenr the Act is-
subacquently amen~ed or intcrpreti;:d in such a way to_ make valid any provision of tbc Ope~ting 
Agreement t.1lat was-formerly invalid, such prov1sion shrul be considererl ~o b~ valid from the 
effective date of such i.nterprerati on ·or amendment. Further, it is the e)!::press intention of the 
mem ben, that the LLC be treated as a pa.r',m:rship for purpose~ of federal and state taxatjpn. The 
members· agree to take such actions a.nd make such elections as may be necessary or co1wenient to 
cnsun, ~bat the LLC be tre11ated as a p·artnership. lf it is determined thar the LLC l~ or vvilJ not be 
classified. _as a partnenh:i:p under the Jntemal Revenue Code (the "Code'') , tben the Opera.ting 
Agrecm~t shall bi:: considered amen ded to the smallest degrcq po5sible in whate:yer J11anner · 
necen~ary to ensure th,arthe LLC is or shall be t.raa.ted'as- a. pa.rt:lership.under- tbe Code for purposes 
or federal and state C3X3.tion. 
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ART1Cl.E"2 
}.{ENJ:B:SRS. CONTRIBUTIONS, .Al~D INTERESTS 
2.1 ~~e3. Addre~~es and 1,j1ial ComnbJ.!ti.sm.~. The n!,lltlcs an.d addresses of tire initial 
members qf the LLC, and the ·agnied value ofthe\,r respective initial caµiral contributions and initial 
percantagc ownership interests in tqe LLC (the ''Sharing Ratios'') a..e-a_s a~~:t~d .in tthe cha."t below. 
su.bjeci: i:o the adjuatmerit as provided in th.is Article 2. Each of the members as his ·initial 
comn1mtion h~ contributed his undivided one.-half (%) interei;t in and ~o th9se certain !:'NO parccls 
of cornrnen::ial real esure, more parJc>Jla:ly described on &hiQit A anached hereto, together 'With 
. ail appurtenanc_es, and any existing lease~ contrnct; or agreements relating thereto. 
;Nrune and address 
Re.neeBrurd 
1000 S. Ro o.seve!t 
Boise . Idaho 83705 
Agr:eec:l Y aJue of Contrj.b'ution 
$50,000 
Sharing Ratio t 
' . ' 
160% 
2.2 Limitation ofLta:bllit<1. Each mcmber~s liability shall be limite0d tc the maximtlm · 
extent permitted by applicable law. The. failure of r.he LLC to obscrv~ - any fo'rmaliries ~ 
requirements relating to the cxercisr: of its p9wers or management of its business or affairs !hall n~f 
be grounds for imposing pers,ona.l liability on the members ofT.be Ji~bilities of the Ll...C. . .n. 
··t.', 
2. 3 No L iabilitv for LLC Debts; Person.a1 Guarantees. A member shall not be penonaJjf 
liable fc;ir fl.TIY debts or losses of the LLC beyond his respectiv': cap(tal contrfoutjoru, e:iccept ~l 
oihernist! rCCJuired. by law. Notwithstanding the fore:goiog~ the members shall execulc person.id 
guarantees fur loans .made to th~ llC as and only tot.he cxiem required by future l.~nd~rs. · 
2.4 Other .Businesa of Members, Except as may be othe.rn~$e provideq in agre~eo~s ·: 
arnor,g tbe members and the LLC, nny member may engage indcpf,ldently or vith others in otber 
b1isioess ancl investment vemure5 of cery nature and descriptjon and ahall have no obligation to 
account to t1·19 LLC for sucb business or investments Dr for busine!ls or mvestment oppo·r,.:imitie.s~ 
2.5 Additiona l Members. Additional membcr.5 shall not be admitted except upon a 
una.nimou~ vote of the ni.cmben. 
2.6 Addhional Ca:oital 
2.6. l Additional Contributiom. Except 8:-3 set forth in this Seci:[on .2.6, n.o member 
sbaJJ be re{1uired or permitted to make a...,y capital contributions. In ilje event chat at any ti.me, 
pursuam. to a unanimous yotc of the meq-rbtr.q, the members determine that additiocrnl fuod~ are 
reg'ui.red 'by rb. e. LLC for its busines:; or any of irn obligapon~. cxp-en.ses .. costs, liabilities or 
expenditures, th.c members :!hall be required to contribute sucb additional funds in proportion to their 
Sharing Ratios, w,[e:33 the members el~ct t)' majO'ricy vote to ha.ve the LLC ~crrow the amount of 
s~ch additional funds needed. If the members have determined that the· rnemb1:rs shall make -~ 
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a.dp.i:ional capit?i ':":nrributicn pursuant to the Section 2.6, Land a m~ber fails tom~ its required 
p9r~on of:he add_Jtian.al capiW contribution (a "Non-ConnibntlngMember'), tilen those members 
making_ the,r reqmred portion of the additicn:af capJtal',comn"bution ("Contrlb-Pting Mcmb~'') may 
elect _e1th_er of the follovroig: 0) to adjust the Sha.ring Ratios of the Com:ribtrtio.g. and ·Non-
Co.ntobuung Members by increasing the ~haring' .Ratios of the Non-Co11~nnuting Members; or (ii) 
the_ Contribu~~g Memh~s may,. in a.dql"cion to !lilY other Jegp.l r;eme_gies ~yailable, in propon:ion to __ _ 
thei.r O'illl'\er:!!rup .Intcresta or a!! otherwise ~greed by the Contributing Memb~. conm"bute a.dditioniu. 
funds to ~o_ver such a.moum that has not been coni:,ributed. 
. . 
2, 6 .2 Adjustment ta Sh.a.rim, Ratios.. The S.)laring Ratios of each Contributing 
Member sb.a.lt be ine,ea.sed by Adju.s1:ment P~centa.ge X1 whi~h shall be calcu!ared for eacb 
Contributu,g Member accordit1gto the formula. s~t forth below. ·For purposes of r-.h.is formula,° the 
phrase "Addi-tionai Capital Contripi;tion" shall tbean the additional ca.pitaJ conmoutiou.s ma.de. by 
eac~ Contribt.,tlng Memb~r purs.ua.'1.1 to . a capitai c;all under ~cctio~ 2.5. L The Tota.1 Capital 
Contnoutions of all .Members to Date shan· linc!udc the a.greed value of the initial capital 
·contributions as se~ forth in Section 2.1 above. ! 
Adjustment => 
Percemage X 
Arno1Jttt of A~tional Canital Contribution . 
Total CapitaJ Comr:iputions + Sum of All Additional 
of c\ll Members to Date Capital Contnoutions 
The rcspectrre Snaring Ratios of the Non-Contributing Me~bers :;hall be dezreased 
(bur not below zero) by each such memben, pro rnta share (based ori the total Sharins Ratios of the 
Non-C,;:mtribu~g Members) of Adjustment ·.Percentage X. 
. 2.l'i.3 Co.ntribi..'1io11 of Addltiona! Funru . lf a Contn'bu.1ing Member elet?tS to . · 
cootiibute addition~l funds to cover such ~mount that ha!l noc· been- contributed by a Non-:-
Coutr.ibuting Member, the advance shall be deemed a demand lo:in by the Co~mouting Member or 
Members ·to 1be Non_.-Comributi-ngMcmber bea.'ing inter~st a.t tb.e rate of tv;cJve perce:m (12%) per 
nrmurn .from the da.te the il.dVance is made. To the ext~nt of suc.h .ndva.nce plus interest, any 
distributions o,:herwise due to the Non-Contdbuting Me.'1lber shall, i.nste.ad be paki tc the 
Contributing Mc;nber or Members (pro rata with the amounts advanc~d by e.1.ch Contributing 
Member) w.ha mad6 such ·contr.ibution. · 
2. 7 Int.gr-est on Capis1tl Contributions. Except as provided in Section :2. 5 .3, no interest . 
sbaU be paid on capital connibutions . 
.2 . 8 Loans. The LLC may borrow money from any member of third panies upon such 
commercially reasonable terms and co.qditior.3 as may be approved by the. roembe~. 
· 2. 9 Ri gJns of"'illd emniti.cation. The LlC, or it3 receiver or trU.stce, shall indemnify, hold 
hnrmless, and pl:iy· alf judgmcn,;s a.nd clainis agf\.inst each member for all co~t:.S,. los.~es, liabilities and 
damages p!1id or accrued· by suct1 membe:r by re.'!san of any act pcrfonned or om.in4ed t~· be 
performed by SllCh member, in ·ca~ection wlrb the busine!ls of th LLC, to the ful)~st extent. providt:id 
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or allowed by tbe Act and the laws of _the State ofldaho, incfodi.ng atton~ey fees and cqsi:s incurred 
b~ ruch ~ember. How~ver, no rne:nber shall be indemnified from uny liabilit'f for fra\ld, bacf faith., 
wi.llful m~or-irluct:;-e-rgrassneglrge. .- _ · . · . 
. ~-10 Title fa;urance. hi the evetJt lJ)e LLC 51Jffcrn any loss. whi.ch i~ compensable th.rough 
the u:le. L'1Stlran:e olr~iried by m~er :Penni~ J.. SaU-az ani payment~ made uhdi;;,r sucp pol_icies will 
be paid to Denm.s J. Sallaz and not the LLC. · 
3 .1 Management Md Vo011g R.igl:m .. Ail members who h.ave not Di!:)i;oda.ted ·shall be 
entitled to vo1e on any matter sijbmitt~d to a vote of the Memben. fioVo?eve,, Assignees shaJl not 
be entitled ta yote on any rnaners. 
. -' J.1.1 Acts Reouiring a M.aiority Vote. ,Except .as othotwi.se pro0ded in Artie.le 
3 J .2 or otherwise int.his Operating Agre1::ment, al!. detemunatfor,s, decisions, approvaT.s a.nd actions 
affecting; the LLC a.nd its business and affairs shall be determlncd, made, app~avcd, or authorized . 
9nly.by the affirmative vote of a Majority of the ~embers, f;Xc[uding a.-iy interested Member and 
excluding ·any A3signee. 
' . 
3.1.2 Acts Requiring Unanimous Vdte. Notwithstanding Article 3.1.1, the 
following matter~, decisions and actions shaD not b~marlc Oi ta.l<en without the unanirrmus vote of 
all of rl,e Membenl, e:ccluding a.ny interested Mc:mb~ and ~eluding any Assignee: 
(a) any a.'7\endrnent to thls Operating Agreem:eni tbat changes the 
purnber of votes or degree of consent required co approve or d"isapprove any ~atters that require voce 
or con sent; and 
(b) :lJ1Y amendment to Article 6 or An;iqle 7 ofth.is Operating 
Agreement . 
. J .2 h,uthority of Members to Bind theJ,LC. The Members hereby agree rhat oo 
one Member shall have the authority cu m&k:e representations or warranties, or enter into contracts 
on bcba.lf of th~ LLC, take any action as an tgent for the LLC, or oth~rwfae bind the LLC: Rs.ther, . · 
a Majority shill be required to make represema.tions or warranties, or enter into conttac.ts on behalf . 
~ftbe LLC, take any ~ction as an agent for the LLC, pr othen.vis~ bind the LLC to Pers~ni- having. 
knowledge of such determination. The following actions, withoutlimita.tian, shaU require a :Majority 
vote: 
3.2..1 thein." tttution, prosecm:ion emd defom;e ofar.y proceecllng in the LLS: 's no.me; ,., 
3 .2.2 the pl.'lrc:hasc, recei))t, lca.se or other a-cguis.i-cio.o, o.vnership, holding, 
improvement, use and other d'eafmg wirh Property wherever located; 
000106
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. . . 3 .2.3 the sa!Ci ccnvoyance1 mortgage, pledge, lea:ae, e)(ch.ange, and other 
dtspa.5,non of Propert";; . 
. 3 ,1. 4 the en.tenn.g into ·con~racts arid guaranties; incurring of lia:biiities~ borrowing 
money, JS~ance of notes, bond;;, and otJ1cr obligatiol'.ls; a.:id the securing cf any ofits obligations by 
mortgage or pledge cr-sny -nfir:. Pmpen:y or .income; · 
. ' 
J.2.5 the .len'di~g.ofmoneyi investment and reinvest.'rlent of the LLC's funds a.--id 
receipt ancj holding of PropcITj as securir:y for repayment, including, wjthout lin:i.itation., the lo~g 
of .mont.'Y ta, and otherwise helping Members) officers, employees, and agents; 
3.2.6 the conduct afmeLLC's busmess, the est.ablishmeni afllC offices,, and the 
exercise of the powers of the LLC Within or v.ithom: the State; · 
3.2.7 the appointment of employeo.s and A~Ots of the U.C, .tb.e defirung ofthe:ir 
duties, the _establishment of~cfr compen&ation; 
3.2.S the: payment ofpenaions and es~blishment of pe.tl.~jon plans, pension trusts., 
-profit r,haring. plans, and benefit ruid in¢entive pla.,s for all or any of the current ar former Member~, 
emp1oyees, and agents of the UC; 
:$.2.9 the roa.lcing of donatioM to the public ·wel:fure or for religious charit..Q,.ble, 
scientihc, Urerary or educational purposes; 
3.Z,l O the payment or donapon, or any other act that furthers the business and affu.irs 
of the Ll;C; 
3 .2.11 the payment of compensation, or additional compensation to any or all 
Members, ·and c~ployees cin account of s~rvices prellioualy rendered to the limited liability 
campnriy, whether or not an agreement to pay .such compensation was made before rucb services 
were rendered; · 
J .2.12 the purchase: ofio.surance or:i the life of any of hs Memb';.ro, or' employees for 
the benefit of tbe LLC; 
3 .2. l 3 the partic:ipatton in ps.rmenihip agreements, joint venrures, or otber 
as~ociatfons of any kind with any pc.son or per:mns; 
3.2.14 the inde.mrification ofMernbe.s or any otherPl!nlon. 
3 .3 Maj o.i:il..)'.. ·Whenever any matter i;i reg ui.red or allowed tc:i be approved by a Majority 
ofcneMe.rnbers or aMajori~ of the rcmainir:rg Member:; undcrt.he Act or the Operating Agreemem, 
such matter shat] be ccmlridered approved 9r cor:,i;enteq ta upcn the receipt afthe affirmative a.pprova.I 
(Jr con:;cnt, either in writing or at a meeting of the Memb.ery, on ... 1emberg bavi!iz ·Shru:ing Rat;os of 
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( all the Members entitle~ _to vqte on a particular marter. for trJs pi.;rp~ae, the Shari.ng Ratios cf ail 
~i:mb~~ !!haU ?e conside~d in determining whether a Majority h..a.ve vaied ln favor of an action., 
ln:espect...l\re of. Whether or not ·a Mernbcr participates in 31.lCh vote. Msl gn~eg and, in the case of 
approvals to wttI:-drawal where consent aftl)e remaining Members is required, e!issociating Meµibers 
shall nae be cons1dered"t-.fernben e~titled to vote for the purpcse of detcrminipg a Majority. In the 
case 0.f a Mer!,'!aer wb.o bas disposed of Chat Me~br;r'.[ ~mire 1'4en:b~r,;;rzip :i;ni:c::rcst to fi.n A.s~iguec; 
but has nat been removed as a Member, the Sharing Ratio cf such A'!signee i;ha.lJ oe ·consi.'derei:! in 
detenr.Jning a 1{ajority nnd such Member's vote or consent shall be determined by such .Sharina-
R.at[o. · · · · • ;;;, 
ARTIC;LE4 
NlEETING ANT? k\1ENDME.i.°'IT 
4. i Gener.c.11. Action.s and d~cisio~s requiring the approval of the Membeni· pur.suant 
to any provision of this Operating Agreement may _be authorized ·or made either by vote of the 
required ninnber t;,f Members. ta~en ,Jt a meeting of the Membersi" or by una.n.i..pious 'Mi.tten · 
c~nsent without a. meeting. 1n s.ddrtion, · emergency actions may be taken l.n )iccorda...'1.ce with ili-e 
'Proviaions of Article 4 .6 hereof. 
4.2 Meetings. Any Member may c.a.ll a meetiag 1a copsider approval cf an ~ior:i. or 
'· 
decision under any provision of this Operating Agreement by de.livering to each other·Membcrnotice · 
of the rime a.nd purpose of such meeti."1.g at least five: (S) businesg days before the day of su.c}l 
meeJing, A Member may waive the requirement of notice of a mectil.lg ei~er by attending such 
meeting ~r e.,'(ecuting a wrinen waivcI: ·before or after such m~tbg. Any such .meeting sh.all be held 
during ·the LLC's norma:l business h9\lrs; at its pxincipal place qf b1.1sines~ tin less all o:f the other 
Me.mbers consent in. :writing ~r by tbeir at"tendance at such meeting to its being held a.t .a.iloth.er 
Jocati:on or time: Notwithstanding a.ny qther proviaion of tru:S Op~rating Agrec~em:, if all the 
members hold a me~ting at any time and place, ,mch m~~i:ng shall be vall.d wr..h:out calf or nonce 
and any ·1a.-.,,..fuj a.~cn taken at such meeting shap be the actian of the members. · 
4,3 M~mings ta]'c:l~hone. Meeting!'\ cf !be members may be ~dd by confcr'<:nce 
telephone o-r by a..-.,y other mc3:n.s of C1Jm,rnunication by which all participaots can hear each other 
simuit.aneCJu.sly during the m~ting, and such parddparion sha!J coruidtute presence jn person at the 
rncering. 
. . . . 
4.4 Unaniroou.s Consent. Any Member may.propose the.t utie UC authorize an a.cti_on 
or decision pursu~t to any provii;ion of this Operating A.greemenr by '"rumimou:; writt~n c_:1nsem: of 
a!J Members in· lieu of a meeting. A Member's written consent may be eyidenced by his signature 
on a counterpart of the f)roposaJ or by a separate writing (including facsimile) that iden.tifies the 
proposal with reai;onable. speci5ciry and $111.r.es that such i\-fombe:r consents i:o such proposal 
... 
4.5 Va~e bv Prozry. A Member may Yo~e ( or cx~cutc a writt-!!n .consent ) by proxy giv en 
to iit1Y other Membe,. Any such proxy must be in writing- ·and muat identify the specific meeting" or 
ma.trer to which the proxy appli(}s or si:2.te that it applies to aH m·atter:; (SLlbject 'to specified 
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reservatia~s, if any) ccming bef9re the L~C for' approvat under- any provision of this Operating 
Agreement ptfortu Ii specified date (whfoh 3hall not be later tt.an tne first ar..n.ive;rsary of the date on 
·which such p.rox-J is given). An:f such proxy shall be revocabk at arr</ time and shall not be eifectfve 
fl! . any meeting at whlch the Member giving sud; proxy is in anend.ance. 
·· · 4.6 · Emergency Procedures. NotwithS1:ariding any other p,n::l""'1.!li~i:i,s ~ei:-ia!,?( in the eveot 
thJr Mep1bers who cnuld authorize a LLC ac.tioo or di::cision at a duly c;aUed m~ring reasonably 
detemrine, in '.v.riting, cbat rhe LLC is faeing a sjgnifo:;am business emergency that requires · 
immcd1ue action, such Meroben may, without comp]ying'Wlt)l ge..ne~U.y applicabl.e procedures. for 
meeting~ or actions by un.animou~ .consent, authocize any act.ion or decision ,:bat .they deem 
reasoruibly ncce5sary ro a1low the LLC to benefit from a ?lgnifica.1t opporri..mit"'J or to protect the ~LC 
from !>igolficant Joss er damage, pro'nded that they rn~e re.as.enable efforts under the circtim$'mces 
to contact consulr al) Member;; concemitfg such ~ction or decision and the reJ;L~on why such action 
or decision mst .be made without ob.serving generally ·applie.l.bie procedures . 
4. 7 R~cords. The LLC shall mamtain pennaneut reC!)rds of ail actions rake..'1. by the 
Members pursuant to auy provision· of this bp erating .Agreement, including minutes of all LLC 
meering&i copi~s cf all action5 ta.ken by cons em of the Membe~s, a."1d copie,s of.all proxies pUfSUant 
1:0 which one Member vor.os or executes a consent on behalf of another. 
4.8. Operating AgrE'.emenI Mw Be Mod.ified. This Operating A.greement m.ay be 
modiiie-4 or amended from time to time only by a wntien instrument ado'pted and ~ecuted by all of 
t.be Members. 
4.8 .. 1 De.~ign.ated Representatives. In the c.aae of a member that is a corporation, 
1JaT.tn~rship, limited iiabil.ity company, or other organization, assodation or eri.tity (an i'Enti.t't 
Membe:r''), such member shall deslgn;,,1e ·one (l) indivjdual who alone· .shall be. entitled to attend 
meetings of th,:: LLC a.t:1d vote sucb member/ s . Sb~-ing Ratio. Entity memben may change their 
design~~ed repr~em:ativcs frc,nJ? time ·to time by prcvidi..-1g the I.LC \iv;th notice of .:u~b change in 
accordance. with the pro-visions of this Ope.rating Agreement. Ari.y change in an Entity Member's 
deslgnarnd represem..a.tiv~ aha.J.l be effective upon the LLC' s receipt of notice of si;cb ch:uigc. 
4.8.2 'Right ta Relv r.m .... Pesig;nated Repg:sentative. The LLC, an.d its members, 
shall have: the right io rely on t.he most recently appointed de.signaced rcpreseut'afrrc of a.., .Entity 
.lvte:mber. ·Each Entity .Member shall be liable to indemnifJ, defend and hold h?,rroless the LLC n.no 
t,hc other members from all cost, Habi1ity and damag~ that any of such indemnified persor~ ~y 
incur (inciudir1g, without limitation, e.nameys' fees and: expenses) ari~ing: from or relat~d to any 
.dispute concerning the authority of an Entity Member's dcsigna.ted representative. 
AR'IlCLE 5 
. ACCOUNTlNG A}fD RECORDS 
5. l Beaks of Account. The LLC shall keep adequate bo oks and records a.tit~ 
Pr incipai p-lace ofbusiness, ?etting forth at rue and acctJ.ra.t~ account of aU bu-~in es~ mmsactions 
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arising om. cf an din cou11ection ;"\?11th tile conduct of tne LLC. The Member:. agree that Jeffrey 
W. Casey shml be responsible for th~ books a.'1,d records, Any Member or his designa.red have 
the rig.ht, at any r~sou~ble time, to have.access re a.id inspect ap.d copy the cot1.tents of :ruch 
bocks or records. Any Member requesting ~cess to or inspection cf s11ch books or records sbail 
. _pay the reasonable cost of such access or inspection. · 
5.2 Fiscal Yea( The "fiscal year- of the LLC sh·all· b~ th~ cal~~d~ year . ......, 
5.3 Accoup,!:ing Reoom. Within ninety (90) days after the dose of each :fi11eal year) 
each member shall receive an unaudited teport of the activities of ~he LLC for the prnceding 
fisc..a! year, including a. copy of a balance sheer of the LLC as of the ertd of such year and a 
staremem: of income or loss for such ye!Ir. · 
. . 5.4 Ta.~ Returns, Within ninetj' (90) dayii a.ofter the end of each. focal yeirr, each 
rncrnber shall be furnished a ~tti.ternent suimblc for u::ic in th~ yTeparation of the rncrnber' s 
income tax return, showing th.e amount:; of any distributiom, contributions, gains, losses, prof.ts~ 
or credits al.located to i.t..e membor du.-ring such £seal year. 
5.5 Jax Matters Partner. R.euee Baird shall be designated to act as the tax 
matters partner ofthe-tLC pursuant to §6231(a)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code. Any c:iember 
designated as tax-matters partner shaJI ta.1..::e rucb action as may be peces~ary to cause each other 
member to become a notice partner -within the meaning of §6223 of foe Code. A:r;,y m~ber who 
is designated u:x matter partner ma.y not take a.,y action contemplated by §§6222 through 6232 
oftL"le Internal Revenue Code 'Without tht3 consent of the members. · . 
ARTICLE6 
ALLOCATIONS 
6.1 AUocations Genera!J.y. Except as otberv,,ise provided in this Operating 
t\.greement, an items of incuroe, gain, loss, deduction and credit of the LLC sba.ll be al!oc.atcd amQog 
all the member:, fu. proportiqn ta the.ir Sharing R.atios. 
6.2 LO$$ Allocation~1. Lc;tsses of 1he LLC shall be allocated to rhe membe:rs in 
prnportion t·o their Sharir..g Ra.uos, except that in the cit!\c of a loss realized on the liquidation oftbc 
LLC under ArticJe 9 hcreo~ one hundred percent (100%) of ~uch loss shall be a,!tocaccd to th.e 
members who have rude ~ash or a.greed value capfral contributions to the LLC (.in the ~arnc 
relationship as t(Jeir respective capit~ account.;, ~ave been reduced to zero. 
6.3 Net P.rofit AJlocations. Net profits from the LLC' s operations sh.all first be 
nUocated to the ·members who receive cash or propeny ctistribu"tioT.1S under Section 7.3 to the extct1t 
oft.he cash dis+..Jibwtions received during the extent of the cash di3tributions received 'during the 
applicable taxab]ti: year ·and then to the: members in proportion 1:0 :he respective Sha..-ing ~rio.s. 
6 .4 Net Gain AJlocati_O™-- Net gai.n from a sale of all or substarrti31ly .\lJi of the LL C's 
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) assets shall be .a11ocared among t:h~ members in proporti-on to their respecrive Sharing Ratios. 
6.S · Capital Accounts. An individuaJ capital account shall be maintained for efl.C.h 
member. Each member's caphal a.er.mint &.\all be 0) credi1ed with all ca.pual comnbutioPS by ruch 
member and the member's distributive share of aU income and g~n Qncluding any income exempt 
· from fodt::ral income tax); a.n,d. (ii) c:lurJed ~'ith the· :unoum cf all distribi..'i:ians· to such member and 
the members' s distributive share of losses and derlu.ctions. Caoital accounts shall be ma.i;taineci in 
accordance with federal income tt:t •accounting principles as set forth m Treas. Reg. l-704-
l(b)(2)(iv) or any sucr.cssor proviSJon. · 
6.6 Compfa!)Ct. \l,.,jth Section 70"1. The provisions oftbi.:t Article 6 as they relate: to the 
rpainrnaa.nce of c2pitaJ s.ccoums are intend:ed, and shall be construed~ and; lf nec.essary, modified as 
provid,;id ia Artide 12, iO Cause the ~Uoi;:atlon~ of pra'fits, lasses, i.ncom.o, gain and credit purn.1ant 
to Article 6 to have su bs.tantial economic .effect under ~he Regulations promulgated under § §704(b) 
anrl 7D4(c) of the Coc\e, in light of the distributions made: pur?1Jant t6 AnicJe 7 and 9 and the capital 
contri.b!J'Jons made punuant to Article 2 . 
. ARTICLE 7 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
7. l Dipributio,ns ar Members' Disc,~tion. Except as· otherwise provided in tbis 
,Operating Agreement, dismoutions of the llC' s cash .available for d!S'moution s.han be made at Teast 
semj-aMually for ~ach fiscal year. 
7.2 Ca.!!h Ava.ilable for'Distribution. For purposes of ~1113 Article 7 the phra3'e ··ca.sh 
ava.ilabte for distnoution" shall mean cash of the LLC tvhi.ch the mempers reasooably determine may 
be distributed without. impairing the ~bilit)' of the LLC to _oo.rry out its purposes, after tal<;ing into 
accolJJlt the aci;ual an~ .anticipated e-,q,enscs of the LL~ and sµch regerves as the members.reasonab1y 
deem adyiaablc to protect theLLC from future cash s!lor1falls. Upon distribution in accorda.uce v,,ic..h. 
this Article, the capital accouot for eacll member shall be charg~d for the a.mount of tbc pa.ymcnt ta 
that member. · · · · · · 
7.3 Di~mbut)ap Schedule. Distributions of the LL~' s cash av.ail!ible for disr..-r:-i.bution 
shaU be mude in tJ-ie follow5ng order of priority: 
7.3 . 1 R.et'\l'm of Capital. A...'1y ca.sh av.allable for distribution sball be dis.tnout~ to 
the membero until the members h,we received ca_qo distributions w.hic.h are reiums of c.:iphal fo_r the 
full value of te members' ca~h o, ligfCCd value capital contributions . . 
7.3.2 · Rema.Lning Cash. Any cash.' available for dismb9tion ~em.aining sfter 
sari,,faction of the n::turn of capital provided in Section 7.3. l $hall be dfatributerl to th.e members in 
proportion to i:bcir rc,1;pective Sba.-ing Ratio:;. 
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·~~o~rf. _of d~stribution. ~d th.ere is not enough cash ava.Us\)le · for distrilJ~tion to covi;.r .all · 
Cl:.str:,but,ons m tlmt pnonty carego~j, the cash .available for disrribution stalJ be allocated and · 
dis:..rrom,ed to t.h~ members entitled to di.rtribmioi, i,vithir, iQa:! priority category in the relatic;ioshlp 
wh.icb eacb of the member'~ respective claims in that priority categ9r; bear to the 10-i:al claims .of all. 
members in trui:t priority category. · 
- •';"" ·- .... , ,.. 
ARTICLE 8 . ····-
DISPOSITION OF lviEMBERSHIP INTERE~TS 
. 8. l Restriction~ on. Qimosition. No member er ·assignee shaJJ ~en, cooirlbU1e, gift, · 
enc:.umber, hYPothecate1 exchange or otherwise dispose of(collectively, 0 Tran:;;fer") all O( any portion 
of his Sha.ring Ratio witho\.lt the express, priorur)a.nimous written consent of the remaining membC(S, 
except .as provjded in Sect.ion.s 8.1, 8.21 9J,.9.4 and 9.5. Each member hereby aclamwled~ the 
reasonableness o.f the restrictions on dispo::.itfou imposed by this Operating Agreement .in view of 
th~ UC's purposes and therclationsb.ip c;ifthe members. Ac.cordingly, the restrictions on disposition 
.contained herein shall be specifical1y enforceable. . . . 
. 8.2 Prohibited Trangfers. A!Jy purporterl Transfer of~! or any porti(m of a Sharing R.a1io 
that does not satisfy the reguirements of Sectio11 8.1 shall be nwll and void and of~~ force or effect 
whatsoever, providetl that, if t.\e LLC is requirerl to rec::ogm;.e· a Transfer that. does not meet such 
rnquirements (or if the LLC, in its. so1e di~cretion, elem to reco,gniz~ e. Transfer that does nor sati$.fy 
such requirements), ·the Iransfe.rred Sharing Ratio shall be strictly l\mited to · the tra.nsf~rar's 
economic rights with r~spect to the Transferred Sparing ],utio, which econotnic rights ma be applied 
('?<.ithoµt limiting any other legal .or equit!!ble rights of the ILC} to satisfy any debts., obligations, o:F 
lia.bifajes for da.qu1.ges that the transferor, or l:lSsignee .of such Sharing Ra.cio may have to the LLC. 
In the case af a Transfer or a.ttempted transfer. of a Snaring R.atio i:hat does not satisfy such 
req1.1irements, the par-Jes CJJgag:ing or n.nempting to engage ht :iu.c::h 1'rBll.sfer shall be liable to 
indem;,Jfy, deft;nd and hold harm.less the LLC af)d the other members from ~ cost, .t:i:3-bilicy, and 
damdge that any of sucb indem.ni.fied pcr3ohs may incw (iocluding, '7vithout' !Jmitation., mcrc:;n~tal 
tax liability and attomcy5' fee;s and expenses) as a result of Sltch Transfer or attempted Transfer and 
ef.fo:rts to enforce the indemnhy gro.nted hereby. . . 
8,3 Admis:,Ton of Assignees as Members. Subject to the ot11er provisions ~fthis Article 
8, an assignee ofa Shiiring Ra~io may be admitted to the LLC as a member otlly upon a majority vote 
of the members a.nd the satisfaction of such other terms o.n.d conditions as they shall require. 
8.1 R.i/;!ht3 of Un admitted A~sig.nee.s. A person who ac:quires e. Sharing Ratio b,it "W110 
is oot admitted as a ::nember pursuant to this Article B (an "Assignee") sha!T b~ entitled onlj to the 
economic rights ·wirh ·respect to l'<uch transferred Sharing .Ratio in acconiance wirp this Operacing 
~reement, and· shall. have no rigti.t to vote un any ma.cters as a mer.n.b~i\ sbcl.11 ~ave .not righ1 to auy 
information or accountir1g of.tie affairs of the LLC, sh.alt not be entitled to tnspect che. books or 
records otth.e LLC, and shall oot have any o:f the rights of a member under th~ Act ar this Operating 
Agreement. 
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· 9.1 w1thdrawal. Each member agre~s not to withdraw from the LLC ,vithout rbe · 
cop.sent of iill other members. A vohintary withdrawal in violation of this Section 9.1 shall be 
erTe..."'ti.\le'afr~ct;re~ (3) .illCiiths ',),,'Jirten notice dclJv~eC-t:J the ma.nagen, but sh.ill co.n~n.itc a brea~h 
of mis Operating Agreement for which th~ ·LLC a.1d 0th~ 1n~m.ber:i 3hall have all remedie~ orovidecl 
under app]icab)e Tew. · · · . ' 
9.2 Events of Dissolution, Except as otbenrr...se pro,.,ided in this Operating Agreement, 
I.he LLC shaU · di~$o/ve upt>n the earlier· at (a) death, incompetence, dissolution, t~nnination or 
for.feituI; of the right to do bu¢ness qf an .Entir; Member, ba:nkruptcy or wi1hdra."WaJ of a member: 
(b) sale of all or substantially all ·of the LLC's a.'lset!!; (c) a vote of the mesnbers holding at least 
se\,e.nty-tivc percent (75%) of the Sharing Ratios; or (d) ;ipproval of dissolution by an unimimcus 
vote of the memb~rs-
9-3 Effect of Death of a Member. fa the event of t,he death of a.Member, the re.maming 
Members ma.y within· 9.0 days elect to: 
9 .3 .1 Continue the LLC !l.nd adn:,.f t tb.e deceased· Membe:r' s spouse_. C?s'tate or other 
bencficfa.,""'J as a Iv!ember in place of the decc:ascd Member; or · 
. . 9 .3 _2 . Contirruc: the LLC ;among the sun,;ving MembcrB" and purchase t}Je inter"'--st 
of the deceased Me..iber pursuant to the prpvisions of Sections 9,8 ~d 9.9. 
The ~lection-·shall b~ at the sole discretion of the survivjng Members and shall req_~re ~h-~ir 
unanimous consent lf the si1rviving Members de ru:it so elect, the LLC shaH f?e dissolved. 
. . 
9.4 Effeg_ of Withdrawal or Other Event_ Upon th~ inco;;,.petcnce, ,,.,;fhdra:Mtl, 
exp1;lsr.on, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a Member, ·che reroai.ni.ng Members may within'ni:ncry (90) 
daya, withotii waiving my ri::rn~dies in the case ofvolumery withdra~al, elect to c;ont:in1J.e the LLC 
among th.emselves .eu1d to purchase the interest of the affected Member pursuant to the _provisions 
of Sections 9 .8 and 9.9. The elccnon shalJ be at tlie sole discretion of.the rernuining Members an~ 
shall require rheiJ- una.nimous'-consent. If the remaining Member~ do no,: so elect, the LLC shall be 
dissolved. · 
9 .5 Pui/Ca!l Offerin5 ·Notice. If a Me:mbe-1· determines to Dispose 9-f his Membership 
lmeres't for- any reason at any time during rhe term of this Operating Agreement (the "Imtia~g-
Member"), su~b Member shall give wri;te.il notic::c· (the ."Pm/Ca1J Offering Notice'') of intent ro sell 
@.ll, but not less tha.u all, of irs MerrtG~ship fotcrcst that fa cbe Offered L·iterest to th~ remaining 
M~mbcr (thE'. uRe3poriding Member"). The Responding Member may Vi-ithin nfteen (15) days of 
receipt: of i:h :Put/Cali Offc:ring Notice ask for written clarification as. to any aspects cf the Putluu.1 
Offering Notice. The Initiating Member ~hall pro-vidc any clarifications the hutia.:ing Mcmoer deems 
· appropria.te ,;,1th.in five (5) da;/s of r.ccdpt of tbe request for clarification_:.~. 
~ : 
1707 
,.., . ' 
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; f1 • • 9 . .5 . l PuJ/Call Offering Not~. If a Member detennines to Di~pose of .hls 
~~°:};~rn1.1p Inter~ for any reason at any time . durir.g the ter.ri cf this Opera.ting Agreement (the;: 
. mrna-tmg Member J, such Member shaU give ·wntten r10tice (the 1Tut/Call Offering Notice") of 
in.tent to sell al~ but net Jess than all, of ite Membership Inter~st that is the Offer~~ Interest to t_i.,o. 
... ~ , .. ·~, _ : .. :~~~~g-~f~mber (_the "respondirlg· Member'"). Th~ ~spending M~mber may within fifteen (15) 
· · da.ys C:! rec:elpt of tnc .Put/Call Offeri-;rg Natke aa~ for 'Written clar-ifk-ati~na. a.s. to ,im;t a~e~ of tl;le 
Put/Call Offering N9tice. The Inittatlng Member shall provide · any clarifications the Initiating 
Member cieem:i approµti'a.1:a mrb.i...1 five (5) days of receipt of the request for clarincations_ 
· ..... . 
. · 9.5.1 Purcha.i;e );:rice - Term.,;;, Th~ Initiating Member shall :;petjrJ in hs Oifuring , 
Nutice the purchase prie!: and terms at which the Ini.t1at:ing Membl;:l" would b~ willing to purchase 
an undi'vided ooe htll'.ldred percem (100%) interest ln the LLC. 
9.5.3 Exerc\sc afPµt/Call .. Upo.n receipt of the Put/Ca11 Offering Notice, the 
Responding Member shall be obligated .either: 
. (a) Tc ~ell i:o the Initiating Member its Membership Interests at a p~ce 
a..'1d terms el'lUal to the amoum the Responding Member.would have been· entitled to receive. upon. 
cUssoJution of the LLC pursuant fo the. licjuidariao di5tribudon provit-Jons- 11et forth. in S ecrion 9. 6 as 
jf the LLC had so1d tlic PiOJ)Crty to a third party, at the price and terms set forth ui th Put/Call 
Offering Nat)ce, or 
(b) To purchase the Membenhip LiT.erest of the Initiating Mernberf~r the 
price and rcrms equal to tbe amoum: tbe Initiati..-r:ig Mem.ber W01Jld have been entiped to receive upon 
disso!mi_on of the LLC pursuant to the liqu:id_a.1ion distribution provis5onll set forth in Section 9.6 as 
if the 1:l,C had sold t..1-ie Property to a third pany, at ·ch.e price a.nd tenns sot forth in Pu:~~Call Offering 
Notice. . 
9.5.4 Nodfiq_tion. The_ Responding Member sb11.U notify° the Initiating Member 
of its election within thirty (30) days after the: date of receipt oft:bd?ilt/Cal1 Offering: No~ce. Failur~ 
to give nqtice withio · the required tune period shllU be deemed an election by the Responding 
Member not _to purchase the bf.fared Interest but rather to sell its Membership foterest ·to tne 
Infria.Tio.11 Member. The thirty (3 0) day pe.riod shall be e,ctc.nded for -five (5) dirys if the Responding 
Member has asked for clarifications a3 set.forth above. 
9.5.5 Lapse of Offer. If the Responding Member fails 1:0 respond to the Put/C~ 
Offering Nonce, or fol!owin_g an ef~ction by the Responding Member to purchase rhe Offered 
Interesr, th1;: Resoonding Member· fails to can.)ummare the purch.sac of the entire Offered Interast in 
· accordance here~ith, tben tbe .Responding Member snaH be obligated to sell its emir~ Member-5.b.ip 
Im:ercst to the Ini1iaiing Member under the same tenns and conditions as provided in i:be PutJCall 
Offering Notice. · 
9..5 .6 Lirnii:ation on E;cerciso. Notvnthi,tuJqing anything to the contrary contained 
in i-his Article 9: no Pi~-;·;ition of a Mem_bership Interest .~hall be pe:rmincd in the eve.n~ 1hat such 
GJ08 
'· 
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, Agreen_1ent_ Any Member purchas[pg h~reunder shall be, obfigated1 as a: ::0J"Jd.itio11 of{he purcbase, 
tc obtrunrelea.ses of all guarantees ofllC obUgationnhen outstanding as obligations cf an<".J selling . 
Member. · • 
·. 9.6 ·ois-::riburion Up9n bJ.sagJution. Upon dissolution of the LLc· as provTded in this 
Atticle 9, the: proceed~ th~efrorn shall be applied. e..'IJ~. di.stribut<:d Jp the.f.ol,lowfog. order. . . 
9,6.1 First, to pay secured debts: to third parties and members (exdudjng a:iy deb~ 
to be asirurned pursu~.nt to an a53et sale, if any); tbe:n . . · ' 
9.6_2· Sccon~.in th-c case of the i;a1~ of_rub~ta.'1tially all oftbe.LLC\~ asset~, tp pay 
the costs of such sale~ then · .. 
9.6.3 Third, to pay umecured debts oithe LLC o.:ved to creditors other than 
members; then 
9 .6.4 Folli:th, to pay uns~cured d~bcs of the LLC owed tei metpb~s: then 
9.6.5. FiJtb, tom.embers wbo h.e.-ve made cash cap5tai or agreed value contributio:os 
ta the LLC to the e;rtent of S!Jch cash c:;..pitaJ or agreed value contributiof\s; then 
9.6.6 The balmce, if any, to mernpel"!'I in proportion to· their respective Sharing 
~- Ratios. 
', ! . • 
. 9. 7 Distributions and Allocations in P. . .e~~ect to Di3oos.ed of Members.hip ,Interests. 1f 
any Mcr{i.bership Interest is ·sold, assigned, or Disposed of dutjng ·any T~bie Year in pompliance 
with the provisions' o.fthh Article 9, Net Profits, Net Losses, eacb item thereof; and :iD other items 
attributabie to 1he Disposed of Membership Ioterest for such Taxable Year shall be divided and 
(lliocated berwe.ett the transferor and the Assignee by ta icing into 1!,Ccourit the:ir varying Membership 
Interests during such Ta).a'c,Je Year in accordance v11th.co<:le Section 706(d), using any conventiaos . 
permitted by law and selectc~ by the Membe;3_ All Distributions o-c or before the date of ;ru,ch 
Disposition sh11l.l be made to the tran.sferor,and all Distributions then::a:frer sba.U be ma~::: to the. 
Assignee_ Solely fqr purposes of making such a.11.oca.ticns and Distr:ibutior:i~. the I..I ,C sJ1all recognize 
such Disposition not ]ater than the end of the ca[cidar month during ?Jhich it is given noci~e of such 
DL~po~ition , provided t1at , if the LLC i~ given notic;i:: of a Disposition at least ten (} 0) Busmess 
Days prior ~o the Dlsposition the lLC .sh.all i-ecogniz:c such DiSQOSition as the date of such 
Dispositiort, and provided further thnt, if the LLC does not re·ceive. a .r.iotice st'1.ting r:hr.: date such 
Member:.ruo Iotcre-st was Disoosed of 11nd such other information a..~ the Members ma reasonably 
req~ire with1n thirty (30) days ~f\:cr 1hc end oftiw Taxable Year during which ·the Disposition occurs, 
tl1c11 aJJ such it~ms shall be anocatcd and all .Disrri}:lutJons shaJJ°be made, to the. Person who, 
acc.ording to the books and records ofth~LL<;, was the owner ofth~Memb~ship Interest cin the la.st 
ciay of the Taxable Year durlng wbich tbe Die:po:;_ition bccun. Ndthe.r the LLC n.or any M~mber 
shaJl incur any liability for· rnnkiug aUocacio~s snd Distributions in a.ccorda-ncc 'With the provisions 
· of this A..'1icle 9_7, whether or nor any Member of the LLC hi!.3 knowledgo ~f any disp_osition of , 
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'( oWl!enr.ip of any Memb~hip,Imerest. 
,J 
·"t· 
. 9.8 ,Valua1ion of Member1a hiternsi:. Upon an election by 'd1e LLC to purchase tb~ 
)nt~cst ofa Me.rnberpur:.iuant to Section 9.3 or 9.4, the value of the a:ffec;.ted Member's intC!fest shall 
be. ?.~~et:rn'.;ed b~ a .fiur mark.et value appraisal of the Assets (tho "Appraisal"). rne Appr~al shall 
be i:;ompleted by an MAI design.it-~ a'.ppraiset"faml1iar with ~irnilar·commercfalpro_?erclcs, •,.vitl: said 
appraiser to l:!e s.eiectcd by a majority of the oilier Members. The value of the 0'?/Ilership. IntcreSt 
shall be dei:ennined based on the fair' market value as dctrnnined by t~e Appraisal and apportioned 
ct.'nong the O'Nrie:shlp Im.crests in accordance ~ith the dbmbution provisions. of Section 9.6. Such 
amount wculd be the same amotint attributable to the same OWnershlp J-qterest if the Assets were 
being sold !It the Appraisal established fuir market vah.ic and 1:he resultant proceeds apponioned ag 
sm: out in Section 9.6. 
9.9 ~ent for 1Yfomber' s Interest. The purchase price for a Member'$ im:erest 
purchased pursuant to Section 9.3 or 9.4 shnll be paid in 5 rubsta.ntially equal, consecutive annual 
pizyn:icilcs, inciuding principal a.nd interest. Intemit shall accrue ~t tbe ni:tc of~n percent (10%) per 
annum. The first pt1.yment shall be made at the: dose of the transaction Md the subscqt1en't pa.yrnents 
shall be made each year on the anniversary ofth[:!.t date. The.LLC may prepay the remaining amount 
of the purch.!l3e price 11.1. any time. 
9. l O Ff!ect ofllurchase ofMem.ber' s Inter eat.. A Member shall cease to be a Mernbci:- upon. 
the LLC's elcctioq to purchase the Member's interest pursuant to Section 9.3 o:r9.4. During the 
period in ,;,rhich the LLC Js rpaking paymems to the fonner Member, the former Member sl1.a.ll have 
no rights as a M~ber i.o th LLC. 
. ARTICL~ 10 
MJSCEL.hAf"i'"EOU S 
I 0.1 Adrutional Documents. Ea.ch meril.bei' shall exeetitc such ·a.ddltionaJ..dacum.ents 
and take such actions~ are re~onably reque:rted in order to complete or confirm the transactions 
contemplated by trus Operarin~ Agrcemem.. · 
l 0.2 Headings. Beadings in this Operatln~ .Agrzernen.r are for convenie11c:! only and .sha.11 
not affect its .rr:earung, 
l 0.3 ~-~verabi1itv_ .. The inviilidicy Oi uncnforceability of any provision of this Operating 
Agreement sna!l nat affect the valirlity or enfurcen.bili~ of the rernaini,."lg pro?isions. 
10.4 1'},jrd~Party Beneficiariei,. The provisi0ns oftb.is Operating Agreement are intcoded 
saldy for the b~nefi.t of the members and shall create 110 righ~ or qbligation.s enforceable by any 
,:bird party, inciuding cred1co,:; of th llC, ex'"ept as o,herwise provided lry applicable Jaw. 
10.5 No 'Partncrshif. Intendeg for Nontax P:urpa.3e3, The m~mben havefonned the. Lt.C 
und~r the AL't, and expressly do i10t iittend hereby to form a pmtnei:ship ~loder either the Idaho 
. Urufq1 rn Pan.:-i~rship Act nor t he Idaho Uniform r..lmited Pa11ner.gh.ip Ac.1. Tbe members do not :···· ,.. 
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intend to be pannen one to atother1 or partners; as to any thlrd piµ-ty. To the e:ccent any m~mber, by 
word or ac~ion. represents to a.poi.her person that any other member is a part1er or tha~ the LLC •is 
a partnership, the member making 3uct, wTongful representation shall be lfable ro any other member 
who ir.c-..rr.; pqrsonal liabilitiJ by reason or such \'1:'ong:ful repnisentaticn. . -
·] a. 6 f,ari.n-e~hin lmerrdia;d fol Tax :Purposes. The memters·have formed the LLC un-:for -· , ... 
tbeAct, and e,cpressly do imend h.er~by ta have the LLC clas.;1ified and treat:::d far purposes affederal · 
and state income ra~ation as a partnen:;hip. . . . 
1 O. 7 ,Binding P'ffect. Except as othenvfoe. provided in t~is Operating Agreement, ever-:1 
covena.,t, term a.'ld provision of this Qperatjng Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benent of the members and their respective heire, kgltees, legal rnpre.senta.tives, 3..:.ccessor:-, 
transferees, a.'1d assign:i. · 
l 0. 8 Ca:nstruction Every covemi.nt, tern.. and provisions of this Ope~ring Agre~ent 
shal! be construed simply according to its fair meaning and noi sl .. "lctly for or. against any :member. 
The terms of this Operating Ag1"eement are {otende~ to embody the ec.on~mlic relationship among 
the members and shall not be subject to modi.ifoation by, or be conformed with, any a.ctipm by the 
Internal Revenue Service except as thls Operating Agreement may be e;stplicitly so a..-neuded acd . 
except as may relate speciftcal}y to tbe filing of te:x returns.· · 
10.9 Time. Time is of the essence witb respect to this Operaong Agreemem . 
. 10. IO Gmreming Law. The JaW;, of the State ofldaho shall govern the validity cftpis 
Operaring Agre·ement, t]:ie construccfon of its tenn~, ad the imerpr..ctatian of thi:, rights and duties of 
the members. · 
10.11 Waiver of Action for Partition· No :sii1 for Prn:tner;;hip Acccu:uting. Each of the 
membc:-s Irrevocably ,,,.-aives any right that he may have ta maintain any action for p.anition .virh 
re3pcct to ·any of the co1npany property. To the fallest extent permitted by Jaw, cr..cb member 
coven-ams not to ft1e a bill for a Jjmited liabilicy comp.aoy accounting. 
l 0. 12 CouoteuH1n Exw.i~i0n. This Operating /i..greement may be .execmed in·My :number 
of counterparts with the same: clfect as if all of the members h.o.d signed the s:une document.' PJl 
~oui:iterpan~ s\}afl b_e construed togetber l!DU shaU constitute one agreement. · 
l 0.13 Specific Perforrnance. Ea.ch member agrees w~th the other, rnernbe,s tha.r the 
members would be irrepara.bly damaged if .any of the provisions of this Operati.ng A.s:reement are not 
performed in accordance with th~ir spednc terms and that !)1onetary darriages would not pro,.,;de an 
adequate remedy ion .~ucb even t. Accurding)y. i,t is ngn;ed that, in a.9dition to any otlJ~r remedy to 
which the non-br caching members mz.y be entitled, at Jaw of in equity, the 11on-breachinB oiembers 
~hRll be emitkd io injunctive reJjef to prevent br~aches of the p,ravisioris of thii. Oparnthig 
.. Agreement and spccillciltly to enforce rbe terms Rnd pro~1ision.s hc:rcofin any acci,S)n institute!! in lllly 
cqun of the United Siatc:s or My state then:ofhavlng subject matter jurisdicti,9n-there:'f. · · 
. . • ? ,' , 
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_. J.0.14 Notice. All notices. dsma...1ds; requem and other comt,n.micqtions reqtiired or 
permitted hereunder shall b~ in wr:itmg and shall b~· d.ee1ne_d delivered o·n the car.lier of (i) i:hree (3) 
d.aya after the date of posring c:if registered or cerdfied mail, adcressed to the .add.ress~ a.t its address· . 
&ct fortb hereia or at sllch. other address as Sllch' part ma.y have spec-ified· theretof9ra by riotke 
delivered in acc.ordari.c:e' With this Sc..,'"tion, (ii) ane:mp,:cd delivery OT refusal to accept deli;very if sem · 
by: rourie;: or otber-pcrso.na.l deliyery servjcc, c:H:.(iii} . .acruru receipt by tbe a.ddr~s:~.~e.,regil,r_dt~s~ _1;::fth~ '" . 
method of giving notice. The addresses sec forth .in Article 2, as am~ded from time t6. time, shall 
be used for purposes of giving ootic~ to members. 
1 O. 15 lligbts a..1d Remedies Curnulatii.;e, Th~ rights and remedies provided by tbis 
Operating Agreement are cumulative imd thi::i· use of any one right or remedy by a.:ny pai:t'J shall ooc 
preclude or waive 1he right ~o use. any or 611 other remedies .. Said rights and remedjes are gi:ven in 
a<ldition to any Other rights tbe parties ma ~ave bey la.w, gtatute, oidJnance er otb.erwis~. 
'l 0.16 W eivc.-s. The fail~re of any pany to seek red.ress for violation of or to insist upon 
the ~ct performance of any covenant or r.andition of this Opera,ting Agreement shall not prevent 
· a subsr;quent act, which would h;.we ociginaHy ccustit' ... 'ted a. v,ofation, frol')1 .having the cffeci: of an 
miginal viola.tion. 
lO. J 7 Atrnroev Fee3. In the evem any action is instituted ta enforce or determine the 
parties' rights or dmies a..""ising ouc. of the terms of this Operating .Agreement, tbe prevailing pm shall 




The following tenns i:.."ed in thfa Agreement shnll ha.va the fo!Jawing meanings (unle?s 
otherwise e)..'J)resslfiirovidcd herein)~ ' . 
l l.l Adiustc,,i beficit shall mea:., with respe.ct to a.ny .~rnber, tbe deficit balance, i.f any, , 
fu such member's capita] accour.t ns ofth~ end of the r~t-~vant fiscal yea.r, after giving effect to the 
fallav.mg adjustrn.ems: · · 
· 11.1 .. 1 !he capital account shall be inc,eased by any amoums whl.c:h such member 
[s 6bJjg.Jted to restore p\lrsuan't to any provision of tn:is .Operating Agreep-rent or is deemed. to be 
obligated ta restore pursu.aut ro the ne~ t;:- -r.he last se.ntences o(Regulations Sections 1. 704-2(g)(l) 
and .1 .704-Z(i)(?): and 
1) .1 2 The capital account shall be decreased by the items described in Seci:ipn.s 
1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(cq,), l 704-l(o)(2)()i)(d)(5) s.nd l 7d4-l(b}(2)(ii)(d)(6) ofth~ Regulations. 
The fo;egoiog Jcfinit:ion of Adjusted Deficit is inter.ded to cor:tply wi,h the provis1on:i of 
Sccti on l. 704-1 (b)(2)(ii)( d) of the Regulatior,s and shall be -interpr[)tcd consistently th~~'?>'.ith. 
. . . •, : ~. ·,· . : :· . 
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. ·~ l ~ .2 D:mreciation shall mean, for e~ch focaf yeJ!l",· an. amount equai to . the d~~ciari.on. 
a.mai:rizat:on, Of pt.ber CO.St recovery deduction al)owable With respect to· an RS Set fot SU C:..1 fi
1
5c;J year, . 
. ?mVlded, however, that if th_e gro3:t asset vaJwe of a.n as3et dif.fi;ra from its adjl.lsted basis fur federal 
mcome ra;< purpoae:; at the pegitmiJig of such fiscal year, Depreciation shaU be an amount whi~h 
bears the same ratio to such beginrrins Gros3 As.~et Value as r.he federal income t~ dep:reda.tion, 
amortiz~cion,. or other cost recovery deduction for .such £seal yei.J );J~a.1.s _to,.sucti, b~ni~g adjusted 
tax b~is; and further provided, however; that if the adjusted ba.si.s for fedeml ~con:ie tax PUJpOSeS 
of nn asset at tbe beginning of such fisccl year fa zero. Depredatio.n shall be determined with 
reference to sud, beginning Grass Asset Value using any reasonable met"\od ~el~ed by th~ 
managers. 
11) GroAs Aoaet Value B.hall mcari. an asset's adju:.;t~d bas1s for federal income' ta.--;; 
purposes> except as follows : 
l 1.3J The Inhis.1 Gross A.'lset Value of any asact contribut~d by a memp.er to the 
LLC she.ll be th~ gross fair market value of such asset, as dffi:ermioed by the contribi.11.ing member; 
11.3 .2 The Gross Asset Values of a.U a.~s·ets shaJJ be .adjusted t~ equal their 
respective gross fair market va1u·es, as deteanine:d by the member.; as of the foll<::wmg times: 
(a) ihe acquil'.l.ition of im additional interest in the LLC by a..'1y :new or 
existing member in ·exchange for more than a. de minim.is capital contribution; 
. (D) the dlst!ibution by tbe LLC to a member of more than a de nrlnirnfu 
amount ofpr::ipeny as consideration for ~n tntere91: in the LLC~ and 
(c)- the liquidation ofthe LLC within the meaning ofRegu.lations Section 
1. 704-l(b)(2)(ii)(g); provide~ however, that adjumn.e:n~ pursuant to clau.ses O) a~d (il) above S:h.all 
be made only if tl~c members reasonably d·eterminc t1,~t such adjustments are ne.ce~rnrry o.r 
appropriate to reflect the relative Sharing Ratios of the members; 
11 .3 .3 The Gross Alsct Value· of any asset di.mibut.e,d to any member 5hall be 
a.qjusted _to eg1.1Rl t.ht: gross fair market vn.lue of such asaet on the date of distribution as detennin.ed 
by the distrib\Jtee imd t.he members; · 
11.3.4 The Gro.ss Assc:t Values of assets shall be incrca.<;ed (or decreased) to refJe(;t 
a~y adjusUu~ats to the adjusted ba~.i~ of such a.~sets pursua.ntto Code Section 734(b) or Code s·ecrion 
7,43 (b)> but only to the extent tha! such adj1JsL1nents are takes1 into accounr in det:im.inirig Capital 
Accounts pur::iuant to Regul.a.r.ion Section 1. 704-l(b)(2)(i11)(rn) hereof; provided, ho\lo{ever, t1at Gras;. 
Asset Value shall no,; be :i.djuffted pursuant to .this Section l l.3.4 re· the e;.,..1:ent the ruemb.ers 
determine that an 8djustment ls ne:;:ess~ry or approptiatc in ccnriecclon with a traru[ction that would 
citlicrmse result i.n an adju~1UJCilt pursuant to this Sect:ion l l.3.4; and 
l l .J .5 Ifthc: Gross A:i3et Value ofan asset has been dete:rrn.ined_.?r.adjus,ted p}J~suant . 
O.l-'J;:H.ATINO AGJt.ff°:i\,[ENT. l i 
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to Section. l l .3 .1, 11.3 .2 or l l .3 .4 hereo~ such Gross A.sset Value shall .thereaft~ be adjJ.istci:I by the 
Depreciation tak~n into a.ccoi.mt with. respect i:O such as2et for purposes of coin:µuting proni:a and 
tosses, 
11 . 4 J.,LC_l,dinimum Gain sba.ll mean the ;ame as "partners)Jjp .mhumum gain'' as set form 
· in Sections 1. 7 0+2Eb1(2) a.,d 1. 7 04-2( d) nf the Regulation::: . .. . ~ . · _.: ... -.. 
.t 1.5 MemberNonreccurse Debi srian have the meaning set forth in s~c'!:100 1. 704-2(b)(4) 
of the Rc:g1.1iations for "piµtner nonrecourse debt.'' · 
. . . 
· 11.6 MemberNonrccour3cDebLMini~.m 9ain sha!l mea.~ !Ul. aP1ount, ·with respect to 
each Member N ~orecourne Debt, equal· to th LLC Minimum Gain thn.t would result jf such Member 
Nonrec01.1Jse Debt were treated us )l Nonrccoursc LiabUlty, determined in accprdance ~;,,1th Sccrjon 
1. 704-2(i)(3) of the Regu.la6ons: · 
11 . 7 ~mber Nonrecourse Deductio11s shall ha.vc 'the meanjng set forth in Sections l. 704-
20)(1) and l . 704-2-{I)(.2) of the Regulations for "partnei nonrecaurse deductions.1' 
} 1.8 Non.recours~ ]2eduction,5 sbaU have the meaning ~et forth in Se~jon l.704--2(0)(1) 
of the Regu3atjani. · 
11.9 :tiQnrecottrscLiabmrv shall have the meaning s.et'forth in S~ction L704-2(b)(J) of · 
tbe Regulation$. · 
l I. l O Rerrnlation.s :ihall mean propos.ed, temporary and .final re&.lla.tions promulgated under 
thi:: Code in e:ffict ao: of th~ da.te of :Bling the Articles and the corresponding sections of f).ny 
regulation:. subsequently js3u.ed tho.~ amend or. si1per&ede such regulations. · 
ARTICLE 12 
CERTAIN TAX.PROVISIONS 
12 .. l ~ecial AJ!ocatioas. The follomng special allocations shall be made in the fo.llowiog 
order: 
12.1.1 Ivfinjmum Gajo Chargeback, Except a.s oiherwise pro•lid ed in ~ection J. 704-
2(£} of rhe Regul atfons promulgat~d under the Code in.effect as of the drJ.te of.f.ilfog tne Articles and 
tbe comir.pondir.g ·sections of r:rny regntark,ns sµb.sequently issu~d that amend ·or 51.ipersede such 
regulations., nocwitlmandlng any other provision oftllig Article 12, if ,;here is a ner ciecrease in LLC 
.Mlnimum Gain duriJ1g any focal year, .each member .shall . be speciaHy altocatec.: items of LLC 
.income and gain for such :fiscal year (and, if nece~sary, s1.1bsequcnt :fiscal years) in an amount equal 
rn ·.such inembe(s share cf the net decrease in LLC i'vfin.imum Gain, dererrpjned in accorda,,ce \.\rith 
Kegulatioris Section 1. 704-::l(g). Alloca~im1s pursuant to the previous sentenr;e ::.hall be made ln 
proportion to the respective amounts required to be allocmc:.d to each ro.ernbcr pu'r!ll .. ant thereto . The ( 
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20)(2) of the Regulations. This Secuon 12. l s intended to comply with the rrrini-nuro gain 
ch.argeba:.ckr~quiremen.t in Sectioa.1 . 704-2(f; of the Rdgu.lations a.1d a hall be 1nter;ireted col'..siste.-n}y 
there~ith. · 
12.. l.2 M_~mber Minimum Gain Ghargzback. fa·..cept as otherwise provldeci .in 
Section: L704~-2(ij(4).of tbe·Regulations, no't:Witb.stan.<lJng an other provision cfthi.sMtcle.12. if 
tliere is a a.et decrease in ~ember Nonrecourse Debt :Minimum Gain attributqble to a. Member 
Nonrecour:se Deqt during any fiscal year~ each member who bas a share of th.e Member N onreco,irse 
Debt Minimu~ Gain attributable to ruch Mcrober Nonrec.ou:se Debt, determined in accordance ·with 
Secti 9u 1. 704-20)(5)' of the reg.UIBtioris1 shall be speciaHy nlloc.ated items ofLl.C income an¢ gain 
for such fiscal year {and, ifnecessar.y, subseguent fiscal years)~ an amoui1.t equal to such mc:mber's 
shart of tc nei d_ecrease in M~ber Nonreccurse Debt .!v1i11.imurn Gain at-:ributable to such Member 
Nonrec.-:iurse Debt, detern,i:Jed in at.cordanc~ with' Regulations s~ction l .704-2(i)( 4). Allocations 
purnu!lnt to the previous sentence sha.JJ be: ma<le in proportion ta therespecti.~ fui'.IOUOtS required tO 
be a!Joca,~d tci each member pursuant thereto. 1'he items to be so allocated sh.all be d~termine.d ~ 
accorcla."ice 'with ~eciions l.704-20)( 4) and l .104-2(i)(2) cif t.\e Regulation;. This Sec::tfon 12.1.2 
is intended to comp?r?rith th~ minimum gain chargeback require..."nent in Section l.704-2.((i)(4) of 
the Regulations a;ld .shaJJ be interpreted consistently therewith. · 
12.1.3 Ouali5c.d Income Offset. J:n the event any memberunexpeci:cdly rec~ves any 
ai::ljuBtments, aUocations, or distributions describeijin Seaiqn 1.104-l(b)(.2.)(i:i)(d)(4), Section 1. 704-
l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(5) or Section 1. 704-l(b)(2)(li)(d)(6) of the Regulations, i"cerns o~C inco:rne and gain 
!-:hall be o specially allocated to eaoh S'tlch mi:irnber in a.n amoi.t1Jt and manner .rufqcien.t to euroinau; 
to. the roertt required by the Regulations, the Adjusted De£cit of such. roqnbcr as quickly as 
possibie, proYlded. ~nat an allocation pursuant to this Seci:ion 12.1,.3 shall be rnadc o_nly-if a.a.d to the 
c:;,,;tcnt that si.ich 1nember would h1;vc an Adjuated Defictt after all other allocations provided for in 
this Article 12 ·have been tentatively mad~ as if thls Section 12.1.3 were not rn ~hls Operatins 
Agracrnent. 
12.). 4 Gross Income A11oce.tiQTI.- In th.e event any member has s. defid-c Capital 
Account at r.pe end of any foe.al' yer.r wruch is ·Jn excess of the ::ium of; 
(a) the amount such member is: obligated to res:r:on::: pursuant to any 
provi5ion ofthl~ Opc:rl1t.ing Ag,i::::m.eut, 1JJ1cJ · 
(b) the amount such memb~ is de~roed l'.0 b~ obligated to c-estoie 
p11.rsiiant to the ,nex-t to the last sentences of.Regulation!. Sections l.704-2(g)(1) and ~.704-.2.(I)(S), 
~~ch such member shs.U he ~pe.cially allocated items of LLC income and gain in. the amount of sucb 
excess as qukkly a!i possible, provided thai: a.u allocaclon p-lm\lant 10 this Section 12. 1.A shaJJ be 
· n1a.dc only if end to the e-.ctent that $uch member wauld ave a deficit capi.al account in· excess of such 
11urn after all other aUoc.ations provtded for in this A.'"ticle 12 have been made· as. if Sectlon 12: 1.3 
hcrcofa~d t;,js· Section 12.l.4 were n<.1t in this Opera.ting-Agreement. 
12.1.5 Nonrec.ow$r.. Deductions. Nonrecoursc Deductions for aoy fiscal ye;ir sh,s.ll 
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be specially allocated to the :members ~n proportlo~ to their Sharing Ratios: 
12. 1.6 Member Nonrecourge bductions. Ari.y MemberNonre.cou('scDeducrior.s for 
E!J'IY qs.ca) year shall b~ specially allo~ted to the member ~ho bears· the e.cono-!71i~ risk of;loss with 
respect ta cbc Member N9nrec_ourse Debt . to which such Member Nonrecour~ Deductions arc 
- · · attnbt.:ltablc.-in ·accar.::iance wii:.h Reguiati~s-Section 1. 704-2.(.i)(l). ~ ., _ -· ... - . .• 
12. l. 7 Seed on 754 Acljust:rnects.' To the extent. a.n :adju~tment to rne adj1.JSted rax. basis 
of an.y LLC asset pursuwt to ())_de Secti.on 73 4(b) or Code Section 7 43 (b). is required, pur.nianr to 
Regula.tiqn~ Saccion l.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(m)(2) 9r Regulatious Sectjon l:i04-J(b)(2)(iv)(m)(4). To be 
taken into acccwn in dernrrruning capital accounts as the result. of a disnibution to a ~ember in 
complete liquidation of the member's :Sharing Ratio [n the LLC •. the· runount of such a~ust."lle.nt ro 
capital accouots ~hall be treated as an item of gain (tfth~ adjuscmc..~t increases the ~asis of the asset) 
or lass (ut:be a~u.mnent in~~ses the basjs Dfthe as~et) arthe loss (if the adjustment dccr~es such 
basis) an.d such gain·· or lqss shall be specially_ allocsted to the member in· accotdanc-e .i,ifu their 
Sharing Ra:i:ios in the LLC in the event that Re8'J:lationa. Section 1.704-l(b )(2)(iv)(m)(2.) applies, or 
to the member w whom such .distnbt .. 'tion was made in the event tbat:R:::gulations Section 1.704-
J {b){2)(iv)(m)(4) applies. · · 
12.2 .Qy.rative Al1o~Ji.Qru.. The-allocations set forth i.n Section sl2.1.1 tliraug~. 12.L7 
hereof (t,b.e ''Regulatory A.llocmion.'1'') are intended to comply with certain requirements . of the 
Re:guhitions. It_i.s ~he iment of the membera that, to the ex:te.nt possible, all Regulatory Allocations 
shall be offset either with pilier Regularory .Aflocations or with sped.al allc.ca.11oliS or crthc:r items of 
com_pa,ny income,. gnln. loss or.deduction pt:1r-auant to tbis Section 12.2.. Therefore, notwithsta..,_.ding 
any otber prcvi.sicn ofthis Article 12 (other than the Regulatory f..llocaticns), the members shall 
make su.ch offsetting special aJJo,;:ations of LLC income, gain, loss or deduction in wbatevel"I:nan:ner 
they detererlne apµropriat~ so that, a..4.9r such off.'.?~ing ~lo~:tioni,. are made, each members' capital 
account is> to tlic e;x.1.ent po!1stble, equal to th'7 capital acco\;nt such member would have had if the 
Regi.ile.tory Allocations were not pa,~ of this. Opera.ting Agreement 8:IJd aH LLC items were allocai~d 
uursuaJJt to Art)clc 6. In e;.:ercising discretion under thfa Sectton 12.2, the members ~hall take im:o 
~ccounr fotui:-e Regulat ory AJloca.'tions under Section 12.1. l and 12.1.2 that, a.1tho1J.gli not yet made, 
are likely to offset other Re~1atory AJJocations previously mad~ under Sections · 12. J .5 and I 2.1.6. 
. . 
12.3 OtliPr A!Jocati.on Rul-es. 
11.3 .1 For purposes of dete:mmring tlw: pro.fas, 1os3cs, or any at.her items allocable 
to.any period, profits, lasses, and any such other items shaU be d.e.termi.ned_on e. daily, monthly, or 
od1er basis, as dctcnnined by Vi,c members 1.1sjng any pe-rmissible method under Code Section 706 
and the Regulations '(hereunder. . . . . 
12.3 .2 The members are a.we.re of tne income 'tax c,;insequences oftile allocations 
made by Article 6 a.nd this Article 12 and hereby agree to ba hmJ.r.d by the provi sions of Artide 6 and 
of this Article 12 in reµorting rbeir i.h!l.i es of LLC income and 1as,s for income ta.-.; purpose:i . 
000122
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: 12.3.3 Solely for p\lrposes of dct::nnining a men;:ber's proportionate share of the 
"excess n6nr~course.liabj)sties1' of faeLLC ·ivitrun the mea.rung ofRegulation.s Section 1. 75~·3(a).(3), . 
the rnember's mtares1s in LLC profrrs shall be in pro-portion to their Sharing Ranos. 
12.J.4 To the e~em pen:rutted by Section l.7D4-ifn)(3) of the :Regularions-, µie 
· members shall endeavof'ta··treat di~tribution~ of net cash from eperatfor.s er net cash from s.Jes .. cc. ~ 
net G,3.Sh from refin;mcing as havmg peeo m~de from the proceeds of a Nonrecourse Li<l;biUty' or a 
M~mbcr Ncnrecourse Debt oruy to the extent that such distributions wo:uJd cause .or i:nc:reas~ a:n 
Adj\l~"ted. Deficit for n...'1)' member . 
. ADOPTED effective as ofibe.(z:day o.fJanuary) 2001, by the·undcr5igned, <;onst1ruting all 
t):le tnen\~en of the LLC: · 




280 • FILE' EFFECTIVE 
AMENDED AND RESTATED 
ARTICLES OF ORGAN1ZAT10N 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
(Instructions on back of application) 
03 SEP l 2 PM 3: 39 
SECRET/\HY Of STATE 
STATE OF IOAHI 
1. The name of the limited liability company is: Real Homes, L.L.C. 
2. Tihe date the articles of organization were flied was: Juiuny 19, 2001 
The Artlcles of Organizatjon are amended and restated to read: 
3. The name of the limited liability company is: _ __._..Re .... a ..... J_H ..... a ..... ro .... e.... s .... , ... 1 ... L ......... G""--------
4. The latest date certain upon which the limited liability company will dissolve is: 
January 1, 2011 
5. The registered agent and registered office is: -"io1D4!f-l@R;+.R+-+i+.s~J;.,,,.....,Sa ... 1i-+1 ... ~;;--------
6. The management of the limited liability co 
0 Manager(s} [i] 
7. The name and address of at least 1 manager or member: 
Name: Address: 
Dennis J. Sallaz 1000 S. Roosevelt Boiae, Idaho ~~l.0'-3" 
8. Signature of at least one manager, if any, or at least one member. 
Sign~ture --------
Typ~d Name Dennis J. Sa 11 az 
Type 
Oil/ner Secretary of State use only 
IMfO SECRETARY (F STATE 
09/12/2003 85188 
Cl: Q1SH CT: '42241 Ith 711478 





SALLAZ & GATEWOOD LAW • ~003 
'i PROMISSORY NOTE 
NOTE AMOUNT: $10,800 Boise. Idaho 
Dote: 06/10/05 
I PROMISE TO PAY to the order of ROY RICE, of Boise, Idaho, TEN THOUSAND 
EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS AND N0/100 DOLLARS {$10.800.00} payable in lawful 
money of the United States of America, with interest thereon from and after June 
10, 2005. until paid. at the rote of TWELVE PERCENT per annum! 12%}. Principal and 
interest ARE DUE ON DEMAND. 
If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note, I agree to pay such 
sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees. The maker and endorser hereon 
jointly and severally waive presentment for payment. demand, protest and notice 
of protest of non-payment of this note. 






04/~6/2006 16:32 FAX 208 J~26J SALLAZ & GATEWOOD LAW~ 
PROMISSORY NOTE 




I PROMISE TO PAY to the order of ROY RICE, at Boise, ldoho, TEN THOUSAND 
DOLLARS AND N0/100 DOLLARS ($10,00.00J payable in lawful money of the United 
States of America. with interest thereon from and ofter September 21, 2005, until 
paid. at the rote of TWELVE PERCENT per annum ( 12%}. Principal and interest ARE 
DUE ON DEMAND. 
If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note. I agree to pay such 
sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees. The mc·(er and endorser hereon 
jointly and severally waive presentment for payment. demancl, protest and notice 
of protest of non-payment of this note. 
Doted this 21 51 day of September, 2005. 
PROMISSORY NOTE $10,000 9-21-05 
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BILL OF SALE 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That, DENNIS J. SALLAZ, the Party of the First Part, the Seller, for and in consideration of 
the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00), legal mont:y of the United States of 
America, to him in hand paid by ROY RICE, the Party of the Second Pa~ as Buyer, the receipt 
whereof is hereby acknowledged, does by these presents grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said 
Pany of the Second Part, the Buyer, his successors and assigns, all right, title and interest to the 
following vehicJes/trailers, more particularly described below, free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances, to-wit: 
2002 Yamaha Grizzly 660 ATV, VIN No. JY4AM02Y22C022268; 
1998 Yamaha Grizzly 600 ATV, VIN No. JY4AJ0IWA0l 1016; 
Tandem Axle 4 Place ATV Trailer 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the same unto the said Parry of the Set.:ond Part, its successors 
and assigns forever. And doe~ for himself, his heirs, successors and assigns covenant and agree, to and 
with the said Party of the Second Part, its successors and assigns, to warraut and defend the sale of 
said property, goods and chattels, hereby made unto the Party of the Second Part, its successors and 
assigns, against all and every person and persons whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Party of the First Part has hereunto ·5et his hand and seal this 
5th day of May, 2005, at Boise, Jdaho. 
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• POSffiON OF DENNIS !LAZ Condcnselt Thi JUNE 15, 2005 Page 470 
Page 468 
Q Do you want to --
2 A Okay. Debra, what page is that? 
3 Q I'm just referring to your exhibit. If you could 
4 identify what items you have sold. 
5 A Sure. 
6 MR. DEVIS: she's asking about the four wheelers. 
7 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
8 MR. BEVIS: I don't know that I've got --
9 THE WITNESS: okay. Just the two Grizzlies, if you 
10 found them on your copy. I haven't found that them yet. 
11 MS. EISMANN: That is nwnber 66 and 67. 
12 MR. BEVIS: On the left-hand side. 
13 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
14 BY MS. EISMANN: 
15 Q Okay. So, those two were sold? 
16 A Those two and the trailer that they are sitting on. 
17 Q You have listed two AW trailers in Item 68. 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And so one of the two are sold? 
20 A Yes. It's the one that holds four machines. One 
21 . holds two machines and one holds four machines. The 
22 Grizzlies were on the one that holds four machines. 
23 Q And you stated in your description that you own 
24 them 50/50 with Darrell? 

















Q So, did he receive a portion? 
A No. He consented to the sale. 
Q He basically relinquished his interest in it for 
you to sell it? 
A I still owe him half a trailer, but he agreed that 
I could sell them. 
Q Okay. So, you sold trailer and the two ATV's --
A Yes. 
Q -- for those Items 66 and 67? 
A Yes. 
Q For 7,500 dollars? 
A Yes. 
Q To Roy Rice? 
A Yes. 





Q You value at 4,000 dollars? 
A Yes. · . corrunuruty asset. 
Q And you have characterized 1t as a 
A Yes. . h G ·zz1 
9 yaina a ri y, you Q And you -- and item 67, a 199 . . t t? 




have stated the 
Q And one of the ATV tailers -- you 
9 one that carries four ATV's? 




Q That you sold? 
A With the Grizzlies. . t 
Q Okay. Now -- and you characterized your mteres 
14 in the trailer as community? 
15 A As 50 percent. As community. he 
16 Q So, the value is -- you valued the trailer w n you 
17 sold it at what figure? 500 't 
18 A Well, I had both of them at my half at,. ,hsur75i ,, ge 1or t e . 
19 was just a package sale. Here is the pacr-!I 
20 There is no breakdown. d ak di you m e your 
21 Q And when did you do that? Whe!l 
22 sale to Roy Rice? t t 
• _,1 the paymen o 
23 A It was the same day that I dehvercv . d th ..-vtopm own e . 
24 you, would probably be the best way to t.; ·· 

















MR. BEVIS: was mean -· 
THE WITNESS: I brought it straight up bere. ki fi h' 
. st loo ng or is 
MS. EISMANN: And that's okay. I'mJJ.l 
recollection. 
TIIB W1TNESS: Maybe a month ago. 
BY MS. E1SMANN: •• May 15th. 
Q So, you're thinking probably May of 
A April or May. 
Q April or May of 2005? 
A Yes. 'd 
. ol.l sa1 you 
Q Now, you had further testified that 'I f D 1 d Part rom a . . paid in two checks, one from Roy Rice an 1 b 1 Id. may e s1ou 
Evans loan. That's what my notes reflect, so · 
clarify. 
A I think I paid 50 percent of his bill from each 
A I did. 16 16 source. 
..,0 payment to 
17 Q Was that by your own check or a check from Mr. 17 Q I see. And you're referring to the se.1•· 
18 Rice? 18 Mr. Bevis? 
19 A I believe 1 had to make it out payable directly to 19 A Yes. . ? 
20 Jim is my recollection. 20 Q And what amount did you pay Mr. 13evis. 
21 MR. BEVIS: I don't know. 1 didn't receive those. 21 A It would have been probably 15,000 even. t Mr 
22 BY MS. EISMANN; 22 Q And that was paid from the sale of tbe JSV O · 
23 Q So, you had listed item 66 on Exhibit 201, a 2002 23 Rice? 
24 to Yamaha Grizzly? 24 A Half. 
25 A Yes. 25 Q Half of the 7,500 dollars? 
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1EV. 1-10 
$3.50 Fee* NOTICE OF RELEASE OF LIABILITY $3.50 Fee* 
PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY - ALL INFORMATION MUST BE COMPLETE - NOTIFICATION BY SELLER/TRANSFEROR IS MANDATORY 
Vehicle or Hull Identification Number (VIN or HI N) Yeo r Make Body Sty le Ti1lc: Number 
1GBKP37W5K33 02440 19 8 9 WINN MH 98909668 
Seller's/Transferor's Full Legal Name(s): Dayti me Phone: 
Seller's Idaho Drivers License Number(s) or Social Security Number(s): 
Address: C ity: State: _ _ _ Zip 
Odometer: Selli ng Price: $ Date Delive1·ect to Purchaser/T1·ansfe ree: 
Purchaser's/Transferee's Full Legal Name(s) & Idaho Driver's License Number(s) : 
Address: City: State: Ztp Day time Phone: 
I/we hereby request that the [<la.ho Transportation Department mark it,;, records m indicate that the veh icle or ·,esscl ckscnbcd above has been transferred. However. r/we understJ.nd tha t Lhe title record 
wi lt cemai11 in my/our name(s) un ti l J new Tdaha CcrtificaLe of Title is Jpp!it:d for ,.me! issued. recording !ht! m11ne(<;J of che new owner(.-.) . 
x _________________ .\_'ig- ,-W-IL_ir_e_oj-.-S-el-/e-r(_S_)tr- ,---c,-11-:,j-er-o-r(-,·-) - - - - - --------f'E-x-HH-<IHBl'H-IT ____ H,_._ __ 
- SEE REVERSE SID E FOR MAILING/PA YMENT INSTRuCTIONS 
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PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 
INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC 
Tl-IIS AGREEtvfENT is made and entered into this 6th day of January, 2006, by and between 
GLENN TREFREN and DENNlS J. SALLAZ, SELLER, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, BUYER. 
W I T N E S S E T H: 
WHEREAS, Sellers each hold 100 % ovmership interest in Real Homes LLC, which is all of 
the ownership interest therein, an LLC formed and recorded with the Idaho Secretary of State on 
.I an uary 19, 2 00 I , and 
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties hereto that Sellers shall sell to the Buyer all of 
said Ownership Interest and all right, title and interest in and to all real property owned by Real Homes, 
LLC as set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements herein 
contained, 
IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties as follows: 
1. · Sellers hereby agrees to sell to Buyer and Buyer hereby agrees to purchase from the 
Sellers, all of said Ownership Interest owned by Sellers, being all of the Ownership Interest thereof, 
subject to the terms and conditions herein set forth. 
2. It is understood and agreed that the total purchase price for said Ownership Interest 
shall be the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($250,000), lawful money of the 
United States of America, to be paid by the Buyer to the Sellers as follows: 
(a) Buyer shall assume all recorded ene-umbrances against all real properties owned by 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC, P. 1 
EXH 1B IT---=I=---_ 
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Real Homes, LLC; including, but not limited to, D. L. Evans Bank, Perry Harding. 
CPA, and Canyon County property taxes and Buyer shall hold Sellers harmless 
therefrom. 
(b) Said encumbrances include that certain Note and Deed of Trust held by Saxton Fruit 
Farms dated 02/13/2001 which is in default and set for foreclosure sale on January 6, 
2006, and Buyer agrees to pay same in full prior to sale. 
(c) The balance of said purchase price after payment of the title encumbrances shall then 
be paid by Buyer to Sellers in two equal cash shares from the net proceeds from sales, 
income or other disposition of any or all of the said real properties herein. In any event 
said payment shall be made no later than 24 months from the date hereof. 
(d) Provided, however, that Buyer agrees to give Seller Dennis J. Sallaz an advance of 
$5,000.00 as a partial payment on his Attorney fees due to Jim Bevis prior to Ap1il 10. 
2006. 
3. Sellers represent, warrant and agree with the Buyer as follows: 
(a) That the Ownership Interest which is being sold herein constitutes 100% of the 
Ownership of Real Homes, LLC; 
(b) The Sellers have good and marketable title to said Ownership Interest being sold and 
transferred hereunder with absolute right to sell, assign and transfer same to Buyer free 
and clear of all liens, pledges, security interests or encumbrances and without any 
breach of any agreement to which he is a party. 
(c) The Sellers covena..11t that all real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC and being 
PURCHASE AGREENIBNT FOR SALE OF INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC, P. 2 
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transferred herein are free and clear of all encumbrances not listed herein. 
( d) Real Homes, LLC has free and clear title to said real properties and Sellers shall 
execute any and all documents requested by Buyer to transfer all interest therein to 
Buyer. 
4. Time is agreed to be of the essence of this Agreement and the performance thereof. 
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors, 
administrators, personal representatives and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITh'"ESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have hereunto set their han.ds the day and year in 
this Agreement first above written. 
BUYER: 
SELLERS: 





By Glenn Trefren, Cea-Owner 
J/ 
REAL HOM.ES, I ,LG 
A / ---------7'----·· ---- / / £· /t-i,/;_ 
By Glenn Trefren~ Co-~er 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC, P. 3 
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STATE OF IDAHO) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this & day of.....,L,t:.:::::::~q 
State, personally appeared , known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
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A port.i.c:o. cf th.a Scut:hw.st Quarta:r of tb• litortb.ca.st. Quirter of 
Sft<:tio::. l17, 'r~h.ip 3 North, ~e 3 WeBt ·o! ti:.• Boi•e Ke:ridian, 
C&:trycn County, Id.a:b..o and is I1:0:rt1 pt:::-ticul.a.:rly d.e!!c:ribed ILil follC",,r'S: 
~ING at the lio:rthv-eat coma: of s:a.id Sou~.it Qt::.a.:rt•:: of the 
North.east Qu.art•r; thence 
South a· 35' 1~• W~Qt along the Wast ~J" of •tld Soutbrest 
Quarter df the liklrth,u.11t Qo..c:ta-r a di•tanoe of 7-i5 .ls £•Ht; thanoa 
Jliort:.b eg- 4!' !51• :Rut putllsl with tbAi Worth boi::c.d.L.ry o;t th• 
lfortha&s.t Qu.31:ts:- o~ "'id- Saetio:i l 7 a. di1tEm~ -of 1sC. Cv f"65tj 
t.h.e:c• , • \ 
Sou.~ o• 35' 1-4• W••t pua.lld with the "H'aat b~:ry o! atld 
Souti:was~ Q,J.ute:?" of th.a lfc:th:.e.ut Qu&rtu:· a d.i1tc..ce e! 180. 00 
feet to th:a ~ POrxT OJ' l!~QnmDfG1 th.anoe 
?:io:rt;h 89' ~5' !51• kat pa-......ilel with th.a North ~:ry o! •.lt.id 
North4!11a.at Qu.arte:- a. diat:.&D.cia of 152. 50 !•et, the::::c• 
South 0" 35' 1·1- We-st p.a.rallel rlth th.II lfasat bott::::.da._ry of ea.id 
Soutliv.·at ()u..u:'tar of the Rorthauit Qua.rt*r a. <li•ta.n.ca of 302. 80 
fe.etJ th.tine• 
South 8 ~ 3 .9 ' :2 5 • West pa.....-all al vi th t:b.• Sou th l::,omiaa_._"7 o :LE!ti-o. 
soutlrw'est·Quarter of the ~orthoaat Qu.a.rta: & dista.n.cc of 1SJ.50 
te~t, th~• . 
N'orth 0 11 35' J.~· l<!a.st paral.lel with the West bou::µ:la....--y of aaid 
Sout:.hwes~ Quarter of the Nort.b.eaat Qu.a.:rter a disM±ice of 3-03. 09 
feet to ~e rn POiln' OF' BX~. 
~ po::tion of th• Southwe:Jt Qc.arter of the North~at Qu&:::-ter o:f 
Seation :p. Town:e:1-~i> 3 lirorth. R.-D.g~ 3 Weat of th• Boi8e Meridian, 
<:a.n.yc:i cqc:ncy, Idaho and ia ?DO:re ~rticularly d.cec:d . :b~ as fcilO"#i!: 
c<:::i4'X'!raCI5G a.t tbe NorthYe!!.t co=.e:::- cf ;;.aid Soutbrea~ <;r.a.rter cf the 
Northe.&lil tt Qc.a.rtar; thane• · 
south a• 3S' 1.ft• We.at a.long the W.st hom::i.da.ry of s.aid Sot::.th,;-eat 
Qua.rtex cit ths Northeast ·Qcarter a. cliata.nce of 745 .15 feat, the=.c• 
>lm:'th 8 3• 45 • 51 • J:a.a t pa.ra.1111 Yi th the North bo't:t::l.d&.ry o:f tha 
Nort.ru,,a.st Qwtz-tar of aa.id. Sacticm. 17 -. diat.anoe of 40. 00 f.-et; 
t.h.e=l.ca 
South o• 35' 1.4:• We:&:t pa.ra1lel 'Id.th th.a Waat ~ of sa.id 
Sout:.hw.a~i: Qaa.rt-.r of the Nort:.h.&~t Qtla,.-:ter a. di:;t-s;-;c;; o! ::teo. 0-0 
fe•t1 th.:i.ce 
North 89" 45' si• Eaat pa=a.llel ld.th the Horth bo~ry of said 
Nort:o...&..st Qu.a,rter a dist.Clea of 152 .50 fe-et to the TRtn: PODlT OF 
B~; tha:DC• continuing 
North 89* ~5· SI- k2t parallel with said North ~ a 
cliatan.ce: of 363 .32 feet to a. point on the centerli::l.e of the Burri!! 
Cana.l; th.e.nc:e 
South 45• 39' 4.8• Weat a.lOtlg sa..id centerline a diatancei ot 
43,.92 fe~t; thcl.oe 
· South a.9• 39• 2s• West para1l•l W'ith the South ba.:ndary of sa.id 
Southwaab.: Qu&l:'te.::: of the No:::thea.st Qua.rt9X' a d.ist:ande · of ss. 35 
feot; thoi:iee 
lrorth o• 35' 1-l• Ea.at p&...-a.l.lel with the ltest :boundary of aa..id 
Southwest Quarter of the North.ea.st Quarter a. d.ista:ioe of 302.80 




A portion of the Sou~~t Quarter of thf!I Nortl:::..e.a..1t Quarter of 
Se<::t:ion 17. Townsh.±p 3 North. Range 3 We.st ct the Boise Xe:ridi.a.n, 
Cc:rycnl County, Idaho and il!I :mora pa.rtiauJ.c:ly describ-.d a.z fol.10'W3: 
CO!d:MEliCING at the North.west cor.::i.er of sa.id. South:Yaat Qua.rte: of the 
Northen.st Qa.a...""'ter; thane• 
Scajth o• 35' 14• West alcmg the West bou:nda...""Y o'f said Sout:.hvest 
Quarter of the !iorth.ea.st Qu;a.:rtel:' a d.iata:o.aa o:f 745.1.5 :feet7 thenaa 
North s9• ~.sa s1• :&a.at parallel wit:1l th• North l:xm:cd.ary of the 
Northeast Quarter of sa.id Se~tion 17 .a. distance o:f 40.00 f~et to 
the TRU!: POINT Ol1' BEG:INll:D:m; th.moe c:0t1.tirmi:c.g • 
North 99• 4:5' Sl • Ea.it p;;....-:.11:i:l ~i th =~id North b~u:i::ida::y a 
d.i.s.t.a:n.c:e.. o.£ 2~.9.. <l O f~et; the-....ce 
South o• 35 • 14 • West parallel with th.a Waat bound..L.7 of said 
Soutlrv&st Qu&.:rt•r of the Northeast QU.arter a d.i8tance of 180.00 
feet; the:nae · 
Sou.th. 99• 45' s1• lfest parall.el with the North boandary of aaid 
Northea*.t Qu.arter a distanoa of 2~9.00 f••t; th~ce 
North oa 35' 1.4• Ea.st pa....---aJ.lol with the lt'est bo•mda...7 of said 
Soutl:V't\st Qua...-ter of the :Northeast Qua.rt•: a d.iatance of 1.BO. 00 
feet to. th.a TRUE POD."T OF BEGINNING. 
A · portion of the Soutmrest Qu&rter of the :North.ea.st Quarter of 
Section 17. Town.ship 3 North, 'R.ui.ga 3 w~uzt of the Boisa Meridian, 
Canyon CoillltYr Idaho a:nd is :llOre particularly described a.a foll0W21 
COMMXNCING at the Northwest corner of .eaid Sout.lr..tast Q-u.a:rter of the 
Northe.uit Quarter; theiloe · . 
South o· 35• 1-4:• West a.leog the South bounda.....""'Y of said 
B<:,uthwe11t Quarter o:f the North.ea.st Quarter a di"t&:l.Ce of 7~5 .1.S 
faet1 the!lce 
!'l~:;:-tb. SS" 45' 51 .. ~t pa:ra.llal rlth t±.s lforth ~da.-.--y of the 
No=theaat Quarter of said 86<:ltion 17 8. dista::I.CQ of 289.00 feet to 
the~ POM OF BEGnmmG1 thenoa continuing 
North 89• ~5' 51• hat pa.ra.l.lel. with said Horth bound.a.-ry a 
distance of 44:!L :9.5 :feet to a point on the can tar line of the Burri~ 
<:anal.; thence 
South 45• 39' 4.8• Weat a1ong said. ocuterline z. disitanoe of 
258. 6:2 feet7 thence leaving aa.id ow.terlina and ~a.ring 
South as· -i5' .si• wut pa.ra.l1el with th• North bo"tmd.u.ry of said 
Northe.a.Bt Qu&.rter a distanc• of 256.8:2 faet1 ~o• 
No~th o• 35' 14• bat parallel with the West bow:::i,;h..zy o:f aaid 
Scuthwaut Qua.rtar of th• Rorth1H.at Quarter a. d.istci.ce of 180. 00 
feet to the TR"iJE POINT 07 ~-
{continued) 
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OCT 3 0 2007 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
ByJ HEATON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
RENEE L. BAIRD-SALLAZ, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 











Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on four separate occasions over 
a nine month period. The dates of trial were November 15, 2005, through November 19, 2006; 
April 10, 2006, through April 14, 2006; July 17, 2006, through July 21, 2006; and July 27, 2006. 
A total of 16 days were utilized for the trial. There were several hundred exhibits admitted into 
evidence - many consisting of a substantial number of pages. 
The Plaintiff was present during the trial and represented by Debra L. Eismann, Esq, of 
Nampa, Idaho. The Defendant was also present during trial and represented by James A. Bevis, 
Esq, of Boise, Idaho. There were many pretrial motions that were considered by the Court, as 
well as many motions and litigation issues .during the period that this matter was tried. This 
matter was, at times, highly contentious and the parties and attorneys challenged the court's 
schedule for a long period of time. However, the Court wishes to note that both parties were 
FINDINGS I CONCLUSIONS I ORDER - 1 EXHIBIT T 
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well represented by their attorneys and the Court appreciated the caliber of counsel. The Court, 
counsel and the parties were all required to exercise a great deal of patience and flexibility in 
order to allow both parties to have a full, fair and complete trial. 
In addition, the Court required an inordinate amount of time to complete the Findings and 
Conclusions below. As indicated in earlier correspondence, this was highly unusual for this 
Court. Part of the delay was due to the large volume of exhibits and the substantial time between 
trial days, which required more of the Court's time in reviewing evidence it heard as far back as 
November, 2005. Part of the delay was due to the other circumstances, schedule and demands of 
the Court's time and duties throughout the last year. Finally, part of the delay was due to 
circumstances and demands upon the Court on a personal level, which the Court understands is 
probably not a concern of either party. Regardless of ~e causes of the delay, the Court wishes to 
sincerely compliment and thank the parties and their counsel for their patience. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Dennis and Renee were married on July 4, 1996. This action was filed on May 
27, 2004. The parties were divorced by this Court on July 28, 2005, with the issues of property 
and debt division remaining for trial. 
2. Long before the marriage, Dennis represented Steve Sumner and other entities in 
a lawsuit. He began work on this lawsuit in 1985 and was still acting as Sumner's attorney as 
late as August, 1999. In March, 1999, Dennis claimed that he was owed $377,398.60, plus 
interest for his fees and costs advanced and monies loaned to Sumner and his entities. The 
evidence established that as of August 5, 1999, he was owed $351,089.42. At that time, 
$269,204.60 of this was at least 120 days overdue. There was no documentary evidence to 
establish how much of this was earned prior to July 4, 1996. The balance of $81,984.82 was 
current. 
FINDINGS I CONCLUSIONS I ORDER - 2 
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3. Prior to the marriage, in 1992, Renee began working for Dennis at his law firm in 
· Boise, Idaho. Dennis has been a licensed and practicing attorney in the State of Idaho since 
1965. On March 15, 2004, Dennis entered into a partnership which consisted of the law firm and 
Scott and Marjorie Gatewood. This resulted in the filing of an Election for Small Business 
Corporation named "Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd.". This election states that Dennis and Renee 
have a 90% ownership and the Gatewoods have a 10% ownership in the law firm. 
4. Dennis terminated Renee's employment at the law firm on May 11, 2004. 
5. Prior to the marriage, Dennis acquired a one half interest in real property located 
in Grandview, Idaho. 
6. Prior to the marriage, in 1969, Dennis organized and/or became the owner of a 
corporation known as National Financial Service, Inc. On May 11, 2004, Renee took $3,200.00 
from the account for this entity. 
7. Prior to the marriage, Dennis acquired a residence located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, 
Boise, Idaho. Dennis' law office is operated out of this location. There is a mortgage on this 
property in the amount of $272,032.67. The monthly payment on this amount is $2,241.93. 
Dennis also receives rent from the law office in the amount of $3,400.00 per month. Plaintiff has 
abandoned her claim for any improvements to this property during the marriage. 
8. Dennis also acquired 3 properties prior to the marriage in June of 1991 from 
Kendra Bertsch-Sallaz. These are located in Grandview, Smith's Ferry and Ada County, Idaho, 
and are identified in defendant's Exhibits 240, 241 and 242. 
9. There exists a retirement account with Putnam Investments. The client number 
for that account is 0336644339. The balance in that account according to the latest statement in 
evidence is $40,160.99. The account consists of eight (8) separate funds. Only three (3) of the 
separate funds were opened before the marriage. The documentation for these three funds shows 
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contributions pnor to the marriage of $1,974.67, $3,140.35 and $3,395.90, for a total of 
$8,510.92. 
10. Dennis' grandmother, Bessie Matcham, died on March 26, 2000. Prior to that, on 
or about March 20, 2000, Dennis deposited $184,969.37 from her estate into his trust account. 
Between March 20, 2000, and August 15, 2001, all of this money was disbursed to the heirs 
except for $5,625.25. 
11. Dennis did not file an application to be appointed personal representative of his 
grandmother's estate until October 12, 2000. He was appointed on October 19, 2000. 
12. Dennis prepared and filed an inventory for the estate. However, this inventory 
was not signed by him. Instead, it was signed by Dennis' sister, Chris Snyder. The inventory 
did not list any loans made to any third parties as assets and the value of the estate was placed at 
$103,767.44. 
13. Chris purchased Renee's jeep in April, 2001, for $22,500.00. She used part of the 
monies paid to her out of the estate. The money was deposited into the Real Homes checking 
account. 
14. On June 18, 2003, Dennis signed escrow instructions relating to his receipt of 
payment of a settlement in the Sumner case, along with a confidentiality agreement regarding the 
settlement. 
15. On August 13, 2003, Dennis opened an account for his grandmother's estate at 
D.L. Evans Bank (hereinafter "estate account"). This was approximately 3 years after her death 
and approximately 3 years after he was appointed the Personal Representative of her estate. He 
authorized, in addition to himself, his brother Daryl and his daughter as signatories on this 
account. He also directed all statements and correspondence to be sent to his daughter's address. 
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16. On or before August 15, 2003, Dennis received $182,098.00 from the trust 
account of Richard Harris. This money was from the settlement of the Sumner litigation. 
However, the check received by Dennis was made payable to "Estate of Bessie B. Matcham" 
(Dennis deceased grandmother). Dennis did not tell Renee about this money. He did not deposit 
the check into the law firm trust account. Instead, on August 15, 2003, he deposited the check 
into the account associated with his grandmother's estate. 
17. Dennis received additional monies from the Sumner settlement which he did not 
deposit into his trust account and did not tell Renee about at the time. These amounts were 
deposited as follows: $2,000.00 (August 29, 2003), $5,000.00 (September 8, 2003) and 
$198,000.00 (July 13, 2005). 
18. The total received during the marriage by Dennis from the Sumner settlement, 
was $387.098.00. 
19. Dennis signed Renee's name on a 2003 joint income tax return on October 4, 
2004. This return did not report the income he received from the Sumner case settlement. 
Although Dennis testified in his deposition that he advised Perry Harding, CPA about this and he 
said he would take care of it, Mr. Harding testified at trial that Dennis did not tell him about this 
money and he did not tell Dennis he would take care of it. 
20. In addition, Dennis spent a great deal of money from the estate account for 
personal living expenses following the deposit of the settlement monies. Dennis testified in his 
deposition that he began writing checks on the estate account for his personal use on October 8, 
2003. 
21. Dennis withdrew $6,000.00 in cash from the estate checking account on August 
29, 2003 .. 
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22. Dennis wrote four separate $40,000.00 checks on the estate account on June 8, 
2004. They were payable to Daryl, Chris, Becky and Diani - all relatives of Dennis. It does not 
appear from the terms of the will that Diani is entitled to receive any share of the residue of the 
Matcham estate. These checks were not endorsed and were all run through the bank at the same 
time. Then, they were converted into cashiers checks, which were never endorsed. 
23. On July 13, 2005, Dennis deposited another $198,000.00 from the Sumner 
settlement into the estate checking account. On that same day, he wrote a check in the amount of 
$198,000.00 to D.L. Evans Bank and had his brother Daryl sign the check. Four cashier's 
checks were purchased with this money, each in the amount of $49,500.00, payable to Daryl, 
Chris, Becky and Diani. As noted earlier, Diani is not entitled to receive any of the inheritance 
under the terms of the will. None of the four cashier's checks were endorsed by the payees and 
all four were run through the bank at the same time. 
24. One of the 4 cashier's checks for $49,500.00 was re-deposited into the estate 
checking account on August 25, 2005. Likewise, another one of these checks was re-deposited 
into the estate account on October 28, 2005. 
25. Dennis wrote a $500.00 check from the estate checking account to Tradesman, 
Inc. on August 25, 2005. 
26. Dennis wrote another check from the estate account on August 31, 2005, in the 
amount of $25,807.00 for a closing on real property. This check was payable to Title One. 
27. In January, 2001, Real Homes, LLC was formed (hereinafter "Real Homes"). 
The Articles of Organization for this entity were filed with the Secretary of State on January 19, 
2001. Dennis is listed as the original registered agent and Renee is listed as the Manager. Both 
Parties signed the Articles. 
FINDINGS I CONCLUSIONS I ORDER - 6 
000142
• 
28. Two Operating Agreements were introduced into evidence regarding Real Homes 
- one by Renee and one by Dennis. 
29. The one provided by Renee is dated on its cover and on the signature page 
January 19, 2001, and is signed by Renee only. The testimony established that Dennis prepared 
this document. This document provides that Renee owns 100% of the membership of the LLC 
and that it is governed by its members. The document also provides that no additional members 
can be admitted except with a unanimous vote of the members. It also requires a majority vote 
of the members regarding all determinations, decisions, approvals and actions affecting the 
entity, as well as the business affairs of the LLC. Finally, this Operating Agreement specifically 
prohibit any amendments to the Agreement which change the number of votes or degree of 
consent required to approve or disapprove any matters that require a vote of consent and any 
amendments to provisions for allocations or distributions of profits, losses or cash. 
30. The one provided by Dennis is signed by Dennis and Glen Trefren. However, this 
document is not dated, either by way of a stated effective date in the agreement or on the 
signature page. Dennis and Glen Trefren are the stated members of the LLC, with a sharing ratio 
of 50% each. The document also states that both contributed an initial amount of $25,000.00. 
The evidence at trial established that Mr. Trefren did not make such a contribution. 
31. On February 11, 2002, the Annual report for Real Homes was filed with the Idaho 
Secretary of State. This report identifies Renee as the President of Real Homes. On February 
19, 2003, another Annual report was filed with the Secretary of State which also identified Renee 
as the president. The Annual report filed February 16, 2004, also identifies Renee as the 
president and secretary of real Homes. However, Dennis filed an annual report for Real Homes 
which listed he and Glen Trefren as manager-owners. He signed the articles as "co-owner". 
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32. On September 3, 2003, Dennis filed Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization for Real Homes with the Idaho Secretary of State. This document listed him as a 
member and he signed this document as "Owner". 
33. Renee opened a checking account for Real Homes on January 19, 2001. 
34. Renee, signing as President, applied for an Employer Identification Number for 
Real Homes on April 17, 2004. 
35. In January, 2001, Glen Trefren was employed as a property "scout" for Real 
Homes, LLC. He was paid $300.00 to $400.00 per week. 
36. On February 15, 2001, Real Homes purchased 5 acres of property from Saxton 
Fruit Farms located on Riverside Blvd., in Caldwell, Idaho (hereinafter "Riverside Property"). A 
deed of trust was executed naming Saxton as beneficiary in the amount of $43,900.00. 
37. The Riverside Property was later divided into 4 lots: lA, lB, 2A and 2B. Renee 
provided a letter to Canyon County authorizing Glen Trefren and a realtor to appear on behalf of 
real Homes regarding the conditional use permit required to divide the this property into the four 
lots. 
38. Renee moved into the Riverside Property, Lot IB, in August or September of 
2003, when she moved out of the marital residence, and continues to reside there. 
39. On February 10, 2004, Real Homes sold Lot lB of the Riverside Property to 
Dennis and Renee for $105,000. This property is also known as 15584 Riverside, Caldwell, 
Idaho. The deed from Real Homes was signed by Renee. This property was appraised on March 
30, 2005 and had a value of $152,000.00. The debt against this property is approximately 
$114,471.90, leaving a net value of $37,528.10. 
40. Another appraisal of the 15584 Property was admitted into evidence in July, 2006. 
This report is dated July 18, 2006, and lists a value of $280,000.00. 
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41. On August 16, 2001, Glen Tre:fren formed his own LLC named "Tradesman 
Contractors & Construction". Dennis prepared the Articles of Incorporation for him. 
42. On December 20, 2002, Dennis refinanced the property at 1000 S. Roosevelt. 
Some of the community credit card debt was paid off at this time. The total of all the various 
accounts paid was $73,014.85. Although Renee testified that only $17,762.64 of this amount 
should be subject to reimbursement because that amount related to personal credit cards, there 
was no evidence that the balance was not also spent on community debt. 
4 3. Renee entered into a contract with the Hennifers to purchase real property located 
at 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho (hereinafter the "Hennifer Property"). Renee had been 
pasturing her horses there and the purpose was to acquire the property for the same. However, 
Dennis and Renee could not ultimately qualify for the loan to purchase this property. In order to 
acquire and close on this property, they had to obtain a loan from Dennis' brother, Daryl. Renee 
testified that following the closing, Daryl signed a quitclaim deed to them. However, no such 
quitclaim deed was admitted into evidence and there is no evidence of recording of the same. 
44. Daryl testified that he has no out-of-pocket investment in the Hennifer property. 
Renee and Dennis are the only ones who have any such investment. They incurred expenses 
associated with the clean-up and remodel of the house on the property. Dennis collects the rent 
and pays the underlying mortgage. He also personally pays any shortfall between the rent and 
mortgage. Daryl pays no taxes on this property. In addition, Daryl's testimony at trial regarding 
the arrangement he had with Dennis regarding this property is inconsistent with his testimony at 
his deposition and there is no documentation regarding this arrangement. 
45. On April 17, 2002, the Buckinghams purchased a strip of property from the 
Hennifer Property for the purpose of enlarging their yard. Renee was listed on the contract as the 
seller and the $14,750.00 proceeds from the sale were deposited into the Real Homes account. 
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46. On that same date, the Campbells also purchased a strip of property from the 
Hennifer property. Renee was listed as the seller on that contract and the $12,250.00 proceeds 
from that sale were deposited into the Real Homes account. 
47. The value of the 916 S. Roosevelt (Hennifer) property 1s approximately 
$180,000.00, with debt against it of approximately $115,000.00, leaving $65,000.00 in equity. 
48. On October 7, 2002, Real Homes purchased real property located on Smith 
Avenue in Nampa, Idaho (hereinafter "Smith Property"). There was no secured debt against the 
property at the time of purchase. 
49. Dennis prepared a deed of trust and promissory note in the amount of $15,000.00 
to secure debt that he and Renee owed to Perry Harding, CPA. The note was signed by Renee as 
president of Real Homes, and she and Dennis signed individually. 
50. Dennis testified that he stopped payments to the Saxtons on the debt owed to them 
by Real Homes because he ran out of money. Thus, Real Homes was defaulted on April 15, 
2004, on the underlying deed of trust. However, the balance in the Real Homes checking 
account as of April 1, 2004, was slightly over $70,000.00 and was almost $68,000.00 as of April 
30, 2004. 
51. $30,686.69 was transferred by Dennis on May 7, 2004, from the Real Homes 
account to pay off a line of credit with D.L. Evans Bank. On that same date, he transferred 
$35,665.94 from the account into a cashier's check. On May 18, 2004, $30,000.00 was 
deposited into the law firm trust account. The balance of$ 5,665.94 has not been accounted for 
by Dennis. 
52. Dennis closed the Real Homes checking account on June 2, 2004. 
53. Dennis filled out and signed a business credit application for Real Homes with 
D.L. Evans Bank on November 5, 2004. In that application, in which he acknowledged that his 
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answers were truthful and accurate, he states that he is 100% owner. On November 8, 2004, he 
completed a financial statement with D.L. Evans regarding his personal guarantee on the loan to 
Real Homes. 
54. On November 15, 2004, Dennis filled out and signed an Annual Report for the 
Secretary of State for Real Homes, wherein he listed himself as owner-manager and signed as 
"owner". 
55. Also in the fall of 2004, Glen Trefren, through a bid submitted to Dennis, 
estimated the cost of construction work at the Smith Property at $30,950.00. 
56. Dennis signed a promissory note on behalf of Real Homes for $30,475.00 and on 
February 4, 2005, D.L. Evans Bank recorded a deed of trust against the Smith Property to secure 
this amount. 
57. The Saxtons proceeded with a Notice of Trustee's Sale on January 19, 2005, in 
order to foreclose against the Riverside property. The sale was scheduled for May 25, 2005. 
58. Later in February, 2005, Glen Trefren signed a quitclaim deed, as a purported 
member of Real Homes, LLC, granting all real property owned by Real Homes to his LLC 
known as Tradesman, Inc. The deed also included Lot lB of the Riverside property which was 
owned by Dennis and Renee, not Real Homes. Dennis testified that he did not know about the 
quitclaim deed, but Mr. Trefren testified Dennis prepared it. 
59. There were several collection proceedings against Dennis and Renee in the spring 
of 2005, relating to Dennis' medical bills. It appears that these bills have been paid. 
60. Dennis sold 2 ATVs and a trailer to Roy Rice on May 5, 2005, for $7,500.00 to 
pay his attorney. 
61. On May 25, 2005, Glen Trefren filed a bankruptcy proceeding on behalf of Real 
Homes. He represented himself as an authorized agent. The Petition stated that the assets of 
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Real Homes had a value of $545,000.00 with secured creditors totaling $99,596.00. The petition 
did not list any unsecured creditors. This resulted in the cancellation of the foreclosure sale by 
the Saxtons. 
62. Renee filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy upon the grounds that :Nfr. Trefren 
was not a member of Real Homes and had no authority to file such a proceeding. The 
bankruptcy court dismissed the proceedings on November 25, 2005. 
63. Glen Trefren then, on June 6, 2005, and on behalf of his LLC (Tradesman), 
recorded a $250,000.00 lien against all real property owned by Real Homes, and the residence 
owned by Dennis and Renee (Lot1B Riverside). 
64. Nfr. Trefren recorded two amended claims of lien on July 22, 2005. One was 
against the Riverside property, including Lot IB, for $250,000.00. The other was against the 
Smith Property for $35,000.00. 
65. Despite this matter having been pending for over a year before trial was 
completed, Nfr. Trefren was unable to provide even a single document to support any of his liens. 
Further, these debts were not listed in the bankruptcy filings he made on behalf of Real Homes. 
In fact, he testified under oath, that his intent in recording the lien was to cloud the title on all the 
real property. 
66. Dennis testified that he turned over all but 10% of his interest in the law firm 
named Sallaz and Gatewood. He testified that he turned over all his accounts receivable. 
However, there is no documentation regarding any of these facts and the Subchapter S Corporate 
documents from the year 2004 show him as a 90% owner. 
67. Theresa Pulliam, the accountant hired by Renee, valued the accounts receivable 
for Sallaz & Gatewood, as of July 28, 2005, to be $130,744.00. Part of her valuation was based 
upon an accounts receivable aging summary provided by Dennis' law office as of 12:06 p.m. on 
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October 25, 2005. That summary only listed 8 accounts between 31 and 60 days old, totaling 
$1,416.17, and no other accounts older than 60 days. That summary showed current accounts 
receivable to be $247,689.79 and those between 1 and 30 days to be $9,672.63. 
68. Ms. Pulliam did not reduce the value of receivables based on taxes that would be 
paid upon receipt or for any payables due at the time. She did note that a reduction could be 
done in the amount of $4,650.00 for the payables and testified that the ta-x rate would be 25%. 
69. The accountant hired by Dennis, Perry Harding, reviewed Ms. Pulliam's opinion, 
did some independent review, and arrived at a lesser figure of $43,334.15. His valuation was 
based upon a "revised" accounts receivable aging summary, which showed only $15,952.12 as 
current, $27,167.92 from 1 to 30 days old, and the large figure of $179,883.53 as over 90 days 
old. These figures were arrived at after discussions between he and Dennis' office manager. 
70. Despite the figure of $15,952.12 as current, the firm was collecting in excess of 
$30,000.00. 
71. During the summer of 2001, Renee made arrangements through a friend who 
owned a Labrador stud to purchase a yellow puppy from Josh Edwards. 
72. On August 3, 2001, Dennis had semen extracted from his dog named "Vegas" for 
preservation of the bloodline. 
73. Renee picked up the puppy from Mr. Edwards on October 27, 2001. Renee 
named the dog Smooch. 
74. During the early pendency of this matter, the Court entered an order providing an 
equal sharing of possession of Smooch. This was done because Renee would not allow Dennis 
to take the dog on an annual hunting trip for approximately a week. 
75. For the most part, equal sharing of possession of Smooch has worked fairly well. 
The only problem that has arisen since the initial order was last fall when Renee refused to 
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cooperate with Dennis regarding another hunting trip and the Court was required to enter an 
order allowing Dennis to have possession of the dog on specified dates. 
76. Renee filed this action on May 27, 2004. 
77. Renee's testified that her residence at the Riverside property was broken into on 
May 28 or 29, 2004, and again on July 27, 2004. On both occasions, the only area that was 
disturbed was the office. She testified that the items stolen were the hard drive from her 
computer, her file on Real Homes and the quitclaim deed from Daryl to Dennis and Renee 
regarding the Hennifer property. However, it does not appear that she actively engaged the 
authorities in investigating these incidents to learn who might have done it. 
78. Following the parties' separation, the receipt of the Sumner settlement monies, 
and the disbursement of those monies through the estate account, on January 13, 2004, Dennis 
rented a new safe deposit box at D .L. Evans Bank. While this matter was pending, the Court 
entered an order providing that both parties view and inspect this safe deposit box together to 
confirm and/or determine the contents therein. On July 20, 2005, at approximately 4:33 p.m., 
Dennis and Renee went to the bank and inspected the box. However, on that same day, at 
approximately 3:55 p.m., Dennis went to the bank and accessed the box. Dennis was not truthful 
about this visit about one half hour before he was to meet Renee and further testified that he was 
not carrying anything with him when he accessed the box. However, the surveillance video from 
the bank shows that Dennis was in fact carrying a briefcase when he went into and when he left 
the safe deposit box. 'When the parties met and inspected the box 30 minutes later, there was 
nothing in the box except some silver dollars. 
79. On December 9, 2005, Dennis received written notice through his law office of an 
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale for January 16, 2006. Renee did not receive this notice. 
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80. The entity known as "Real Properties, LLC" was formed on January 4, 2006. 
Pursuant to the Articles of Organization, Dennis is shown to be the registered agent, Janet Rice 
(Roy Rice's wife) is shown to be the manager or member, and Millis Anderson (Dennis' 
secretary) signed the Articles as a member. 
81. Two days later, on January 6, 2006, Dennis and Trefren entered into a contract 
entitled "Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC". Dennis and Trefren are 
identified as "seller" and Real Properties is identified as "buyer". Roy Rice signed for Real 
Properties as a manager. The contract recites that Dennis and Trefren own 100% of Real Homes 
and that they are selling all their ownership interest and all real property which includes all 4 
parcels of the Riverside property (including Lot IB) and the Smith Property to Real Properties 
for the sum of $250,000.00. Dennis and Trefren also warrant 100% ownership of Real Homes 
and "good and marketable title free an clear of all leins, pledges, security interest or 
encumbrances and without any breach of any agreement to which he is a party". 
82. Trefren recorded a quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, as sole owner, member and 
manager of Tradesman. This deed purported to convey Lots IA, 2A and 2B of the Riverside 
property from his LLC (Tradesman) to Real Properties. This deed was dated January 6, 2006. 
83. Trefren recorded another quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, as co-owner, member 
and manager of Real Homes, LLC. This deed purported to convey the exact same property as in 
his deed from Tradesman, also to Real Properties. This deed was also dated January 6, 2006. 
84. Trefren recorded a third quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, which was also dated 
January 6, 2006, as co-owner, member and manager of Real Homes. This deed purported to 
convey the Smith property from Real Homes to Real Properties. 
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85. On March 6, 2006, Dennis assigned his interest in the proceeds of the January 6, 
2006, contract to his counsel in this divorce proceeding by preparing and signing written 
assignment of that purchase and sale agreement. 
86. Neither the January 6, 2006, Purchase and Sale Agreement or the March 6, 2006, 
Assignment thereof were disclosed to Renee or her counsel until April 10, 2006 ( during trial). 
87. The parties acquired a 1989 Chieftan Motorhome during the marriage which is 
worth between $15,000.00 and $16,000.00. The parties do not dispute that this item may be 
awarded to Dennis. It does appear that this item was acquired with funds from a refinance on the 
1000 S. Roosevelt property in the amount of$17,107.00. 
88. Dennis possesses a 1982 Rolls Royce automobile. Renee claims this was 
purchased during the marriage and Dennis claims it is his separate property. The value is 
disputed with Renee claiming it is worth $28,000.00 and Dennis claiming it is worth only 
$5,500. The documents pertaining to this vehicle are found in Exhibits 70 and 372.· 
89. There exists a 1980 Porsche, the character of Which the parties dispute. Renee 
claims it is her separate property, but there is no supporting documentation for this claim. The 
value of this item is $5,500.00. 
90. Dennis acquired a 1954 Cadillac automobile long before the marriage. Renee 
claims that community funds in the amount of $1,750.00 were expended on this vehicle. 
91. Comparing Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no dispute 
regarding either the character or assignment regarding the following items of property: 12, 14, 
15, 16,22,28,29,30A,30B,31,32,44,44(aj,45,48.1,50,51,55,5~58,59,60,61,62,65,69, 
69.3, 69.5 - 69.21,. 
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92. There are household appliances at the 1000 S. Roosevelt property which the 
parties agree are community (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Item 77.1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, Item 
71). The Plaintiff values these at $4,000.00 and the Defendant values them at $3,250. 
93. Numerous household items are listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 as numbers 77.2 -
77.61. Some of these are in Renee's possession, most are in Dennis' possession. It does not 
appear from Defendant's Exhibit 201, or the evidence, that Dennis objects to either the 
characterization of all these as community property or the proposed division in Plaintiffs Exhibit 
1. 
94. There are several firearms in Dennis' possession. Renee claims three were 
acquired during the marriage - the 12 ga. Binelli, worth $1,400.00; the Glock 9mm, worth 
$950.00; and the .22 Ruger, worth $800.00. Dennis agreed in his testimony that the 12 ga. 
Binelli and .22 Ruger were acquired during the marriage, with values of $450.00 and $125, 
respectively. He testified that the Glock was given to him by a third party. Neither party 
provided any documentation regarding value or dates regarding any any of the disputed items. 
95. There is one AQHA horse and one APHA horse. The parties appear to agree that 
the AQHA horse is a community asset. However, they dispute the character of the APHA horse 
with Renee claiming it "does not belong to the community". However, the Court is unable to 
locate any documentation regarding any third party ownership of this animal. It appears the 
animals are worth approximately $1,500.00 each. The horse tack appears to be gone as a result 
of theft. 
96. There is a 1950 Packard automobile that the parties agree is owned jointly (50/50) 
by them and Daryl's brother. The value is disputed between $1,500.00 and $3,000.00. 
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97. There is a 1978 Oaks Whitewater boat with trailer which the parties agree is 
Dennis' separate property. Renee claims that community funds were expended on a new engine 
and other improvements. However, there was no documentation regarding these improvements. 
98. There is a 1949 Dreamboat Roadster which the parties agree is Dennis' separate 
property. Renee claims that community funds were expended on improvements to this item 
which enhanced the value. However, there was no documentation regarding these improvements 
or amount thereof. 
99. During the pendency of this action, Dennis sold the 2002 and 1998 Yamaha 
ATVs and the trailer for them. He received $7,500.00 for all three items, which the parties agree 
were community property. 
100. Following the parties' separation, Renee sold the 1994 Mitsubishi automobile and 
used the proceeds for expenses. 
101. Dennis possesses the 1995 Chevrolet Suburban, which he claims is not an asset of 
the community. Renee claims it is and argues the value is $9,000.00. 
102. Renee claims that the 1999 Yamaha was given by Dennis to her daughter. Dennis 
claims that Roy Rice owns this ATV. The value of the item is uncertain. 
103. The 1967 Pontiac Firebird is community property. Renee values it at $6,100.00 
and Dennis values it at $1,500.00. There is no documentation regarding value. Dennis has 
possession of this vehicle. This vehicle should be awarded to Dennis and the Court will assign a 
value of $2,500.00. 
104. There is an account with Capital Educators with a balance of $247.96. There does 
not appear to be a dispute that this is a community asset. 
105. The parties acquired several retirement accounts identified as Items 28 - 34 on 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201. As noted above, the only item that is disputed 
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is #30. Item 30 is a Putnam SEPIRA account# 0336644339. Dennis argues that this account 
was opened by him before the marriage and he claims it as his separate property. Toe value of 
this account, as ofDecember 31, 2005 was $40,160.99. 
106. There was a break in on May, 2004, where a horse trailer and its contents were 
stolen. Dennis and Renee received $14,075.20 in insurance proceeds from Safeco Insurance. 
The contents of the trailer belonged to third parties and not Dennis or Renee. The value of each 
party's stolen items is accurately listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit #1. The Court ordered these 
proceeds to be held in Plaintiffs attorney's trust account, with $1,247.97 to be paid towards a 
community debt on the Riverside property. 
107. Comparing Plaintiffs Exhibit #1 and Defendant's Exhibit #201, there is no 
dispute regarding the assignment of the following items of community debt: #82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96A & B, 97, 97.1, 97A, 98, 99, 101 (Plaintiffs Ex. 1), 102 
(all), and 104. I 
108. There is a $30,097.38 community debt to Real Homes, LLC, for monies taken 
from that entity and used for community expenses. 
109. Dennis claims that there exists a community debt to Roy Rice in the amount of 
$44,093.00, which he claims includes $8,500 owed on the Chieftan Motorhome. Dennis and Mr. 
Rice had an arrangement, for many years, including prior to the marriage, where any family 
member of Dennis' could come into his business and pick out whatever they wanted and he 
' 
would be able to get legal services from Dennis in exchange. There is an exhibit listing items 
and amounts taken from Mr. Rice's business over the years. There is no documentation 
regarding how much, if any, legal services have been provided by dennis against this amount. 
1 Item 101 on defendant's Exhibit 201 appears to be a debt of the Jaw firm and not the community. 
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Mr. Rice testified that he and Denny have "done a hell of a lot of business over the last 25 
years". Mr. Rice did lend the parties $8,500.00 to acquire the Motorhome. 
110. There is a debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service. The parties agree this is a 
community debt. The amount owed is somewhere between $15,400.00 and $19,347.13. 
111. There is a debt owed to Perry Harding in the amount of $16,000.00. The parties 
dispute the division of this debt. 
112. Items 106.1 through 106.24 in Exhibit #1 identify Renee's separate property. 
Dennis does not object to the characterization of these items. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA \V 
1. The parties do not dispute that the property located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, 
Idaho, was acquired by Dennis prior to the marriage and is therefore his separate property. 
Accordingly, this property should be awarded to him as his sole and separate property. 
2. Likewise, the mortgage associated with the property at 1000 S. Roosevelt is the 
separate debt of Dennis. However, Dennis' separate estate is entitled to reimbursement, dollar 
for dollar, for the amount of community debt paid off through the refinance of this property in 
2002. See, Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1983); Josephson v. 
Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1989). This amount is $73,014.85. 
3. The three other properties acquired by Dennis from Kendra Bartsch-Sallaz in 
1991, are also his separate property and should be awarded to him as such. 
4. There is a dispute regarding the property located at 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise, 
Idaho. The facts above regarding this property (Hennifer Property), present difficulty for the 
court. Dennis argues that this property is not owned by him and Renee because his brother 
acquired the title when he bailed them out on their obligation. Renee argues that, despite the 
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lack of a deed from Daryl back to them, this Court should still determine that this property is 
owned by them because all the other "indicia of ownership". 
Title by deed is not always the determining factor and there are times when 
circumstances will overcome the presumption of a deed. . In that regard, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has given the following summary: 
Under Idaho law, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the holder of 
title to property is the legal owner of that property. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 
Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994); Russ Ballard & Family Achievement 
Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572, 579, 548 P.2d 72, 79 (1976). 
A rebuttable presumption imposes upon the party against whom it operates the 
burden of going forward with the evidence to rebut the presumption. I.R.E. 301. 
The magistrate considered the evidence and found that under "all other 
circumstances and 'indicia' of ownership", the deed was not controlling and that 
the corporation did not own the O'Dell property. See Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 
44, 53, 324 P.2d 380, 385 (1958) ("Where title to property is taken in the name of 
one party but the consideration is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor 
of the party who pays the consideration."). 
McA.ffee v. Jv!cA.ffee, 132 Idaho 281,971 P.2d 734 (Ct. App 1999). 
Such is the case here. Daryl has title which he obtained when he loaned money to Renee 
and Dennis to close the transaction. However, Daryl has done nothing consistent with ownership 
by him. Instead, Dennis and Renee have made the payments, occupied the premises and made 
improvements on the property. Dennis collects the rent and pays the mortgage, including any 
shortfall between rent and mortgage. Dennis has continued to pay for expenses associated with 
this property. Renee pastured her horses on the property. Daryl pays no taxes on this property. 
Daryl even testified that he did the financing as an accommodation to Dennis and Renee. Other 
than loaning Dennis and Renee his name and money, Daryl has done nothing else consistent with 
being the owner of this property .. Instead, all indicia of ownership points to Dennis and Renee. 
In addition, the Court is concerned with the evidence regarding the break in at Renee's 
residence. The evidence tends to show that Daryl did sign a deed conveying the property back to 
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Dennis and Renee,. but that it was taken from her home during the burglary. The Court can only 
speculate why such a deed was not recorded and cannot help wondering why the two burglaries 
were never properly followed up with law enforcement. Nevertheless, the Court does believe it 
is more likely than not that there was a deed back from Daryl which was taken from Renee's 
residence, which made it significantly more difficult to establish that this property is community 
property. 
Based upon the foregoing, Renee has met her burden of rebutting the presumption that 
Daryl is the owner of this property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the 916 S. Roosevelt 
(Hennifer) property is the community property of Dennis and Renee and that they owe Daryl a 
debt of $30,000.00 for the money he loaned them. 
The Court recognizes that this determination of ownership is not necessarily binding 
upon Daryl as he is not a party to this action. Thus, regardless of whether the Court awards this 
property to one of the parties or that it be sold, one or the other (or both) parties may be involved 
in resolving this issue before title is clear, including further litigation. This Court cannot help 
with that situation which is the result of the parties own actions. 
It is the Court's determination that this property should be sold immediately, that the 
proceeds be applied to all outstanding debt against it, and any equity (approximately $65,000.00 
at the time of divorce) remaining should be awarded to Renee. 
5. There is a dispute between the parties regarding the community interest in Real 
Homes, LLC. Dennis argues, based upon the evidence he produced, that the community only 
has a 50% interest in this entity and its assets and liabilities. Renee argues that the community 
has a 100% interest. If the Court determines that the Operating Agreement introduced by Renee 
is the original document, then she would be correct. If the Court believes the Operating 
Agreement produced by Dennis is the original, then Dennis would be correct. 
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In order to resolve this issue, the Court has considered these two documents, the 
circumstances and other facts regarding Real Homes, the testimony of the parties and Mr. 
Trefren, and the consistencies and inconsistencies between all of this evidence. This analysis 
includes, but is not limited to, the following highlights. 
Several of Mr. Trefren's actions and much of his testimony, were unsubstantiated and 
inconsistent with his claimed 50/50 ownership with Dennis of Real Homes. In particular, his 
signing of a quitclaim deed transferring all of the real property owned by Real Homes to his LLC 
(Tradesman), apparently without Dennis' knowledge or approval, simply does not make sense. 
In addition, Mr. Trefren's recording on June 6, 2005, of his wholly unsupported claim of lien in 
the amount of $250,000.00 against all real property owned not only by Real Homes, but also 
Dennis and Renee, seems to this Court to be concocted. In fact, he testified his intent was to 
cloud the title on all the real property! Further, Mr Trefren, apparently to further carry out this 
scheme, recorded amended claims of lien in July, 2005, to include Lot lB of the Riverside 
Property, and the Smith Property for $35,000.00. Again, Mr. Trefren could not produce any 
documents to support his claims on any of the properties. Further, if Mr. Trefren was already a 
member of real Homes, LLC, there was little reason for him to form another. Further still, Mr. 
Trefren's signing of a quitclaim deed on February 16, 2005, as a member of Real Homes, 
regarding all the property owned by Real Homes, including the Riverside Lot (lB) owned by 
Dennis and Renee, to his own LLC, is highly suspect given all the other documentation and 
efforts to eliminate all real property holdings of Real Homes. This seems particulariy evident 
since Mr. Trefren testified that Dennis prepared the deed, but Dennis testified that he was 
unaware of the deed. Finally, as a whole, Mr Trefren's testimony is not credible as much of it 
was either without basis or documentation, contradictory with itself, or contradictory with others 
who testified, such as Roy Rice regarding his employment and firing of Mr. Trefren. 
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Likewise, Dennis' actions, or inactions, and testimony were also inconsistent and not 
such as to be expected of a 50/50 owner. There is no evidence that Mr. Trefren objected to 
Dennis' withdrawal of $30,000.00 in May of 2004, as his "personal funds". His testimony at his 
deposition and at trial regarding why ~fr. Trefren's name was not on the Operating Agreement 
that Renee produced was contradictory. As well, Dennis' interaction with Mr. Trefren and Real 
Homes was not consistent with a 50/50 ownership, at least until March, 2005. There is no 
evidence that he ever referred to or treated Trefren like an equal partner prior to that date. 
On the other hand, the Operating Agreement introduced by Renee is actually signed and 
dated. Further, the filings with the Idaho Secretary of State in 2002, 2003 and 2004 (for the 
years 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively), were all filed in February of those years and each 
listed Renee as the President of Real Homes. For some reason, Dennis filed the 2004 annual 
report in November, 2004 - after the firing of Renee and the separation of the parties, and before 
the year had actually ended - and listed himself as "owner". Finally, Renee did engage in 
activities consistent with her ownership under the Operating Agreement she introduced into 
evidence. 
Upon consideration of these items, and others contained in the Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that the Operating Agreement which is signed by Renee should govern. That 
Agreement is dated January and designates her as 100% owner. 
As a result, Renee had 100% ownership in Real Homes, LLC when it was formed and 
any changes without her consent or approval were without authority and therefore void. 
Accordingly, the community, through her ownership, retained a 100% interest in Real Homes, 
LLC, including all its assets and liabilities. This includes the Riverside Lots (except for Lot lB) 
and the Smith Property. 
FINDINGS I CONCLUSIONS I ORDER - 24 
000160
As with other properties, there are potential issues regarding third party claims 
concerning the assets of Real Homes, LLC. Unfortunately, this Court cannot adjudicate in a way 
that is binding, any claims of third parties. Therefore, the Court concludes that all holdings of 
Real Homes, LLC, should be sold immediately. Proceeds from the sale of a specific property 
should first be applied to any debt on that property. Any remaining proceeds from a specific 
property should be applied to remaining debt on other properties sold.2 
If, after all the assets are liquidated and the proceeds are used to pay debts of the LLC, 
there remains outstanding debt, then that remaining obligation shall be shared equally by the 
parties. If, there is a remaining surplus in proceeds, they shall be distributed first to Renee to 
satisfy any remaining equalization, then shared between the parties equally. 
6. The parties dispute both the character and value of the property located at 15584 
Riverside (Lot 1 B), which is the residence occupied by Renee. 
Although Dennis argues that this property is still treated by Glen Trefren as an asset of 
Real Homes, LLC, there is no credible documentation to support this. As set forth above, it does 
not appear Mr. Trefren is in the legal position he thinks he is. Further, the evidence clearly 
shows that the property was in fact conveyed from Real Homes, LLC, to Dennis and Renee. 
Finally, Dennis has not provided sufficient evidence to refute this. Therefore, the Court 
concludes that this item is community property. 
The value of this property as of March, 2005 (about 4 months prior to the date of divorce) 
was approximately $152,000.00. Dennis provided an appraisal from July, 2006, which indicates 
the property has appreciated substantially after the effective date of divorce. While this does 
show the value of this item has increased, the Court is required to value the assets as of the date 
of divorce, not a year later. See, Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 21 P.3d 918 (2001); 
2 See, Equalization Section below. 
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}vfcA!fee, supra; Desfosses v. Desfosses, 122 Idaho 634, 836 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App. 1992). Based 
upon the evidence, it appears that the value is likely closer to the figure in March, 2005. The 
Court understands Dennis' argument that the market did jump in 2005. The Court also 
understands that the comparables in the appraisal submitted by Renee are somewhat outdated. 
However, the record does not have sufficient evidence to determine how much, if any, the value 
jumped between March and July, 2005. To arrive at a different figure would require pure 
speculation by the Court. 3 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that ~e value of this asset, as of the date of divorce, 
was $152,000.00, with debt of $114,471.90, leaving equity of approximately $37,528.10. It is 
the Court's determination that this property should be awarded to Renee subject to the debt of 
$114,471.90.4 
7. With regard to the settlement monies from the Sumner lawsuit received by Dennis 
during the marriage, the Court has carefully reviewed all the facts associated with these monies. 
In Idaho, the character of property as either separate or community vests at the time it it 
acquired. Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411 (1983); Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 
555 P. 2d 385 (1976). It is presumed that all property acquired during the marriage is 
community property. I.C. § 32-906; Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 860 P.2d 634 (1993); Winn, 
supra. Thus, earnings of the parties during the divorce and up to the date of divorce are 
community property. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976); Desfosses v. 
Desfosses,supra. 
3 The Curt notes that Defendant had more than ample opportunity to obtain an appraisal at or near the date of the 
divorce, or any time prior thereto while this matter was pending. He did not and chose to wait until a year later. In 
addition, the Court notes that defendant's appraiser did not discount his value back to the date of divorce or 
otherwise offer an opinion in that regard. 
4 By awarding this property to Renee subject to the debt thereon, the Court is not in any way validating any claims 
of lein, etc. by Mr. Trefren and the Court recognizes there main remain third party issues. However, those claims 
against this property (and any other properties) will have to be determined in some other action. Further, the Court 
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Generally, the party asserting that property is separate has the burden of proof. Worzala 
v. Worzala, 128 Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (1996). This must be done with reasonable certainty 
and particularity. Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 512 P. 2d 1317 (1973); Barton v. Barton, 
132 Idaho 395, 973 P.2d 746 (1999). This may be done through evidence of direct tracing or 
indirect tracing through an accounting. 1vfartsch v. Martsch, 103 Idaho 142, 645 P.2d 882(1982); 
Josephson v. Josephson, supra. 
The Sumner settlement monies were received during the marriage. The total of these 
monies is $387,098.00. Dennis testified that most of this money was earned before the marriage 
and was his separate earnings. Thus, he has the burden of showing, with reasonable certainty 
and particularity, these moneys were not earned during the marriage. The evidence does not 
entirely support Dennis testimony. 
The only documents that arguably support this contention is the Amended Answer and 
Cross Claim he filed on March, 1999, and the summary and aging of the Sumner amounts 
provided at his deposition in August, 1999. However, these documents clearly establish that as 
of August, 1999, at least the current amount of $81,984.82 was earned during the marriage. 
They also establish that the balance of $269,204.60 was earned at least 120 days prior to August, 
1999. Approximately three years of this time was during the marriage (the parties were married 
in July, 1996). No other documentation was provided by Dennis to show when any of these 
monies were actually earned. In fact, there is no accounting or other documentation concerning 
the remaining $35,908.58 of the settlement monies deposited into the estate account. Without 
such accounting evidence, it is impossible for the Court to determine, with reasonable certainty 
or particularity, how much of this amount was earned by him before or during the marriage. 
notes that it does not appear that these claims are legitimate and have not been documented, making it unlikely they 
will be validated. 
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In addition, the balance of the evidence surrounding the Sumner monies also does not 
help Dennis with his burden of proof. First, all the money from the Sumner settlement was 
received after the marriage. Second, he deposited this money into the account for his 
grandmother's estate account instead of his trust account or other appropriate account. Dennis' 
testimony that the reason he deposited this money into the account for his deceased grandmother 
because she loaned him money in the past is not supported by the evidence. There are no loan 
documents substantiating such a debt and the estate inventory does not list such a debt to Dennis. 
Further, Dennis had already distributed $184,969.37 from his grandmother's estate between 
March, 2000 and August, 2001. If he owed her money for a loan, why did he take his share of 
the estate at that time? Third, he distributed this money to others in his family, including Diani, 
who was not legally entitled to any of the Matcham estate. Finally, all of this was done during 
his marriage to Renee and without her knowledge. 
Based upon the foregoing, Dennis did not meet his burden of proof that all of the Sumner 
settlement monies were earned prior to the marriage. First, the Court concludes that $81,984.82 
was "current" as of August, 1999. Thus, the Court concludes that this amount was earned during 
the marriage and was community property. Second, this leaves a balance of $305,113.18 of the 
total deposited as Sumner monies ($387,098.00 - $81,984.82). Of that amount, $269,204.60 
appears on the aging report in August, 1999. The Court recognizes that this amount is quite 
large to have all been earned during the first 3 to 3 Yi years of the marriage and that it is likely 
some of it was earned before. However, there is simply no competent evidence accounting for 
the dates that the monies were earned. Without something, there is no way to arrive at a figure 
with reasonable certainty or particularity. Accordingly, the Court has no alternative but to 
conclude that this money was also community property. Finally, there is no accounting for the 
remaining $35,908.58 deposited into the estate account as settlement monies. Again, without 
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such evidence, the Court must conclude that this amount was also community property as it was 
acquired during the marriage. 
Consequently, the Court can only conclude that all the moneys received during the 
marriage from the Sumner settlement were community funds. The total of this amount is 
$387,098.00. 
The evidence further shows that $160,000.00 of this money was distributed to four of 
Dennis' family members on June 8, 2004. Another $198,000.00 was distributed to these same 
people on or about July 13, 2005. Thus, a total of $358,000.00 of the $387,000.00 in settlement 
monies was distributed to persons outside the community. The Court concludes that these 
community funds were expended for purposes unrelated to the community. See, Larson v. 
Larson, 139 Idaho 972, 88 P.3d 1212 (Ct. App. 2003), not reversed on review, 139 Idaho 970 
(2004). Accordingly, the Court will apportion this amount as part of Dennis' share of the 
community property division. Id.; Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P. 3d 889 (Ct. App. 2001). 
It would appear from the evidence that the balance of the settlement money ($29,000.00) 
was used by Dennis for various personal expenses during the marriage and period of separation 
of the parties and the Court will not deem this as part of division of community property. 
8. The community also has an interest in the accounts receivable of Dennis' law firm 
up to the date of divorce on July 28, 2005. The evidence regarding the value of this asset is in 
conflict. To resolve this conflict, the Court looks at the methodology and detail applied by each 
expert, as well as other factors such as any personal interest in the outcome of this matter. In 
addition, the Court agrees with counsel for Dennis that consideration of taxes once such 
receivables may be paid is appropriate. See, Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 860 P.2d 634 (1993). 
While Ms. Pulliam's review appears to be more extensive and detailed, it does not appear 
that her opinion considers the effect of taxation upon payment of the receivables. Nor does it 
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discount the value based upon age of the accounts. Also, she did not adjust for any payables that 
Dennis would be responsible for, which she noted could be considered and totaled $4,650.00. 
:Mr. Harding did factor in the effect of taxes and did discount for the age of accounts. However, 
he discounted all accounts receivable which were over 90 days old to a uniform value of 10% 
without any basis for such extreme and uniform discounting. Further, he did so without 
considering the firm's history concerning writing off bad debt, the pay history regarding most of 
the clients and was unaware of any work-in -progress, despite having access to all of the records 
of the firm. Finally, he does have an interest in the outcome of this matter, having a secured 
interest in real property in dispute in this case. 
Further still, :Mr. Harding's valuation was based upon a new set of revised numbers by 
the law firm which ~s. Pulliam did not have initially. This concerns the Court greatly for two 
reasons. First, these new numbers appear to be based upon "discussions" between :Mr. Harding 
and the office manager and are not supported by documentation. Second, this is a theme 
throughout this case - there are numerous instances where there exist two documents with the 
same title, but containing different or new information. The best example of this is the two 
versions of the Operating Agreement for Real Homes, discussed above. As with those items, 
only one can be correct - one is false or concocted. In the case of the accounts receivable, Renee 
had no access to either of these summary documents and both were provided by Dennis. This 
gives at least the appearance that one of the summaries is concocted. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court believes that both expert's opinions are useful and 
based upon data that they were provided. However, their opinions are only as good as the data. 
On the one hand, it appears that Mr. Harding over discounted the value based upon his method of 
aging. In addition, the summary he used is suspect because it was revised after the first one 
provided to Ms. Pulliam and there is no supporting documentation. On the other hand, Ms. 
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Pulliam did not account for the effect of taxes and has no aging discount because her data did not 
contain any old accounts. 
In an effort to give due consideration to both opinions, based upon the most credible and 
documented evidence, the Court concludes that the accounts receivable should be valued at 
$130,744.00, less $4,650.00 for payables, for a total of $126,094.00. This amount should be 
further reduced by the 25% tax rate, which would be $31,523.5. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that the value of the accounts receivable assignable to Dennis as of July 28, 2005, is 
$94,570.50. 
9. The evidence was conflicting regarding Dennis' share of the accounts receivable. 
He testified that he turned over all but 10% of his interest to Mr. Gatewood. However, he bas 
provided no documentation to support this position. To the contrary, the Subchapter S 
documents in evidence show that he is a 90% owner. Accordingly, the Court concludes that as 
of the time of divorce, Dennis owned 90% of the accounts receivable of Sallaz .and Gatewood, 
which was $85,113.45 ($94,570.5 X .90). For practical reasons, this asset should be awarded to 
Dennis. 
10. With regard to the Putnam Investments retirement account, the balance at or near 
the time of divorce was $40,160.89. Dennis argues that the entire balance should be his separate 
property. Renee argues that all of this money is community in nature. The Court disagrees with 
both parties as the evidence does not support either entirely. 
This account is comprised of eight (8) separate funds. The evidence shows that 5 of these 
accounts were actually opened after the marriage and three were opened in 1994. However, the 
backup documentation from Dennis only shows a total of $8,510.92 accumulated in those three 
accounts before the marriage. There is no other evidence to support his claim that the rest of the 
funds are his separate property. As a result, he has failed in his burden of establishing that aU of 
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the money in this account is his separate property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 
$31,649.97 is community property and $8,510.92 is the separate property of Dennis. The fund 
should be liquidated, and Dennis should be awarded $8,510.92 as his separate property, with the 
balance to be awarded to Renee. 
11. After comparison of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no 
dispute regarding either the character, value ( or the value is minimal) or assignment of the 
following items of property: 12, 14, 15, 16, 22, 28, 29, 30A, 30B, 31, 32, 44, 44(a), 45, 48.1, 50, 
51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 69, 69.3, 69.5 - 69.21, As a result each of these items should be 
awarded to the listed party with the values as indicated. There is some discrepancy between the 
values assigned these items by the parties. Using Dennis' values, the division is approximately 
$4,000.00 in favor of Renee ($28,078.48 vs. $23,909.07). Using Renee's values, the division is 
approximately $800.00 in her favor ($29,243.48 vs. $28,454.07). Given these amounts, as a 
whole, the division is substantially equal. 
12. The household furnishings and appliances located at 1000 S. Roosevelt (Item 71 
on Defendant's Exhibit 201 and Item 77.1 on Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) are community property. The 
parties agree that these items may be awarded to Dennis, but do not agree on the total value of 
them. The Plaintiff argues the value is $4,000, while the Defendant argues the value is 
$3,250.00. The Court concludes that the total value is $3,500.00 and that these items should be 
awarded to Dennis. 
13. The household furniture, appliances, etc., listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 as items 
77.1 and 77.2 - 77.61 are community property and should be divided according to the division 
proposed therein, except for the storage shed (Item 77.60). Thus, Renee should be awarded 
items 77.7, 77.8, 77.9, 77.10, 77.26, 77.34, 77.50, 77.51, 77.56 and 77.58. The total value of the 
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items awarded to Renee is $3,225.00. Thus, the total value of the items remaining and awarded 
to Dennis is $26,645.00. 
14. With regard to the firearms, the Court concludes that all but the 12 ga. Binelli and 
.22 Ruger are the separate property of Dennis. Accordingly, all but these two should be awarded 
to him as his separate property. The Court further concludes that the value of the Binelli is 
$800.00 and the value of the .22 is $350.00. These items should be awarded to Dennis as part of 
the division of community property. 
15. With regard to any horses remaining, it appears that there is only one AQHA 
horse remaining and that it is community property. The parties dispute the characterization of 
the APHA horse. The Court does not recall any documentation regarding this animal and will 
conclude that it is community property. The Court further concludes that each horse is worth 
$1,500.00. Both horses should be awarded to Renee as community property. 
16. The community has 50% ownership in the 1950 Packard with Dennis' brother. 
The value of this interest is disputed between $750.00 and $1,500.00. There was no 
documentation regarding the value. The Court concludes that the community interest in this 
vehicle is $1, 125. 00. This item should be awarded to Dennis since his brother is the co-owner. 
17. With regard to the 1978 Oaks Whitewater boat and trailer, it is clear that this is 
Dennis' separate property. Renee claimed there were improvements to this item during the 
marriage, but no documentation was provided. Further, her value of the improvements was 
$9,800.00, while Dennis value of the boat and trailer together was only $9,000.00. It seems 
unlikely that a boat and trailer that is approaching 30 years old is worth much more than this and 
certainly there is value over and above any improvements. Accordingly, the Court cannot find 
that the community is entitled to any reimbursement for improvements to this item, or that the 
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value was enhanced, and concludes that it should be awarded to Dennis as his sole and separate 
property. 
18. Likewise, the 1949 Dreamboat roadster is clearly Dennis' separate property. 
Renee's claims regarding improvements to this item are undocumented and the Court is therefore 
unable to find that the community is entitled to reimbursement for enhancement. Accordingly, 
this item is awarded to Dennis as his sole and separate property. 
19. The 2002 Yamaha ATV, 1998 Yamaha ATV and ATV trailer were sold to Roy 
Rice for $7,500.00 and the funds were used by Dennis for attorney's fees. Renee claims these 
items are worth more, but the Court cannot reach that conclusion. Accordingly, the $7,500.00 
proceeds from the sale of these items should be awarded to Dennis. 
20. With regard to the 1999 Yamaha ATV, Renee claimed it was given by Dennis to 
her daughter. It seems she is asserting ownership of this ATV on behalf of her daughter, despite 
Dennis' position that he did not give it to her daughter. However, it does not appear that she is in 
a position to do so. Under Idaho law, a community asset may not be given away without the 
consent of both the husband and wife. See, Estate of Hull, 126 Idaho 437, 885 P.2d 1153 (C.A. 
1994). In addition, as the proponent of this claim, Renee has the burden of proving such gift was 
accomplished. There is insufficient evidence to show that Dennis gave the A TV to her daughter, 
including evidence that he did, or now does, consent to such a gift. The Court therefore 
concludes that this item is community property and that it, or the proceeds from it, should be 
awarded to Dennis. 
21. The 1967 Pontiac Firebird is in Dennis' possession. Although the parties appear 
to agree that this item may be awarded to Dennis, the value is disputed. The Court concludes the 
value of this asset is $3,500.00 and that it should be awarded to Dennis. 
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22. With regard to the 1989 Chieftan motorhome, the parties do not dispute that this 
is a community property item and may be awarded to Dennis. The Court will assign a value of 
$15,000.00 to this item, which is the lower amount indicated by Renee. The Court chooses this 
value based upon the age of the vehicle. It also appears that the loan on this vehicle was paid 
with separate funds belonging to Dennis in 1998 when he refinanced the 1000 S. Roosevelt 
property. Therefore, Dennis is entitled to receive reimbursement for his separate property in this 
amount. See, Ustick, supra; Estate of Freeburn, supra; Gapsch, supra. 
23. The character and value of the 1982 Rolls Royce are disputed. Dennis has the 
burden of proving, to a reasonable certainty, that this item is his separate property. Worzalla, 
supra. 
There is no document in evidence that clearly established when the vehicle was acquired 
by Dennis. The documents within Exhibit 3 72 are dated after the marriage, except for three. 
These three documents establish little, do not clearly relate to this vehicle and do not clearly 
indicate ownership by Dennis. However, Exhibit #70 is from the Idaho Transportation 
Department and does indicate the owner is Empire West, Inc, which is an entity of Dennis'. This 
is sufficient evidence to establish, to a reasonable certainty, that this vehicle is Dennis' separate 
property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that it is his separate property and will award it as 
such to Dennis. 
Since the Court has determined this item to be Dennis' separate property, the Court need 
not address the value. 
24. Likewise, the character of the 1980 Porsche is disputed with Renee claiming it as 
her separate property without documentation. Based on the same reasoning above, the Court 
concludes that Renee has not shown, to a reasonable certainty, that this vehicle is her separate 
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property. Accordingly, the Court concludes it is a community asset. The Court will assign the 
value given by Renee of $5,500.00 and will award this item to her. 
25. The 1954 Cadillac Eldorado was acquired by Dennis long before the marriage. 
Renee claims that the community expended $1,750.00 on improvements to this vehicle. 
However, there is no documentation supporting this claim. Therefore, Renee has not met her 
burden as required to show that community funds were used and that such expenditures 
enhanced the value of the vehicle. See, Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 488, (2003). 
Accordingly, this item is awarded to Dennis as his separate property without reimbursement to 
the community. 
26. The parties do not agree regarding the character, value or disposition of the 1995 
Chevrolet Suburban. Renee argues it is a community asset worth $9,000.00. Dennis argues it is 
not a community asset, but he is in possession of it. He argues it was owned by the law firm and 
then sold to his brother Daryl. There is little documentation in the record to give the Court a 
basis to reach a conclusion regarding the character of this asset. Plaintiffs Exhibit #72A does 
not establish the vehicle was acquired with community funds. It appears that National Financial 
Service, Inc. was involved with this vehicle. However, as noted elsewhere, this entity is the 
separate property of Dennis and the Court is unable to unravel the source or use of funds by this 
entity. The Court will conclude that this vehicle is not a community asset. 
27. The entity known as National Financial Service, Inc. was acquired by Dennis as 
early as 1969. Renee claimed this entity was transferred by Dennis'to her. However, the Court 
cannot recall that there is any documentation supporting such a transfer. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that it is Dennis' separate property. 
28. The entity and account for this entity were used by the parties during the marriage 
for various purposes which have not been fully traced. For example, the Ford Excursion was 
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titled in the name of this entity, but used by the parties. Also, Renee took $3,200.00 from the 
account on the day she was terminated by Dennis. It is not possible for the Court to sufficiently 
delineate which funds were used by which party, and for what purpose in order to determine how 
much in the account is separate and how much is community. Therefore, the Court concludes 
that Dennis should be awarded this entity and its account as his separate property. 
29. With regard to the Putnam SEPIRA account# 0336644339, Dennis claims this as 
his separate property. Dennis has the burden of establishing when this account was opened and 
the source of all funds deposited. He refers to Exhibits 21 OB, 21 OC and 248 as support for this 
claim. However, those documents do not establish that this was an account prior to the marriage. 
Without such documentation, his claim of separate property must fail. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that this account is a community asset with a value of $40,160.99. 
This item should be divided equally between the parties. 
30. There are two community bank accounts which the parties did not agree upon 
regarding balance, character or division. Account# 910403141 at D.L. Evans Bank appears to 
be closed. As a result, there is nothing for the Court to divide. The parties agree that there is a 
balance of $247.96 in the Capital Educators account #0000601990. The Court will award the 
balance in this account to Renee. 
31. With regard to the Safeco Insurance proceeds, Renee argues that these funds were 
received by the community on behalf of third parties who suffered losses exceeding the 
$14,075.20. The Court agrees. The evidence at trial established that the items stolen were the 
personal property of those parties and not Dennis or Renee. As a result, this money belongs to 
those parties and is in the nature of a community debt to them. The amounts due each are set 
forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit #1. This money should be paid to them according to these amounts. 
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Since there will be a shortfall, they should be paid their proportionate share, with the balance of 
this "debt" to be assigned to Renee. 
32. After comparison of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no 
dispute regarding the assignment of the following community debts: #82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96A & B, 97, 97.1, 97A, 99, 101 (Plaintiffs Exhibit #1), 102 (all), and 
104. 5 As a result, each of these items should be awarded to the listed party as their 
responsibility.6 Essentially, this results in the assignment of all these debts to Dennis, except the 
VISA balance of approximately $2,900.00. Using Dennis' figures, the total he is assigned is 
$153,781.59. Using Renee's figures, the total assigned to Dennis is $146,719.63. The average 
of these two figures is approximately $150,000.00. From this, and with regard to these items, the 
Court concludes that Dennis is assigned approximately $147,000.00 more of the community debt 
than Renee. 
33. With regard to the IRS debt, the amount is somewhere between $15,400.00 and 
$19,347.13. Dennis proposed that this debt be assigned to him, while Renee proposed it be 
assigned 50% to each. Since Dennis has been assigned substantially more than Renee with 
regard to the items immediately above, the Court concludes that this debt should be assigned 
equally between the parties. 
34. With regard to the $16,000.00 debt owed to Perry Harding, Dennis proposed he 
be assigned $8,000.00 and that Glen Trefren should be responsible for the other $8,000.00. 
However, based upon the Court's determination regarding the Real Homes situation, the Court 
concludes that this entire debt is a community debt to be paid by both parties. Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that each party should be assigned one half of this debt. 
s Item #101 on Defendant's Exhibit 201 appears to be a debt of the law firm and not the community. 
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35. With regard to the alleged debt to Dennis' brother Daryl for one half of the rents 
collected on the Grandview property, there is insufficient evidence to conclude this debt exists. 
There is no documentation regarding Daryl's ownership in that property and he testified in his 
deposition that he never made any claim for such rents. As a result, the Court concludes there is 
no community debt to Daryl for the court to assign. 
36. With regard to the alleged debt to Roy Rice, the Court is uncertain. On the one 
hand, Mr. Rice provided a list of items and their values that were taken from his business by 
Dennis and/or Renee and/or her daughter. The Court has every reason to believe that this list is 
accurate as Mr. Rice was one of the more credible witnesses in the trial. He came across as a 
very honest, tell-it-like-it-is person, which the Court appreciated. Thus, the Court does not 
question that the members of the community received items of value from Mr. Rice. 
37. However, it was clear that the arrangement was that Dennis did legal work in 
exchange for items taken by his family. But, it was not clear which legal work applied to which 
items - on the list or off - or when legal work was done, etc. It also appeared that this "open 
account" arrangement was in place before the marriage of the parties herein. 
38. This would seem to make it a separate debt of Dennis. In essence, Dennis agreed 
with Mr. Rice, before the marriage, that he or his family members, could obtain items and that 
Dennis would pay him back with legal services. Due to the nature of this arrangement, its 
ongoing nature, and the lack of evidence regarding legal services actually provided, the Court 
concludes that the balance owed on this debt, if any, is not a community debt to be shared by the 
parties. Instead, it seems more of a separate debt of Dennis' and the Court will so conclude. 
6 The amount of Dennis medical bills is uncertain. His Exhibit #201 lists most of them as having a zero balance, 
while Renee's Exhibit #I lists them as unknown. The Court concludes that these bills should be assigned to Dennis 
as he suggested, but the Court finds that none of these have any outstanding balance at this time. 
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39. The parties did receive $8,500.00 from Mr. Rice to acquire the Motorhome. This 
portion of the claimed debt is a debt of the community and the Court will assign it to Dennis. 
40. With regard to the community debt of $30,097.38 owed to Real Homes, LLC, it 
does appear that this amount was taken from the Real Homes account and deposited into Dennis' 
personal checking account or sent to the IRS. Exhibit 205 does show where this money was 
spent and many of the items the Court recognizes as debts of the community ( eg. credit cards, 
George Hicks, ... ). The Court concludes that this money was expended on community debts and 
constitutes a debt of the community to Real Homes, LLC. However, the Court need not address 
the assignment of this item due to the determination regarding the ownership of the LLC. 
41. The personal property listed as Items #106.1 through #106.24 should be 
confinned as Renee's separate property. Any of these items which Dennis has possession of 
should be returned by him to her. If he no longer has possession, then Renee is entitled to a 
judgment for their value. 
42. The Court has struggled greatly with the issues and ultimate award of the parties' 
dog named "Smooch". Much attention has been given to this dog, and required of the Court, by 
the parties. The Court entered an order providing for equal time of possession of Smooch while 
this matter was pending. This was done for more than one reason. First, the Court recognized, 
and could relate to the fact, that this asset was very important to both parties. Second, how the 
parties dealt with the shared time of possession and with each other might shed some light on a 
fair and equitable award of the dog. This did indeed provide useful guidance for the Court. 
Finally, the Court knew that this matter would not be resolved in a short time frame and felt that 
since Smooch would likely be awarded to one party or the other, it would be most fair for them 
to both have as much an opportunity to enjoy him as possible. That time has now come. 
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Dennis has argued that the Court should provide that Smooch be jointly owned by the 
parties, subject to motions in the future if they cannot agree as to times of possession. This 
argument is inviting as the temporary arrangement has actually worked fairly well. Frankly, the 
Court anticipated many more problems due to the parties' antagonism on so many other issues. 
No doubt, Smooch would be fine with such an arrangement - he is a Labrador - Labs love 
everyone. 
However, the Court declines to do as urged by Dennis as it would be contrary to the 
directives of Idaho law to divide all the community property. In addition, the parties do not need 
to be tied together in this fashion from this point forward. Assuredly, they would be back in 
Court again regarding Smooch and they do not need this. So, the Court must make a decision. 
In the pages and paragraphs above, it appears that during the marriage and while this 
matter was pending, Dennis was less than forthright with Renee about finances and assets. The 
Court has addressed those instances above, occasionally determining Dennis' statements or 
evidence to be less credible and often resolving conflicting evidence in favor of Renee, and 
awarding her share of the community estate accordingly. However, with regard to Smooch, 
there is no evidence that Dennis has engaged in similar types of deceit towards Renee. In fact, it 
is he who has been willing all along to share Smooch equally, including on a permanent basis. 
On the other hand, it has been Renee who has been less than cooperative and forthcoming 
regarding Smooch. This required the entry of the temporary order at the outset of this litigation 
and further rulings by the Court when Renee refused to cooperate. This tips the scale ever so 
slightly on this issue. 
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As a result, the Court concludes that it would be more fair and equitable to award 
Smooch to Dennis at this time. 7 
EQUALIZATION 
Toe Characterization and division of property and debt above is not equal. It results in an 
award of approximately $260,000.00 of the community assets and $114,000.00 of the debt to 
Renee, for a net of approximately $146,000.00. On the other hand, Dennis is awarded 
approximately $501,000.00 in community assets and $155,000.00 of the debt, for a net of 
approximately $346,000.00. This results in Dennis receiving a difference of approximately 
200,000.00 in his favor. Toe Court felt constrained to do this for two reasons. First, the Sumner 
monies are gone because Dennis gave them to third parties and/or used it himself. Therefore, 
none of these funds are available to be awarded to Renee and must be considered as awarded to 
Dennis. Second, it seemed impractical to award to Renee the accounts receivable at the law 
firm. Thus, the Court is left with this unequal division. 
Reducing the above amount by the amount of reimbursement Dennis is entitled 
($84,000.00 - refinance of 1000 S. Roosevelt and payment on Motorhome), reduces this amount 
to approximately $116,000.00. This is the amount that must be equalized. 
The Court has ordered the assets of Real Homes, LLC to be sold, which includes all the 
real property associated therewith at the time of divorce. Once these properties are sold and the 
debts against them are paid, any surplus proceeds would be available and should be awarded to 
Renee to accomplish the equalization. The Court recognizes that there may not be sufficient 
surplus proceeds, if any, to accomplish this. The Court also recognizes that the sale of the 
properties held by Real Homes, LLC may be problematic due to the transactions by Dennis after 
7 Although Smooch is awarded to Dennis and he will be the owner, there is nothing preventing the parties from 
sharing on their own· if they should be able to agree to do so. 
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the date of divorce. In either of those events, the equalization can only be guaranteed by a 
judgment in favor of Renee against Dennis. 
As a result, the equalization shall be accomplished as follows. Renee shall be entitled to 
a judgment against Dennis in the amount of $180,000.00. Immediately upon the sale of the Real 
Homes community assets set forth above, and after payment of the debts associated with said 
property, any surplus proceeds shall be immediately distributed to Renee and a satisfaction, or 
partial satisfaction, of the judgment shall be entered. If there is any surplus proceeds (which the 
Court recognizes is unlikely), then the proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties. 
ORDER 
Counsel for Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to prepare a Judgment and Decree 
consistent with the foregoing. 
DATED this ~day of October, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 3iJ day of October, 2007, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Debra L. Eismann, Esq. 
3016 Caldwell Blvd. 
Nampa, ID 83651 
James A. Bevis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 827 
Boise, ID 83701-0827 
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Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement 
This Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement is entered into and made effective 
this Ji_ day o~lO between EUGENE RICE AND JANET RICE, husband and wife, 
REAL HOMES L.L.C. an Idaho limited liability company, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company (hereafter the "Plaintiffs") and RENEE BAIRD, an 
individual (hereafter "Defendant"). 
1. The parties acknowledge the purpose of this agreement is to extinguish any 
and all claims, disputes, actions and controversies ClL.'Tently pending or which could 
be asserted in the litigation styled Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, 
Real Homes, L.L.C. and Real Properties, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company v. 
Renee Baird, Dennis Sallaz, Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction, LLC., an Idaho limited liability company, Case No CV 09-11855 ("the 
subject litigation") pending in the Third Judicial District in and for the County of 
Canyon. The matters of record in the pending litigation are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
2. Reference to the parties and persons in privity with them is meant to include 
but is not limited to the officers, shareholders, directors, employees, agents, insurers 
subsidiaries, partners, customers, suppliers, dealers, distributors, affiliates and 
attorneys of, within, or related to the 'named party. 
3. The parties executing this agreement warrant and represent they have the 
authority to make and enter into this agreement and that each party is relying upon the 
representations and covenants made herein, all of which are deemed material. 
4. · The parties have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel prior to 
making this agreement and none are operating under duress. 




5. In consideration of the mutual covenants agreed to herein and in consideration 
of the deeds exchanged by the parties, whereby Plaintiffs convey Riverside parcel 
lB, Canyon County, Idaho to Defendant, and Defendant conveys Riverside parcels 
lA, 2A, and 28 and a portion of Lot 24 of Westview Subdivision, Canyon County, 
Idaho, and whereby each party releases all Lis Pendens filings and for other good and 
valuable consideration, Plaintiffs agree to release, relinquish, waive, and extinguish 
any and all demands, rights, actions or claims which have been or could be asserted 
against Defendant and any person in privity with Defendant including but not limited 
to her employees, agents, insurers, customers, attorneys and representatives as of the 
effective date of this instrument. Defendant agrees to release, relinquish, waive, and 
extinguish any and all demands, rights, actions or claims which have been or could be 
asserted against Plaintiffs and any person in privity with Plaintiffs including but not 
limited to any officers, directors, employees, agents, insurers, customers, dealers, 
distributors, shareholders, partners, attorneys and representatives as of the effective 
date of this instrument. This release extends to every kind or type of claim related to 
or in any way connected with the facts underlying the subject litigation, including any 
claims known or unknown, contingent or unliquidated, in contract or tort, or in the 
nature of unfair competition, copyright infringement, deceptive trade practices or 
other forms of liability whether under state or federal law including claims for 
monetary or injunctive relief arising from the beginning of time to the date and time 
of this agreement. 





7. The effective date of this release is the date upon which this instrument is 
signed by the parties, below. 
8. The Parties authorize their respective counsel to prepare and execute such 
papers as are necessary for dismissal of the pending litigation with prejudice upon 
payment of the amounts aforesaid and each party shall bear their own fees and costs. 
The Plaintiffs hereby authorize and direct its counsel to file a dismissal of the above 
mentioned litigation. 
I HA VE READ THE FOREGOING AGREEMENT AND HA VE HAD 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK LEGAL COUNSEL BEFORE 
EXECUTING THIS INSTRUMENT. 
i.. .'.- ~ (') c.Z . 
By: '):Z4'v'X ~A"~ 
¥ANET RICE, individually 
,/_ ~1r~ 
~ES,L.L.C. 
By: Eugene Rice 
Its: Managing Member 
·-) . .--·····7· ~/···--- / 11~····· ~ ... 
By: '-£/c-71-i;;b ~---
~AL PROPERTIES, LLC. 
By: Janet Rice 
Its: Managing Member 
Date: ;l-3-/d 
Date: '6' r 3 ·-I 0 -~~~----
Date: %-- :3 - ID 
Date: <? ~ 3 -/0 
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ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT 
TO 
R-R INVESTMENTS, INC. 
* * • * ... 
• 
,p 3C 
:-ii ~ -~ 





. ~ ...,. 
These Anicles of Amendment and the following certificate is hereby made and er.ec-.iled ... -
"' ~ 
pursuant to Section 30-1-59, Idaho Code, for the purpose of ameooing the Articles of 
Jncorporation of R-R Investments, Inc., an Idaho corporation, and to effect a change of name 
of said corporation to Rentals & Royalties, Inc. 
The undersigned, MICHAEL RICE, President of said corporation, and RENEE BAJRD, 
Secretary of said corporation, do hereby respectively certify as follows: 
I. 
That a meeting of all of the stockholders of R-R Investments,: lac., an l<llaho corporation, ,1, ,.,. 
was bekl on February 21. 1995, at 1000 South Roosevelt. Boise, Ada County, Idaho, pur~t 
to Call and Waiver of Notice signed by an of the stockholders anol filed in the minute book of 
the corporation. 
II. 
That at such meeting, the following resolution was presented and upon motion duly made, 
seconded and unanimously carried, the same was adopted: 
BE IT RESOLVED, that Article I of the Articles of 
• 
Incorporation of R-R Investments, Inc. be amended by deleting thMm SECRETIIW EF smtE 
entire first Anicle and inserting in place thereof. the follo1ftll;M RIO &1121 2 
at I: 229a CIJSII 422-tl 
CORP 
.... •.:: .50.UO== 30.00 
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT - 1 
•= C 




The name of the corporation is Rentals & Royalties, Inc." 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the President and 
Secretary of the 001rpo,ration, respectively, be, and they are hereby, 
authorized to prepare a certificate of this resolution and 
amendment to the Articles of Incorporation of this corporation and 
to fJJe the same with the Secretary of State for the State of Idaho, 
and to do all things necessary in order to duly effect the change of 
name of this corporation in accordance with this resolution. 
m. 
We further cenify that we are the proper officers to execute this. certificate, being the 
President and Secretary of said corporation, respectively, and we therefore execute these Articles 
of Amendment of Incorporatioo of said corporation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. We have hereunto set our hands and seals this J /~day 
of February, 1995. 




MICHAEL RICE. being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That I am the President in the above-entitled corporation; that I have read the within and 
foregoing Articles of Amendmem, know the contents thereof. and that the same is. true and 
correct as I verily believe. 
MJ H L RJCE 
SUBSCJUBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME This J/ ft day of February, 1995. 
,,,•'"'""••,, 
.... ,, i,. CRA w:',,, 
....... c.'\v .... ...... (YO ",, 
,! ~v .•• • •• "f \ 
~~· 1' •,cj .. .. , ... ~o A.P. J.- -. ,:; 
: : 1i, .. ~ : 
: *: ........ : *: 
: • G : : 
;_ \• PVBi.\. .• i 
~«P.· ··o • 1. . ,.. ... .. ~\.." # 
~ <:., ......... ~,~.., ~.###;!! OF 1°0 _..,,.., 
--~~. ·--.1,..-. 
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State of Idaho 
CERTJFICATE OFJNCORPORATION 
OF 
CAPITAL BROADCASTING INC. 
File number C 10?'814 
I, PEl'E T. CBNARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idlaho, hereby certify 
that duplicate originals of Articles of Incorporation for the incorporation of the above 
named corpora~ duly signed pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Business 
Corporation A¢ have been received in this office and are found to conform to law. 
ACCORDJNGL Y and. by virtue· of the authority vested in me by law, I issue this 
Certificate of Incorporation and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Articles of 
Incorporation. 
Dated: September 28, 1994 
~(!0~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 
CAPITAL BROADCASTING INC. 
A CLOSE CORPOR~TION 
SEt· tH I I 5J AH 'Sq 
;fJ~ET AR'f 0~ STHE 
FIRST. THE NAME OF THE CORPORATION IS CAP ITAL BROADCASTING 
INC. 
SECOND. THE PERIOD OF DURATION IS PERPETUAL. 
THI.RD. THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS AND THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSE 
PROPOSED TO BE TRANSACTED, PROMOT'EII) JI.ND CARRIED ON ARE TO ENGAGE 
IN ANY LAWFUL ACT OR ACTIVITY F'OR WHICH CORPORATIONS MAY BE 
INCORPORATED UNID1ER THIS ACT. 
FOURTH. THE AMOUNT OF THE TOTAL AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK OP THE 
CORPORATION IS DIVIDED INTO 1000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK OF NO 
PAR VALUE. 
F'IFTH. ALL OF THE CORP·ORATIONS ISSUED STOCK SHALL BE HELD BY NOT 
MORE THAN THIRTY (JO) PERSONS. 
SIXTH. ALL OF THE ISSUED· STOC'K OF ALL CLASSES SHALL BE. SUBJECT TO 
THE FO.LLOWiNC RESTRICT'IO:NS ON TRANSJ.li'ER PERMITTED BY SECTION J 0-123A 
OF THE CORPORATION LAWS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
SEVENTH. EACH STOCKHOLDER WILL OFFER TO THE CORPORATION OR TO THE 
OTHER STOCKHOLDERS OF THE CORPORATION A TH.IRTY (JO) DAY FIRST REFUSAL 
OPTION TO PURCHASE HIS S,TOCK SHOULD HE ELECT· TO SELL HIS STOCK. THE 
PRICE FOR ALL STOCK SHALL BE BASED ON THE BOOK VALUE OF 'FHJ:: COMPANY 
AT THE TIME OF THE SALE EXCEPT !~OR STOCK THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY SELL. 
EIGHT, CORPORATION SHALL BE ELIGIBL.E TO FILE A SUB CHAPTER S AND 
TO USE THE 1244 PROVISION. . 
NINTH. THE co,RPORA.TION SHALL MAKE NO OFFERING OF ANY STOCK OF ANY 
CLASS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC OFFERING WITHIN THE MEANING 
OP THE UNITED STATES ·SECURIT'IES ACT OF 1933, AS IT MAY BE AMENDED FROM 
TIME TO Tl.ME. CORPORATE OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS SHALL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPOR:AT'E INTERESTS OR O"BLIGATIONS. 
TENTH. THE ADDRESS 0 1F ITS INITIAL REGISTERED OFFICE IS 5 03 VISTA 
BOISE, IDAHO 83705 AN,O THE NAME OF ITS INITIAL REGISTERED 
AGENT AT SUCH ADDRESS IS ROY RICE, 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 8370'5 
ELEVEN'l'H. THERE SHALL, BE ONE DI.RECTOR CONSTI'l!'UTING THE INITIAL 
BOARJD, o,F DIRECTORS AND 'Jl'HE NAMES AND ADDRESS,ES o,p THE PERSONS TO 
SERVE AS DIRECTORS UNTIL THE FIRST ~UAL MEETING OF SHARE HOLDERS 
OR UNTIL THEIR SUCCESS,ORS B,E ELECTED AND OUALIFY. 
ROY RICE, 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 
000190
• • 
TWELFTH. 'l'HE NAME AND ADDRESS OF EACH INCORPORATOR: 
ROY RICE, 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 
000191l 
• • 
State of Idaho 
I I 
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
WESI'ERN BROADCASnNG INC. 
File number C 10~813 
t PETET. CENABRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, hereby certify 
that duplicate originals of Articles. of Incorporation for the incorporation of the above 
named corporation, duly signed pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Busiiness 
Corporation Act:, have been received in this office and are found to conform to Jaw. 
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, I issue this 
Certificate· of Incorporation and attach here.to a duplicate original of the Articles of 
Incorporation. 
Dated: September 28, 1994 
~df'>~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
.r 
By~~~~·: _...,~~~~.-...,,,%~·~~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION&r {.jj I I s.., 4H 19,J 
Sf:GRE'JA,ffy ,.,;:; S.,._..., .. _WESTERN BROADCASTING INC. vr 1~ ~ 
31.lftS :S AIM3llai tlUII 
A CLOSE CORP·ORATION 
FIRST. THE NAME OF THE CORPORATION IS WESTERN BROADCASTING INC. 
SECOND. THE PERIOD OF DURATION IS PERPETUAL. 
THIRD. THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS .AND THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSE 
PROPOSED TO BE TRANSACTED, PROMOTED AND CARRIED ON ARE TO ENGAGE 
IN ANY LAWFUL ACT OR ACTIVITY FOR WHICH CORPORATIONS MAY BE 
INCORPORATED UNDER THIS ACT. 
FOURTH. THE AMOUNT OF THE TO'TAL AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK OF THE 
CORPORATION IS DIVIDED IN'TO 1000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK OF NO 
PAR VALUE. 
FIFTH. ALL OF THE CORPORATIONS ISSUED STOCK SHALL BE HELD BY NOT 
MORE THAN THIRTY (JO) PERSONS. 
SIXTH. ALL OF THE ISSUED STOCK OJP ALL CLASSES SHALL DE SUDJECT TO 
THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS·ON TRANSFER PERMITTED BY SECTION 30-12JA 
OP THE CORPORATION LAWS OF THE STATE.OF IDAHO. 
SEVENTH. EACH STOCKHOLDER WILL OFFER TO TUE CORPORATION OR TO THE 
OTHER STOCKHOLDERS OF THE CORPORATION A THIRTY {JO} DAY FIRST REFUSAL 
OPTION TO PURCHASE HIS STOCK SHOULD HE ELECT TO SELL HIS STOCK. THE 
PRICE FOR ALL STOCK SHALL BE BASED ON THE 800]( Vl\LUE OF THE COMPANY 
AT THE TIME OF TflE SALE EXCEPT FOR STOCK THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY SELL. 
EIGHT. CO·RPORATION SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO FILE A SUB CHAPTER S AND 
TO USE THE 1244 PROVISION. . 
NINTH. THE CORPORATION SHALL MAKE NO OFFERING OF ANY STOCK OF ANY 
CLASS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC OFFERING WITHIN T'HE MEANING 
OF THE UNITED STATES ·SECURITIES ACT OP 1933, AS IT MAY BE AMENDED FROM 
TIME TO TIME. CORPORATE OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS SHALL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE INTERESTS OR OBLIGATIONS. 
TENTH. T'HE ADDRESS OP ITS INITIAL REGISTERED OF'FICE IS 503 VISTA 
BOISE IDAHO 83705 AND THE NAME OF ITS INITIAL RE:GISTERED 
AGENT 1AT SUCH ADDRESS IS ROY RICE 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 
ELEVENTH. THERE SHALL BE ONE DIRECTOR CONSTITUTING THE INITIAL 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF THE PERSONS TO 
SERVE AS OIRE:CTORS UNTIL THE FIRST J\NNUAL MEETING OF SHARE HOLDERS 
OR UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS BE EL.EC'rEo AND OUALIFY. 
ROY RICE 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 
000193
• • .... , , ., 
TWELFTH. TBB HAMB Al!ID ADDRESS OF EACH INCORPORATOR: 




June 18, 2003 
Mr. Van 0. Bishop 
Attorney at Law 
16 12th Avenue South 
Nampa, ID 83651 
Dear Mr. Bishop: 
RE: Escrow Instructions 
El SMANN LAW OFF. • 
Acting in your fiduciary capacity as Trustee, upon receiving the signed Stipulation and Order for 
Dismissal as to Dennis J. Sallaz and Rentals & Royalties, Inc .• (8R-R) and Wilbur Fifer appropriltiely 
signed as written, hereinafter referred as Dismissal, you shall notify Steve Sumner of such. 
Upon receipt of the funds from the closing ofthe sale of the assets of Capital West., Inc. to 
First Western, Inc., as trustee you shall: 
1. File the Dismissal as referred to above with the Court. 
2. Deliver to Dennis J. Sallaz certified funds in the amount of $150,000.00 payable to 
Dennis J. Sallaz,- or payable as directed in writing by Deilllis .T. Sallaz 
3. Deliver to Denl'lis J. Sallaz an addjtional amount in certified funds of$32,098.00 for 
and on behalf of Rentals and Royalti3es, Inc., ("R-R) payable to Dennis J. Sallaz or 
payable as clirected in writing by Dennis J. Sallaz 
4. Deliver to Dennis J. Sallaz the prepared Promis:sozy Note in the amount of 
$218,000.00 made payaqle to Dennis J. Sallaz signed by First Western, Inc. and 
Steve Sumner, guarantor and secured by znd assignment of promissozy note from 
Educational Me<lia Foundation, a non-profit California corporation. Said assignment 
and security forms and documents to be approved by Dennis J. Sallaz. 
5. In the event this transaction does not close within 120 days hereof, Sallaz has the 
option to terminate same. 
Steve Sumner 
Approved and ag1:eed: 










Uij/JU/U~ WED :9:27 FAX 20~498 EI SllANN LAW OFF. • 
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
Thi<i Ccmfidentia.lity Agreement (hereinafter the ".A.;;-ee~~ent") is made this __ :fay of 
__ __., 2003, by and between Denrtis J. Sallaz, an individual, Rentals & Royalties, Inc. (''R-R"), 
an Idaho corporation (collectively "Sallaz"), and Capital West, Inc., au Idaho corporation ("Capital"), 
and First Westem,foc., an Idaho corporation ("First Western"), and Steve Sumner (''Sumner). 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Sumner and Capital owes money to Sallaz, and Capital West has signed a 
Promissory Note in the form attached hereto as Exhibit •An, which is incorporated herein by this 
reference and restated a.s if set forth in fulL 
WHEREAS, the fact that Sumner and Capital West, Inc. has signed the note and agreed to 
make payments and Sallaz has accepted said note, is infonnation that First Western, Sumner, Capital 
West and Sallaz would rather not have publicly disseminated; and 
WHEREAS, Sallaz, Sumner, Capital West and First Western in consideration of the delivery 
and acceptance of the Promissory Note on the terms thereon, all parties are willing to honor each 
parties' concerns that all of the tenns of this transaction, including the Promissory Note, remain in 
confidence. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed between all parties as follows: 
L Recitals. The foregoing recitals are hereby incorporated by this 
reference and restated as if .set forth in full as part and parcel of thfa Agreement. 








06/J0/04 WED 09:28 FAX 20~498 E1SMANN LAW OFF. • 
2. Confidentiality. It is understood and agreed that the confidentiality of all 
provisions of this Agreement and the non-disclosure and non-publicatio11 thereof subsequent to the 
execution of this Agreement is a material part of the consideration recited herein. The parties 
acknowledge that the disclosure, dissemination or publica.tion of the provision of th.is Agreement by 
any of said parties may adversely affect the others. The parties do further stipulate and agree that 
none of the tenns of this settlement or any of the agreements or payments herein, including the 
aforesaid Pro01issory Note, req.uire the filing by any of the parties of a federal I 099 fonn or any 
other notification either to the United States, or any department thereof or any state or any 
department thereof and none of the parties hereto shall make said filing without the written consent 
of all parties. The parties acknowledge thar disclosure, dissemination or publication of the 
provisions of this Release, by any of these parties, may adversely affect the other parties in an 
amount that cannot be presently determined and would be difficult to determine the exact amount of 
damages if disclosure was made. Because of that difficulty it is agreed that any parties releasing my 
of said information shall pay the sum of $25,000.00 as liquidated damages to the other parties. All 
parlies1 agreement not to disclose, disseminate, publish or otherwise make public information 
concerning.the agreement except and unless written consent of all the parties hereto is obtained and 
except as may be necessary for a particular party Lo &sclose infonnation for his or its individual or 
corporate tax or other court related purposes, shall be binding upon the parties for a period of thirty 
(30) years from the execution hereof and is severable from all other agreements, terms, conditions 
and covenants set out herein, which terms shall remain in full force and effect notwithstanding any 
breach of the terms of this paragraph. 








06/30/04 WED ,09:28 FA.I 20~498 EISMANN LAW OFF, • @004 
Dennis J. Sallaz 
CAPITAL WEST, INC, 
President 
FIRST WESTERN, INC. 
President 
Swnner 
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OWNER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
EUG ENE LEROY 
ROS2 J :C::ANETTE 
RICE, 
RI CE, 
26 7 9 PALOUSE 
BOISE, I D 8 370 5 
_J' 
OR 
YEAR MAKE DESCRIPTION 
195 4 CADI CV ELD 
, LOSCrv.!_i:TcR .~EftDING 
l ::'.~MPm 
DATE 
/'NEIGH, L::NGTn WIDTH HULL HORSEPOWER PROPULSION 
I 
GTi,ER :,ERTINE:\oT DATA 
Warning: It is a lelcny to enter a false selling price, name, er address, or to alter or forge this dccument. Federal and State laws require you to state the mileage when 
transfernng motor vehicle ownership. Failure to comple e lhls disclosure or providing false informat1on may result ,n fines and/or imprisonment 
ODOMETER READING • Reading is actual unless indicated otherwise_ 
0 
5 ! st FUfiCH.1SER'S PffilTEll RJtL LEGAL N.AME i luAHO OR1VER'S LICENSE '10 .. OR SSN. {USl: SN IF BUSINES) 
(NO TENTHS): t :, ,,._. ::- :;:j DATE: , ~-- ..,. "':, :"'r A 
D In &csss of ~l•chanical u,nits O Eurr.ot 2nd "UAChASE.'l'S paJl'IT:l). <\.U. !.$,II. NMIE ' 'DAl'<l ORNEq•5 LICENSE NO. CA SSN. (USE :'N IF BUSINE.SS) . 
D Net Actual • Warning: Ocometer Discrepancy D Ne Device 
B 
DATE SOLD: SEWNG PRICE (see waming a.bevel 6 MAILING ADDRESS ~ PHYSICAL ADCn.ESS (IF DIFFERENT) 
SELLER'S CR REPRESENTATIVES PRINTED NAME(S) 7 CITY 
FlRST LIEN 
NONE 
SIGNATURE RELEASING LIEN 
RECORDED 01/24 / 2011 ,o X 






n .£..\SE PR1: ff CLEARLY 
------- ---------- - --- -
'( ·:1 1 '• ,!.1: . 
1954 CADI 
1eiler ' -/t' ,··ir.sf :r, i l•' ~lt L.: ~ ti (·Lun ,! I ; '·- - ·-·-- ----- ___ --··----- --- __ .. _ _ .• 
-~ \. J! r') [ iano r ,n . .Ii Li(PCtS? ~ .t: 1 J~ t! 1 "! '1 'I • ,, \ J 11 ~- 1·1::-H ·~ i i1, \ .- i ~ . ---
I !'11:· .;u ·,:··' ;/ l\·.i. ·.;;' ,. • , ·; l; ill L<':.; . .t , . , : ; ' -~'. I I ,h, I j \t.; l' ; f ,1, l :. ' ",., J i JI 1· ; 
[_\ '.d:·_:, ... -·------·------ --- -- -----·- -- -- l_ , !~ 
1 'J., ' h. ' I ·, ,, , \,,t 1; 1). ; : 1 •• l I , ~\ I' ,II ''· .1; 
.v ' 1 •··1.•J' ,I'' 
,r .. :, 
' \ 11".V I. I I 
.'.ii 
,, '• • .I 







I 1., ,,, 
!. I 
11· , ,I ,1 1,l t 
EXRIBIT_K __ 
000199
\' !J f ·,, , I l 
• ,J 
-=~ : '.:J ?'" . 
': \ , 1_ ~Jr-: 1.: 
J~ 
OCOMET:;:; REil.DiNG ' SS>I us.= BN F BUS<NESS, 
Readng s OC:U .ll ..nles: ; ;('IC>C3!'eo 
oft-erw,se NO t :J,,IT"rl~l ----------
0 10 ~~, :I 19',;.-,c:l"IQ! ;.tl"t.'I , = '.::( _;!trf l 
,__:i __ ,._, ·--"'-· -'-' _.,_.,_, ._,·,_; _Gi1_._"'_"_··_• _0_isc_""""_· _.·i_, ____ 0_•_·_" _·' - ------ ---------; 2!1C .::uFCl-~$E.?'f'", 01:UNTED FUL'... l.E('Y.1.., /',AME '!CAHC ORJVE?'S L!CE~sr: fl..0 CF ·3SN lUS'.: i?N iF 6 .JSi~~ess· I OEAl.E=iSf-:iP ;~A~,t': DEALE;: !\,U l::E? 
I 
1-
AC:C F'i: : 3 
1 irn awaro of tr.\J occme1er cerufic.atA:n mace Cy 1·•;i ,.111.11 
1-- -------- ------------------- --------! l~t PUF.ChASEF'"3 (er represenraJ-1e's) SIG"-u\i\; R1· I Si,'{ ST i TE : 1P I 
I OE.lL ::~, .l(i E ·•J T'S -o-;:-,J-' l ___ c_S_ ~-1.-~-... -, ~---- -------- ---------, ~ PLFK>'•Sc= > SG'IATL<FE :or cacre"8nt01f'-" J prln ··-
\! ,, ·,r, •ott • ,, .. , ., n • .cv. ~•:," "'-' ", '"c"' ' - •'·"1 ,,, ,7, :ne •,.·,,.- "'""l• ,r'" ' ·'""'·""" oc,wtee. l CE JJ-'OLDER S ' .JAiviE ib. "lerac· ·nf.: 1·· 1 nv nt.~ r i-:.:: ;r I nr:·/,· 1 ;\/1 , r 11 1 t., r: • • ir .. I ;,1..n:..'t .J ·P.r I 
I CSAL::'?/~ UE,'H '3 3 iG., J0: 7 LRE 1--- -------------------------=c-.c=----::_-::-ip;::-----j j L:ENHCL0€i','3 ADOFES:'3 c,- ·, ::-.;·r= ,x 
OCQ(<.,JETEF: RE.-"011- C i j [ ,.\TE I 
Aeaain J s 1r:a1. !I •. rlt•s:; ncfc:.ue,i f ·· . 
·Jtt'er..-.. -m ' 10 i Eff'' '.-IS '-----·-----' '-- -------~ -
R SSN USF. EIM IF 8USINESS.1 
0 n = .ce•;:; ;f \\,1t;"·W 1i; :I ul 'H t~ :::: i. .t!lrc t 
1--,-...,c,.....~".-' ".-c..,1o~u-l·•..,V_Jn_ ,r _; _':--cc_m_•_1e_,_~_1. :_c,_a_•· _"._';._• __ :J~ 'llu __ ::_• •_:1<. __ ,______ -,-,-------------,' 2nd Pl.PC~ASEiiS FfiJNTED. FULL LEGAL iJ.;ME !D~t,O DRIVER'} I 'CEN~ i: 1\1(, Of; SS·'I ,USE EJN 1F ~USINESS) 
I CEALERSl-'IP NAc,IE GEALER NU~1s::: ;:i 
M,),11..!NG ,J,QOFESS ~ Fh YS1C;1L /lOORESS l!F OIFFER!:H-) 
ADDRESS 
1 lll"I 1 nar'3 ot ·ne oocmare:- cenllic:::dc'l mace L·y ~ se1!er. 
1------------------------------------! 1st PURCHASER' S (0 1 re,:m~tatJVC: .. , s:GNATlJCf. 
Cl,Y STATE ZIP X 
,------- -------------------- - --------! ~'fd P'...JRCHASE? S: S1GN,4TUrfC 1or reoresantc:C\ler. , rrn,w., narre j. 
DEALEFi/AGENT'S PRIN• l:O NAl'vlE X 
f--------------------------------l LIENHOLDER'S NAME 
I ca1~1t'1 . !{ \ :na Clll!t ot :11) .<ncw1eL:ge. :nm :tn cccrre,~~ rescwq ,e1lects ·ne·Jc ual niuear;e. untess.otherw1sei nc1co.tec1. 
1 ills<J 1emby rclo,11l,'? f"\'i' m.:-11·t',t :u,d tran :, tcr "J•imersn·u to th':! narre".i cun:na:w r 
OEALER/ACiE~IT' S SIC'iN.~ TIJRE 
X 
-w~ [?T:3' 
LI ENHOLDER'S ADDRESS CITY 
e r -· 
STATE 
2,~~M5E~fur~~\~IL.. _______ _,I DATE ! "· - ISi Pt:RCHASEn'S PRl"'1:0, RJLL LEGAL N~ME DAHC DRIVEP'S t.,CE:.~Sc NLl.. OR 3SN ,L.SE ;IN IF evSINESS) 
otl'en.~e NO TE."'frr!S ~--------~ 
0 ,n i:¥Ca5:i ol •,!ed· 3nic;JJ LfT'r:,,; 0 ~'lrnot 
I 
! 
f-,---CJ_ N_o,..>_c..,.:u_OJ_·V.-l-.•m_ r·.Q_. _.:..,.ac_m_,9_1•_,_:_,sc_,_,c_3_,.C'_, _ _ ::_,..,.·..,, ,_: e_,_1·~..,.• ----....-=------------! :rte ?t..RChAS E) i "S PAINTi:~. FVU. L:~L NAMF. IG.J.~0 CFWIErl'S .._:CE."lSE ,0. CF SSH l.iSE ::1N ·F 5US1NE5Sll 
oE.:_Lc::iSHP i',; \,1,!:: DEALEri NUMBE,~ 
MAlL NG .400RE5S et!Q. P1-tVSICAL ,),CJIJF:;ss \IF OIFF::F::" .' 1-
... A_C_·D -IP-.-E-S-S- - ------------------------------, 
, am .1w..1ro ,1 ·re cacmalor cerJnc.·w~r. m.u:e )'J 'he seUer 
f------- --- --------------------------, 1st FURC!-'.4SER'S (or repmsent.;rr,e s . SfGN.ATUR!: 
C ITY STATE ZIP 
X 
X 
l~,---,c-.-~-,.-n-,-, -, :-,-"'- ,-, -,,-.. -"-c-.,,,,-.,-,,;-, - ,-:.-, -:,-. -"-.,-,.,-,.-.,-.-.,-,-;r-g -.• -,.-c·_:.;_.n_e-,-c,-ca-, -,-,1.-,-i;,- ·,c-.1.-:s-, -".-.,-, -.,,,-,-o-=-· -,-.a-; LIEN!-:OUjE,', S cl,\ ).J= 
T' c:!P 
' I 
! ii it, :erebv "/OJ.!.,.l 1w n! :r :ST tr J ·nps· ;r :.·,r~r;.r,p !;; •r:e .,,r. ~11 :::;ur::n 1;0::r 
ue.i c.. .= 0 1.>. GC:1- S !11'.i~I ~:,J ;.::E 
X 
~,-=:-:-=-----:=-..,.......-=-===--=-=-- - ~r:~·-~-,-----~--~ ~.~. \-~-=-~~--:~_=---__J 
llENt-CLDEr1 '3 ADCR~3.~ _ , -
-----'------------ --- - ----- - -------------- --
• i e · 0 18 11-3/ 
I I , Id ._ I. ' ._ . l l ' ' '.· l '. 
r 1 ··.1 1, 1/1. 11 1. 1,n1p!i- 1,:! ·, 1i ll 11 111 lh 1• 1·1·q · r ·q~ ; irJ 1.' r\ f t i n.: 1,1n11, i 
• J , ll 1 .) , h O i h•_ r1i1 ·11 "\ .\. _.;i) d:i;1~h. ,;r m,111 Li 11rd1 r i i i l i• j " 




/·. ·1 (t ' ' . 1 11 .._ J\ , 1 . I , f'l1 . ·: .: ,,· 
INS i=iUC: 10 \S 
, 1 l'i 1_·1 I I 
, , j , r•,' /·• I, 111 I I '.!>lf f 111 j , 11 \ 
I. 
(I] J. I ii I 1 1 \• + 1- I• f +! 111. 1,• I 
;, , . •• I 1, 1 j, , . ',, ,, 
1 . r '"l ·-
I " -, ~ • 
It I 
.. 11 1 · , , •• ·n:. 
\ :1•1 J.. IH! !L 




('(" (_, . '{' '·\ 
QP_\G\~~l • NO. ____ ~i=n""-fH+A~--
A.M. ____ F_IL~-~- ££j = (' ,, 
--\,a\'' 
" 9 ~ Iver J. Longeteig (!SB 1051) 
5304 Turrett 
JUN O 9 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By LARA AMES 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: (208) 342-5995 
Facsimile: (208) 424-6972 
William A. Fuhrman (ISB 2932) 
TROUT + JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 
Post Office Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: 208-331-1170 
Facsimile: 208-331-1529 
Vernon K. Smith (!SB 1365) 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ, 
Plaintiff, 
) 





) VERIFIED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM 
) AND PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants. 
) DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM AND 






EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband ) 







VERIFIED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFEN'DANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
' __J 
000201
DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD Chtd. And SALLAZ AND 












COMES NOW Counterdefendants, by and through their counsel of record and, in reply to 
Plaintiffs' Counterclaim, admit, deny, and affirmatively allege as follows: 
I. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Some or all of Defendants' counterclaims may fail to state proper claims for relief 
and should be dismissed. 
2. Counterdefendants deny each and every allegation in Plaintiffs' Counterclaim unless 
specifically admitted in this Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial. 
II. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
3. Paragraphs 1 through 4 of the Counterclaim are admitted. 
4. Paragraph 5 is admitted to the extent Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered is an Idaho 
corporation. 
5. In answer to paragraph 6, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz is a licensed attorney 
who practices at Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered, a professional limited liability corporation which 
has a principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, Idaho 83705. 
6. Paragraph 7 is admitted. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
000202
• 
7. In answer to paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, it is admitted only that this court has 
jurisdiction and that venue is appropriate in Ada County. It is denied that Counterclaimants were 
damaged in excess of $10,000. 
8. In answer to paragraph 11, it is admitted only that, at various times, Dennis Sallaz 
provided legal services to counterclaimants. 
9. Paragraph 12 is denied. 
10. In answer to paragraph 13, it is admitted only that Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., 
was one of numerous attorneys who provided legal services to Counterclaimants. 
11. In answer to paragraph 14, it is admitted only that, at times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
12. In answer to paragraph 15, it is admitted only that, at times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
13. Paragraph 16, is denied. 
14. Paragraph 17 is denied. 
15. Paragraph 18 is admitted on information and belief. 
16. Paragraph 19 is denied on the basis that it is unduly vague. 
17. In answer to paragraph 20, it is admitted only that as part owner in A Vista Pawn, 
Dennis Sallaz received certain goods from that entity. 
18. Paragraph 21 is denied. 
19. Paragraph 22 is denied. 
20. In answer to paragraph 23, it is admitted only that a copy of the Articles of 
Organization of Real Homes, L.L.C. is attached as "Exhibit A" to the counterclaim and that it 
VERIFIED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 
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was filed with the Secretary of State on January 19, 2001. It is denied that "Exhibit B" is a true 
and correct copy of the original Operating Agreement of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
21. In answer to paragraph 24, it is admitted that Renee Baird was listed as a manager 
of Real Homes, L.L.C., in the Articles of Organization filed on January 19, 2001 and in the 
Operating Agreement. 
22. Paragraph 25 is admitted. 
23. Paragraph 26 is admitted. 
24. Paragraph 27 is denied. 
25. Paragraph 28 is admitted. 
26. Paragraph 29 is admitted and it is affirmatively alleged that Glen Treferen was 
also an owner of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
27. Paragraph 30 is admitted. 
28. Paragraph 31 is denied. 
29. Paragraph 32 is denied. 
30. In answer to paragraph 33, it is admitted only that Real Homes, L.L.C. conveyed 
15584 Riverside Rd., Canyon County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz for $105,000 to be held in 
trust for Real Homes, L.L.C. 
31. Paragraph 34 is denied. 
32. Paragraph 35 is admitted. 
33. Paragraph 36 is denied on the basis that it is unduly vague. 
34. Paragraph 37 is denied. 
35. Paragraph 38 is admitted. It is affirmatively alleged that Counterclaimant Roy 
Rice never loaned the funds represented in the two promissory notes to Dennis Sallaz. 
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36. Paragraph 39 is denied except to the extent that it is admitted that a purported Bill 
of Sale for the ATVs and trailer is attached to the counterclaim as "Exhibit F ." 
37. In answer to paragraph 40, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the counterclaim. It is affirmatively 
alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said SUVs to Rice but that Rice never paid for said 
SUVs and the sale was never completed. 
38. In answer to paragraph 41, it is admitted only that a copy of the title of the 
motorhome is attached as "Exhibit H." It is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Motorhome. 
39. Paragraph 42 is denied. 
40. Paragraph 43 is denied. 
41. Paragraph 44 is admitted. 
42. Paragraph 45 is denied. 
43. Paragraph 46 is denied. 
44. In answer to paragraph 47, it 1s admitted only that the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement is attached as "Exhibit I." 
45. Paragraph 48 is admitted. 
46. In answer to paragraph 49, it is admitted only that the terms of the purchase 
agreement for sale of interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. speak for themselves. 
4 7. Paragraph 50 is admitted. 
48. Paragraph 51 is denied. 
49. Paragraph 52 is denied. 
50. Paragraph 53 is denied. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL • 5 
000205
• 
51. Paragraph 54 is denied. 
52. Paragraph 55 is admitted. 
53. Paragraph 56 is denied on the basis of a lack of sufficient information to form a 
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein. 
54. Paragraph 57 is denied. 
55. Paragraph 58 is admitted. 
56. Paragraph 59 is admitted but it is affirmatively alleged that the Magistrate Judge 
did not have jurisdiction to make the ruling he did. 
57. Paragraph 60 is denied. 
58. In answer to paragraphs 61 and 62, it is admitted only that Renee Baird's claim of 
ownership in some or all of Real Homes, LLC and/or Real Properties, LLC, and/or their assets, 
was known to Counterclaimant Roy Rice at the time he entered into the Purchase Agreement for 
the Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC. 
59. In answer to paragraph 63, it is admitted only that on or about November 4, 2009 
Eugene "Roy'' and Janet Rice filed an action to quiet title in Canyon County as Case No. CV 09-
11855. 
60. Paragraph 64 is admitted. 
61. Paragraph 65 is admitted. 
62. Paragraph 66 is denied. 
63. In answer to paragraph 67, it is denied that Counterdefendants committed any 
fraudulent, malicious, negligent, and/or wrongful acts. 
64. Paragraph 68 is denied on the basis of a lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
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65. In answer to paragraph 69, it is denied that Counterdefendants concealed, 
misrepresented, and/or fraudulently withheld information or that Counterdefendants committed 
any deceitful and fraudulent acts. 
66. Paragraph 70 is denied. 
67. Paragraph 71 is admitted. 
68. Paragraph 72 is denied. 
69. Paragraph 73 is admitted. 
70. In answer to paragraph 74, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
71. Paragraph 75 is admitted but it is affirmatively alleged that Counterclaimant Roy 
Rice never loaned the funds represented by the two promissory notes to Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz. 
72. Paragraphs 76, 77, 78, and 79 are denied. 
73. Paragraph 80 is admitted. 
74. Paragraph 81 is denied. 
75. In answer to paragraph 82, it is admitted only that the terms of the promissory 
notes speak for themselves. 
76. Paragraphs 83, 84, and 85 are denied. 
77. In answer to paragraph 86, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
78. Paragraphs 87 and 88 are admitted. 
79. Paragraphs 89 and 90 are admitted. 
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80. In answer to paragraphs 91, 92, and 93, it is admitted only that there was an 
agreement between the parties allowing Counterdefendants to take items from A Vista Pawn in 
return for legal services and that this was addressed by the court in the divorce proceeding. 
81. Paragraph 94 is admitted. 
82. Paragraph 95 is denied. 
83. Paragraph 96 is admitted only to the extent that, for a limited time, 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz provided legal advice in forming, and was the registered agent 
for, "R-R Investments, Inc." 
84. Paragraphs 97, 98, 99, 100, and 101 are denied. 
85. In answer to paragraphs 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, and 110, it is 
admitted only that Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz was involved in litigation with Steve Sumner 
over unpaid legal fees which resulted in a settlement in 2003. The other allegations of these 
paragraphs are denied. 
86. Paragraphs 111, 112, and 113 are denied. 
87. In answer to paragraphs 114 and 115, it is admitted that Dennis Sallaz was the 
personal representative for his grandmother's estate and that he deposited portions of the 
settlement funds into his grandmother's estate. It is denied that any of the settlement funds were 
due to Counterclaimants. 
88. Paragraphs 116, 117, 118, and 119 are denied. 
89. In answer to paragraph 120, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
90. Paragraph 121, 122, and 123 are denied. 
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91. In answer to paragraph 124, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
92. Paragraph 125 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
93. Paragraph 126 is denied. 
94. In answer to paragraph 127, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
95. Paragraphs 128, 129, and 130 are denied. 
96. In answer to paragraph 131, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
97. Paragraph 132 is denied. 
98. In answer to paragraph 133, is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
99. Paragraphs 134 and 135 are denied. 
100. In answer to paragraph 136, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
101. Paragraph 13 7 is denied. 
102. In answer to paragraph 138, it 1s admitted only that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
103. Paragraph 139 is denied. 
104. In answer to paragraph 140, it is admitted only that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
105. Paragraphs 141, 142, 143, 144, and 145 are denied. 
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106. In answer to paragraph 146, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
107. Paragraph 14 7 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
108. In answer to paragraphs 148 and 149, it is admitted only that any fiduciary duties 
owed by Counterdefendants to Counterclaimants are those provided for by Idaho law. 
109. Paragraphs 150, 151, 152, and 153 are denied. 
110. In answer to paragraph 154, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
111. Paragraph 155 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
112. Paragraphs 156, 157, 158, and 159 are denied. 
113. In answer to paragraph 160, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
114. Paragraph 161 is denied. 
115. In answer to paragraph 162, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the counterclaim. It is affirmatively 
alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said A TVs to Rice but that Rice never paid for said 
ATVs and the sale was never completed. 
116. In answer to Paragraph 163, the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
speak for themselves. 
117. In answer to paragraph 164, it is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Winnebago, and it is admitted that a copy of the title for the Winnebago is attached as "Exhibit 
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H." It is further denied that Counterclaimants have a valid interest or claim against said 
Winnebago as any debt has previously been paid. 
118. Paragraphs 165, 166, 167, 168, and 169 are denied. 
119. In answer to paragraph 170, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
120. Paragraph 171 is denied. 
121. In answer to paragraph 172, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the counterclaim. It is affirmatively 
alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said A TVs to Rice but that Rice never paid for said 
ATVs and the sale was never completed. 
122. In answer to paragraph 173, it is admitted only that a demand was made for the 
return of said ATVs and ATV trailer. 
123. Paragraphs 174, 175, 176, and 177 are denied. 
124. In answer to paragraph 178, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
125. In answer to paragraph 179, it is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Winnebago, and it is admitted that a copy of the title for the Winnebago is attached as "Exhibit 
H." It is further denied that Counterclaimants have a valid interest or claim against said 
Winnebago as any debt has previously been paid. 
126. In answer to paragraph 180, it is only admitted that a demand was made by 
counsel for Counterclaimants for the return of the Winnebago. 
127. Paragraphs 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, and 186 are denied. 
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128. In answer to paragraph 187, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
129. Paragraph 188 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
130. Paragraphs 189, 190, 191, 192, and 193 are denied. 
131. In answer to paragraph 194, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
132. Paragraph 195 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
133. Paragraphs 196, 197, 198, and 199 are denied. 
134. In answer to paragraph 200, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
135. Paragraph 201 is denied. 
136. Paragraph 202 is admitted. 
137. Paragraphs 203 and 204 are denied. 
138. In answer to paragraph 205, it is admitted that Rice is purported, by fraud, to have 
been issued a Certificate of Title for the Cadillac, but the copy which is attached as "Exhibit R" 
is illegible. 
139. Paragraphs 206,207,208, and 209 are denied. 
140. Paragraphs 210,211, and 212 are denied. 
141. Paragraph 213 is admitted. 
142. Paragraphs 214, 215, and 216 are denied. 
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143. In answer to paragraph 217, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
144. Paragraph 218 is denied. 
145. Paragraph 219 is admitted. 
146. Paragraphs 220 and 221 are denied. 
14 7. In answer to paragraph 222, it is admitted only that Rice sought to have issued a 
Certificate of Title for the Cadillac but the copy which is attached as "Exhibit R" is illegible. It 
is affirmatively alleged that the Certification of Title for the Cadillac which is attached as 
"Exhibit R" is invalid as a result of Rice's fraudulent acts. 
148. Paragraphs 223,224,225,226, and 227 are denied. 
149. Paragraphs 228 and 229 are denied. 
150. Paragraph 230 is admitted. 
151. Paragraphs 231,232, and 233 are denied. 
152. Paragraph 234 is denied. 
III. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
153. Counterclaimants' claim for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by set-off 
for various amounts due and owing Counterdefendants. 
154. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by their negligence, fault and legal 
responsibility. 
155. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the negligence, fault or liability of third 
parties for whom Counterdefendants are not legally responsible. 
156. Counterclaimants have failed to mitigate their alleged damages, if any. 
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157. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, equitable 
estoppel, and judicial estoppel, and fraud. 
158. Counterclaimants' damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced in that the damages 
sought by Counterclaimants' could have been avoided if Counterclaimants had acted reasonably 
prior to filing their counterclaim. 
159. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by the 
doctrine of unclean hands. 
160. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. 
161. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
162. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
163. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
164. Some or all of Counterclaimants' claims are barred because they should have been 
raised in the pending Canyon County lawsuit, CV 2009-11855. 
165. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, 
including but not limited to, Idaho Code§§ 5-216, 5-217, 5-219, 5-222, 5-224. 
166. Counterclaimants' claims are barred or reduced by Counterclaimants' own breach 
of the subject agreements which are alleged to have been entered into. 
167. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred by the failure of 
Counterclaimants to substantially perform the terms of the alleged agreements. 
168. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by a failure to provide the consideration 
which forms the basis of certain of the agreements at issue. 
169. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
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170. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to post an undertaking required 
by Idaho Code § 8-303. 
171. This action has just commenced and discovery has not yet taken place. 
Counterdefendants reserve the right to amend, modify and supplement their affirmative defenses as 
the action progresses. 
As the substance of Defendants' /Counterclaimants' Counterclaim has raised entirely new 
issues far beyond the scope of Plaintiff's Complaint, as well as adding two new parties as 
Counterdefendants, Plaintiff/Counterdefendants further allege as a counterclaim against 
Defendants/ Counterclaimants as follows: 
IX. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
1. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz and Counterdefendant/ 
Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz in his representative capacity of Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., and 
Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, (hereinafter, collectively referred to as 
"Plaintiff/Counterclaimant"), hereby incorporate the allegations set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint, 
together with Paragraphs 1 through 171, inclusive, set forth herein. In addition, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaimant avers as follows: 
2. Plaintiff/Counterclaimants did, at various times, perform legal services at the request of, and 
on behalf of, Defendants/Counterclaimants and/or their entities. 
3. In exchange for the legal services of Plaintiff/Counterclaimant, Defendant/Counterclaimant 
agreed that Plaintiff/Counterclaimant was entitled to compensation and therefore allowed Plaintiff/ 
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Counterclaimant to collect a portion of his fees in the form of goods from 
Defendant/Counterclaimants' former business "A Vista Pawn, Inc.". 
4. The above-described exchange covered only a fraction of Plaintiff/Counterclaimants' fees 
for services rendered. 
5. Plaintiff/Counterclaimants have never been paid for the balance of its fees owed for the 
rendition of such services the balance of which is approximately $300,000.00. 
6. Plaintiff/Counterclaimant is entitled to payment from Defendants/Counterclaimants' of all 
amounts currently due and owing plus pre and post judgment interest accruing thereon at the 
maximum rate permitted by Idaho law. 
7. In addition, to the extent, if at all, Defendants/Counterclaimants are entitled to any funds 
from Plaintiff/Counterclaimant, Plaintiff/Counterclaimant is entitled to a set-off against all 
amounts, if any, owed to Defendant/Counterclaimants. 
X. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Plaintiff/Counterclaimants have been required to retain the services of legal counsel to 
defend this action and they are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant 
to Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
VII. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff/Counterclaimants hereby demand a trial by jury pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 38. 
VII. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
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WHEREFORE, having fully responded to the Counterclaimants' Counterclaim, 
Plaintiffi'Counterclaimants pray for judgment against Defendants/Counterclaimants as follows: 
1. That Defendants' /Counterclaimants' counterclaim, and each cause of action and/or 
claim stated therein, be dismissed with prejudice, with Defendants/Counterclaimants 
taking nothing thereby. 
2. Plaintiff/Counterclaimants be awarded damages for all sums due and owmg by 
Defendants/Counterclaimants together with pre and post judgment interest thereon at 
the maximum rate allowed by Idaho law. 
3. That the Court award to Plaintiffi'Counterclaimants their costs and attorney fees incurred 
herein. 
4. That the Court award to Plaintiffi'Counterclaimants such other and additional relief as to 
the Court deems just and appropriate. 
DATED this 3-_ day of June, 2011. 
TROUT + JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
By------1..<-+U~) 1l~~,.L---r ._Ct til-----==------=-
William A. Fuhrman - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Counterdefendants 
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County of Ada ) 
DENNIS SALLAZ, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant in the above-entitled action. That he has read 
the within and foregoing Verified Reply to Counterclaim and Plaintiff/Counterdefendants' 
Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial, knows the contents thereof, and that the facts therein 
stated are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ii!.._ day of June, 2011. 
N-OtPublic for hl 
Residing at &1/;l.L, , Idaho 
My Commission Expires /IJ ~d--/-~I b 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this i_ day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing document was forwarded by the method indicated and to the following: 
J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Iver J. Longeteig 
Attorney at Law 
5304 Turrett 
Boise, ID 83703 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
[« U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-delivered 






[~ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 345-1129 
William A. Fuhrman 
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• :=====IIIU!~-.M.-!-. :;•z-··"i-:: 
JUN 1 ~· 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 









IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




10 EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband 




13 EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband 





17 DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
18 GATEWOOD, CHTD., and SALLAZ AND 
19 GATEWOOD, CHTD., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
Case No. CVOC1107253 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 










For Plaintiff: Iver J. Longeteig, Attorney at Law 
For Defendants: J. Kahle Becker, Attorney at Law 


















This matter came before the Court on an Order to Show Cause and the Court 
allowed the parties to submit briefs on or before May 21, 2011. 
BACKGROUND 
On April 11, 2011, Dennis Sallaz filed a Verified Complaint seeking the return of 
a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado which was repossessed by the Defendants after Mr. Sallaz 
allegedly failed to repay a loan. Attached as "Exhibit A" to the Complaint was a 
duplicate title with what is allegedly the signature of Eugene Rice purporting to release 
Mr. Rice's lien on the Cadillac. The duplicate title Mr. Sallaz presented also purported 
to transfer Mr. Sallaz's interest in the Cadillac to his fiancee, Mary Fox. The Defendant 
Eugene Rice submitted a certificate of title and accompanying documents from the 
Idaho Department of Transportation documenting that he is the owner of this vehicle 
and is currently in possession of the Cadillac. 
On April 12, 2011, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause and set a hearing 












Idaho Code § 8-302 provides that: 
(1) Where a delivery is claimed, the plaintiff, by verified complaint or by an 
affidavit made by plaintiff or by someone on his behalf, filed with the court, 
shall show: 
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed or is entitled to 
the possession thereof, and the source of such title or right; and if 
plaintiffs interest in such property is based upon a written instrument, a 
copy thereof shall be attached; 
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, the means 
by which the defendant came into possession thereof, and the cause of 
such detention according to his best knowledge, information and belief; 
(c) A particular description of the property, a statement of its actual value, 




























and a statement to his best knowledge, information, and belief concerning 
the location of the property and of the residence and business address, if 
any, of the defendant; 
(d) That the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, 
pursuant to a statute; or seized under an execution against the property of 
the plaintiff; or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt from such seizure. 
(2) The court shall, without delay, examine the complaint and affidavit, 
and if it is satisfied that they meet the requirements of subsection (1) of 
this section, it shall issue an order directed to the defendant to show 
cause why the property should not be taken from the defendant and 
delivered to the plaintiff. 
( 4) Under any of the circumstances described in subsection ( 1) of this 
section, or in lieu of the immediate issuance of a writ of possession under 
any of the circumstances described in subsection (3) of this section, the 
judge may, in addition to the issuance of an order to show cause, issue 
such temporary restraining orders, directed to the defendant, prohibiting 
such acts with respect to the property, as may appear to be necessary for 
the preservation of rights of the parties and the status of the property. 
(5) Upon the hearing on the order to show cause, the court shall consider 
the showing made by the parties appearing, and shall make a preliminary 
determination which party, with reasonable probability, is entitled to 
possession, use, and disposition of the property, pending final 
adjudication of the claims of the parties. If the court determines that the 
action is one in which a prejudgment writ of possession should issue, it 
shall direct the issuance of such writ. 
I.C. § 8-302. 
DISCUSSION 
This is a rather sordid affair between two former business partners claiming 
ownership of the same vehicle, a 1954 Cadillac. Mr. Rice presented documents of title 
from the Idaho Department of Transportation, hereinafter referred to as ITD, 
demonstrating from that agency that he is the titled owner of the vehicle. Subsequent 
to Mr. Rice securing the documentation in the form of a duplicate title, Mr. Sallaz filed 
this action and produced a title for the same vehicle with a release of lien signed by Mr. 
Rice in 1994. This certificate of title had not been submitted to the ITD at any time prior 




























to or subsequent to the Certificate of Title issued to Mr. Rice. 
Mr. Sallaz asserts that there was no underlying security agreement for the lien 
and that the certificate of title was obtained fraudulently by Mr. Rice. Mr. Rice 
presented evidence that the release of lien was a forgery, that he exercised his rights 
under the lien and obtained possession of the vehicle and subsequently obtained the 
certificate of title. 
As a preliminary matter in determining the rights of the Plaintiff and the 
Defendants, the Court must first determine which statutes control in this case, the Motor 
Vehicle Titles Act or the Uniform Commercial Code. Mr. Rice claims he is the owner of 
the car under Idaho Code § 49-503 because he is the official owner of the vehicle 
according to State records and that title produced by Mr. Sallaz purportedly releasing 
Mr. Rice's lien is invalid because the title containing the alleged lien release was never 
recorded in accordance with Idaho Code § 49-510. 
Idaho Code § 49-503 is very clear: 
... no person acquiring a vehicle from the owner, whether the owner is a 
dealer or otherwise, shall acquire any right, title, claim or interest in or to 
the vehicle until he has issued to him a Certificate of Title to that vehicle, 
nor shall any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of that person against a 
person having possession of a Certificate of Title or an Assignment of the 
Certificate of the vehicle for a valuable consideration. 
I.C. § 49-503. 
Latham Motors, Inc. v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 689, 694, 851 P.2d 985, 990 (Ct. App. 
1985) and Northland Insurance Co. v. Boise's Best Autos & Repairs, 132 Idaho 228, 
233, 970 P.2d 21, 26 (Ct. App. 1992) emphasize that statute's clarity. Reading only I.C. 
§ 49-503 one would conclude Mr. Rice should get the vehicle back because he is the 
owner of record with the State. 
Numerous jurisdictions have struggled with the interplay between the Uniform 




























Commercial Code and their motor vehicle title acts. In some aspects the two statutes 
are concerned with the same subject matter and appear to be conflicting. Shannon v. 
Snedeker, 470 A.2d 25, 29 (N.J. Super 1983). 
The apparent conflict between the provisions of the UCC and the [motor 
vehicle act] arises because the transfer of a motor vehicle, unlike the 
transfer of other chattels, must be made in accordance with documentary 
evidence executed only in the method prescribed by the [motor vehicle 
act]. But these statutes should be read and construed together and given 
fair effect to both if possible. 
Martin v. Nager, 469 A.2d 519, 522-23 (N.J. Super 1983) 
In Simplot v. Williams C. Owens M.D., 119 Idaho 271, 805 P.2d 477 (Ct. App. 
1990), the Idaho Court of Appeals had to determine whether the Vehicle Titles Act or 
the UCC governed the sale of a GMC bus. The Idaho Court of Appeals held the Motor 
Vehicle Act controlled because the vehicle in question did not constitute inventory for 
sale pursuant to I.C. § 49-512. Id. 119 Idaho at 273-74. 
In determining whether the vehicle in Simplot was held as inventory for sale, the 
court focused on whether the seller was in the business of selling used vehicles. Id. at 
274. The seller of the vehicle in Simplot was a private party (Howard) who had first 
used his GMC bus as security and signed the certificate of title over to the secured 
party but Howard kept possession of the bus. Later, Howard sold the bus to another 
party. Since Howard was a private party and was thus not in the business of selling 
used vehicles, the Court of Appeals held the UCC did not apply and instead Idaho 
Code§ 49-503 controlled. 
Similarly, in the present case, the vehicle is not part of an inventory from the 
record. The vehicle was being kept by the Plaintiff as a collectible and was in storage in 
an open field on property owned by Mr. Sallaz's brother. 
The Idaho Code provides the exclusive provisions governing the perfection of a 




























security interest in a vehicle because the Cadillac is not "inventory for sale." 
Idaho Code § 49-510 provides that: 
No lien or encumbrance on any vehicle registered under the laws of this 
state created subsequent to December 31, 1986, irrespective of whether 
such registration was effected prior or subsequent to the creation of the 
lien or encumbrance, shall be perfected as against creditors or 
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers without notice until the holder 
of the lien or encumbrance, or his successor, agent or assignee, has 
complied with the requirements of section 49-504, Idaho Code, and has 
filed the properly completed title application and all required supporting 
documents with the department or an agent of the department. 
1.C. § 49-510(1) 
The purported lien release contained on the 1991 duplicate title is invalid 
because Mr. Sallaz failed to record the certificate. Mr. Rice has shown with sufficient 
probability that he had a valid lien, that he properly repossessed the vehicle pursuant to 
that lien and is the official owner of record of the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that Mr. Rice has shown with sufficient probability that he is the 
official owner of record of the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and that he is entitled to 
possession of the vehicle. 
The temporary restraining order contained in the Court's Order to Show cause 
regarding sale or transfer of the vehicle is dismissed. 
DATED this _f_f_ day of June 2011. 
I HAEL McLAUGHLIN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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This matter came before the Court on (1) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike; (2) Plaintiff's 
Motion to Stay; (3) Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration; (4) Defendants' Motion to Add 
Claims for Punitive Damages; (5) Defendants' Motion to Forfeit the Bond; (6) 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and (7) Defendants' Motion to Strike or, in 
the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement. At oral argument, the Court ruled on all 
of the motions except for the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which was 
taken under advisement. 
BACKGROUND 
On April 11, 2011, Dennis Sallaz filed a Verified Complaint seeking the return of 
a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado which was repossessed by the Defendants after Mr. Sallaz 
allegedly failed to repay a loan. Attached as "Exhibit A" to the Complaint was a 
duplicate title with what is allegedly the signature of Eugene Rice purporting to release 
Mr. Rice's lien on the Cadillac. The duplicate title Mr. Sallaz presented also purported 
to transfer Mr. Sallaz's interest in the Cadillac to his fiancee, Mary Fox. 
On April 12, 2011, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause and set a hearing 
for April 29, 2011. At the hearing Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. were served on the record by Defendants' counsel with a 
counterclaim alleging fraudulent actions and legal malpractice associated with Mr. 
Sallaz's representation of the Rices as their personal and business attorney for 
approximately 25 years. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment will be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 




issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When considering a summary judgment motion, the trial 
3 court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-moving party and draw all 
4 reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West Homeowner's 







motion will be denied if conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or if 
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokot, 117 Idaho 963, 
793 P.2d 195 (1990). 
The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
rests with the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 531, 
12 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994). If the moving party meets that burden, the party who 
13 resists summary judgment has the responsibility to place in the record before the court 
14 the existence of controverted material facts that require resolution at trial. Sparks v. St. 








resisting party may not rely on his pleadings or merely assert the existence of facts 
which might support his legal theory. Id. He must establish the existence of those facts 
by deposition, affidavit, or otherwise. Id.; I.R.C.P. 56(e). Supporting and opposing 
affidavits must be made on personal knowledge and must set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence. I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
A mere scintilla of evidence or a slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to 
23 withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 
24 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). Moreover, the existence of disputed facts will not defeat 
25 summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
26 existence of an element essential to his case, and on which he will bear the burden of 












proof at trial. Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425,426,816 P.2d 982,983 (1991). 
DISCUSSION 
The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the 
promissory notes because "Sallaz's sole basis for refusing to pay the amounts which 
are now due is his unsubstantiated statement that he never received any funds from 
Roy Rice." Mr. Sallaz denied that he ever received any funds from Mr. Rice in the 
Plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatory 15 and in the Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants' 
















proceeding that he received at least some of the money that Mr. Rice loaned to him. 
The Plaintiff responds that the Defendants' claims regarding the promissory 
notes are barred by the five year statute of limitations for contracts under Idaho Code § 
5-216. The Plaintiff also continues to deny that he received any funds from Mr. Rice as 
evidenced by the August 11, 2011 Affidavit filed by the Plaintiff. According to the 
Plaintiff, his prior testimony in his divorce case is not inconsistent because events 
transpired soon after the June 15, 2005 deposition took place, which resulted in the 
contemplated loan transaction between Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Rice falling through. 
At this point in time, the record is unclear as to whether Mr. Sallaz ever received 
any funds from Mr. Rice and as to what the amount of funds received by Mr. Sallaz may 
have been. As was the case in Frazier v. J.R. Simplot Co., 136 Idaho 100, 103, 29 
P.3d 936, 939 (2001 ), there is not a sufficient conflict between Mr. Sallaz's deposition 
testimony and his statements in his Affidavit to strike the Affidavit. Therefore, the Court 
24 finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the amount left owing on 
25 the promissory note and the Court will deny the Defendants' Motion for Summary 
26 Judgment. 






























The Court DENIES the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this l3 day of September 2011. 
ICHAEL McLAUGHLIN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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COMES NOW Counterdefendants, Dennis Sallaz in his representative capacity of Sallaz 
and Gatewood Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc., ("Counterdefendants") by and 
through their counsel of record William A. Fuhrman, of the firm TROUT + JONES + 
GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A., and, in reply to Defendants' /Counterclaimants' 
("Counterclaimants") Counterclaim, admit, deny, and affirmatively allege as follows: 
I. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Some or all of Counterclaimants' counterclaims may fail to state proper claims for 
relief and should be dismissed. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
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2. Counterdefendants deny each and every allegation in Counterclaimants' 
Counterclaim unless specifically admitted in this Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial. 
II. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
3. Paragraphs 1 through 4 of the Counterclaim are admitted. 
4. Paragraph 5 is admitted to the extent Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered is an Idaho 
corporation. 
5. In answer to paragraph 6, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz is a licensed attorney 
who practices at Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered, a professional limited liability corporation which 
has a principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, Idaho 83705. 
6. Paragraph 7 is admitted. 
7. In answer to paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, it is admitted only that this court has 
jurisdiction and that venue is appropriate in Ada County. It is denied that Counterclaimants were 
damaged in excess of $10,000. 
8. In answer to paragraph 11, it is admitted only that, at various times, Dennis Sallaz 
provided legal services to Counterclaimants. 
9. Paragraph 12 is denied. 
10. In answer to paragraph 13, it is admitted only that Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
was one of numerous attorneys who provided legal services to Counterclaimants. 
11. In answer to paragraph 14, it is admitted only that, at times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
12. In answer to paragraph 15, it is admitted only that, at times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
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29. Paragraph 32 is denied. 
30. In answer to paragraph 33, it is admitted only that Real Homes, L.L.C. conveyed 
15584 Riverside Rd., Canyon County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz for $105,000 to be held in 
trust for Real Homes, L.L.C. 
31. Paragraph 34 is denied. 
32. Paragraph 35 is admitted. 
33. Paragraph 36 is denied on the basis that it is unduly vague. 
34. Paragraph 37 is denied. 
35. Paragraph 38 is admitted. It is affirmatively alleged that Counterclaimant Roy 
Rice never loaned the funds represented in the two promissory notes to Dennis Sallaz. 
36. Paragraph 39 is denied except to the extent that it is admitted that a purported Bill 
of Sale for the A TVs and trailer is attached to the counterclaim as "Exhibit F." 
37. In answer to paragraph 40, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the Counterclaim. It is affirmatively 
alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said SUVs to Rice but that Rice never paid for said 
SUVs and the sale was never completed. 
38. In answer to paragraph 41, it is admitted only that a copy of the title of the 
motorhome is attached as "Exhibit H." It is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Motorhome. 
39. Paragraph 42 is denied. 
40. Paragraph 43 is denied. 
41. Paragraph 44 is admitted. 
42. Paragraph 45 is denied. 
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43. Paragraph 46 is denied. 
44. In answer to paragraph 47, it 1s admitted only that the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement is attached as "Exhibit I." 
45. Paragraph 48 is admitted. 
46. In answer to paragraph 49, it is admitted only that the terms of the purchase 
agreement for sale of interest in Real Hornes, L.L.C. speak for themselves. 
4 7. Paragraph 50 is admitted. 
48. Paragraph 51 is denied. 
49. Paragraph 52 is denied. 
50. Paragraph 53 is denied. 
51. Paragraph 54 is denied. 
52. Paragraph 55 is admitted. 
53. Paragraph 56 is denied on the basis of a lack of sufficient information to form a 
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein. 
54. Paragraph 57 is denied. 
55. Paragraph 58 is admitted. 
56. Paragraph 59 is admitted but it is affirmatively alleged that the Magistrate Judge 
did not have jurisdiction to make the ruling he did. 
57. Paragraph 60 is denied. 
58. In answer to paragraphs 61 and 62, it is admitted only that Renee Baird's claim of 
ownership in some or all of Real Hornes, LLC and/or Real Properties, LLC, and/or their assets, 
was known to Counterclairnant Roy Rice at the time he entered into the Purchase Agreement for 
the Sale oflnterest in Real Hornes, LLC. 
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59. In answer to paragraph 63, it is admitted only that on or about November 4, 2009 
Eugene "Roy" and Janet Rice filed an action to quiet title in Canyon County as Case No. CV 09-
11855. 
60. Paragraph 64 is admitted. 
61. Paragraph 65 is admitted. 
62. Paragraph 66 is denied. 
63. In answer to paragraph 67, it is denied that Counterdefendants committed any 
fraudulent, malicious, negligent, and/or wrongful acts. 
64. Paragraph 68 is denied on the basis of a lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
65. In answer to paragraph 69, it is denied that Counterdefendants concealed, 
misrepresented, and/or fraudulently withheld information or that Counterdefendants committed 
any deceitful and fraudulent acts. 
66. Paragraph 70 is denied. 
67. Paragraph 71 is admitted. 
68. Paragraph 72 is denied. 
69. Paragraph 73 is admitted. 
70. In answer to paragraph 74, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
71. Paragraph 75 is admitted but it is affirmatively alleged that Counterclaimant Roy 
Rice never loaned the funds represented by the two promissory notes to Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz. 
72. Paragraphs 76, 77, 78, and 79 are denied. 
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73. Paragraph 80 is admitted. 
74. Paragraph 81 is denied. 
75. In answer to paragraph 82, it is admitted only that the terms of the promissory 
notes speak for themselves. 
76. Paragraphs 83, 84, and 85 are denied. 
77. In answer to paragraph 86, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
78. Paragraphs 87 and 88 are admitted. 
79. Paragraphs 89 and 90 are admitted. 
80. In answer to paragraphs 91, 92, and 93, it is admitted only that there was an 
agreement between the parties allowing Counterdefendants to take items from A Vista Pawn in 
return for legal services and that this was addressed by the court in the divorce proceeding. 
81. Paragraph 94 is admitted. 
82. Paragraph 95 is denied. 
83. Paragraph 96 is admitted only to the extent that, for a limited time, Dennis Sallaz 
provided legal advice in forming, and was the registered agent for, "R-R Investments, Inc." 
84. Paragraphs 97, 98, 99, 100, and 101 are denied. 
85. In answer to paragraphs 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, and 110, it is 
admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was involved in litigation with Steve Sumner over unpaid legal 
fees which resulted in a settlement in 2003. The other allegations of these paragraphs are denied. 
86. Paragraphs 111, 112, and 113 are denied. 
87. In answer to paragraphs 114 and 115, it is admitted that Dennis Sallaz was the 
personal representative for his grandmother's estate and that he deposited portions of the 
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settlement funds into his grandmother's estate. It is denied that any of the settlement funds were 
due to Counterclaimants. 
88. Paragraphs 116, 117, 118, and 119 are denied. 
89. In answer to paragraph 120, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
90. Paragraph 121, 122, and 123 are denied. 
91. In answer to paragraph 124, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
92. Paragraph 125 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
93. Paragraph 126 is denied. 
94. In answer to paragraph 127, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
95. Paragraphs 128, 129, and 130 are denied. 
96. In answer to paragraph 131, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
97. Paragraph 132 is denied. 
98. In answer to paragraph 133, is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
99. Paragraphs 134 and 135 are denied. 
100. In answer to paragraph 136, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
101. Paragraph 137 is denied. 
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102. In answer to paragraph 138, it is admitted only that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
103. Paragraph 139 is denied. 
104. In answer to paragraph 140, it 1s admitted only that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
105. Paragraphs 141, 142, 143, 144, and 145 are denied. 
106. In answer to paragraph 146, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
107. Paragraph 14 7 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
108. In answer to paragraphs 148 and 149, it is admitted only that any fiduciary duties 
owed by Counterdefendants to Counterclaimants are those provided for by Idaho law. 
109. Paragraphs 150, 151, 152, and 153 are denied. 
110. In answer to paragraph 154, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
111. Paragraph 155 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
112. Paragraphs 156, 157, 158, and 159 are denied. 
113. In answer to paragraph 160, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
114. Paragraph 161 is denied. 
115. In answer to paragraph 162, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the counterclaim. It is affirmatively 
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alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said ATVs to Rice but that Rice never paid for said 
A TVs and the sale was never completed. 
116. In answer to Paragraph 163, the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
speak for themselves. 
117. In answer to paragraph 164, it is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Winnebago, and it is admitted that a copy of the title for the Winnebago is attached as "Exhibit 
H." It is further denied that Counterclaimants have a valid interest or claim against said 
Winnebago as any debt has previously been paid. 
118. Paragraphs 165, 166, 167, 168, and 169 are denied. 
119. In answer to paragraph 170, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
120. Paragraph 171 is denied. 
121. In answer to paragraph 172, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the counterclaim. It is affirmatively 
alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said A TVs to Rice but that Rice never paid for said 
A TVs and the sale was never completed. 
122. In answer to paragraph 173, it is admitted only that a demand was made for the 
return of said A TVs and A TV trailer. 
123. Paragraphs 174, 175, 176, and 177 are denied. 
124. In answer to paragraph 178, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
125. In answer to paragraph 179, it is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Winnebago, and it is admitted that a copy of the title for the Winnebago is attached as "Exhibit 
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H." It is further denied that Counterclaimants have a valid interest or claim against said 
Winnebago as any debt has previously been paid. 
126. In answer to paragraph 180, it is only admitted that a demand was made by 
counsel for Counterclaimants for the return of the Winnebago. 
127. Paragraphs 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, and 186 are denied. 
128. In answer to paragraph 187, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
129. Paragraph 188 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
130. Paragraphs 189, 190, 191, 192, and 193 are denied. 
131. In answer to paragraph 194, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
132. Paragraph 195 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
133. Paragraphs 196, 197, 198, and 199 are denied. 
134. In answer to paragraph 200, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
135. Paragraph 201 is denied. 
136. Paragraph 202 is admitted. 
137. Paragraphs 203 and 204 are denied. 
138. In answer to paragraph 205, it is admitted that Rice is purported, by fraud, to have 
been issued a Certificate of Title for the Cadillac, but the copy which is attached as "Exhibit R" 
is illegible. 
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139. Paragraphs 206,207,208, and 209 are denied. 
140. Paragraphs 210,211, and 212 are denied. 
141. Paragraph 213 is admitted. 
142. Paragraphs 214,215, and 216 are denied. 
143. In answer to paragraph 217, the prior paragraphs of this reply to counterclaim are 
realleged as if stated in full. 
144. Paragraph 218 is denied. 
145. Paragraph 219 is admitted. 
146. Paragraphs 220 and 221 are denied. 
147. In answer to paragraph 222, it is admitted only that Rice sought to have issued a 
Certificate of Title for the Cadillac but the copy which is attached as "Exhibit R" is illegible. It 
is affirmatively alleged that the Certification of Title for the Cadillac which is attached as 
"Exhibit R" is invalid as a result of Rice's fraudulent acts. 
148. Paragraphs 223,224,225,226, and 227 are denied. 
149. Paragraphs 228 and 229 are denied. 
150. Paragraph 230 is admitted. 
151. Paragraphs 231, 232, and 233 are denied. 
152. Paragraph 234 is denied. 
III. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
153. Counterclaimants' claim for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by set-off 
for various amounts due and owing Counterdefendants. 
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154. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by their negligence, fault and legal 
responsibility. 
155. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the negligence, fault or liability of third 
parties for whom Counterdefendants are not legally responsible. 
156. Counterclaimants have failed to mitigate their alleged damages, if any. 
157. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, equitable 
estoppel, and judicial estoppel, and fraud. 
158. Counterclaimants' damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced in that the damages 
sought by Counterclaimants' could have been avoided if Counterclaimants had acted reasonably 
prior to filing their counterclaim. 
159. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by the 
doctrine of unclean hands. 
160. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. 
161. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
162. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
163. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
164. Some or all of Counterclaimants' claims are barred because they should have been 
raised in the pending Canyon County lawsuit, CV 2009-11855. 
165. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, 
including but not limited to, Idaho Code§§ 5-216, 5-217, 5-219, 5-222, 5-224. 
166. Counterclaimants' claims are barred or reduced by Counterclaimants' own breach 
of the subject agreements which are alleged to have been entered into. 
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167. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred by the failure of 
Counterclaimants to substantially perform the terms of the alleged agreements. 
168. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by a failure to provide the consideration 
which forms the basis of certain of the agreements at issue. 
169. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
170. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to post an undertaking required 
by Idaho Code§ 8-303. 
1 71. This action has just commenced and discovery has not yet taken place. 
Counterdefendants reserve the right to amend, modify and supplement their affirmative defenses as 
the action progresses. 
IV. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Counterdefendants have been required to retain the services of legal counsel to defend this 
action and they are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code§§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
V. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Counterdefendants hereby demand a trial by jury of not fewer than twelve (12) persons. 
VI. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, having fully responded to the Counterclaimants' Counterclaim, 
Counterdefendants pray for judgment against Counterclaimants as follows: 
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1. That Counterclaimants' Counterclaim, and each cause of action and/or claim stated 
therein, be dismissed with prejudice, with Counterclaimants taking nothing thereby. 
2. That the Court award to Counterdefendants their costs and attorney fees incurred herein. 
3. That the Court award to Counterdefendants such other and additional relief as to the 
Court deems just and appropriate. 
VII. 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
Counterdefendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs further allege, as a Third Party Complaint against 
Third-Party Defendants Eugene (Roy) Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, as follows: 
VIII. 
PARTIES 
1. Third-Party Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz is an individual residing in Ada County, Idaho. 
2. Third-Party Plaintiff Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., is a professional limited liability 
corporation with its principal place of business in Ada County, Idaho. 
3. Third-Party Defendant Eugene (Roy) Rice is an individual residing in Ada County, 
Idaho. 
4. Third-Party Defendant Janet Rice is an individual residing in Ada County, Idaho. 
5. Eugene Rice and Janet Rice are, and at all times material hereto were, husband and 
wife, and the marital community comprised thereof resides in Ada County, Idaho. 
6. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties, and venue is proper in Ada County, 
Idaho. 
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1. Third-Party Plaintiffs Dennis Sallaz in his representative capacity of Sallaz and Gatewood, 
Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation (hereinafter "Third-Party 
Plaintiffs"), hereby incorporate the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint, together with 
Paragraphs 1 through 171, inclusive, set forth herein. In addition, Third-Party Plaintiffs aver as 
follows: 
2. Third-Party Plaintiffs did, at various times, perform legal services at the request of, and on 
behalf of, Third-Party Defendants and/or their entities. 
3. In exchange for the legal services of Third-Party Plaintiffs, Third-Party Defendants agreed 
that Third-Party Plaintiffs were entitled to compensation and therefore allowed Third-Party 
Plaintiffs to collect a portion of their fees in the form of goods from Third-Party Defendants' former 
business "A Vista Pawn, Inc.". 
4. The above-described exchange covered only a fraction of Third-Party Plaintiffs' fees for 
services rendered. 
5. Third-Party Plaintiffs have never been paid for the balance of its fees owed for the rendition 
of such services, the balance of which is approximately $300,000.00. 
6. Third-Party Plaintiffs are entitled to payment from Third-Party Defendants of all amounts 
currently due and owing plus pre and post judgment interest accruing thereon at the maximum rate 
permitted by Idaho law. 
7. In addition, to the extent, if at all, Third-Party Defendants are entitled to any funds from 
Third-Party Plaintiffs arising out of the Counterclaim, Third-Party Plaintiffs are entitled to a set-off 
against all amounts, if any, owed to Third-Party Defendants. 
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X. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § § 12-120 and 12-121, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Third-Party Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
for the prosecution of this action. 
XI. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Third-Party Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of not fewer than twelve (12) persons. 
XII. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Third-Party Plaintiffs pray for entry of judgment in their favor and 
against Third-Party Defendants as follows: 
1. That Counterclaimants' Counterclaim, and each cause of action and/or claim stated 
therein, be dismissed with prejudice, with Counterclaimants taking nothing thereby. 
2. That Third-Party Plaintiffs be awarded damages for all sums due and owing by 
Third-Party Defendants together with pre and post judgment interest thereon at the maximum rate 
allowed by Idaho law. 
3. That the Court award to Third-Party Plaintiffs their costs and attorney fees incurred 
herein. 
4. That the Court award to Third-Party Plaintiffs such other and additional relief as to 
the Court deems just and appropriate. 
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DATED this ft( day of September, 2011. 
TROUT + JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
By_U;{~ifi~v0-=------------?;;~~---=-~ 
William A. Fuhrman - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Counterdefendants 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
DENNIS SALLAZ, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the Counterdefendant/Third-Party Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. That 
he has read the within and foregoing Verified Reply to Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial, knows the contents thereof, and that the facts therein stated are true 
and accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /Jdaay of September, 2011. 
ff ............ Ol :loi~ 
-;,1181)"~' ,LLt_ · -~ 
••-. ) N~ for{?l 
. ,. -t~.,J.O~ Residing at ~ , Idaho \it'~ ~~ • My Commission Expires /t.2 -,,2/-.:k'JIG 
···,."'*' "Jot \"\~ ~" ,,,, ......... ... 
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' . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this (!f_ day of September, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing document was forwarded by the method indicated and to the following: 
J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Iver J. Longeteig 
Attorney at Law 
5 3 04 Turrett 
Boise, ID 83703 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
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• 
J. KAHLE BECKER (ISB # 7408) 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-1403 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: kahle@kahlebeckerlaw.com 
N0 .. ~-----::~--,."1-J.,_,,,,,,,,.._,.,.....~ 
A.M .. ____ F...rlLE·~- iZZ 
SEP 2 9 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE RANDALL 
DEPUTY 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants and Third-Party Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 













EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband ) 
and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, ) 
Defendants. 




DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD Chtd. and SALLAZ AND 
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DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 














Third-Party Defendants ) 
) 
• 
COMES NOW Third-Party Defendants Eugene (Roy) Rice and Janet Rice, by and 
through their counsel of record, and answer Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows: 
1. Third-Party Defendants deny each and every allegation of Third-Party Plaintiffs' 
Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein. 
PARTIES TO THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
2. Third-Party Defendants admit Paragraph 1 of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
3. With respect to Paragraph 2 of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint, Third-Party 
Defendants admit that Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. is an Idaho business entity however, due to the 
existence of both Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., Inc. as well as Sallaz and Gatewood, PLLC as 
Idaho Business entities Third-Party Defendants are without information sufficient to form an 
opinion as to the truth or veracity thereof and therefore deny the same. 
4. Third-Party Defendants admit paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Third-Party Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
5. Third-Party Defendants incorporate their Answer to the Complaint and their 
allegations in their Counterclaim to the extent a response is deemed necessary to the 
incorporation portion of Paragraph 1 of the General Allegations of Third-Party Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. Third-Party Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of 
the General Allegations of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
6. Third-Party Defendants admit that Third-Party Plaintiffs performed legal services 
for Third-Party Defendants in that Dennis Sallaz was the personal and business attorney for 
Third-Party Defendants and their business entities for approximately 25 years. Third-Party 
Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the General Allegations 
of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
7. Third-Party Defendants admit that Third-Party Plaintiffs performed legal services 
for Third-Party Defendants in that Dennis Sallaz was the personal and business attorney for 
Third-Party Defendants and their business entities for approximately 25 years. Third-Party 
Defendants further admit that Dennis Sallaz, his relatives, agents, and employees took tens of 
thousands of dollars of items from A Vista Pawn, Inc. in a trade out arrangement for legal 
services which were to have been rendered by Dennis Sallaz and, at times, Sallaz and Gatewood, 
Chtd. Third-Party Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of the 
General Allegations of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
8. Third-Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 
7 of the General Allegations of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
9. The Third-Party Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
10. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims for damages, if any, are barred and or/reduced by a 
set-off for various amounts due and owing by Third-Party Plaintiffs to Third-Party Defendants. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
11. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims are barred by application of the doctrines of 
estoppel, equitable quasi-estoppel, judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, res judicata, and fraud. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
12. Plaintiffs claims and damages, if any, are barred or reduced by Third-Party 
Plaintiffs' failure to exercise their duty under Idaho law to mitigate or reduce their damages. In 
asserting this defense, Third-Party Defendants do not admit any fault or responsibility, or that 
Third-Party Plaintiffs have suffered any damages. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
13. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims for damages are barred and/or reduced by the 
doctrine of latches. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
14. Third-Party Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are barred or reduced due to Third-Party 
Plaintiffs' own breach of the agreement to provide legal services to Third-Party Defendants by 
committing the negligent and intentional acts described in the Counterclaim. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
15. Third-Party Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are barred or reduced by the application of 
the doctrine of unclean hands. Specifically, Third-Party Plaintiffs violated several Rules of 
Professional Conduct and committed negligent, fraudulent, and intentional acts described in the 
Counterclaim. 
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EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
16. Third-Party Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are barred or reduced by their own fault, 
negligence, and legal responsibility. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
17. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred or reduced because Third-Party 
Plaintiffs have by their own acts, omissions, or conduct waived whatever rights they may have to 
the fees for legal service they claim. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
18. Third-Party Defendants assert the affirmative defense of in pari delicto, in equal 
fault or wrong. By making this defense Third-Party Defendants do not hereby admit to any 
wrongdoing. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
19. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred or reduced by the doctrine of bad 
faith. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
20. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred or reduced by the applicable 
statutes of limitations contained in Idaho Code§§ 5-216, 5-217, 5-222, and 5-224. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
21. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred by IRCP 13(a) because these 
claims should have been brought in Canyon County Case No. CV 2009-1185. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
22. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred by the doctrine of accord and 
satisfaction. 
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Discovery has just begun in this matter and therefore Third-Party Defendants specifically 
reserve the right to amend their Answer to Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint to assert additional 
affirmative defenses as the same may become known. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Third-Party Defendants have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with defending this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of 
suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 120(3), and 12-
121. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
1. That Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed and held for naught and that 
Third-Party Plaintiffs take nothing; 
2. For an award of Third-Party Defendants' attorney's fees and costs incurred in the 
defense of this action; and, 
3. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and appropriate. 
DATED this ;°f day of September 2011. 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants and 
Third-Party Defendants 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Third-Party Defendants hereby demand, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, that the issues properly triable by a jury be tried before a jury. Third-Party 
Defendants will not stipulate to a trial of less than twelve ( 12) jurors. 
DATED this r;{t day of September 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this _i!__ day of September 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
William Fuhrman 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman & Gourley 
225 N. 9th St., Ste 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Iver J. Longeteig 
5304 Turret 
Boise, ID 83 703 
V. K. Smith 
1900 W. Main 
Boise, ID 83702 
Marcy Fox 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, ID 83 705 
~SMail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
~Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
/us Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
~ail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
HLEBECKER 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
and Third-Party Defendants 
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et«>.~--~---
AJA /a.'() 9 ~.u.J.M .. __ _ 
APR 2 5 2012 
CHRISTOPHEA D. AICH, Clerk 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DENNIS SALLAZ, 
Plaintiff, 





11 EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 





EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 





DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
19 representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD, CHTD., and SALLAZ AND 
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Case No. CVOC 1107253 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL 























CHTD., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
CHTD., INC., an Idaho corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
APPEARANCES 
For Plaintiff: Iver J. Longeteig, Attorney at Law and William Fuhrman of 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
For Third-Party Plaintiffs: William Fuhrman of Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman & Gourley, 
For Defendants: J. Kahle Becker, Attorney at Law 
PROCEEDINGS 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Compel and was 
taken under advisement on March 29, 2012. 
BACKGROUND 
On April 11, 2011, Dennis Sallaz filed a Verified Complaint seeking the return of 
a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado which was repossessed by the Counterclaimants after Mr. 
Sallaz allegedly failed to repay a loan. Attached as "Exhibit A" to the Complaint was a 
23 duplicate title with what is allegedly the signature of Eugene Rice purporting to release 
24 Mr. Rice's lien on the Cadillac. The duplicate title Mr. Sallaz presented also purported 
25 to transfer Mr. Sallaz's interest in the Cadillac to his fiancee, Mary Fox. 
26 



























On April 12, 2011, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause and set a hearing 
for April 29, 2011. At the hearing, Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., Inc. ("Sallaz") were served on the 
record by Defendants' counsel with a counterclaim alleging fraudulent actions and legal 
malpractice associated with Mr. Sallaz's representation of the Counterclaimants ("Rice") 
as their personal and business attorney for approximately 25 years. In particular, 
Defendants alleged: 
(1) That two promissory notes were made by Sallaz to Roy Rice in return 
for a $10,800.00 loan and a $10,000.00 loan; 
(2) That $387,000.00 had been wrongfully withheld from Rice by Sallaz in 
relation to settlement in litigation involving Sallaz, Rents & Royalties, Inc., 
and Steve Sumner in Twin Falls County Case No CV-1988-0096812 and 
that Sallaz had commingled the settlement funds with personal funds by 
allegedly placing them in a bank account belonging to the estate of 
Dennis Sallaz's deceased grandmother; 
(3) That Sallaz was unjustly enriched based on the alleged withholding 
above; 
(4) That Sallaz committed legal malpractice and professional negligence 
related to all of the above and also allegedly engaged in misconduct and 
misrepresentations related to the Real Homes, LLC matter which is being 
litigated in Canyon County; 
(5) That Sallaz committed fraud based upon the above; 
(6) That Sallaz breached the fiduciary duty based upon the above; 
(7) That Sallaz converted two ATVs and an A TV trailer that they 



























purchased from Rice, allegedly never paid Rice for the items, and then 
allegedly sold to third parties. In addition the Rice asserts that a 
Winnebago motor home purchased by Sallaz has allegedly never been 
paid for; 
(8) Claim and delivery for the A TVs; 
(9) Foreclosure of the lien on the Winnebago; 
(10) That Sallaz committed a tortious act with relation to all of the above; 
(11) Violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act with regard to all of 
the above; 
( 12) Quiet title and slander of title claims with regard to the 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado; and 
(13) Punitive damages for all of the above. 
In response, on September 14, 2011, Sallaz filed a Verified Reply to 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, wherein they 
alleged, inter alia: 
(1) that Rice never loaned Sallaz the money referenced by the promissory 
notes; 
(2) that Sallaz did not make misrepresentations, commit fraud, or engage 
in any other illicit conduct; 
(3) that the Sumner settlement proceeds were never due to Rice or their 
entities and that the Sumner litigation instead involved claims by Sallaz 
against Sumner for unpaid legal fees; and 
(4) that Sallaz owed Rice nothing for the ATVs or the Winnebago. 
Moreover, in the same pleading, Sallaz asserted a Third-Party Complaint against 




























Rice for $300,000.00 in compensation due for "legal services at the request of, and on 
behalf of, Third-Party Defendants and/or their entities." They further allege that 
$60,000.00 worth of inventory in Rice' business "A Vista Pawn" was used in a trade-out 
agreement to offset these legal services, but that $300,000.00 still remains due and 
owing from Rice. 
On September 29, 2011, Rice filed an Answer to the Third-Party Complaint, 
where, in addition to denying that such funds were owed, they asserted several statutes 
of limitation as defenses to the Third Party Complaint. 
On February 10, 2012, Rice filed a Motion to Compel, in which they contend that 
Sallaz have failed to provide adequate information and documents responsive to 
discovery requests, including: 
(1) Tax returns for Dennis Sallaz for tax years 2006 to 201 O; 
(2) Tax returns for Sallaz & Gatewood, PLLC, Sallaz Law, Chtd., and 
Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., for all tax years in which each entity 
existed; 
(3) Information regarding ongoing tax litigation between Dennis Sallaz and 
the Internal Revenue Service and/or the Idaho State Tax Commission; 
(4) All accounting records of Sallaz & Gatewood, PLLC, Sallaz Law, Chtd., 
and Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., for all years in which each entity 
existed; 
(5) All corporate documents, partnership agreements, operating 
agreements, corporate minutes, and/or financial reports of Sallaz & 
Gatewood, PLLC, Sallaz Law, Chtd., and Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 
for all years in which each entity existed. 










Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. filed an objection to the Motion to 
Compel, contending that the request for tax, accounting, billing, and corporate 
documents were irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation, already provided to the 
extent that they relate to the subject matter of this litigation, contain privileged material 
concerning other clients of Sallaz and Gatewood, and are otherwise confidential and 
proprietary to Sallaz and Gatewood. 
LEGAL STANDARD 












to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is discoverable. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). 
Information is considered relevant for discovery purposes if it relates to the claim or 
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party. Id. 
Under I.R.C.P. 34, a party may only request documents to be produced by another 
party if they are in the possession, custody, or control of that party. If a party fails to 
respond to a discovery request submitted under I.R.C.P. 33 or 34, the discovering party 
may move for an order compelling a response. See I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). The motion must 
certify that the discovering party has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with 
the other party in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. Id. Trial courts 







v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697,700,116 P.3d 27, 30 (2005) (citations omitted). 
If a court grants or denies a motion to compel, it shall, after opportunity for a 
hearing, require the compelled party or the opposing party, whichever is applicable, to 
pay reasonable expenses associated with the motion, unless the court finds that the 
bringing of or opposition to the motion, whichever is applicable, was substantially 
26 justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. I.R.C.P. 
















37(a)(4). If a court grants a motion in part and denies it in part, the court may apportion 
the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and 
persons in a just manner. Id. 
DISCUSSION 
From the Third-Party Complaint and the Answer and Counterclaims filed in this 
action before the Court, it is apparent that two of the central issues present in this 
litigation are disputes over (1): whether $300,000.00 is owed to Sallaz by Rice for past 
legal services rendered by Sallaz to other individuals at the bequest of Roy Rice 
Verified Answer to Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint; and (2) whether Sallaz 
misappropriated $387,000.00 in funds owing to Rice or one of their controlled entities 
as a result of a settlement reached between parties in Twin Falls County Case No. CV-
1988-0096812. 
The Court will first note that it finds information related to Twin Falls County Case 
No. CV-1988-0096812 to be relevant to the subject of this litigation. In support of 








Court, namely: (1) the caption of Twin Falls County Case No. CV-1988-0096812 which 
includes Rents & Royalties, Inc; (2) documentation that Rice, at one point in time, had 
some interest in R-R Investments, Inc. before its name changed to Rents & Royalties, 
Inc; and (3) purported settlement instructions and a confidentiality agreement with 
names of parties involved in Twin Falls County Case No. CV-1988-0096812 wherein 
Dennis Sallaz appeared to be acting not only in his individual capacity but also on 
24 behalf of Rents & Royalties, Inc. Though perhaps the latter instructions and 
25 confidentiality agreement are not admissible in their present form, they satisfy the Court 
26 that further discovery regarding Twin Falls County Case No. CV-1988-0096812 is 





reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in support of 
Rice' counterclaims in this case. 
As such, Sallaz shall provide any and all documentation and information related 
4 to transactions with and/or representation of Rice or Rents & Royalties, Inc. in Twin 





settlement offers, settlement agreements, checks, ledgers, receipts of settlement funds, 
and documents showing distribution of settlement funds into any accounts, including 
any distributions of settlement proceeds into and out of the bank account of Mr. Sallaz's 


















before May 23, 2012. 
With respect to information related to ongoing or pending tax litigation between 
Mr. Sallaz and the IRS and/or the Idaho State Tax Commission, the Court will find that 
any and all documents or statements transmitted to or received by the IRS and/or the 
Idaho State Tax Commission in Sallaz' possession, control, or access that specifically 
reference representation or settlement proceeds arising out of litigation in Twin Falls 
County Case No. CV-1988-0096812 and/or that reference any amounts owed to or by 
Rice or any of their entities are relevant, discoverable, and shall be disclosed to Rice 
before May 23, 2012. The Court will find that any other information related to ongoing 
or pending tax litigation involving Mr. Sallaz is irrelevant to the subject matter of this 
litigation and will decline to compel further disclosure. 
The Court will now address Rice's request for all accounting records and 
corporate documents related to the third-party claim for $300,000.00. At hearing, 
Sallaz replied that all billing invoices and statements supporting their claim for 
$300,000.00 against Rice have been disclosed. Rice, in turn, seeks the disclosure of 










all accounting documents, corporate documents, and tax records for the purpose of 
showing that the third-party claim for $300,000.00 is unsubstantiated. At hearing, the 
Court inquired as to whether any billings or documents before 2011 related to the 
Sallaz' third party complaint have been provided, and counsel for Rice affirmed that 
they had not been disclosed. The Court will accept, at present, Sallaz' representations 
that the 2011 billing records previously disclosed are the only such documentation in 
existence that support the third-party claim. The Court also finds that the corporate 



















financial reports are generally irrelevant to the claims and defenses present in this 
action and will not compel Defendants to provide such documentation. 
Provided, however, should Sallaz find any other billing records, timesheets, or 
other internal documents that explicitly reference either the amount of time spent, costs 
expended, or fees calculated with respect to "legal services at the request of, and on 
behalf of, Third-Party Defendants and/or their entities" in support of their third-party 
claim, such information shall be provided to Rice no later than May 23, 2012. Any such 
documentation not disclosed before said time will be barred from admission on 
introduction by Sallaz at trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(b). Moreover, the Court takes 
Sallaz' concern over privileged materials of other clients seriously; therefore, such 
information will be redacted to exclude any specific substance of conversations, 
arguments, strategies, or opinions between Sallaz and clients other than Rice or any 
entities they hold an interest in. 
As for tax returns of both the law firm entities and Mr. Sallaz, the Court will find 
that any separate schedules or statements which set forth sums or accounts claimed in 
support of Counterdefendant's third-party claim and any schedules or statements which 



























set forth amounts or information regarding Twin Falls County Case No. CV-1988-
0096812 and any settlement proceeds thereof shall be disclosed to Rice no later than 
May 23, 2012. Any such documentation not disclosed before said time will be barred 
from admission on introduction by Sallaz at trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(b). Beyond 
said schedules or statements, the Court will find other portions of Sallaz' tax returns 
irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and will decline to compel production of 
those portions. 
The Court will also reserve further sanctions as it deems appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
As outlined above, the Court GRANTS the Defendants' Motion to Compel in part 
and DENIES in part. Of particular concern to the Court is the appearance that Sallaz 
have been less than forthright in their representations regarding the relevance of Twin 
Falls County Case No. CV-1988-0096812. However, the Court will also note that many 
of the materials sought by Rice in their discovery requests are irrelevant to the subject 
matter of this action. Therefore, the Court finds it appropriate and just that each party 
bear their respective costs and attorney fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) in addressing 
this Motion to Compel. 
DATED this ). Jday of April 2012. 
MICHAEL McLAUGHLIN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






EUGENE (ROY) RlCE and JANET RlCE, ) 




EUGENE (ROY) RlCE and JANET RICE, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
Counterclaiman~, 
-vs-
DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in 
his representative capacity of SALLAZ 
AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., and SALLAZ 















Case No. CV OC 1107253 
MARCY FOX ANSWER 
TO COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW, Marcy Fox, an above-named involuntary plaintiff, hereinafter referred to 
as "Fox", acting Pro Se, and does hereby make Answer to Defendant/Counterclaimant's 
Counterclaim as follows: 
1. Paragraph's} through 10 are admitted. 




2. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge concerning the relationship of 
Dennis sallaz with the Rice's, the structure of the Law Firm, the past legal and business 
dealings between Rice and Sallaz or the Law Firm, or any property exchanges between 
the parties with which to either admit or deny the allegations contained in Paragraph's 11 
through 38, so the same must be denied. 
3. In answering Paragraph 3 9, Fox admits Sallaz possess one or more A TV's but has no 
knowledge as to the make, model or origination source of those vehicles. 
4. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 40 through 73, so the same must be denied. 
5. Paragraph 74 needs no response. 
6. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 75 through 85, so the same must be denied. 
7. Paragraph 86 needs no response. 
8. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 87 through 119, so the same must be denied. 
9. Paragraph 120 needs no response. 
10. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 121 through 123, so the same must be denied. 
11. Paragraph 124 needs no response. 
12. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 125 through 145, so the same must be denied. 
13. Paragraph 146 needs no response. 
14. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
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admit or deny Paragraph's 147 through 153, so the same must be denied. 
15. Paragraph 154 needs no response. 
16. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 155 through 159, so the same must be denied. 
17. Paragraph 160 needs no response. 
18. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 161 through 169, so the same must be denied. 
19. Paragraph 170 needs no response. 
20. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 171 through 177, so the same must be denied. 
21. Paragraph 178 needs no response. 
22. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 179 through 186, so the same must be denied. 
23. Paragraph 187 needs no response. 
24. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 188 through 193, so the same must be denied. 
25. Paragraph 194 need no response. 
26. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 195 through 199, so the same must be denied. 
27. Paragraph 200 needs no response. 
28. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 200 through 209, so the same must be denied. 
29. Paragraph 210 is admitted as to the assignment but the rest and remainder of the 
paragraph is denied. 







Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 211 through 216, so the same must be denied. 
Paragraph 217 needs no response. 
Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 218 through 226, so the same must be denied. 
33. Paragraph 227 is admitted as to the assignment but the rest and remainder of the 
paragraph is denied. 
34. Fox is without sufficient information and/or knowledge and belief with which to either 
admit or deny Paragraph's 228 through 234, so the same must be denied. 
WHEREFORE, Marcy Fox prays for relief as follows 
A. That the Counterclaim be dismissed in its entirety and Counterclairnant's be granted no 
relief thereby. 
B. For such further and additional relief as the court deems just and proper. 
DATED this a.~y of June, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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" I • 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this,2g day of June, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing upon the following individuals by the method indicated below: 
Kahle J. Becker 
The Alaska Center 
1020 W. Main St., Suite 400 
Boise, ID 8~5 
~S. Mail -postage prepaid 
D Email to kahle@kahlebeckerlaw.com 
D Facsimile: 343-3246 
William Fuhrman 
Trout Jones Gledhill et al 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
~ Mail - postage prepaid 
D Email to bfuhrman@idalaw.com 
D Facsimile: 3 31-1529 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
~ Mail - postage prepaid 
D Email to vls59@live.com 
D Facsimile: 345-1129 
Iver J. Longeteig 
5304 Turret 
Boise, ID 83703 
~ Mail - postage prepaid 
D Email to: ILONGTEIG@GMAIL.COM 
D Facsimile:424-6972 
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• • NO·----------A.M ____ ~:...Ju"J.M ~:i' ~ 
JUL 2 5 2012 
CHRISTOPHER 0. FtlCH, Clerk 
By SHAR"i ABBOTT 
DEPUTY 
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DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
19 representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD, CHTD., and SALLAZ AND 







25 DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
ca acit of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
26 
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PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
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TO AMEND SCHEDULING 
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APPEARANCES 
For Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third-Party Defendants: 
J. Kahle Becker, Attorney at Law and Gabriel McCarthy, Attorney at Law 
For Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz: 
Vernon K. Smith, Attorney at Law and Iver J. Longeteig, Attorney at Law 
For Counterdefendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Sallaz And Gatewood, Chtd., Inc.: 
William Furhman and Erika Judd, Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley 













This matter initially came before the Court on June 28, 2012 regarding: (1) 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third-Party Defendants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice's 
("Rice's") Motion to Amend Counterclaim, For Dismissal Of Quiet Title & Slander Of 
Title Claims Or Alternatively To Dismiss Third Party Complaint; (2) Rices' First Motion 
for Sanctions; (3) Plaintiff/Counterdefendants/Third-Party Plaintiff's ("Sallaz") Motion 
For Leave to File Over length Brief; (4) Rices' Motion to Take Judicial Notice of 


















Affidavit of Eugene Rice; (6) Sallaz's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Skye Hallett; (7) 
Sallaz's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Tim Birkle; (8) Sallaz's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; (9) Rices' Motion For Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Damages; (10) 
Sallaz's Motion to Continue Trial; (11) Rices' Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. 
At hearing, the Court granted Sallaz's Motion for Leave to File Over Length Brief 
and simultaneously granted leave for Rice's over length response brief in opposition to 
Sallaz's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court further granted Rices' Motion to 
Amend Counterclaim, For Dismissal Of Quiet Title & Slander Of Title Claims Or 
Alternatively To Dismiss Third Party Complaint in part by allowing the addition of a 
claim for unjust enrichment claim arising out of an alleged open account at A Vista 
Pawn, one of Rices' businesses and a civil racketeering claim pursuant to I.C. § 18-
7805. The Court then heard and orally granted Sallaz's Motion to Continue Trial based 
upon the additional claims Rices included in their proposed Amended Counterclaim. As 
a result of that ruling and in light of service issues concerning the motions to strike, the 
Court orally vacated the hearing on Sallaz's Motion for Summary Judgment, Sallaz's 











Motion to Strike Affidavit of Eugene Rice, Sallaz's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Skye 
Hallett, Sallaz's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Tim Birkle, and Rices' Motion to Amend 
Scheduling Order. At conclusion of the hearing, the Court took Rices' First Motion for 
Sanctions, Rices' Motion for Leave to Add Claims For Punitive Damages, and Rices' 
Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Pleadings and Exhibits From Sallaz v Sallaz Divorce 
under advisement. 
BACKGROUND 
The following facts are undisputed before the Court. Dennis Sallaz and Roy 


















friendship, Sallaz, an attorney presently practicing at Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., 
provided legal services at the request of, or on behalf of, Mr. Rice and his family, 
friends, employees, and businesses. Mr. and Mrs. Rice at times served as corporate 
officers in several entities in which Sallaz was also involved with, including R-R 
Investments, Inc. Among other business enterprise, Roy Rice and his wife, Janet Rice, 
were shareholders in A Vista Pawn, Inc. Prior to its dissolution in 2004, Sallaz 
maintained an open account with A Vista Pawn, Inc. It is alleged that pursuant to an 
agreement between Rice and Sallaz, Sallaz could offset amounts owing to A Vista 
Pawn through legal services provided by Sallaz. However, on or around 2003, Rice 
sold the pawn shop businesses to a third-party, GNP Properties of Idaho, LLC and/or 
GNP of Idaho, Inc. 
In 2004, Sallaz and his ex-wife, Renee Baird ("Baird") commenced divorce 
proceedings in Ada County Case No CV-DR-04-01075M. The divorce matter was 
litigated over the course of three years and was highly contentious. During the course 
of the divorce proceedings, the community ownership interest in Real Homes, LLC, an 




























entity formed in 2001, was a significant point of contention between Sallaz and Baird. 
Real Homes, LLC, owned several parcels of real property and was a relatively 
substantial asset in the divorce. Sallaz argued that the community had only a 50% 
interest in the entity and its assets and liabilities, together with Glen Trefren, who 
allegedly owned the other 50% interest. 
In the middle of the trial proceedings, prior to the Court's entry of findings, and 
one day before foreclosure on the real property owned by Real Homes, LLC by Saxton 
Farms, Real Homes LLC was sold to Real Properties, LLC on January 6, 2006. Real 
Properties, LLC was formed by Dennis Sallaz on January 4, 2006 and had Roy and 
Janet Rice as members thereof. Dennis Sallaz also drafted all of the purchase and 
sale documents for Rice's signature on behalf of Real Properties, LLC. The Purchase 
and Sale Agreement contained warranties that Real Homes, LLC, through Sallaz and 
Trefen, had authority, right, and title to convey the real property to Real Properties, LLC. 
On July 25, 2006, Baird filed a lis pendens with the Canyon County Recorder 
against two properties purportedly conveyed to Real Properties, LLC. Thereafter, in its 
findings issued on or about October 30, 2007, the court held that the marital community 
owned a 100% interest in Real Homes, LLC. 
Sometime in late 2008 or early 2009, Roy Rice, after making substantial 
improvements to the real property, received a copy of the divorce judgment declaring 
the marital community's 100% ownership interest in Real Homes, LLC. Rice 
approached Sallaz concerning the divorce decree and the problems arising from the lis 
pendens. At or around that same time, Sallaz encouraged the Rices to file a quiet title 
action against the lis pendens naming Sallaz, Trefen, and Baird as defendants. Sallaz 
also referred Rice to John L. Runft to represent Rice in the quiet title action. Runft 

























accepted the Rices as clients and associated J. Kahle Becker, current counsel for 
Rices, to assist with the case. 
On November 6, 2009, the Rices, Real Homes, LLC, and Real Properties LLC 
filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Quiet Title, and Unjust Enrichment and 
Alternative Complaint for Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment against Renee 
Baird, Dennis Sallaz, Glenn Trefren, and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, 
LLC in Canyon County Case No. CV2009-11855. The Canyon County matter is still 
pending against all parties other than Renee Baird. Sometime in 2010, Renee Baird 
reached settlement of claims between her and the Rices, wherein Baird allegedly 
informed the Rices of wrongful conduct committed against them by Sallaz over the 
course of many years. 
Also during the divorce proceedings, an issue was made over character of funds 
obtained by Sallaz in the settlement of the matter entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves 
Inc., v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, initially filed in Twin Falls County but 
transferred to Ada County, Case No. 96812 (hereinafter, the "Sumner Matter"). In that 
case, Sallaz and Sallaz Doolittle Chtd., were named as Defendants and subsequently 
became Cross-claimants in a claim against Steve Sumner for past-due legal fees. The 
Sumner Matter also involved a business entity known as Rentals and Royalties, Inc., 
which was, in fact, the same entity formerly known as R-R Investments, Inc. During the 
Sumner Matter, Wilbur Fifer purported to own or manage the affairs of Rentals and 
Royalties, Inc. as its President. Following seven years of litigation, on May 25, 2000, 
24 the court issued its Memorandum Opinion upon the parties' cross-motions for summary 
25 judgment. The case was ultimately resolved by settlement and a settlement stipulation 
26 was filed with the court. Discovery in this matter also yielded a letter purportedly from 
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Sallaz to Vernon K. Smith, who represented Sumner in the Sumner Matter regarding 

























I am very happy that you were able to arrange the Sawtooth take 
out financing and the agreement you have worked out with Runft for all 
Defendants is fine with me, subject to confirmation of the confirmation of 
the following terms: 
(2) That the balance due on the Roy Rice/Sumner loan be 
specifically included in the payment in the above Defendants' Settlement 
Agreement. 
Roy Rice contends that he gave Sallaz money to lend to Steve Sumner and that, 
in return, Sallaz drafted stock certificates in Capital Broadcasting, Inc. and Western 
Broadcasting, Inc. In the Canyon County case, counsel for Rice obtained a file dated 
September 12, 1994 which had the initials DJS on the file and purported to involve Roy 
. . : . - . -
RiceNista Pawn in connection with a loan to Steve Sumner. The file contained alleged 
stock certificates in Capital Broadcasting, Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. 
In 2005, Dennis Sallaz received somewhere between $360,000.00 and 
$390,000.00 from the Sumner settlement. Thereafter, Dennis Sallaz deposited the 
sums into a checking account belonging to his grandmother's estate, allegedly as 
repayment for funds that Sallaz's grandmother had expended for medical treatment of 
Sallaz's son, who died years ago in a battle with cancer. Rice contends that at least 
some of the $360,000 to $390,000 received from the Sumner Matter properly belonged 
to him by virtue of the loan to Sumner and Rices' resulting interests in the radio station 
LLCs as well as his interest in Rentals and Royalties, Inc. Rice further contends that 
Sallaz withheld this information from the Rices, alleging that Sallaz assured the Rices 
that he was representing Rices' interest in the Sumner matter and continued to give 
those assurances for years. Rices finally allege that if they did not have an interest in 








the Sumner litigation, Sallaz defrauded Rice's by enticing them to lend money to 
Sumner in exchange for "bogus stock." 
Around the time of Rices' settlement with Renee Baird in the Canyon County 
Case, the relationship between Rices and Sallaz degenerated, and litigation in this 
matter ensued. 
On April 11, 2011, Dennis Sallaz filed a Verified Complaint seeking the return of 




















allegedly failed to repay a loan. Attached as "Exhibit A" to the Complaint was a 
duplicate title with what is allegedly the signature of Eugene Rice purporting to release 
Mr. Rice's lien on the Cadillac. The duplicate title Mr. Sallaz presented also purported 
to transfer Mr. Sallaz's interest in the Cadillac to his fiancee, Mary Fox. 
On April 12, 2011, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause and set a hearing 
for April 29, 2011. At the hearing, Sallaz were served on the record by Rices' counsel 
with a counterclaim alleging fraudulent actions and legal malpractice associated with 
Mr. Sallaz's representation of Rices as their personal and business attorney for 
approximately 25 years. In particular, Defendants alleged: 
(1) That two promissory notes were made by Sallaz to Roy Rice in return for a 
$10,800.00 loan and a $10,000.00 loan; 
(2) That $387,000.00 had been wrongfully withheld from Rice by Sallaz in 
relation to settlement in litigation involving Sallaz, Rents & Royalties, Inc., and Steve 
Sumner in Twin Falls County Case No CV-1988-0096812 and that Sallaz had 
commingled the settlement funds with personal funds by allegedly placing them in a 
bank account belonging to the estate of Dennis Sallaz's deceased grandmother; 
(3) That Sallaz was unjustly enriched based on the alleged withholding above; 










(4) That Sallaz committed legal malpractice and professional negligence related 
to all of the above and also allegedly engaged in misconduct and misrepresentations 
related to the Real Homes, LLC matter which is being litigated in Canyon County; 
(5) That Sallaz committed fraud based upon the above; 
(6) That Sallaz breached the fiduciary duty based upon the above; 
(7) That Sallaz converted two A TVs and an ATV trailer that they purchased from 
Rice, allegedly never paid Rice for the items, and then allegedly sold to third parties. In 
addition the Rice asserts that a Winnebago motor home purchased by Sallaz has 
9 


















(8) Claim and delivery for the ATVs; 
(9) Foreclosure of the lien on the Winnebago; 
(10) That Sallaz committed a tortious act with relation to all of the above; 
(11) Violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act with regard to all of the 
above; 
( 12) Quiet title and slander of title claims with regard to the 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado; and 
( 13) Reserving a request for punitive damages for all of the above. 
In response, on September 14, 2011, Sallaz filed a Verified Reply to 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, wherein they 
alleged, inter alia: 
(1) that Rice's never loaned Sallaz the money referenced by the promissory 
notes; 
(2) that Sallaz did not make misrepresentations, commit fraud, or engage in any 
other illicit conduct; 














(3) that the Sumner settlement proceeds were never due to Rices or their entities 
and that the Sumner litigation instead involved claims by Sallaz against Sumner for 
unpaid legal fees; and 
(4) that Sallaz owed Rice's nothing for the ATVs or the Winnebago. 
Moreover, in the same pleading, Sallaz asserted a Third-Party Complaint against 
Rice's for $300,000.00 in compensation due for "legal services at the request of, and on 
behalf of, Third-Party Defendants and/or their entities." They further allege that 
$60,000.00 worth of inventory in Rices' business "A Vista Pawn" was used in a trade-
out agreement to offset these legal services, but that $300,000.00 still remains due and 
owing from Rice. 
On September 29, 2011, Rices filed an Answer to the Third-Party Complaint, 










of limitation as defenses to the Third Party Complaint. 
On February 10, 2012, Rices filed a Motion to Compel, in which they contend 
that Sallaz have failed to provide adequate information and documents responsive to 
discovery requests, including: 
(1) Tax returns for Dennis Sallaz for tax years 2006 to 201 O; 
(2) Tax returns for Sallaz & Gatewood, PLLC, Sallaz Law, Chtd., and Sallaz & 
Gatewood, Chtd., for all tax years in which each entity existed; 
(3) Information regarding ongoing tax litigation between Dennis Sallaz and 
23 the Internal Revenue Service and/or the Idaho State Tax Commission; 
24 (4) All accounting records of Sallaz & Gatewood, PLLC, Sallaz Law, Chtd., 
25 and Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., for all years in which each entity existed; 
26 




























(5) All corporate documents, partnership agreements, operating agreements, 
corporate minutes, and/or financial reports of Sallaz & Gatewood, PLLC, Sallaz Law, 
Chtd., and Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., for all years in which each entity existed. 
Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. filed an objection to the Motion to 
Compel, contending that the request for tax, accounting, billing, and corporate 
documents were irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation, already provided to the 
extent that they relate to the subject matter of this litigation, contain privileged material 
concerning other clients of Sallaz and Gatewood, and are otherwise confidential and 
proprietary to Sallaz and Gatewood. 
On April 25, 2012, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision on Rices' Motion to 
Compel granting the motion in part and denying in part. Specifically, the Court ordered 
Sallaz to produce to Rice's before May 23, 2012: 
any and all documentation and information related to transactions 
with and/or representation of Rice or Rents & Royalties, Inc. in Twin Falls 
County Case No. CV-1988-0096812, including, but not limited to, 
pleadings, settlement offers, settlement agreements, checks, ledgers, 
receipts of settlement funds, and documents showing distribution of 
settlement funds into any accounts, including any distributions of 
settlement proceeds into and out of the bank account of Mr. Sallaz's 
grandmother's estate; 
any and all documents or statements transmitted to or received by 
the IRS and/or the Idaho State Tax Commission in Sallaz' 
possession, control, or access that specifically reference representation or 
settlement proceeds arising out of litigation in Twin Falls County Case No. 
CV-1988-0096812 and/or that reference any amounts owed to or by Rice 
or any of their entities; 
any other billing records, timesheets, or other internal documents 
that explicitly reference either the amount of time spent, costs expended, 
or fees calculated with respect to "legal services at the request of, and on 
behalf of, Third-Party Defendants and/or their entities" in support of Sallaz 
& Gatewood's third-party claim; and 
any separate tax schedules or statements which set forth sums or 
accounts claimed in support of Counterdefendant's third-party claim and 




























any schedules or statements which set forth amounts or information 
regarding Twin Falls County Case No. CV-1988-0096812 and any 
settlement proceeds thereof. 
Thereafter, on May 14, 2012, Sallaz filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
wherein Sallaz and his related entities contend that, except for the Promissory Note, 
Quiet Title, and Slander of Title claims, that the statutes of limitations have run on all of 
Rices' remaining claims and that Rices are not the proper parties in interest to seek 
legal malpractice claims against Sallaz for the real property in Canyon County matters. 
Rices, in their Objection, argue that Sallaz fraudulently concealed Rices' damage 
and his own wrongdoing from Rices, thereby giving rise to equitable estoppel of Sallaz 
from asserting statutes of limitation as a defense. Moreover, with regard to the A TV 
and Winnebago related claims, Rices contend that the statute of limitations did not 
begin to run until demand was made upon Sallaz for return of those items to Rices 
possession. Accordingly, Rices contend that their claim and delivery, conversion, and 
foreclosure claims related to the ATVs and Winnebago were timely filed. 
In support of their objection, Rices filed affidavits made by Eugene Rice, Tim 
Birkle, who was involved in purchasing A Vista Pawn from Rice's, and Skye Hallett, a 
former employee of A Vista Pawn. In turn, Sallaz filed motions to strike these affidavits 
from consideration for summary judgment purposes and contended that the affidavits 
were untimely served, were not based on personal knowledge, and contained 
conclusory and hearsay statements. As suggested at hearing, Sallaz's objections to 
the substance of the affidavits are well presented. Moreover, those objections are well 
taken by the Court: serious deficiencies of personal knowledge, lack of pertinent 
specific facts, and hearsay plague these affidavits. However, for reasons mentioned 






above, the Court declined at hearing to hear and decide the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the motions to strike. 
On May 23, 2012, Rices filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Pleadings and 
Exhibits From Sallaz v Sallaz Divorce, where J. Kahle Becker, Rices' counsel, attached 




Dennis Sallaz divorce proceedings and the other two exhibits are excerpts of pleadings 
from that divorce. Sallaz objected, contending that none of the facts stated in the 






On May 23, 2012, Rices filed their Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, wherein 
Rices sought extended deadlines to conduct discovery and submit further motions 
before trial. Sallaz objected, contending that they would suffer undue prejudice from 
such an extension on the eve of trial. At hearing on June 28, 2012, the Court vacated 
14 the original trial date and held that new deadlines would be set at a status hearing 












On May 25, 2012, Rices filed their Motion for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive 
Damages. Sallaz objected, contending that many of the claims upon which punitive 
damages are sought arguably will fail upon summary judgment. 
On June 6, 2012, Rices filed their First Motion for Sanctions, contending that 
Sallaz did not comply with the Court's April 25, 2012 Memorandum Decision compelling 
Sallaz to disclose certain information in tax litigation and checks, ledgers, or other 
documents related to the Sumner matter. Sallaz replied that no tax litigation 
information related to the Sumner matter exists and that documents related to checks, 
ledgers, and account statements are in possession of Jim Bevis, Mr. Sallaz's divorce 
attorney, who refuses to release those documents to either Rices or Sallaz. 











On June 13, 2012, Sallaz filed their Motion to Continue Trial, contending that 
many elements of the case remained in flux and development was delayed, including 
an impending Motion by Rices to add more claims to their counterclaim. Rices 
responded that much of the delay was due to the fault of Sallaz and that Eugene Rice's 
poor health necessitated maintaining the original trial date. At hearing on June 28, 
2012, the Court granted the Motion to Continue Trial, finding that the amendment of 
Rices' Counterclaim would unduly prejudice Sallaz if the original trial date were kept. 












Dismissal Of Quiet Title & Slander Of Title Claims Or Alternatively To Dismiss Third 
Party Complaint, wherein they sought to add claims for unjust enrichment and civil 
racketeering, dismiss their Slander of Title and Quiet Title Claims, or in the alternative, 
to have Sallaz's Third-Party Complaint dismissed. At hearing, the Court granted the 
motion in part by allowing the addition of the two claims and additional factual 
allegations but denied dismissal of Rices' Slander of Title and Quiet Title or Sallaz's 
Third-Party Complaint. 
On June 21, 2012, Sallaz filed their Motion for Leave to File Over-Length Brief. 
At hearing on July 28, 2012, the Court granted the motion and additionally granted 










A. Motion to Amend Counterclaim, For Dismissal of Quiet Title & Slander of 
Title Claims or Alternatively To Dismiss Third Party Complaint 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 S(a) provides that leave to amend a pleading 
"shall be freely given when justice so requires." The decision to grant or refuse 










permission to amend is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Stonewall Surplus 
Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 318,324,971 P.2d 1142, 1148 (1998). 
The Court may properly deny a motion to amend where the amendment fails to state a 
valid claim under Idaho law or where an affirmative defense arises on the face of the 
proposed claim. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'/ Bank, 119 
Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991). The Court may also deny leave to amend if 
factors such as undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure 





present. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272-73, 561 P.2d 1299, 1305-
06 (1977). 
B. Motion for Leave to Amend To Add a Claim of Punitive Damages 
13 A claim for punitive damages cannot be asserted in the claimant's pleading 













claimant to amend their pleadings to assert a claim for punitive damages "if, after 
weighing the evidence presented, the court concludes that, the moving party has 
established at such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to 
support an award of punitive damages." Id. 
A trial court's decision that a plaintiff is not entitled to amend the complaint to 
add a claim for punitive damages is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Seiniger, 145 
Idaho at 250, 178 P.3d at 615; Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 122 Idaho 47, 
52, 830 P.2d 1185, 1190 (1992). In determining whether court abused its discretion in 
denying such a motion, the reviewing court considers: "(1) whether the judge correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the judge acted within the outer 
boundaries of his discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 











specific choices available to him; and (3) whether the trial judge reached his decision 
through an exercise of reason." Seiniger, 145 Idaho at 250, 178 P.3d at 615. 
To recover punitive damages, "the claimant must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct by the party against 
whom the claim for punitive damages is asserted." I.C. § 6-1604(1). "Clear and 
convincing" evidence constitutes that level of proof which falls between a 
"preponderance" - that a matter asserted is more likely true than not (IDJI, 1.20.1) -



















a moral certainty that the matter charged is true (ICJI 103 & 103A). The Idaho Civil 
Jury Instructions declare that clear and convincing evidence means that it is "highly 
probable" that the matter asserted is true. (IDJI 1.20.2). See also, In re Adoption of 
Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006) ("Clear and convincing evidence 
is generally understood to be '[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly 
probable or reasonably certain"'). 
"Punitive damages are not favored in the law and should be awarded in only the 
most unusual and compelling circumstances." Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North 
Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 249, 178 P.3d 606, 614 (2008); see also Vaught v. 
Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357, 362, 956 P.2d 674, 679 (1998). A punitive damage 
claim "revolves around whether the plaintiff is able to establish the requisite 'intersection 
of two factors: a bad act and a bad state of mind."' Seiniger, 145 Idaho at 250, 178 P.3d 
at 615 (quoting Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 503, 95 P.3d 977, 
985 (2004)); Linscott v. Rainier Natl. Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 858, 606 P.2d 958, 
962 (1980)). 




An award of punitive damages is warranted if the defendant "acted in a manner 
that was 'an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act 
























consequences."' Seiniger, at 250, 9178 P.3d at 615 (quoting Myers, 140 Idaho at 502, 
95 P.3d at 984); Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661, 
669 (1983)). The mental state that supports a punitive damage award is "an extremely 
harmful state of mind, whether that be termed malice, oppression, fraud or gross 
negligence; malice, oppression, wantonness; or simply deliberate or willful." Seiniger, 
at 250, 9178 P.3d at 615 (quoting Myers, 140 Idaho at 502, 95 P.3d at 984). 
C. Motion to Continue Trial 
A decision whether to grant or deny a motion for a continuance is vested within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 
24, 105 P.3d 676, 684 (2005). The trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 106, 967 P.2d 
702, 720 (1998). Local Rule 9 for the Fourth Judicial District states that the moving 
party show "good cause" in support of vacating or continuing a trial. 
D. Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Other Proceedings 
I.RE. 201 provides in relevant part: 
(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject 
to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned. 
(c) When Discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether 
requested or not. When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, 



























or transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case, the court 
shall identify the specific documents or items that were so noticed. 
(d) When mandatory. When a party makes an oral or written 
request that a court take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts 
from the court file in the same or a separate case, the party shall identify 
the specific documents or items for which the judicial notice is requested 
or shall proffer to the court and serve on all parties copies of such 
documents or items. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information. 
E. Motion for Sanctions 
If a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, the court in which 
the action is pending may order sanctions in regard to the failure as are just and, 
among others, the following: 
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any 
other 
designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the 
action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose 
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against 
the disobedient party; 
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order 
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an 
order to submit to a physical or mental examination. 
I.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(Emphasis added). 
A trial court's response to a request for Rule 37 sanctions is reviewed for a 
manifest abuse of discretion. Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 274 P.3d 
1256 (2012), reh'g denied (Apr. 18, 2012). 




























1. Motion to Amend Counterclaim, For Dismissal Of Quiet Title & Slander Of 
Title Claims Or Alternatively To Dismiss Third Party Complaint 
Because leave to amend is to be freely granted in the interests of justice, the 
Court at hearing granted Rices' Motion to Amend Counterclaim, For Dismissal Of Quiet 
Title & Slander Of Title Claims Or Alternatively To Dismiss Third Party Complaint as it 
relates to the unjust enrichment claim on the Vista Pawn Trade Out Agreement 
currently in Canyon County (provided, however, that any prior or pending adjudications 
on the merits of the unjust enrichment claim in Canyon County Case No. CV-09-11855 
shall be binding upon this Court and further provided that Rice seeks dismissal of the 
unjust enrichment claim immediately upon receipt of the Court's decision). At previous 
hearings, Sallaz has stated that the Third-Party Complaint in this case is really just a 
response to the $60,000.00 unjust enrichment claim in Canyon County. The two claims 
involve many of the same issues of fact, witnesses, and other evidence. As such, 
judicial economy would be served by the addition of the unjust enrichment claim to this 
case and good cause is shown. 
The Court will also allow amendment of the Counterclaim as proposed to reflect 
the more specific factual allegations contained therein. 
Moreover, under the liberal amendment standard, the Court will allow addition of 
the proposed IRICO claim. Because the claim arises out of commonly alleged facts 
and parties to this litigation, justice would be served by allowing the addition of the civil 
racketeering claim. 
2. Motion To Continue Trial 
At hearing, the Court found that, given the allowed amendment of Rices' 
Counterclaim to add other claims, Sallaz has shown good cause to continue the 









present trial date set for August 20, 2012. Specifically, the treble damages of the 
racketeering claim and nature of proving predicate criminal acts and enterprise 
drastically alters the nature, elements, and proof required in the present case. As such, 
Sallaz would be substantially prejudiced by the amendment if the trial date is not 
continued. 
3. Motion for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Damages 
Rices contend that the facts in evidence, particularly as they relate to the 



















Sallaz contends that allowing amendment of the Counterclaim to add a claim for 
punitive damages is contingent upon Rices' allegedly time-barred claims surviving 
summary judgment. Rices responded at hearing that the addition of the civil 
racketeering claim would survive summary judgment and provide a basis for punitive 
damages. 
With the Court vacating hearing for Sallaz's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
presently deciding the Motion for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Damages, especially 
upon claims to be potentially dismissed later, would be impractical at best and an abuse 
of discretion at worst. Accordingly, the Court will deny Rices' Motion for Leave to Add 
Claims for Punitive Damages as unripe, with renewal of the motion subject to 
determination of Sallaz's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
4. First Motion for Sanctions 
Rices essentially contend two violations of the Court's April 25, 2012 
Memorandum Decision, namely: (1) that Sallaz has failed to produce any tax records or 
information disclosed in Sallaz's litigation with the Internal Revenue Service related to 
the Sumner matter and any settlement proceeds thereof; and (2) that Sallaz has failed 










to produce checks, ledgers, account statements, or other financial documents related to 
or concerning the Sumner matter and any settlement proceeds thereof. 
Sallaz contends that they have produced an exhausting amount of discovery to 
Rices and that they directed Rices to Jim Bevis, Mr. Sallaz's divorce attorney, for 
financial information related to the Sumner proceeds, but that Bevis refused to produce 
any documentation due to unpaid legal fees owed by Mr. Sallaz. Further, Sallaz 
contends that there are no tax records, statements, or other information contained in 
the litigation between the Internal Revenue Service and Mr. Sallaz that reference or 


















The Court finds that Sallaz, at least on the evidence before it, has not violated 
the Court's April 25, 2012 Memorandum Decision as it relates to tax records and 
information from litigation with the Internal Revenue Service. The Court's mandate was 
narrowly tailored to compel information related to the Sumner matter. Sallaz's 
attorneys, as officers of the court, have stated that no Sumner matter information was 
included in tax records or in litigation with the IRS. Given that Rices have not come 
forth with any evidence that such information does exist and has not been disclosed, 
the Court cannot sanction Sallaz for failing to disclose specific information without 
evidence that such information exists. 
The same does not hold true, however, for the checks, ledgers, account 
statements, or other financial documents related to or concerning the Sumner matter 
and any settlement proceeds thereof. Rices have produced evidence, and Sallaz 
conceded at hearing, that these documents do exist. Sallaz did not disclose them in a 
timely fashion to Rices pursuant to the Court's April 25, 2012 Memorandum Decision. 
To be frank, Sallaz's contention that his divorce attorney retains possession of those 

























documents and will not release them is a disingenuous and insufficient response to the 
Court's mandated discovery order. Sallaz had ways to access the documents that 
Rices do not and failed to utilize those methods in a timely manner. Accordingly, the 
Court will find that, in this regard, Dennis Sallaz has violated the Court's April 25, 2012 
Memorandum Decision compelling him to produce: 
any and all documentation and information related to transactions 
with and/or representation of Rice or Rents & Royalties, Inc. in Twin Falls 
County Case No. CV-1988-0096812, including, but not limited to, 
pleadings, settlement offers, settlement agreements, checks, ledgers, 
receipts of settlement funds, and documents showing distribution of 
settlement funds into any accounts, including any distributions of 
settlement proceeds into and out of the bank account of Mr. Sallaz's 
grandmother's estate. 
The Court hereby ORDERS that Sallaz shall provide checks, ledgers, receipts of 
settlement funds, and any other previously undisclosed documentation and information 
related to transactions with and/or representation of Rice or Rents & Royalties, Inc. in 
Twin Falls County Case No. CV-1988-0096812 by no later than July 31, 2012. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that Sallaz shall pay to Rices five-hundred ($500.00) as 
compensation for attorney's fees spent in bringing their First Motion For Sanctions. 
Payment shall be made no later than July 31, 2012. 
5. Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Pleadings and Exhibits From Sallaz v 
Sallaz Divorce 
The Court will find that Rices have complied with I.RE. 201 as it pertains to 
Exhibits 2 and 3 to the Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in support of Rices' Motion to Take 
Judicial Notice of Pleadings and Exhibits From Sallaz v Sallaz Divorce. Provided, 
however, judicial notice is not given to the facts asserted in the pleadings, but rather 
25 that the pleadings were filed and contained the statements made therein on behalf of 
26 Mr. Sallaz. 

















The Court will not, however, take judicial notice of the exhibit list provided to the 
Court for the purpose of taking judicial notice of the exhibits themselves. The 
information provided to the Court by Rice's concerning the exhibits is insufficient under 
I.R.E. 201 for the Court to warrant notice of the exhibits themselves, Rice's have a 
public right to inspect and later produce the exhibits contained in the Sallaz v. Sallaz 
divorce. Moreover, the Court will remind counsel for Rice's that not every exhibit need 
be copied from the· file, thus reducing the expense and burden upon Rice's. 
CONCLUSION 
As noted herein, the Court previously granted Sallaz's Motion For Leave to File 
Over length Brief, Rices' Motion to Amend Counterclaim, For Dismissal Of Quiet Title & 
Slander Of Title Claims Or Alternatively To Dismiss Third Party Complaint, and Sallaz's 
Motion to Continue Trial. At hearing, the Court further denied Rices' Motion to Amend 
Scheduling Order and vacated hearing on Sallaz's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Sallaz's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Eugene Rice, Sallaz's Motion to Strike the 











The Court will presently DENY Rices' Motion for Leave to Add Claims for 
Punitive Damages, granting Rices' leave to renew their motion after determination of 
Sallaz's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will GRANT Rices' First Motion for 
Sanctions. The Court will GRANT Rices' Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Pleadings 
and Exhibits From Sallaz v. Sallaz Divorce in part and DENY in part. 
DATED this /)day of July 2012. 
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EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, 
Defendants. 




DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD Chtd. and SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
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DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative ) 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD ) 
Chtd. and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, ) 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 




EUGENE (Roy) RICE and JANET RICE, ) 
Husband and wife, ) 
) 





COMES NOW Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, (hereafter 
"Counterclaimants"), by and through their counsel of record, J. Kahle Becker, and 
Gabriel McCarthy, and hereby state and allege the following in support of their amended 
Counterclaim. 
PARTIES 
1. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is an individual residing at 2679 Palouse, 
Boise, ID 83705. 
2. Counterclaimant Janet Rice is an individual residing at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 
83705. 
3. Eugene and Janet Rice are husband and wife and the marital estate of 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice resides at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 
83705. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 2 
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4. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is an individual 
residing at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
5. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered is 
an Idaho S-Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. 
Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
6. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is an individual 
who was a representative of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered, an Idaho S-
Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, 
ID 83705. 
7. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is the Personal 
Representative of and Attorney for the estate of his deceased grandmother, Bessie 
B. Matcham. 
8. Upon information and belief, Marcy Fox is an individual who was made an 
involuntary plaintiff by order of this Court and is residing at 1000 S. Roosevelt 
St., Boise, ID 83705. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
9. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the above named Counterdefendants 
pursuant to I.C. § 5-514 and other applicable laws and rules. 
10. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to and by 
virtue of Idaho Code § 1-705 and other applicable laws and rules. The damages 
herein exceed $50,000. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 3 
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11. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404, venue is proper in Ada County since all of the 
parties reside therein. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
12. Dennis Sallaz was Counterclaimants' Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice's 
personal and business attorney for approximately 25 years. 
13. Dennis Sallaz owns 90% of the interest in Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
14. Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. was Counterclaimants' Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet 
Rice's personal and business attorney since it was founded in 2003. 
15. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis 
Sallaz. 
16. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. 
17. Dennis Sallaz formed many business entities on behalf of Counterclaimants Roy 
and Janet Rice including but not limited to: R-R Investments, Inc., Capital 
Broadcasting, Inc., Western Broadcasting, Inc., New Communications, Inc., Far 
Less Auto Rental, Inc., A Fantasy Limos, Inc., B B Auto Sales and Repairs, Inc., 
Aztec Precast, Inc., Ultimate Arms, Inc., Luxury, Inc., Clearwire Wireless 
Communications, Inc., Advanced Technology Systems, Inc., and Real Properties, 
LLC. 
18. Counterdefendants Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood represented some of these and 
other entities as well as Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice in litigation as well 
as many personal and business transactions. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 4 
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19. To Counterclaimants acknowledge there has never been a formal engagement 
letter between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
20. Counterclaimants have been billed by Counterdefendants for legal services and 
Counterclaimants have paid said bills. 
21. Counterclaimants have also allowed Counterdefendants and their agents to take in 
excess of $61,000 worth of items from Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice's 
former business "A Vista Pawn." 
22. Said items were to serve as a retainer in the event legal services were ever 
required from Counterdefendants for Roy Rice or his business entities. 
23. Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were married on July 4, 1996. 
24. Real Homes, L.L.C. was formed on January 19, 2001. A copy of the Articles of 
Organization filed with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State on January 19, 
2001 is attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and a copy of the Operating Agreement is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit B." 
25. Dennis Sallaz's then wife, Renee Baird, was listed as a manager of Real Homes, 
L.L.C. in the Articles of Organization filed on January 19, 2001 and in the 
Operating Agreement. 
26. Renee Baird moved out of the Sallaz residence in August of 2003. 
27. On September 12, 2003, Dennis Sallaz filed Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State for Real Homes, 
L.L.C. stating that management was henceforth vested in members and that 
Dennis J. Sallaz was a manager and member/owner. A copy of the Amended and 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 5 
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Restated Articles of Organization filed with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of 
State on September 12, 2003, is attached hereto as "Exhibit C." 
28. Renee Baird did not sign or approve the Amendment to the Articles referred to in 
preceding paragraph. 
29. Dennis Sallaz signed documents as an owner and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
30. Glenn Trefren is a longtime friend of Dennis Sallaz, client of Dennis Sallaz, and 
client of Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. 
31. Throughout the existence of Real Homes, L.L.C., until its conveyance to Real 
Properties, LLC on January 6, 2006, Glenn Trefren signed documents as an owner 
and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
32. Glenn Trefren had no ownership interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. or in any assets 
thereof. 
33. Throughout the existence of Real Homes, L.L.C., until 2005, Renee Baird signed 
documents as an owner and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
34. On February rci;: 2004 Real Homes, L.L.C. conveyed 15584 Riverside Rd, 
Canyon County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz, husband and wife for $105,000. 
The alleged purpose of this conveyance, as explained to Counterclaimants, was to 
enable the Sallazes as title holders to obtain a loan using the property as collateral 
on the understanding that the proceeds would be used to improve and benefit the 
property. The promise to use the proceeds allegedly was the consideration for the 
conveyance. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 6 
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35. Renee Baird signed the quitclaim deed, which conveyed 15584 Riverside Rd, 
Canyon County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz, as President of Real Homes, 
L.L.C. 
36. The petition for the divorce of Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird was filed on May 
27, 2004. 
37. During the Divorce proceedings, Dennis Sallaz was in need of money. 
38. Dennis Sallaz withdrew approximately $65,000 from the Real Homes checking 
account and placed some of this money in his or Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd.' s 
trust account. 
39. Dennis Sallaz executed two promissory notes with Counterclaimant Roy Rice for 
$10,000 and $10,800 at 12% interest. Those promissory notes are attached hereto 
as "Exhibit D" and "Exhibit E." 
40. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 
2002 Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an ATV trailer which are owned by 
Counterclaimants. The Bill of Sale for said ATV' s and ATV trailer is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit F." 
41. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said A TVs and A TV 
trailer to Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz, pp. 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
42. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz owned a Winnebago Motorhome VIN 
1GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien 
holder on. A copy of the title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit 
H." 
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43. Dennis Sallaz used his position as Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" and Janet 
Rice's longtime personal and business attorney to influence and induce 
Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice to enter into a business transaction for the 
purchase of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
44. Defendant Sallaz did not inform Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice that they 
should obtain independent legal counsel. 
45. In the course and scope of the attorney client relationship with Counterclaimants, 
Dennis Sallaz created an entity which became "Real Properties, LLC" as a vehicle 
for Counterclaimants to purchase "Real Homes, L.L.C." 
46. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants that Renee Baird had not 
approved the September 12, 2003 Amended and Restated Articles of Organization 
for Real Homes, L.L.C. 
47. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants of Renee Baird's interest in 
Real Homes, L.L.C. or the assets thereof. 
48. Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated January 6, 2006 and the 
Representations of Counterdefendants, Counterclaimants believed they purchased 
100% of the rights, title, and interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. for $250,000 by way 
of their interest in Real Properties, LLC. The Purchase and Sale Agreement is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit I" and lists the real property purportedly transferred in 
an attachment thereto. 
49. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
purportedly on behalf of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
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50. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz represented and warranted to Counterclaimant 
that they had full authority to transfer the ownership and assets of Real Homes, 
L.L.C. to Real Properties, LLC in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
51. One of the parcels listed as an asset of Real Homes, L.L.C. in the Purchase and 
Sale Agreement was 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID. 
52. Dennis Sallaz represented to Counterclaimants that title to 15584 Riverside Rd, 
Canyon County, ID reverted to Real Homes, L.L.C. upon the filing of the deed of 
trust securing the loan described above and that Real Homes owned said property 
at the time of the sale to Real Properties, LLC on January 6, 2006. 
53. Based on the representations of Dennis Sallaz, Counterclaimant Eugene Rice 
believed he purchased 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID in addition to 
other properties described in the attachment to the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
"Exhibit I," when the entity Dennis Sallaz created for Counterclaimants, "Real 
Properties, LLC," purchased "Real Homes, LLC" on January 6, 2006. 
54. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz warranted to Counterclaimants that Real Homes, 
L.L.C. had title to and full authority to transfer the ownership of 15584 Riverside 
Rd, Canyon County, ID in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
55. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Counterclaimants, through Real 
Properties, LLC, expended $63,402.82 to extinguish the debt owing on 15580 
Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID and prevent a foreclosure sale of the same. 
56. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Counterclaimant Eugene Rice 
made an advance payment to Dennis Sallaz in the sum of $5,000 at closing. 
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57. Counterclaimants, through Real Properties, LLC, expended in excess of $140,000 
which funds were to be utilized in maintaining and improving the subject 
properties. 
58. On October 30, 2007 Magistrate Judge David C. Epis issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in Renee L. Baird-Sallaz v. Dennis J. Sallaz, Ada 
Co. Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order is attached hereto as "Exhibit J." 
59. The Order declared that Renee Baird owned 100% of Real Homes, L.L.C. and 
neither Dennis Sallaz or Glenn Trefren had authority to transfer the Real Homes, 
L.L.C. or, consequently, any assets thereof to Real Properties, LLC. Id 
60. Dennis Sallaz did not inform Counterclaimants of this Order. 
61. The Order created a cloud on the title of the properties purportedly transferred to 
Counterclaimants via their ownership of Real Properties, LLC. 
62. Counterclaimants found out there were some issues with the Real Homes, 
L.L.C./Real Properties, LLC transaction when they obtained The Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on their own. 
63. At the urging of Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz and based on his representations 
that, Judge Epis misconstrued the Real Homes, L.L.C./Real Properties, LLC 
transaction and that Renee Baird had no interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. or the 
assets thereof, on November 4, 2009 Eugene and Janet Rice filed an action to 
quiet title, seek declaratory relief, and pursue other causes of action in what 
became known as Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
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64. Based on the attorney client relationship that existed between Dennis Sallaz and 
Roy Rice, Roy Rice interpreted these conversations as Dennis Sallaz was 
providing legal advice to him in the course and scope of his attorney client 
relationship with Counterdefendants. 
65. Roy Rice relied on Dennis Sallaz's representations regarding the Real 
Homes/Real Properties transaction and Mr. Sallaz's representation that Judge Epis 
had ruled improperly by awarding Real Homes, L.L.C. and the subject properties 
to Renee Baird. 
66. Dennis Sallaz, Renee Baird, and Glenn Trefren were named as Defendants in 
Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855 and were represented by independent 
counsel. 
67. Dennis Sallaz was included as a defendant at his insistence that the marital 
community of Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were necessary parties to quiet title 
to the subject real estate. 
68. During the course of discovery, Roy Rice, learned that Mr. Sallaz was providing 
inaccurate information regarding the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction. 
69. On or about August 2, 2010, Renee Baird and Eugene and Janet Rice settled all 
claims which existed between them by and through the Mutual Release and 
Settlement Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit K." 
70. Pursuant to the settlement reached between the parties thereto, title to the 
Riverside parcels and 714 Smith were quieted. 
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71. During settlement conversations Counterclaimants had with Renee Baird, in the 
summer of 2010, the Rices learned of fraudulent, malicious, negligent, and 
wrongful acts of Counterdefendants. 
72. Mrs. Baird provided Mr. Rice with copies of the transcripts of Mr. Sallaz's 
testimony from depositions in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce which alerted Mr. Rice 
to the wrongful actions of Counterdefendants described herein. 
73. Thereafter, Counterclaimants began investigating the actions of 
Counterdefendants with respect to the Real Homes L.L.C./Real Properties LLC 
transaction described above as well as other matters associated with their 
relationship with Counterdefendants. 
74. Counterclaimants learned that Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and 
fraudulently withheld information relevant to Counterdefendants' deceitful and 
fraudulent "legal representation" of Counterclaimants. 
75. Counterdefendants continue to conceal, misrepresent, and fraudulently withhold 
information relevant to their deceitful and fraudulent "legal representation" of 
Counterclaimants. 
76. Dennis Sallaz was unhappy with the settlement reached between 
Counterclaimants and Renee Baird in the Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
77. Dennis Sallaz assigned his interest in the Real Homes Real Properties contract to 
Jim Bevis (Mr. Sallaz's attorney from his divorce) and Glenn Trefren. See 
Assignment of Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC 
attached hereto as "Exhibit L" and "Exhibit M." 
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78. Dennis Sallaz continues to litigate Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855 and 
desires to assert counterclaims through his longtime friend, client, and associate 
Glenn Trefren. 
79. Dennis Sallaz's current attorney in the present action, J. Iver Longeteig, is Glenn 
Trefren's attorney in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
80. On February 9, 2012 Mr. Sallaz appealed his divorce based on the grounds that he 
was not actually married to Renee Baird. See Notice of Appeal attached hereto as 
"Exhibit N." 
81. Counterclaimants contend that this appeal is nothing more than a tactic to delay 
this litigation and an attempt to prevent Counterclaimants from asserting the 
doctrines of collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, and res judicata. 
COUNTI 
ACTION AGAINST DENNIS SALLAZ FOR COLLECTION 
ON PROMISSORY NOTES 
82. Counterclaimants restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate 
them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
83. That Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz signed the promissory notes attached hereto 
as "Exhibit D" and "E." 
84. That Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz received $10,800 and $10,000 from 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice pursuant to said promissory notes and 
testified to the receipt of said funds in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See Post Trial 
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Exhibit 201, Husbands Property and Debt Schedule at 19 attached here to as 
"Exhibit O." 
85. There is now a balance due and owing for the principal amount of $20,800. 
86. That by law and by the terms of the agreement, Counterclaimants are entitled to 
an interest charge of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance. 
87. That per the terms of said promissory notes, principal and interest on said 
promissory notes are due on demand. 
88. That on or about March 24, 2011 due demand has been made upon 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz prior to the filing of this action. 
89. That Counterdefendant Sallaz refused or neglected to pay to Counterclaimants the 
above-mentioned sum despite demands made by Counterclaimants. 
90. The terms of said promissory notes provide "if action is commenced to enforce 
payment of this note, I agree to pay such sums as the Court may affix as 
attorney's fees." 
91. Counterclaimants are entitled to and hereby request a judgment for the principal 
and interest due on said promissory notes. 
92. Counterclaimants further request an award of post judgment interest. 
93. That as a result of Counterdefendant Sallaz's failure or refusal to pay said sum, 
Counterclaimants have been required to retain an attorney for the collection of 
this outstanding amount and has and will incur attorney's fees and costs of suit, 
which Counterclaimants are entitled to recover of and from said Counterdefendant 
pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121 and Rule 54 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Counterclaimants are informed and 
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therefore allege that the sum of $5,000.00 is a reasonable sum to be awarded to 
Counterclaimants for attorney's fees herein, in the event the matter is uncontested 
and a greater sum if contested. 
COUNT II 
ACTION TO RECOVER SUMS DEPOSITED IN TRUST ACCOUNT 
94. Counterclaimants restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate 
them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
95. On or about January 14, 2011, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
l.5(f) Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice requested an accounting of all 
sums obtained, received, or held by Counterdefendants on behalf of 
Counterclaimants or any entities Counterdefendants formed or represented on 
their behalf. 
96. On or about January 14, 2011, pursuant to IRPC l.5(f) and l.8(c) 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice requested an accounting of all gifts from 
Counterclaimants which were obtained, received, claimed, or held by 
Counterdefendants. 
97. On or about February 16, 2011 Counterdefendants responded that they did not 
have any funds in their trust account belonging to Counterclaimants. No 
accounting or other documentation was produced to support this denial. 
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98. On or about February 16, 2011 Counterdefendants responded that they did not 
have any record or recollection of any gifts obtained, received, or claimed to be 
from Counterclaimants. No accounting or other documentation was produced to 
support this denial. 
99. Counterclaimants are aware of and Counterdefendants have admitted to owing 
Counterclaimants approximately $61,000 for items taken from Counterclaimant' s 
former business "A Vista Pawn, Inc." 
100. This debt was assigned to Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz in his divorce from 
Renee Baird. 
101. Dennis Sallaz has made an admission that he owes Roy Rice for the items Mr. 
Sallaz took from Mr. Rice. See Post Trial Exhibit 201, Husband's Property and 
Debt Schedule from Sallaz v. Sallaz at 19 attached hereto as Exhibit 0. See Also 
May 26, 2009 Letter from Dennis Sallaz on Sallaz and Gatewood' s fax cover 
sheet attached hereto as "Exhibit P." 
102. Counterclaimants had an ownership interest in a business entity named "R-R 
Investments, Inc." See R-R Investments, Inc. 1990 Annual Report Form attached 
hereto as "Exhibit Q." 
103. The "R&R" in "R-R Investments, Inc." was meant to stand for Roy Rice and as 
such the entity was regularly referred to by Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants as simply "R&R." 
104. Counterdefendants provided legal advice in forming and were the registered agent 
for "R-R Investments, Inc." 
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105. Counterdefendants altered corporate filings with the Office of the Secretary of 
State for "R-R Investments, Inc." without the authorization or signature of 
Counterclaimants. See Articles of Amendment for R-R Investments, Inc. attached 
hereto as "Exhibit R." 
106. Counterdefendants or their agents forged the signature of Defendant Michael Rice 
in fraudulently "authorizing" the Articles of Amendment which purported to 
change the corporate name of "R-R Investments Inc." to "Rentals and Royalties, 
Inc." See Articles of Amendment for R-R Investments, Inc. attached hereto as 
"Exhibit R." 
107. Michael Rice's purported signature was insufficient authority to amend the 
articles of R-R Investments, Inc. 
108. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants of the amendments referred 
to in the preceding paragraphs and "Exhibit R." 
109. The whereabouts of and the value of the assets of R-R Investments, Inc. are 
unknown due to the negligent, willful, fraudulent, and reckless actions of 
Counterdefendants described below. 
110. Steve Sumner was in the business of owning radio stations and was a longtime 
client of Dennis Sallaz's. 
111. Dennis Sallaz introduced Steve Sumner to Roy Rice because Steve Sumner was in 
need of money. 
112. In 1994 Dennis Sallaz encouraged Roy Rice to loan Steve Sumner approximately 
$40,000. 
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113. Dennis Sallaz represented to Roy Rice that, as his attorney, Dennis Sallaz would 
draw up stock certificates which would provide Roy Rice security in radio 
stations owned by Mr. Sumner in exchange for said loans. 
114. In exchange for this loan, Counterclaimants supposedly received 1000 shares 
stock in each of the corporations which purportedly owned said radio stations 
"Capital Broadcasting, Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. See "Exhibit S" and 
"Exhibit T" attached hereto. 
115. These shares were to have constituted the entirety of the ownership of Capital 
Broadcasting Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. and based on representations 
made by Mr. Sallaz, Mr. Rice believed that he had adequate security for his loan. 
116. Mr. Sallaz engaged in complex litigation regarding the ownership of radio stations 
owned by Steve Sumner. This case became Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. 
Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
117. Mr. Sallaz orchestrated a collusive defense of Steve Sumner and his radio stations 
from attacks by outside creditors by asserting claims against Mr. Sumner and his 
business entities. See June 28, 2010 letter from Dennis Sallaz to Van Bishop 
produced by Counterdefendants in discovery as Runft 0000234-Runft000235 
attached as "Exhibit U." 
118. It is conceded that Capital Broadcasting, Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. 
were not parties to Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, 
Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
119. Rather, Steve Sumner, Capital West, Inc., Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., Rentals 
and Royalties, Inc., and Sallaz and Doolittle Chartered were named parties. 
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120. Mr. Sallaz made statements and acted as though he was representing 
Counterclaimants' interests in recovering on the aforementioned loan to Steve 
Sumner by continuing to litigate Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest 
Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812. See July 10, 2000 Letter from Dennis 
Sallaz to Vernon K. Smith attached hereto as "Exhibit V." 
121. Vernon K. Smith is Mr. Sallaz's counsel herein and in Canyon County Case No. 
CV09-l 1855. 
122. Mr. Sallaz repeatedly assured Mr. Rice that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz 
was protecting Mr. Rice's interest and that Mr. Rice's loan would be re-paid when 
the case settled. 
123. Mr. Sallaz settled the Sumner Matter for approximately $387,000 without 
informing Counterclaimants of said settlement or the amount of their interest 
therein. 
124. In the settlement, Mr. Sallaz directed that the sums due to Rentals and Royalties 
be paid to him. 
125. Counterclaimants contend that the $387,000 or a large portion thereof represents 
the principal and interest of the loan they made to Steve Sumner. 
126. A letter to Van Bishop referring to the Sumner Matter and the involvement of 
"Rentals and Royalties, Inc." is attached hereto as "Exhibit W" and illustrates that 
Counterdefendants referred to "Rentals and Royalties, Inc." as "R-R." 
127. The settlement agreement in the Sumner Matter also included a Confidentiality 
Agreement, attached hereto as "Exhibit X," which stated "The parties do further 
stipulate and agree that none of the terms of this settlement or any agreements or 
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payments herein, including the aforesaid Promissory Note, require the filing by 
any of the parties of a federal 1099 form or any other notification either to the 
United States, or any department thereof or any state or any department thereof 
and none of the parties shall make said filing without the written consent of all 
parties." 
128. Counterdefendants made material misrepresentations to Counterclaimants 
regarding the status of settlement negotiations of the Sumner Matter which made 
it impossible for Counterclaimants to verify the precise nature of or status of this 
very complex case. 
129. Mr. Sallaz's actions have made it impossible to verify the precise amount of said 
settlement which is due to Counterclaimants. 
130. Mr. Sallaz continued to inform Mr. Rice that the case was ongoing long after it 
settled. 
131. The Confidentiality Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit X" made it impossible 
for Counterclaimants to verify the precise nature of or status of this very complex 
case. 
132. Dennis Sallaz had a fiduciary obligation to hold the funds which were due to Mr. 
Rice in trust. 
133. Dennis Sallaz had a fiduciary obligation to inform Mr. Rice of the settlement of 
the Sumner litigation. 
134. Counterdefendants comingled said settlement funds which were due to 
Counterclaimants with funds of their own. 
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135. Counterdefendants comingled said settlement funds which were due to 
Counterclaimants with the estate of Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz's deceased 
grandmother Bessie B. Matcham. 
136. Dennis Sallaz is the Personal Representative of and Attorney for his 
grandmother's estate. 
13 7. Counterclaimants discovered that Counterdefendants had in fact settled the 
Sumner litigation during their investigation in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-
11855. 
138. Counterclaimants asked representatives of Sallaz and Gatewood, specifically 
Thom Henry, for information regarding the status of the Sumner litigation and the 
loans Mr. Rice had made, however said requests were ignored. 
139. Rather, Mr. Henry tried to convince Mr. Rice to refrain from initiating litigation 
against Dennis Sallaz. 
140. Counterclaimants learned additional information regarding Mr. Sallaz's 
settlement of the Sumner litigation and his failure to distribute the proceeds 
thereof to Roy Rice during settlement discussions with Renee Baird in Canyon 
County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
141. Counterdefendants continued to conceal the true nature of their 
misrepresentations such that Roy Rice has only been able to begin to comprehend 
Counterdefendants' wrongful actions following a court ordered inspection of 
Counterdefendant' s law firm after a Motion for Sanctions was granted against 
Dennis Sallaz in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
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142. Counterclaimants obtained additional information from Counterdefendants, 
regarding their misrepresentations as to the Sumner litigation, following a Motion 
to Compel, which was granted herein. 
143. In addition to other sums and property described herein, Counterclaimants are 
owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the Mr. Sallaz's settlement of the 
Sumner matter and failure to distribute any portion of said proceeds to Roy Rice. 
144. The $61,000 of items taken from Vista Pawn was also to have been held in trust 
as a retainer in the event Mr. Rice needed legal services. 
145. Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice are entitled to and hereby request this 
Court issue an order for the above balance, as well as any additional sums 
determined by the trier of fact to have been wrongfully withheld by 
Counterdefendants, plus pre and post-judgment interest. 
146. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover its attorney's fees and cost 
of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 




147. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
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148. It would be unjust for Counterdefendants to retain or benefit from the sums and 
property obtained from Counterclaimants described herein. 
149. Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice are entitled to and hereby request this 
Court issue an order of restitution for the above balance, wrongfully withheld 
sums mentioned herein, and wrongfully withheld property described herein plus 
pre and post-judgment interest. 
150. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
COUNTIV 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
151. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
152. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
153. In connection with the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction described above, 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz entered into a business transaction with 
Counterclaimants in violation ofldaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.8(a). 
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154. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.8(a) Counterdefendants Dennis 
Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. had a duty to advise and give 
Counterclaimants and give reasonable opportunity to obtain independent legal 
counsel, to inform Counterclaimants in writing of the essential terms of the 
transaction, including but not limited to whether Counterdefendants were 
representing Counterclaimants in the transaction. 
155. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. breached their 
duty to advise Counterclaimants to obtain independent legal counsel. 
156. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. fraudulently 
and knowingly concealed the material misrepresentations described herein. 
157. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood C~td. engaged in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4. 
158. Counterdefendants had a duty to notify Counterclaimants of the receipt of funds 
which Counterclaimants had an interest in. See Idaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.15(a). 
159. Counterdefendants breached their duty to notify Counterclaimants of the receipt 
of funds which Counterclaimants had an interest in. This breach was a violation 
ofldaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(a). 
160. After a reasonable request, Counterdefendants had a duty to provide an 
accounting for fees and costs claimed or previously collected. See Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct l .5(f). 
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161. Counterdefendants breached their duty to provide an accounting for fees and costs 
claimed or previously collected. 
162. This failure to provide an accounting for fees and costs was a violation of Idaho 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(±). 
163. Counterdefendants had a duty of competent and diligent representation as well as 
adequate communication. See Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, and 
1.4. 
164. Counterdefendants breached their duties of competent and diligent representation 
as well as adequate communication by the actions described herein. 
165. To the extent Counterdefendants contend any of the funds or items of personal 
property mentioned herein were gifts from Counterclaimants, Counterdefendants 
had a duty not to solicit substantial gifts from Counterclaimants. See Idaho Rule 
of Professional Conduct l.8(c). 
166. To the extent Counterdefendants contend any of the funds or items of personal 
property mentioned herein were gifts from Counterclaimants, Counterdefendants 
breached their duty to not solicit substantial gifts from Counterclaimants and 
violated Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8( c ). 
167. Counterdefendants had a duty not to engage in a conflict of interest transaction 
which there was a significant risk the representation of Counterclaimants was 
materially limited by Counterdefendants' responsibilities to other clients as well 
as Counterdefendants' own self interest. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.7(a)(2) 
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168. Counterdefendants breached this duty and engaged in a conflict of interest 
transaction which there was a significant risk the representation of 
Counterclaimants was materially limited by Counterdefendants' responsibilities to 
other clients as well as Counterdefendants' own self interest. 
169. If this Court determines the statute of limitations has run on any of the 
counterclaims asserted herein, as a retained attorney, Counterdefendants Dennis 
Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. had a duty to advise Counterclaimants as 
to the statute of limitations on said claims. 
170. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. breached their 
duty to advise Counterclaimants of the statute of limitations on said claims. 
171. By reason of the foregoing negligent actions, Counterclaimants have suffered 
general and special damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact including 
but not limited to the following damages: 
a. Counterclaimants have expended m excess of $50,000 in 
attorney's fees as a direct and proximate result of the negligent, 
willful, and malicious actions described herein. Those fees 
continue to accrue. 
b. Counterclaimants executed promissory notes m favor of 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz for the principal amount of 
$20,800 and interest at 12% per annum. 
c. Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items 
taken by Counterdefendants for which legal services were not 
performed. 
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d. Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the 
settlement of the Sumner Matter. 
172. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover its attorney's fees and cost 
of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 
12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those costs are 
$5,000. 
COUNTY 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
173. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
174. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
175. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. had fiduciary 
duties to Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice in connection with the 
legal representation and business transactions described herein. 
176. These fiduciary duties include but are not limited to the duty of loyalty, the duty 
to avoid self dealing, the duty to avoid comingling assets, the duty to keep and 
render accounts, the duty to furnish information, the duty to exercise reasonable 
care and skill, and the duty to take and keep control. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 27 
000327
177. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. were negligent, willful, reckless, outrageous, malicious and 
fraudulent and therefore breached said fiduciary duties. 
178. Counterdefendants negligently, fraudulently, and willfully concealed their 
deceitful and wrongful actions from Counterclaimants. 
179. By reason of the foregoing negligent, willful, and malicious actions, 
Counterclaimants have suffered general and special, damages in amount to be 
proven by the trier of fact including but not limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $50,000 in 
attorney's fees as a direct and proximate result of the negligent, 
willful, and malicious actions described herein. Those fees 
continue to accrue. 
b) Counterclaimants executed promissory notes m favor of 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz for the principal amount of 
$20,800 and interest at 12% per annum. 
c) Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items 
taken by Counterdefendants for which legal services were not 
performed. 
d) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the 
settlement of the Sumner Matter. 
180. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
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cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-




181. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
182. A longstanding attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. which entitled 
Roy Rice to rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
183. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice inducing Roy Rice to 
loan funds to Mr. Sallaz's client, Steve Sumner. 
184. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
185. Mr. Sallaz intended that Roy Rice act on this misrepresentation. 
186. Mr. Rice agreed to make a loan of approximately $40,000 to Steve Sumner based 
on Mr. Sallaz's assurances that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz would prepare 
the documents securing said loan. 
187. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's 
assertions. 
188. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
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189. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that he would prepare 
documents, as Mr. Rice's attorney, providing Roy Rice security for his loan to 
Steve Sumner. 
190. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
191. Mr. Sallaz intended that Roy Rice act on this misrepresentation. 
192. Mr. Rice agreed to loan to Steve Sumner approximately $40,000 based on Mr. 
Sallaz's assurances that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz prepared documents 
adequately securing said loan. 
193. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's 
assertions. 
194. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
195. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice regarding Roy Rice's 
security interest, in the form of stock, in certain radio stations. 
196. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
197. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by believing for many years that he had 
adequate security for his loans to Steve Sumner, that were increasing in value due 
to the accrual of interest thereon, in the form of stock certificates prepared by 
Dennis Sallaz. 
198. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's 
assertions. 
199. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
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200. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that, as Mr. Rice's 
attorney, Mr. Sallaz was representing Roy Rice's interest in recovering the 
principal and interest due on said loans to Steve Sumner by litigating Sawtooth 
Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
201. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
202. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney to secure a 
resolution to or assert any claims necessary in Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. 
Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812 that would protect Mr. Rice's 
interest in the loan he had made to Mr. Sallaz's client, Steve Sumner. 
203. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's 
assertions. 
204. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
205. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that Sawtooth Energy 
Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812 was still in 
litigation when in fact it had settled. 
206. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
207. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing 
an independent case against Steve Sumner. 
208. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis 
Sallaz. 
209. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's 
assertions. 
210. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
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211. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice by failing to notify Roy 
Rice that Mr. Sallaz had received approximately $387,000 as the settlement of 
Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 
96812. 
212. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
213. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing 
an independent case against Steve Sumner. 
214. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis 
Sallaz. 
215. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's 
assertions. 
216. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
217. Sallaz and Gatewood made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice when Roy 
Rice learned of the settlement and inquired as to the status of the funds Roy Rice 
believed he was owed, and Sallaz and Gatewood tried to convince him not to file 
suit and refused to provide further information to Mr. Rice. 
218. Counterdefendants knew these representations were false. 
219. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing 
an independent case against Steve Sumner. 
220. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis 
Sallaz. 
221. As Mr. Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did 
rely on Sallaz and Gatewood's assertions. 
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222. Mr. Rice did not know that Counterdefendant's representations were false. 
223. Counterdefendants have made material misrepresentations in their discovery 
responses herein which have made it difficult for Mr. Rice to learn the full nature 
of the wrongful actions of Counterdefendants. 
224. Counterdefendants knew these representations were false. 
225. Mr. Rice acted on these misrepresentations and was unable to amend his 
counterclaim until such time as Mr. Sallaz was compelled to produce certain 
documents from Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., 
et al, Case No 96812 in this case and Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
226. As a party to litigation wherein the opposing party is to truthfully respond to 
discovery, especially where the opposing party is an actively practicing attorney, 
Mr. Rice had the right to rely on Counterdefendants to truthfully respond to 
discovery. 
227. Mr. Rice did not know the true nature of the fraudulent actions of 
Counterdefendants until Mr. Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood were compelled by 
Court Orders to produce certain documents. 
228. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants were willful, reckless, outrageous, 
malicious and fraudulent. 
229. By reason of the foregoing Counterclaimants have suffered the damages including 
but not limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $50,000 in 
attorney's fees as a direct and proximate result of the negligent, 
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willful, and malicious actions described herein. Those fees 
continue to accrue. 
b) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the 
settlement of the Sumner matter. 
230. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VII 
CONVERSION 
231. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
232. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 
2002 Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an ATV trailer which are owned by 
Counterclaimants. The Bill of Sale for said A TV's and ATV trailer is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit F." 
233. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said ATVs and ATV 
trailer to Counterclaimant Eugene Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz pp 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." See 
also Husband's Property and Debt Schedule at 11 attached hereto as "Exhibit 0." 
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234. Accordingly, the Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the 
Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce awarded the proceeds of this sale to Dennis Sallaz. 
235. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is or was in possession of a Winnebago 
Motorhome VIN 10BKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is 
the first lien holder on. The title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit H." 
236. Counterdefendants are in possession of funds described herein which are due and 
owing to Counterclaimants. 
237. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz has not extinguished Counterclaimant's lien on 
said Motorhome. See also Husband's Property and Debt Schedule at 9 attached 
hereto as "Exhibit O." 
238. Counterdefendants wrongfully refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted 
wrongful dominion over said funds, ATVs, trailer, and Motorhome. 
239. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said funds, ATVs, 
trailer, and Motorhome and for general and special damages incurred by reason of 
said wrongful possession. 
240. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
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COUNT VIII 
CLAIM AND DELIVERY 
241. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
242. Counterdefendant Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 
Y arnaha and a 1998 Y arnaha, and an ATV trailer which are owned by 
Counterclaimants. The Bill of Sale for said ATV' s and A TV trailer is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit F." 
243. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said ATVs and ATV 
trailer to Counterclaimant Eugene Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz pp 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
244. Prior to filing this complaint, demand has been made by counsel for 
Counterclaimant for the return of said ATVs and A TV trailer. 
245. Counterdefendants refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted wrongful 
dominion over said ATVs and ATV trailer. 
246. Counterclaimants are entitled to immediate possession and control of said ATVs, 
and ATV trailer. 
24 7. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said A TVs and A TV 
trailer and for general and special damages incurred by reason of said wrongful 
possession. 
248. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
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cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
COUNTIX 
FORECLOSURE OF LIEN 
249. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
250. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is or was in possession of a Winnebago 
Motorhome VIN 1GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is 
the first lien holder on. The title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit H." 
251. Prior to filing this complaint, demand has been made by counsel for 
Counterclaimant for the return of said Motorhome. 
252. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz has not extinguished Counterclaimant' s lien of 
$8,500 on said Motorhome. See also Husband's Property and Debt Schedule at 9 
attached hereto as "Exhibit O." 
253. Counterdefendants refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted wrongful 
dominion over said Motorhome. 
254. Counterclaimants are entitled to immediate possess10n and control of said 
Motorhome. 
255. Alternatively, Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of damages of $8,500 
plus pre and post-judgment interest. 
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256. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said Motorhome and 
for general and special damages, including but not limited to pre and post-
judgment interest, incurred by reason of said wrongful possession and failure to 
satisfy said $8,500 lien. 
257. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those costs 
are $5,000. 
COUNTX 
AIDING AND ABETTING IN THE COMISSION OF A TORTIOUS ACT 
258. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
259. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimant and 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz. 
260. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendant Sallaz were willful, reckless, 
outrageous, malicious, fraudulent, and tortious. 
261. Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and fraudulently and wrongfully 
withheld information regarding their willful, negligent, and fraudulent actions 
described herein. 
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262. Counterdefendant Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. aided and abetted in the 
commission of said willful, reckless, outrageous, malicious, fraudulent, and 
tortious acts. 
263. As a result of the foregoing, Counterclaimants suffered and are entitled to an 
award of general and special damages in an amount to be proven by the trier of 
fact. 
264. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those costs 
are $5,000. 
COUNT XI 
VIOLATION OF THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
I.C. § 48-601 et seq. 
265. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the 
preceding paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set 
forth. 
266. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
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267. Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and fraudulently and wrongfully 
withheld information regarding their willful, negligent, and fraudulent actions 
described herein. 
268. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants violated provisions of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act LC. 48-601 et seq including but not limited to: 
a) Passing off goods or services as those of another; 
b) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the 
source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods; 
c) Causing likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding as to 
affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, 
another; 
d) Engaging in acts or practices which is otherwise misleading, false, 
or deceptive to the consumer; and 
e) Engaging in any unconscionable method, act or practice in the 
conduct of trade or commerce as provided in LC. 48-603(c); 
269. As a result of the foregoing, Counterclaimants suffered and are entitled to an 
award of general and special damages in an amount to be proven by the trier of 
fact. 
270. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-
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120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
XII 
CIVIL RACEKTEERING (VIOLATION OF I.C. § 18-7805) 
271. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the 
preceding paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set 
forth. 
272. The actions described herein constitute a pattern of criminal behavior including 
but not limited to violations of LC. §§ 18-2403(2)( d)(l) (Theft by False 
Promise); 18-2403(2)(b) (Theft by Trick); 18-2407 (Grand Theft); 18-1905 
(Falsification of Corporate Records); 18-4501 (Perjury); 18-4510 (Subornation 
of Perjury); 18-3601(Forgery); 45-918(Forgery of Lien Cancelation on Vehicle 
Title); 30-14-501 (Securities Fraud). 
273. Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. is an enterprise under LC.§ 18-7803(c). 
274. The pattern of criminal behavior is ongoing including most recently perjury, 
forgery, and the forgery of Mr. Rice's signature allegedly releasing the lien on the 
title certificate Mr. Sallaz is utilizing for his claim and delivery cause of action. 
275. By reason of the foregoing willful, criminal, and malicious actions, 
Counterclaimants have suffered general and special, damages in amount to be 
proven by the trier of fact including but not limited to: 
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a) Counterclaimants executed promissory notes m favor of 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz for the principal amount of 
$20,800 and interest at 12% per annum. 
b) Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items 
taken by Counterdefendants for which legal services were not 
performed. 
c) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the 
settlement of the Sumner Matter. 
d) Counterclaimants are owed $7,500 as a result of 
Counterdefendants refusal to surrender the ATVs and Trailer and 
$8,500 for Counterdefendants refusal to surrender the Winnebago 
motorhome. 
276. Pursuant to Idaho Code 18-7805(a) Counterclaimants are entitled to treble 
damages and the cost of suit including reasonable attorney's fees. 
277. This Court should immediately invoke its power under Idaho Code 18-7805(c) 
and order the production of the ATV's, trailer, and Winnebago motorhome 
described herein. 
278. This Court should invoke its powers under Idaho Code 18-7805( d) and a) Impose 
reasonable restrictions on the future activities of Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz & 
Gatewood including but not limited to their ability to transfer, assign, or conceal 
assets to avoid satisfying any judgment rendered herein and b) Order the 
suspension or revocation of Mr. Sallaz's license to practice law. 





279. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the 
preceding paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully 
set forth. 
280. Eugene "Roy" Rice was the first lien holder on a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VIN 
546265334 which was owned by Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz. 
281. Said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado is the same Cadillac Eldorado that is the subject of 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
282. Dennis Sallaz failed to satisfy said lien on the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
283. In January or February, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice lawfully 
repossessed the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
284. On or about February 1, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice was issued a 
Certificate of Title by the Idaho Department of Transportation for the 1954 
Cadillac Eldorado which is attached hereto as "Exhibit Y." 
285. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is the lawful owner of said 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado. 
286. Dennis Sallaz attached a false certificate of title for said Cadillac Eldorado to his 
Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
287. Dennis Sallaz or his agent forged the signature of Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" 
Rice on said false certificate of title in purporting to release said lien. 
288. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice did not release his lien in favor of Dennis 
Sallaz. 
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289. On or about January 4, 2011 Dennis Sallaz purported to assign whatever interest 
he allegedly had to "Marcy Fox" by way of an Assignment of Title on the false 
title attached to Dennis Sallaz's Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
290. On or about March 20, 2011 Dennis Sallaz filed an application for Title Stop 
stating "My car was stolen out of a locked storage lot within the last 20 days and 
a duplicate title was forged and filed with the Idaho Department of 
Transportation in the name of Eugene Leroy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice on 
February 1, 2011 (see attached). The original title was never lost. The 
application for duplicate title was fraudulent and there was not any valid debt 
owed at the time of theft and no repossession has been done and it is imperative 
that this title be frozen pending the filing of a theft report and court action." 
291. The representations in the application for title stop were false. 
292. Dennis Sallaz has filed a Complaint for claim and delivery and obtained a 
Temporary Restraining Order preventing Counterclaimants from disposing of 
said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
293. The above referenced actions by Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz have created a 
cloud on the title of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and prevented 
Counterclaimants from disposing of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
294. By reason of the foregoing claimants have suffered general and special damages 
and are entitled to an order quieting title for said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado in the 
name of Eugene "Roy" Rice. 
295. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
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connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code § § 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
COUNT XIV 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
296. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the 
preceding paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully 
set forth. 
297. Eugene "Roy" Rice was the first lien holder on a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VIN 
546265334 which was owned by Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz. 
298. Said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado is the same Cadillac Eldorado that is the subject of 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
299. Dennis Sallaz failed to satisfy said lien on the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
300. In January or February, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice lawfully 
repossessed the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
301. On or about February 1, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice was issued a 
Certificate of Title by the Idaho Department of Transportation for the 1954 
Cadillac Eldorado which is attached hereto as "Exhibit Y." 
302. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is the lawful owner of said 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado. 
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303. Dennis Sallaz attached a false certificate of title for said Cadillac Eldorado to his 
Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
304. Dennis Sallaz or his agent forged the signature of Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" 
Rice on said false certificate of title in purporting to release said lien. 
305. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice did not release his lien in favor of Dennis 
Sallaz. 
306. On or about January 4, 2011 Dennis Sallaz purported to assign whatever interest 
he allegedly had to "Marcy Fox" by way of an Assignment of Title on the false 
title attached to Dennis Sallaz's Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
307. On or about March 20, 2011 Dennis Sallaz filed an application for Title Stop 
stating "My car was stolen out of a locked storage lot within the last 20 days and 
a duplicate title was forged and filed with the Idaho Department of 
Transportation in the name of Eugene Leroy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice on 
February 1, 2011 (see attached). The original title was never lost. The 
application for duplicate title was fraudulent and there was not any valid debt 
owed at the time of theft and no repossession has been done and it is imperative 
that this title be frozen pending the filing of a theft report and court action." 
308. The representations in the application for title stop were false. 
309. Dennis Sallaz has filed a Complaint for claim and delivery and obtained a 
Temporary Restraining Order preventing Counterclaimants from disposing of 
said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
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310. The above referenced malicious actions by Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz have 
created a cloud on the title of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and prevented 
Counterclaimants from disposing of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
311. By reason of the foregoing malicious actions and Counterdefendant' s slander of 
title claimants have suffered general and special damages. 
312. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services oflegal counsel in 
connection with this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and 
cost of suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-
120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should this matter be resolved by default, those 
costs are $5,000. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
313. Counterdefendants by their conduct, have engaged in an extreme deviation from 
reasonable standards of conduct, and have engaged in gross, willful, outrageous, 
malicious, wrongful and wanton conduct, and, therefore, upon this Court's 
Granting of Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive 
Damages, Counterclaimants will plead for the recovery of punitive damages 
against Counterdefendants and in such amounts as will be proven at trial. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants pray that this Court: 
• 
A. That Counterdefendants be restrained by Injunction from disposing of, 
injuring, or concealing the said funds, Motorhome, ATV's and ATV 
trailer from Counterclaimant. 
B. That an Order be issued requiring Counterdefendants to return said funds, 
Motorhome, ATV' s and ATV trailer to Counterclaimants. 
C. That in the event Counterdefendants have lost, concealed, or refuse to 
return said funds, Motorhome, ATV's and ATV trailer to Counterclaimant 
that an Order be issued that Counterclaimants be awarded $7,500 for said 
ATVs and ATV trailer, $8,500 for said Motorhome, and $480,000 plus pre 
and post judgment interest. 
D. That Counterclaimants be awarded general and special damages against 
Counterdefendants jointly and severally. 
E. Counterclaimants pray that this Court enter judgment against 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz for the principal and interest due on the 
two promissory notes; 
F. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for sums · due and 
owning from Counterclaimants' trust account. 
G. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
unjust enrichment against Counterdefendants; 
H. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
legal malpractice against Counterdefendants; 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 48 
000348
I. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
breach of fiduciary duties against Counterdefendants; 
J. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
fraud against Counterdefendants; 
K. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
Conversion against Counterdefendants; 
L. Award Counterclaimants general damages for their claims of Claim and 
Delivery against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
M. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claim to 
foreclose on their lien against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
N. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
aiding and abetting the commission of a tortious act against 
Counterdefendant Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd.; 
0. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against 
Counterdefendants; 
P. Award Counterclaimants treble damages for their claims of violation of 
the Racketeering Act, Idaho Code 18-7805(a). 
Q. Award Counterclaimants their costs and attorney's fees in connection with 
this action; and 
R. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, costs and fees under and 
pursuant to Idaho law, from the date of entry of judgment in this matter 
until full satisfaction of the judgment. 
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S. Award Counterclaimants any other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
DATED this day of August 2012. 
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By:~()_. --'<--ry~-~--
# J. KAHLE BECKER 
// Attorney for 
Defendants/Counterclaimants 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
VERIFICATION 
EUGENE RICE after being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
That he is one of the Defendants and Counterclaimants in the foregoing 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, that he has read the AMENDED 
COUNTERCLAIM and believes the facts stated therein are true based upon his 
own information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Defendant/Counterclaimant has set his hand and seal 
the day and year first above written 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
.................. 
~--~~1'o~t\t!~· ,,; #-~ I ~OTA~};~, 
: -·- : • • 
\ (/1.;. ;buauc I l 
~ .d •• ,.l');:J ' 
.,., -~;,:,., •·•····• ~ , •, r• ( . ''' I). ,, 
'• • J I , \ ' • •' ,, . ' . \ ,,, 
'•,i ' 
e me this J8 day of August 2012 . 
Notary P lie for IdahoB . J _ 1 
Residing t: o '&e , I v,. c,vv,O 
Commiss on expires 01 · I ') · I r: 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 51 
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• 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
e 
VERIFICATION 
JANET RICE after being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
That she is one of the Defendants and Counterclaimants in the foregoing 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, that she has read the AMENDED 
COUNTERCLAIM and believes the facts stated therein are true based upon her 
own information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Defendant/Counterclaimant has set her hand and seal 
the day and year first above written 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 




SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to e o me this J.8 day of August 2012. 
Notary Pub ·c for Idaho . 
Residing a Bo •Se I I d. a.,h o 
Commissi n expires O 1 · I 1 · I '1 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 52 
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e 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·The undersigned hereby certifies that on this.£ day of August 2012, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM was served upon 
opposing counsel as follows: 
William Fuhrman 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman & Gourley 
225 N. 9th St., Ste 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Iver J. Longeteig 
5304 Turret 
Boise, ID 83 703 
V. K. Smith 
1900 W. Main 
Boise, ID 83702 
Marcy Fox 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
Boise, ID 83705 
Gabriel McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St. #302 
Boise, ID 83 702 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 53 
US Mail 
~ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
)( US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
X US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
~US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
)(. US Mail 













ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION 
,I/, LJiWJTED LIABILITY COMPANY 
S Ta the Secrstary of State of Idaho 
, (; Corporations Division 
~~ . / 7C-O West Jefferson Reem 203 
(,;-' ... ~ P. 0. Box 83720 • Boise, 10 83720-CCSO 
' ;t/ ~ -~ 
I"'. ~ :~ ~r ~e name of··rhe limited liability company is: __ Re_a_l_H_,...._rr._es_L_. L_-._C_. --------
• ~ . ' 
j Th.~iddrass cf the initial registerad offica is: 1000 S · Haosevel t St · 
i::;., c.;:i · (net l ?O Sox} 
Boise, ID 83705 . . . . 
------------------- and the name of the in1t1al registered 
agent at that address is: ____ De_ru_n_i_s_J_._s_a_l_laz _________________ _ 
Signature cf registered agent: ---------------------
3. The latest date cartain on vvtiich the limited liability ecmpariy will dissoive: 1-1-2011 
4. Is management cf the limited liability company vested in a manager or managers? 
rl Yes D No (c::ecxai:i:,l'Qprtate ~, 
5. If management is vested in one er mora manager(s), list the name(s) and address{es) of at 
least one initial manager. If management is vested in the members, list the name(s} and 
addrass(es) of at least one initial member. 
Name: Address: 
Renee L. Baird 1000 s Roosevelt St Boise, ID 83705 
01/19/2981 89199 
CX: 2~ Ci1 ~41 BH1 373"4 
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I U• ...l...lD.l.C:D...l 
e e 
OPER.A..TTI'~G AGB.EE1v1ENT OE: RE.AL HOMES·, ·LLC 
an Idaho Limited. Liability Cor::rrpa.1y 
, NO, 2G5 
. The u...idersigned n::e:n~er~,.desiring to form a. limJ,~d liabiJit"J compar:y uncc: th.e Idabo 




1. l' ~- The name of the limited liability company (th~ ''LLC") i; RE.ttl:. ;IO.MES, 
l .2 },,Jijcles of Or-~a.nizat1on .. Articles of crganizarfon were fil~d with the Idaho Se~uy 
of Scare o.n .January 191 2001. . . . . . . 
I .3 ~rlnciJ:?8:1' Place ofBusine~s: The principal office of the q .. c sh.111 iriitially he tocated 
ac l 000 S .. R.cosevclt So-eet, :Bpise, ldaho 83 705. The tnembera may relocat~ ~e prir..c:pal cr.ffice or 
e~tabtish additional o:ffic!;.S from time i:O time in their rliscr~tion. . 
1.4 .Reai.3tered Office an'd :R.eiristered .Ag_e_m:, Tb~ LLC's lnitiaJ i~gistere<l o:ffi.~ .. shall be 
s.r l 000 S. Rc-0~evelt Strsec, Boise, Id.ahq ·83105, and the na.."Ile of its initial registered agent at such 
address shall be·De~s J. ~anaz .. The members r;My change the registered o:ffic~ and registered 
agent frof!l, t:'.me to time in their discretion. · · · · · 
. 1.5 _Il.rnrim.;, Pnro~"· Th? I.LC Is organized to_ ,,4_.1 ~ f .,.t_ &~ 
and to pngage In any ather lawful busrness. . · . . . · 9 
1.6 Agfoemen.i;. The memb~r:i. e:<:ecuti.ng the Operating Agreement' hereby agree to the 
terms ?-rid conditions ofthe Operacing Agreement, as it may from time to time Qe amended according 
to it~i terms. To the ern:en.:.: airJ provision ·of the Operating .Agreement is pro.rn'bited or ineffective 
under the Act,. the Oo~ai:h1g'A.graemcnt shall be considered amended to th~ s.malJest de-zr:!e pcissibJe 
in order to make the Opern#ng Agreement effective unaer th~ Act. In tbc e'-'·enr the Act is 
subgcquently a.men~ed or int.crpret~d ip such a way tq make vafid any provision cf the Ope~ting 
Agreement t.ia.t was-formerly inve.Iid, such provision shall be C';!nsider::rl ~o b(;: valid from the 
effective date of such interpretati an ·or iunendment. Further, it is the ~press intention of che 
memberR that the LLC be treat~q as a pa:r..riernhip for purp·o~e;'! of fod~al and S'Cil.te taxa.tjpn. Tiie 
members· agre~ to take suc:h actions a.~d make such eJecrions a., may be nece3sary or cor.iveni~~t to 
ensure tbat the LLC be tre,.ted as a partnership. Lf iris determined thac the LLC i$. or i:viJJ not he 
classified .as a partnership under the Jntemal Revenue Code (the "C~de''), then the· Opcrn.,ting 
Ag"teoma;nt sh.!:!.ll be: considered amecded to the sma11e~ qegrcq po3si~ie in whate'<(.=r ~a.nner · 
r,ecea!at;/ to ensure t~a.t the UC i.s or sh.tll be traatef aa part::1ership'tindet" tbe Code for purposes 
or federal and state taxation. 
., -
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ARTICLE'2 
11.ElvIBERS. cor-rrRIBUTIONS, A~D INTE..~S.TS 
2.1 Npnes. AddT~s~.es and,L.,tial Comrib~f&n.~. The n\lltlcS a.n.d add~sses oftlre initial 
members qf the LLC, and rhe 'agrned value ofthet,r respf?Ctive. initial ca~-i'caJ ccn:tributicns a..1d icitiai 
pere;:r.1t.sgc O',,'merd:rip lnteregts in tqe LLC (the ''Sharing Ratios'') a:~a_s a~~:.:~d .io t~e cha..'1: ~clow, 
su.bjeci: to the ad.juatment ::1s pravidGd in this Arrl9le. 2. Each of the memb.ers as his initial 
cantrtlmtion h~ conr:ributed ms un.dirided one-ha.!f (%) interest L11 a.wi p th9ae cenaJ:n t-No parcels 
of ccmrner~ial re:il estare, more pa.rJr=ularJy described on ExhiQit A ariach.ed hereto, together i!v-ith 
. aiJ appurtenanc_es, and a...,y existing Jea.ses, contract; ct agre~ents ~ciating ther~to. 
;Name a.'ld addres:; 
'.j:t!neeBaird 
· Aiveecl Y alue of Con;tnbl.1tlo11 · Sh_ari..n~ E..ario i . . ' 
1000 S. Ro aseve.lt 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
$50,000 
2.2 Limitation cf Lt1bl1it<,. Each member's Jfa.bilitv shall be limlted to the maximum · 
extent pcnnit:ed by applicable law. Th~. failure of r.h.e LLC to obscrv~ · any formalities ~ 
requirements relating to the exercise of it~ p9wers c-r man.agernent of its business or affatrs shall n~f 
be grounds fer imposing per;;,onal liability on the members of tbe Ji3:bilities of the LLC. n.. 
··t:, 
2.3 NoLrabi1itv forLLC Debts; Persor...a.1 Guarantees. ,.t..,, member shall not be pergonalff 
Hable f<?.r .any debts or lo~scs cf lhe LLC be}·and hfa respectiv~ capital cont.-ihutj.oru, except ~l 
ofher:wise required. by la.w. Natv1iih,';!tanding tne foregoing, the members shall execute peraari.~ 
gua..ran~ees fur Joa.1s made to che 11.C as and only to tbe extent require~ Ery foture lendf?rs. · 
. . ... 
· 2.4 Other _B1.isinesa of Members, Except as may be othernri~e pravideq in agrecn;ellF3·; 
among toe members and the LLC, any member may engage fndopp.denrly or 'io"'ilith other'3 in otber 
busiaess a.no iovcst~ent ventures of cer; aarurc and de.1cri.ption ~nd llhall ha":/e no obligru:ion to 
account to tl·i~ LLC for such business or investments or !or busine;:s or mvast-n,.ent oppO'r;'C)mities-. 
2. 5 Addli;icnal Members. Additional members shall not be admitted e;;'l:cept upon a 
unanimau!l vote of the rr.cmben, 
2.6 Additional C&DitaJ. 
2.6.1 .Additional Contribution3. Except ":3 setfor.h in tlus Section 2.6, n.o member 
~ba:JJ ~e re<1uired or permitted to make a..,y capital oontributiona. In tbe event chat at any ti.me, 
pursuam to 3. un-animous vote of the m~b~i"3, t1ic members determine that e:dditiocial .funrh are 
reg'ui.red by the LLC for its bl!.&iness 6T any of its obUgaf.i.ona, c,:;p~n.ses, costs, liabilities er 
c,cpaiditures, the merr,bers !!l,all be tequirci:; to contribute sucb o.dditionaJ fund.i in prcipo!"'don co their 
Sha.ring R.a.tio.s, w,!es$ tho members elect by rnajc:mcy vote to ha.ve the U..C !;,en-ow the a.en.aunt\'.); 
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a.d1:ii~icnai capit?J ':':'n9ibuticn pvnuant to the Section 2.6, Land a m~ber fa.Ha to ma.lo its required 
p~r'~on of ~be ad~Jtion,al c~piW con_tnbuticn (.a "Ncn-Coqrribtiting Member'), men t.i.ose rnemben 
making_ t_h.e?r requued pom~n of the additicu:.af capital·, comn1mcion ("Contzib1:ting Mcmber'.3'? may 
eJ ect _eitn.~r of tJ:1.e fc.Ilov,."11,g: 0) to adjuit the Shai-ing Ratios of tp.e Cow ... '11't:itiag, a.nd ·Non-
Co~bu'::11g ~!embers by incre~ing e,~e. ~naring Ratios of the Non-~or.~n~uting ~embers; or (ii) 
ti?-e_ UJPtnou~~g Memhe:.s may,. Jn a.dqlnon rn ~y oth~r Jegp.J r:em~.;i1es ~yai)ab!e, m proportion to -· _ 
their Owner:-i.cup lntcrasta or a.'3 otherwise wcc:d by the Crwtribrrting Member;;, conm"but.e addition~. 
fonds to ::~ver such a..nount that ha$ :iot been corq:ribmed. 
2, 6 .2 Adiu.'ltment to S,h.a..-in~ Ratios. The S.paring Ratios 9f each Comributi!)g 
Member sh.all be ine.ea.'.led by Adjustment Pe;rc:eniage X1 whi~h shall be calcuTa.i:~d for each 
Cantributi.:ng Member accordi.hg to the formula. !IC?t furth below. ·For purpcses of i-.hls for:nu1a,' the 
pmase "Addl-tionai Capital Contricrction" ~haII tbea.fl. tb.e addttional capi'Uil conmoution.s mado, by 
each Conrrlbr..i:lng M.embtr pur.9.Ua."l.1 to. a capi-'81 ~aH under ~cctio.q 2.5 :i, The Tar.al Capital 
Comrfbutior~ of all .Members to Date shall· /include the agreed value of the iriJtiaI capital 
·e-0ntTicutions as se~ forth in .~ection 2. 1 a.bova i 
Adjustmeat => 
P ercem:age X 
A, .. n1aum of AdQiticnaI Canita! Contribution 
Total Capital Cam.ril?utions + Sum of All P...dditiomtl 
of ~1 Me."!?bt~ to Date Capir.aJ Contn"butions 
The rcspecti'Ye S.haring Ratios of the Non-Contribt.<tmg fyfe~bers shall be de.cr~sed 
(bur not below zero) by aach such member3 pro rata 8bare (ba$ed on che rot~ Sharing Ratios of the 
N o-a-C?nt.:ibl1~g Members) of Adjustment t:i ercen:tage X · 
2. l'i .J Co.ntribul'.i on of Additional Funru.. If a Contn"bu1ing Member elects to . · 
cootribute additional funds to cover such ~rnow:it that ha~ nae· hcen- contributed by a Non-:-
Cputnbutirtg 1'.:fember., the advance 5hall be d~emed a demand )o:in by the Co~tnnuting Member or 
M 6mbers . to ~.he N on-'C omributt.ng :Mcmb er bea.'ing in ter~st a.t the ,:a; a of twelve p ercem ( l 2%) per 
armurn from che da.te: the advai,ce fa made. To the exti:::nt of suc.h ndva.,ce plus interest, any 
,fatribution.s otherwise due to the Non-Contributing Me.'llber shall, t11:stea.d be paid to the 
Contributing Mc;nber o.r Memben (pro ratil with the e,mounts advanc~d by e.1ch Contributing 
Member) w.ho made such ·contribution. 
· 2. 7 Interest: on Capi~11.l Contribution~. Except_ as pjovided in Sectio.n :?.. 5.3, tto i.'1.t,!rcst. 
shall be pcid on capital conrributiom . 
. 2. 8 .Loans. The LLC may borrow money from any member of chird panies upor., such 
comrn~rcjally reasonable temis a.nd co.qditi9r..3 a:s may be approved by the. roe.mben. 
· 2.9 Rishq ofindemni.ti.cation. The I.LC, or it3 receiver or tl'tlstcc, shall'indemnify, hold 
hnrmles31 and ~y· all judgments and c.!airris a.g?..inst each member for all co~u, losl\es, liabilities aDd 
damages pt'l.id or accrued· by sucf~ mcc,.ber by reason of ari.y act per.formed or om.in;4ed t~· be 
perfor,med by s1Jch membe:r, in ·c~~ectior. wicb the business ·ofth .t.LC, to the ful)~st e~er::J.t. proYldt:d 
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. ~- 10 Title Insurance. In the eVel")t 1;l,1e LLC s1.rffcrn any less. whi.ch ia compensable through 
the t!~Ie. t11sura,1ce obti.i~ed by ~r :O~r,ni~ J.. Sallaz an:l peyment~ made uhd~r ~ch po!ides will 
be paid to De!]nis 1, .Sallaz ~nd n.o"t the LLC. · ·- · 
. ~· 
-----------........... ,--~·n DUT.IES OF J.t..1E1v.1BERS . ' . . . . 
3. l .Mam.gcmcnt a.id Voting :Righ·t~. All members ~ha h.a•1e noc Dissocia.:ced ·~hall be 
entirled to vote on any matter sijbmitwd to a vctc of the Mem.ben. fiowever1 Assignees J:ha1I not 
be en.titled to y-ote oµ any rnaners. 
. : J. U Act;! Reouirmg a Msiority Vote. pcep(.aa o thcrwi.ae pro0dcd in Articl~ 
3 .1.2 or oth~rwise in tJtis Operating Agrei!rn.etti all detenninatfor,s, deci3ioos, apprcva1.s a,,d actions 
affectin~ the LLC a.nd its business and affairs shall be determl.Md, rtJade, a.ppfovcd, or a.uthor:i2ed . 
9ctly.,by the affirmative vote of a N.!ajocity of the }.!etnbers, ~xcluding a.'l; interested Member and 
eX'duding any A.3signee. ·· 
. . 
3.1.2 Acts Rwuiring Unanimous Vd-te. Norwithstandi.ng Article 3.1. l, the 
followir.cg matter~, decisions and actions shaD not b1:j marlo or taken without the unanirr-.ous vote of 
all oft~e Memben, ~ch.idLrig: any interested Mcmb~ and ~eluding any As.:dgnce: 
; 
. (a) any a.."1l.endrnen: to thls Ope.a.ring Agreenteni tbat cb.a..,ges the 
purn~er of vot:::s or degree of consent required co approve or disapprove any µ,.atters that reqtri.re voce 
or consent; end 
(p) (l.Jly amendment to Artide 6 or .ArµqJe. 7 of this Operating 
Agreement. 
J.2 Authoritv ofMei:ibers to Bi.nd t;1~-~. The Members hereby agree rhat co 
one Jvfo:nber ·s~hll have the aurhcrity cu mqke representa.tious or war.a.ntie.s, or ~ter into cont:racts 
on be{1a.lf of cbc LLC, ~a.\:e any action as l!Jl e.ge.nt for the :LLC, or <Jth~nvise bind the LLC: F:a.ther, . · 
;;i.Majorit'; shall be required to mak'e represematio.ns or warrantio)s, or enter into contracts on b~alf . 
oftbe LLC, take any i,.ction as an agcoc for the LLC, 9.r atherwis:: bind the LLC to PersC!n.s .bav1ng 
knowledge ofruch determination.. Tbc foJlo,~irJg JlCtiao.si withoutlimi'ta.tion, 5.haU require a.Z,,!ajcrit"J 
vate: 
I • L-1.... ...,.ll._l 
3 .2.1 the 1w,titution, prosect.-rrion and defonae of ar.y proc.eedlng in tile LL~' s n.mte; / 
3.2.2 the p1.}rchase, receipt,. lc~e or other a:cquisitfo.c, o'\vnershlp, holdi:ng, 
imp-rovement, use ~nd other d'eafJ.ng wirh Property wherever located; 
000361
10:3361263 
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• • • ,j ..... 3 the 3a1c., conyeyance1 mortgage, pledge, leaae, exch.ailge, a,,d oth;:r 
dtspasmon of Properr-;; . 
. 3,1.4 the eutering ~to ·con>;racts and gtiararrties-; incurring oflfabiiities; borrowing 
money, J&~ance of nott; bono;;, and orJ1cr ooligaticr,1$; a:id the sccu:riog af any of.its obligarions by 
mC:1rtgage Ol"' pledge cr-My-afir~Pmper1)1·or1ncome; · 
J .2.5 the 1end~g.of money1 invescrncr.t and rcii~ves-,..11ent ·of the LLC' 3 fundg a:1d 
r;eipt antj holding of Pr?pcrt'f ~s. securir; for repa~en\ includhig, w.ith'out lin:iitatiori. tho .lo~"lg 
o, .mon(;..-y to, aqd other,1,1J.Se belpmg Member; officers, emp[oye-eg, a.ud agents; 
3.2.6 the conduct of ihe LLC's business, the est.ablishme;oi afllC office~ and the 
exercise of the pow en of the LLC with.in or ,;;..itho111 the Seate~ · 
3 .2.7 the appointment of employees ,'lnd agects of the ILC,.tb.e defining of their 
du-cles1 the _establishment ofq-ieir i:ompenMtion; 
3.2.8' the payment of pensions arid es~blishment of pep-?~on plans, pension trusts._ 
profit 3ha..ring. phms, and ben~fit and' in¢entive p)a..'13 :fur all or a.r.y of the current or former Members, 
employees, and agent.:. o.f t.1e U..C; 
3.2.9 the making of d.cnatfo~ to the public ·wel.fure or for religious charit..o.ble, 
scientific, UreraIJ or educational purposes; 
3.2,1 O the pa:;mem or donapon, or a:.nyoth.er act that furthers the business and affairs 
oft.ie L~C; 
3.1.1 l tbs paym.ent of com_peJ1sarion, or·add:itiana.l compensa-tiern to any or all 
M~mb-er-3, 'and einployees on account of sr!rvices prelliou.'i!y rendered to the limited liahllizy 
carnpuny, whethei or not an as;reetnemto pay such compensation was made before ruch scrv..ces 
were rendered; · · · 
J .2.12 the purchase: ofiosurance oi:i th.: life of~ny ofl1s Memb-:.ra, or' crnploye.es for 
the bene:fit of tbe LLC; 
3 .2. l 3 the pa.rt:icipati.on in ps.rmenihlp agreen;ients, joint venrur~, or other 
as3ociatfon.s of any !cind ._vir.h any pc.so.i or p,:mons; · 
3 .2.14 the inqemrification ofMe·rnbers or any other Per:lon. 
3 . .3 Mai o.i:i.f..Y.. ·~eoever any matter i.:i required er allow~d tci be app·rove<l by a: ~Jority 
of ch e Members or a Majority of the rc1nainir.rg Member:; undpr eJ, e Act or the- Opcntfag A~~emer.tt, 
such matter ehatl be c.::onaidered approved 9r coc1$ent;a~ tc up!On the re~eipt afthe a.:ffimia:tive ii.pprova.t 
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( al] the M~b~1 entit!~~ _to vqte ~n a particular matt~. For this purp~ie, the Sha..-ing Ratios of all, 
~fr=rnb~':' 3fHt~ ?e considered i;"t d.e:tennirung whether a Majority hll.ve vcied·ln favor of an action, 
l~espec:t .. rve or. whether or not ·a M~rnbcr partfoipsre-s in 3\lCh vota. A..;;sigq·i;;es and, in the case of 
apprn,,a.Lsto WI~drawal where consent of the r~ma.inir.g Members is required' dissociating »ri~bera 
shall noc be ¢o~s1dered·Mem~er3 ~t:1titled to vote for the p1.1rpcse of ~etcrn::irii:pg a M;ajorit:/· In i:he 
case cr,..f a M~~cer wb.a bas d1spas~d of Chat Me~bi;r'! ~tire ?v:(emb~r.sJ-tlp :i;nt:cr-c:.rt to pn .A..saignee., 
but has iaat oeen removed as a. Member, 'the Sharing Rs.tio of such Assiilec i.ha!l' '6e ·cohs.i.'de:rea iit 
detimr..iuing a !vfajority and. such Member's 'lOte or ~onsent shall be d;cnruned bv :ruch Shar<..n!2: 
ludo. · · · ~ ,., 
·, ... 
ARTiq..B4 
MEETING AN]? AMENDMENT 
4.1 Ge"l'!,eq,l. Actioll! a!')d deci.sfo~s requirfog the approval of the M~mbe~· pur.suant 
co any pro"lision 6fthis Op~rating Agreement may be auchorized·or rnade either by vote oft.he 
raquired rmmber 9f Member~ tal:cen at a meeting of the Memb~s,· or by une.ni!llOUS written . 
c~nsent 'Without a. meeting. In a.ddmon, · emergenc-1 a£:ticru may be taketl in )l.ccordance 'With the 
provi3ions of Article 4.6 hereof. · 
'· 
I ,. 
4.2 Meetine:s. Any Member may mr.ll 11, meeticg 1a co:psid~ approval of an. ~o~ ot 
decision \.l.'Ccler aey provision ofthi.s Opera.ting Agre-~iment by delivering to each other·Membe:rn.otic~· 
of the time aJ;1d purpoae of such m~eting at least five: <S) busi.ru:113 da.ys bcl'ore the _da.y of s-.icJ:i 
mee~fug, A Member m!JY waive the ~~quiroment of notice of a i;oeetfog ei~er by attending such 
cneetfu.s qrex:ecuf.ng a written waivc.i: before or-after gucb. m~tLr1g. A.Ily such .meeting shall be held 
during "the Ll.C s norm~l busmesJ h9urs; at its principw. pla.ce qf b1.1!,ine9s tin les..s all of th.e other 
Me,ml,ers coJ1se~'t in :writing er by their atteudance at irut::h meeting to its be.ing held a.t ua'!±l,er 
Joca:-~n or time. Notwimstandmg my qther proviaion of t..'tis Op.era.ting Jl...gr~en~ if all the 
memb~ ho Id a me~ting at any time and place, such m~~g shall be. val~d wi-Jtout calf or notice 
a.ud aoy la.wful a.~cn taken at such meetjng sh8:1] be the acticn of t.b.c members. · 
. ' 
4,3 MeetinC's t,,~ T~ephmie. Meetings cf i.'.he members may be ~dd by co:n.fcr~ce 
telephone Ot' by a.TJy Other mc3:nl; Of CJ:Jm,muni~atioq by wmoh aJl p~rticipaots can he.at c.icb. other 
si.muI~e:ously during the m~ting, and such p.ardcipation ~ha.lJ con.,1:itute presence _in person a.t the 
rnceting. 
. . ' . 
4.4 IJm,.ilhnc-us Consent. Any Member may.propose that me LLC authorize itil a.~on 
0~ decision pur:ru~t to any provision of U,js Operating Agreement by lJn.an.imous writt~o C.C:Jn.sen:t of 
alJ Meroben in lieu of a. meeting. A Member's written conse.."J.t may be evfr~enc~~ tr.1 hi.s signatore 
on a coun~crpart of t.be proposal or by a separate .writing (includit1g facsimile) that ide.n.tifie.s r.he 
proposal with reai.ooable specifi.cizy af).d Sl~ates u"lat sucb Z....(ernoer consents to sucjl proposal. 
•" 
4.5 Va~e bv 'Prozry, ~- Mim.bc:r may vo~e ( or cx:~c'\ltc a. written ·conse:nt) by pro~/ gt,1en 
to !i!IY ocher Member. Any such proxy must be in writing ·r.nd muat identi..i.7 the specific meeting·or 
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ceservaric~s, ff a.1y) ccming bef~re i:be .L+,C fol' approvaf Wlc!erany provision of this Operating 
Agreement prior to ii specined date (which shall not be later t~an the first ar..!Jlvervary of the da:te on 
·which .1iuch p.ro"7:'j is given). PJr:'J S".ich proxy shall be revocable ai ~/ time and sbaH not be effective 
1l't any meerlng ai: which the Memb~'. giYing such, proxy is in a.ttend.anc::. 
·· ·· 4. 6 · Ern.err;ericv Procedures. Notwi!hstanding any ath~r p.rqvi4ip~ ~el."e~( in the ever.t 
that fy!cr,nbers who could authori..ac: a I.LC aeticn or decision at a duly ~a!Jed° ~ting reasonably 
deiemrine, in ~'lriting, chat ~he LLC is £acing a aigmtic;ant business emergency that· req_uiics · 
inuncdiue a.ctjon., such Membeo may, withoui comp]}ing witp. gene~y applicable procedures. for 
m~tijig~ or actions by unanimous .consent. authorize any a.ciion or decisico. that .the"] deem 
r~onabJy ~ecesaary ro allow the LLC to ben.eflt .from a lignificant opportunity or to protect the ~C 
from signi:fical.lt lo$S or d.arnage, pro~ded° that !hey rn~e reasonable efforts under the circtim$:mces 
to c~tacr. ccnsu.lr al.l Memben concerning ruch 1;tctio_n or dacision and t-ie r~on why such action 
o:r dec~:.ion ms! ·be made whhout ob.serving generally applicable proceduras . 
. ,4: 1 R2cords. The UC s.ball roam.ta.in permanent rw:ir.ds of a.ii action3 ta.k:..'1. by the 
Members pursua.'lt to acy pro1?ision'of this bp~ating ~.:rccment, mcladitig minutes of all LLC 
m~!~~ copi~ of all action& taken by eonsem of the Membe~,, and copie$ of all proi'<ies pursua."'It 
to which one Member vorcs or exeC\l.tes a consent cm behalf of another. 
4.S Qperating Azeo.ern.en.t Mi.v Be 1'.:fodif3ed. This OP,erating A.greemer.t may be 
modifie-4 or a.mended from time to time l:,lnl}' by a written instr\Jr.rtent a.do"pt;:d and ~ecuted by all of 
the Members. 
4.8 .. 1 De.~i.gr,ated Re~re.sentatives. In the c.aae. of a. member that is a corporari.on, 
pan.'l~i'.ip; limited iiability company, or oth~r orga.oiza.ttcm, asso'cfa.tian or entity (an ~tit/ 
Member"), such member shall designate. ·one (1) individual who alone· .shall be cntjtled to attend 
meeting; of the LLC a.t,:1d vote sucb member~ s. Sba.."iµg Ratio .. Entity membeTJ may change their 
designar.ed repre.sem:atives fi-911? time ·to rime by proViding the LLC with notice of su~b change ia 
accordance wicb the pra-visiollS ofthjs Operating Agreement. .AJJ.y chMge in an Entity Mei:ioer•s 
design'a1ed repn:seUi.3.tive a.nail be effective up.on tba LLC's receipt of notice of such ch,u1gc. 
4.8.2 'Right to Relv o,n..Pesi!llgted Rel2!,_eserrtative. The LLC, and its memben, 
shiIII. have the light to rely on the most recently appointed designated. rcpre.:ient'a.frrc of a., .Eruity 
.Member. ·Each Entity Member shall be li.3bJe to indrunnif'J, defend a.nd hold h?-nnfess the LLC a.qd 
t,he other members from all cost, liability and damagi;: that any of such indero.uined persons m3'Y 
iru:ur (inciuding, without lirn.lta.tioo, a.ttorneys' fees a.net ~xpenses) arui.ng: frotD or relat~d to aoy 
.dispute concerning ~e authorit:y of an Entity Member's designis.ted represematlve. 
ARTICLE 5 
. ACCOfJ~'T.ONG ~'\ID RECORDS 
5. i .Beaks of Acccunc. Ttie LLC shall keep adequate boo-ks and records a.t it:;. 
.Pr in.cipa.l p1ace of business, ~~cting forth at rue and acctJra.t~ account cf. aU bu.~~~s~ cransa.ctioos 
OPERATING AOREMENT- 7 
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arising our. ~f :L'l din c~nn~ction with the conduct of the LLC. The Memoen agree th~t Jeffre.-1 
W. Casey sn.a.!l be responsible for th~ boo~3 a..id .rec~nh, ~A...,y Member or bis designated have 
the rig:ht, at ~y r~sou~b.la ti.me, to have.access ro a.1d inspect ~1d copy the contents of such 
bocks or .reccrds. A;ty Me.-nber requesting ~cess to or i.,apection cf such boob O!" r.ecords sba.Il 
P,s.7 1.Jienasonable i:!ost of such accesa or inspection. · 
•, I • •' • ' • 
• a .. •• - .. • 
5 .2 Fiscal Y eru:: Tne fixal year- of the LLC shall be th; cal~;d; yea; . ...., 
S.3 AccoupJing Re:30i!S. W1thin ninety {90) days after the close of each :Bit~ ye;u-1 
each m~mb~ shall receive an unaudited tepor: of the activities of ~he LLC for the praceding 
fis~ year, mcluding a copy of a. b.alax,ce si"leet cf fne LLC a.s of the er .. d of such year and a 
sta.temem: of incorn; or loss for such ye1Ir. . · . 
. . -S.4 Ta.-..:: R~. "vVitl#n ninety (90) tjay~ mer the end of ea.ch focaJ yer, each 
member shall be furnished a s-taten,ent suitable for u.sc in th·~ ,ortpa;a.tion of the mi::m.ber' s 
ill come tax r~tum. Gho-wiug t~ amount:; of any disnibutiom, coritrib\.'rio.n.s, gai.:is, losses, pronts, 
or credits allocated to l.!\e member duricg suc.h fiscal year. 
S.5 T~ Maners Partner. R.eiiee :Baird shall be de.,ignatcd to act ~ th~ tax 
mattera partnet ofthe-tLC punuanc tq §o23l(a)(7) of the Intemal Revenue Code. Am.; member 
designated as tax.,matter3 pa.r"1..1:1.er shaJI ta.'<a :nrch action a.s may be peces:i.aty to cawc each other 
memoer tc become ~ notice partner >Vithfo the meanl.ng of §6223 of tI,e Code. Arzy m~ber wh.o 
~ is d~s.ig:nated u.x matter partner ma.y not ta..°1<:e a..,y action ccntompl.a.tc~ by §§6Z22 through 5232 
ofthe"Internal I;tevenue Code-.;,,.ithaut tb-e consent oftbe members. 
ARTICLE6 
ALLOCATIONS 
6.1 AUocations GeneralJy. Except as othery.'ise provided in this Operating 
Agreement) all items of income, gain, loss, deduction and c.r&dit oft.lie U.C shall be allocated &PlQog 
all the .r.iember.; fu. proportiqn ta the.ir Sharing Ratios. 
o.2 Lo::s Alloca.tioa!I . .Las~es of the LLC shall be allocated to the membe:t:s in 
ptop-ortion to their Sharing P...a.~~s, except that.in the cMe of'a.los.s realized on the jjquidat.ioo ofthe 
LLC under Article 9 hcreo~ one hundred percent {100%) of aucll loss shall be ~Itocaced to th~ 
memhe.rs who ha\1e made ~ash or a.greed value capfral contributions to the LLC (in ¢e same 
rel~tio..,ship as their ri:spective capit~ accounts. pave beec. reduced t9 zero. 
. . 
6.3 Net Pro-fit AHccations. Net pro:fi.ts from the LLC's operations shall firn be 
allocated co the·memben who receive cash or property ilistribunons under Sec.rion 7,3 to the exte11t 
o,fth.::: cash distribwtiq-q.s received during t.he extent of the cash distributions received ·during the 
appticab~e ~able year ~nd th;:;.; to the members in proportion to !.he f?lSpective Sha:.··fog ·~uo.s. · 
6.4 Nc.t Gain AJlocati_Q~. Net gai.n from a sale of all er s-,.;bstarrti.atly .~ o.f the LLC's 
000365
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(·-) asse1s s;-;all be a!1ocar..erl ar.ic-ng m; members i.1 prop.orJ-on to their re:;pecrive Sharing Ratios. 
• ...... 
~-5 · Capital AcCOU;'l1S. An indivfduaJ capital account shall be maintained for e,ac.h 
me,,ilier. Each rne."'1'.ber' 5 capi1al a.cC01.mu,.'i.all be 0) cre:dhed with all ca.pi:ial co~butio;is by ruch 
member a."'!d me member.' 3 distributive share of ail income and gain Qncluding aey mco~e ex.empt 
· from fod~raUr:come ta't); an.cl. (ff) char,ie~ wit'2- the- :imoum. Qf all 'distnb1..'i:ians' to such m~mber and 
the members' s distributive 3ha:re of losses s..,d deifo-~tioq_s. Capital a.ccou.1ta "'hall he ma.in.tamed in 
accordance -with federal income t~:t -accounting principles M :iet forth m Treas. Reg. l-704-
1(b)(2)(iv) or any su~c:t:Jsor provision. · 
6.6 Ccm:gHa.uce ~ith Section 704. The piovisions afthis Article 6 a,s the-1 re.late: to th:: 
rr,ainrnoance of e2pital accmmts are inten4ed> B..'1d shall be conat.'lled~ and; if necessary, modified a~ 
provid{ld ia .<\rticfe 12, 'iO Cause t:he ~t1oi;:ations Of pra'fits1 losses, LnCO.Di;C, gain IL"ld credit purm.i?,TI.t 
to .A..-tide 6 to have subs.ta:ntia.J economic .effect under ~.he Regulations promulgiited under § §704(b) 
and 704(c) of the Code, in light o:fthe distributions made pur?Ua.nC t6 A.rJcJe 7 and 9 and the capital 
conui.btruons me.de punuant to Article 2. 
ARTICLE i 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
7.1 Di;tr:ibutiop.s a.r Members' Di.scr:!tion_ Ex~ept ~ otherv,,i,sc provided in this 
. Operating Agreement, dfa:tn'bueians of the LI.C's cash anil?,ble for d[nnoution shall be ma.de at Teas't 
senri-aMua]y for ~ach fiscal year. 
7.2 Ca;lh Avail.able for'D.i.stribution. For purposes oft,.1,fa Article 7 the phra3~ "cash 
av:tilabk for distribution" shall mean cash of the LLC 'Q.lhich th.e memj).ers reasouably determine may 
be distributed without impairing the ~bility of tho UC to .co..rry out its pUI]JOScs, mer ta.1<;:ing into 
accoUJlt tbe aci;u.al an~ .anticipated e-,q,eruies of the LL.S: a.id sµch reserves as the rn~bers_reasona.bly 
dci::m ad'0sab[c to protcor. theLLC fram future cash s.hol""\'.fa!ls. Up011 distribution i.n accordai::i.ce with 
this An:icle, the ,capital account f9r eacli. member shall be charg~d for the u.;noum of the pa~crit ta 
that membe:r. · · 
7.3 Di~ml:ru:tia:n Schedule. Distributions of the LL~' s cas:b. a.vail~ble for distribt,:.tian 
sha.U be made in the foJJo,;.,:ing order of pr:iorl~;: 
7.3. I Ret.'1.irn of-Capital A,,1y ca.sh a:v.al!able for distribution shall be distrfbuted to 
the member; until th.e. members b,we received C;jJO distributions w.hic.h are re1.ums of u..rital fo_r rhe 
full value of ce member.s' ca3h or 11.grc-:d value capital contributions .. 
7.3 .2 · Rema.hung Casb. A.1y cash· a.vailahle for dism~!-)tion ~ern.ainiog after 
sarlsfacdon of the retum of capital prcvid~d in Section 7.3. l shall be dfatributed to the rnembera in 
propordon to their respective Sha.-::ng R:i.tio!il. 
7.4 Sha,n.d Prioritj~s. Tfrbcre is more than cine member who ls entitled t.o rhe s.irne 
. . 
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'priority. of pistibutioli ~d th.ere is not encugh cash e.vaIJsble · for dist.ibutioIJ to co..,zr aJJ · 
cfistr;butions iu t~t priciity cate3or1, the cash available for disrribution shall be allocac~d ~d · 
d.15:..ri~ut,:d to t.he members entitled fo di.rtribm.ipri \1-rithb tha:t priprity. categ~~;I in t.hc relatic;ins.hlp 
which eacb cft1e member'uespcctive clafo1s in that priority ca.t~g9i'l bear tQ the,oca.l claims .of ail. 
members in t.111t priority category. ' 
- •';"' ·- ... -1 ... • 
ARTICLE 8 
....... 
DISPOSITION OF MEi\ffiERSEI? IN1'FJE,?TS 
. 8.1 Restriction~ on. Dispos-ition. No member cr·asaignce sbaJJ sen, conirlbll1e, _gift, · 
encut:iber, h.y-pothecate1 exchange oraClicrwise dispose of( collect.ively, 1'Transfif) all O( any ponicn 
of his Sha....·ing:Ra.tio without the expn::ss, priorur,a.nimous written consent of the-remaining me.mbet:'3., 
except .as pjovjded in SectJOll.9 8.1, &.2, 9.3_, .9.4 and 9.5. Eac.h member hereby ack:nowled~ ~c 
reasonableness of the restrictions oo. dispcsitiao im.ppstd by this Opera ti r.g Agreement in vte:\V o:f 
th~ LLC' s purposes and the rcla.tionsbip 9fthe mel!Ibera. Ac.cording1y, the restrictions on disposition 
.contained herein shall be spedfica.Hy enforceable. 
. 8.2 Prohibited Tranlsfers. Any purpori.erl Tra.usfer of ~I or a..,;1 portit;m of a. Sharing R..uio 
that does not satisfy the reguiram.ents of SerJ:io!l 8.1 sba11 be null and void !l,11d oflJ~ farce or effect 
wnataae.'iler; provided that, if t.\c LLC is required to recogni;Ze· a Tr:i.1s:ti:r thar. does not meet such 
requirements ( or if the LLC, :bi its. sole di:icyetion, elect:3 to n:cogniz~ e. transfer that does nor ~fy 
siich requirement~), ·ti1e Transferred Sharing Ratio shall be strictly t\rnited to· the tra.ruif~rar's 
economic rights "With respect to the Transferred Sharing .J?..1tia, which econotuic rights ma. b~ applied 
(v.-ithoµt limiting any other leg.al .or equit~ble rights oftb.e LLc} to satisfy any debts, obliga-cion.1, o:v 
liabilities .for da.qw.ges that the q:-ansfcror: or i:issignea,of such S~aring Ra.do may have to the LLC. 
In the case of a Transfer or attempted Transfer. of a Snaring Ratio r.hat does not satisfy such 
re.quirements~ the µar-Je!! c:rJga.g:ing or attempting to engage jn :nic::h 1'r3lls:fer shall be liable to 
indemnify, deft;nd and hold harmless ch9- U..C ;mrl th,e other members from llll cost, li;d-bilicy, and 
da.ma:ge t:1Ett any of such iIJdemni..fied pe.r:ions ma-y incw (i.ccludi!lg, 'P'tithour limitation, i:ncri::i;n~tal 
t~ liability and attorneys> ~ei!;s and expense.:s) as a result of Sltch Transfer or attempted Transfer a..."ld 
effo:r"i'S to enforce the inderr.ru't)' grantee hcl."eby. · · 
. 8,3 Adrni.~.,Ton of A,3s{gnees /!S Members. Subject to che. ot1H'!r provisions ~fthis A.""ti.cle 
8, an :c.signee of a Sh!'!,ring Ratio may be admii1ed ta the LLC as a member or.lly upon a majoricyvote 
of th.e members and the satisfaction of such othcrtenns o.nd conditions as they shall requfre. 
. . . 
S.4 Ffaht::i ofU11admitted Aasii;mee.s. A pen on who acquires e. Sharing Ratio .btit who 
is cot admitted a3 a menJ.ber pursuant to trus Article iJ (an "A.ss·(g;:iee") shruT b~ em;itled onlj to the 
ecooon:iic rights\~rh ·re~cct to r1uc'h t:ra:n3fcrred Sha.-ing .Ra.tic in a.coonianc.e w.it:.h this Opentiog 
A~rcement, and"shall h~ve M rigl}t to.voi~ on a.ny ma.tters as a mem,b7r1 shall ~ave .not right ra apy 
information or accounnng of .the mam Qf the LLC, shalt not be enmied to mspect d1e. books or 
recor~9 ot'th.e Ll.C, an.d :sliaJ! cot have any of the: rights of a member Ulld'erthe Act or this Opera.tmg 
Agreement. 
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ARTICLE 9 
~;.rrnmAAwAL 1t1'J.u nrssoLUTIQN 
· 9.1 Vtrthctrawa!. Each member agre~s not to 'i'fithdraw from the LLC :vnthout the· 
co~se:it of itl1 01her members. A vohi.n.tary ·,.;r,ith~rawal in violation of this Section 9. l shall be 
er._T~i'Jg'afr~.c~re~ (3) w.Oliths 1>11irten iJOtice dclh·e;ec-t::, th~ ~ariager:;, but ~h~ co.n:::tit.i~c a 'brea,h 
or cbis Oper~.1.ng Agreement for which th~'Ll..C a.1d or.her memberri ,hall have all remedfo3 orovidecl 
under appJ~cab1e [aw. · · · 
9.2 Events afDfasolution, Except as otherwise prc-1,ided in thl.$ Operating Agreement, 
I.he LLC shaD· dhs~lve up'c)Q the ear!icr·ot (a) deai:h, incompetence, dissolution, wnninatfon at' 
f.of;fcitur:! of the right co do bu¢ness qf a..1.Entil:J ?vfomber, ba:nkru ptcy or "'i1:J1dra:waJ of a me:o.ber: 
(o) sale of all or subsca.,tlally a1l ·of tl1c LLC's assets; (c) a. vote of the me..11bers holding at least 
seve.~-tive percent (75%) of the Sharing Ratios; or (d) {lpproval of dissolution by an. un!mimcus 
Vote oft.he memb~rn. · · 
9.3 Effect ofD§ath ofa Member. fa the event cft.he death of a Member, tp.e remaining 
Members may with.in· 90 days elect to: 
9 .3 .1 Continue the LLC /l.Ild adn:i{t th.e deceased· Member's spouse .• cs.ate or other 
benc±icfaPJ as a ~eroba; in place of the deceased Member; or · 
. . 
. . 9.3 .2 . Contlm.ic the LLC ?,mong the sun,iving Members and purcll.ase tpe: interest 
of the decel.'.led Me.-n~er pursuant to the prpvisjons o.fSeecior.s 9,8 ~nd 9.9. 
. The ~lection··shall b~ at the sole discretion of the surviving Members and shall req_qire ~h.~ir .. 
unanimous consent. lfthe suJv'iviog Members do net so elect, the LLC shaU ~e dis::i6lved. . . 
9 .4 ~e_g of1..1/i.thdrawaJ or Other Event. Upon th~ inco~petonce, "''ithdrawal, 
exp1Jlsion, bankr..rptcy, or dissolution of a Member~ ·che reroai.ning Members may wi'chin"ni:nery (90) 
days, 'witho1.:1i waiving my n.:111edies in the case ofvolunrary withdr:iV?a!, elect to coct:inlle the µ,.c 
arno~g themselves a.r~d. to purchase 1:he i.nterest of the affected Member pt.muant to the _provisions 
cf Sectiona 9.8 and 9.9, Th~ election shall be at ti,e sole cfoicretion of.the remnining ?vfe.mbers- an~ 
shaJJ require rhei,- una.nimous·coi:1sent. If the remaining Member~ do not so elect, the LLG fhall be 
dissolved. · 
9.S Put/Ca[) Offerine;}Jocice. If a Me:mb~.t determirre:s to Dispo~e 9fru5 Merobeis.hi.p 
!merest for- a.ny reason at any tiin~ during ::he term of tJus Operating Agreem~t (tbe "Io.itia.~,g 
Member"), such Member shall give wri;ien notiqc · (the ."Put/C:e,11 Ofr'ering Notice'') of intent r:o s-eU 
P.l~. but not less tha.o all, o.f its MemGi:rship !ntcrca~ that ts th~ Offered L,terest to th~ remaining 
Member (the ':Re3poriding Member"). The ~esponcilng Member may withia fifteen (I 5) days of 
receipt of1:h l?'wt/Call Offering Notice !!;SK for written cla.ri.5cation a& to a.ny asp.ects of the .Fut/Call 
Offering N6tlcc. The fol dating Member ,hall pro,vidc any clariticaticns the L'l.iti~1:ing Mcm~r r;ieems 
, approprfa.tei ,;,itlun five (5) days of r.ccelpt c,f tbe r,eque3i for clari6ca.cio~, 








, . . . 9 . .5. I Put/~all Qtreii..ig Notice. If~ .Member detennines to Di;pose of .his 
~~b:rsh1_p Im.err~ for a..,y reasot) at a...11y t!me during the te:.ri of thfa Opeq.ting f~greement (th~ 
mrna.tmg Member J, such Member shaU give written riotic:e (tbe "Put/Call Offering Notice") of 
intent tq sell a.l~ but net Jess than a.lJ, of ita Mcmber:ship Inter~st tba.t is the Offcr~9 Incere.st to "tho. 
... .,. ,.. ·~, _ : •. :~~~fl:!~~-~f~mb:.(_r:he "~espoodmg· Member'"). The ~spondlng M~mber may ,;i,ithJn ~eeo (l 5) 
· days ~1 r.ecelpt or tnc.Put1Ca.ll Offer:i~g·Notke a.* fo~written aial'tQ(.a~~ns.as.to,;µi;t aspe~ ofrl;le 
Put/~all Offe.-i.ng N9ti~. The l11itiatlng Member sba.lJ provide· any cte.rifications the" IcitiatL,g 
Member deems appr~ri·a:a mthln fure (5) day; of recei~ of the request fur clarifications. 
L · ...... ' 
. · 9.5.1 Purchase f.ricc -Terms. Th~ Initiating Member shall :;petjfy .in its Offering 
Nutice the purchase pri~ a.11d terms at which the Initiating Member would b1:: w'i.lliog to purchase 
an ucdivided ooe hundred percenr (100%) intere,t 11'.) th~ LLC. · 
9.5.:i .E:xer~l$c ofPytJCall .. Upo.n receipt of the Put/Cal1 Offering N"ctice, the 
Responding Mernber shall ~e obiig.,tea either: 
. . (a) To .1cll i:o the Irotia.ting Member ju Membership .Interests at a ~ce 
and terms equal to the amount the R.~omfing :M:ember.would ha.ve been· entitled to recclve. upon. 
d!.9$clution cf the LLC purS\.14.'l.t fo tbe liguidatiao distn1n:rdo.n provi~ons ~e. fa.r-J,, m Sectloll 9,6 a3 
if the tLC ha.d sold the Property to a ti'ii;:-d paroJ, at the prlcc a.od te~s set forth in" th Put/Call 
Offering- Notice, or · 
(b) To purchase the Membenh.ip 11r.ercst of the Initiating Member fqr the 
price and Cerros equal to rbe amount tbeirritia"ti.-r:g Member would have been enti1"fed to receive. upon 
disso!uti_cn ofth.e l.LC pur.sua~t to the Jiqwd:arfon dismoution- provisfona ser. forth in Section 9.6 as 
if the µc had sold the Property to a third pan:y, a~ ·cn.e price i1,ad terma sot forth in Pu;ltCaU 0.fff"...d.,g 
Notice. · · · . · 
9.5.4 Noti.flcatlon. The. Responding Member sba.Jl noth·i:i the Toiriating Member 
of its election within thirty (3 O} days after thi;: date of receipt of tbe Put/Call Offe..ri.'lg Nol.ice. Fai.lur~ 
to give nQtice within· the required thn~ pei:iod shaU be deemed an election by the Rasp.oncfuig 
Member not .to porch.as.:: the Offered Inte_rest but rather to sell in Membersrup foterest ·to ,:he 
lnit.ia:rion Member. The thlrty (30) da.y period shall be e:<tcnded for "five (5) da:ys ift.1e Re:spandicg 
Mcmberba:s asked for clatif.icadorts as set.forth above. 
9.5.5 Lapsa of Offer. If the ~spondi11g Member fails to respond to ti.ie Put/C~ 
Offering No"tii:e, or fo1lowm_g an o[~ciion by the Respondjng Member ta pu~cha:se the Offered 
Intetes; tbe Responding Member"fa.ils to can.~\H'O.i.11are the purch.sse of the entire Offered. ~terast in 
· acc1)rdai1ce berev.,,ith, tben tbe .Responding Me.."ll.ber aha!J be obligated to sell its entire Membe:r.:ih.ip 
Inrercst to the mi.tiating Member under the same terms and conditions as provided in the Put/Call 
Offering Notice. · 
9 . .5 .6 Li.t~jtat:ion on Exercise. Not,i,itru;ta.".lQing a.nyt.hiug to the contrary contained 
in rhis ,A..rtide 9-, no :Oisposirjon of a Mem_bership foter~s.t 5h:tll be penn.ittcd in the e;ve.n~ ibfit su_ch 
Member is a Defi,nqu::n.t Me-mbcr or has otherwise qr~cbed a..1y proviai~n of this Operating,: ... : 
... ~ ~· 
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Agreement. A:rJ Mc:ncer purchasfng he;-cu.jder 3haU be obfio-ated as a:·,-o"'dlt:i··on of~;..e D""cr.,,,·s~ 
1 ~ .. • •• I.) 1 - , #.I . ~..1.,1 ,1 ~ Dt.lo 1w., 
!of oo~~nrele.a.ses off~ guarantee,s ofLLC o~Hgafion:rtben outstanding as obl~gations cf any soiling 
1v. e:nue.,, 
. ·. 9.6 'Dfor.~bi.n:icn Uoon bisaoJution, Upon diaso~utlcn of the LLc· as provided in this 
· ,A.,"tlcle 9, the proceed a- foef.efrom shall be applied. e."ld. d).str.ibu.td ,llJ the.f.oIJpwing. oder. . . 
9 .6.1 First. to pay secured debts ~o thitd parties and members ( e:-.(,~ludjng a::iy d~bts 
to be asiiliI:led pwsuant to an aaJ~ sal~, if ai'ly); tben . . · ' 
. ' 
9.6.2· Sccon~.in ,hi: case of the l!al;i of.sub.~tantia.lly all oftbeLLC\:; a:rnet.:!-, tp pay 
the c<?st:S of such saie; ti.en · , . 
9.6.3 Third. to pay unsecured debts of the LLC owed to c.rcditci:s other the.n 
rnember3; tten 
9.6.4 Fou~h, ~a pay uns~cured d~bcs o.f ihe LLC owed to me~bcr:s; t11.:;n 
. · . 9.6.5. FL't.h.,. to IJlt}mbers wbo h.a.-ve made i:a.sb cap,taJ or agTeed .. va1ue contribc"Jo.ns 
ta the LLC to the e;rtent of sµch cash c:;..pitaJ or a.greed value contributio11;s; then 
~: Ratio.s. 
9.6.6 The balance, if any) w me.m):1er3 in proportion to· theii respective Sharing 
,, J, I 
·~t ,, 
•·' I 
. 9. 7 ~istribution~ and Al!ocations in Respect to pi3oos.:'!d of M¢mbers.rup .IptM'~SC5. 1f 
any Me~1bership Interest is sold, as:.ign~ or Disposed of duJing any T~.~la Year in _comp.Uan~e 
with the provisi':)nf ofthh Article 9, Nee Profits, Net Laa.ses> each item there~:!; anq ::in other ittrns 
attribumbie to the Di.sposed o.t: Membership Iateresr fur such Taxable Year. ahall be divided and 
!3,!located berwe.ett ~he transferor and the .i\saignee by mk:ing inco 1!,Ccou:qt th~ir varying Members.hip 
lnterescs during such T~abte Yee.r in accordance -1.iith_code Section 706(d), using any canvencfoos . 
pera1itted by law and seJ ectc~ by the Member 3. .Nl Distributions ot or before t.ie date of ~,ch 
Disposmon sh11/.l be; made to the tra.n.sferot,and al.J Dfatributio'ns rh,erea..-4:er sbaU l:ie ma~~ to the. 
Assignee. Solely fqr purposes of making ruch a.llot.a.iicns and Dis,rr:ibu1iom1. the 1.I ,C sJ1all recognize 
such Disposition not Jater than the end of the cd[endar month during: ?,'hich it is given noci.ce: of such 
Dispo$ition , provided t)at , if the LI..C i9 given noti cc: of a Disposition at 1 ease ten (10) Busme5s 
pay$ prior ~o the D!sposition the l.LC .shall recognize such Disgosition as the date of such 
Disposl:don, and p.-ov/de.cl furthe1 thnt1 if tl,e LLC doe~ not re·ceive. a .notice stating r:h.r. date such 
Member:irup Interest was Disposed of Md m.t\:h oth<;:r infqrmation a.~ the J:v~e:nbers ma rcasonabJy 
require withln thirty (3-0) days af.l:c:r the end ofth; Taxab 1c Ye~r during "Vhich the Disposition .oc~rs, 
thcp all ruch it~m5 shnll be aUocatcd and ~l .Disrrlputions ~haJI°be ma.de, to the. Person who, 
a.ccordini to the books and record~ of the: LLc;.;, ~as the. owner ofch; Membership Interest qn the la.s~ 
day of the Tax:able Year ~u,ing ·which tbe Dispos.iticn occt;.rs. Ncithe.r th0 LLC n.or a.cr-1 M~mbe, 
sh,dl incur any liabllit"/ for makfog a.Uocatioqs and Distributions in a.r.corda~1cc with the provisions 
· of chfa Aniclt:1 9. 7, w.hethcr ·or n.ot any Member a·f rhe LLC hl!.3 know!edgEJ of any ·cfispcsition of 
- . . . . .. )~ ' 
' ..... ..; 
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. 9. 8 Valu~:rion of Member' a In1erest. Upon an election ·by ;:he L.LC to purchase the. 
)nt~c~ ofa. Memberpur:ruantta Section 9.3 or 9.4, the value of\,,e affor,.tedMember'sinmresr shall 
be deterrr.rine.d by a fuir market value apprafaal of the Asaec;s (tho "Appraisal"). T'.a.e Appraisal shall 
be· ~mpleied by an }...{Al de~ign.it.."'C' ifppr(tiserYaii'Jii:i:r wt!:h sirnilar·~mmercjal·p,roveinqs, \l;,-j¢ said 
appraiser ta Qe seiect~d by a majoricy· of the oilier Members. The value cf the 0"?JDership.Interesc 
shall be determined bas~rl on the fajr· market value a.'l determined by t~e Appraisal and apportioned 
a..'110ng the O~~shlp 1"1tcr:;sts iri ac.cordanc:e 1i"ith the disnibutiolj provisions of Section 9.6. Sl.,lch 
amount would be qi.e same a.mount attribut,J.ble to tbe same Owners~p Jqterest if the Assets we;ra 
bein~ sold~ tl1e Appraisal established fuir market vah.ie and th~ resultant proceeds apportioned a3 
ser out in Section 9.6 . 
9.9 ~e]1C for Memb~r1 s Tntercm;. The purchase price for a Member's irn:arest 
purchased pursuant to Section 9.3 or 9.4 sh(ln be paid b 5 rubstantiaIJy equaI, consecutive annual 
pa:yn:ie:O.cs, including principal and intc.rcst. rnt~re3t shaJJ ac~rue ~t the rat~ oft~n percent ( 10%) pe:-
annum. Th~ .fir.st pflyment shall be made at the close cf the transai.tion and the subscq~ent pa.ym~nt.s 
ey.hall be mi;de each year on the anniver3J.ry ofth?,t date. TheLLC may prepay the ramaln.ing a.mount 
of the purchi!.3e price tu any time. 
9.1 O Effect ofFurchase o:fMember'e Interest. A Member shall cease to be aMernbcrupon. 
the LLC's election to purchase the Member's interest pursuant to Section 9.3 or.9.4. During the 
period in which the LLC ls rpa..l<lng payment:i to the fom:ier Member, the :for.n~r Me.'1't.ber slu.11 have 
no rights as a M::mber irl th LLC. 
. ARTICLJ:i 1 O 
MJSCEU.A.t~""EOUS 
I0.1 Additional Documents. Each member' shall exeCtJtc s-...ich·a.ddiclona!-.dacum.ents 
and tab such actions~ are rl!~sonably reque:rt~d in order to complete or ~onfum the tra:nsac+Jo.n.s 
contemplated by thls Operarix1~ Agr~ernem.. 
10.2 I-Ieadin,s-s. Beadirtgs in this Operat[n~ .~aernen.r are for convenie11c:! orJy and .3ha.ll 
not affect its .JI),eaning, 
l 0.3 ~-~verabirirv_ .. The invalidity Oi unenfc.rceabili'cy of a.'1y provision of th.is Operating 
Agreement sbaH not affect the validity oi: enfurcen.blli~ of the rerna0irig pro?ision.s. 
10.4 Tlijrd~Part"f Beneficiarie&. Tbc prc1.;fai00.s oftb.is Operating Agreement are intei::d~d 
S<Jldy fqr the b~ne:fit of ~he member:; and shall create no tights or qbUgation.s enfo:rceable by any 
i:b.i;d part'), including credfro,r of ih LLC, ex:::ept a.s other,v:se p~ovided q-y app1kabre law. 
J 0.5 No '?ar-..ncr:;hi.F. L-itended for Nontax Pun:ia.3ea. The m~mbe:-s ha:vefo~ed the L:CC 
1Jnd:er t1e A.ct, and expressly do not i1tte:nd hereby to form a partnei:~hip under either the Ida.ha 
. TJnifqi rn Pafl:i~r:;hip Act nor the fdaho Uniform r..lmiced Pa.rtner.gh.ip Ac:t. Tbe memi:?ers do ri~t·." ·· · ,.. 









1 .:· 1nt:md ro b-e_Par .... 1en one to ahother, Oi partnere: as ro any thlrd p~y. To tb.e e:ct::nt any m~mber, by 
word or ac=ian. represents to aqother person that any other member is ll partrie:- or tha{ the UC •is 
a pumership, rhe member mili.ng 3uc~ wTong:fuJ re_?resemarion shall be liable ro any othe: member-
... ' ~~... .,. 
I 
\ 
who ir;.C'Jr3·pqrsonar liability by reason or mch Y?.:'ongful repce~ntation. - -
· la. o fa.rirre~h.iti Iuten,j~d fnt Tax :Pumose.s. The members·have formed the LLC un<lc>.r -· , ..• 
the Act, and e:q:ires:;;Jy do imend hereby ta hava the Ltc clas~fied and treat::d for purposes of federal· 
and st~t!! income ra:~3tion as a pamiershlp. . . . 
10. 7 .8indfog Effect. E'"(:cept as other.:;,rfoe provided in tf1i~. Operating Agreement, every 
covena.,t, tenn a."id provision of this Qperadng Aarzement sball he biod.ing upon and inure to the 
benent of the members and their reapec_tive heir~> Jcgltees, legal rapre.sentatwes, ~c.ccesso-r... 
transferees, and a.~sigru. 
l 0. 8 Co:nsfruct.ion Every covenant, term a.'1d proviaious of this Ope~ting Agre0 ~ent 
shaH be construed simply according ta its :fui.r·meaning and noi B"' ...... ictly for or. aga;;nsi any member. 
The tenns of thls Opera.tiJJg Agreement ate in'tende~ to ei.nbody the eC£Jn9mic relationship among 
the member:; and sh.all not be subject to modification by, or be conformed with, any a.cti5;>n~ by th.: 
Internal Rivenue S~rvice except as i:J:1j3 Operat{pg Agre-ement may be e:{plicitly so a.-neuded and. 
c;(Cept as may r'ela.te spectfically to tbe fiJiJJg of tex returns.· · 
10.9 Time. Tfrne is of the essenc2 with respect to tlrls Operadng Ag:-eeme[j:t 
. 10. IO Goveµ1i.i,.g Law. The iav."3 of the State ofldaho shall govern the validity oftpig. 
Opera.ting Agre·ement, t.~e construction of its term~. ad the ioterpr..ctatioo ofth.e rights and duties of 
tlic members. · 
10. l l Waiver pf Action for Pa..Ytition; No Biil for Par,.nership Acc(nnting. Each oft.1\2 
.membc::-s irrevocably ,;i;aiv~s a..,y right that he may have ta maintain any action for partition .vith 
re~pc'ct to ·a..,y of the coinpany µropen.y. To the fl.Jllest extent pennitted by Jaw, c?..cb member 
coven-ams not to fiJe a bill for a limited liability co~p.a.ay accaul'.ltiag. 
10. l 2 Couoternan Executi<m. This Operating A.gree.'..nent may be ~xe~s;ed i.::rany :number 
of countcrparts·with the Jame eft'ect as if all o.f the members had signed the sa."l'le document.' AH 
coui:n:erpan$ stiafl b_e construed ragetber 1z.nd shaU cc.nstitut1:1 one a.~reement. ' 
l 0.13 .Snccific Pcrform.ance Ea.ch member agrees with the other; r;ner'JJbers thar the 
members would be irrepara.bly i:fa.maged if .a.rry· of the provisions of this Opera~\ng A.,:P'"eem~n1 aie not 
perfcnned in accordance with tb~ir sped.tic terms emd that monetary druriag~s would .not pro,;jde an 
adequate remedy loo such evear. Accordingly, it is agreed that, in a.~dition to any otbqr remedy to 
11,,·hicli tl.1<!! non-brcachlng members f:!:'i.1.Y be entitled, at law ot in equity, the 11on-brea.ching members 
3hR11 be 1:1mitJ~d ~o injunctive relief to prevent br~ach-es of the p,rovisfons of thi~ Opm.iting 
.. ;.gree.ment and speci.!h:;i!ly to enforce the terms a.nd provisions hereofi:n any ncci9n institµted in !l.I!,Y 
_cl:l'uri af the Unhed S~ates or it.'1y state thereo~ha.vin.g subject matter jurisdict~9n· t.he~:~f..,. .· · :: · \· i. ,.:r'· .. ·, .. ,. 
:·· 
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(<':"} .· 1. 0, 14 Notice. A1J .notices. dsma.:."1ds>· reguem and other C0.17'...:r,runicqtions reqt;ired or 
permitted hereunder sbaU b-~ in "wT.it.ing a.cd shall b~· deemed delivered o·n the earlier c.f (i) i:hree (3) 
day.i after tJl~ date of posting 9fregisterl!d or ¢er,:ified ma.if,° ~dcressea iO the ,:1.dd.ressc~ a.t ~S a;daress· 
&cc fortb llereia or ~t s11ch ct.l1er address as .such' part ma.y have specified· theretof9ra by notice 
delivered in l'!•:!cordan.ce'l)(ith Ws S.c....'"tion, (ii) anemp,:e.d d~livery or re:fiisnl to accept deli;,,,ery if sell!· 
by: OOl:!rie; or otbe;: pcr-sc.n.:,J, deliyer; serl.icc, .dt:.(iii).,,ai:ruru racdp~ by the addri;~~l;~.f?ls£1.iJ:l.!~~~ pf t~~ ....... 
method of giving notice. +he addresses &ec fort}1 .in Article 2, as a.."Jle;.1ded frcrn.time r6. time, ·s.ball . 
be used for purposes of giving notice to members. 
10. lS PJia-hts- an.d Remedles Cumulative, The .rights and remedies provided by this 
Operating Agreernem are cuim.t.1ative nnd t.lu,· use cf any one right or remedy by any pa~; shall ooc 
preclude or waive the right ~o uae. any or all oth~r remedies.. Said rights. a.i:i.d remedies a:re given in 
a<lditioo to iu1y othe.r rights the parties ma ~aye bey law, statm~. ar&nance or otherwis~. 
·10 . .l 6 Waive.a. Tbe fai1~re of any pa..rtyto seek red.ress far violation of or to .in3ist upon 
the ~ct performance of any covenant or condition of tJus Opera,ting Agreement shall ~ot prevent 
· a subsequent act, which would h,we ariginaHy cc-ostit-... 'ted a vfofation., froJTI .having the effect of a..".l 
original 1,,iofa.tion. 
W. J 7 Atro.rne'l Fe,:;,'J. In the evem any action is instituted ta enforce or determine the 
p1uti es' rights or duciea asisjng ou~ of the t~n..,s of thfa Operating Agreement, tbe pre:v-ailin.g parr shall 





Th,e follow~ng tenns used in thfa Agraement slwil h~ve the foUawing meai:.i.ngs (unle~s 
otherwise e"-1Jressly.providcd herein)~ . ' . . ' 
] 1.l .Adiustc~,i beficit sha!l mean, with respe;ct to a.ny ,m~rnber, tbe deficit balance, if acy, / 
fu such memo er' .s capital accour,.t n.s of the e-nd of the re:i·~vant fiscal year, after giving effect to the 
foUav.ring adj!.lstme::rrs: · · 
· · 11. l .. 1 The c:;i,pfta.l accauilt shall bl!! inc,aased by any arnoums whi.ch such me.mb(:r 
is obi1go:ted to t~tore pur;;uan't to a.JY provfaion of tQi,s .Operating Agreement or is deemed. t~ be 
obligated ta restore pur:mat1t to the ne:i:t t;:, the last se.ntences o(Rsgulations Sections 1. 704---2(g)~l) 
and .1. 704-.2(i)(~); and 
l J .1 2 The capiw1 account shall be decreis~d by the items described in S,!c!ipns 
l. 704-l (b)(2)(ii)(d)(4), 1 704-1 (o)(2)(ii)(d)(5) and l 7d4-! (b}(2)(ii)(d)(6) of tho R~gutations. 
The f9;egoiog dcifoit:Jcn of Adj~stcd· Deficit is i.nte.r.ded. co co.r.:,,ply wiHl the pro•1i7[ons o.f 
Section l. 704-1 (b)(Z)(ii)(d) of the Regt.1Iatior,s and .~hall be u1cer;,rctod ccnsiste~tly thq~'~1th.. , . 
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('") . ·~ 1 ~.2 D~reciation shall mean, foi e~c1'. focaf year>' an. amount equai ta.the d~rf!ciari.on. 
amorr.zat.:on, Or ptber Cost recovery deduction illowable With respect to' an asset for S"J ch fisc-.J j-cat'; . 
. pmvide.d, b?-wever, that if the. gro?, asse, vaju~ of an as:ic.t di~~r:; :from its ad.justad ha.sis fur federal 
income ra:-< purpoaes at tlie ~egirrnirg of such fiscal year, Depreoiati9Il 3hau be· an arncµ..,r. whiqh 
bears the sarne ratJo to such. begir.;I'Jln8 Grosa Asset Value as the felforal iucon::e ta.."'I: deo.redatioo. 
, ....... 
•. , ·· ··· amortiz~cion,. or o'r11er cost recovery de<liictiol'l for such Jis~1 yei.f p~a,r.s _rO}t./.CLJ. b~niZ}g. a~ju~ted 
tax b.uis; and further provided, however; that if the adjusted basis for feder.nl lqcon:ie. ca.~ purposas 
of nn asset !3,! the begjnni.ng of such fisccl year i:t zero. Depr.~cia:tio.n sJ,-..all be determined with 
reference to sud, beginning Grass Asset Value using any reasof!ab{e met.~od ~el~ed by th!! 
managers. 
I I) Qr.g_sg A.saet Value .s.lulI m.ea.r.1 a,., a~~~t's adjust~d basis for federal income ta,~ 
purposes) e;i;cept as foIJow:i: 
. l 1.3.1 The In.i~al Gross Asset Va:lue of fl!l.y asset c~ntributed by a mem]Je: to the 
LLC shall be th~ gross fair mMket value of roch liBset, as d-rtermi.oetl by t.he contrib1.rr.ing member; . '• 
11.3 .2 The Gross A.3.set Values of all a.~s·ers sbaJJ be adjusted to equal their 
r~pcctive gross fair market vahJ.es, as derem:tined bv the members as of foe fullowmg times: . . 
(a) Lhe acqui~ition of 11n additional interest in t.li.e LLC by .any new or 
existing member in ·e~cc.hange for more than a de w..inhnis capital contribution; 
(o) tfie dlst~bution by !he LLC to a member of more than a de win1a::i6 
a.'1iour:r of property as con.sidcratior, for~ lnterm in the LLC; and 
(c} the liquidation of the LLC within the meanhig ofRegulatious Section 
1. 704-J(b)(2)(ii)(g); proV1des however, the.t ~jusnne:,tfS pursua:it to clau.ses Ci) ~d (ii) abov~ s-fui.ll 
be made o.cly if the members r~asone.bly determine tn!lt such adjustments are ne.c.essruy o.r 
appropriai:e iO reflect the rda.cive Sharing Ratios of the members; 
. 7 l .3 .3 The G;css A.3sct Value of any asset di.mibut~.d to any member .shall be 
a.c.ijusted .to equal tht: gross fair market valu<! of sucT1 asi:Jet on the qate of distribution as decennin.ed 
by the dlstributec imd the members: · 
. i 1.3 .4 The Gi°O$S Asset Values of a.sset::. shall be incrca..o;ed (a.r decreased) to r~e~t 
an,, adjusun.::.its ta tbeadjuste<l ba~.is ofruch assetspur.ruant to Code. s~ction 7J4(b) or Cade Section 
~43(b)> but only to th~ extent that such adj1.lsL1nems ~ra take.n mto a.ccou.nr in det~imin~ng Capital 
Accouncs purjuant to P~t;gular.ion Sectfon 1. 704-l(b)(2)(iv)(m) hereof; provided~ ho'Yever, that Gtos~ 
Asset Value shall not be a.djusted pursuant to. tM5 Section 11.3.4 i::o· tp.e e;...."tent the ruemb.ers 
c.fotcrmir)e th.at an e.djusttnent ~s n-e:essa.ry er 11.ppropt.:iatc tn coiu:ectlon ~i.tb a trarua:ctfon tha.t wou~d 
ot11crwi-~ resulc in a.c c:,dju~1tnCilt pursuant to this S~ctio.n 11.3 .4; a.ad 
l l .J .5 Ifthc: Gross A.,:m Value ofa.n asset h~ been determined or.adjusted i:mrsuii..'1.t. •·,: 
. . ..• . ·:.' : . ::: . 
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a to Section. 1 j . .3 .1, l l .3 .2 or J l J .4 hereo( such Gross A.:lset Value shall .::hereafter be <1clju.sfoq by the 
Dcprecia~a;i tak~n into acco~mt with. r:;spect to such asset for purposes of computing_ profaa. imd 
losses, · 
l 1. 4 J..,LC. lvunimum C~in sba.U mean me ~a.me as "par"i.nm]Jip .mL.imurn gai"i:;'' ~ set form 
·in Sections 1.70~2f-iKZ:}a..,d l.704-2(d) ofthe Regulation~ .... ,. .: ... :,. ... . .... ,,_ 
.l 1.5 MemberNoorecourne Deb;;_ shalt have the i:n,eani.i1g set fcnb in Si;ctioo 1. 704-2(b;( 4) 
of the Rc:gulations for "p~er n.oarecourse debt.'' · 
· 1 i.6 ,\\f ember i'fonrccour~c J)ebcMi:n .. ~;, Gain shaU rnca.~ ~. ap,.ount, v,ith respect to 
each M...embcr N ~nrecoune Debt> equ aJ. to th LLC Minimum C.~n tha.t wo uJd result i;f 3uch ·Member 
No.nrecourse Debt were treated a.s .a NoNccaur.sc Liability, determined i.n accprdance -,,vith Scc-rion 
l.W4-2(i){3) afthe Regu.latfons: · 
11. 7 Member N anrecoune Deductia.rc.s shall. ha.ve ;:he meanJng set fort.Ii. in S ecti oi;1s l. 704~ 
20)(1) end l.704.2-(1)(2) of the Regufo.tjcns for "pa~er nc,nrecaurse deducti,ons.11 
J 1.8 Nonreccurse: Deductions sliaU h.a:ve the meaning f!et forth In $e~fon 1.704--2(0)(1) 
of the ReguJa.tioni. · 
1 I. 9 :t:{Qnr~cm~ne Liabmr,, shall have the meai.1i.ng s.et" forth in S<!ctiou J. 704-2(b)(J) o~ · 
rbe Regulation.1. · 
1 I. l O R~rml atiom :=in.all moan propos.ed, ·tempo):"ary a.nd .finnl regwat:ions promulgated under 
thr:: Code in e:ffe;ct as of-th~ dll.te of :Blf.ng me Articles and the corresponding sections of a.,..-...y 
regulatior.:t sub.scquentiy js3t.J,ed tho._t ~'1teu.d: or st1persecle such regutatiocs. . 
12 .. 1 
order: 
A,"?-.TfCLE 12 
CERTAIN TAX PROVISIONS 
.§.Qecia/ AHoca.tioas. Th~ follomng special allocations shrul be made. in the following 
. 12.1 . .l · lvfinimur.1 Gain Char~back, Except as otherwise provi£;5ed in ~cctico. l. 704-
2(£} ofrhe .R.egulatiorui prornulgat~d uodci-the Code in.etfoct as of the ds.re of.filing the.A.rtjcl~ and 
tbe carrespo.ndir.g sections of ~r.ny regt.1faricns sµbsequently issued that amend ·or S'i.ipersede such 
regulations, nocw~tlmandlng any other pro'1'isi-00 of this Article l Z, if there is a ner cier;rea.se in .LLC 
Iv.!Jnirnum Gll-rn duri.J1g acy fiscal ya!l . .l'\ ~ach member .shall. ~e spec.ial!y altocate=ci items of LLC 
.income a.od gain for ruch fiscal. year (and, ifnece~sary, S\Jb.sequenc :fiscal years) in an amount equal 
to 'sui::h inembe(s share of the net decrease in LLC iViinirnum Ga.in, decet'u'.ined in accorda....1ce with 
Kegulatior,s Section l. 704-2(g). Allocatiot1s pui-suant to the previous sentenr;e shall be: .made ln 
prapc1rtio11 to the respective a.1'1'.l.ounts required tO· be alloc.1tc.d to cac.h me:r:nbcr pu'r!ll.:.al"l.t th.aero. The 1 
i~e.ms ·co be .so s.!located shall e determined ir. ~ccc-rde.;1ce wifa.Sectioris 1.704-2(f)(G) and·J.704- · •. <· . . .. . ; 
OPE.IV .. TING A GRS:EMENT - l 8 
r • ...)O' .::,c; 
000375
. l 
I •....JI ._.,U 
e e 
10:65 PlOl'iE:=R T liLE , 9453~812 ND.256 . Gl1S 
20)(2) . of rhe Reguistians. This Sec-ti on 12. l s inte.pded to comp1y with the .rruni..."'.Ouro gain 
chargeba:ck r.::quirem~nt L, Sec::ica.l. 704-2(t; of me Ri.~J.latians a.1d aha.II be inter;iretep cor.siste.rcly 
there'ltith. · 
12.. l.2 M~mber }-:11,nimum Gain Ghanrnback. E,y,.cept as ot..1er;..ise pro vi d~d .in 
Seccion 1 ... 70.,f .. -~ (l:l( 4). of cbe· .Regula dona, no't;Wit.b.star..ding an other provision cf tru_s .Arti.cl.~.T2, if 
there is a a.et decrease in fyfombe.r Nonre~ourse Debt M:Inim,urn Qain attributqble to a Men:ib~ 
Nam-ecourse Debt during any Bscal year~ each mer11berwho bas a share ofth.e Member N onreco,irse 
Debt Minm11.l:~ Gatn a:t:ibutabfo to such Mcmbe::-Nonrecou:seDcbc, de't'.":!n:nined in accorda..1.ca v,-ith 
Secti9u 1.704-2(1)(5)' of the regu.l.a:tion~, shall be speciaHy ~ocated items ofLlC incoine ~~ g,,.la 
for such fiscal year (and, ifne~essar.y, subsequent fiscal years) .Iq an a,rnount equal to sucb mcrnb-er's 
share of tc: net ~ecrease in Me;niber Nanreccurse Debt lvJinimum Gain attributable to :ruch Member 
N cil:rec.-:iurse Debt, d.etemiined ill accordance with' R~gulations Sectjon l. 704-2(i)( 4). P.Jlocations 
pu.'"'iru!l.Oi to the previous .sentence shaU he: made in proport..ion ta therespecti:n a..i:iouo.ts required to 
be a!locatad eci each member pur::ruar.n: c.b.ereto. The items to be so aUocat.ed shall be d~termine.d ~ 
ac:conlance'with ~acttons l.704-2(1)(4) and 1.704-20)(2) qft..1-te Regull!,tions. Thi~ Section 12.l.2 
is intended tc comply·'?vith the minimum gain chargelu1.ck requirc."I)ent .in Sec;tion l.70+2.((i)(4) of 
the Regula.ti ans apd _shaJJ be interpreted consistently therewith. · 
12.1.3 Ouali~cp Income Offset. ;en the event any member une~ectadly re:c?ives any 
adjustments, a.Docaticns, or di.stribt;Jriona qescrib~ m Sectlqn 1.104-l(b)(2.)(11)(d)(4), Sectl<;rn 1. 704- · 
l(o)(2)(li)(d)(5) or Section 1. 704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(o) o:ftheRegulatioM, teems o;:"1,J..,C income and gain 
~hall be o specially allocated to eaoh such member in an amoi.mt an.cl mann~r sufficient to eliminate,. 
to. the extent required by the Regulations, the Adjusted Deficit of such mc~ber as qwck.ly as 
possibie, provided. ih.at an .n.lloca"tioo pur~:am to this Seci:i~n 12.1.3 shell be made c_r,Ly-if aud to ihe 
extent that such tnember would h~vc an AdjuJtild Deficft after all other allcca!ions provided for in 
t.his Article 12 ·bave been tentatively mad!! as if this Section 12.1.3 were not in pus Operating 
Agraement. 
l ,?. J. 4 Gross Incq_rne Al1ocatiQll.- In thi::i eve;1.t any member bas s. deficit Capital 
Account at ~!:ie end of any facal'yet.r which ia·ln e;(cess of the aum of: 
. (a) t~e amount su.ch memb1::r is: obligat;:d to rest:or~ pursuant to a..-::iy 
provision ofthls Opc:r:itillg Agret:rn.i:uc, 1U1cl 
(b) the amount such me.mb~ is deeroed to b~ obligated to resto,e 
p.ursuaiit to the,ne-:..--: to the last sentences of.Regula.dang Sections 1.i04-2(g)(1) aod ~.704·i(I)(5). 
e.(!ch suc:h rnerober shaU he specially allocated items ofLLC income and gain .in the arnount of such 
excess as qukkly as possible, provided that a.11 allqcadon p-ur.s\.lant to this Section l2.1 . .4 s.haJJ l;,c 
· mado only if and tu the e-..:rent thar such member wauld ~\le a deficit capital acco~l'ttt in' excess of.sucq 
l!Urn a.fter all other allocations prov{ded for in this ,Article 12 have been made· as if Secticp 1.2: 1..3 
J,c.rcofa:id tJ-js" Scet.ion 12'.1.4 were not in thi9 Operatin$·Agrar:mcnt · 
l.2. l .5 Ncin.rec.q_1..mr. Deductions .. Nonreco.ursc Deductions for aoy fiscal ye,ar sh~l 
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be specially allocated to the :members ~n p;opor.io~ to their ShariTig F,.a.tios: 
12.1.6 Memb'er N onreco1me Ddudan.s. Any Member N onraccu1se Deducticr-.s for 
a.,y ~s.cal year shall b~ specially aJlo~ted tc rhc memb~r ,;;;.ha bears· the econcr;nic risk o-f:l9ss with 
resuect to ebc Member Nonrecm..1r3e Debt to which such Member Nonrecoor..e Deduci:icns arc 
~ .. attrib1.:itabJc.-in ·ac.:arda.1c_e ~~1 Regufo.tl~1/Sezt:on l. 704-2(1)( l). ' ,; - .. . . .. . .. 
12.1. 7 Section 7 54 Acliust!tlent~.' To the extent: a.n 2.dju~tment to rl:1e adjust~d r:ax b~is 
of any LLC asser p1.m~a.r1t co Ci~dz Sec"J.on 734(b) or Code Section 743(b). is required, pur.m~r to 
Regulati~n~ Section i.70:4"-l(b)(2){iv)(!!1)(2) ~r Regulations Sectjon l:704-1(b)(2)(jv)(m)(4). To be 
ta.\'en into a.cccu.."1T in deterro.irung capital a.ccounts as the result. cf a distribution to a ~ember in 
c~mplere liquidation of the memo-er' s Sharing Ratio [n the L.LC,. the· runount of such a.pjusnnent to 
capital acca.uota ~hail be trea:i:ed as an item of giin (tfthy adjuscmc..~r increases the ~asis of the ~et) 
or las~ (if t.be a~u.m-nerit inq-~ses the basis ·of the a.s~et) arthe loss (fftbe adjusnnent dccr~es .ruch 
basis) an.d such gain·· ar lqss shall be specially_ aliocstad tq the member in· accordance y;,ith their 
Sharing Ratios in the LLC in the e•,ent that Re~ationa Section 1. 704-!(o ){2)(iv)(m)(2) :i.ppli es, or 
to the member ~o whom .such.dis.tnb1 .. it;on was made in the event that Regulations Section 1.704-
J (b)(2)(iv)(m)(4) appii~s. · 
12.2 p,1.rative A..lkigiJi.Qru. Thcallocatious g~t forth in Sectior. &12.1.1 tfiraugh 12 .. L 7 
hereof (t,h.e ''Regulatory .Allocation.,;'') are interided to comply with certam :requirements. of the 
Regulations.. It_i5 ~he went oftb.c. memoer;3. that, ta the e,aani: poS31.'"bie, all Regulatory Allocations 
shall be offset either with pi.her Regu!arory Allocations or i.vith sp edal allcc:111101\S or mhcr items of 
compa,ny income,. gala loss or.deduction pqr:,uant to tbfa Section 1·2.2. Tq.crefore, nor,0ths~a.-,di.,'1g 
any ether provision of this Article 12 (other than the RaguJatory f,.llocadons), the members shall 
make s~.c.h offsetting special aJJocations ofLLC income, gain, losa or dcdu~tion in whareve:rm.mner 
they deterr..ine appropriate so tha.t, a..'1.91" such off~6tting ~lo~tiool are m.a.:ie, each membctS' capital 
account fa, to ti10 ~'tent po~stble, equal to th'? capital account such member would have had if the 
Regi,.la.iory Al! ocat.ions were not pa.,"."t of ehis. Operating Agreement 9:nd aJj LLC items were a:llocalcd 
uunwmt to Ax-!Sclc 6. 1n exerciing discretion undor tii.fo Section 12.2, the members shall take imo 
~ccom,r fhtui:-e Regulatory Allocations under Sectinn 12. J. l and 12.1 . .2 that, alth01.1gn not yet ma.de, 
are likely ta off~et other R~ler.ory Allocations pn:•~iously mad~ under Sectio~s· 12. J .5 a.rid I 2.1.6. 
12.3 .Qj.lJ.~r .,!Jl~cati.on RuYes. 
11.3.1 Fo,purposes of detemrining th!:= profrta, losses, or any atb~ items aJJo,;able 
to. any period, pr:ofrts, losses, a."td any such other items shall be d.e.termJ.ned. oa a. d.a.tly, rnonu'lly, or 
other bas\s, as determined by Vi,c members L1Sln8 a.:iy permissible met.hod under Code Section 706 
and die Regulations ~hereun;ki. . . . 
12.J.2 The memb~r;s are awe.re afthe income'tax c9nsequences oft.'rle alloca!ions 
made by Article 6 and this A..rticle 12 and .hc-reby agre-e ta be hm.lnd by the provisions of A..rtide: 6 and 







: l.2.3.3 Solely for purposes of dct;;m-.Jning a. 111erpb~r' s prcportionate share of tli.e 
"exces~ n6n.r~course·liabilitres1' of faeLLC 'il,rithin fhe meaning cfRegulatioc:s Section 1. 75.4-J(a).(J ), . 
the r,nember':: i.itare.sts in LLC profrrs sh.ill be in propcrtion to their Sharing Ranos. 
12.J.4 To the e.:G:::::i:t: p-emutt~d by Se.cticrn l.704-Zfn)(3) of tbe ~egutation~, T:he. 
· members shall endeavono··f:reat di?tribution~ of ne~ ca3h from eperatfox:s er net cash from saJes. cc. ~ 
net Ga-Sh from refin;L11.cing as haying peen m~de .from the proceeds of a N onrecourse Lic+bilicy· or a 
.M~mbcr NoMacaurs.e Debt only ro tlie ez.:::.em thar such distributio.ns would cause .er inc::-ea.sc a:n 
Adjusted Deficit for nny member . 
. ADOPTED effoctive a.s of the l..fiday o.f Ja:nu;1ry~ 2001, by t~e·undcr:,igned, {;onscicuting all 
tpe members of the LLC: · 
OfE?..A. TiNO A0.R.2BMENT • 21 
... 
•. ·-





280 • F1LE~FFECT1VE 
AMENDED AND RESTATED 
ARTICLES OF ORGANlZATJON 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
(Instructions on back of application) 
03 SEP I 2 FM 3: 39 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
STATE OF IOAHll 
1. The name of the limited liability company is: Real Homes, L.L.C. 
2. lfhe date the articles of organization were flied was: Ja.'1ua"'y 19, 2001 
The Articles of Organization are amended and restated to read: 
3. The name of the limited liability company is: __ ,.i:.R.::..ea.._Jl-..J./.Hl.Llom.w::e;..;is .... , ..J1 ..... J.L~C~------
4. The latest date certain upon which the limited liability company will dissolve is: 
January 1, 2011 
. . 
5. The registered agent and registered office is: --..D~e~mi+-ii~s;....,;.J.-. ... s~a+ll.-iah!:Z.---------
6. The management of the limited liability co 
D Manager(s) [i] 
7. The name and address of at least 1 manager or member. 
Name: Address: 
Dennis J. Sallaz - 1000 S. Roosevelt Boiae, Idaho '\5"::i"10'S 
8. Signature of at least one manager. if any, or at least one member. 
Sign~ture --------
Typ~d Name Dennis J. Sa 11 az 
Secretary of State use only 
IJtHl sm£TMY IF STATE 
09/12/2993 B5180 
CK: C.QSH CT: 42a41 8th 71147& 
1 I 31. 18 ~ 31. M ARIMllC I 2 







SALU.Z & GATEWOOD LAW • 14) 00 J 
) PROMJSSORY NOTE 
NOTE AMOUNT: $10,800 Boise. Idaho 
Dote: 06/ 10/05 
I PROMISE TO PAY to the order of ROY RICE, at Boise, Idaho, TEN THOUSAND 
EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS AND N0/100 DOLLARS ($10.800.00) payable in lawful 
money of the United States of America, with interest thereon from and otter June 
l O. 2005. until paid, of the rote of TWELVE PERCENT per annum ( 12%). Principal and 
interest ARE DUE ON DEMAND. 
If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note, I agree to pay such 
sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees. The maker and endorser hereon 
jointly and severally waive presentment for payment. demand. protest and notice 
of protest of non-payment of this note. 
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) PROMISSORY NOTE 




I PROMISE TO PAY to the order of ROY RICE, at Boise, ldoho, TEN THOUSAND 
DOLLARS AND N0/100 DOLLARS ($10,00.00J payable in lawful money of the United 
States of America, with interest thereon from and after September 21, 2005, until 
paid. at the rote of TWELVE PERCENT per annum (12%). Principal and interest ARE 
DUE ON DEMAND. 
If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note. I agree to pay such 
sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees. The mc·~er and endorser hereon 
jointly and severally waive presentment for payment, demancl, protest and notice 
of protest of non-payment of this note. 
Doted this 21st day of September, 2005. 
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c, 
BILL OF SALE 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That, DENNIS J. SALLAZ, the Party of the First Part, the Seller, for and in consideration of 
the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Do11ars ($7,500.00), legal mont:y of the United States of 
America, to rum in hand paid by ROY RICE, the Party of the Second Part, as Buyer, the receipt 
whereof is hereby acknowledged, does by these presents grant, bargain, se\l and convey unto the said 
Party of the Second Part, the Buyer, his successors and assigns, all right, title and interest to the 
following vehicles/trailers, more particularly described below, free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances, to-wit: 
2002 Yamaha Glizzly 660ATV, VINNo. JY4AM02Y22C022268; 
1998 Yamaha Grizzly 600 ATV, VIN No. JY4AJ01 WAOI 1016; 
Tandem Axle 4 Place ATV Trailer 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the same unto the said Party of the Second Part, its successors 
and assigns forever. And does for himself, his heirs, successors and assigns covenant and agree, to and 
with the said Party of the Sec~nd Part, its successors and assigns, to warraut and defend the sale of 
said property, goods and chattels, hereby made unto the Party of the Second Part, its successors and 
assigns, against all and every person and persons whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same. 
.. ) IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Party of the First Part has hereunto ·;et his hand and seal this 
5th day of May, 2005, at Boise, Idaho. 
:_) 
















IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 




Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CV DR 04-01075M vs. 
) 
8 



















M. DEAN WILLIS 
CSR NO. 95 
Prepared for: 





June 15, 2005 
12:16 p.m. 
960 Broadway Ave. 
Boise, Idaho 
DEPOSITION OF DENNIS J. SALLAZ 
VOLUME III 
M.D. WILLIS, INC. 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
P.O. Box 1241 












Condenselt n., JUNE 15, 2005 
Page 470 
Page 468 
Q Do you want to •• 
A Okay. Debra, what page is that? 
3 Q I'm just referring to your exhibit. If you could 
4 identify what items you have sold. 
5 A Sure. 
6 MR. BEVIS: she's asking about the four wheelers. 
7 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
8 MR. BEVIS: I don't know that I've got •• 
9 THE WITNESS: okay. Just the two Grizzlies, if you 
10 found them on your copy. I haven't found that them yet. 
11 MS. EISMANN: That is number 66 and 67. 
12 MR. BEVIS: On the Ieft·hand side. 
13 1HE WITNESS: Yes. 
14 BY MS. EISMANN: 
15 Q Okay. So, those tv;.ro were sold? 
16 A Those two and the trailer that they are sitting on. 
17 Q You have listed two AW trailers in Item 68. 
18. A Yes. 
19 Q And so one of the two are sold? 
20 A Yes. It's the one that holds four machines. One 
21 holds two machines and one holds four machines. The 
22 Grizzlies were on the one that holds four machines. 
23 Q And you stated in your description that you own 
24 them 50/50 with Darrell? 
25 A I do ·• did. 
Q So, did he receive a portion? 
A No. He consented to the sale. 
Page 469 
2 
3 Q He basically relinquished his interest in it for 
4 you to sell it? 
s A I still owe him half a trailer, but be agreed that 











Q Okay. So, you sold trailer and the two ATV's •• 
A Yes. 
Q •· for those Items 66 and 67? 
A Yes. 
Q For 7,500 dollars? 
A Yes. 
Q To Roy Rice? 
A Yes. 










































17 Q Was that by your own check or a check from Mr. l 7 
18 Rice? 18 
19 A I believe I had to make it out payable directly to 19 
20 Jim is my recollection. 20 
21 MR. BEVIS: I don't know. I didn't receive those. 21 
22 BY MS. EISMANN: 22 
23 Q So, you had listed item 66 on Exhibit 201, a 2002 23 
24 to Yamaha Grizzly? 24 
Q You value at 4,000 dollars? 
A Yes. ·t t c()llll11um y asse . 
Q And you have characterized it as a 
A Yes. - . h G ·zz1. 
9 yaina a n y, you 
Q And you ·• and item 67, a 199 . . t t? 
valued at 2,500 dollars. That's a conu11U111ty meres · 
A Yes. d th . have state e 
Q And one of the ATV ta1lers ·- you 
one that carries four ATV's? 
A Yes. 
Q That you sold? 
A With the Grizzlies. d . te t 
Q Okay. Now -· and you characteri:ZC your m res 
in the trailer as community? 
A As 50 percent. As community. 1 h ai er w en you 
Q So, the value is ·- you valued the: tr 
sold it at what figure? at 500, BtIT it 
A Well, I had both of them at my half r th _75 . ,,age ,or e . 
was just a package sale. Here is the. pacl\, 
There is no breakdown. d nak 
Q And when did you do that? Whe!l di you 1 e your 
sale to Roy Rice? t to 
_,1 the paymen 
A It was the same day that I delivereu . d th 
you, would probably be the best way to t,1'/ to pm own e ·· 
exact day, because I brought it. 
Page 471 
MR. BEVIS: Was mean .. 
THE WITNESS: I brought it straight up bete· ki ~ h' 
. st Joo ng ,or 1s 
MS. EISMANN: And that's okay. I'mJll 
recollection. 
TIIB WITNESS: Maybe a month ago. 
BY MS. EISMAi"IN: M 15th 
Q So, you're thinking probably May of·- ay · 
A April or May. 
Q April or May of 2005? 
A Yes. 'd ou sai you 
Q Now, you had further testified that '/ f D 1 d part rom a . . paid iu two checks, one from Roy Rice an 1 b 1 uld. 0 may es 10 
Evans loan. That's what my notes reflect, 5 · 
clarify. h 
A I think I paid 50 percent of his bill frolll eac 
source. e payment to 
Q I see. And you're referring to the sa!'ll 
Mr. Bevis? 
A Yes. . ? 
Q And what amount did you pay Mr. 13e:vts. 
A It would have been probably 15,000 even. t M 
ATV o ir. 
Q And that was paid from the sale of tJ:ie: 
Rice? 
A Half. 
25 A Yes. 25 Q Half of the 7,500 dollars? 








$3.50 Fee* NOTICE OF RELEASE OF LIABILITY $3.50 Fee* 
PLEASE PRlNT CLEARLY - ALL u'ffOR.}CATION MUST BE COMPLETE - NOTIFICATION BY SELLER/TRANSFEROR IS MANDATORY 
hoc!< or Hull [~cntiflcotion Number (VTN or HIN) Y~::ir Make Body S1ylc Tille Number 
1GBKP37WSK3302440 1989 WINN MH 98909668 
iller'sffransferor's Full Legal Name(s): Daytime Phone : 
:lier's Idaho Drivers License Nurnber(s) or Social Security Number(s): 
jdress: City: State: ___ Zip: 
lometer: Selling Price: $ Date Delivered (0 PL1rc baser/Transferee: 
1rchaser'sffransferee's Full Legal Name(sl & Idaho Driver's License Number(s): 
!dress: Citv: State: Zip : Daytime Phone: 
Uwc hereby request that chc [dlho Tran.c;porracion Departmcnl mark it~ records co indicace char the vehicle or ·1csscl ck.scribed :1bove ha~ been rransfcrrcd. Howe•,cr. f/wc undcrsCJnd I.hat lhc cit!.: record 
will remain in my/our n:ime(J) uncil J new rdaha Certifii;.11c of Title is .1ppl i cc.l fo r Jncl is:,ucd, recording 1hi:: m11ne(.~1 l'lf che ne•.v i)wner(.'i) . 
X------------------~-'ig_"_"_"_,r_e_v_if_S-,.-,1,-,.-r,-~-,-a,-i;-Je_r_v_rr_,-,-------------~E~x-H=IHB::}"t"iT. __ 4rr~·---
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PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 
INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC 
rai 006 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 6th day of Januruy, 2006, by and between 
GLENN TR.EFREN and DENNTS J. SALLAZ, SELLER, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, BUYER. 
WIT NE S S ETH; 
WHEREAS, Sellers each hold 100 % ownership interest in Real Homes LLC. which is all of 
the ownership interest therein, an LLC formed and recorded with the Idaho Secretary of State on 
Jantlal}' 19, 2001. and 
WHEREAS, .it is the mutual desire of the parties hereto that Sellers shall sell to the Buyer all of 
said Ownership Interest and all right, title and interest in and to all real property owned by Real Homes, 
LLC as set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements herein 
contained, 
IT JS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties as follows: 
l. .Sellers hereby agre~s to sell to Buyer and Buyer hereby agrees to purchase from the 
Sellers, all of said Ownership Interest owned by Sellers, being all of the Ov.nership Interest thereof: 
subject to the terms and conditions herein set forth. 
2. It is understood and agreed that the total purchase p.cice for s:1id Ownership Interest 
shalt be the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand and no/100 Dollars {$250,000), lawful money of the 
United States of America •. to be paid by the Buyer to the Sellers as follows: 
(a) Buyer shall assu[JJe all recorded encumbrances against all real properties owned by 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF INTEREST IN REAL HOMES. LLC, P. 1 
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Real Homes, LLC; including, but not limited to, D. L. Evan~; Bank, Perry Harding, 
CPA. and Canyon County property taxes and Buyer shall hold Sellers hannless 
therefrom. 
(b) Said encumbrances include that certain Note and Deed of Trust held by Saxton Fruit 
Fanns dated 02/13/2001 which is in default and set for foreclosure sale on January 6, 
2006, and Buyer agrees to pay same in full prior to sale. 
(c) The balance of said purchase price after payment of the title encumbrances shall then 
be paid by Buyer to Sellers in two equal cash shares from the net proceeds from sales, 
income or other disposition of any or all of the said real properties herein. In any event 
said payment shall be made no later than 24 nionths from th1: date hereof. 
( d) Provided, however, that Buyer agrees to give SeUer Dennis J. Sallaz an advance of 
$5,000.00 as a partial payment on his Attorney fees due to Jim Bevis prior to April 10, 
2006. 
3. Sellers represent, warrant and agree with the Buyer as follows: 
(a) That the Ownership Interest which is being sold herein constitutes I 00% of the 
Ownership of Real Homes, LLC; 
(b) The Sellers have good and marketable title to said Ownership Interest being sold and 
transferred hereunder with absolute right to sell, assign and transfer same to Buyer free 
and clear of all liens, pledges, security interests or encumbrances and without any 
breach of any agreement to which he is a party. 
(c) The Sellers covenant that all real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC and being 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC, P. 2 
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transferred herein are free and clear of all encumbrances not listed herein. 
(d) Real Homes, LLC has free and clear title to said real properties and Sellers shall 
execute any and aU documents requested by Buyer to transfer all interest therein to 
Buyer. 
4. Time is agreed to be of the essence of this Agreement and the performance thereof. 
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors, 
administrators, personal representatives and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have hereuuto ~t thek hands the day and year ia 
this Agreement :first above written. 
REAL PROPERTIES, LLC 
BUYER: . ~ ,4 ~~;,~'----
~get -r/_ 
SELLERS: 
AL~ By Glenn Trcfre~ 
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EXHIBIT A 
This parcel is a portion of Lot 24 of WESTVJEW SUBDIVISION, Canyon County, Idaho, 
according to the official plat thereof. filed in Book 4 of Plats at Page 31, records of said County and 
situated in the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Sectiora 
21, Township 3 North, Range 2 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Southwest corner of said Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter; thence 
South 89°43' 35" "East along the South boundary of said Sourheast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 396.00 feet thenc~ 
North 00° 02' Jl'' East parallel with the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of30.00 to the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING; thence continuing 
North 00° 02' 31" East parallel with rhe West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Sourhwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distsmce of 254.10 feet; th enc,: 
South 89" 45' 35·• East parallel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter or the Northwest Quarter a distance of 120,00 feet; thence 
South 00° 02' 31" West parallel with the West boundary oCsaid Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwesr Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 2S4.l0 feet; th encl! 
North 89"451 35" West parallel with the South bonndary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 120.00 feer to the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
This parcel is subject to ~rnd includes the use of a 32.00 foot wide ingress-egress and utility 
ease1nent more particuJarly desc-ribcd as follows: 
COMMENCING at rhe Southwest corner of said Southeast Quarter o:· the Soutbwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter; thence 
South 89° 45' 35" East along the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwesr Quarter a distance of-184.00 feer; thence 
North 00° 02' 3I" East parallel wirh the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 30.00 feet to rhe TRliE POINT OF 
BEGINNING; 1hence 
North 00° 02' 31" East parallel with the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 2S4.IO feet; thencl' 
South 89° 45' 35" East paraJlel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 32.00 feet; thence 
South 00° 02' 31'' West parallel with the West boundary oCsaid Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance 0!254.10 reetj thencr 
North 89° 45' 3:S" West paralfe1 with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
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Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M 
FThlJINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Tne above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on four separate occasions over 
a nine month period. The dates of trial were November 15, 2005, through November 19, 2006; 
.April 10, 2006, through April 14, 2006; July 17, 2006, through July 21, 2006; and July 27, 2006. 
A total of 16 days were utilized for the trial. There vvere several hundred exhibits admitted into 
evidence - many consisting of a substantial number of pages. 
The Plaintiff was present during the trial and represented by Debra L. Eismann, Esq, of 
Nampa, Idaho. The Defendant was also present during trial and represented by James A. Bevis, 
Esq, of Boise, Idaho. There were many pretrial motions that were considered by the Court, as 
well as many motions and litigation issues .during the period that this matter was tried. This 
matter was, at times, highly contentious and the parties and attorneys challenged the court's 
schedule for a long period of time. However, the Court wishes to note that both parties were 
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well represented by their attorneys and the Court appreciated the caliber of counsel. The Court, 
counsel and the parties were all required to exercise a great deal of patience and flexibility in 
order to allow both parties to have a full, fair and complete trial. 
In addition, the Court required an inordinate amount of time to complete the Findings and 
Conclusions below. As indicated in earlier correspondence, this was highly unusual for this 
Court. Pa.rt of the delay was due to the large volume of exhibits and the substa.11tial time between 
trial days, which required more of the Court's time in reviewing evidence it heard as far back as 
November, 2005. Part of the delay was due to the other circumstances, schedule and demands of 
the Court's time and duties tJ,..roughout the last year. Finally, part of the delay was due to 
circumstances and demands upon the Court on a personal level, which the Court understands is 
probably not a concern of either party. Regardless of tJ:ie causes of the delay, the Court wishes to 
sincerely compliment and thank the parties and their counsel for their patience. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Dennis and Renee were married on July 4, 1996. This action was filed on May 
27, 2004. The parties were divorced by this Court on July 28, 2005, with the issues of property 
and debt division remaining for trial. 
2. Long before the marriage, Dennis represented Steve Sumner and other entities in 
a lawsuit. He began work on this lawsuit in 1985 and was still acting as Sumner's attorney as 
late as August, 1999. In March, 1999, Dennis claimed that he was owed $377,398.60, plus 
interest for his fees and costs advanced and monies loaned to Sumner and his entities. The 
evidence established that as of August 5, 1999, he was owed $351,089.42. At that time, 
$269,204.60 of this was at least 120 days overdue .. There was no documentary evidence to 
establish how much of this was earned prior to July 4, 1996. The balance of $81,984.82 was 
current. 
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3. Prior to the marriage, in 1992, Renee began working for Dennis at his law firm in 
· Boise, Idaho. Dennis has been a licensed and practicing attorney in the State of Idaho since 
1965. On March 15, 2004, Dennis entered into a partnership vvhich consisted of the law firm and 
Scott and Marjorie Gatewood. This resulted in the filing of an Election for Small Business 
Corporation named "Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd.". This election states that Dennis and Renee 
have a 90% ownership and the Gatevvoods have a 10% ownership in the law firm. 
4. Dennis terminated Renee's employment at the law firm on May 11, 2004. 
5. Prior to the marriage, Dennis acquired a one half interest in real property located 
in Grandview, Idaho. 
6. Prior to the marriage, in 1969, Dennis orgai'1ized and/or became the owner of a 
corporation known as National Financial Service, Inc. On May 11, 2004, Renee took $3,200.00 
from the account for this entity. 
7. Prior to the marriage, Dennis acquired a residence located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, 
Boise, Idaho. Dennis' law office is operated out of this location. There is a mortgage on this 
property in the amount of $272,032.67. The monthly payment on this amount is $2,241.93. 
Dennis also receives rent from the law office in the amount of $3,400.00 per month. Plaintiff has 
abandoned her claim for any improvements to this property during the marriage. 
8. Dennis also acquired 3 properties prior to the marriage in June of 1991 from 
Kendra Bertsch~Sallaz. These are located in Grandview, Smith's Ferry and Ada County, Idaho, 
and are identified in defendant's Exhibits 240, 241 and 242. 
9. There exists a retirement account with Putnam Investments. The client number 
for that account is 0336644339. The balance in that account according to the latest statement in 
evidence is $40,160.99. The account consists of eight (8) separate funds. Only three (3) of the 
separate funds were opened before the marriage. The documentation for these three funds shows 
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contributions pnor to the marriage of $1,974.67, $3,140.35 and $3,395.90, for a total of 
$8,510.92. 
10. Dennis' grandmother, Bessie Matcham, died on March 26, 2000. Prior to that, on 
or about March 20, 2000, Dennis deposited $184,969.37 from her estate into his trust account. 
Between March 20, 2000, and August 15, 2001, all of this money was disbursed to the heirs 
ti $ ~ 6r 'r except or .:,, _J._). 
11. Dennis did not file an application to be appointed personal representative of his 
grandmother's estate until October 12, 2000. He was appointed on October 19, 2000. 
12. Dennis prepared and filed an inventory for the estate. However, this inventory 
· was not signed by him. Instead, it was signed by Dennis' sister, Chris Snyder. The inventory 
did not list any loans made to any third parties as assets and the value of the estate was placed at 
$103,767.44. 
13. Chris purchased Renee's jeep in April, 2001, for $22,500.00. She used part of the 
monies paid to her out of the estate. The money was deposited into the Real Homes checking 
acco1,II1t. 
14. On June 18, 2003, Dennis signed escrow instructions relating to his receipt of 
payment of a settlement in th~ Sumner case, along with a confidentiality agreement regarding the 
settlement. 
15. On August 13, 2003, Dennis opened an account for his grandmother's estate at 
D.L. Evans Bank (hereinafter "estate account"). This was approximately 3 years after her death 
and approximately 3 years after he was appointed the Personal Representative of her estate. He 
authorized, in addition to himself, his brother Daryl and his daughter as signatories on this 
account. He also directed all statements and correspondence to be sent to his daughter's address. 
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16. On or before August 15, 2003, Dennis received $182,098.00 from the trust 
account of Richard Harris. This money was from the settlement of the Sumner litigation. 
However, the check received by Dennis was made payable to "Estate of Bessie B. Matcham" 
(Dennis deceased grandmother). Dennis did not tell Renee about this money. He did not deposit 
the check into the law firm trust account. Instead, on August 15, 2003, he deposited the check 
into the account associated with his grandmother's estate. 
17. Dennis received additional monies from the Sumner settlement which he did not 
deposit into his trust account and did not tell Renee about at the time. These amounts were 
deposited as follows: $2,000.00 (August 29, 2003), $5,000.00 (September 8, 2003) and 
$198,000.00 (July 13, 2005). 
18. The total received during the marriage by Dennis from the Sumner settlement, 
was $387.098.00. 
19. Dennis signed Renee's name on a 2003 joint income ta'< return on October 4, 
2004. This return did not report the income he received from the Sumner case settlement. 
Although Dennis testified in his deposition that he advised Perry Harding, CPA about this and he 
said he would take care of it, Mr. Harding testified at trial that Dennis did not tell him about this 
money and he did not tell Dennis he would take care of it. 
20. In addition, Dennis spent a great deal of money from the estate account for 
personal living expenses following the deposit of the settlement monies. Dennis testified in his 
deposition that he began writing checks on the estate account for his personal use on October 8, 
2003. 
21. 
29, 2003 .. 
Dennis withdrew $6,000.00 in cash from the estate checking account on August 
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22. Dennis wrote four separate $40,000.00 checks on the estate account on June 8, 
2004. They were payable to Daryl, Chris, Becky and Diani - all relatives of Dennis. It does not 
appear from the terms of the will that Diani is entitled to receive any share of the residue of the 
Matcham estate. These checks were not endorsed and were all run through the bank at the same 
time. Then, they were converted into cashiers checks, which were never endorsed. 
On July 13, 2005, Dennis deposited another $198,000.00 from the Sumner 
settlement into the estate checking account. On that same day, he wTote a check in the amount of 
$198,000.00 to D.L. Evans Bank and had his brother Daryl sign the check. Four cashier's 
checks were purchased with this money, each in the amount of $49,500.00, payable to Daryl, 
Chris, Becky and Diani. As noted earlier, Diani is not entitled to receive any of the inheritance 
under the terms of the will. None of the four cashier's checks were endorsed by the payees and 
all four were run through the bank at the same time. 
24. One of the 4 cashier's checks for $49,500.00 was re-deposited into the estate 
checking account on August 25, 2005. Likevvise, another one of these checks was re-deposited 
into the estate account on October 28, 2005. 
r _.). Dennis wrote a $500.00 check from the estate checking account to Tradesman, 
Inc. on August 25, 2005. 
26. Dennis WTote another check from the estate account on August 31, 2005, in the 
amount of $25,807.00 for a closing on real property. This check was payable to Title One. 
27. In January, 2001, Real Homes, LLC was formed (hereinafter "Real Homes"). 
The Articles of Organization for this entity were filed with the Secretary of State on January 19, 
200 l. Dennis is listed as the original registered agent and Renee is listed as the Manager. Both 
Parties signed the Articles. 
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28. Two Operating Agreements were introduced into evidence regarding Real Homes 
- one by Renee and one by Dennis. 
29. The one provided by Renee is dated on its cover an.d on the signature page 
Januaq 19, 2001, and is signed by Renee only. The testimony established that Dennis prepared 
this document. This document provides that Renee owns 100% of the membership of the LLC 
and that it is governed by its members. The document also provides that no additional members 
can be admitted except with a unanimous vote of the members. It also requires a majority vote 
of the members regarding all determinations, decisions, approvals and actions affecting the 
entity, as well as the business affairs of the LLC. Finally, this Operating Agreement specifically 
prohibit any a..'!lendments to the Agreement which change the number of votes or degree of 
consent required to approve or disapprove any matters that require a vote of consent and any 
amendments to provisions for allocations or distributions of profits, losses or cash. 
30. The one provided by Dennis is signed by Dennis and Glen Trefren. However, this 
document is not dated, either by vvay of a stated effective date in the agreement or on the 
signature page. Dennis and Glen Trefren are the stated members of the LLC, with a sharing ratio 
of 50% each. The document also states that both contributed an initial amount of $25,000.00. 
The evidence at trial established that Mr. Trefren did not make such a contribution. 
31. On February 11, 2002, the Annual report for Real Homes was filed with the Idaho 
Secretary of State. This report identifies Renee as the President of Real Homes. On February 
19, 2003, another Annual report was filed with the Secretary of State which also identified Renee 
as the president. The Annual report filed February 16, 2004, also identifies Renee as the 
president and secretary of real Homes. However, Dennis filed an annual report for Real Homes 
which listed he and Glen Trefren as manager-ovvners. He signed the articles as "co-owner". 
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32. On September 3, 2003, Dennis filed Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization for Real Homes with the Idaho Secretary of State. This document listed him as a 
member and he signed this document as "Owner". 
33. Renee opened a checking account for Real Homes on January 19, 2001. 
34. Renee, signing as President, applied for an Employer Identification Number for 
Real Homes on April 17, 2004. 
35. In January, 2001, Glen Trefren was employed as a property "scout" for Real 
Homes, LLC. He was paid $300.00 to $400.00 per week. 
36. On February 15, 2001, Real Homes purchased 5 acres of property from Sa,-xton 
Fruit Farms located on Riverside Blvd., in Caldwell, Idaho (hereinafter "Riverside Property"). A 
deed of trust was executed naming Saxton as beneficiary in the amount of $43,900.00. 
37. The Riverside Property was later divided into 4 lots: lA, lB, 2A and 2B. Renee 
provided a letter to Canyon County authorizing Glen Trefren and a realtor to appear on behalf of 
real Homes regarding the conditional use permit required to divide the this property into the four 
lots. 
38. Renee moved into the Riverside Property, Lot lB, in August or September of 
2003, when she moved out of the marital residence, and continues to reside there. 
39. On February 10, 2004, Real Homes sold Lot lB of the Riverside Property to 
Dennis and Renee for $105,000. This property is also knovvn as 155 84 Riverside, Caldwell, 
Idaho. The deed from Real Homes was signed by Renee. This property was appraised on March 
30, 2005 and had a value of $152,000.00. The debt against this property is approximately 
$114,471.90, leaving a net value of $37,528.10. 
40. A.nether appraisal of the 15584 Property was admitted into evidence in July, 2006. 
This report is dated July 18, 2006, and lists a value of $280,000.00. 
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41. On August 16, 2001, Glen Trefren formed his own LLC named "Tradesman 
Contractors & Construction". Dennis prepared the Articles of Incorporation for him. 
42. On December 20, 2002, Dennis refinanced the property at 1000 S. Roosevelt. 
Some of the community credit card debt was paid off at this time. The total of all the various 
accounts paid was $73,014.85. Although Renee testified that only $17,762.64 of this amount 
should be subject to reimbursement because that amount related to personal credit cards, there 
was no evidence that the balance was not also spent on community debt. 
43. Renee entered into a contract with the Hennifers to purchase real property located 
at 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho (hereinafter the "Hennifer Property"). Renee had been 
pasturing her horses there and the purpose was to acquire the property for the same. However, 
Dennis and Renee could not ultimately qualify for the loan to purchase this property. In order to 
acquire and close on this property, they had to obtain a loan from Dennis' brother, Daryl. Renee 
testified that following the closing, Daryl signed a quitclaim deed to them. However, no such 
quitclaim deed was admitted into evidence and there is no evidence of recording of the same. 
44. Daryl testified that he has no out-of-pocket investment in the Hennifer property. 
Renee and Dennis are the only ones who have any such investment. They incurred expenses 
associated with the clean-up and remodel of the house on the property. Dennis collects the rent 
and pays the underlying mortgage. He also personally pays any shortfall between the rent and 
mortgage. Daryl pays no taxes on this property. In addition, Daryl's testimony at trial regarding 
the arrangement he had v,ith Dennis regarding this property is inconsistent with his testimony at 
his deposition and there is no documentation regarding this arrangement. 
45. On April 17, 2002, the Buckinghams purchased a strip of property from the 
Hennifer Property for the purpose of enlarging their yard. Renee was listed on the contract as the 
seller and the $14,750.00 proceeds from the sale were deposited into the Real Homes account. 
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46. On that same date, the Campbells also purchased a strip of property from the 
Hennifer property. Renee was listed as the seller on that contract and the $12,250.00 proceeds 
from that sale were deposited into the Real Homes account. 
47. The value of the 916 S. Roosevelt (Hennifer) property is approximately 
$180,000.00, with debt against it of approximately $115,000.00, leaving $65,000.00 in equity. 
48. On October 7, 2002, Real Homes purchased real property located on Smith 
Avenue in Nampa, Idaho (hereinafter "Smith Property"). There was no secured debt against the 
property at the time of purchase. 
49. Dennis prepared a deed of tmst and promissory note in the am.aunt of $15,000.00 
to secure debt that he and Renee owed to Perry Harding, CPA. The note was signed by Renee as 
president of Real Homes, and she and Dennis signed individually. 
50. Dennis testified that he stopped payments to the Saxtons on the debt owed to them 
by Real Hornes because he ran out of money. Thus, Real Homes was defaulted on April 15, 
2004, on the underlying deed of trust. However, the balance in the Real Homes checking 
account as of April 1, 2004, was slightly over $70,000.00 and was almost $68,000.00 as of April 
30, 2004. 
51. $30,686.69 was transferred by Dennis on May 7, 2004, from the Real Homes 
account to pay off a line of credit with D.L. Evans Bank. On that same date, he transferred 
$35,665.94 from the account into a cashier's check. On May 18, 2004, $30,000.00 was 
deposited into the law firm trust account. The balance of$ 5,665.94 has not been accounted for 
by Dennis. 
52. Dennis closed the Real Homes checking account on June 2, 2004. 
53. Dennis filled out and signed a business credit application for Real Homes with 
D.L. Evans Bank on November 5, 2004. In that application, in which he acknowledged that his 
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answers were truthful and accurate, he states that he is 100% owner. On.November 8, 2004, he 
completed a :financial statement with D.L. Evans regarding his personal guarantee on the loan to 
Real Homes. 
54. On November 15, 2004, Dewis filled out and signed an Annual Report for the 
Secretary of State for Real Homes, wherein he listed himself as owner-manager and signed as 
"owner". 
55. Also in the fall of 2004, Glen Tre:fren, through a bid submitted to Dennis, 
estimated the cost of construction work at the Smith Property at $30,950.00. 
56. Dennis signed a promissory note on behalf of Real Homes for $30,475.00 and on 
Fepruary 4, 2005, D.L. Evans Bank recorded a deed of trust against the Smith Property to secure 
this amount. 
57. The Sax:tons proceeded with a Notice of Trustee's Sale on January 19, 2005, in 
order to foreclose against the Riverside property. The sale was scheduled for May 25, 2005. 
58. Later in February, 2005, Glen Trefren signed a quitclaim deed, as a purported 
member of Real Homes, LLC, granting all real property owned by Real Homes to his LLC 
known as Tradesman, Inc. The deed also included Lot lB of the Riverside property which was 
owned by Dennis and Renee, not Real Homes. Dennis testified that he did not know about the 
quitclaim deed, but Mr. Trefren testified Dennis prepared it. 
59. There were several collection proceedings against Dennis and Renee in the spring 
of 2005, relating to Dennis' medical bills. It appears that these bills have been paid. 
60. Dennis sold 2 ATVs and a trailer to Roy Rice on May 5, 2005, for $7,500.00 to 
pay his attorney. 
61. On May 25, 2005, Glen Trefren filed a bankruptcy proceeding on behalf of Real 
Homes. He represented himself as an authorized agent. The Petition stated that the assets of 
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Real Homes had a value of $545,000.00 with secured creditors totaling $99,596.00. The petition 
did not list any unsecured creditors. This resulted in the cancellation of the foreclosure sale by 
the Saxtons. 
62. Renee filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy upon the grounds that J\,fr. Trefren 
was not a member of Real Homes and had no authority to file such a proceeding. The 
bankruptcy court dismissed the proceedings on November 25, 2005. 
63. Glen Trefren then, on June 6, 2005, and on behalf of his LLC (Tradesman), 
recorded a $250,000.00 lien against all real property owned by Real Homes, and the residence 
owned by Dennis and Renee (LotlB Riverside). 
64. Mr. Trefren recorded tvio amended claims of lien on July 22, 2005. One was 
• 
against the Riverside property, including Lot IB, for $250,000.00. The other was against the 
Smith Property for $35,000.00. 
65. Despite this matter having been pending for over a year before trial was 
completed, Mr. Trefren was unable to provide even a single document to support any of his liens. 
Further, these debts were not listed in the bankruptcy filings he made on behalf of Real Homes. 
In fact, he testified under oath, that his intent in recording the lien was to cloud the title on all the 
real property. 
66. Dennis testified that he turned over all but 10% of his interest in the law firm 
named Sallaz and Gatewood. He testified that he turned over all his accounts receivable. 
However, there is no documentation regarding any of these facts and the Subchapter S Corporate 
documents from the year 2004 show him as a 90% owner. 
67. Theresa Pulliam, the accountant hired by Renee, valued the accounts receivable 
for Sallaz & Gatewood, as of July 28, 2005, to be $130,744.00. Part of her valuation was based 
upon an accounts receivable aging summary provided by Dennis' law office as of 12:06 p.m. on 
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October 25, 2005. That summary only listed 8 accounts behveen 31 and 60 days old, totaling 
$1,416.17, and no other accounts older than 60 days. That summary showed current accounts 
receivable to be $247,689.79 and those between 1 and 30 days to be $9,672.63. 
68. Ms. Pullia.t'TI did not reduce the value of receivables based on taxes that would be 
paid upon receipt or for any payables due at the time. She did note that a reduction could be 
done in the amount of $4,650.00 for the payables and testified that the tax rate would be 25%. 
69. The accountant hired by Dennis, Perry Harding, reviewed Ms. Pulliam's opinion, 
did some independent review, and arrived at a lesser figure of $43,334.15. His valuation was 
based upon a "revised" accounts receivable aging summary, which showed only $15,952.12 as 
current, $27,167.92 from 1 to 30 days old, and the large figure of $179,883.53 as over 90 days 
old. These figures were arrived at after discussions between he and Dennis' office manager. 
70. Despite the figure of $15,952.12 as current, the firm was collecting in excess of 
$30,000.00. 
71. During the summer of 2001, Renee made arrangements through a friend who 
owned a Labrador stud to purchase a yellow puppy from Josh Edwards. 
72. On August 3, 2001, Dennis had semen extracted from his dog named "Vegas" for 
preservation of the bloodline. 
73. Renee picked up the puppy from Nfr. Edwards on October 27, 2001. Renee 
named the dog Smooch. 
74. During the early pendency of this matter, the Court entered an order providing an 
equal sharing of possession of Smooch. This was done because Renee would not allow Dennis 
to take the dog on an annual hunting trip for approximately a week. 
75. For the most part, equal sharing of possession of Smooch has worked fairly well. 
The only problem that has arisen since the initial order was last fall when Renee refused to 
FINDINGS I CONCLUSIONS I ORDER. 13 
000412
cooperate with Dennis regarding another hunting trip and the Court was required to enter an 
order allowing Dennis to have possession of the dog on specified dates. 
76. Renee filed this action on May 27, 2004. 
77. Renee's testified that her residence at the Riverside property was broken into on 
May 28 or 29, 2004, and again on July 27, 2004. On both occasions, the only area that was 
disturbed was the office. She te~tified that the items stolen were the hard drive from her 
computer, her file on Real Homes and the quitclaim deed from Daryl to Dennis and Renee 
regarding the Hennifer property. However, it does not appear that she actively engaged the 
authorities in investigating these incidents to learn who might have done it. 
78. Following the partfos' separation, the receipt of the Sumner settlement monies, 
and the disbursement of those monies through the estate account, on January 13, 2004, Dennis 
rented a new safe deposit box at D.L. Evans Bank. While this matter was pending, the Court 
entered an order providing that both parties view and inspect this safe deposit box together to 
confirm and/or determine the contents therein. On July 20, 2005, at approximately 4:33 p.m., 
Dennis and Renee went to the bank and inspected the box. However, on that same day, at 
approximately 3:55 p.m., Dennis went to the bank and accessed the box. Dennis was not truthful 
about this visit about one half hour before he was to meet Renee and further testified that he was 
not carrying anything with him when he accessed the box. However, the surveillance video from 
the bank shows that Dennis was in fact carrying a briefcase when he went into and when he left 
the safe deposit box. When the parties met and inspected the box 30 minutes later, there was 
nothing in the box except some silver dollars. 
79. On December 9, 2005, Dennis received written notice through his law office of an 
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale for January 16, 2006. Renee did not receive this notice. 
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80. The entit:; known as "Real Properties, LLC" was formed on January 4, 2006. 
Pursuant to the Articles of Organization, Dennis is shown to be the registered agent, Janet Rice 
(Roy Rice's wife) is shown to be the manager or member, and Millis Anderson (Dennis' 
secretary) signed the Articles as a member. 
81. Two days later, on January 6, 2006, Dennis and Trefren entered into a contract 
entitled "Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC". Dennis and Trefren are 
identified as "seller" and Real Properties is identified as "buyer". Roy Rice signed for Real 
Properties as a manager. The contract recites that Dennis and Trefren own 100% of Real Homes 
and that they are selling all their mvnership interest and all real property which includes all 4 
parcels of the Riverside property (including Lot lB) and the Smith Property to Real Properties 
for the sum of $250,000.00. Dennis and Trefren also warrant 100% ownership of Real Homes 
and "good and marketable title free an clear of all leins, pledges, security interest or 
encumbrances and without any breach of any agreement to which he is a party". 
82. Trefren recorded a quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, as sole mvner, member and 
manager of Tradesman. This deed purported to convey Lots lA, 2A and 2B of the Riverside 
property from his LLC (Tradesman) to Real Properties. This deed was dated January 6, 2006. 
83. Trefren recorded another quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, as co-owner, member 
and manager of Real Homes, LLC. This deed purported to convey the exact same property as in 
his deed from Tradesman, also to Real Properties. This deed was also dated January 6, 2006. 
84. Trefren recorded a third quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, which was also dated 
January 6, 2006, as co-owner, member and manager of Real Homes. This deed purported to 
convey the Smith property from Real Homes to Real Properties. 
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85. On March 6, 2006, Dennis assigned his interest in the proceeds of the January 6, 
2006, contract to his counsel in this divorce proceeding by preparing and signing written 
assignment of that purchase and sale agreement. 
86. Neither the Jai.1.i..:ary 6, 2006, Purchase and Sale Agreement or the March 6, 2006, 
Assignment thereof were disclosed to Renee or her counsel until April 10, 2006 ( during trial). 
87. The parties acquired a 1989 Chieftan Motorhome during the marriage which is 
worth between $15,000.00 and $16,000.00. The parties do not dispute that this item may be 
awarded to Dennis. It does appear that this item was acquired with funds from a refinance on the 
1000 S. Roosevelt property in the amount of $17,107.00. 
88. Dennis possesses a 1982 Rolls Royce automobile. Renee claims this was 
purchased during the marriage and Dennis claims it is his separate property. The value is 
disputed with Renee claiming it is \.vorth $28,000.00 and Dennis claiming it is worth only 
$5,500. The documents pertaining to this vehicle are found in Exhibits 70 and 372. · 
89. There exists a 1980 Porsche, the character of which the parties dispute. Renee 
claims it is her separate property, but there is no supporting documentation for this claim. The 
value of this item is $5,500.00. 
90. Dennis acquired a 1954 Cadillac automobile long before the marriage. Renee 
claims that community funds in the amount of $1,750.00 were expended on this vehicle. 
91. Comparing Plaintiff's Exhibit I and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no dispute 
regarding either the character or assignment regarding the following items of property: 12, 14, 
15, 16, 22, 28, 29, 30A, 30B, 31, 32, 44, 44(a), 45, 48.1, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 69, 
69.3, 69.5 - 69.21,. 
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92. There are household appliances at the 1000 S. Roosevelt property which the 
parties agree are community (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Item 77.1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, Item 
71). The Plaintiff values these at $4,000.00 and the Defendant values them at $3,250. 
93. Numerous household items are listed in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 as numbers 77.2 -
77.61. Some of these are in Renee's possession, most are in Dennis' possession. It does not 
appear from Defendant's Exhibit 201, or the evidence, that Dennis objects to either the 
characterization of all these as community property or the proposed division in Plaintiffs Exhibit 
1. 
94. There are several firearms in Dennis' possession. Renee claims three were 
acquired during the marriage - the 12 ga. Binelli, worth $1,400.00; the Glock 9mm, worth 
$950.00; and the .22 Ruger, worth $800.00. Dennis agreed in his testimony that the 12 ga. 
Binelli and .22 Ruger were acquired during the marriage, with values of $450.00 and $125, 
respectively. He testified that the Glock was given to him by a third party. Neither party 
provided any documentation regarding value or dates regarding any any of the disputed items. 
95. There is one AQHA. horse and one APHA horse. The parties appear to agree that 
the AQHA horse is a community asset. However, they dispute the character of the APHA horse 
with Renee claiming it "does not belong to the community". However, the Court is unable to 
locate any documentation regarding any third party ownership of this animal. It appears the 
animals are worth approximately $1,500.00 each. The horse tack appears to be gone as a result 
of theft. 
96. There is a 1950 Packard automobile that the parties agree is owned jointly (50/50) 
by them and Daryl's brother. The value is disputed between $1,500.00 and $3,000.00. 
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97. There is a 1978 Oaks Whitewater boat with trailer which the parties agree is 
Dennis' separate property. Renee claims that community funds were expended on a new engine 
and other improvements. However, there was no documentation regarding these improvements. 
98. There is a 1949 Dreamboat Roadster which the parties agree is Dennis' separate 
property. Renee claims that community funds were expended on improvements to this item 
which enhanced the value. However, there was no documentation regarding these improvements 
or amount thereof. 
99. During the pendency of this action, Dennis sold the 2002 and 1998 Yamaha 
ATVs and the trailer for them. He received $7,500.00 for all three items, which the parties agree 
were community property. 
100. Fallowing the parties' separation, Renee sold the 1994 Mitsubishi automobile and 
used the proceeds for expenses. 
101. Dennis possesses the 1995 Chevrolet Suburban, which he claims is not an asset of 
the community. Renee claims it is and argues the value is $9,000.00. 
102. Renee claims that the 1999 Ya.ma.ha was given by Dennis to her daughter. Dennis 
claims that Roy Rice owns this ATV. The value of the item is uncertain. 
103. The 1967 Pontiac Firebird is community property. Renee values it at $6,100.00 
and Dennis values it at $1,500.00. There is no documentation regarding value. Dennis has 
possession of this vehicle. This vehicle should be awarded to Dennis arid the Court will assign a 
value of $2,500.00. 
104. There is an account with Capital Educators with a balance of$247.96. There does 
not appear to be a dispute that this is a community asset. 
105. The parties acquired several retirement accounts identified as Items 28 - 34 on 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201. As noted above, the only item that is disputed 




is #30. Item 30 is a Putnam SEPIRA account # 0336644339. Dennis argues that this account 
was opened by him before the marriage and he claims it as his separate property. The value of 
this account, as of December 31, 2005 was $40,160.99. 
106. There was a break in on May, 2004, where a horse trailer and its contents were 
stolen. Dennis and Renee received $14,075.20 in insurance proceeds from Safeco Insurance. 
The contents of the trailer belonged to third parties and not Dennis or Renee. The value of each 
party's stolen items is accurately listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit #1. The Court ordered these 
proceeds to be held in Plaintiffs attorney's trust account, with $1,247.97 to be paid towards a 
community debt on the Riverside property. 
107. Comparing Plaintiffs Exhibit #1 and Defendant's Exhibit #201, there is no 
dispute regarding the assignment of the following items of community debt: #82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96A & B, 97, 97.1, 97A, 98, 99, 101 (Plaintiff's Ex. 1), 102 
(all), and 104. 1 
108. There is a $30,097.38 community debt to Real Homes, LLC, for monies taken 
from that entity and used for community expenses. 
109. Dennis claims that there exists a community debt to Roy Rice in the amount of 
$44,093.00, which he claims includes $8,500 owed on the Chieftan Motorhome. Dennis and Mr. 
Rice had an arrangement, for many years, including prior to the marriage, where any family 
member of Dennis' could come into his business and pick out whatever they wanted and he 
would be able to get legal services from Dennis in exchange. There is an exhibit listing items 
and amounts taken from ~fr. Rice's business over the years. There is no documentation 
regarding how much, if any, legal services have been provided by dennis against this amount. 
1 Item 101 on defendant's· Exhibit 201 appears to be a debt of the law firm and not the community. 
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Mr. Rice testified that he and Denny have "done a hell of a lot of business over the last 25 
years". Mr. Rice did lend the parties $8,500.00 to acquire the Motorhome. 
110. There is a debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service. The parties agree this is a 
community debt. The amount owed is somewhere between $15,400.00 and $19,347.13. 
111. There is a debt owed to Perry Harding in the amount of $16,000.00. The parties 
dispute the division of this debt. 
112. Items 106.1 tJ:,..rough 106.24 in Exhibit #1 identify Renee's separate property. 
Dennis does not object to the characterization of these items. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA '1V 
1. The parties do not dispute that the property located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, 
Idaho, was acquired by Dennis prior to the marriage and is therefore his separate property. 
Accordingly, this property should be awarded to him as his sole and separate property. 
2. Likewise, the mortgage associated with the property at 1000 S. Roosevelt is the 
separate debt of Dennis. However, Dennis' separate estate is entitled to reimbursement, dollar 
for dollar, for the amount of community debt paid off through the refinance of this property in 
2002. See, Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1983); Josephson v. 
Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1989). This amount is $73,014.85. 
3. The three other properties acquired by Dennis from Kendra Bartsch-Sallaz in 
1991, are also his separate property and should be awarded to him as such. 
4. There is a dispute regarding the property located at 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise, 
Idaho. The facts above regarding this property (Hennifer Property), present difficulty for the 
court. Dennis argues that this property is not owned by him and Renee because his brother 
acquired the title when he bailed them out on their obligation. Renee argues that, despite the 
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lack of a deed from Daryl back to them, this Court should still determine that this property is 
owned by them because all the other "indicia of O'Nnership". 
Title by deed is not always the determining factor and there are times when 
circumstances will overcome the presumption of a deed. . In that regard, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has given the following sun1mary: 
Under Idaho law, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the holder of 
title to property is the legal o\vner of that property. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 
Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994); Russ Ballard & Family Achievement 
Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572, 579, 548 P.2d 72, 79 (1976). 
A rebuttable presumption imposes upon the party against whom it operates the 
burden of going forward with the evidence to rebut the presumption. I.RE. 301. 
The magistrate considered the evidence and found that under "all other 
circumstances and 'indicia' of ownership", the deed was not controlling and that 
the corporation did not own the O'Dell property. See Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 
44, 53, 324 P.2d 380, 385 (1958) ("Where title to property is tak:en in the name of 
one party but the consideration is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor 
of the party who pays the consideration."). 
1v!cA.ffee v. Jv!cA!fee, 132 Idaho 281, 971 P.2d 734 (Ct. App 1999). 
Such is the case here. Daryl has title which he obtained when he loaned money to Renee 
and Dennis to close the transaction. However, Daryl has done nothing consistent with mvnership 
by him. Instead, Dennis and Renee have made the payments, occupied the premises and made 
improvements on the property. Dennis collects the rent and pays the mortgage, including any 
shortfall between rent and mortgage. Dennis has continued to pay for expenses associated with 
this property. Renee pastured her horses on the property. Daryl pays no taxes on this property. 
Daryl even testified that he did the financing as an accommodation to Dennis and Renee. Other 
than loaning Dennis and Renee his name and money, Daryl has done nothing else consistent with 
being the owner of this property .. Instead, all indicia of ownership points to Dennis and Renee. 
In addition, the Court is concerned with the evidence regarding the break in at Renee's 
residence. The evidence tends to show that Daryl did sign a deed conveying the property back to 
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Dennis and Renee, but that it was taken from her home during the burglary. The Court ca..'1 only 
speculate why such a deed was not recorded and cannot help wondering why the two burglaries 
were never properly followed up with law enforcement. Nevertheless, the Court does believe it 
is more likely than not that there was a deed back from Daryl which was taken from Renee's 
residence, which made it significantly more difficult to establish that this property is community 
property. 
Based upon the foregoing, Renee has met her burden of rebutting the presumption that 
Daryl is the owner of this property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the 916 S. Roosevelt 
(Hennifer) property is the community property of Dennis and Renee and that they owe Daryl a 
debt of $30,000.00 for the money he loaned them. 
The Court recognizes that this determination of ownership is not necessarily binding 
upon Daryl as he is not a party to this action. Thus, regardless of whether the Court awards this 
property to one of the parties or that it be sold, one or the other ( or both) parties may be involved 
in resolving this issue before title is clear, including further litigation. T'nis Court cannot help 
with that situation which is the result of the parties own actions. 
It is the Court's determination that this property should be sold immediately, that the 
proceeds be applied to all outstanding debt against it, and any equity (approximately $65,000.00 
at the time of divorce) remaining should be awarded to Renee. 
5. There is a dispute between the parties regarding the community interest in Real 
Homes, LLC. Dennis argues, based upon the evidence he produced, that the community only 
has a 50% interest in this entity and its assets and liabilities. Renee argues that the community 
has a I 00% interest. If the Court determines that the Operating Agreement introduced by Renee 
is the original document, then she would be correct. If the Court believes the Operating 
Agreement produced by Dennis is the original, then Dennis would be correct. 
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In order to resolve this issue, the Court has considered these two documents, the 
circumstances and other facts regarding Real Homes, the testimony of the parties and Mr. 
Trefren, and the consistencies and inconsistencies between all of this evidence. This analysis 
includes, but is not limited to, the following higrJights. 
Several of J\tfr. Trefren's actions and much of his testimony, were unsubstantiated and 
inconsistent with his claimed 50/50 ownership with Dennis of Real Homes. In particular, his 
signing of a quitclaim deed transferring all of the real property owned by Real Homes to his LLC 
(Tradesman), apparently without Dennis' knowledge or approval, simply does not make sense. 
In addition, Mr. Trefren's recording on June 6, 2005, of his wholly unsupported claim of lien in 
the amount of $250,000.00 against all real property owned not only by Real Homes, but also 
Dennis and Renee, seems to this Court to be concocted. In fact, he testified his intent was to 
cloud the title on all the real property! Further, Nfr Trefren, apparently to further carry out this 
scheme, recorded amended claims of lien in July, 2005, to include Lot lB of the Riverside 
Property, and the Smith Property for $35,000.00. Again, Mr. Trefren could not produce any 
documents to support his claims on any of the properties. Further, if 1-fr. Trefren was already a 
member of real Homes, LLC, there was little reason for him to fonn another. Further still, Mr. 
Trefren's signing of a quitclaim deed on February 16, 2005, as a member of Real Homes, 
regarding all the property owned by Real Homes, including the Riverside Lot (IB) O\.vned by 
Dennis and Renee, to his own LLC, is highly suspect given all the other documentation and 
efforts to eliminate all real property holdings of Real Homes. This seems particulariy evident 
since Mr. Trefren testified that Dennis prepared the deed, but Dennis testified that he was 
unaware of the deed. Finally, as a whole, Mr Trefren's testimony is not credible as much of it 
was either without basis or documentation, contradictory with itself, or contradictory with others 
who testified, such as Roy Rice regarding his employment and firing of Mr. Trefren. 
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Likewise, Dennis' actior:s, or inactions, and testimony were also inconsistent and not 
such as to be expected of a 50/50 owner. There is no evidence that Mr. Trefren objected to 
Dennis' withdrawal of $30,000.00 in May of 2004, as his "personal funds". His testimony at his 
deposition and at trial regarding why 1vfr. Trefren's name was not on the Operating Agreement 
that Renee produced was contradictory. As well, Dennis' interaction with Mr. Trefren and Real 
Homes was not consistent with a 50/50 ownership, at least until March, 2005. There is no 
evidence that he ever referred to or treated Trefren like an equal partner prior to that date. 
On the other hand, the Operating Agreement introduced by Renee is actually signed and 
dated. Further, the filings with the Idaho Secretary of State in 2002, 2003 and 2004 (for the 
years 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively), were all filed in February of those years and each 
listed Renee as the President of Real Homes. For some reason, Dennis filed the 2004 annual 
report in November, 2004 - after the firing of Renee and the separation of the parties, and before 
the year had actually ended - and listed himself as "owner". Finally, Renee did engage in 
activities consistent 1,,vith her mvnership under the Operating Agreement she introduced into 
evidence. 
Upon consideration of these items, and others contained in the Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that the Operating Agreement which is signed by Renee should govern. That 
Agreement is dated January and designates her as 100% owner. 
As a result, Renee had 100% ownership in Real Homes, LLC when it was formed and 
any changes without her consent or approval 1,,vere without authority and therefore void. 
Accordingly, the community, through her o\.vnership, retained a 100% interest in Real Homes, 
LLC, including all its assets and liabilities. This includes the Riverside Lots ( except for Lot 1 B) 
and the Smith Property. 
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As with other properties, there are potential issues regarding third party claims 
concerning the assets of Real Homes, LLC. Unfortunately, this Court cannot adjudicate in a way 
that is binding, any claims of third parties. Therefore, the Court concludes that all holdings of 
Real Homes, LLC, should be sold immediately. Proceeds from the sale of a specific property 
should first be applied to a.11y debt on that property. A.r1y remaining proceeds from a specific 
property should be applied to remaining debt on other properties sold.2 
If, after all the assets are liquidated and the proceeds are used to pay debts of the LLC, 
there remains outstanding debt, then that remaining obligation shall be shared equally by the 
parties. If, there is a remaining surplus in proceeds, they shall be distributed first to Renee to 
satisfy any remaining equalization, then shared between the parties equally. 
6. The parties dispute both the character and value of the property located at 15584 
Riverside (Lot 1 B), which is the residence occupied by Renee. 
Although Dennis argues that this property is still treated by Glen Trefren as an asset of 
Real Homes, LLC, there is no credible documentation to support this. As set forth above, it does 
not appear J\'Ir. Trefren is in the legal position he thinks he is. Further, the evidence clearly 
shows that the property was in fact conveyed from Real Homes, LLC, to Dennis and Renee. 
Finally, Dennis has not provided sufficient evidence to refute this. Therefore, the Court 
concludes that this item is community property. 
The value of this property as of March, 2005 (about 4 months prior to the date of divorce) 
was approximately $152,000.00. Dennis provided an appraisal from July, 2006, which indicates 
the property has appreciated substantially after the effective date of divorce. \Vhile this does 
show the value of this item has increased, the Court is required to value the assets as of the date 
of divorce, not a year later. See, Brinkmeyer v. Brinhneyer, 135 Idaho 596, 21 P.Jd 918 (2001); 
2 See, Equalization Section below. 
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ivfcA.JJee, supra; Desfosses v. Desfosses, 122 Idaho 634, 836 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App. 1992). Based 
upon the evidence, it appears that the value is likely closer to the figure in March, 2005. The 
Court understands Denn.is' argument that the market did jump in 2005. The Court also 
understands that the comparables in the appraisal submitted by Renee are somewhat outdated. 
However, the record does not have sufficient evidence to determine how much, if any, the value 
jumped between March and July, 2005. To arrive at a different figure would require pure 
speculation by the Court.3 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that ~e value of this asset, as of the date of divorce, 
was $152,000.00, with debt of $114,471.90, leaving equity of approximately $37,528.10. It is 
the Court's detennination that this property should be awarded to Renee subject to the debt of 
$114,471.90.4 
7. With regard to the settlement monies from the Sumner lawsuit received by Dennis 
during the marriage, the Court has carefully reviewed all the facts associated with these monies. 
In Idaho, the character of property as either separate or community vests at the time it it 
acquired. Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411 (1983); Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 
555 P. 2d 385 (1976). It is presumed that all property acquired during the marriage is 
community property. I.C. § 32-906; Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 860 P.2d 634 (1993); Winn, 
supra. Thus, earnings of the parties during the divorce and up to the date of divorce are 
commur,Jty property. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976); Desfosses v. 
Desfosses, supra. 
3 The Curt notes that Defendant had more than ample opportunity to obtain an appraisal at or near the date of the 
divorce, or any time prior thereto while this matter was pending. He did not and chose to wait until a year later. In 
addition, the Court notes that defendant's appraiser did not discount his value back to the date of divorce or 
otherwise offer an opinion in that regard. 
4 By awarding this property to Renee subject to the debt thereon, the Court is not in any way validating any claims 
of lein, etc. by Mr. Trefren and the Court recognizes there main remai.n third party issues. However, those claims 
against this property (and any other properties) will have to be determined in some other action. Further, the Court 
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Generally, the party asserting that property is separate has the burden of proof. Worzala 
v. Worzala, 128 Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (1996). This must be done with reasonable certainty 
and particularity. Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 512 P. 2d 1317 (1973); Barton v. Barton, 
132 Idaho 395, 973 P.2d 746 (1999). This may be done through evidence of direct tracing or 
indirect tracing through an accounting. iviartsch v. 1Vartsch, 103 Idaho 142, 645 P.2d 882(1982); 
Josephson v. Josephson, supra. 
The Sumner settlement monies were received during the marriage. The total of these 
monies is $387,098.00. Dennis testified that most of this money was earned before the marriage 
and was his separate earnings. Thus, he has the burden of showing, with reasonable certainty 
and particularity, these moneys were not earned during the marriage. The evidence does not 
entirely support Denn.is testimony. 
The only documents that arguably support this contention is the A.mended Answer and 
Cross Claim he filed on March, 1999, and the summary and aging of the Sumner amounts 
provided at his deposition in August, 1999. However, these documents clearly establish that as 
of August, 1999, at least the current amount of $81,984.82 was earned during the marriage. 
They also establish that the balance of $269,204.60 was earned at least 120 days prior to August, 
1999. Approximately three years of this time was during the marriage (the parties were married 
in July, 1996). No other documentation was provided by Dennis to show when any of these 
monies were actually earned. In fact, there is no accounting or other documentation concerning 
the remaining $35,908.58 of the settlement monies deposited into the estate account. Without 
such accounting evidence, it is impossible for the Court to determine, with reasonable certainty 
or particularity, how much of this amount was earned by him before or during the marriage. 
notes that it does not appear that these claims are legitimate and have not been documented, making it unlikely they 
will be validated. 
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In addition, the balance of the evidence surrounding the Sumner monies also does not 
help Dennis with his burden of proof. First, all the money from the Sumner settlement was 
received after the marriage. Second, he deposited this money into the account for his 
grandmother's estate account instead of his trust account or other appropriate account. Dennis' 
testimony that the reason he deposited this money into the account for his deceased grandmother 
because she loaned him money in the past is not supported by the evidence. There are no loan 
documents substantiating such a debt and the estate inventory does not list such a debt to Dennis. 
Further, Dennis had already distributed $184,969.37 from his grandmother's estate betvveen 
March, 2000 and August, 2001. If he owed her money for a loan, why did he ta.1<e his share of 
the estate at that time? Third, he distributed this money to others in his family, including Diani, 
who was not legally entitled to any of the Matcham estate. Finally, all of this was done during 
his marriage to Renee and without her knowledge. 
Based upon the foregoing, Dennis did not meet his burden of proof that all of the Sumner 
settlement monies were earned prior to the marriage. First, the Court concludes that $81,984.82 
was "current" as of August, 1999. Thus, the Court concludes that this amount was earned during 
the marriage and was community property. Second, this leaves a balance of $305,113.18 of the 
total deposited as Sumner monies ($387,098.00 - $81,984.82). Of that amount, $269,204.60 
appears on the aging report in August, 1999. The Court recognizes that this amount is quite 
large to have all been earned during the first 3 to 3 Yi years of the marriage and that it is likely 
some of it was earned before. However, there is simply no competent evidence accounting for 
the dates that the monies were earned. Without something, there is no way to arrive at a figure 
with reasonable certainty or particularity. Accordingly, the Court has no alternative but to 
conclude that this money was also community property. Finally, there is no accounting for the 
remaining $35,908.58 deposited into the estate account as settlement monies. Again, without 
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such evidence, the Court must conclude that this amount was also community property as it was 
acquired during the marriage. 
Consequently, the Court ca.11 only conclude that all the moneys received during the 
marriage from the Sumner settlement were community funds. The total of this amount is 
$387,098.00. 
The evidence fur+J1er shows that $160,000.00 of this money was distributed to four of 
Dennis' family members on June 8, 2004. A..11other $198,000.00 was distributed to these same 
people on or about July 13, 2005. Thus, a total of $358,000.00 of the $387,000.00 in settlement 
monies was distributed to persons outside the community. The Court concludes that these 
community funds were expended for purposes unrelated to the community. See, Larson v. 
Larson, 139 Idaho 972, 88 P.3d 1212 (Ct. App. 2003), not reversed on review, 139 Idaho 970 
(2004). Accordingly, the Court will apportion this amount as part of Dennis' share of the 
community property division. Id; Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P. 3d 889 (Ct. App. 2001). 
It would appear from the evidence that the balance of the settlement money ($29,000.00) 
was used by Dennis for various personal expenses during the marriage and period of separation 
of the parties and the Court will not deem this as part of division of community property. 
8. The community also has an interest in the accounts receivable of Dennis' law firm 
up to the date of divorce on July 28, 2005. The evidence regarding the value of this asset is in 
conflict. To resolve this conflict, the Court looks at the methodology and detail applied by each 
expert, as well as other factors such as any personal interest in the outcome of this matter. In 
addition, the Court agrees with counsel for Dennis that consideration of taxes once such 
receivables may be paid is appropriate. See, Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 860 P.2d 634 (1993). 
While Ms. Pulliam's review appears to be more extensive and detailed, it does not appear 
that her opinion considers the effect of taxation upon payment of the receivables. Nor does it 
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discount the value based upon age of the accounts. Also, she did not adjust for any payables that 
Dennis would be responsible for, which she noted could be considered and totaled $4,650.00. 
l\ifr. Harding did factor in the effect of ta'(es and did discount for the age of accounts. However, 
he discounted all accounts receivable which were over 90 days old to a uniform value of 10% 
without any basis for such extreme and uniform discounting. Further, he did so without 
considering the firm's history concerning writing off bad debt, the pay history regarding most of 
the clients and was unaware of any work-in -progress, despite having access to all of the records 
of the firm. Finally, he does have an interest in the outcome of this matter, having a secured 
interest in real property in dispute in this case. 
Further still, Mr. Harding's valuation was based upon a new set of revised numbers by 
the law firm which NJ;s. Pulliam did not have initially. This concerns the Court greatly for two 
reasons. First, these new numbers appear to be based upon "discussions" between Mr. Harding 
and the office manager and are not supported by documentation. Second, this is a theme 
throughout this case - there are numerous instances where there exist two documents with the 
same title, but containing different or new information. The best example of this is the two 
versions of the Operating Agreement for Real Homes, discussed above. As with those items, 
only one can be correct - one is false or concocted. In the case of the accounts receivable, Renee 
had no access to either of these summary documents and both vvere provided by Dennis. This 
gives at least the appearance that one of the summaries is concocted. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court believes that both expert's opinions are useful and 
based upon data that they were provided. However, their opinions are only as good as the data. 
On the one hand, it appears that l\ifr. Harding over discounted the value based upon his method of 
aging. In· addition, the summary he used is suspect because it was revised after the first one 
provided to l\ifs. Pulliam and there is no supporting documentation. On the other hand, Ms. 
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Pulliam did not account for the effect of taxes and has no aging discount because her data did not 
contain any old accounts. 
In an effort to give due consideration to both opinions, based upon the most credible and 
documented evidence, the Court concludes that the accounts receivable should be valued at 
$130,744.00, less $4,650.00 for payables, for a total of $126,094.00. This amount should be 
further reduced by the 25% ta'{ rate, which would be $31,523.5. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that the value of the accounts receivable assignable to Dennis as of July 28, 2005, is 
$94,570.50. 
9. The evidence was conflicting regarding Dennis' share of the accounts receivable. 
He testified that he turned over all but 10% of his interest to Nfr. Gatewood. However, he has 
provided no documentation to support this position. To the contrary, the Subchapter S 
documents in evidence show that he is a 90% owner. Accordingly, the Court concludes that as 
of the time of divorce, Dennis mvned 90% of the accounts receivable of Sallaz and Gatewood, 
which was $85,113.45 ($94,570.5 X .90). For practical reasons, this asset should be aw·arded to 
Dennis. 
10. With regard to the Putnam Investments retirement account, the balance at or near 
the time of divorce was $40,160.89. Dennis argues that the entire balance should be his separate 
property. Renee argues that all of this money is community in nature. The Court disagrees with 
both parties as the evidence does not support either entirely. 
This account is comprised of eight (8) separate funds. The evidence shows that 5 of these 
accounts were actually opened after the marriage and three were opened in 1994. However, the 
backup documentation from Dennis only shows a total of $8,510.92 accumulated in those three 
accounts before the marriage. There is no other evidence to support his claim that the rest of the 
funds are his separate property. As a result, he has failed in his burden of establishing that aU of 
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the money in this account is his separate property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 
$31,649.97 is conununity property and $8,510.92 is the separate property of Dennis. The fund 
should be liquidated, and Dennis should be awarded $8,510.92 as his separate property, with the 
balance to be awarded to Renee. 
1 L After comparison of Plaintiffs Ex..11.ibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no 
dispute regarding either the character, value ( or the value is minimal) or assignment of the 
following items of property: 12, 14, 15, 16, 22, 28, 29, JOA, 30B, 31, 32, 44, 44(a), 45, 48.1, 50, 
51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 69, 69.3, 69.5 - 69.21, As a result each of these items should be 
awarded to the listed party with the values as indicated. There is some discrepancy between the 
values assigned these items by the parties. Using Dennis' values, the division is approximately 
$4,000.00 in favor of Renee ($28,078.48 vs. $23,909.07). Using Renee's values, the division is 
approximately $800.00 in her favor ($29,243.48 vs. $28,454.07). Given these amounts, as a 
whole, the division is substantially equal. 
12. The household furnishings and appliances located at 1000 S. Roosevelt (Item 71 
on Defendant's Exhibit 201 and Item 77.1 on Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) are community property. The 
parties agree that these items may be awarded to Dennis, but do not agree on the total value of 
them. The Plaintiff argues the value is $4,000, while the Defendant argues the value is 
$3,250.00. The Court concludes that the total value is $3,500.00 and that these items should be 
awarded to Dennis. 
13. The household furniture, appliances, etc., listed in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 as items 
77.1 and 77.2 - 77.61 are community property and should be divided according to the division 
proposed therein, except for the storage shed (Item 77.60). Thus, Renee should be awarded 
items 77.7, 77.8, 77.9, 77.10, 77.26, 77.34, 77.50, 77.51, 77.56 and 77.58. The total value of the 
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items awarded to Renee is $3,225.00. Thus, the total value of the items remaining and awarded 
to Dennis is $26,645.00. 
14. With regard to the firearms, the Court concludes that all but the 12 ga. Binelli and 
.22 Ruger are the separate property of Dennis. Accordingly, all but these two should be awarded 
to him as his separate property. The Court further concludes that the value of the Binelli is 
$800.00 and the value of the .22 is $350.00. These items should be awarded to Dennis as part of 
the division of community property. 
15. With regard to any horses remaining, it appears that there is only one AQHA 
horse remaining and that it is community property. The parties dispute the characterization of 
the APHA horse. The Court does not recall any documentation regarding this animal and will 
conclude that it is community property. The Court further concludes that each horse is worth 
$1,500.00. Both horses should be awarded to Renee as community property. 
16. The community has 50% ownership in the 1950 Packard with Dennis' brother. 
The value of this interest is disputed between $750.00 and $1,500.00. There was no 
documentation regarding the value. The Court concludes that the community interest in this 
vehicle is $1,125.00. This item should be awarded to Dennis since his brother is the co-owner. 
17. With regard to the 1978 Oaks Whitewater boat and trailer, it is clear that this is 
Dennis' separate property. Renee claimed there were improvements to this item during the 
marriage, but no documentation was provided. Further, her value of the improvements was 
$9,800.00, while Dennis value of the boat and trailer together was only $9,000.00. It seems 
unlikely that a boat and trailer that is approaching 30 years old is worth much more than this and 
certainly there is value over and above any improvements. Accordingly, the Court cannot find 
that the community is entitled to any reimbursement for improvements to this item, or that the 
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value was enhanced, and concludes that it should be awarded to Der..nis as his sole and separate 
property. 
18. Likewise, the 1949 Dreamboat roadster is clearly Dennis' separate property. 
Renee's claims regarding improvements to this item are undocumented and the Court is therefore 
unable to find that the community is entitled to reimbursement for enhancement. Accordingly, 
this item is awarded to Dennis as his sole and separate property. 
19. The 2002 Yamaha ATV, 1998 Yamaha ATV and ATV trailer were sold to Roy 
Rice for $7,500.00 and the funds were used by Dennis for attorney's fees. Renee claims these 
items are worth more, but the Court cannot reach that conclusion. Accordingly, the $7,500.00 
proceeds from the sale of these items should be awarded to Dennis. 
20. \Vith regard to the 1999 Yamaha ATV, Renee claimed it was given by Dennis to 
her daughter. It seems she is asserting ownership of this A TV on behalf of her daughter, despite 
Dennis' position that he did not give it to her daughter. However, it does not appear that she is in 
a position to do so. Under Idaho law, a community asset may not be given away without the 
consent of both the husband and wife. See, Estate of Hull, 126 Idaho 437,885 P.2d 1153 (C.A. 
1994). In addition, as the proponent of this claim, Renee has the burden of proving such gift was 
accomplished. There is insufficient evidence to show that Dennis gave the ATV to her daughter, 
including evidence that he did, or now does, consent to such a gift. The Court therefore 
concludes that this item is community property and that it, or the proceeds from it, should be 
awarded to Dennis. 
21. The 1967 Pontiac Firebird is in Dennis' possession. Although the parties appear 
to agree that this item may be awarded to Dennis, the value is disputed. The Court concludes the 
value of this asset is $3,500.00 and that it should be awarded to Dennis. 
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22. With regard to the 1989 Chieftan motorhome, the parties do not dispute that this 
is a community property item and may be awarded to Dennis. The Court will assign a value of 
$15,000.00 to this item, which is the lower amount indicated by Renee. The Court chooses this 
value based upon the age of the vehicle. It also appears that the loan on this vehicle was paid 
with separate funds belonging to Dennis in 1998 when he refinanced the 1000 S. Roosevelt 
property. Therefore, Dennis is entitled to receive reimbursement for his separate property in this 
amount. See, Ustick, supra; Estate of Freeburn, supra; Gaosch, supra. 
23. The character and value of the 1982 Rolls Royce are disputed. Dennis has the 
burden of proving, to a reasonable certainty, that this item is his separate property. Worzalla, 
supra. 
There is no document in evidence that clearly established when the vehicle was acquired 
by Dennis. The documents within Exhibit· 3 72 are dated after the marriage, except for three. 
These three documents establish little, do not clearly relate to this vehicle and do not clearly 
indicate 01,vnership by Dennis. However, Exhibit #70 is from the Idaho Transportation 
Department and does indicate the owner is Empire West, Inc, which is an entity of Dennis'. This 
is sufficient evidence to establish, to a reasonable certainty, that this vehicle is Dennis' separate 
property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that it is his separate property and will award it as 
such to Dennis. 
Since the Court has determined this item to be Dennis' separate property, the Court need 
not address the value. 
24. Likewise, the character of the 1980 Porsche is disputed with Renee claiming it as 
her separate property without documentation. Based on the same reasoning above, the Court 
concludes that Renee has not shown, to a reasonable certainty, that this vehicle is her separate 
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property. Accordingly, the Court concludes it is a community asset. The Court will assign the 
value given by Renee of $5,500.00 and will award this item to her. 
r _). The 1954 Cadillac Eldorado was acquired by Dennis long before the marriage. 
Renee claims that the community expended $1,750.00 on improvements to this vehicle. 
However, there is no documentation supporting this claim. Therefore, Renee has not met her 
burden as required to show that community funds were used and that such expenditures 
enhanced the value of the vehicle. See, Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 488, (2003). 
Accordingly, this item is awarded to Dennis as his separate property without reimbursement to 
the community. 
26. The parties do not agree regarding the character, value or disposition of the 1995 
Chevrolet Suburban. Renee argues it is a community asset worth $9,000.00. Dennis argues it is 
not a community asset, but he is in possession of it. He argues it was owned by the law firm and 
then sold to his brother Daryl. There is little documentation in the record to give the Court a 
basis to reach a conclusion regarding the character of this asset. Plaintiffs Exhibit #72A does 
not establish the vehicle was acquired with community funds. It appears that National Financial 
Service, Inc. was involved with this vehicle. However, as noted elsewhere, this entity is the 
separate property of Dennis and the Court is unable to unravel the source or use of funds by this 
entity. The Court will conclude that this vehicle is not a community asset. 
27. The entity known as National Financial Service, Inc. was acquired by Dennis as 
early as 1969. Renee claimed this entity was transferred by Dennis'to her. However, the Court 
cannot recall that there is any documentation supporting such a transfer. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that it is Dennis' separate property. 
28. The entity and account for this entity were used by the parties during the marriage 
for various purposes which have not been fully traced. For example, the Ford Excursion was 
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titled in the name of this entity, but used by the parties. Also, Renee took $3,200.00 from the 
account on the day she was terminated by Dennis. It is not possible for the Court to sufficiently 
delineate which funds were used by which party, and for what purpose in order to determine how 
much in the account is separate and how much is community. Therefore, the Court concludes 
that Dennis should be awarded this entity and its account as his separate property. 
29. With regard to the Putnam SEPIRA. account# 0336644339, Dennis claims this as 
his separate property. Dennis has the burden of establishing when this account was opened and 
the source of all funds deposited. He refers to Exhibits 21 OB, 21 QC and 248 as support for this 
claim. However, those documents do not establish that this was an account prior to the marriage. 
Without such documentation, his claim of separate property must fail. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that this account is a community asset with a value of $40,160.99. 
This item should be divided equally between the parties. 
30. There are two community bank accounts which the parties did not agree upon 
regarding balance, character or division. Account# 910403141 at D.L. Evans Bank appears to 
be closed. As a result, there is nothing for the Court to divide. The parties agree that there is a 
balance of $247.96 in the Capital Educators account #0000601990. The Court will award the 
balance in this account to Renee. 
31. With regard to the Safeco Insurance proceeds, Renee argues that these funds were 
received by the community on behalf of third parties who suffered losses exceeding the 
$14,075.20. The Court agrees. The evidence at trial established that the items stolen were the 
personal property of those parties and not Dennis or Renee. As a result, this money belongs to 
those parties and is in the nature of a community debt to them. The amounts due each are set 
forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit #1. This money should be paid to them according to these amounts. 
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Since there will be a shortfall, they should be paid their proportionate share, with the balance of 
this "debt'' to be assigned to Renee. 
32. After comparison of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no 
dispute regarding the assignment of the following comm.unity debts: #82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96A & B, 97, 97.1, 97A, 99, 101 (Plaintiffs Exhibit #1), 102 (all), and 
104. 5 As a result, each of these items should be awarded to the listed party as their 
responsibility. 6 Essentially, this results in the assignment of all these debts to Dennis, except the 
VISA balance of approximately $2,900.00. Using Dennis' figures, the total he is assigned is 
$153,781.59. Using Renee's figures, the total assigned to Dennis is $146,719.63. The average 
of these two figures is approximately $150,000.00. From this, and with regard to these items, the 
Court concludes that Dennis is assigned approximately $147,000.00 more of the community debt 
than Renee. 
33. With regard to the IRS debt, the amount is somewhere between $15,400.00 and 
$19,347.13. Dennis proposed that this debt be assigned to him, while Renee proposed it be 
assigned 50% to each. Since Dennis has been assigned substantially more than Renee with 
regard to the items immediately above, the Court concludes that this debt should be assigned 
equally between the parties. 
34. With regard to the $16,000.00 debt owed to Perry Harding, Dennis proposed he 
be assigned $8,000.00 and that Glen Trefren should be responsible for the other $8,000.00. 
However, based upon the Court's determination regarding the Real Homes situation, the Court 
concludes that this entire debt is a community debt to be paid by both parties. Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that each party should be assigned one half of this debt. 
5 Item #101 on Defendant's Exhibit 201 appears to be a debt of the law finn and not the community. 
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35. With regard to the alleged debt to Dennis' brother Daryl for one half of the rents 
collected on the Grandview property, there is insufficient evidence to conclude this debt exists. 
There is no documentation regarding Daryl's ownership in that property and he testified in his 
deposition that he never made any claim for such rents. As a result, the Court concludes there is 
no community debt to Daryl for the court to assign. 
36. With regard to the alleged debt to Roy Rice, the Court is uncertain. On the one 
hand, Mr. Rice provided a list of items a..11d their values that were taken from his business by 
Dennis a..11.d/or Renee and/or her daughter. The Court has every reason to believe that this list is 
accurate as Mr. Rice was one of the more credible witnesses in the trial. He came across as a 
very honest, tell-it-like-it-is person, which the Court appreciated. Thus, the Court does not 
question that the members of the community received items of value from Mr. Rice. 
37. However, it was clear that the arrangement was that Dennis did legal work in 
exchange for items ta..1<:en by his family. But, it was not clear which legal work applied to which 
items - on the list or off - or when legal work was done, etc. It also appeared that this "open 
account" arrangement was in place before the marriage of the parties herein. 
38. Tnis would seem to make it a separate debt of Dennis. In essence, Dennis agreed 
with Mr. Rice, before the marriage, that he or his family members, could obtain items and that 
Dennis would pay him back with legal services. Due to the nature of this arrangement, its 
ongoing nat1..ire, and the lack of evidence regarding legal services actually provided, the Court 
concludes that the balance owed on this debt, if any, is not a community debt to be shared by the 
parties. Instead, it seems more of a separate debt of Dennis' and the Court will so conclude. 
6 The amount of Dennis medical bills is uncertain. His Exhibit #201 lists most of them as having a zero balance, 
while Renee's Exhibit #I lists them as unknown. The Court concludes that these bills should be assigned to Dennis 
as he suggested, but the Court finds that none of these have any outstanding balance at this time. 
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39. The parties did receive $8,500.00 from Nfr. Rice to acquire the Motorhome. This 
portion of the claimed debt is a debt of the community and the Court will assign it to Dennis. 
40. With regard to the community debt of $30,097.38 owed to Real Homes, LLC, it 
does appear that this a.111ount was ta.1<:en from the Real Homes account and deposited into Dennis' 
personal checking account or sent to the IRS. Exhibit 205 does show where this money was 
spent and many of the items the Court recognizes as debts of the community ( eg. credit cards, 
George Hicks, ... ). The Court concludes that this money was expended on community debts and 
constitutes a debt of the community to Real Homes, LLC. However, the Court need not address 
the assignment of this item due to the determination regarding the ownership of the LLC. 
41. The personal property listed as Items #106.1 llrrough #106.24 should be 
confinned as Renee's separate property. Any of these items which Dennis has possession of 
should be returned by him to her. If he no longer has possession, then Renee is entitled to a 
judgment for their value. 
42. The Court has struggled greatly with the issues and ultimate award of the parties' 
dog named "Smooch". Much attention has been given to this dog, and required of the Court, by 
the parties. The Court entered an order providing for equal time of possession of Smooch while 
this matter was pending. This was done for more than one reason. First, the Court recognized, 
and could relate to the fact, that this asset was very important to both parties. Second, how the 
parties dealt with the shared time of possession and with each other might shed some light on a 
fair and equitable award of the dog. This did indeed provide useful guidance for the Court. 
Finally, the Court knew that this matter would not be resolved in a short time frame and felt that 
since Smooch would likely be awarded to one party or the other, it would be most fair for them 
to both have as much an opportunity to enjoy him as possible. That time has now come. 
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Dennis has argued that the Court should provide that Smooch be jointly owned by the 
parties, subject to motions in the future if they cannot agree as to times of possession. This 
argument is inviting as the temporary arrangement has actually worked fairly well. Frankly, the 
Court anticipated many more problems due to the parties' fu'ltagonism on so many other issues. 
No doubt, Smooch would be fine with such an arrangement - he is a Labrador - Labs love 
everyone. 
However, the Court declines to do as urged by Dennis as it would be contrary to the 
directives of Idaho law to divide all the community property. In addition, the parties do not need 
to be tied together in this fashion from this point forward. Assuredly, they would be back in 
Court again regarding Smooch and they do not need this. So, the Court must ma..1<:e a decision. 
In the pages and paragraphs above, it appears that during the marriage and wliJle this 
matter was pending, Dennis was less than forthright with Renee about finances and assets. The 
Court has addressed those instances above, occasionally determining Dennis' statements or 
evidence to be less credible and often resolving conflicting evidence in favor of Renee, and 
awarding her share of the community estate accordingly. However, with regard to Smooch, 
there is no evidence that Dennis has engaged in similar types of deceit towards Renee. In fact, it 
is he who has been willing all along to share Smooch equally, including on a permanent basis. 
On the other hand, it has been Renee who has been less than cooperative and forthcoming 
regarding Smooch. This required the entry of the temporary order at the outset of this litigation 
and further rulings by the .Court when Renee refused to cooperate. This tips the scale ever so 
slightly on this issue. 
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As a result, the Court concludes t.1.at it would be more fair and equitable to award 
Smooch to Dennis at this time. 7 
EQUALIZATION 
The Characterization and division of property and debt above is not equal. It results in an 
award of approximately $260,000.00 of the community assets and $114,000.00 of the debt to 
Renee, for a net of approximately $146,000.00. On the other hand, Dennis is awarded 
approximately $501,000.00 in community assets and $155,000.00 of the debt, for a net of 
approximately $346,000.00. This results in Dennis receiving a difference of approximately 
200,000.00 in his favor. The Court felt constrained to do this for two reasons. First, the Sumner 
mo11ies are gone because Dennis gave them to third parties and/or used it l:1imself. Therefore, 
none of these funds are available to be awarded to Renee and must be considered as awarded to 
Dennis. Second, it seemed impractical to award to Renee t1e accounts receivable at the law 
firm. Thus, the Court is left with this unequal division. 
Reducing the above amount by the amount of reimbursement Dennis is entitled 
($84,000.00 - refinance of 1000 S. Roosevelt and payment on Motorhome), reduces this amount 
to approximately $116,000.00. This is the amount that must be equalized. 
The Court has ordered the assets of Real Homes, LLC to be sold, which includes all the 
real property associated therewith at the time of divorce. Once these properties are sold and the 
debts against them are paid, any surplus proceeds would be available and should be awarded to 
Renee to accomplish the equalization. The Court recognizes that there may not be sufficient 
surplus proceeds, if any, to accomplish this. The Court also recognizes that the sale of the 
properties held by Real Homes, LLC may be problematic due to the transactions by Dennis after 
7 AJth9ugh Smooch is awarded to Dennis and he will be the owner, there is nothing preventing the parties from 
sharing on their own· if they should be able to agree to do so. 
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t..11.e date of divorce. In either of those events, the equalization can only be guaranteed by a 
judgment in favor of Renee against Dennis. 
As a result, the equalization shall be accomplished as follows. Renee shall be entitled to 
a judgment against Dennis in the amount of $180,000.00. Immediately upon the sale of the Real 
Homes communirJ assets set forth above, and ai.-9:er payment of the debts associated with said 
property, any surplus proceeds shall be irnmediately distributed to Renee and a satisfaction, or 
partial satisfaction, of the judgment shall be entered. If there is any surplus proceeds (which the 
Court recognizes is unlikely), then the proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties. 
ORDER 
Counsel for Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to prepare a Judgment and Decree 
consistent with the foregoing. 
DATED this -3l4day of October, 2007. 




CERTIFICATE OF ~!AILING 
I hereby certify that on the 3iJ day of October, 2007, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Debra L. Eismann, Esq. 
3016 Caldwell Blvd. 
Nampa, ID 83651 
James A. Bevis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 827 
Boise, ID 83701-0827 




Niutual Release and Settlement Agreement 
iliis ~~:: :~::a:::e::::::~ :~:m:~sJ:::d;;:,::,::: ::e:;e~ 
REAL HOMES L.L.C. an Idaho limited liability company, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company (hereafter the "Plaintiffs") and RENEE BAIRD, an 
individual (hereafter "Defendant"). 
l. The parties acknowledge the purpose of this agreement is to extinguish any 
be asserted in the litigation styled Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, 
Real Homes, L. L. C. and Real Properties, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company v. 
Renee Baird, Dennis Sallaz, Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction, LLC., an Idaho limited liability company, Case No CV 09-1185 5 ("the 
subject litigation") pending in the Third Judicial District in and for the County of 
Canyon. The matters of record in the pending litigation are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
2. Reference to the parties and persons in privity with them is meant to include 
but is not limited to the officers, shareholders, directors, employees, agents, insurers 
subsidiaries, partners, customers, suppliers, dealers, distributors, affiliates and 
attorneys of, within, or related to the named party. 
3. The parties executing this agreement warrant and represent they have the 
authority to make and enter into this agreement and that each party is relying upon the 
representations and covenants made herein, all of which are deemed material. 
4. The parties have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel prior to 
making this agreement and none are operating under duress. 
p - I 
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5. In consideration of the mutual covenants agreed to herein and in consideration 
of the deeds exchanged by the parties, whereby Plaintiffs convey Riverside parcel 
lB, Canyon County, Idaho to Defendant, and Defendant conveys Riverside parcels 
lA, 2A, and 2B and a portion of Lot 24 of Westview Subdivision, Canyon County, 
Idaho, and whereby each party releases all Lis Pendens filings and for other good and 
valuable consideration, Plaintiffs agree to release, relinquish, waive, and extinguish 
any a.i.,d all demands, rights, actions or claims which have been or could be asserted 
against Defendant and any person in privity with Defendant including but not limited 
to her employees, agents, insurers, customers, attorneys and representatives as of the 
effective date of this instrument. Defendant agrees to release, relinquish, waive, and 
extinguish any and all demands, rights, actions or claims which have been or could be 
asserted against Plaintiffs and any person in privity with Plaintiffs including but not 
limited to any officers, directors, employees, agents, insurers, customers, dealers, 
distributors, shareholders, partners, attorneys and representatives as of the effective 
date of this instrument. This release extends to every kind or type of claim related to 
or in any way connected with the facts underlying the subject litigation, including any 
claims known or unknown, contingent or unliquidated, in contract or tort, or in the 
nature of unfair competition, copyright infringement, deceptive trade practices or 
other forms of liability whether under state or federal law including claims for 
monetary or injunctive relief arising from the beginning of time to the date and time 
of this agreement. 





7. The effective date of this release is the date upon which this instrument is 
signed by the parties, below. 
8. The Parties authorize their respective counsel to prepare and execute such 
papers as are necessary for dismissal of the pending litigation 'vvith prejudice upon 
payment of the amounts aforesaid and each party shall bear their own fees and costs. 
The Plaintiffs hereby authorize and direct its counsel to file a dismissal of the above 
mentioned litigation. 
I HAVE READ THE FOREGOING AGREEMENT AND HAVE HAD 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK LEGAL COUNSEL BEFORE 
EXECUTING THIS INSTRUMENT. 
Date: ?-3"'" /d 
Date: __ t_--r~3_-_·-_/_0 _ _ 
Date: ,f-- 3 - /!J 
By: Eugene Rice 
Its: Managing Member 
--;· __ _...,,-----) 
(' , -, .-.t-- 1·' -~-
By: '---,.,.,. /t:..-r1-e·.--u , i ~,--·· Date: $;-} -/cJ 
/ AL PROPERTIES, LLC. 
By: Janet Rice 
Its: Managing Member 
~~ 
RENEE Bf\JRD, individually 













ASSIGNMENT OF PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 
INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in consideration of Assignee's continuing his representation, 
the undersigned Assignor does hereby sell and assign to Jim Bevis, Attorney at Law, Assignee, all 
proceeds due Assignor pursuant to that certain Purchase Agreement dated 1-6-06 by and between 
Assignor as Seller and Real Properties, LLC as Buyer, attached hereto as Exhibit "A", sufficient to pay 
any and all attorney fees and costs due Assignee by Assignor related to that certain legal action entitled 
Sallaz v. Sallaz, Case No. CV DR 0401075D, filed in Ada County, State ofldaho. The Assignee 
shall have full power and authority to enforce said Purchase Agreement to collect all sums due to him 
hereunder in his name and remit to Assignor any sum remaining therefrom. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned hereunto executes this Assignment this 6th day of 
March, 2006. 
ASSIGNMENT OF PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 




02/01/2011 10:00 208424~2 LONGETEIGLAWTOWE~ 
2011-Feb-01 08:2B AH SALLAZ & GATEWOOD PLLC 2083"3'512..63 
ASSIGNMENT OF PURCHASE AGllEEMENr FOR.SALE OJ 
INTEREST IN REAL BOMBS, LLC 
FOR YALVE RBCBlfl1ID. the wdersigned Aasignor do" hereby !ell and aasi~ tf> Olen 
T.raften, A.,signee, all of uaignor•, right, titl1 and intmet in andto· atheal ·estato set forth in 
Exhibit ••A"• attaohod hereto and fncotporated .he.rcln by~ and u, .all proc;~ cJ.\lB 
Aefgnor _purauant to that certain Purchase Agreement dated 1-6-06 by and between A88ignor a 
SeJ1er2 and R.eal Properties, LLC ·a Buyer, attached hereto u Exhibit"B" and lncol'J)orated. h&-ein 
byrefen:11"'· 
The Asst111e1 shall have 1\111 power and authority to cmfbtce said PUrchiae ApenteDt to 
collect all iumi, due him hereunder in his name, moluc:ling my end lll.1 actions I1CCCBBIIIY tQ 
onf'ori.o the amno agaloo aa.y and ·111 o:f the aforeu.ld real propertt. 
IN WITNESS JVBEREOF, the undersigned haunto executes tho .AJsijDlllont tw 10~. 






DENNIS J. SALLA.Z, IBB No~ I053 
Aftomey at Law 
P.O. B-0x &:956 
Borse. Malt.a 83701 
Te'lephoue: (208} 336-1145 
Facsimile: (20·&} 336-1263 
Pro Se 
IN THE DiS1RICT COURT OF THE FOURTI:I JUDICfAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STlffE OF IDAHO~ DN_A.1"\lD FOR 'IHE COUNTY OF ADA. 
llENEE L BAlRD-SAL:tAZ f Case:: No. CV DR 0-4"- 0 I.015 D 
Plaintiff/Respondent,. 
-vs-· NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DENNIS J .. SALLAZ,. 
Defe:nd~mtiAppellant. 
TO: RENEE L BAIRD. her altomey ,. DEBRA L. EISMAli'lN~ whose a.dmess is 3016 
Caldwell Blvd.2 Nampa,, Idaho 83,651; the Cferk af tlte Comt fur fhe.afro.~enritled 
Court: 
NOT'.ECE. 15 HEREBY GIVEN that: 
Amended F'.mdings of Fact... Conclusions of Law and Order, and Ame.nd:.edl Final Jndgnrent and 
Decree: entered on Jru:ma:rJ 4,. 2012., hy The Honorable David C .. E:pfa,, Ma:gisn:ate Jrrdg~. 
2.. The Defendant bas: the Jtight: to appeal to the District Court from. the &fagistrate: 
Court"~ Amended Findings of Fact,. Concfusions ofim.v' and Order~ a:nd Amended Final 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - I 
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Judgment and Decree, and the same are appealable Order(s) under and pursuant to I.AR. 
1 l(a)(l), and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(a). 
3. The issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to assert in the appeal, are 
as follows: 
a. Did the Plaintiff commit fraud upon the. Defendant when she represented 
she had recorded the Oregon marriage certificate when she new she had 
not, and dicf Piaintiff commit fraud upon the Court when she testified she 
was married to the Defendant when she knew she had never recorded the 
Oregon marriage certificate. (Based upon newly discovered evidence). 
b. Did the Court e.rr in awarding properties and monies not specifically 
owned by the parties but which were separate business entities Defendant 
was engaged in with numerous other joint owners, and over which the 
Court did not have proper-subject matter jurisdiction, including but not 
limited to: 
Real Homes, LLC, 
Daryl Sallaz, 
Glen Trefren and his LLC, 
National Financial Service, Inc., 
Empire West; 
c. Did the Court err in mislabeling and awarding items of Defendant's 
personal property as community property and/or separate property; 
4. No Order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. A Reporter's Transcript is requested on all matters including: 
7/17/2006 Court Trial transcript; 
2/13/2007 telephone conference bearing transcript; 
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9/16/2008 hearing transcript; 
10/28/2008 hearing transcript; 
12/16/2008 telephonic hearing transcript; 
2/24/2009 hearing transcript; 
5/19/2009 hearing transcript; 
6. The Appellant requests a complete Clerk's Record pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(n). 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that: 
A. A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below in the following Certificate of 
Service, at the address shown and by the method indicated. 
B. That the Clerk of District Court wm be paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the Reporter's Transcript. 
C. That the Appellate filing fee of$S3.00 has been paid on this date to the Clerk of 
the District Court. 
D. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
DATED this i_ day of February, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this !:{lb day of.February, 2012, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following in the manner 
d.escribed below 
DEl?RA L. EISwIANN, 
Attorney at Law 
3016 Caldwell.Blvd., 
Nampa, Idaho .. 83651 
Honorable David C. Epis 
Ada County Courthous.e 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
RaeannNixon~ Transcripts 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 w~ Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
All other parties 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
~S. MAIL, postage p~epaid 
0 Facsimile to: 
OeMail: ·----------
0 Other; 
~: :MAIL postage prepaid 
0 .Facsimile to: 
0 eMail: ----------
0 Other: 
~S.. MAIL postage prepaid 
0 Facsimile to: 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
1 . . . .. . ... _R~L PRC>PERT~ _ j i . -·-·· ... f· 
2 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho to-be ·delermlnedj. ($27:i°:032.'67)'° S 
· (no principal reducUon during marriage) 
Sep. 
I 
! j I 
2a 'iiis s: RooseveiCiioisa:· ... -- .... ---···--·-- ---·- ... --· .. fs3o.oo_o __ -·--r-··- -··· .... --- -·- ---·--· ----··---·-···· r··-
10wned by Darryl. Funds paid by Buckingham jconUngent i I 
collected by parties Is owed to Darryl or aucklnghams. !liability 
2a!ii .'i.iabmiy ii:ifiiiai H·omes of ona:11a1ioi m:Soo Real .... --· 





Owned by DeMls Sallaz before marriage,248. Wells Fargo loan 
as of 6/15/05, 247. 3198 rely, 248a. Loan proceeds dep to 
Brookslreel, item 28. Renee QC'd 2X 248b,c. 2d DofT 10/8/99, 














2b --· ·rRaim1iu'isamenl ciiiiiii'icircradii"ciiic(paymants from-· : T . -··-· ---·----+·--"·" ---·. ----···- "·-----.. ---·--···--.. -·- ··-·-.. ·--·· ,,._. ··-·-.... , ....... _,, !-··----··-· 
.closing of Walls Fargo rannance 12/20/2002 . 1 I 
i ....... c:r . i 5580 Riverside Road, Caldwell, ID. THE ONE .. 1RENEE IS LIVING IN. '(50% lnlerest bu't value slated Is whole value) 
p,oaoll, • 
~ 
~ Casa No. CV DR 04 01075 I_...... DateolMarrtaga: July4, 1996 
: ' ($73,014.75)1 . I ! 
--··s2eo,ooo.ool- cs104.14o.oot- $175,il&o.oii ·---· ····· --------·--·-· !·-·· ·· 
C $175,660.00 . 
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POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
5 L_ ------ --------------------------- --- ------ ------------1 Community debt owed to Real Homes for the net loan 




--·-···-·f·--·-··- ·-· ··---- ··-·-- -
! I I ($30,000.00)i ($30,000.00) C 
6 ·----[Riverside Rd., Caldwell, ID -- · ·-
j(Parcel #03N03W171509) 




,-- !Riverside-RcC Caldweu,10 - - - --····- ---- ----- --- -
j (Parcel No. 03N03W171506) 
8 ---+Riverside Rd.-Lot (bare land)·· -- · 
------ -j ~-··-··· 
' ($71,000.00) J 
I 
1-------------- ···- -- ----
1 
i 
---- ------- -------l 
__ !(Parcel No. 03N03W171508) ________________ ... ----·r------- __ 
9-- freai property tax on parcel ... 509 (SO''!. Interest but 








- !- ----· 
1
1 I ($1,98126)1 
I . 
'' ~ ........... , .• .,,.,. ........ ---·-- -- -·-- .... t--,,,,,,.,J----- --- ·····t--·. 
I 1 : I 
I 
! 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 




I -_J ______ _ 
$66,000 moved out of business account: $36,000 of that paid on /! 205 
debt owed by Real H~mes lo DL Evans Bank, remaining $30,000 ,205A 
used to pay community expenses. ! 
--··· ·- --· ···-·--- · ·· -·izoo-upuau:,-
'209 debt 
1209a 
Saxton debt paid by Rice. Rice owes Dennis/community 
approximately $60,000. See item 19. 
r2s1-- ·-----
1209 debt 
'392 [_; __________ _ 
J208 
:209 debt __ .. _______ ·----- ·---\-----····-····-··· 
Renee produced demand from First Am. Real Est. Tax Service for! 
reimb. Because they paid Real Homes property taxes in error. : 206 
See Ex. 206(a)/ Renee's #001046-As of 11/30/2004 per tax l20e(a) 
noUce. ' 
Per Tax Assessment NoUce for 2 yaars - to be supplemented. 
! 
!201 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 2Cl1 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
11 ireal property lax due on parcel # ... 508 (50% Interest J ($1,789.46)1 S , 
; but value staled Is whole value) I , 
! ! I 
I I 
Per Tax Asssmenl Noice for 2001, 2002, and 2003 lhrough 
11/30/04. j2oa 
l 
·-··- . -·· .L.------·-· ---·--·-··-----·--· ----····------·--
11(a) !World Savings Paid taxes on Riverside lots added lo I debt secured by item 6, 15580 Riverside. 
' --·- _l _________________________ ------- -----·--










I DL Evans Construction Loan ---, 
l 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
I 
+---,--------·-T---- --- ------·-··-1-------------------· 
j , , First American Real Estate Tax Service $10,427 for real property 1206(a) I I I laxes paid on corporation's behalf Inadvertently. J 
·---- -· -!no deb~-------- S - --------!,· · -··-····--··· ·--·--·····---··---··---·----·-·-· --·----i ..... 
I I Debt owed to Daryl for 1/2 of rental Income: See Quitclaim Deed f240 i Sep. I from Kendra Sue Bertsch-Sallaz, 6/21/1991. !255 
I I Shown In prior rior Divorce Decree as Dennis' separate property. i353 Deed 
--r·-----------·-r-------- -·--· ·-----· -------·----- --:- .. --- --·--· ··- ··-·---·--··--·-···· ----·· - -····-- ··-··--
! I I I 
: I See item 7 and Real Homes real property. Sold to Rice. Rice assumed real ~t ~+---1---+a--na_l_y_s_ls._l_n_b_r~l-------pr_o_p~~~ax d~~~---- -------···. -- - I ------. ··+-
! I Owned by Raal Homes LLC. $30,000+ DL Evans construction 
I I loan. Ex. 311 Is offer to purchase. Ex. 330 Is debt Debi 
!330 
1331 
:392 i paid/assumed by Rice. 
! 
Page 3 of 22 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
. . . . . . . . . . ·.· .. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.·.·.·.·.·.·. •:-:-:• .. :.::-::.-:-:-:-:-:.;,· .:.::.::>-:-:-:-.: .. _:::::: .. ::.:-·_.;,: ::::::·.:,:.:: ·. -:..:::-:-: .· :::.:. ;.::;:<:-:-:.::::::-:;:;:-:;:::::::-·:·::::.: : .. ::>:.: .. ·.·..... . ............ ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ... ,', .·.·. : : :.:.:.:.:.:.::-:.: :·: :,: ·.· .. ){{i\:u::]t:\:\:\{:\/\:\Utt:::::\::::::nr:r:tt\l?l\ •:•:•:•:•:-:·:-··:•:•:·.·: .-:·.·:·:·:···:·.·:·:···:·:·.•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•.•:•: ·.···:•: :• :HUS13AND1s·PttdPOSc1J ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·. 
14 ;federal Way Lot 50% interest (olher share owned by · l S ! 





I cougar Mountain.Lot 50% Interest (other shared 
!owned by Mike Standley) 
I 
I 
ic1ear creek Lol 50% lntereSi'"(other.share·owned by-·· 




----···-·· · 1 
l 
I Sep. i Quitclaim Deed from Kendra Sue Bertsch-Sallaz, 6/19/1991. 1242 




Sep. I See Quitclaim Deed 6/19/1991 from Kendra Sue Bertsch-Sallaz. /241 
Prior Divorce Decree ! 255 
-------~·-· - ···--···-··- ····-··-···--·-····---··- ---·-··-·····- ··-- ·······-·---·· .. -· -· ····••· -·· ' i --· -·-r··------- ---· 
I ; I 
I 
I ~~ 1' See Quitclaim Deed 6/12/91 by Kendra Sue Bertsch-Sallaz. 1239 ,255 
! l .,· ________ J, ··--------·----- ·---~s-·- ·----- __ I ---·--· 11-···1,<i1n1iiresilnBessie·Maicham Estate-(Den~- ---··------ - ·,--- 1 ! 
(Grandmother) Estate, probate not completed. I 'I / 
I 
f---·-
1 i Sep. I Death Certificate and Estate documents are Ex. 244. :244 
" l --_""""-'"''"-~--'-- ----- =:==-r~- -1--- -- -----t-=---::-=: =--=-==::::: == ~ ===-= =r~--== 
\Real Homes LLC Denny la 50% owner and Glen j I Denny's aep. $20,000 on 8/8/01 and $20,000 on 8/3/01 from J332 !Trefren owns other 50%. DL Evans Ck. AccL # ... 27BB , $60,000.00 ($62,500.00)1 Brookstreet 
19 
I opened 2/11/05 with new construcUon loan proceeds. ! I Dennis $22:500 reimbursement claim per Ex. 289A, cks 1378, -·····1'~1523A, ;- Ex. 331 (old DL Evans AccL Stmts. Ex. 375) 1376. Batas 
Ceae No. CV OR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Page 4 of 22 
\001455 
;244 last pg. 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
20 I Sallaz & Gatewood CHTD 10% ownership (other 90% lo be determined' I I · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · -.. ·.·.·.·-·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·-·. ,.·.·.· 
, I ' ! llis Scott Gatewood's) i / i i I "'""·" I "'- "' 0 • '"' '"""· ,~_, "....... ' 
21~-li~~i~n::::n~:~:::::·:~ .. =~=:~- =~==r- -- tll --- ~~-~~---·r--~.:~..::.~.=~="'·"" [:::,: 
22 Empire West - - - ---- -- __ .. -- -- ---- --- ---- -- ----- ·-- ·}-------
~ I 
'257 
I Sec. of Slate filings are Ex. 257(a) I l257(a) 
~ _':~;~~;~. -,oo,~~~(l,.,m:~m.,,~~·· ~~~-l~ -=~~---~:~~- _·J== 
I / I j210Jd 
Separate I and Ex. 248a. 8/8/01 $20,000 w/d and 8/3/01 $20,000 w/d went update 
I' 
) deposited lo acct. 3/20/1998 from Roosevelt Refy. See Ex. 210A 210 2d 
I · Margin Loan. Balance as of 6130/05. Dennis" separate funds J' update 
29 _ __jl""'""°""'-..;;;;"'...--............. L---- c ,__ ____ i_ ___ ::-... ·--:=· .. :~--- -- ~"' 
community debts. / I I 
lw111 supplement wilh back up documents. I ($7.500.00)1 See Summary of community bills paid from loan proceeds. !211A 
i I , !210A 
i I I ! 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Page 5 of 22 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
30 I Putnam Investments SEP/IRA #0336644339/A79 3 $40,160.99 $40,160.99 s 
1 
i,518 42 3803 BBBW j
210 
B 
------~ --·--···-----------·-··-} ------•---~~-c-l-------f--~·=~ 
30A Putnam SEP/IRA (Renee's) $6,990.00 $6,990.00 C 
$1,250_00 Statement dated 1/1/05-6/30/05-2106 update. Account opened In I update 
July 1994 (before marriage). j210 B 
1210c 
----------·- _ -·----------r48A __ 
Slml Produced by Renee In supplemental response rec'd 
$6,990.00 7//13/05. "lntitiat amount Invested 1/26/98" - Supp 7/26/05 
Bates page 1365 
2100 
300 Renee's Simple_l_RA __ ...,O~p-p-e···n-~h--e~im--e-r-·--------l-t-o7b-e...,de...,te-rm~ln_e...,d·I-----+------ -C--1------1---- -----l----------------------------t----
31 Operating Engineers Pension Contribution 
32 John Hancock Venture Annuity (was-·Manullfe 
Financial) #820741 
I Owner is Dennis; Annuitant Is Dennis; Inception Date Is 10/3/1994 (before marriage) 
I 
I 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 





Page 6 of 22 
$100.00 See Renee's pays tub dated 6/30/05 showing contribution. 
See Renee's Ans. To Interrogatory #1B. $9,388 Disclosed 
7/26/05 

















POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
33 IManulire Financial Venture Annuity duplicate of #32? I 
I 
~: ritems for these numbers _____ ' ---·--
~~ ~ 38 
~ .. - .. INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS/STOCKS 
I one 
See Renee's Ans. To tnterrogatory #16. $7489 
rl---------·----- ----+-------f---··---1=---
41--lLIFE INSURANCE (CASH VALUE) ------- ---· -- ·-------------·---·----------- -----
4-4:-~ ;-~-~-:-:s-, ~-A-~-l~=~=s-H-C~.-D--.-M-·-:--N-EY---:-~----~-ET-· - •------1-------1------ ---· -----~r
1 
------------------------------------
44 Bank of the West Checking; Renee Baird :sa11az; $130.00 $130.00 C . . 212 
1
#211-088497 $130 00 Plaant,trs value - agreed. See Bates #000069-0000103. Bal. as of 280 
. 3/10/05 (Ex. 280). 281 
44(aTlli.Bank of America Checking #79585535______ $2,498.48 s2•49a.4a I -------------------------------l-,12_8_0(_a_) --· F $2,498.48 Online banking printout produced by Renee as of 6/8/05. 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Page 7 of 22 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
45 ;Personal Account at DL. Evans, Dennis J. Sallaz. $3,834.071 I $3,834.07 C I ; 




!Joint DL Evans Account No. 910403141 
I 
I 
$3,834.07 ; 2/11/2005-Ex. 254. '254 
l , Ex. 254 Supp is stmts. 6/04-6/05. (acct opened 5/18/2004) J254 supp ·--··· ····--·-·-- ..... _,, _____ ,, ___ ./- .. ----·· ·----··- --- ,. ____ , --·-·-----· ·--·-· . l. .... ____ ------------ .. --- ___ ,, ________ .. ____ .. _ .. _________ ,,_____ _i .... -------... 
·oint account has been closed 
I 
I 
Statements In Renee's possession. See 000104 -000190. Bal. 
1/9/2004 $1,823.11. 1281 
i-............. -- ---- _,, ____ ---i Safeco Insurance Claim Proceeds 
I 
........... $14,075.201""" ··r-·$14,075.20 c" -- ----------··. I .. ......... __ ,, __ ,,.,, .... t .. ··--47 -I 
i 
$14 075_20 Per Order entered ~2005 the check was to be deposited to the j 213 
' trust account of Plamt11f's attorney. , 
.. L ______ .... ------------.. -----------......... . 




49 • tvEHICLES/VESSELS: . -- . - . 
50 -~20oi' Dodge Truck, 3/4 ton 4WD ... 
I 
I ! 
---·-·--$247.96!·-·-------·t-· -$247.96 -·--·-· ·---·--- ------1--------
1 ' I : 
.. ···---- ....... ir. -.......... ·-j--.. _-_$ .. 7-.-7._0_0·.-0--0- -c·-· ..... _ ............... ·-+ ... ____ ,.,_ ............ --................... _ .... _____ _ 
. __ , ... ._ ______ --- -· ---· ··-----·--·---·-------·--- --···-··--·- . ·-- ----·--------- -----!-- ·-
' I 
48 i ________ ,, _________ , -··-·------- --- .......... - ....... "" ' 
$247.96 r Statements 5/04-6/30/05 - Ex. 302 
...... -.. - ............... ·- .. -- ...... , .............. . 
I 
I I $7,700.00 
I ' 
s1··-t2_0_00 = ,;.;,;.;; . --- . . .. ··- ... .,,,ooo.oof ""·""'oo'I '"·""'"'' c 
Stipulation as to value. Renee produced Chrysler Financial 
statement - showing balance owing as of 6/20/05 j336 
j 
! . . ---·-·-····------------ ----·[ ·-------·-
(negative value) I D.L. Evans Bank; auto deducted from bank account-no monthly 
statement received. 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4. 1996 Pag!!' 8 of 22 
! 
iP's Ex. 72. 







POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
52 \ 1989 Chieftain 31' Winnebago MH $15,000.00 I ($8,500.00)! $6.500.00 I 
I , Rely 1998 Ex. 248A paid debt to 1st Sec. Bank. Rice has 
I i, security interest. Debt of approx. $61,570 to Vista Pawn. $8,500 303 X debt due Roy Rice is included In debt owed to Vista Pawn, Item 338 
I I !PE., ___ ····-------- - ---- ... - .. --- ----------- - --- 248A 
I Dennis' separate property reimbursement claim of $17,500 i exceeds value. 
" --r """ ,.,,..- --. ----- -------- --·----------:·------------ ii --- - ' - =-----r- •=••: ~ .. -::~,~:=::_-~ ::,:.t~ 
! Rolls [ 




! I i sell and use proceeds to pay Dennis testified value was between $4,000 and $5,000. Renee's i 
'50Packard (50% ownership with Daryl-total value 
:$1,500) 
···-··· , ____ __,_ _____ , ________________ . -
! I l 
' i Sep. I 1303 
i I ',i i ! 
---,--- s*-fS0.00 c --·--. -·-------·------- - -- -·-··-------·- +····· 
i 
$750.00' 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Page 9of 22 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
.......... · ......................... ················································ . ...... . ...... · ............ · .. · . . .. :··:::.·.:,;.·:::-:-:-::>:::-::::.;.:>:::-:::::-:-:::::-::::::::::::::::::::::::>::::::::::::::········.·.··.·····.·-:·.·.·.····:-:•::-:-:·:·::-:-:-:•:•:-:····:-·.·.· .. ·.>.·.-:-::-.-:·::-:-:-:-:-:•:-:-:•:-:-:•:-:-:-:-:-:-:•:-:-:-:···.·.·.·.·.·.-:•:-··.········.·.·.·.:.:.:.::::::-::::::::::::.:.:.:: ......... ·.·.··············· -
-----
~ -1:==~·- ---------··-- --~-f-----1----~~~--- -1------- ---- ·····---------- --·· ---t • 
60 ·--]54CadillacEldoradoConvertible · - ·· - ----------·-·------t- --S - ·----------+------------·-··----·------·---··---·-·-·---··---- ·-------··--·----~----
! I Sep. I Acquired tiUe 2/4/1965, subject to lien I~~! 
=t~--t_-:-~• ,., -1==~•~,: -~-~-~-- _j00~-
I I c J1 I 
-··-·-·-L------------·--·--·-------
61 !79 Chevrolet 1 /2 Ton 4 WO 
! 
.... ! ____ . ______ ··-·····--·--·---·-·--------··--------
62 [2000 Sidekick Trailer 3/horse slant (Insurance 
!proceeds) 
j I . $4,460.00 Plaintiff stated that the proceeds were $4,460. ,215a 
53--178 Oaks-W-hitewater26'1iiboardbo,itw/traiier--· ------t----+----S--- ,_,----t-----~ --- ---- ---- -- -1:-.. 
·-----------··- ------+-- 1-----·- s ...... -t---------· ---·-----·-·-·- ····--···-··· ...... --··--····-- .... ----······-------- -------t------·-64 - --, 1949Dreamboat Roadster ---
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date or Marriage: July 4, 1996 
1 l i Se~ , 
! i 
Page 1oor22 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule • 
----·-
65 ! 1953 Cadillac 4 door sedan $2,500.00 [ $2,500.00 S ! I 
! I Sep. ! Acquired liUe 5/12/89 I~~~ 





Yamaha Grizzly i Dennis testified that it was never gifted to Ashley. There Is no 
~
, · delivery of the supposed gift. 
i I 
ae·--1AT'iira1ier_____ sold -- ----·lso1d·- ---- 1------·1 r -· 
.. -j,. ....... ..,, ......... ""' ... .....,- ----···-- ----1- --- -----+-~ ----------- ---- --------- ----- ·,---·-····· 
69.1 \Chev;oietSuburbali·--·--·--· -------· --·- J t
1 
.. , ..... ,. ... , ....... , ........... oo,a..s,.ww•-r
1
~!_: --
1 not a community asset 
I I 
; ·--·-----,- ------- ----- -t--···· ·-···-··--- ------····-···-··-·-·-····-- ·····-----·····-··-··-···-··-· ···-··1--·-····--·-· 69.2 -!Pontiac Flrebird -- - ··-·--··---· I , I I 
i I . $1,500.00 I I 
I , 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Page 11 of 22 






69.3 Whitewater Raft and Equipment 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
-c-c,-,-l,-,--,-,,.,...,-,----,----=cc:-:-----c=c=-~-·-- ------ -------------1------1---- ---·----l-----·1---------------------·--------f--·--69.4 1999 Yamaha Grizzly A TV 
owned by Rice 
'=-=-i=~c=---7:'"':=--:~·:=;--·-- --·------ ------lf------+-----
69.5 2002 Kawasaki Prairie ATV $5,000.00 ·------1-----1-------------·-------·-----·---f----l 
$5,000.00 owned by firm; to be returned by Renee together with the trailer. 
69:S.. 1997 Polaris 425 A TV -------•------i-----+-----,---t-------+------1--------------------------1---·---
·---·---l------+·-----1-------1---1------+-----•--------------------·- -----
l-6-9-.7--l-2-Ka-w-as_a_kl_P_ra-lrl_e_4_00-ATV_s ______ ---l------11------1------1---1------f-------l-o-w_n_ed_b_y_R_ic_e ________________ -+-
69.8 1997 Kawasaki 300 
$500.00 
69.9 1 ATV 2 place side by side trailer t 
=...,.,-~---l----l---1--1-----l----l------- -
69.10 1 ATV Zieman Trailer 
•-->----· --------------1--------+-·--t---- ---1------' $1,200.00 In Renee's possession - Renee's value·-----------·----~----
69.11 Slide-In Hitch TIit Trailer/ Rack r-
$75.00 I Dennis' opinion of value. 
i I I 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Page 12ot22 







POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
---- ----~ 
I I '1 11 69.12 !Thule Storage Bin, Black 
~. ,-,-~~ ,.,..;o;;·· ---- __ . _ -- -·- __ --· _ ·-·--. +----+-________ ----~--- __ '"·" o...,., """"'. d .. ,.. _ _ ·- ···---- i 
ei.ff II.a.·oow;...·---- --··--- --··----·+- ~t-------- --x__ ~: . - -:=--------- --- . -+---
eil.is·-~c Chan9e,--------------=~==JI -= ==--= -t~-- -.. -----------~-- ~--= 
as.1a·\c:0.-Raciio ______________ - ---·----- · 
1 
I I 
'9. '7 1,omadO NiT,Y-- --·· - . --- - ----- -- - ---·-t-· -----11----. - --- ~____'_'~~1 · - --,-o-value ------- - -- - - t- --
1 ------ --- -----t----·----1----- --------· ·--- --·------- ----+---69.1B!PortableBalleryCharger _____________ ----- -- I I I 
,.,; ~Goi ...,. ,..,.--·- . -·- ---·-·- - --·-- - t-- -- ~ -- -- X .. ~=~ ----:::: .. :- - -
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
I 
Page 13 of 22 






69.20 5 Gas Cans for A TVs 
69.21 1990 Ford Bronco 
~- HOUSEHOLD GOODS, FURNISHINGS AND 
APPLIANCES 
71 Household furniture, appliances, and furnishings at 
1
1000 S. Roosevelt 
~ Antique Firearm Collection 
__ ...._ . 







Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 







Sell and Use proceeds to pay 
community debt. 
Page 14 of 22 
No value 
Belongs to Scott Gatewood 
See Exhibit 321{a). Value stated Is total or community Items. 
2 community guns (Benelll and Ruger) the values of which are 
included in #71 above. Dennis doesn~ have Renee's dad's 20ga. 
Glock was Dennis' sep. property-value $250. Certain guns are 
itemized In the divorce Decree from Kendra at page 34. 
Wife says horses worth $6,000. 
1321{a). 
i 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
75 I Misc. Tack and Supplies $5,800.00 $5,800.00 C 
76 - Household furniture, appliances, ani! furnishings at to be determined ~--· to be determined 
Riverside home 
Sell and Use proceeds to pay 
community debt. Renee claimed Items were stolen. Exhibit 213. 
Renee's values for Items In her possession: 
#77.7 $120 #77.26 $500 
$2 505 00 #77.8 $180 #77.50 $300 
' . #77.9 $150 #77.51 $150 
#77. 10 $80 #77 .56 $725 
#77.58 $300 
77 no items for these numbers 
78 
79 
~ DEBTS (OTHER THAN ABOVE) _____ 1-= 
61 Debi owed to Daryl Sallaz for ,12 oi rents collected 
and not paid to him. 
82 VISA, Renee Baird- Sallaz, 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 





Page 15 of 22 
Claim not pursued at trial. 
·$2,539.00 Simi. Dated 9/20/04 produced by P #000006 216 







POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
83 !American Express, # ••. 71002 ; ($21,978.81) ($21,978.81) C 217•2dsup. 
Strnt. 7rT/05 2172d Supp. + ($21 .979.00) Def.pd. $1,297 7/29-11/1 327167 Bal. 11/1 $20,806 supp. 217 update 217 84 Cabela's\11sa ($7,296.40) ($7,296.40) C l-----+-------1------------------------------. 
!--· . 
85 Costco Wholesale Credit Card ($3,027.69) ($3,027.69) C 
218-2dsup. 
Simi. 7/6/05 2182d supp. 376 
($7,296.00) Def.pd. $433 7/29-11/1; 218supp 
($3,028.00) 
Bal. 11/1 $7013 21 Bupdate 
218 
Strnt. 6/18/05 219 supp. 
Def.pd $254 7/29-11/1/05 






·~ Discover Card 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
($8,146.77) ($8,146.77) C 
($10,024.34)'-cs,0,024.34) C 




Stml 6/20/05 220 supp. 
Def. pd. $633 7/29-11/10 
Bal.11/10 $6,121 
Simi. 6/24/05 221 supp 
Def.pd $646 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10 $7,826 
Stml 6/20/05 222 supp. 
Def.pd. $977 7/29-11110 



















POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
89 Home Depot Credit Card $0.00 I $0.00 C 
91 MBNA # ... 7599 
92 MBNA# ..• 1206 
93 Wells Fargo Credit Card 
94 Advanta Credit Card 
I 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 

















Page 17 of 22 
Supp. Is sbnts 11/04-1n/05. Balance was transferred to Direct 
Merchant's .. 
Simi. 6/22/05 Is 224supp. 
Def.pd. $582 7/29-10/14 
Bal. 10/14/05 Is $0.00 (pd. In full) 
Simi. 6/22/05 Is 225 supp. 
Def. pd $2,133 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10/05 $24,807 
Simi. 6/22/05 Is 226supp. 
Def.pd. $2,129 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10/05 $27,222 
Sbnt. 6/3/05 Is 2272dsupp 
Def.pd $626 7/29-11/10 
Bat. 11/10/05 $6,398 



























POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
95 George Hicks. for Property Dispute. $0.00 $0.00 C · · · · · · · · · · · · .. · · · .. · · · · · · · · · · · 
$0.00 Paid by Defendant - $2,300. 
96 -'int .. -rn-a ..,..I R~e-v-en_u_e~S~e-rv~ic-e~fo-r~2=00-o~.=2.,..00~2~. a-n-d~2=0~01~·•-------(=$~15~,4~D=o~.o=o,+) -(=$-15.,..,4~0~0~.o~o-)1."'c:---l-----+------l-------------------------+-----I 
96A Internal Revenue Service for 2003 
968 Internal Revenue Service and Idaho Slate Tax 
Commission for 2004 
97 Idaho State Tax Commission for 2000, 2002, and 
2003 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
($15,400.00) See I.R.S. Letter/Statement dated 7/6/2005-Ex. 229A(1). See 




Included In #96 -C--l------~-----1------------------·---I-----I 
($5,938.00) ($5,938.00) C 
paid with borrowed funds; see C 
97.1 below 
Page 18 of 22 
($5,938.00) 
Bal. owing as 017/6/05 shown on Ex. 229(A)(1). Estimate 
including interest and penalties. See Ex. 250, $6838 tax due 
Federal Return. See also tax summary Ex. 229. 
Taxes due for 2004. Federal $4,369; State $1,569. 
Dennis paid lo avoid Levy, borrowed funds from Roy Rice. 








POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
----- -------
97.1 !Debt owed to Roy Rice I ($10,883.00)1 ($10,883.00) · j 
! ($l0,883_00>1 Dennis borro~ed the fu~ds from Roy Rice to pay the Idaho Slate ·1 349 \ I . Tax Commission to avoid a levy. 1 1--T .. ,.............. ~-- "'·"'-"' r "'·"'·"'' · ,-- -----1- ----· =·--=-:~~-~ -· .. ---t:.~--
1 I I I 
97B ·-rTaxesfor 2005 ___ -----·- . . . .. -···· - --· ·--- -- r-· ----- ____ T _____ -- -·--· ------ -·-· ---------·----- · -r-- .. ·---------- --- ----------------------- --· --. - ·----- .. -----------·-· ·-· r·--. 
l \ one-half I one-half Tax liability unpaid through dale of divorce. I 
! ~ ' I ! . ! l 
M r.PerryHardingCPA_______ ···-------------- -- --r«~«)
1 
(S,oooaooW- -~=: .. 1 - - -- ::..,a.m=a•:~=-- - - .. --r---
~-f-B-C-TI-,e-and-Au-to-,-tnc:----· ------------· ------ -~·'"'"''i "'"""'"- --.,,,,JI --- .. ~ .... :."' --- - ----~:----
• I 
------------- -1--- ---t-------- C ··-----------t-----------
100 ivisla Pawn debt (not included above) 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
1 l ; 
I ($44,093.00)i 
Page 19 of 22 
.... -·- -· -·-·-· --··--·---. ---·-·---,----·--·-· 
Includes $8,500 owed to Rice for Chieftain Motorhome. 1338 
I 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
101 I.R.S. Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing against Sallaz ($34,022.00) ($34,022.00) I 
Law Offices Chartered ($34,022.00) Notices dated 4128/06, for tax years 1996, 1997, 1999, and 2000; 348A 
certified letter dated 519/06. Total is on Ex. 382 382 
102 Dennis' Medical Bills 
102A Anesthesia Associates 
1028 Boise Radiology 
102C Boise Pathology 
1020 Boise Gastroenterology 
102E Boise Orthopedic 
102F Cardio. Consultants 
102G Cardiov. &.Chest Surgery 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 








see below Estimale. BUls not received yet, Insurance not applied yet. To be 
determined. 
As of 2/05 had been paid 
As of 1/05 had been paid. 
As of 1/05 had been paid. 
As of 5104 the balance of $1,200 had been paid. 
As of 5/04 had been paid 








i Exhibit 333 G, 2/2/05 
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102H Greg Flint MD 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
Ex. 333 H, 6/30/05 333 H 
·1·occ2"'"1+.1d.,..a.,..ho-=En-d,-o-sc-o-py------------l------+---.:$-=-o.""oo;;---t------t---l-----t------1:-------------------------
As of 5/04 had been paid 3331 
l·c1702c-J--+-l=DX~Pa-,t,--ho~lo_g_y-----···------- l----·--t---------,$=-=oc-:.0:=0-J------ ---i:-----r--------·r-------------------·------+----
As of 5/04 had been paid 333J 
102K lntermountaln Eye Clinic $0.00 
As of 6/04 had been paid 333K 
1""02=L---tcDc-r.-Jc-oc-ha-n-s-------·- ---·----l-------+---·-s=oc-.o=-=o-+----- ---•------i--------t-----------------·--·-·-t------
102M Selah Medical Center/Dr. Spencer 
102N Berkey Heart Lab 
1020 Saint Alphonsus RMC 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
$0.00 
$0.00 
Paga 21 of 22 
As of 11/03 the balance of $2,021 had been paid 1333L 
As of 2/05 had been paid 
-·--r::-
As of 6/05 had been paid 333N 
As of stmt. 5/16/05. The SI. Als Ambulatory of $525.79 was paid, 333 0 
and the Lab of $120 was paid. 







102P I Saint Lukes RMC 
I 
102Q I Medical Bills from Procedure occurred on 7/11/05. 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
to be determined 
As of statements printed 3/8/05 and 12/22/04. 333P 
Bills not received yet. 
I 
103 !Debt owed to Sallaz and Gatewood by Renee for ·l------t----,,($"'1c:=8-=-1.-,-49'"),,---,(:a-$1:-:8:-:-1-,.4""9) -c--l------4--- ----l-----------·-------------1----
1enlering Into a Stipulation on 2/10/05 in Small Claims I 
I Court whereby her and/or Ashley's debt for dry 
!cleaning expenses of $181.49 was to ba charged off 
1
237 
(gains! a Sallaz and Gatewood Account Receivable. . J 
104 -IAcUon Collection Service - bill incurred to Treasure-·l------f----($-3-51--.0-0-)l-----($_3_5-1.-00-) -C-- -------I-------,-------·----··-----·---------------,----·-· 
I Valley Hospital (addressed to "Dear Renee L. Sallaz") I 




Casa No. CV DR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
$139,403.08 '---~--------,'-------l--------------·------+t----l 
$49,694_68 community assets/debts to be redistributed lo equalize division 




------ ----·---~------+------- ---I-------!-------- -------------------------f-·---
($53,161.47) 
Page 22of 22 
($53,161.47) 









SALLJ...Z & GATEWOOD. Ca.-rD. 
l ODO South Rccsevelt Street 
Pc~ OfficaBox me 3oise ID B3707 
T:le?hone (208) 336-114.5 
Faczimile- (208) 336-1263 
e-MaU: saUa:@sana:Iaw.com 
FACSIMILE TR..A...NSM1SSION 
_£ PAGES INCLUDING COVER 
Fa.1 No.: 3¥ 3 .... 3 :2 t.J ~ 
FR.OM: Sa.!la.z & Gat:wood Fal: No.: 336·126.3 / Ph: 336-1145 
su"B.T.ECT: 4 .t.?~·, .. 11/r/A fl~,.,.,~// 
COPY TO: NI.Ji,. 
Comments: J~ .. 
TdIS IS THZ ONLY COPY YOU \v1LL RECEIVE / 
THE ORIGINAL rs ro FOLLOW BY U.S. ?I.A.TL ---A COPY WILL FOLLOW EY U.S. ?v!AI!. 
#AteY1 j 
Cu11fldcttl11llty Nallco: Th11 m11t1d1l, with this tacsl:lllle tninaml!Slcn an privat: and canfldcntlal ar.d A."1 tho pra)l(Jrty or dlo 
rcndi::-, Thcs tn£11rniatl1111 in \Jig mlltllrial l.c prlYllept and 11 intandad ;nly far th1113cs of!ho lndl'llldulll(3) or ;nlil)'(ias} nuud. 1ba11c. 
!ry0111r: nor :he lllrc:iclc:t ra;ipi~n~ bo acM1c:d dw llni' unaulharlzcd disala111~ capyln1, dlstrlbutlan, or the tak!n1 afnny acdan 
In r1Jlanci, OIi 11111 canll:nl.T if this mli=4r;apcd lnt'armatlol\ Ir strf,l!y prol1lbi11d, Ityau hLVG received this ib;;fmllo trsnsmf.sfal\ In 





dba VISTA PA ID[ 
Boise. Idaho 
D.EN1'i1SandRENEESALLAZ 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
RE: ACCOUNT DUE 7/5/90 • S/1/04 
Motor Home • Cash S 









2S pc various disney 
S pc va.."ious movies 
Hitacbi 10" chop saw 
Xe:ox 40.30 p:dntcr w/dua! trays 
1-:dia.1 case, quiver, arrows-sna.bs.!6."'l 
Pipe, horn, leitther arrow heads, feathe:-
Che:yenna ash bow., leather sheather, quive:-
Mountain bike grey/black/red 





Jarn.aca Me Tan 
Pewtar mini auto collei:iion 
Tool.a 
Ste:-ao 
















To Renee i.n Portland 
.RJ:nee (Nicole) o/98 #1080723-1 
Fer aI1J1ivemry #I089g99.1 
Fer anniversary #1089509·1 
Fer birthday 1#1090426·2 
Renee's daughter4/9S #19514-2 
R:nee's daughter #1059030-2 






160.0C 7/21/97 #1070150 
1,800.00 7/1 ~/97 #1070108 
359.90 #.1 I 36S09-4 
S98.00 fill 01067-I 7 
339.90 #I-: 4052 
1S9.98 
2,500.00 











# l l:?S2S-6 
A3h..ey#l l3 l 18S·1 
000483
• 
Car Ste,!o 239,5,Q As~Jey #I-139:;S 
VCR 149.98 Ashleyr #1137121-2 
DVD Pl.a.ye;; 217.98 Ashley #:I-13204 
Dai:zghtar #l 13S479-17 
Daughter# t 135479-18 
Daughter# 113558 0-19 
Daughter #1133310 l-1 
Outdoor stereo, floor Speake:, CD, receiver 600.00 Renee 
R!d Ouitar in black case 600.00 #1136814-1 
Mongoose mountain bike 239.90 fH136856-l 
VID system. controller adapter 359.98 #1136995-1 
Oold chaiu w/}Jfairtrq ruby 299.98 #I 080392·1 Renee 
Ring fJl 079263-1 Renee 
Men's :ing4.10 dwt #37784-1 Renee 
Chain 1#1080406-18 Renee 
IVC stereo unit w/6 disc CD 439.98 f 1073282-1 
VID Ni...,t...~do w controller 239.90 #1082264-1 
V arlous video games 69.98 fl 0808.35-2 
Craig CD pfayer w/2CD 139.98 #10779S7-3 
Fisher CD player 69.93 #1087109-2 
Cold 2.30 DWT #1079556-3 
18.90VvT #1092163-1 
Gold pearl earri.'lg'S 59.98 #1070308-2 
519.90 iJ.!-12523 
Jewel.7 4S.OO #10889S0-2 Denny took 
Jewehy 30.00 #1097973-I Deri."l.jl tcok 
Jewehy 28.00 #107.2306-I Denny took 
Jewehy 6S.OO #10721.51-3 Oe?'.nytook 
JeweL"y 110.00 #I085642-4 Denny tcok 
Fish.mg poles 57.00 
Jewelry 30.00 #! 08So42-4 Denny :oak 
#1135580-19 Daughter 
#113361-1 Da:2,ghte: 
Konica Carne:.. 179.90 # I-3749 
Chai"l 299 . .90 
Twist w/J dia 179.90 
Earrings l,399.90 # l OSS08S·2 Den::.y 
HP printer dcljet #1051571-I 
4 pc green outdoor spes.hr 449.90 #10543.SS-1 
Smith Coro:ca wor:i processor 259.90 #I-1109S 
New York Fur Shop ja~ket #31505-1 
ACCOUNT· ROY RICE:, P. 2 
000484
• • 
Sharp Carnccrcer w/equipment 9i9.Si0 #1060S21-1 
Printer 90 #1052914-1 
4Cds 20.20 #1052620-4 
CD 10.10 #30CiO•l 
CD 10.10 fHOSi22S-l 
2CDs 20.20 l0S35B9-2 
CD 10.10 #1057337-1 
CD 10.10 #1058092-1 
CD 10.10 #1057580-1 
Cds g9,90 #1057599-3 
Furc:oat 1,200.00 #10114-1 
Plumbing bldg main:tentar.ce pa."t.9 Srl.56 ii 
Fur coat 1,000.00 #30686-1 
Blue sapphire ring/baguettes 6,299.99 Renee #I-4749 
Large marquis ring 6,599.90 Renee #42150-1 
Men's flower 7 diamond ring 699.90 Renee i#35484-o 
Triangia 10 diamond ring 0,2.99.90 Renee #48934-1 
Men 1 s 1 ct solitaire .3,989.90 Rene: #44602-1 
Men's 4 diamond band l,S9S.90 Renee #21388-2 
7 Marquis ladies ring 999.90 Renee #42211-4 
3 marquise 2 tears 450.00 Renee 11050530-l 
3.10 band 179.90 Renee #23500-1 
2.90band 81.90 Renee i¥24S78-2 
3.00Band 159.90 Rene: 139938-Z 
3.00 Band 159.90 Renee a!347S8-2 
1.70 Band 89.90 Renee #39423-3 
5.10 Band 259.90 Renee #26449-1 
l.50Band 89.90 Renee #33104-1 
3.10 Band 179.90 Renee #::!3691 • l 
2.6Band 149.80 Renee #22821-1 
2.6' Band 129.80 R.etee # 19064-1 
Hea.."t wfdi~ond chain 359.90 Renee #49404-3 
Ring-3quare top 649.90 Renee # 1050603-1 
Ring, gold w/1 577.90 Renee #20805-1 
Men's ring w/:iquare design 239.90 Re.,ee #44256· l 
TOT AL DtJE (n.at including in t:rest) $61,SiO . .Sl 






INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE ISSUED: 06-30-1990 
No. <jl 1 '/, ),<_ Idaho Corporation Annual Report Form 
2. Registered Agent and Office 
Return To 
Due No Later Than November 1, 1-no OENNIS J. SALLAZ 
1. Mailing Address - Please Correct 1000 s. ROOSEVELT 
Secretary of State 
Room 203, Statehouse R-~ INVESTMENTS, INC. SO!SE IO ~370; 6 
Boise, ID 83720 
PENNIS J • SALLAZ 3. Incorporated Under The Laws 
1000 s. ROOSEVELT of . ID 
NO, F .. i: ~- REQU!R:O BOISE ID B3705 NO: 091268 
4. Names and Addresses of Officers and Directors 
'J) ~ 
Name Street or P.O. Address Qtl State&; GTu 
:;a 
rn -President Roy Rice 523 Vista Avenue Boise ID ..... 83705 
Secretary: Dennis J. Sallaz 523 Vista II II ~ c..3 ..-... -~ 
Directors: 
0 ~3705 Roy Rice 523 Vista, Boise, ID ~ 
Janet Rice II II. II (J) -0 II 
Dennis J. Sallaz P. o. Box 8956 Boise ID """ ~3707 > 
Marjorie Leatham P. o. Box 8956 Boise, ID """ ~3707 "' ] 
5. Nature of Business 6. l certify that this Annual Reoort hA<'l heen examined by me and is to the best of my knowledge 
Real personal property 
true, correct and ,.. "" . . 
& . -,. 7··27-90 
investments Date 








ARTICUS OF A.MENDl\'JENT 
TO 
R-R INVESTMENTS, fNC. 
HA1r I ? 
Sf.C"/t fl "' S.] f}f 'Or 












These Articles o.f Amendmem and the following certificate is hereby made and eiec~d 
~ .~ 
purs.11.Jant to Section 30.-1-59', Idaho Cede, for the purpose of ameooing the Articles of 
]ncorporation of R-R Investmems, Jnc., an Idaho corporation, and to effect a change of name 
of said corporation to Rentals. & Royalties, Inc. 
The uooersigned, MICHAEL RICE. President of sand corporation, and RENEE BAIRD, 
Secretary of said corporation, do hereby respectively certify as foHows; 
I. 
That a meeting of a]l of the stockfuo!ders of R-R Investments,: Inc., an Idaho corporation, .J.1 ,,,· 
was be~d on February 21, 1995, at lCOO South Rooseveltt, Boise, Ada County, Idaho, pursuant . . 
to Call and Waiver of Notice signed by aH of the s.tockholders aoo filed in the minute book of 
the corporation. 
11. 
That at such meeting, the foUowi:ng resolutiion was presented and upon motion duly made, 
seconded and unanimously carded, the same was adopted: 
BE IT RESOLVED. that Article I of nhe Art~cles of 
Incorporation ofR-R Investments, lr..c. be amendled by deleting~ SECRETM'f EF SJmE 
entire first. Artide and hllserting in place thereof, the folJo,._t 0900 68128 2 
CK•~ 22D Cl.6TI E~l 
CORP 
..... :.: .:SU. UO== 30.00 
ARTICLES Of AMENDMENT - 1 
:Ii: C 




Tlhe lflame of tlbe corporation is Rentabs & Royalties, foe.• 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the President and 
Secretary of tbe corporation, respectively, be, and they are hereby, 
authorized to prepare a cenificate of this resolution and 
amendment to the Articles of hlcorporation of this corporation and 
to fiJe the same with tbe Secretary of State for the State of Idaho, 
and to do an things nece,ssary in o,rder to duly effect the change of 
name of this corporation in accordance witth this resolution. 
m. 
We flllrtber certify ili.a.t we are the proper officers to execute this certificate, being the 
President and Secretary of said corporation, respectively, and we therefore execute these Articles 
of Amendment of Incorporation of said corporation. 
,a? 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have herellillto set our hands. and seals this ..,2/ - day 
of February, 1995. 
AEL RICE. 
~~ 
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT- 2 
000490
VERIFICA1'ION 
MICHA.EL RICE. being first dhu.ly s.worn 1Upon oath, deposes and says: 
That. I am too President in the above-entitled corporation; that I have read the within and 
foregoing Articles of Amendment. know the conttents thereof, andi that the same is true and 
correct as J verily believe. 
ARTICLES Of AMENDMENT - 3 
·.·,. - ---~ : ..... " 
NOf ARY PUBLIC forkia 
Residing at Boise. Idaho c q 






State of Idaho 
I I 
CERTIFICATE OF INCOR'.PORATION 
Of 
CAPITAL B'RO:ADCASTIN!G Il\l'C. 
File n1Ll.mber C 10Q'8]4 
I, PE.TE T. CENARRUSA, Secretary of St.ate of ilie State· of Idlaho, hereby cel'tify 
t.ha.t duplicate originals of Articles of fucorporation f01i the mcorporation of the above 
named co·rporati.on, duly sig;ned pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho· Business 
Corporation Act, have been received in this o·f:fice and are found to conform to law. 
ACCORDlrNGL Y and by virttue· of th.e authority. ves.ted in me by law, I issue thls 
Cerl:iificate of Jfncorpo·ration and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Artides of 
Incorporation... 
Dated: September 28, 199·4 
~Ji'~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
EXHIBIT 1\1 
000493
oo ·oai: =00 ··oaT el 
dH03 
9'300'1 119"0 H6W : I }O 
2 809tr 0060 a-~t 
31.il'.lS :fi ~ EIM!ll 
C.ERT'IFIC:ATE OF INCORPO.IRATION 
CAPITAL BROADCASTING INC. 
A CLOSE COR.PORJ\TIOINI 
Su· tH 11 s.:. AH '~ 
<,£1":JiET AR'r N ST.HF. 
PIRST. THE NAME OF THE CORPORATION IS CAPITAL BRO:ADCASTING 
INC. 
SECOND. THE PERIOD OF DURATION IS PERPETUAL. 
THIRD. TI-IE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS AND THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSE 
PROPOSED ·ro SE TRANS}tCTED, PROMOTED AND CARR.IE . .[)1 ON ARE T'O ENGAGE 
IN ANY LAWFUL ACT OR ACTIVITY FOR WHIC'H CORPORATIONS MAY BE 
INCORPORATED UNDER THIS AC'?. 
FOURTH. THE AMOUNT OF THE TOTAL AUlTHORUED CAPITAL STOCK OF THE 
CORPORATION IS DIVIDED INTO 1000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK OF NO 
PAR VALUE .. 
FIFTH. ALL OF THE CORPORATIONS ISSUED STOCK SHALL BE H.ELD BY NOT 
MORE THAN THIRTY (30) PERSONS. 
SIXTH. ALL OJP THE IS.SUED STOCK OF ALL CLASSES SHALL BE SUBJECT TO 
THE FOLLOWINIG RESTRICTIONS ON TMNSJ!?EH PERMIT'll'ED BY SECTION 30-l23A 
OP THE CORP·ORA'll'ION LAWS OF THE STATE OF IDA.HO. 
SEVENTH. EACH ST'OCKHOLDER WILL OFFER TO THE CORPORATION OR TO THE 
OTHER STOCKHOLDERS OF THE CORPORATION A 'FH.IRTY (JO) DAY FIRST REFUSAL 
OPTION TO PURCHASE HIS STOCK SHOULD HE ELECT TO SELL HIS STOCK. THE 
PRICE FOR ALL STOCK SHALL BE BASED ON 'Jl'HE .BOOK VALUE OF '.FHE COMPANY 
AT THE TIME O·F' THE SALE EXCEP·T J!o'OR STOCK THA"I' THE PRESIDENT MAY SELL. 
EIGHT'. CORPORA.'TION SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO F1LE A SUB CHAPTER S AND 
TO USE THE 1244 PROVISION. . 
NINTH. THE CORPORATION! SHALL MAKE NO OPFER ING OF ANY STOCK OF ANY 
CLASS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC 01-'PEJHNG WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF THE UNITED STATES ·SECU.RIT'IES ACT OF 1933, AS IT MAY BE AMENDED FROM 
TIME TO TI.ME. CORPORATE OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS SHA.LL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE IN'I'ERE.STS OR OBLIGATIONS. 
TENTH. THE ADDRESS OP ITS INITIAL REGISTERED OFFICE IS 5 03 VISTA 
BOISE, IDAHO 8370,5 AND THE NAME OF ITS INITIAL REGISTERED 
AGENT AT SUCH ADDRESS IS ROY RICE, 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 
ELEVEN'l'H. THERE SHALL BE ONE DIRECTOR CONSTITUTING THE INITIAL. 
BOA.RD• OF DIRECTORS AND 'FHE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF THE PERSONS TO 
SERVE AS DIRECTO'RS UNTIL THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF SHARE HOLDERS 
OR UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS BE ELECTED AND OOALIFY. 
ROY RICE, 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 8370S. 
000494
e e 
TWELFTH. 'FHE NAME AND ADDRESS OF EACH INCORPORATOR: 
ROY RICE, 5,03 VIS'F.A, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 





State of Idaho 
I ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
WESI'ERN BROADCASITNG JNC. 
Fil!e number C lm'813 
I, PBTE T. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, herelby certify 
that duplicate origjnals, of Ariides of !m:mporation for t.he incorporation of the above· 
named corporation, duly si8'11ed pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho B-usiiness 
Corporation Act, have been received in this office and are found to conform to law. 
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority ves,ted in me by law, I issue thls 
Cert:fficate of fuco1poraffon and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Articles of 
Incorporation. 
Dated: September 28, 1994 
~00~ 






oo. ·o:a:1 =OO ·o:ai: ul 
dliO:l 
~ 11Sltl HS:l:J :, 'l() 
a 6041lr 0060 8'~'1 
311il:S J3 .\lff!lt:Y.Bi 3W,t 
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATIONS& £8 II s., AM t9'1 
Sct'Rp • . 
WESTERN BROADCASTING INC. -J ·•"lff'f OF ST.Hf 
A CLOSE COJRP·ORATION 
FIRST. THE NAt'"l:E OF THE CORPORATION IS WESTERN BROADCASTING INC. 
SECOND. THE PERIOD OF DURATION IS PERPETUAL. 
THIRD. THE NATURE OF' THE BUSI.NESS ANID THE OBJECTS A.ND PURPOSE 
PROPOSED TO BE TRANSACTED, PRO.MOT.ED AND CARRIED ON ARE TO ENGAGE 
IN ANY LAWFUL ACT OR ACTIVITY FOR WHICH CORPORATIONS MAY BE 
INCORPORATED UNDER THIS ACT. 
FOURTH. THE AMOUNT OF THE TOTAL AUTHORil:ED CAPITAL STOCK OF THE 
CORPORATION IS DIVIDED INTO 1000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK OF NO 
PAR VALUE. 
FIFTH. ALL OF THE CORPORATIONS ISSUED STOCK SHALL BE HELD BY NOT 
MORE THJt.J.1 THIRTY ( 3 0) PERSONS. 
SIXTH. ALL OF THE ISSUED STOCK OJP ALL CLASSES SHALL DE SUBJECT TO 
THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS• ON Tlti,NSFER PERMITTED BY SECTION 3 0-12JA 
OP THE CORPORATION LAWS OF THE: STATE.OF IlDAHO. 
SEVENTH. EACH ST'OCKHOLDER WILL OFFER TO THE CORPORATION OR TO THE 
OTHER STOCKHOLD'ERS OF THE CORPORATION! A THIRTY (JO} DAY FIRST REFUSAL 
OPTION TO PURCHASE HIS STOCK SHOULD HE ELECT TO SELL HIS STOCK. THE 
PRICE FOR ALL STOCK SHALL BE BASED ON THE BOOJK VALUE OF THE COMPANY 
AT THE TIME OF THE SALE EXCEPT FOR STOCK THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY SELL. 
EIGHT, CORPORATION SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO FILE A SUB CHAP'rER S AND 
TO USE THE 1244 PROVISION. 
NINTH. THE CORP·ORATION SHALL MAKE NO OFFERING OF ANY STOCK OF ANY 
CLASS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A PUB.I.IC OFFERING WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF THE UNITED STATES ·SECURITIES ACT OP 1933, AS IT MAY BE AMENDED FROM 
TINE TO TIME. CORPORAT·E OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS SHALL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE INTERESTS OR OBLIGATIONS. 
TENTH. THE ADDRESS OF ITS INITIAL REGISTERED OFFICE IS 503 VISTA 
BOISE IDAHO 83705 AND THE NAME OF ITS INITIAL REGISTERED 
AGENT 1AT SU'CH ADDRESS IS ROY RICE 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83 705 
ELEVENTH. THERE SHALL BE ONE. DIRECTOR CONSTITUTING THE INITIAL 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE NAt"'fES AND ADDRESSES OF THE PERSONS TO 
SERVE AS DIRECTORS UNTIL THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OP SRA.HE HOLDERS 
OR UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS BE ELEC'fED AND QUALIFY. 
ROY RICE 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83 70·5 
.:-
000498
• • .... ' ... 
TWELFTH. THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF EACH INCORJ!?'ORATOR: 
ROY RICE, SOJ VISTA, BOISE,. IDA.HO 83 705 






SALLAZ LAW, CHARTERED 
DErt:l"IIS J. SAUAZ 
RAYMOND D. SCHILD 
Van Bishop 
Attorney at Law 
603'2"" Street South 
:Nmnpa, ID 83651 
RE: 
Dear Van: 
June 28, 2000 
IV • 
1000 sourn ROOSJ3VELT 
POST OffJCE BOX 89lJG 
JSOJS8. IDIUIO 8'5101 
PIICSl'IE: (208) 2136,,1145 
FAX: (.208) 336-1.263 
Ia respot1$0 ta your faxed Jetter of illday's dateiftdtn;;:Si@lf~~f.~fm~,fiif~~,i,#;my . 
ositio11 re BCdin the status oftlttS entire l;mllsbit dealfru)'.ijfAfjrroh~iiiS,(·!im't!$)!1'~lmi1i:~ uinn p • g g . . . ·. .. . . ··"" .,,., :···:"·· ... -.-.,,,~.,.""'•' . ..Jt,. ,·;c,,, ........... : sq 
- 1ude the ball - crawl under his racks and tlten prevail.'!ttid~~r.e1,,qgoo,;;i,n..fuaef;,li~:~:t~: 
perpetuato same is over, as it i'eh'il:es to me and tbose prlvyto ':iiie:·· '.. .. 
The entire settlement of tMs case at all times was absolutely mutually and uoi.vcr.sru.ly 
agreed by all parties and attorneys to be a. 3 agreement package on the terms presently set forth 
therein and with each agreement totally dependent o.n the others. · 
I perso.nally wa.s told by Sumner that .he had signed No. 2 and 3 as written and it would be 
delivered to .Runft. Also. Sumner and I specifically agreed that I would adjust any error3 in the 
Runfl: billing and Fi.fer agreed to reassign all stock when he was paid plus his out of pocket costs 
which he reduced to $3,000. 





I , I 
Letter to Van Bishop 
June 28, 2000 
Page Two 
e ,u 
My word is absolutely solid gold and after literally and .tiguritively carrying Sumner for 
12 yW'3 - including ell attorney fees - cash costs· advances - cash JQallS - loan suarantees -
redeeming loan defaults-eating tom of shit - bleeding pro:fuaely- and then delivering these radio 
9tations to him, in spite of~~ it's over. 
If Sumner wants to question my woi:d now then he better tighten his cinch and grab his 
ass. because it's gonna be a hell of a lot mote than an 8 second ride. 
t>1S:da 











SAT IAZ IA WO.FFICES. CI;IAI?J]REI) 
DlilffiIS f, · $i\.liLt)Z . . .. 
RA"l'XOND D. Scmr.o 
July io, 2000 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
ViaFacsimile: 34S-1129 




PoS"t omca Box 8956 
BOIS'c, loAf:lo 83701 . 
PHONB {208) 336-114.5 
FA."l: (208) 336.1263 
r am Yery happy tbat you were able to arrtl11g¢ tbe $~j1J~~J:i1~IiijhlHitj~Jq~itfl([J& .;' 
agreement you bave worked out with R:unft for all Defen4iJP.~~ffir~~llitmef&!.1~1~fu·tli~i ': 





That the balan~ due, on the Roy FJ.ee/ Sumner loan be specifically included in the 
payment in. the above Defendants' Settlement A~t. " ·': . 
3. That in return for the assignment or release of all of the Fifer/ R&R stock to 
Sumner, Fifer recovers a portion of bis out-of-pocket cosu in tb.c sum of $3000.00 
from the above Settlement Agreement. 
' Upon Sumners signature hereon I am prepared to e;cecutB his new loan documents. 
.r 
STEVE SUMNER 
,,a•, cc: Van Bishop 
Wes Wilhite 
Johnltunft 















June 18, 2003 
Mr. Van 0. Bishop 
Attorney at Law 
16 121h A venue South 
Nampa, ID 83651 
Dear Mr. Bishop: 
RE: Escrow Instructions 
El Se!ANN LAlY OFF. • 
Acting in your fiduciary capacit'J as Trustee, upon receiving the signed Stipulation and Order for 
Dismissal as to Dennis J. Sallaz and Rentals & Royalties, inc., ("R-R) and Wilbur Fifer appropriately 
sig.1.,ed as written, hereinafter referred as Disnlissal, you shall notify Steve Sumner of such. 
. . . 
Upop. re~eiptof thefurtds from th~ closing ofthe sale ofthe assets of Capital We&., Inc. to 
First Western, Iric;~as tnistee you shall: . . . 
1. I=ile the Dismissal as referred to above with the CotU-t. 
2. P~livetto beimis I.Sallaz certified furids i1' the an:iount of $150,000tOO payable to 
09nnjs I. Sallaztor payable as directed in writing by De1lllis J. Sallaz 
3. Deiiverto Denifu I. Sallaza:n additional amotl,ritin certified funds qf$32,098'.00for 
ai'l<i.on },ehalf ofRentalsand);loyalp:31:!s,.Iri.~ ..•. ("R.,.R} payable toDeililisJ. Sa.Uaz or 
}#y~l,le,as· clirectedin.writing l,1y,penigs}. $~laz 
4. Delive~ to Deriilis J. Szjlaz the prepared Promissory Note in the amount of 
$218,000.00 m:ade paja~le to .JDe.n:rtJs J. Sallaz signed by First Western. Irie. and 
Steve Sumner, g\la!antor and secured by 2nd assignment of promi.ssbzy note from 
Educational Media Foundation, a non-profit Ca.lifomia corporation. Said assignment 
and security fomis and documents to be approved by Dennis J. Sallaz. 
5. In the event this transaction does not close within 120 days hereof, Sallaz has the 
option ta terminate same. 
Trustee 
Steve Sumner Van Bishop 
Approved and agreed: l:)'4 7>">' '-\ 
f~ \\ ... 
~l 
1 
-.\0 ,' 1 
\I~ { 1. 7 
Dennis J. Sallaz 
l4}007 
/l.· /¢t/,15 
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CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
Thi~ Ccmfidentia.l.ify AgTeement (hereinafter the ".A.~ee~-:i.ent") is made this __ :fa:,, of 
---~ 2003, by and between Dennis J. Sallaz, an individual, Rentals & Royalties, Inc. ("R-R"), 
an Idal1o corporation (collectively "Sallaz"), and Capital West, Inc., au Idaho corporation ("Capital"), 
and First Western,. Inc., an Idaho corporation ("First Western."), and Steve Sumner ("Sumner). 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Slllilner and Capital owes money to Sallaz, and Capital West has signed a 
Promissory Note in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A", which is incorporated herein by this 
reference and restated a.s if set forth in full, 
WHEREAS, the fact that Sumner and Capital West, Inc. has signed the 11ote and agreed to 
make payments and Sallaz has accepted said note, is information that First Western, Sumner, Capital 
West and Sallaz would rather not have publicly disseminated; and 
WHEREAS, Sallaz, Sumner, Capital West and First Westem in consideration of the delivery 
and acceptance of the Promissory Note on the terms thereon, all pai1ies are willing to honor each 
parties' concerns that all of the terms of this transaction, including the Promissory Note, remain in 
confidence. 
AGREErvrENT 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed between all parties as follows: 
1. Recitals. The foregoing recitals are hereby incorporated by this 
reference and restated as if.set forth in full as part and parcel of th1s Agreement. 
CONF'IDENTIALTTY AGREEMENT, P.l 







06/J0/04 WED 09: 28 FAX 20!.98 EI SM.ANN LAW OFF. • 
2. Confidentiality. It is understood and agreed that the confidentiality of all 
provisions of this Agreement and the n,on-disclosure and non-publication thereof subsequent to the 
execution of this Agreemerit is a material part of the consideration recited herein. The parties 
acknowledge that the disclosure, dissemination or publication of the provision of this Agreement by 
any of said parties may adversely affect the others. The parties do further stipulate and agree that 
none of the tenns of this settlement or any of the agreements or payments herein, including the 
aforesaid Promissory Note, req.utre the filing by any of the parties of a federal l 099 fonn or any 
other notification either. to the United States, or any department thereof or any state or any 
department thereof and none of the parties hereto shall ma_1<e said filing without fae written consent 
of all parties. The parties aclcnowledge thar disclosure, dissemination or publication of the 
provisions of this Release, by any of these parties, may adversely affect the other parties in an 
amount that cannot be presently determined and would be difficult to determine the exact amount of 
damages if disclosure was made. Because of that difficulty it is agreed that any parties releasing my 
of said information shall pay the sum of $25,000.00 as l.iquidated damages to the other parties. All 
parties' agreement not to disclose, disseminate, publish or ot'lerwise make public information 
concerning.the agreement except a....1d unless written consent of all L~e parties hereto is obtained and 
except as may be necessary for a particular party lo disclose infonnation for his or its individual or 
corporate ta.'"< or other court related purposes, shall be binding upon the paities for a period of thirty 
(30) years from 'the execution hereof and is severable from all other agreements, terms, conditions 
and covenants set out herein, which terms shall remain in full force and effect notwithstanding any 
breach of the terms of this paragraph. 
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Dennis J. Sallaz 
CAPITAL WEST, INC. 
-------~--. 
President 
FIRST WESTERN, INC. 
President 
Sumner 
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Iver J. Longeteig (ISB 1051) 
5304 Turrett 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone: (208) 342-5995 
Facsimile: (208) 424-6972 
William A. Fuhrman (ISB 2932) 
JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 
Post Office Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: 208-331-1170 
Facsimile: 208-331-1529 
Vernon K. Smith (ISB 1365) 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendantsffhird-Party Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Counterclaimants, 
) 


















VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED 
COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
vs. ) 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
- - -- _ __J 
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) 
DENNIS SALLAZ an individual, DENNIS ) 
SALLAZ in his representative capacity of ) 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD Chtd. and ) 








DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 




















COMES NOW Counterdefendants, Dennis Sallaz in his representative capacity of Sallaz 
and Gatewood Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc., ("Counterdefendants") by and 
through their counsel of record William A. Fuhrman, of the firm JONES + GLEDIDLL + 
FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A., and, in reply to Defendants'/Counterclaimants' 
("Counterclaimants") Amended Counterclaim, admit, deny, and affirmatively allege as follows: 
I. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Some or all of Counterclaimants' counterclaims may fail to state proper claims for 
relief and should be dismissed. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
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2. Counterdefendants deny each and every allegation in Counterclaimants' Amended 




3. Paragraphs 1 through 4 of the Amended Counterclaim are admitted. 
4. Paragraph 5 is admitted to the extent Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered is an Idaho 
corporation. 
5. In answer to paragraph 6, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz is a licensed attorney 
who practices at Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered, a professional limited liability corporation which 
has a principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, Idaho 83705. 
6. Paragraphs 7 and 8 are admitted. 
7. In answer to paragraphs 9, 10, and 11, it is admitted only that this court has 
jurisdiction and that venue is appropriate in Ada County. It is denied that Counterclaimants were 
damaged in excess of $50,000. 
8. In answer to paragraph 12, it is admitted only that, at various times, Dennis Sallaz 
provided legal services to Counterclaimants. 
9. Paragraph 13 is denied. 
10. In answer to paragraph 14, it is admitted only that Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
was one of numerous attorneys who provided legal services to Counterclaimants. 
11. In answer to paragraph 15, it is admitted only that, at times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 
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12. In answer to paragraph 16, it is admitted only that, at times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
13. Paragraph 17 is denied. 
14. Paragraph 18 is denied. 
15. Paragraph 19 is admitted on information and belief. 
16. Paragraph 20 is denied on the basis that it is unduly vague. 
17. In answer to paragraph 21, it is admitted only that as part owner in A Vista Pawn, 
Dennis Sallaz received certain goods from that entity. 
18. Paragraph 22 is denied. 
19. Paragraph 23 is denied. 
20. In answer to paragraph 24, it is admitted only that a copy of the Articles of 
Organization of Real Homes, L.L.C. is attached as "Exhibit A" to the Amended Counterclaim 
and that it was filed with the Secretary of State on January 19, 2001. It is denied that "Exhibit B" 
is a true and correct copy of the original Operating Agreement of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
21. In answer to paragraph 25, it is admitted only that Renee Baird was listed as a 
manager of Real Homes, L.L.C., in the Articles of Organization filed on January 19, 2001 and in 
the Operating Agreement. 
22. Paragraph 26 is admitted. 
23. Paragraph 27 is admitted. 
24. Paragraph 28 is denied. 
25. Paragraph 29 is admitted. 
26. Paragraph 30 is admitted and it is affirmatively alleged that Glen Trefren was also 
an owner of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND TIIIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
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27. Paragraph 31 is admitted. 
28. Paragraph 32 is denied. 
29. Paragraph 33 is denied. 
30. In answer to paragraph 34, it is admitted only that Real Homes, L.L.C. conveyed 
15584 Riverside Rd., Canyon County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz for $105,000 to be held in 
trust for Real Homes, L.L.C. 
31. Paragraph 35 is denied. 
32. Paragraph 36 is admitted. 
33. Paragraph 37 is denied on the basis that it is unduly vague. 
34. Paragraph 38 is denied. 
35. Paragraph 39 is admitted. It is affirmatively alleged that Counterclaimant Roy 
Rice never loaned the funds represented in the two promissory notes to Dennis Sallaz. 
36. Paragraph 40 is denied except to the extent that it is admitted that a purported Bill 
of Sale for the ATVs and trailer is attached to the Amended Counterclaim as "Exhibit F." 
37. In answer to paragraph 41, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the Amended Counterclaim. It is 
affirmatively alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said SUV s to Rice but that Rice never 
paid for said SUV s and the sale was never completed. 
38. In answer to paragraph 42, it is admitted only that a copy of the title of the 
motorhome is attached as "Exhibit H." It is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Motorhome. 
39. Paragraph 43 is denied. 
40. Paragraph 44 is denied. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
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41. Paragraph 45 is denied. 
42. Paragraph 46 is denied. 
43. Paragraph 47 is denied. 
44. In answer to paragraph 48, it 1s admitted only that the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement is attached as "Exhibit I." 
45. Paragraph 49 is admitted. 
46. In answer to paragraph 50, it is admitted only that the terms of the purchase 
agreement for sale of interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. speak for themselves. 
47. Paragraph 51 is admitted. 
48. Paragraph 52 is denied. 
49. Paragraph 53 is denied. 
50. Paragraph 54 is denied. 
51. Paragraph 55 is denied. 
52. Paragraph 56 is admitted only to the extent that Roy Rice, on behalf of Real 
Properties, LLC, made an advance payment of $5,000. 
53. Paragraph 57 is denied on the basis of a lack of sufficient information to form a 
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein. 
54. Paragraph 58 is admitted. 
55. Paragraph 59 is admitted but it is affirmatively alleged that the Magistrate Judge 
did not have jurisdiction to make the ruling he did. 
56. Paragraph 60 is denied. 
57. In answer to paragraphs 61 and 62, it is admitted only that Renee Baird's claim of 
ownership in some or all of Real Homes, LLC and/or Real Properties, LLC, and/or their assets, 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6 
000519
• 
was known to Counterclaimant Roy Rice at the time he entered into the Purchase Agreement for 
the Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC. 
58. In answer to paragraph 63, it is admitted only that on or about November 4, 2009 
Eugene "Roy" and Janet Rice filed an action to quiet title in Canyon County as Case No. CV 09-
11855. 
59. Paragraphs 64 and 65 are denied on the basis of lack of information to form a 
belief as to their truth. 
60. Paragraph 66 is admitted. 
61. In answer to paragraph 67, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was included as a 
defendant in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
62. Paragraph 68 is denied. 
63. In answer to paragraph 69, it is admitted only that "Exhibit K" appears to be a 
copy of a Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement, and denied as to the remainder on the basis 
of lack of information to form a belief as to its truth. 
64. In answer to paragraph 70, it is admitted only that the Mutual Release and 
Settlement Agreement attached as Exhibit K speaks for itself and is denied as to the remainder. 
65. In answer to paragraph 71, it is denied that Counterdefendants committed nay 
fraudulent, malicious, negligent, and/or wrongful acts. 
66. Paragraphs 72 and 73 are denied on the basis of lack of information to form a 
belief as to their truth. 
67. In answer to paragraph 74, it is denied that Counterdefendants concealed, 
misrepresented, and/or fraudulently withheld information or that Counterdefendants committed 
any deceitful and fraudulent acts. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
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68. Paragraph 75 is denied. 
69. Paragraph 76 is admitted. 
70. In response to paragraph 77, it is admitted only that the Assignment of Purchase 
Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC attached as "Exhibit L" and "Exhibit M" to 
the Amended Counterclaim speak for themselves. 
71. Paragraph 78 is denied. 
72. Paragraph 79 is admitted. 
73. In response to paragraph 80, it is admitted only that the Notice of Appeal attached 
as "Exhibit N" speaks for itself. 
74. Paragraph 81 is denied on the basis oflack of information to form a belief as to its 
truth. It is denied that the appeal is a tactic to delay this litigation or to prevent Counterclaimants 
from asserting the doctrines of collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, or res judicata. 
75. In answer to paragraph 82, the prior paragraphs of this reply to the amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
76. Paragraph 83 is admitted but it is affirmatively alleged that Counterclaimant Roy 
Rice never loaned the funds represented by the two promissory notes to Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz. 
77. Paragraphs 84, 85, 86, and 87 are denied. 
78. Paragraph 88 is admitted. 
79. Paragraph 89 is denied. 
80. In answer to paragraph 90, it is admitted only that the terms of the promissory 
notes speak for themselves. 
81. Paragraphs 91, 92, and 93 are denied. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
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82. In answer to paragraph 94, the pnor paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
83. Paragraphs 95 and 96 are admitted. 
84. Paragraphs 97 and 98 are admitted. 
85. In answer to paragraphs 99, 100, and 101 it is admitted only that there was an 
agreement between the parties allowing Counterdefendants to take items from A Vista Pawn in 
return for legal services and that this was addressed by the court in the divorce proceeding. 
86. In answer to paragraph 102, it is admitted only that the document attached as 
"Exhibit Q" to the Amended Counterclaim speaks for itself. 
87. Paragraph 103 is denied. 
88. Paragraph 104 is admitted only to the extent that, for a limited time, Dennis Sallaz 
provided legal advice in forming, and was the registered agent for, "R-R Investments, Inc." 
89. Paragraphs 105, 106, 107, 108, and 109 are denied. 
90. Paragraph 110 is admitted only to the extent that Steve Sumner was once a client 
of Dennis Sallaz. 
91. Paragraphs 111, 112, 113, 114, and 115 are denied. 
92. In answer to paragraph 116, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was involved in 
litigation against Steve Sumner over unpaid legal fees which resulted in a settlement in 2003, the 
matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case 
No. 96812, the pleadings of which speak for themselves. 
93. Paragraph 117 is denied. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
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94. In answer to paragraphs 118 and 119, it is admitted only that the pleadings filed in 
Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case No. 96812, speak for 
themselves. 
95. Paragraph 120 is denied. 
96. Paragraph 121 is admitted. 
97. Paragraph 122 is denied. 
98. In answer to paragraphs 123 and 124, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was 
involved in litigation against Steve Sumner over unpaid legal fees which resulted in a settlement 
in 2003, the matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., 
et al, Case No. 96812, the pleadings of which speak for themselves. The other allegations of 
these paragraphs are denied. 
99. Paragraph 125 is denied on the basis of lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. It is further denied that Counterclaimants were entitled to any settlement proceeds from 
Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case No. 96812, and that 
the pleadings filed in that case speak for themselves. 
100. In answer to paragraphs 126 and 127, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was 
involved in litigation against Steve Sumner over unpaid legal fees which resulted in a settlement 
in 2003, the matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., 
et al, Case No. 96812, the pleadings of which speak for themselves. 
101. Paragraphs 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, and 134 are denied. 
102. In answer to paragraph 135 and 136 it is admitted that Dennis Sallaz was the 
personal representative for his grandmother's estate and that he deposited portions of the 
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settlement funds into his grandmother's estate. It is denied that any of the settlement funds were 
due to Counterclaimants. 
103. Paragraph 13 7 is denied on the basis of lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
104. In answer to paragraphs 138 and 139, it is admitted only that Roy Rice requested 
that Tom Henry steal documents from the Sallaz and Gatewood law office which request was 
denied. All remaining allegations in paragraphs 138 and 139 are denied. 
105. Paragraph 140 is denied. 
106. Paragraphs 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, and 146 are denied. 
107. In answer to paragraph 14 7, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
108. Paragraphs 148, 149, and 150 are denied. 
109. In answer to paragraph 151, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
110. Paragraph 152 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
111. Paragraph 153 is denied. 
112. In answer to paragraph 154, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
113. Paragraphs 155, 156, 157 are denied. 
114. In answer to paragraph 158, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
115. Paragraph 159 is denied. 
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116. In answer to paragraph 160, is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
117. Paragraphs 161 and 162 are denied. 
118. In answer to paragraph 163, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
119. Paragraph 164 is denied. 
120. In answer to paragraph 165, it 1s admitted only that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
121. Paragraph 166 is denied. 
122. In answer to paragraph 167, it is admitted only that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
123. Paragraphs 168, 169, 170, 171, and 172 are denied. 
124. In answer to paragraph 173, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
125. Paragraph 174 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
126. In answer to paragraphs 175 and 176, it is admitted only that any fiduciary duties 
owed by Counterdefendants to Counterclaimants are those provided for by Idaho law. 
127. Paragraphs 177,178, 179, and 180 are denied. 
128. In answer to paragraph 181, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
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129. Paragraph 182 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants, denied as to the 
remainder. 
130. Paragraphs 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 
197,198, 19~ 200,201,202,203,204,205,206,207,208, 209,210,211~212,213,214,215, 
216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229, and 230 are denied. 
131. In answer to paragraph 231, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
132. Paragraph 232 is denied. 
133. In answer to paragraph 233, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the counterclaim. It is affirmatively 
alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said A TVs to Rice but that Rice never paid for said 
ATVs and the sale was never completed. 
134. In answer to Paragraph 234, the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
speak for themselves. 
135. In answer to paragraph 235, it is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Winnebago, and it is admitted that a copy of the title for the Winnebago is attached as "Exhibit 
H." It is further denied that Counterclaimants have a valid interest or claim against said 
Winnebago as any debt has previously been paid. 
136. Paragraphs 236,237, and 238 are denied. 
137. Paragraph 239 is denied on the basis oflack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
138. Paragraph 240 is denied. 




139. In answer to paragraph 241, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
140. Paragraph 242 is denied. 
141. In answer to paragraph 243, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the amended counterclaim. It is 
affirmatively alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said ATVs to Rice but that Rice never 
paid for said A TVs and the sale was never completed. 
142. In answer to paragraph 244, it is admitted only that a demand was made for the 
return of said ATVs and A TV trailer. 
143. Paragraphs 245 and 246 are denied. 
144. Paragraph 247 is denied on the basis of lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
145. Paragraph 248 is denied. 
146. In answer to paragraph 249, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
147. In answer to paragraph 250, it is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Winnebago, and it is admitted that a copy of the title for the Winnebago is attached as "Exhibit 
H." It is further denied that Counterclaimants have a valid interest or claim against said 
Winnebago as any debt has previously been paid. 
148. In answer to paragraph 251, it is only admitted that a demand was made by 
counsel for Counterclaimants for the return of the Winnebago. 
149. Paragraphs 252, 253, 254, and 255 are denied. 
150. Paragraph 256 is denied. 
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151. Paragraph 257 is denied. 
152. In answer to paragraph 258, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
153. Paragraph 259 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
154. Paragraphs 260,261,262,263, and 264 are denied. 
155. In answer to paragraph 265, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
156. Paragraph 266 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
157. Paragraphs 267,268,269, and 270 are denied. 
158. In answer to paragraph 271, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
159. Paragraph 272 is denied. 
160. In answer to paragraph 273, it is admitted only that Idaho Code § 18-7803(c) 
speaks for itself and denied as to the remainder. 
161. Paragraphs 274,275,276,277, and 278 are denied. 
162. In answer to paragraph 279, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
163. Paragraph 280 is denied. 
164. Paragraph 281 is admitted. 
165. Paragraphs 282 and 283 are denied. 
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166. In answer to paragraph 284, it is admitted that Rice is purported, by fraud, to have 
been issued a Certificate of Title for the Cadillac, but the copy which is attached as "Exhibit Y" 
is illegible. It is affirmatively alleged that the Certification of Title for the Cadillac which is 
attached as "Exhibit Y" is invalid as a result of Rice's fraudulent acts. 
167. Paragraphs 285,286,287, and 288 are denied. 
168. In answer to paragraph 289, it is admitted only that the document attached as 
"Exhibit A" to the Verified Complaint speak for itself 
169. In answer to paragraph 290, it is admitted only that the application for Title Stop 
speaks for itself. 
170. Paragraph 291 is denied. 
171. Paragraph 292 is admitted. 
172. Paragraphs 293, 294, and 295 are denied. 
173. In answer to paragraph 296, the prior paragraphs of this reply to amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
174. Paragraph 297 is denied. 
175. Paragraph 298 is admitted. 
176. Paragraphs 299 and 300 are denied. 
177. In answer to paragraph 301, it is admitted only that Rice sought to have issued a 
Certificate of Title for the Cadillac but the copy which is attached as "Exhibit Y" is illegible. It 
is affirmatively alleged that the Certification of Title for the Cadillac which is attached as 
"Exhibit Y" is invalid as a result of Rice's fraudulent acts. 
178. Paragraphs 302, 303, 304, and 305 are denied. 
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"Exhibit A" to the Verified Complaint speak for itself. 
180. In answer to paragraph 307, it is admitted only that the application for Title Stop 
speaks for itself. 
181. Paragraph 308 is denied. 
182. Paragraph 309 is admitted. 
183. Paragraphs 310, 311, and 312 are denied. 
184. Paragraph 313 is denied. 
III. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
185. Counterclaimants' claim for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by set-off 
for various amounts due and owing Counterdefendants. 
186. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by their negligence, fault and legal 
responsibility. 
187. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the negligence, fault or liability of third 
parties for whom Counterdefendants are not legally responsible. 
188. Counterclaimants have failed to mitigate their alleged damages, if any. 
189. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, equitable 
estoppel, and judicial estoppel, and fraud. 
190. Counterclaimants' damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced in that the damages 
sought by Counterclaimants' could have been avoided if Counterclaimants had acted reasonably 
prior to filing their counterclaim. 
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191. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by the 
doctrine of unclean hands. 
192. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. 
193. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
194. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
195. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
196. Some or all of Counterclaimants' claims are barred because they should have been 
raised in the pending Canyon County lawsuit, CV 2009-11855. 
197. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, 
including but not limited to, Idaho Code§§ 5-216, 5-217, 5-219, 5-222, 5-224. 
198. Counterclaimants' claims are barred or reduced by Counterclaimants' own breach 
of the subject agreements which are alleged to have been entered into. 
199. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred by the failure of 
Counterclaimants to substantially perform the terms of the alleged agreements. 
200. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by a failure to provide the consideration 
which forms the basis of certain of the agreements at issue. 
201. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
202. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to post an undertaking required 
by Idaho Code§ 8-303. 
203. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to satisfy the pleading 
requirements of Idaho Code § 18-7801 et seq. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 18 
000531
204. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to plead predicate acts 
constituting a pattern of racketeering. 
205. This action has just commenced and discovery has not yet taken place. 
Counterdefendants reserve the right to amend, modify and supplement their affirmative defenses as 
the action progresses. 
IV. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Counterdefendants have been required to retain the services of legal counsel to defend this 
action and they are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code§§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
V. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Counterdefendants hereby demand a trial by jury of not fewer than twelve (12) persons. 
VI. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, having fully responded to the Counterclaimants' Amended Counterclaim, 
Counterdefendants pray for judgment against Counterclaimants as follows: 
1. That Counterclaimants' Amended Counterclaim, and each cause of action and/or claim 
stated therein, be dismissed with prejudice, with Counterclaimants taking nothing 
thereby. 
2. That the Court award to Counterdefendants their costs and attorney fees incurred herein. 
3. That the Court award to Counterdefendants such other and additional relief as to the 
Court deems just and appropriate. 






Counterdefendants!Ihird-Party Plaintiffs further allege, as a Third Party Complaint against 
Third-Party Defendants Eugene (Roy) Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, as follows: 
VIII. 
PARTIES 
1. Third-Party Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz is an individual residing in Ada County, Idaho. 
2. Third-Party Plaintiff Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., is a professional limited liability 
corporation with its principal place of business in Ada County, Idaho. 
3. Third-Party Defendant Eugene (Roy) Rice is an individual residing in Ada County, 
Idaho. 
4. Third-Party Defendant Janet Rice is an individual residing in Ada County, Idaho. 
5. Eugene Rice and Janet Rice are, and at all times material hereto were, husband and 
wife, and the marital community comprised thereof resides in Ada County, Idaho. 




1. Third-Party Plaintiffs Dennis Sallaz in his representative capacity of Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation (hereinafter "Third-
Party Plaintiffs"), hereby incorporate the allegations set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint, together with 
Paragraphs 1 through 205, inclusive, set forth herein. In addition, Third-Party Plaintiffs aver as 
follows: 
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2. Third-Party Plaintiffs did, at various times, perform legal services at the request of, 
and on behalf of, Third-Party Defendants and/or their entities. 
3. In exchange for the legal services of Third-Party Plaintiffs, Third-Party Defendants 
agreed that Third-Party Plaintiffs were entitled to compensation and therefore allowed Third-Party 
Plaintiffs to collect a portion of their fees in the form of goods from Third-Party Defendants' former 
business "A Vista Pawn, Inc." 
4. The above-described exchange covered only a fraction of Third-Party Plaintiffs' fees 
for services rendered. 
5. Third-Party Plaintiffs have never been paid for the balance of its fees owed for the 
rendition of such services, the balance of which is approximately $300,000.00. 
6. Third-Party Plaintiffs are entitled to payment from Third-Party Defendants of all 
amounts currently due and owing plus pre and post judgment interest accruing thereon at the 
maximum rate permitted by Idaho law. 
7. In addition, to the extent, if at all, Third-Party Defendants are entitled to any funds 
from Third-Party Plaintiffs arising out of the Counterclaim, Third-Party Plaintiffs are entitled to a 
set-off against all amounts, if any, owed to Third-Party Defendants. 
X. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Third-Party Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
for the prosecution of this action. 
XI. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
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Third-Party Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of not fewer than twelve (12) persons. 
XII. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Third-Party Plaintiffs pray for entry of judgment in their favor and 
against Third-Party Defendants as follows: 
1. That Counterclaimants' Amended Counterclaim, and each cause of action and/or 
claim stated therein, be dismissed with prejudice, with Counterclaimants taking nothing thereby. 
2. That Third-Party Plaintiffs be awarded damages for all sums due and owing by 
Third-Party Defendants together with pre and post judgment interest thereon at the maximum rate 
allowed by Idaho law. 
3. That the Court award to Third-Party Plaintiffs their costs and attorney fees incurred 
herein. 
4. That the Court award to Third-Party Plaintiffs such other and additional relief as to 
the Court deems just and appropriate. 
DATED this { 0 day of September, 2012. 
JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
By {c&l_~A;;e 
William A. F~e Firm 
Attorneys for Counterdefendants 
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County of Ada ) 
DENNIS SALLAZ, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the Counterdefendant/Third-Party Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. That 
he has read the within and foregoing Verified Reply to Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial, knows the contents thereof, and that the facts therein stated are true 
and accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /O~ay of September, 2011. 
~ r -~ .a/a/.4 Notaryublicfor ld!?l 
Residing at ~ , Idaho 
My Commission Expires / l> .,~/ ,-,;?Jo/ G, 
VERIFIED REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 




e . • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ( 0 day of September, 2012, a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing document was forwarded by the method indicated and to the following: 
J. Kahle Becker [~ U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law [ ] Hand-delivered 
1020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 [ ] Facsimile 343-3246 
Boise, ID 83702 
Iver J. Longeteig [~ U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law [ ] Hand-delivered 
5304 Turrett [ ] Facsimile 424-6972 
Boise, ID 83703 
Vernon K. Smith [v( U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law [ ] Hand-delivered 
1900 W. Main Street [ ] Facsimile 345-1129 
Boise, ID 83702 
Marcy Fox [v'] U.S. Mail 
Sallaz & Gatewood, PLLC [ ] Hand-delivered 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. [ ] Facsimile 336-1263 
P.O. Box 8956 
Boise, ID 83707 
Gabriel McCaI1fiy. ~'{ U.S. Mail Attorney at Law . . ~ . Hand-delivered 
401 W. Front St. #302 [ ] Facsimile 345-9982 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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Marcy Fox 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, ID 83705 
344-1021 
Pro Se 
• • NO.- - -· ,,~0  -A.11.4.---· .M.A{:.1,11..J,.~t.1,J...--
SEP 2 6 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RiCH, Cierk 
By ANNAMARIE MEYER 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 






EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD Chtd. And SALLAZ AND 

































Case No: CV OC 1107253 
ANSWER OF MARCY FOX 
TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW, Marcy Fox, ( hereinafter referred to as "Fox") acting prose, and does as 
and for an Answer to Counterclaimants Amended Counterclaim, state as follows: 
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1. Fox admits paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8. 
2. Fox admits the statements in paragraph 289 and 306 that she was assigned Dennis Sallaz' 
interest in the vehicle, but denies the rest and remainder of both paragraphs. 
3. After carefully examining the Counterclaim of the Counterclaimants, Fox finds no claims 
made against her. However, in the interest of caution, Fox states that she is without sufficient 
knowledge and/or information with which to admit any of the remaining paragraphs contained in 
the Amended Counterclaim so therefore denies all paragraphs contained therein not specifically 
admitted above. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Marcy Fox hereby requests that she be afforded a trial by jury in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Fox prays for relief as follows: 
l. That this Court find Counterclaimant's Amended Counterclaim fails to state a cause of 
action against Fox and therefore must be dismissed. 
2. That this Court enter any and all additional relief as deemed just and proper. 
d.l> 
DA TED Thisr Day of September, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on theo<~1ay of September, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing upon the following individuals by Email: 
J. Kahle Becker 
kahle@kahlebeckerlaw.com 
[ ] Facsimile: 343-3246 
William Fuhrman 
bfuhrman@idalaw.com 
[] Facsimile: 331-1529 
Iver J. Longeteig 
ilongetei g@gmail.com 
[ ] Facsimile: 424-6 72 
Gabriel McCarthy 
mccarthylaw@cableone.net 
[] Facsimile: 345-9982 
Vernon K. Smith 
vls59@live.com 
[] Facsimile: 345-1129 
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EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, and MICHAEL 
RICE, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE RICE AND JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Counterclaimants, 
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DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in 
his representative capacity of Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd. and SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD, CHTD. INC., an Idaho 
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Counterdefendants. 
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and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER ON (1) PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL AND (2) 
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION 
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CHTD. INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE AND JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
• 
This matter came before the Court on two separate Motions to Compel. The Court heard 
oral argument on October 15, 2012. William Fuhrman and Erika Judd argued on behalf of the 
Plaintiff and Counterdefendants. J. Kahle Becker and Gabriel McCarthy argued on behalf of the 
Defendants and Counterclaimants. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matters 
under advisement. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The parties here have been in active litigation since April 11, 2011 when Plaintiff filed a 
Complaint for the return of a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado which the Rices allegedly repossessed after 
Sallaz failed to repay a loan. Sallaz argues that Eugene (Roy) Rice previously released his lien 
on that Cadillac, while Rice argues that his signature releasing the lien was forged. Janet and Roy 
Rices filed an Answer and Counterclaim on April 28, 2011. The Counterclaim asserted several 
claims, including allegations that Sallaz, an attorney, (1) wrongfully withheld $387,000 that was 
owed to the Rices in connection with the settlement of a case in Twin Falls (the "Sumner 
Matter"), (2) billed them for services over the course of their 25-year relationship that were not 
actually rendered. The Defendants also argue that they had an agreement with the Plaintiff, 
under which the Plaintiff would provide legal services and credit those services against the value 



























of (A) items taken from Defendant's pawn shop, and (B) equipment rented from Defendant's 
equipment rental company. 
Since these initial pleadings, the Parties have engaged in contentious discovery, and 
discovery disputes bring the parties before the Court again here. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Control of discovery is within the discretion of the trial court. Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 
Idaho 745, 749, 890 P.2d 331,335 (1995). To determine whether a trial court has abused its 
discretion, the appellate courts will consider whether the trial court "correctly perceived the issue 
as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Reed v. 
Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 57, 44 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2002). Parties may obtain discovery of any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. I.R.C.P. 26(a). 
Inadmissibility at trial is not grounds for objection if the information sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. 
Rule 26(b )(1) provides that the scope of discovery is as follows: 
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the 
scope of discovery is as follows: (1) Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking 
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, 
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or 
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge 
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information 
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 



























Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 33(a)(2), 34(b)(2), and 36(a) provide that the party upon 
whom interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission have been served shall 
respond within 30 days of service. No more than forty (40) interrogatories are allowed. I.R.C.P. 
33(a)(2). The number of Requests for Admission and Production is not limited by rule. The rules 
also authorize the party submitting the requests to move for an order compelling a response 
under Rule 37(a). Rule 37(a)(2) controls the form of the motion to compel: 
If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rules 
30 or 31. .. or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 
33 ... the discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer, or a 
designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. 
The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith 
conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an 
effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
IRCP 3 7 (a)( 4) allows the party bringing a motion to compel discovery to recover 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees under the following circumstances: 
If the motion is granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require 
the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or 
attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the 
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees, 
unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the 
moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to the 
party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in 
opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the 
making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may apportion the 
reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and 
persons in a just manner. 




























FIRST MOTION TO COMPEL 
The first motion stems from Defendants' discovery responses relevant to Plaintiff's claim 
for the return of the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the following 
discovery responses are presently deficient: 
A. Interrogatories: 18, 19, 20, 21, 22; 
B. Requests for Production: 6, 7; 
C. Requests for Admission: 3, 4. 
As required under Rule 3 7, the Plaintiff has certified in an accompanying affidavit that 
Plaintiff has attempted to confer with the other party before filing its Motion. Affidavit of 
Counsel, 110. The Plaintiff bolstered this initial claim with a Second Affidavit of Counsel, filed 
on October 11, 2011. In this Second Affidavit, Counsel states that she and opposing counsel, Mr. 
Becker, discussed these matters and could not reach an agreement about the subject of the 
Motion here. Second Affidavit of Counsel, 11 4-6. See also Affidavit of Vernon K. Smith, 11 4-
7. Based on these affidavits, the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff attempted to resolve the 
dispute before filing its Motion. 
The Court also finds in its discretion that the subject matter of these discovery requests is 
relevant to the Plaintiffs claims and/or defenses and that these requests are reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Having addressed these threshold concerns, the Court will now take up the substantive 
motion. 
INTERROGATORIES 
The Interrogatories and Accompanying Answers that are the subject of this Motion are as 
follows: 



























Interrogatory No. 18: Do you still own and possess (or have the right to possess) 
the Cadillac which is the subject of this action? 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 18: Objection. Plaintiff has exceeded the number of 
interrogatories allowed under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See IRCP 
33(a)(3). 
Interrogatory No. 19: If not, please state whether it was sold, identifying the 
purchaser with name and address. 
Answer to interrogatory No. 19: Objection. This interrogatory is vague and 
ambiguous, specifically the word "it." Plaintiff has exceeded the number of 
interrogatories allowed under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See IRCP 
33(a)(3). 
Interrogatory No. 20: How much was it sold for? 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 20: Objection. This interrogatory is vague and 
ambiguous, specifically the word "it." Plaintiff has exceeded the number of 
interrogatories allowed under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See IRCP 
33(a)(3). 
Interrogatory No. 21: When was it sold? 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 21: Objection. This interrogatory is vague and 
ambiguous, specifically the word "it." Plaintiff has exceeded the number of 
interrogatories allowed under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See IRCP 
33(a)(3). 
Interrogatory No. 22: Did you advertise the Cadillac for sale at any time after 
May 1, 2011? 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 22: Objection. This interrogatory is vague and 
ambiguous, specifically the word "it." Plaintiff has exceeded the number of 
interrogatories allowed under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See IRCP 
33(a)(3). 
Plaintiff argues that it has only submitted seventeen (17) interrogatories before the ones 
at issue here. As such, it has not served more than the maximum of 40. Since the Plaintiff, 
Dennis Sallaz, and the Counterdefendant, Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., are not the same party, he 




























is entitled to submit forty (40) interrogatories of his own. Any interrogatories that the 
Counterdefendant has served on Rices do not count against the Plaintiffs allotment. 
Plaintiff argues in the alternative that if the Court finds that he has already served the 
number of interrogatories allowed under the Rule, that the Court should give the Plaintiff leave 
to serve additional interrogatories. 
Defendants state that they have answered a total of 33 interrogatories propounded by the 
Counterdefendant and 40 interrogatories ( counting subparts as interrogatories) propounded by 
the Plaintiff. This total exceeds the forty ( 40) allowed under the Rule. All 73 interrogatories 
should be attributed to Mr. Sallaz because Mr. Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. are only 
nominally separate parties. 8A Wright, Miller, and Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure 
Civil 2d § 2168.1. 
The Court does not find Defendant's alter ego argument persuasive for two reasons. First, 
the claim for delivery of the Cadillac is quite distinct from the multi-count counterclaim filed 
against Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd, and second, when Plaintiff served its first set of discovery on 
Rices on May 31, 2011, Rices had not yet filed this Counterclaim. As such, the Court finds that 
both Mr. Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. are entitled to 40 interrogatories each under 
Rule 33(a)(3). 
The next issue is whether the Plaintiff already reached this amount before serving his 
second set of discovery. As noted above, the Plaintiff asserts that only seventeen (17) 
interrogatories were served in the first set, while Defendants assert that when the subparts are 
counted, over forty ( 40) interrogatories were served. 
In an exercise of discretion, the Court finds that the first set of discovery contained only 
seventeen interrogatories. While several interrogatories nominally contain subparts, the 




























"subparts" have been inserted simply to make the interrogatory as specific as possible and to 
communicate the nature of the answer desired. Interrogatory 11 from the first set of discovery is 
illustrative: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: With respect to your allegation ... that the 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by ... unclean hands, please set forth each fact which 
supports this allegation. Please cite to the specific Rules of Professional Conduct 
which were violated by Plaintiff. If any such fact is contained in a document, 
attach copies of the document. If any such fact is alleged to have been an oral 
representation, please state, with regard to the representation: 
a. The name and address of the person making such representation and all 
persons who witnessed such representation; 
b. The words which you contend amount to such representation; and 
c. The time and place at which such representation was made. 
By asking Defendant for the items styled as subparts (a) thru (c), the Plaintiff has tried to make 
sure that Defendant's answer is thorough and responsive. Given the tenor of the litigation, it was 
reasonable for the Plaintiff to serve detailed interrogatories like this one to reduce the chances of 
receiving inadequate answers. 
Given the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Compel responses to 
Interrogatories 18 thru 22. For purposes of answering Interrogatories Nos. 19-21, Defendant is 
advised that "it" refers to the Cadillac, and for the purposes of answering Interrogatory No. 22, 
"advertise" carries its dictionary meaning. 1 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
The Requests for Production and the accompanying Responses that are the subject of this 
Motion are as follows: 
Request for Production No. 6: All documents pertaining to the sale of the Cadillac 
executed since May 1, 2011. 
1 Advertise: Verb. Definitions: To make something known; to make publicly and generally known; to announce 
publicly especially by a printed notice or a broadcast; to call public attention to especially by emphasizing desirable 
qualities so as to arouse a desire to buy or patronize. Webtser 's New Collegiate Dictionary (5th ed. 1977). 



























Response to Request for Production No. 6: Objection, this request assumes facts 
not in evidence and calls for a legal conclusion. The word "executed" is also 
vague and ambiguous. See, title documents previously produced as Bates Nos. 
RICE 00224 -Rice 00231, 00236, and 00262 as well as publicly available 
documents maintained by the Idaho Department of Transportation or any other 
state in which the subject Cadillac may now be located. 
Request for Production No. 7: All documents relating to the advertising of the 
Cadillac for sale after May 1, 2011. 
Answer to Request for Production No. 7: Objection, this request is overly broad 
and unduly burdensome. Defendants Roy and Janet Rice are not in possession of 
any advertising material for the subject Cadillac. By way of further response, see, 
title documents previously produced as Bates Nos. RICE 00224 - Rice 00231, 
00236, and 00262 as well as publicly available documents maintained by the 
Idaho Department of Transportation. Defendants object to the extent this request 
calls for speculation as to documents which may or may not exist regarding 
subsequent sales of the subject Cadillac. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants refuse to provide information with respect to the sale of 
the Cadillac even though they have previously represented to the Court and counsel that they 
sold it. Defendants have taken inconsistent positions on the issue of whether they have sold the 
car. If the Rices have no documents responsive to these requests, they should respond "none" to 
each. 
Defendants argue that there is no evidence that the documents requested exist. 
Defendants cannot be compelled to produce documents not in existence. The Rices have offered 
to make their files available to the Plaintiff for counsel to review and Plaintiff has yet to depose 
Roy Rice. 
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that if the Defendants do not have files responsive to their 
Requests for production, they should simply say so. Taking the deposition of Roy Rice and 
inspecting files to establish the nonexistence of documents is unnecessarily expensive if simple, 


























verified answers to these Requests for Production would suffice. The Court also agrees with 
Plaintiff that Defendants' responses with respect to the Cadillac have been inconsistent to date. 
As such it would be premature for the Court to conclude that Rices are not in possession of 
documents responsive to these Requests for Documents. The Court disagrees with Defendants' 
position that Request No. 6 calls for a purely legal conclusion. To the extent that a document 
cannot be executed unless it has been signed ( or otherwise marked), and since the issue of 
whether a document has been signed is a question of fact, the Request here relates to the 
application oflaw to fact, which is within the permissible scope of Rule 36(a). 
Given the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Responses to 
Requests No. 6 and No. 7. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
The Requests for Admission and the accompanying Responses that are the subject of this 
Motion are as follows: 
Request for Admission No. 3: Admit that Plaintiff Dennis J. Sallaz never executed 
a promissory note in favor of Eugene "Roy" Rice, Janet Rice, or Michael Rice in 
relation to any "loan" on the 1954 Cadillac. 
Response to Request for Admission No. 3: Objection, this question calls for 
speculation and seeks a legal conclusion. The term promissory note is undefined 
and is therefore vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object that the request 
is a compound question. Subject to and without waiving these and the general 
objections stated above, Admit that Dennis Sallaz executed documents and made 
verbal assurances which provided Roy Rice with lien interest in the subject 
Cadillac in exchange for a loan of money. Defendants deny this request to the 
extent not admitted herein. 
Request for Admission No. 4: Admit that Plaintiff Dennis J. Sallaz never made 
any payment to you on any alleged "lien" which you recorded against the Cadillac 
on July 17, 1991. 
Response to Request for Admission No. 4: Objection, this request calls for 
2 s speculation and seeks a legal conclusion. The term promissory note is undefined 



























and is therefore vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object that the request 
is a compound question. Subject to and without waiving these and the general 
objections stated above, Admit that Dennis Sallaz executed documents and made 
verbal assurances which provided Roy Rice with lien interest in the subject 
Cadillac in exchange for a loan of money. Defendants deny this request to the 
extent not admitted herein. 
Plaintiff argues that its requests were straightforward and Defendants' responses were 
unresponsive. Defendants argue that the last sentence of each response qualifies as a denial, 
which is a permitted response. Defendants also argue that the requests were subject to proper 
objections, as indicated in their responses. 
The Court here finds Defendants' objections unpersuasive. In Request No. 3, the word 
"execute" could carry either a factual meaning (such as whether the note was signed) or a legal 
meaning (whether the note is a legally binding obligation). To the extent that it can be construed 
as a factual request, it does not necessarily call for a legal conclusion. Additionally, while the 
request is "compound" in the sense that the same request is made upon three parties, this does 
not make the request fatal because the request can be easily responded to by each party. See 8B 
Wright, Miller, and Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 2d § 2258 n.9. Request No. 4 
is similarly straightforward: whether a payment was made to the Defendants is a question of fact 
that Defendants should either admit or deny. 
Lastly, the Court disagrees with Defendants' assertion that the last sentence of each 
response constitutes an effective denial. Given their objections to the requests themselves, the 
purported denials appear to be superfluous and boilerplate in nature. 
Given the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Responses to 
Requests for Admission Nos. 3 and 4. 
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ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
1 
2 In its discretion, the Court awards $500 in sanctions to the Plaintiff as well as Plaintiffs 
























SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL 
The Second Motion stems from Rices' responses to discovery requests that the 
Counterdefendants served on May 14, 2012. Specifically, Counterdefendants argue that Rices' 
responses to the following requests were insufficient: 
Interrogatory No. 31; 
Requests for Production Nos. 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51; and 
Requests for Admission Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26. 
As required under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3 7, Counterdefendants have certified that they 
made reasonable attempts to confer with opposing counsel before filing this Motion. Affidavit of 
Counsel ,r,r 7-13. Based on the Affidavit of Counsel and the correspondence between the parties, 
the Court finds in its discretion that these attempts to meet and confer were reasonable. 
Additionally, the subject matter of these requests is certainly relevant given the nature of the 
parties' claims, and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
The Court will now address the substantive motion. 
INTERROGATORY No. 31 
The Interrogatory and Response at issue here are as follows: 
Interrogatory No. 31: Please identify the amount of compensation actually paid by 
you for legal services performed by Dennis Sallaz and/or related entities. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 31: Objection. This Interrogatory calls for 
speculation, is overly broad, and unduly burdensome. The attorney client 
relationship at issue in this case occurred over the course of approximately 25 




























years. Pursuant to IRPC 1.5 the responsibility to account is placed on the attorney. 
Please see testimony of Dennis Sallaz from Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce and husband's 
property and debt schedule, wherein Mr. Sallaz claimed that he was indebted to 
me for approximately $44,093 in unperformed legal services. Please also see 
5/26/09 Letter from Dennis Sallaz to John Runft and attachment thereto which 
indicates Mr. Sallaz was indebted to me for $61,570.51 of unperformed legal 
services. 
Counterdefendants argue that this interrogatory is straightforward: "Counterdefendants 
simply seek to know how much money Defendants believe they have paid, either by trade out or 
by payment otherwise, to Mr. Sallaz for legal services over the course of the last 25 years." 
Memorandum in Support at 8. Counterclaimants argue that they cannot answer this question 
without materials that they have requested and have yet to obtain from Mr. Sallaz. 
The Court agrees with the Counterdefendants on this point. There is nothing to stop the 
Counterclaimants from answering this interrogatory using their own records of the transactions 
between themselves and Sallaz, and supplementing their Answer as more information becomes 
available. 
Given the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel an 
answer to Interrogatory No. 31. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
The Requests for Production at issue here are as follows: 
Request for Production No. 43: Please produce for inspection and/or copying each 
document that contains, refers to, or relates to the sale and.or transfer of "A Vista 
Pawn, Inc" dba "Vista Pawn" to GNP Properties ofldaho, LLC and/or GNP of 
Idaho, Inc. 
Request for Production No. 44: Please produce for inspection and/or copying each 
and every document purporting to support your claim of ownership of "A 
Mercedes Convertible VIN 107004412049659." 
Request for Prudction No. 47: Please produce for inspection and/or copying any 
and all accounting records, ledgers, notes, and/or other documents evidencing an 
ownership interest in any entity in which you claim( ed) an ownership interest. 



























Request for Production No. 48: Please produce for inspection and/or copying all 
invoices and/or any other documentation relied upon in formulating the amount 
claimed to be due to A Vista Pawn. 
Request for Production No. 49: Please produce for inspection and/or copying the 
original Promissory Note attached as Exhibit D to your Answer, Counterclaim, 
and Joinder of a Party (hereinafter, "Counterclaim"). 
Request for Production No. 50: Please produce for inspection and/or copying the 
original Promissory Note attached as Exhibit E to the Counterclaim. 
Request for Production No. 51: Please produce for inspection and/or copying all 
accounting records, ledgers, notes, or any other documents evidencing each and 
each and every credit that was applied to the Vista Pawn open account for legal 
services rendered. 
Counterdefendants argue that the documents produced were mostly unsigned, appear to 
be drafts, and reference other documents which have not been provided. Counterclaimants have 
indicated that they do not have the documents requested but have not provided a verified 
response to this effect. 
Counterclaimants argue that they have produced all the documents they have and have 
also offered to make their complete files available for review. This offer was refused. 
Additionally, Sallaz is free to depose the current owners of Vista Pawn to inquire as to whether 
additional responsive documents exist. 
In reply, Counterdefendants argue that Counterclaimants' offer to make the files available 
for inspection is not particularly valuable for two reasons. First, counsel has described the 
documents in the files as "mostly irrelevant" and second, Counterclaimants insist on entering 
into a cumbersome, unnecessary protective order. With respect to the protective order, 
Counterclaimants have yet to indicate what information in the files is confidential and why a 
protective order is necessary. 




























Counterclaimants correctly note that allowing Counterdefendants to inspect their files is 
allowable under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 34. However, since the parties are unable to work 
out the terms of an inspection, the Court in its discretion will GRANT this Motion to Compel 
and require Counterclaimants to make their files available for inspection no later than 60 days 
from this issuance of this Order. If the parties cannot stipulate to the terms of a protective order 
within 30 days of the issuance of this Order, Defendant may file a Motion for a Protective order. 
If none is granted, the inspection will proceed without a protective order. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
The Requests at issue here are as follows: 
Request for Admission No. 1: Please admit that the Sumner Matter you claim an 
interest in is more accurately described as Ada County Case No. 96812, entitled 
Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc., v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al. 
Request for Admission No. 5: Please admit that Rentals and Royalties and Wilbur 
Fifer were represented by Wes Wilhite, attorney at law, in the Sumner Matter. 
Request for Admission No. 6: Please admit that Sallaz Doolittle, Chtd., was a 
named party in the Sumner Matter. 
Request for Admission No. 7: Please admit that Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz Doolittle, 
Chtd., filed a cross claim against co-defendants Steve Sumner, Northwest 
Broadcasting Inc., and American National Corporation to collect a sum of 
$377,398.60, plus interest, for legal fees and prejudgment interest. 
Request for Admission No. 11: Please admit that prior to initiating the 
Counterclaim at issue in this matter that you never made written demand upon 
Steve Sumner for any alleged loans. 
Request for Admission No. 16: Please admit that you have no bank or financial 
records to support any consideration given in exchange for the Promissory Note 
attached as Exhibit D to the Counterclaim. 
Request for Admission No. 17: Please admit that you have no bank or financial 
records to support any consideration given in exchange for the Promissory Note 
attached as Exhibit E to the Counterclaim. 



























Request for Admission No. 19: Please admit that you have no bank or financial 
records to support any consideration given in exchange for the Bill of Sale 
attached as Exhibit F to the Counterclaim. 
Request for Admission No. 20: Please admit that during the 25-year relationship 
with Dennis Sallaz, you utilized and employed other attorneys to perform work on 
your behalf. 
Request for Admission No. 22: Please admit that you expected to pay for legal 
services provided by Dennis Sallaz. 
Request for Admission No. 23: Please admit that you have not paid for the legal 
services provided by Dennis Sallaz and as detailed in the billing statements 
produced by Counterdefendants on or about June 17, 2011. 
Request for Admission No. 24: Please admit that you were notified by Dennis 
Sallaz that Renee Baird claimed an interest in the property at issue in the Real 
Homes/Real Properties, LLC transaction prior to your agreement to purchase the 
property. 
Request for Admission No. 26: Please admit that Dennis Sallaz advised you to 
obtain a Title Report in regard to the Real Homes/Real Properties Matter. 
Counterdefendants argue that Counterclaimants' responses were insufficient and even 
incoherent at times. Counterclaimants argue that Counterdefendants have not stated their 
objections with sufficient particularity. In reply, Counterdefendants argue that they previously 
communicated their objections with particularity in a letter dated June 26, 2012. See Affidavit of 
William A. Fuhrman, Exhibit 5. 
The Court agrees with Counterdefendants that the Response to Request No. 1 was 
inadequate. This request was a straightforward attempt to confirm that the Defendants are 
referring to Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al (Ada County 
Case No. 96812) when they mention the Sumner Matter. Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel 
a response to this Request is GRANTED. 



























The Court agrees with Counterdefendants that the Response to Request No. 5 was 
inadequate. This request is straightforward and does not require a legal conclusion. If Wilbur 
Fifer represented Rentals and Royalties in the Sumner Matter, the Counterclaimants should 
respond "Admit" while reserving the right to contest the extent and nature of such representation. 
Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel a response to this Request is GRANTED. 
The Court agrees with Counterdefendants that the Response to Request No. 6 was 
inadequate. This request is a straightforward attempt to determine whether the parties have a 
genuine dispute over this particular issue. Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel a response to 
this Request is GRANTED. 
The Court agrees with Counterdefendants that the Response to Request No. 7 was 
inadequate. Whether a cross-claim was filed against Steve Sumner is not a question of law, and 
the request does not call for a legal conclusion. It also does not require Roy Rice to speculate as 
to the veracity of any assertion made by Mr. Sallaz. Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel a 
response to this Request is GRANTED. 
The Court agrees with Counterdefendants that the Response to Request No. 11 was 
inadequate. Whether Counterclaimants made a written demand upon Steve Sumner for an 
alleged loan is a question of fact, and answering this question does not require Counterclaimants 
to make a legal conclusion. Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel a Response to this Request is 
GRANTED. 
The Court disagrees with Counterdefendants with respect to Counterclaimants' 
Responses to Request Nos. 16, 17 and 19. Although the Counterclaimants raised several 
objections to this Request, Counterclaimants unequivocally denied that Roy Rice had no records 























supporting his claims under the promissory notes and a bill of sale. Counterdefendants' Motion 
to Compel Responses to these Requests is DENIED. 
The Court agrees with Counterdefendants that Counterclaimants' Response to Request 
No. 20 was inadequate. This Request is straightforward and the Counterclaimants did not make a 
good faith effort to respond. Whether the Rices engaged other attorneys during the 25-year 
relationship with Mr. Sallaz is a factual question and the Rices objections are not well-taken. 
Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel a Response to this Request is GRANTED. 
The Court agrees with Counterdefendants that Counterclaimants' Response to Request 
No. 22 was inadequate. The Court does not see how Mr. Rice would have to speculate to answer 
a question about his own state of mind. The Court also rejects Counterclaimants' argument that 
the Request is vague or ambiguous because the services Plaintiff refers to are clearly those 
provided by Mr. Sallaz. Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel a Response to this Request is 
GRANTED. 
The Court agrees with Counterdefendants that Counterclaimants' Response to Request 
No. 23 was inadequate. The Request does not require the Counterclaimants to admit or assume 
responsibility for paying the legal services listed in the billings. This is a simple factual question 
that calls for either an admission or a denial. Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel a Response 
to this Request is GRANTED. 






No. 24 was inadequate. Without a more detailed description of the property that Plaintiff is 
referring to, the Request is sufficiently ambiguous to justify Counterclaimants' objection. 
Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel a Response to this Request is DENIED. 



























The Court agrees with Counterdefendants that Counterclaimants' Response to Request 
No. 26 was inadequate. This is a straightforward request and the Defendants should either admit 
or deny it. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel a Response to this Request is GRANTED. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
In its discretion, the Court awards $500 in sanctions to the Plaintiff as well as Plaintiffs 
reasonable attorney's fees associated with bringing its Motion to Compel. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED in full. Plaintiff is awarded $500 in sanctions 
in addition to their reasonable attorneys fees for bringing this Motion. 
Counterdefendants' Motion to Compel is GRANTED with respect to all Interrogatories, 
Requests for Document Production, and Requests for Admission Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 20, 22, 23, 
and 26. The Motion is DENIED with respect to Requests for Admission Nos. 16, 17, 19, and 24. 
Counterdefendants are awarded $500 in sanctions in addition to their reasonable attorneys fees 
for bringing this Motion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this Cj ~y of November 2012a 
-------,,.....---1-:::,,...__ _____ _ 
Ronald J. Wilp 
District Judg 
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JAN O 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cl:Jr!~ 
By ELYSHIA HOLMEt 
JEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 






EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 




DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD Chtd., SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD PLLC, and SALLAZ LAW Chtd. 
and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, 
Chtd, Inc. an Idaho Corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 1 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 1107253 
) 































DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative capacity of ) 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD Chtd. and SALLAZ ) 
AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
vs. 
EUGENE (Roy) RICE and JANET RICE, 
Husband and wife, 











COMES NOW Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, (hereafter 
"Counterclaimants"), by and through their counsel of record, J. Kahle Becker, and Gabriel 
McCarthy, and hereby state and allege the following in support of their amended Counterclaim. 
PARTIES 
1. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is an individual residing at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 
83705. 
2. Counterclaimant Janet Rice is an individual residing at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 83705. 
3. Eugene and Janet Rice are husband and wife and the marital estate of Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice resides at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 83705. 
4. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is an individual residing at 
1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 2 
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5. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered is an 
Idaho S-Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., 
Boise, ID 83705. 
6. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC 
is an Idaho Professional Limited Liability Company having its principal place of business 
at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
7. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz Law Chartered is an Idaho S-
Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 
83705. 
8. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is an individual who is a 
representative of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered, an Idaho S-Corporation having its 
principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705, Sallaz and 
Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC, an Idaho Professional Limited Liability Company having 
its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705, and Sallaz Law 
Chartered, an Idaho S-Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. 
Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
9. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is the Personal 
Representative of and Attorney for the estate of his deceased grandmother, Bessie B. 
Matcham. 
10. Upon information and belief, Marcy Fox is an individual who was made an involuntary 
plaintiff by order of this Court and is residing at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83 705. 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the above named Counterdefendants pursuant to 
LC. § 5-514 and other applicable laws and rules. 
12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to and by virtue of 
Idaho Code § 1-705 and other applicable laws and rules. The damages herein exceed 
$50,000. 
13. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404, venue is proper in Ada County since all of the parties 
reside therein. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
14. Dennis Sallaz was Counterclaimants' Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice's personal and 
business attorney for approximately 25 years. 
15. Dennis Sallaz owns 90% of the interest in Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
16. Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. was Counterclaimants' Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice's 
personal and business attorney since it was founded in 2003. 
17. Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC is the successor in interest to Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. 
18. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
19. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. 
20. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz Law, Chtd. 
21. Dennis Sallaz and Counterdefendants failed to clarify which of the three business entities 
named as Counterdefendants was representing Counterclaimants and their interests at 
various points in the attorney client-relationship. 
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22. Dennis Sallaz and Counterdefendants failed to clarify which of the three business entities 
named as Counterdefendants held Counterclaimants funds and property at various points 
in the attorney-client relationship. 
23. Dennis Sallaz formed many business entities on behalf of Counterclaimants Roy and 
Janet Rice including but not limited to: R-R Investments, Inc., Capital Broadcasting, Inc., 
Western Broadcasting, Inc., New Communications, Inc., Far Less Auto Rental, Inc., A 
Fantasy Limos, Inc., B B Auto Sales and Repairs, Inc., Aztec Precast, Inc., Ultimate 
Arms, Inc., Luxury, Inc., Clearwire Wireless Communications, Inc., Advanced 
Technology Systems, Inc., and Real Properties, LLC. 
24. Counterdefendants Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood represented some of these and other 
entities as well as Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice in litigation as well as many 
personal and business transactions. 
25. There has never been a formal engagement letter between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants. 
26. Counterclaimants have been billed by Counterdefendants for legal services and 
Counterclaimants have paid said bills. 
27. Counterclaimants have also allowed Counterdefendants and their agents to take in excess 
of $61,000 worth of items from Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice's former business 
"A Vista Pawn." 
28. Said items were to serve as a retainer in the event legal services were ever required from 
Counterdefendants for Roy Rice or his business entities. 
29. Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were married on July 4, 1996. 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 5 
000566
30. Real Homes, L.L.C. was formed on January 19, 2001. A copy of the Articles of 
Organization filed with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State on January 19, 2001 is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and a copy of the Operating Agreement is attached hereto 
as "Exhibit B." 
31. Dennis Sallaz's then wife, Renee Baird, was listed as a manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
in the Articles of Organization filed on January 19, 2001 and in the Operating 
Agreement. 
32. Renee Baird moved out of the Sallaz residence in August of 2003. 
33. On September 12, 2003, Dennis Sallaz filed Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State for Real Homes, L.L.C. 
stating that management was henceforth vested in members and that Dennis J. Sallaz was 
a manager and member/owner. A copy of the Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization filed with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State on September 12, 2003, 
is attached hereto as "Exhibit C." 
34. Renee Baird did not sign or approve the Amendment to the Articles referred to m 
preceding paragraph. 
35. Dennis Sallaz signed documents as an owner and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
36. Glenn Trefren is a longtime friend of Dennis Sallaz, client of Dennis Sallaz, and client of 
Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. 
37. Throughout the existence of Real Homes, L.L.C., until its conveyance to Real Properties, 
LLC on January 6, 2006, Glenn Trefren signed documents as an owner and manager of 
Real Homes, L.L.C. 
38. Glenn Trefren had no ownership interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. or in any assets thereof. 
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39. Throughout the existence of Real Homes, L.L.C., until 2005, Renee Baird signed 
documents as an owner and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
40. On February 10, 2004 Real Homes, L.L.C. conveyed 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz, husband and wife for $105,000. The alleged 
purpose of this conveyance, as explained to Counterclaimants, was to enable the Sallazes 
as title holders to obtain a loan using the property as collateral on the understanding that 
the proceeds would be used to improve and benefit the property .. The promise to use the 
proceeds allegedly was the consideration for the conveyance. 
41. Renee Baird signed the quitclaim deed, which conveyed 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz, as President of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
42. The petition for the divorce of Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird was filed on May 27, 2004. 
43. During the Divorce proceedings, Dennis Sallaz was in need of money. 
44. Dennis Sallaz withdrew approximately $65,000 from the Real Homes checking account 
and placed some of this money in his or Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd.' s trust account. 
45. Dennis Sallaz executed two promissory notes with Counterclaimant Roy Rice for 
$10,000 and $10,800 at 12% interest. Those promissory notes are attached hereto as 
"Exhibit D" and "Exhibit E." 
46. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 
Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an A TV trailer which are owned by Counterclaimants. 
The Bill of Sale for said A TV's and A TV trailer is attached hereto as "Exhibit F." 
47. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said ATVs and ATV trailer to 
Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See deposition of 
Dennis Sallaz, pp. 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
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48. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz owned a Winnebago Motorhome VIN 
1GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien holder on. 
A copy of the title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
49. Dennis Sallaz used his position as Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" and Janet Rice's 
longtime personal and business attorney to influence and induce Counterclaimants Roy 
and Janet Rice to enter into a business transaction for the purchase of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
50. Defendant Sallaz did not inform Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice that they should 
obtain independent legal counsel. 
51. In the course and scope of the attorney client relationship with Counterclaimants, Dennis 
Sallaz created an entity which became "Real Properties, LLC" as a vehicle for 
Counterclaimants to purchase "Real Homes, L.L.C." 
52. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants that Renee Baird had not approved 
the September 12, 2003 Amended and Restated Articles of Organization for Real Homes, 
L.L.C. 
53. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants of Renee Baird's interest in Real 
Homes, L.L.C. or the assets thereof. 
54. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants that they had obtained an appraisal 
of the value of the real estate owned by Real Homes, LLC in the latter part of 2005. 
55. Said appraisal valued the real estate owned by Real Homes, LLC at $195,000 and is 
attached hereto as Exhibit Z. 
56. Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated January 6, 2006 and the 
Representations of Counterdefendants, Counterclaimants believed they purchased 100% 
of the rights, title, and interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. for $250,000 by way of their 
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interest in Real Properties, LLC. The Purchase and Sale Agreement is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit I" and lists the real property purportedly transferred in an attachment thereto. 
57. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement purportedly on 
behalf of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
58. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz represented and warranted to Counterclaimant that they 
had full authority to transfer the ownership and assets of Real Homes, L.L.C. to Real 
Properties, LLC in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
59. One of the parcels listed as an asset of Real Homes, L.L.C. in the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement was 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID. 
60. Dennis Sallaz represented to Counterclaimants that title to 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID reverted to Real Homes, L.L.C. upon the filing of the deed of trust securing 
the loan described above and that Real Homes owned said property at the time of the sale 
to Real Properties, LLC on January 6, 2006. 
61. Based on the representations of Dennis Sallaz, Counterclaimant Eugene Rice believed he 
purchased 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID in addition to other properties 
described in the attachment to the Purchase and Sale Agreement "Exhibit I," when the 
entity Dennis Sallaz created for Counterclaimants, "Real Properties, LLC," purchased 
"Real Homes, LLC" on January 6, 2006. 
62. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz warranted to Counterclaimants that Real Homes, L.L.C. 
had title to and full authority to transfer the ownership of 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
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63. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Counterclaimants, through Real 
Properties, LLC, expended $63,402.82 to extinguish the debt owing on 15580 Riverside 
Rd, Canyon County, ID and prevent a foreclosure sale of the same. 
64. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Counterclaimant Eugene Rice made an 
advance payment to Dennis Sallaz in the sum of $5,000 at closing. 
65. Counterclaimants, through Real Properties, LLC, expended in excess of $140,000 which 
funds were to be utilized in maintaining and improving the subject properties. 
66. On October 30, 2007 Magistrate Judge David C. Epis issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in Renee L. Baird-Sallaz v. Dennis J Sallaz, Ada Co. 
Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit J." 
67. The Order declared that Renee Baird owned 100% of Real Homes, L.L.C. and neither 
Dennis Sallaz or Glenn Trefren had authority to transfer the Real Homes, L.L.C. or, 
consequently, any assets thereof to Real Properties, LLC. Id 
68. Dennis Sallaz did not inform Counterclaimants of this Order. 
69. The Order created a cloud on the title of the properties purportedly transferred to 
Counterclaimants via their ownership of Real Properties, LLC. 
70. Counterclaimants found out there were some issues with the Real Homes, L.L.C./Real 
Properties, LLC transaction when they obtained The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order on their own. 
71. At the urging of Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz and based on his representations that, 
Judge Epis misconstrued the Real Homes, L.L.C./Real Properties, LLC transaction and 
that Renee Baird had no interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. or the assets thereof, on 
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November 4, 2009 Eugene and Janet Rice filed an action to quiet title, seek Jeclaratory 
relief, and pursue other causes of action in what became known as Canyon County Case 
No. CV 09-11855. 
72. Based on the attorney client relationship that existed between Dennis Sallaz and Roy 
Rice, Roy Rice interpreted these conversations as Dennis Sallaz was providing legal 
advice to him in the course and scope of his attorney client relationship with 
Counterdefendants. 
73. Roy Rice relied on Dennis Sallaz's representations regarding the Real Homes/Real 
Properties transaction and Mr. Sallaz's representation that Judge Epis had ruled 
improperly by awarding Real Homes, L.L.C. and the subject properties to Renee Baird. 
74. Dennis Sallaz, Renee Baird, and Glenn Trefren were na~~s Defendants in Canyon 
County Case No. CV 09-11855 and were represented by independent counsel. 
75. Dennis Sallaz was included as a defendant at his insistence that the marital community of 
Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were necessary parties to quiet title to the subject real 
estate. 
76. During the course of discovery, Roy Rice, learned that Mr. Sallaz was providing 
inaccurate information regarding the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction. 
77. On or about August 2, 2010, Renee Baird and Eugene and Janet Rice settled all claims 
which existed between them by and through the Mutual Release and Settlement 
Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit K." 
78. Pursuant to the settlement reached between the parties thereto, title to the Riverside 
parcels and 714 Smith were quieted. 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 11 
000572
• 
79. During settlement conversations Counterclaimants had with Renee Bai'"d, in the summer 
of 2010, the Rices learned of fraudulent, malicious, negligent, and wrongful acts of 
Counterdefendants. 
80. Mrs. Baird provided Mr. Rice with copies of the transcripts of Mr. Sallaz's testimony 
from depositions in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce which alerted Mr. Rice to the wrongful 
actions of Counterdefendants described herein. 
81. Thereafter, Counterclaimants began investigating the actions of Counterdefendants with 
respect to the Real Homes L.L.C./Real Properties LLC transaction described above as 
well as other matters associated with their relationship with Counterdefendants. 
82. Counterclaimants learned that Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and 
fraudulently withheld information relevant to Counterdefendants' deceitful and 
fraudulent "legal representation" of Counterclaimants. 
83. Counterdefendants continue to conceal, misrepresent, and fraudulently withhold 
information relevant to their deceitful and fraudulent "legal representation" of 
Counterclaimants. 
84. Dennis Sallaz was unhappy with the settlement reached between Counterclaimants and 
Renee Baird in the Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
85. Dennis Sallaz assigned his interest in the Real Homes Real Properties contract to Jim 
Bevis (Mr. Sallaz's attorney from his divorce) and Glenn Trefren. See Assignment of 
Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC attached hereto as "Exhibit 
L" and "Exhibit M." 
86. Dennis Sallaz continues to litigate Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855 and desires to 
assert counterclaims through his longtime friend, client, and associate Glenn Trefren. 
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87. Dennis Sallaz's current attorney in the present 'lction, J. Iver Longeteig, 1s Glenn 
Trefren's attorney in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
88. On February 9, 2012 Mr. Sallaz appealed his divorce based on the grounds that he was 
not actually married to Renee Baird. See Notice of Appeal attached hereto as "Exhibit 
N." 
89. Counterclaimants contend that this appeal is nothing more than a tactic to delay this 
litigation and an attempt to prevent Counterclaimants from asserting the doctrines of 
collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, and res judicata. 
COUNTI 
ACTION AGAINST DENNIS SALLAZ FOR COLLECTION ON PROMISSORY NOTES 
90. Counterclaimants restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
91. That Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz signed the promissory notes attached hereto as 
"Exhibit D" and "E." 
92. That Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz received $10,800 and $10,000 from 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice pursuant to said promissory notes and testified 
to the receipt of said funds in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See Post Trial Exhibit 201, 
Husbands Property and Debt Schedule at 19 attached here to as "Exhibit O." 
93. There is now a balance due and owing for the principal amount of$20,800. 
94. That by law and by the terms of the agreement, Counterclaimants are entitled to an 
interest charge of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance. 
95. That per the terms of said promissory notes, principal and interest on said promissory 
notes are due on demand. 
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96. Tha~ on or about March 24, 2011 due demand has been made upon Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz prior to the filing of this action. 
97. That Counterdefendant Sallaz refused or neglected to pay to Counterclaimants the above-
mentioned sum despite demands made by Counterclaimants. 
98. The terms of said promissory notes provide "if action is commenced to enforce payment 
of this note, I agree to pay such sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees." 
99. Counterclaimants are entitled to and hereby request a judgment for the principal and 
interest due on said promissory notes. 
100. Counterclaimants further request an award of post judgment interest. 
101. That as a result of Counterdefendant Sallaz's failure or refusal to pay said sum, 
Counterclaimants have been required to retain an attorney for the collection of this 
outstanding amount and has and will incur attorney's fees and costs of suit, which 
Counterclaimants are entitled to recover of and from said Counterdefendant pursuant to 
agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Counterclaimants are informed and therefore allege that the sum of 
$5,000.00 is a reasonable sum to be awarded to Counterclaimants for attorney's fees 
herein, in the event the matter is uncontested and a greater sum if contested. 
COUNT II 
ACTION TO RECOVER SUMS DEPOSITED IN TRUST ACCOUNT 
102. Counterclaimants restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
103. On or about January 14, 2011, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.5(f) 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice requested an accounting of all sums obtained, 
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rec'=ived, or held b'r Counterdefendants on behalf of Counte ... claimants or any entities 
Counterdefendants formed or represented on their behalf. 
104. On or about January 14, 2011, pursuant to IRPC 1.5(±) and l.8(c) Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice requested an accounting of all gifts from Counterclaimants which 
were obtained, received, claimed, or held by Counterdefendants. 
105. On or about February 16, 2011 Counterdefendants responded that they did not have any 
funds in their trust account belonging to Counterclaimants. No accounting or other 
documentation was produced to support this denial. 
106. On or about February 16, 2011 Counterdefendants responded that they did not have any 
record or recollection of any gifts obtained, received, or claimed to be from 
Counterclaimants. No accounting or other documentation was produced to support this 
denial. 
107. Counterclaimants are aware of and Counterdefendants have admitted to owing 
Counterclaimants approximately $61,000 for items taken from Counterclaimant's former 
business "A Vista Pawn, Inc." 
108. This debt was assigned to Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz in his divorce from Renee 
Baird. 
109. Dennis Sallaz has made an admission that he owes Roy Rice for the items Mr. Sallaz 
took from Mr. Rice. See Post Trial Exhibit 201, Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
from Sallaz v. Sallaz at 19 attached hereto as Exhibit 0. See Also May 26, 2009 Letter 
from Dennis Sallaz on Sallaz and Gatewood's fax cover sheet attached hereto as "Exhibit 
P." 
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110. Counterclaimailts had an ownership interest in a business entity named ·'R-R 
Investments, Inc." See R-R Investments, Inc. 1990 Annual Report Form attached hereto 
as "Exhibit Q." 
111. The "R&R" in "R-R Investments, Inc." was meant to stand for Roy Rice and as such the 
entity was regularly referred to by Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants as simply 
"R&R." 
112. Counterdefendants provided legal advice in forming and were the registered agent for "R-
R Investments, Inc." 
113. Counterdefendants altered corporate filings with the Office of the Secretary of State for 
"R-R Investments, Inc." without the authorization or signature of Counterclaimants. See 
Articles of Amendment for R-R Investments, Inc. attached hereto as "Exhibit R." 
114. Counterdefendants or their agents forged the signature of Defendant Michael Rice in 
fraudulently "authorizing" the Articles of Amendment which purported to change the 
corporate name of"R-R Investments Inc." to "Rentals and Royalties, Inc." See Articles of 
Amendment for R-R Investments, Inc. attached hereto as "Exhibit R." 
115. Michael Rice's purported signature was insufficient authority to amend the articles of R-
R Investments, Inc. 
116. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants of the amendments referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs and "Exhibit R." 
117. The whereabouts of and the value of the assets ofR-R Investments, Inc. are unknown due 
to the negligent, willful, fraudulent, and reckless actions of Counterdefendants described 
below. 
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11 8. Steve Sumner was in the bL,siness of Ovv ning radio stations and ·i\!as a longtime client of 
Dennis Sallaz's. 
119. Dennis Sallaz introduced Steve Sumner to Roy Rice because Steve Sumner was in need 
of money. 
120. In 1994 Dennis Sallaz encouraged Roy Rice to loan Steve Sumner approximately 
$40,000. 
121. Dennis Sallaz represented to Roy Rice that, as his attorney, Dennis Sallaz would draw up 
stock certificates which would provide Roy Rice security in radio stations owned by Mr. 
Sumner in exchange for said loans. 
122. In exchange for this loan, Counterclaimants supposedly received 1000 shares stock in 
each of the corporations which purportedly owned said radio stations "Capital 
Broadcasting, Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. See "Exhibit S" and "Exhibit T" 
attached hereto. 
123. These shares were to have constituted the entirety of the ownership of Capital 
Broadcasting Inc. and W estem Broadcasting, Inc. and based on representations made by 
Mr. Sallaz, Mr. Rice believed that he had adequate security for his loan. 
124. Mr. Sallaz engaged in complex litigation regarding the ownership of radio stations owned 
by Steve Sumner. This case became Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest 
Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
125. Mr. Sallaz orchestrated a collusive defense of Steve Sumner and his radio stations from 
attacks by outside creditors by asserting claims against Mr. Sumner and his business 
entities. See June 28, 2000 letter from Dennis Sallaz to Van Bishop produced by 
Counterdefendants in discovery as Runft 0000234-Runft:000235 attached as "Exhibit U." 
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126. It is conceded that Capital Broadcasting. Inc. and We :tern Broadcasting, Inc. were not 
parties to Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 
96812. 
127. Rather, Steve Sumner, Capital West, Inc., Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., Rentals and 
Royalties, Inc., and Sallaz and Doolittle Chartered were named parties. 
128. Mr. Sallaz made statements and acted as though he was representing Counterclaimants' 
interests in recovering on the aforementioned loan to Steve Sumner by continuing to 
litigate Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 
96812. See July 10, 2000 Letter from Dennis Sallaz to Vernon K. Smith attached hereto 
as "Exhibit V." 
129. Vernon K. Smith is Mr. Sallaz's counsel herein and in Canyon County Case No. CV09-
11855. 
130. Mr. Sallaz repeatedly assured Mr. Rice that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz was 
protecting Mr. Rice's interest and that Mr. Rice's loan would be re-paid when the case 
settled. 
131. Mr. Sallaz settled the Sumner Matter for approximately $387,000 without informing 
Counterclaimants of said settlement or the amount of their interest therein. 
132. In the settlement, Mr. Sallaz directed that the sums due to Rentals and Royalties be paid 
to him. 
133. Sometime around or during the years of 2003-2005 Dennis Sallaz directed that several 
payments totaling said $387,000 settlement be deposited in the bank account for the 
estate of Bessie B. Matcham. 
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1.34. Counterclaimants contend that the $387,000 or a large portion :he:-eof represents the 
principal and interest of the loan they made to Steve Sumner. 
135. A letter to Van Bishop referring to the Sumner Matter and the involvement of "Rentals 
and Royalties, Inc." is attached hereto as "Exhibit W" and illustrates that 
Counterdefendants referred to "Rentals and Royalties, Inc." as "R-R." 
136. The settlement agreement in the Sumner Matter also included a Confidentiality 
Agreement, attached hereto as "Exhibit X," which stated "The parties do further stipulate 
and agree that none of the terms of this settlement or any agreements or payments herein, 
including the aforesaid Promissory Note, require the filing by any of the parties of a 
federal 1099 form or any other notification either to the United States, or any department 
thereof or any state or any department thereof and none of the parties shall make said 
filing without the written consent of all parties." 
137. Counterdefendants made material misrepresentations to Counterclaimants regarding the 
status of settlement negotiations of the Sumner Matter which made it impossible for 
Counterclaimants to verify the precise nature of or status of this very complex case. 
138. Mr. Sallaz provided false discovery responses herein which made it difficult for 
Counterclaimants to seek repayment of the loan, verify the precise amount of said 
settlement which is due to Counterclaimants, and ascertain the location of the funds due 
to Counterclaimants. 
139. Mr. Sallaz continued to inform Mr. Rice that the case was ongoing long after it settled. 
140. The Confidentiality Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit X" made it impossible for 
Counterclaimants to verify the precise nature of or status of this very complex case. 
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141. Dennis Sallaz had a fiduciary obligation to hold the funds which were due to Mr. Rice in 
trust. 
142. Dennis Sallaz had a fiduciary obligation to inform Mr. Rice of the settlement of the 
Sumner litigation. 
143. Counterdefendants comingled said settlement funds which were due to Counterclaimants 
with funds of their own. 
144. Counterdefendants comingled said settlement funds which were due to Counterclaimants 
with the estate of Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz's deceased grandmother Bessie B. 
Matcham. 
145. Dennis Sallaz is the Personal Representative of and Attorney for his grandmother's 
estate. 
146. After the receipt of said $387,000 settlement Dennis Sallaz expended funds held in the 
account for the estate of Bessie B. Matcham for his personal use. 
14 7. Counterclaimants discovered that Counterdefendants had in fact settled the Sumner 
litigation during their investigation in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
148. Counterclaimants asked representatives of Sallaz and Gatewood, specifically Thom 
Henry, for information regarding the status of the Sumner litigation and the loans Mr. 
Rice had made; however, said requests were ignored. 
149. Rather, Mr. Henry tried to convince Mr. Rice to refrain from initiating litigation against 
Dennis Sallaz. 
150. Counterclaimants learned additional information regarding Mr. Sallaz's settlement of the 
Sumner litigation and his failure to distribute the proceeds thereof to Roy Rice during 
settlement discussions with Renee Baird in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
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151. Counterdefendants continued to conceal the true nature of their misrepresentations such 
that Roy Rice has only been able to begin to comprehend Counterdefendants' wrongful 
actions following a court ordered inspection of Counterdefendant's law firm after a 
Motion for Sanctions was granted against Dennis Sallaz in Canyon County Case No. CV 
09-11855. 
152. Counterclaimants obtained additional information from Counterdefendants, regarding 
their misrepresentations as to the Sumner litigation, following a Motion to Compel, a 
Motion for Sanctions, and a Motion for Additional Sanctions which were granted herein. 
153. In addition to other sums and property described herein, Counterclaimants are owed 
$387,000 plus interest as a result of the Mr. Sallaz's settlement of the Sumner matter and 
failure to distribute any portion of said proceeds to Roy Rice. 
154. The $61,000 of items taken from Vista Pawn was also to have been held in trust as a 
retainer in the event Mr. Rice needed legal services. 
155. Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice are entitled to and hereby request this Court 
issue an order for the above balance, as well as any additional sums determined by the 
trier of fact to have been wrongfully withheld by Counterdefendants, plus pre and post-
judgment interest. 
156. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover its attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 





157. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
158. It would be unjust for Counterdefendants to retain or benefit from the sums and property 
obtained from Counterclaimants described herein. 
159. Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice are entitled to and hereby request this Court 
issue an order of restitution for the above balance, wrongfully withheld sums mentioned 
herein, and wrongfully withheld property described herein plus pre and post-judgment 
interest. 
160. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNTIV 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
161. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
162. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants 
Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz Law, Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
163. Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC is a successor in interest to Sallaz & Gatewood, 
Chtd. 
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164. In connection with the Real Hornes/Real Properties transaction described above, 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz entered into a business transaction with 
Counterclairnants in violation ofldaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.8(a). 
165. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.8(a) Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz 
and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. had a duty to advise and give Counterclairnants and give 
reasonable opportunity to obtain independent legal counsel, to inform Counterclairnants 
in writing of the essential terms of the transaction, including but not limited to whether 
Counterdefendants were representing Counterclairnants in the transaction. 
166. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. breached th~ir,duty to 
advise Counterclairnants to obtain independent legal counsel. 
167. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. fraudulently and 
knowingly concealed the material misrepresentations described herein. 
168. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. engaged in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 8.4. 
169. Counterdefendants had a duty to notify Counterclairnants of the receipt of funds which 
Counterclairnants had an interest in. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.15(a). 
170. Counterdefendants breached their duty to notify Counterclairnants of the receipt of funds 
which Counterclairnants had an interest in. This breach was a violation of Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct l.15(a). 
1 71. After a reasonable request, Counterdefendants had a duty to provide an accounting for 
fees and costs claimed or previously collected. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.5(f). 
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172. Counterdefendants breached their duty to provide an accounting for fees and costs 
claimed or previously collected. 
173. This failure to provide an accounting for fees and costs was a violation of Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.5(±). 
174. Counterdefendants had a duty of competent and diligent representation as well as 
adequate communication. See Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct I.I, 1.3, and 1.4. 
175. Counterdefendants breached their duties of competent and diligent representation as well 
as adequate communication by the actions described herein. 
176. To the extent Counterdefendants contend any of the funds or items of personal property 
mentioned herein were gifts from Counterclaimants, Counterdefendants had a duty not to 
solicit substantial gifts from Counterclaimants. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
l.8(c). 
177. To the extent Counterdefendants contend any of the funds or items of personal property 
mentioned herein were gifts from Counterclaimants, Counterdefendants breached their 
duty to not solicit substantial gifts from Counterclaimants and violated Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.8( c ). 
178. Counterdefendants had a duty not to engage in a conflict of interest transaction which 
there was a significant risk the representation of Counterclaimants was materially limited 
by Counterdefendants' responsibilities to other clients as well as Counterdefendants' own 
self interest. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.7(a)(2) 
1 79. Counterdefendants breached this duty and engaged in a conflict of interest transaction 
which there was a significant risk the representation of Counterclaimants was materially 
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limited by Counterdefendants' responsibilities to other clients as well as 
Counterdefendants' own self interest. 
180. If this Court determines the statute of limitations has run on any of the counterclaims 
asserted herein, as a retained attorney, Counterdefendants had a duty to advise 
Counterclaimants as to the statute of limitations on said claims. 
181. Counterdefendants breached their duty to advise Counterclaimants of the statute of 
limitations on said claims. 
182. By reason of the foregoing negligent actions, Counterclaimants have suffered general and 
special damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact including but not limited to 
the following damages: 
a. Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $50,000 in attorney's fees as a 
direct and proximate result of the negligent, willful, and malicious actions 
described herein. Those fees continue to accrue. 
b. Counterclaimants executed promissory notes in favor of Counterdefendant Dennis 
Sallaz for the principal amount of$20,800 and interest at 12% per annum. 
c. Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items taken by 
Counterdefendants for which legal services were not performed. 
d. Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of 
the Sumner Matter. 
183. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover its attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNTV 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
184. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
185. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
186. Counterdefendants had fiduciary duties to Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice 
in connection with the legal representation and business transactions described herein. 
187. These fiduciary duties include but are not limited to the duty of loyalty, the duty to avoid 
self dealing, the duty to avoid comingling assets, the duty to keep and render accounts, 
the duty to furnish information, the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill, and the 
duty to take and keep control. 
188. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants were negligent, willful, reckless, 
outrageous, malicious and fraudulent and therefore breached said fiduciary duties. 
189. Counterdefendants negligently, fraudulently, and willfully concealed their deceitful and 
wrongful actions from Counterclaimants. 
190. By reason of the foregoing negligent, willful, and malicious actions, Counterclaimants 
have suffered general and special, damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact 
including but not limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $50,000 in attorney's fees as a 
direct and proximate result of the negligent, willful, and malicious actions 
described herein. Those fees continue to accrue. 
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b) Counterclaimants executed promissory notes in favor of Counterdefendant Dennis 
Sallaz for the principal amount of $20,800 and interest at 12% per annum. 
c) Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items taken by 
Counterdefendants for which legal services were not performed. 
d) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of 
the Sumner Matter. 
191. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VI 
FRAUD 
192. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
193. A longstanding attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz Law, Chtd. and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
which entitled Roy Rice to rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
194. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice inducing Roy Rice ·to loan 
funds to Mr. Sallaz's client, Steve Sumner. 
195. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
196. Mr. Sallaz intended that Roy Rice act on this misrepresentation. 
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197. Mr. Rice agreed to make a loan of approximately $40,000 to Steve Sumner based on Mr. 
Sallaz's assurances that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz would prepare the documents 
securing said loan. 
198. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
199. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
200. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that he would prepare 
documents, as Mr. Rice's attorney, providing Roy Rice security for his loan to Steve 
Sumner. 
201. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
202. Mr. Sallaz intended that Roy Rice act on this misrepresentation. 
203. Mr. Rice agreed to loan to Steve Sumner approximately $40,000 based on Mr. Sallaz's 
assurances that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz prepared documents adequately 
securing said loan. 
204. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
205. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
206. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice regarding Roy Rice's security 
interest, in the form of stock, in certain radio stations. 
207. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
208. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by believing for many years that he had 
adequate security for his loans to Steve Sumner, that were increasing in value due to the 
accrual of interest thereon, in the form of stock certificates prepared by Dennis Sallaz. 
209. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
210. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
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211. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. 
Sallaz was representing Roy Rice's interest in recovering the principal and interest due 
on said loans to Steve Sumner by litigating Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest 
Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
212. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
213. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney to secure a resolution 
to or assert any claims necessary in Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest 
Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812 that would protect Mr. Rice's interest in the 
loan he had made to Mr. Sallaz's client, Steve Sumner. 
214. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
215. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
216. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that Sawtooth Energy Reserves, 
Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812 was still in litigation when in 
fact it had settled. 
217. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
218. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing an 
independent case against Steve Sumner. 
219. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis Sallaz. 
220. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
221. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
222. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice by failing to notify Roy Rice 
that Mr. Sallaz had received approximately $387,000 as the settlement of Sawtooth 
Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
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223. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
224. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing an 
independent case against Steve Sumner. 
225. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis Sallaz. 
226. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
227. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
228. Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice when Roy 
Rice learned of the settlement and inquired as to the status of the funds Roy Rice believed 
he was owed, and Sallaz and Gatewood tried to convince him not to file suit and refused 
to provide further information to Mr. Rice. 
229. Counterdefendants knew these representations were false. 
230. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing an 
independent case against Steve Sumner. 
231. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis Sallaz. 
232. As Mr. Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on 
Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd.'s assertions. 
233. Mr. Rice did not know that Counterdefendant's representations were false. 
234. Counterdefendants have made material misrepresentations in their discovery responses 
herein which have made it difficult for Mr. Rice to learn the full nature of the wrongful 
actions of Counterdefendants. 
23 5. Counterdefendants knew these representations were false. 
236. Mr. Rice acted on these misrepresentations and was unable to amend his counterclaim 
until such time as Mr. Sallaz was compelled and sanctioned to produce certain documents 
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from Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 
96812 in this case and Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
237. As a party to litigation wherein the opposing party is to truthfully respond to discovery, 
especially where the opposing party is an actively practicing attorney, Mr. Rice had the 
right to rely on Counterdefendants to truthfully respond to discovery. 
238. Mr. Rice did not know the true nature of the fraudulent actions of Counterdefendants 
until Mr. Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood were compelled by Court Orders to produce 
certain documents. 
239. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants were willful, reckless, outrageous, malicious 
and fraudulent. 
240. By reason of the foregoing Counterclaim~ts have suffered the damages including but not 
limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $50,000 in attorney's fees as a 
direct and proximate result of the negligent, willful, and malicious actions 
described herein. Those fees continue to accrue. 
b) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of 
the Sumner matter. 
241. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 





242. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
243. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 
Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an A TV trailer which are owned by Counterclaimants. 
The Bill of Sale for said ATV' s and ATV trailer is attached hereto as "Exhibit F." 
244. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said ATVs and ATV trailer to 
Counterclaimant Eugene Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See deposition of Dennis 
Sallaz pp 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." See also Husband's Property and 
Debt Schedule at 11 attached hereto as "Exhibit O." 
245. Accordingly, the Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Sallaz v. 
Sallaz divorce awarded the proceeds of this sale to Dennis Sallaz. 
246. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is or was in possession of a Winnebago Motorhome VIN 
1 GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien holder on. 
The title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
247. Counterdefendants are in possession of funds described herein which are due and owing 
to Counterclaimants. 
248. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz has not extinguished Counterclaimant' s lien on said 
Motorhome. See also Husband's Property and Debt Schedule at 9 attached hereto as 
"Exhibit O." 
249. Counterdefendants wrongfully refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted 
wrongful dominion over said funds, ATVs, trailer, and Motorhome. 
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250. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said funds, ATVs, trailer, 
and Motorhome and for general and special damages incurred by reason of said wrongful 
possession. 
251. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VIII 
CLAIM AND DELIVERY 
252. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
253. Counterdefendant Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 Yamaha 
and a 1998 Yamaha, and an A TV trailer which are owned by Counterclaimants. The Bill 
of Sale for said ATV's and ATV trailer is attached hereto as "Exhibit F." 
254. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said ATVs and ATV trailer to 
Counterclaimant Eugene Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See deposition of Dennis 
Sallaz pp 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
255. Prior to filing this complaint, demand has been made by counsel for Counterclaimant for 
the return of said ATVs and ATV trailer. 
256. Counterdefertdants refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted wrongful 
dominion over said A TVs and A TV trailer. 
257. Counterclaimants are entitled to immediate possession and control of said ATVs, and 
ATV trailer. 
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258. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said ATVs and ATV trailer 
and for general and special damages incurred by reason of said wrongful possession. 
259. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNTIX 
FORECLOSURE OF LIEN 
260. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
261. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is or was in possession of a Winnebago Motorhome VIN 
1GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien holder on. 
The title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
262. Prior to filing this complaint, demand has been made by counsel for Counterclaimant for 
the return of said Motorhome. 
263. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz has not extinguished Counterclaimant's lien of $8,500 
on said Motorhome. See also Husband's Property and Debt Schedule at 9 attached hereto 
as "Exhibit O." 
264. Counterdefendants refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted wrongful 
dominion over said Motorhome. 
265. Counterclaimants are entitled to immediate possession and control of said Motorhome. 
266. Alternatively, Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of damages of $8,500 plus pre 
and post-judgment interest. 
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267. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said Motorhome and for 
general and special damages, including but not limited to pre and post-judgment interest, 
incurred by reason of said wrongful possession and failure to satisfy said $8,500 lien. 
268. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNTX 
AIDING AND ABETTING IN THE COMISSION OF A TORTIOUS ACT 
269. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
270. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimant and Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz. 
271. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendant Sallaz were willful, reckless, outrageous, 
malicious, fraudulent, and tortious. 
272. Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and fraudulently and wrongfully withheld 
information regarding their willful, negligent, and fraudulent actions described herein. 
273. Counterdefendants Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Sallaz Law, Chtd., and Sallaz and 
Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC aided and abetted in the commission of said willful, 
reckless, outrageous, malicious, fraudulent, and tortious acts. 
274. As a result of the foregoing, Counterclaimants suffered and are entitled to an award of 
general and special damages in an amount to be proven by the trier of fact. 
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275. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT XI 
VIOLATION OF THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
I.C. § 48-601 et seq. 
276. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
277. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
278. Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and fraudulently and wrongfully withheld 
information regarding their willful, negligent, and fraudulent actions described herein. 
279. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants violated provisions of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act I.C. 48-601 et seq including but not limited to: 
a) Passing off goods or services as those of another; 
b) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, 
sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods; 
c) Causing likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation, 
connection, or association with, or certification by, another; 
d) Engaging in acts or practices which is otherwise misleading, false, or 
deceptive to the consumer; and 
e) Engaging in any unconscionable method, act or practice in the conduct of 
trade or commerce as provided in I.C. 48-603(c); 
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280. As a result of the foregoing, Counterclaimants suffered and are entitled to an award of 
general and special damages in an amount to be proven by the trier of fact. 
281. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
XII 
CIVIL RACEKTEERING (VIOLATION OF I.C. § 18-7805) 
282. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
283. The actions described herein constitute a pattern of criminal behavior including but not 
limited to violations of LC. §§ 18-2403(2)(d)(l) (Theft by False Promise); 18-
2403(2)(b) (Theft by Trick); 18-2407 (Grand Theft); 18-1905 (Falsification of Corporate 
Records); 18-4501 (Perjury); 18-4510 (Subornation of Perjury); 18-3601(Forgery); 49-
518(Forgery of Lien Cancelation on Vehicle Title); 30-14-501(Securities Fraud). 
284. Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. is an enterprise under LC.§ 18-7803(c). 
285. Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices PLLC is an enterprise under LC.§ 18-7803(c). 
286. Sallaz Law Chtd. is an enterprise under LC. § 18-7803( c ). 
287. The estate of Bessie B. Matcham is an enterprise under I.C. 18-7803(c). 
288. The pattern of criminal behavior is ongoing including most recently perjury, forgery, 
grand theft of the A TV's, trailer, and Motorhome, and the forgery of Mr. Rice's signature 
allegedly releasing the lien on the title certificate Mr. Sallaz is utilizing for his claim and 
delivery cause of action. 
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289. Counterdefendants caused the signature of Janet Rice to be forged on the certificate of 
title of a 1979 Mercedes Convertible VIN 10704412049659, which was owned by 
Counterclaimapts, and utilized unlawful means to have the Idaho Department of 
Transportation issue a certificate of title in the name of involuntary Plaintiff, Marcy Fox. 
290. Counterdefendants caused a lien to be recorded on the certificate of title of the 1979 
Mercedes Convertible in favor of National Financial Services. 
291. National Financial Services is an enterprise under LC.§ 18-7803(c). 
292. By reason of the foregoing willful, criminal, and malicious actions, Counterclaimants 
have suffered general and special, damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact 
including but not limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants executed promissory notes in favor of Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz for the principal amount of $20,800 and interest at 12% per 
annum. 
b) Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items taken by 
Counterdefendants for which legal services were not performed. 
c) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the 
settlement of the Sumner Matter. 
d) Counterclaimants are owed $7,500 as a result of Counterdefendants 
refusal to surrender the ATVs and Trailer and $8,500 for 
Counterdefendants refusal to surrender the Winnebago motorhome. 
293. Pursuant to Idaho Code 18-7805(a) Counterclaimants are entitled to treble damages and 
the cost of suit including reasonable attorney's fees. 
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294. This Court should immediately invoke its power under Idaho Code 18-7805(c) and order 
the production of the ATV's, trailer, Mercedes, and Winnebago motorhome described 
herein. 
295. This Court should invoke its powers under Idaho Code 18-7805(d) and a) Impose 
reasonable restrictions on the future activities of Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz Law, Chtd., Sallaz 
& Gatewood Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC including but not 
limited to their ability to transfer, assign, or conceal assets to avoid satisfying any 
judgment rendered herein and b) Order the suspension or revocation of Mr. Sallaz's 
license to practice law. 
COUNT XIII 
QUIET TITLE 
296. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
297. Eugene "Roy" Rice was the first lien holder on a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VIN 
546265334 which was owned by Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz. 
298. Said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado is the same Cadillac Eldorado that is the subject of 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
299. Dennis Sallaz failed to satisfy said lien on the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
300. In January or February, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice lawfully repossessed 
the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
301. On or about February 1, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice was issued a 
Certificate of Title by the Idaho Department of Transportation for the 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado which is attached hereto as "Exhibit Y." 
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302. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is the lawful owner of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
303. Dennis Sallaz attached a false certificate of title for said Cadillac Eldorado to his Verified 
Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
304. Dennis Sallaz or his agent forged the signature of Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice 
on said false certificate of title in purporting to release said lien. 
305. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice did not release his lien in favor of Dennis Sallaz. 
306. On or about January 4, 2011 Dennis Sallaz purported to assign whatever interest he 
allegedly had to "Marcy Fox" by way of an Assignment of Title on the false title attached 
to Dennis Sallaz's Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
307. On or about March 20, 2011 Dennis Sallaz filed an application for Title Stop stating "My 
car was stolen out of a locked storage lot within the last 20 days and a duplicate title was 
forged and filed with the Idaho Department of Transportation in the name of Eugene 
Leroy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice on February 1, 2011 (see attached). The original title 
was never lost. The application for duplicate title was fraudulent and there was not any 
valid debt owed at the time of theft and no repossession has been done and it is 
imperative that this title be frozen pending the filing of a theft report and court action." 
308. The representations in the application for title stop were false. 
309. Dennis Sallaz has filed a Complaint for claim and delivery and obtained a Temporary 
Restraining Order preventing Counterclaimants from disposing of said 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado. 
310. The above referenced actions by Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz have created a cloud on 
the title of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and prevented Counterclaimants from disposing 
of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
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311. By reason of the foregoing claimants have suffered general and special damages and are 
entitled to an order quieting title for said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado in the name of Eugene 
"Roy" Rice. 
312. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT XIV 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
313. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
314. Eugene "Roy" Rice was the first lien holder on a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VIN 
546265334 which was owned by Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz. 
315. Said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado is the same Cadillac Eldorado that 1s the subject of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
316. Dennis Sallaz failed to satisfy said lien on the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
317. In January or February, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice lawfully repossessed 
the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
318. On or about February 1, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice was issued a 
Certificate of Title by the Idaho Department of Transportation for the 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado which is attached hereto as "Exhibit Y." 
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319. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is the lawful owner of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
320. Dennis Sallaz attached a false certificate of title for said Cadillac Eldorado to his Verified 
Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
321. Dennis Sallaz or his agent forged the signature of Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice 
on said false certificate of title in purporting to release said lien. 
322. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice did not release his lien in favor of Dennis Sallaz. 
323. On or about January 4, 2011 Dennis Sallaz purported to assign whatever interest he 
allegedly had to "Marcy Fox" by way of an Assignment of Title on the false title attached 
to Dennis Sallaz's Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
324. On or about March 20, 2011 Dennis Sallaz filed an application for Title Stop stating "My 
car was stolen out of a locked storage lot within the last 20 days and a duplicate title was 
forged and filed with the Idaho Department of Transportation in the name of Eugene 
Leroy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice on February 1, 2011 (see attached). The original title 
was never lost. The application for duplicate title was fraudulent and there was not any 
valid debt owed at the time of theft and no repossession has been done and it 1s 
imperative that this title be frozen pending the filing of a theft report and court action." 
325. The representations in the application for title stop were false. 
326. Dennis Sallaz has filed a Complaint for claim and delivery and obtained a Temporary 
Restraining Order preventing Counterclaimants from disposing of said 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado. 
327. The above referenced malicious actions by Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz have created 
a cloud on the title of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and prevented Counterclaimants from 
disposing of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
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328. By reason of the foregoing malicious actions and Counterdefendant's slander of title 
claimants have suffered general and special damages. 
329. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services oflegal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
330. Counterdefendants by their conduct, have engaged m an extreme deviation from 
reasonable standards of conduct, and have engaged in gross, willful, outrageous, 
malicious, wrongful and wanton conduct, and, therefore, upon this Court's Granting of 
Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Damages, 
Counterclaimants will plead for the recovery of punitive damages against 
Counterdefendants and in such amounts as will be proven at trial. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants pray that this Court: 
A. That Counterdefendants be restrained by Injunction from disposing of, injuring, or 
concealing the said funds, Motorhome, ATV' s and ATV trailer from 
Counterclaimant. 
B. That an Order be issued requiring Counterdefendants to return said funds, 
Motorhome, A TV's and A TV trailer to Counterclaimants. 
C. That in the event Counterdefendants have lost, concealed, or refuse to return said 
funds, Motorhome, ATV's and ATV trailer to Counterclaimant that an Order be 
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issued that Counterclaimants be awarded $7,500 for said ATVs and ATV trailer, 
$8,500 for said Motorhome, and $480,000 plus pre and post judgment interest. 
D. That Counterclaimants be awarded general and special damages against 
Counterdefendants jointly and severally. 
E. Counterclaimants pray that this Court enter judgment against Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz for the principal and interest due on the two promissory notes; 
F. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for sums due and owning 
from Counterclaimants' trust account. 
G. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of unjust 
enrichment against Counterdefendants; 
H. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of legal 
malpractice against Counterdefendants; 
I. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of breach 
of fiduciary duties against Counterdefendants; 
J. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of fraud 
against Counterdefendants; 
K. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
Conversion against Counterdefendants; 
L. Award Counterclaimants general damages for their claims of Claim and Delivery 
against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
M. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claim to foreclose 
on their lien against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
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N. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of aiding 
and abetting the commission of a tortious act against Counterdefendant Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd.; 
0. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of violation 
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against Counterdefendants; 
P. Award Counterclaimants treble damages for their claims of violation of the 
Racketeering Act, Idaho Code 18-7805(a). 
Q. Award Counterclaimants their costs and attorney's fees in connection with this 
action; and 
R. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, costs and fees under and pursuant to 
Idaho law, from the date of entry of judgment in this matter until full satisfaction 
of the judgment. 
S. Award Counterclaimants any other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
DATED this ~ day of January 2013. 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
e • 
VERIFICATION 
EUGENE RICE after being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
That he is one of the Defendants and Counterclaimants in the foregoing 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, that he has read the SECOND 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM and believes the facts stated therein are true based 
upon his own information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Defendant/Counterclaimant has set his hand and seal 
the day and year first above written 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
tb 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this]__ day of January 2013. 
Notary Public fqf ~daho 
Residing at: \~Ct,'.\~\ . ,, 
Commission expires 3.,. (9 -· 13 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
VERIFICATION 
JANET RICE after being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
That she is one of the Defendants and Counterclaimants in the foregoing 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, that she has read the SECOND 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM and believes the facts stated therein are true based 
upon her own information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Defendant/Counterclaimant has set her hand and seal 
the day and year first above written 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
By: <Jtru:J=,a~, 
/ JANET RICE 
1~ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this __ day of January 2013. 
~~ ~ :hr,"'1o\l~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: NC:f'i::yC 
Commission expires :7) -A -- )s 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this~ day of January 2013, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM was served upon 
opposing counsel as follows: 
William Fuhrman 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman & Gourley 
225 N. 9th St., Ste 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Iver J. Longeteig 
5304 Turret 
Boise, ID 83 703 
V. K. Smith 
1900 W. Main 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Gabriel McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St. #302 
Boise, ID 83 702 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 48 
US Mail 
I Personal Delivery 
-A- Facsimile 
___x_ US Mail 






__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
HLEBECKER 
ttomey for Defendants/Counterclaimants 








I -?: • A~RTICLES OF ORGAJ.JjZATJOlV 






Tc the SectEta.ry of-State cf Idaho 
Corporations Division 
7C-O West Jeffers....~ Reem 2'J3 
P. 0. Box 83720 • 8cise, iD 83720-0CSO 
.{// ~ -~ I ,· ~ .·:~ ,Ji Re nar.:ie o{ihe iimited liability company is: __ e_ea_l_Ear. __ e_s_L_. L_._c_. ---------· ~ -..,;;.. _ __; ________________________________ _ 
· / 'z~ Tn~(dd~ass of the initial registerad offica ls: lOOO s · F.oosevel t St · 
~~ c.::, · (net 1 ?O Sax) 
Boise ID 83705 . ... . 
1 and the name of the mmal registered 
agent at that address is: ____ D_em_n_i_· s_J_. _s_a_ll_az _________________ _ 
Signature cf ragistered agent: ----------------------
3. Ti1e latest date csrtain on wtiich the limited liability comp.any will dissolve: 1-1-2011 
4. is management of the limited liability company vested in a manager or managers? 
~ Yes D No (c;'lecXar:P!'Qpriate !:ex) 
5. If management is vestsd in one er mora manager(s), list the name(s) and address(es) of at 
least one initial manager. If management is vested in the members, list the name(s) and 
addrass( es) of at least one initial member. 
111"1,s=cn 
Name: Address: 
Renee L. Baird 1000 S Rcosevelt St Boise, ID 83705 
01/19/2091 09180 
C:t: 2~ CTI ~11 BH1 37Ja31 
1 I 1M. tll : 1tt, II ~. UC I 2 ' 
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i:;,q- <:"1 -·-· _ . .., • 
OPER.,l,.TJ:N_G AG.REE1v.GNT OE: RE.,.1.1.L HOMES·, .t.LC 
a., Ida.ho Limited. Liabiiity Cocrrpa:Jy 
, NC. 2G3 
. The u..,de.r3igned n::e::n~~r~,.desi.ring to form a. limh~d Ba.bility company unc.c..- th.e Idabo 
Li1T1tej Llability Company Act ~~he 'j'Act") hereby agree as follows: 




Na:'Tle. The n;une of the limire.d liability company (Li~ 1'LLC') i; REJ~ ;fOMES1 
. l .2 },..rticle? of Or-s-a.nizat1on ... ~rticles of organization. were filed vtith the Idaho Secre'"..a..ry 
of Scare on.January 191 2001. · · · . 
1.3 ~noel??~ Place ~fBusbe?s: The principal t:ffice cf the J~C sh.111 initially be tocated 
ac l 000 S,. Rcase"ye!t Str~et, :Boise, Jdaho 83 705. 'The membe.""J r.nay relocat~ the pri.r.c~p:u a.ffice or 
e~taotish adrutiona! ofiic~s fr~ tL."'C.e tq time in their discretion. ' .'. 
1.4 _F..eai3tered Office an'd :R.eiri.stered ,A2em.. Tb~ LLC's lnitiaJ i~glstered offi~ .. shall be 
ar l 000 S. Rc-0~evelt Strsec, Baise, 'Id.ahc ·837fJS1 and the na.."lle of its initial reg!st$ted agent at such 
address shall be-De~s 1 ~anaz .. The members. IPAY change t.6e registered o:ffic~ and regiatered 
agent fro~ time to time in their discretion. . . 
. J.5 _Eusi!le.<,s Pun,':"· Th~ IJ..C is or;anfaed t0 ~_.? ¢<?. ,j'...L_&~ 
and to .engage many other Ia.wfu{ business. . · . · 9 
. . ' 
1.6 Agreer_n:en.t.. The memb~r:i. e:cecutmg the Operating Agr~sment' hereby agree to the 
tenns ?,ad condit:ions ofthe Operating Agreement, a.a it may from time to time qe amended according 
to it~ tcnns. To the e..'Tient arr-1 provision ·of the Operating .Agreement is proru'bited or ineffective 
imdertbeAct, the Ooe,ratlng'Agraemcnt shall be considered amended to the 1maJJest deBI"ee pcissibJe 
in order to make .the Oper~g Agreement effective under th~ Act. In the evenr 'Che Act is 
subacquently a.menfied or int.crprett;d ip suc .. '1 a WilY tq make vafid a.tr} provision cf the Ope~ting 
Agreement t.ia.t wa5·formerly invalid, such pn:ivision 1hall be considererl ~a b~ valid from the. 
e.ffe.ctive date of such i.riterpreration 'or iuDendment. Further. il:. is the e::i:prass intention of che 
me.,;_1oers that the LL~ be treat?~ as a part!lersbip for purpo~e;i of fod~:i.l and stui:e taxa.tjpn. 7iie 
members· agree to take such actio-µs a.0d make such eJ:ecrions as may be nece3sary or copveni~~t to 
ensure ~bat the LLC b~ treated as a partner3hlp. J.f ic is determined thac the LLC i~ or 1-YilJ not be 
classified ,as a pa.rtnenhi:µ under the Jntemal R.""Venue Code (the •·c~de''). tben the Operap.ng 
Agtecmi;nt shall be: consicfe;ed a.mended to the sma!.te~ tjegrcq P.o.3s.iqle in what~_:r i;na..'1.Der · 
r,eoea!ary co er.sure t~a.r the LLC is or shcill be trae.teq"as a.pa..""r.Jership u.nd~ cbe Code for purposes 







MEi:VIB:SRS, CO:NTRIBUTIONS. A~'D INTE..~STS 
2.] N~e.'.t AddTe~~.es andJphi~ Com:rib~:t:tgn~. T:he n[l.mcS a:id add~S3'e$ oftlre i."'liria! 
members qf the LLC, and roe ·agni.ed value ofthet,r resMcti1e initial cap-iral con.tributicns a.,d ir:ritial 
per~r.t.sgc o\"wer.J.up lnteregts in tQe LLC (the ''Sharing R2tios'') a..c;_ a_s a!:J.t~d _in tt!,e chart· ~clow, 
subjecr to the adjuatmen( ~s p,rovidcd in this Artf9J~ 2. Each of the members as his initial 
cantrto-ution h~ contributed hjs undivided one-ha.If(%) interest Lri a.:i.ii ~a th9ae cenai:n e-.,;o parcels 
of ccmmer~ial re:i.l es.are, morn p2.r'Jr;,JlarJy described on &hiqit A attached her~t6, together v.,itb. 
. a.J;l appurtena.1c.es, md a:ny existing ]eases, contractd ot ag;e~ent5 ~ciating the;~to. 
}fame a.1d addres:; 
:J;t!nee Baird 
1000 S. Roo,seve.!t. 
Bcist, Idaho 83705 
· Agr.eed Y alue of Con.tribi;tion 
$50,DOG 
S;ia...-i.ntr Ratio i . . ' 
160% 
2.2 Limitation cfI)_a'oUit<,, Each mcmber)s liability shall be limite0d. to· the max5mtlm ',: 
cx:enr pcrmit:~d by applicable law. The. failure of t.he LLC to obsqyo. a.ny fo'raialicies Ofc 
requirementS' relating to the exercise of it~ p9wers o-r management of its bu3iness or affairs ~.ha.!1 n~f 
be grounds far imposing per;;,onal lia.bility on the members of the Ii~bilities of the LLC. n . 
.... , 
·2.3 No Lrabi1itv for LLC Debts; Persor..a.1 GiJarantees . ..,A.. member shall not be penonaJ/r{ 
Jfable f<;>r .any debts or Jo3scs cf Lhe LLC beyond bi3 respectiv~ cap~i:al com.i.butj.oru. except ~) 
ofher;wis~ required. by faw. Notwithstanding tne: foregoing. the members shall execute peraori.1l 
gu-a..'<i~ees fur Joans ma.de to che llC as and only to the cxten"t require~ by foture lendt?rs.. · . . .. 
· 2.4 OtherJ3usinesa of.Members, Except e.s may b~ othe.r·wi~e pra-.rideq in agrecn;eoF3·; 
an"Jcng the members and the LLC, ~ny member may engage indcpf<lden.tly or v.iith othen in ctber 
busiaes:i a.nc1 iovcst~eni: ventur~s of cery nature and description ~nd llhrul ha~,e no obligation to 
acco1,..11t to tl'19 LLC far such busincs,3 or investments or !er business or mvest.T.ient oppo~mitiez. 
2.5 Addldonal Members. Additional membc~ .shall J:lot be adn1.itted e;{cept upon a 
1..ma.nimo·ll~ vote of tb.e .mcrnben, 
2.6 Addi'tionaJ Canital. . .. 
2.6.1 Additional Contributiom. Except~ set forth in this Sect ton .2.6, n.o member 
sbaJI tle re<,uired or permitted to make a..,y capital contributions. In tbe event that a:t any ti.me> 
pursuanr. to s. unanimous vote of the mexriber~, the me.."Tibers dc:iter:min.e rhat a:dditiocrnl funrfa are 
reg'ui.red by rha LLC for its bl!.Siness or any cf its oblie;a.T,i,ona, c-xp~n.ses, costs, liabilities or 
expenditures, the members !!haU be requircci to contribute s.u.cb additionaJ funds in proportion co their 
Sha.ring R.a.tio.s, l.lrlles~ tho me:mber.s elect by rntjarit'J vote ta ha.ve t.h.e UC l;,orrow the a.mount 1:Jf 






J ., ... _. 
-. 
?.:19: Si 
a.dp.i:icnai caph?J ~r.i9ibuticn p1.fr:Ua.'1.t to the Secian 2.6, .Land a m~ber faifa tom~ it5 required 
P9r'~on of :he ad~it.:an:aJ c~piW con.tr.ib~ti.cn (a "Ncn-Ca~r:ribur1.ng Member"), !herr th.ose mewben 
rn·alcing __ r.he:r requued pom~n of the add1tmrr.af capital·, comnoucion ("Contrib17ting Member~") may 
eJ ect _erm.~r of 0-e fo..Ilo,;r,.i.ng; C,) to adju.sr the Sha,-ing Ratios of t!ie Com:n"'butiag, 11t1d ·Non-
Cc~nmi.,~ng ~!embers by incre~ng c..~e. ~'ihanng· Ratios of the Ncn-Cor.~rr1mting Members; or (lj) 
~e. '"'."optr,ou~~g Memher.s may,. in adqincn to ~y oth~:; Jeg_al .c:erni:~ies ~yaUab!e, iµ proportion to -· _ 
:heir 0'ilt1'\er~mp I:ntcresta'ar a!! otherwise ~greed by the Ccmtribcting Memb~. contnbut.e addition:ti . 
.mnds to ::o:vet such a.mmm.t that ha, not been con~ributed. 
. . 
2.6.2 Adiu:itment tc Sh.a..-m!t!Ratio~. The S.ha.rin~Ratios of each Contributing 
• • : • C . • .._ 
Member sb.a.ll be me;eased by Adju.stment Per~ntage X1 whic::;h shall be ca!cuiat~d for eac:b 
COnrributmg Member accordil'lg to the formula. g~t forth bel9w .. For purposes of this for:nula,' the 
ph:r.ase "Addrtionai Capital Contri1?1;tion" shall diean the additional capi.a.J conm1mtion.s made, by 
each Conrribt.iing Membtr punua..-,,1 to. a capital ~all under ~cctio~ 2.5.'l. The Tor.al Capi'"i.al 
Contnlmtious of l!.11 .Members to Date shalJ· linc!udc the agreed value of the irJtiaI capital 
·contribution~ as 3e~ forth in Section 2.1 above. i 
' 
Adjustmeat =i Arnaunt of Adg!tjcnaI Canitai Contribution •. 
Perceni:age X Total Capil:aJ Camr.il?utians + Sum of All f...d<litiomiI 
of'1,11 Me."Il.b~n to Data Capil:a.J Contnoutians 
The rcspecti"re SJ'laring Ratios of tbe Non-Co:nt..'1'bt.<tmg fyre~ber3 s.h.a.Il be de.crMsed 
(bur not below zero) by each such mernbel\l pro rata share (ba.sed o;i che total Sharing Ratins of the 
No~-C9ntibt1t~g Members) of Adjustmem ·Percentage X 
. 2.o.J Co.ntribmiorr of Additional Fund.! .. If a Contt1."b~ing .Member e1e~t3 to . · 
cootribute addition~l funds to c'o-ter such ~rnoum that h~ net· been. contributed by a. Non:-
Cputri'6utin.g 1iember, the advance shall be deemed a demand )o:in by the Co~m"'buting Member or 
Mc!Jltb~r:; ·co ~be Non.-'comn"buttog lv.fcmber bea....-jng inter~st a.tthe ra,c of cwclye percem (12%) per 
annum from che da.te the adva.nce i~ made. To the exti::nt of suc.h advance plus interest, any 
d.i.';tributicn.s otherwfae due to the Non-Contn"buting Me..'llber shall, ~ea.d be paid to the 
Contributing Mc;nber or Membef3 (pro rata with the e,mcunt!l adva.nc~d by e.1.ch Contributing 
Member) w.ho made such ·conmoution. · 
· 2. 7 Inter:lst on Cacit11.l Cor.tribt.Jtions. Except_ as pjo,.,ided in Sectio.n ?.. 5.3, no 1."1!-!n:-st. 
sbaU b~ pcid on capital connibutiom. 
J..8 .Loans. Tho LLC may boITow money from any member of chird panies upor., such 
comm~icfal!y reasonable te.mu a.nd co.gditi<;,r..3 as may be approved-by the, m.e.mben. 
· 2.9 Rle:ht:i ofi"ldem.;i.fi.c~. The LtC, or iu receiver 9; crustec, snall'indemr~lfy, held 
hnrrnless, ;ind p~y· aH jud~ts and c.l,;,.bris ag?Jnst ea.ch member for all c:oiu, lo:S.~es, liabilities and 
dart)1tgcs pt=1id or accrued· by sue[~ mec,,ber by re.:ison of atiy act p~rformed or oti.i~4ed t~· be 
performed by ~lJch r.nembe:r, ln ·c~~ect:ion wlcb che busine.!ls ·of th I...L~, co the ful.J~~t e":Cec.t. prov:1dt?d 
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' 
,er allo;vecf by che A_ct ai:~ tbe la.w::. cf.the Star~ ofldaho, inducing attonley fees and cqm;., Li.curred 
o~ 5::;cn 1:1eurb~. B.ow:ver, no r:n~rr:ber llhall be indemnified from uny liability far fraud~ ba.cf .falth., 
W1lliul m~-xcluct;-erg'i'ossnegfrg~~- · . . 
. ~-10 Title In..•mrance, l.n the eve~t tj1e LLC StJfcrii any less. whi.c:h i~ compensable through 
the t!tle. t"Qsura.'1ce obtai'\'led by Ir'~r .Penni~ I.. Sallaz arI;! payment~ made ubd~r ~ch polides will 
be oaid to D~nnis J. 5a.Uaz and noi the LLC · ·- · .. . . . . . 
~-
~1) nvrms OF 10EMEERS . . . . . 
3. l .Mam1gemcnt !lu"ld Voong Right~. NJ members ~ho h.ave noc Dissociated -~hall be 
e:nic.led to vote an any matter st,lbmitted to a vc-cc of th.e Memben. ~aw~e.1 Assignees .:iliaJI ooc 
be entitled to yote oµ any rnaners. 
. : J, U ~ Recuirmg a Mskrity Vore. ~cept,a:1 othcfwfae provided in Article 
3 ..l .2 or otherwise in i:.his Operating Agr~mer.:; a.11. detemu.natiop3., deci3'ions, e.pprova:1.s a.,d actions 
affe::tm~ the LLC and its business and a:ffa.ir.s sbaJl be determlnc.d, rnade, approved, or authorized . 
9ctly;by tho affirmative vote of a. Majority of the .;v:l'.embersJ ~xc[uding a.,y intar~ed Member and 
exc!~ding -any Assignee. ·· 
. . 
3 .1.2 Acts .R.eaufring Una.nin;.aus Vd1e.. N orwithsta.ndi.ng Arcicfe 3 .1.1, the 
following matters,, decisions and actions shan not bl:j made or ta.ken witbcut the t.lJlanirnous vote of 
all afr!le Member3, e:(cluding any Lr.tcrcstad Mcmb~ and ~~ludmg any As.:iig:nce: 
. . . ' . . . . 
{a) · any a.-itendrnen: ro thlk Operating Agreement tbat changes the 
purnber of vo'r:::s or degree of consent required co approve or d-isa.pprove any i,natters that requir~ •;cce 
or cc-nsent; end 
th\ a..1y amendment to Article 6 er .A.rti."qJe 7 of this Operating \!-'/ 
Agreement.. 
3.2 Autboritv ofMec,bers to Bi.nd th~_.(J&. The Members hereby agn:e chat ao 
one Mernber ·s~hll have the aurhcrity cu milke repre:senr.1ti;u3 or war.a...,ties, or ~ter imo contracts 
a.a behalf of the LLC, ia.~e any action.~ ru1 t1genc fo~ the llC, or fl'th~rwfae bi.~d the LLC: lG.ther, .· 
11MajoritiJ shall be required to mak-e represema.tions or warranties, or enter into con:tract.s on be~alf . 
oftbe 'LI:.C, take. any i;tction as an agcoc for the LLC, pr otherwis:! bind the LLC re Persqn:.:-bavm.g 
knowledge of such determination. T.,c follo't!rirlg a.ctioua1 withoutlirnita.tian, shall require a:Majcnty 
vace: 
3.2.. l the foAtit'Jtion, prosecmfon and daf~nae ofar.y proceed.ing int.he LL~'.s nl.\Ilte; / 
3.2, 2 the p9rchase, receipt. lc8.9e or other a-cqujsitio-.a, o'\-mers . i.ip, h.oldl.ng, 








. 3 ,~-.4 the en~ar:n.g i~to ·con~racts and guaranties-; incurring of lia:biiities; borrowing 
rncrrey, JS31?aoce of note; bonr.:J;;, and or.her ob!iga'fi.C::ns; a:id the sccuriog cf a:ny of its obUgarions by 
rn~rtgage or pl edge er .any -of ir.1 Pmperry ·or :income; · 
J.2.5 the .lendi~g.of moneyi invescrncnt and rei.i~vestnent -~the lLC'.; funds a.1.d 
r;eipt a:ntj ho1ding cfPr?pcny ~s . .s~curicy for repaymen\ including, w:ich·out li:o:ritation, the .lo~g 
o, .mone.7to, a.~d other..JIJ.Se heJpmgMember; officers, emp[oye-es, !U'ld agent:;; 
. 3 .2.6 che Gonduct of iiie LLC' s bumneas, the eiit.ablfahmeni of UC office::-..., and the 
exercise of the powers oft.he LLC within o:r v,::it.hon1 the State~ . · 
3 .2. 7 the appointment of emplo~s Md agect:5 of the LLC,.t:he defirung ofthe:it 
du-cie:s1 the _establishment ofqieir ~otnpensation.; 
3.2.8' the: paJment of pensions a.Jl,d ea1~blishment of pep~)on pla.,s, pension ttust:;. 
profit ~ha.dog. plans, a.rid ben,;ifit and: incentive p)a,-,3 for all or any of the current ar former Members, 
employees, and agent:3 oft~e ll.C; · 
. . 
~.2.9 ihe rnaldng of dcnatiom to the public wel.fure or for religious: charitable, 
sci~ntific, Ur:era.rJ: or educational purposes; 
3.2, 10 the pa::;mem or donapon, or any other act tha.t furthers the business and affair::, 
of the LJ~~C; 
3 .2.1 l the payment cf com_pensatioa, or ·additional comp ensa-i:ion to any or all 
MemoorJ, 'and e~P.loyees cin account of services prelffoualy rendered to the limited liab.ilizy 
cacnpn.ny, whether or not an 1tgreetne:1Tto pay such compensation was made before rucb ijcrvices 
were r~dered; · · 
J .2.12 tbe .o.urcbase: ofio.s:.irauce oi:, fb.: life of~ny ofhs Memb•!ra, or'cmploy~s for 
che benefa of tbe LLC; 
3 .2. 13 the participa.rion in pa.rtnenhlp agreen;rerrts, joint ventur~, or ot.1ier 
as!!ociations of any kind wii.h any pcrso.n or persons; · 
3 .2.14 the indemri.fic.ar:ion of Merriam or any other Penon. . . .. 
3 .J Mai o_:itY,. :V{i,eriever any marter i~ required or allowed to be approv~<l by a ftl{?jori:ty 
of ch e Me.mbers or a M.ajmi ty of the rcl}lainiag Members undpr c}i e Act o; the- Op crating Agraemem, 
such matter ehatl be c.::onmd~r-ed approved 9r consent:!!~ ta ~pm1 the recc!ipt afthe affirmative a.pprov:;.t 
er consent, either i.o writing or at a meeting of the Membefi'l, ofl',fembers ta~_e;-Sh~.ng Rat;os. of 





e e -- ·-- --
10;'35 
N'C. :2S6 
( a.11 rhe M~b~ entitle~ _to vqte ~n a pJlJticujar matter. f'or tbls p~rp~ie, the Shs...-in:g Ratios cf ~1 · 
~ti:mbe,r: ana~ ?e considered iµ determ:irJ~g whether a Majoril:"J have vct'ed·ln favor cf an action, 
1~especr..i1ro or. whether or not ·a Me;mbcr partfoipB.tes in .such vote. A...,.sjgq·~e:; and, in th.e case of 
appr:Y·ralsto WI~drawa,l where canse:n~ aftbe r;ma.lning Members is required, clisscciating x--feµJbefS 
3hal! not be co~sldered'Mw.ben e1:1titled to vote for the p1.1rpcae of ~etcqriing a M;ajorit'/. lo che 
case 0.f a Me$We:r who bas .dispose;:d of that .Me~b~'i ~mire 1'4emb~@p.ip :i;ni:cr-e:.rt to pn .As~ignee., 
but has J.1Ct been removed as a Member, the Sharing Ratio of such A3·aignei: GbaIJ '6e ·corisi'derei:! in 
dete:rrrJuing a :?vfajority nnd .such Memb-?r's vote er ~onsem: shall be det:;r;m.ined by s:ucb Sbarin.z 
RAt!o. . ; . · . - .... 
ARTrC;tB4 
]A.dEETING AN}? Ai.v!ENDMENT 
4.1 Gen.er,aj_. Acti-0113 a11d d~cisio~s requi:rbg the ap!)'fOVal of the M!?.mber:,' pur.suant 
re any pro•,ision 6fthis Op~rating Agreement may.be a-nchori.zed·or made either by vote cf the 
required riiimber 9f Mcrober:i. tal;:exi ir. a meeting of the Memb~s,· or by una.r,j.p;ious v..ntten . 
c~nscnt without a. rne.eting. In addr.ian, · emergenc-1 a.£:tiari_g may be taken i.n Jlccorda."l.ce with the 
pr6vfaions of Article 4.6 he.reef, 
'· 
I ,· 
4.2 Meetin2:s. ~y Member rnay call a meetiog fa cop:5id;r approval of an ~io~1 or 
decision under any pravii.on afthi.s Operating Agre-iment by de.livering to each other·Membe:rnotic~· 
of tr.e: time and pur))O!e of such m.eefa1g at lea..~ five: (5) busi.nes3 da.ys bctore the .da.y of SUCfl 
meey.fng, A Member ffi(IY wai-'Je the ~cquir8ment of notice of a tr,ectfog ei~er by attending such 
cneetfu_g C1r e.~ecufag a wri ct:m waivc.i: bcfcro or· after such m~tbg. Any such meeting shall be held 
during ·the LLC' s norma:l busines3 h9urs; ac its principc:l place qf b1.1l'iines~ tin(ess all o:f the oth~r 
Me.)11}Jer11 consent in :writing i>r by their atte.odance ar such meeting to its be.ing held a.t uo'ili.er 
location or rime~ No'!:vvimstanding any qther proviaion of tl'!fs Op:m.ting Ag.ree.q1e11r, if all the 
members hold a me~ting at any time and place, such mc~ing shcll be vall,d wi-Jtout calf or notice 
a.nd aoy '1a"?r'ftll· action tak:en at such meedng shall be the actian of the members. · . . . 
4,3 M~fftim;:s by Tde,:ibone. Meetings o.f the mcmbern rnay be ~dd by confcr~ncc 
telephone 0( by a.."ly other mc3:ns of CJJm,nmni~atioq by which all p?,rticipants can hear each other 
simufi:a,.'ler.iu.sly during th.c meeting, and sucb p.e.rdciparion ahaij cor....,t:itu'!:e presence ,in p~rson ai. the 
rncering. 
. . . . 
4.4 1,inai1i:mous Consent. Any M!:!mber may.propose that che LLC a'lthorb:o an a.ct~on 
or decision purn13!1t to M}y provision o-f t:tiis Operating .'\.grc:!':menr by unaI"Jmous writt~o c.1:'nsem of 
alj Members in li~u of a meeting. A Member's writre.n conse."l.t may be eyiqenc~~ by his signature 
oo a cou.nJcr.part of tbe. proposal or by a sepa.race :writing (ipc!uding facsimile) that ide:n.tifie.s r.he 
proposal with reaijooable spedfi.ciry a;td ~.!ates that such ~.(ember conse.tm to sucj, -proposal .. 
4.5 Vq~e bv Prom. ~- M~bcr may vote ( or cxeclltC a. written 'consemt) b)' pro~/ gi.ven 
to a.11y other Member. Any such proxy must be In m-iting ~nd must identify the- specific meetin~ror 
m.a.tter to which the: prcxy appli~s or m . .1:e that it S:pplies to aH cna.tter.; (Sl!.bject 'to speci.n~d 
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reser{ariaf?S, if e.iy) cc'ming befqr2 the .W:.,C for approval undarany provision of this Operating 
Agreement prior1o ef. specified date (whlch s~all not be later t~ao the fir3t ar.nivervary of the da:te on 
·which ,guch prDX"f is given). N1:'j .such proxy shall be revocable ai ll-.'T'J time and shall not be eff'ectfva· 
!It a.ny meerlng ar whlch the Memb-c'. giving such prox"j ia in rmend.mc::, 
. ,,. . 
·· ·· 4.6 · s'.meri;rcncy Procedures. Natwirhstandfog any oth~r p.n:~.vi~ip!).S ~ei:~£; in the evec.t 
that ?y.(epibers who could authorize: a LLC actica or decision at a duly c;:tlled· ~ting reasonably 
deiemrine. in ~v.riting, cbat rhe LLC is faeL"lg a aig.rufir;;ant business emergency that · r~s · 
i:mme~iue acpon, such Memben may, wit1.ouJ C,_!Jmp}ying ~ ge.ner.µly applicable procedures for 
tr.C!Onµg~ or actions by unanimou3 .consent, ai.ithodze any acpon or decisice tbat .they deem 
ie;ll$oMbly ~e.ce.ssary ro a.llow the LLC to ~enefir from a 1lgnificant op porn.mi rt or to protect the µc 
from signlfic:n1t Jo~s or damage, pro~ded ti.1at they make re.as.enable efforts under the i:irctim$JD.ces 
to co~taa ccnsu.lr a.JJ Memben .~i::lnceming such i,.r:tio.n or dacfaicn and ti1.e r~on why sucb action 
o:r dec~sion ms! 'be made '?llthout ob.serving generally applicable proceduras . 
!, ....... . ·4: 7 R~cords. The LLC shall mainta.i.'1 permanem recnr.dg of all action3 take.,'\ by the 
M~bers pursua.11t to aay provision· of this Operating .AgI'cctt1ent, indadiug minute! of all LLC 
me!!fi~~ oopi?S cf all actions taken by consem of the Memb~,, a.."ld copies of all proxies puµua.--rt 
to which one Member vorcs or exec\l.tes. a consent on behalf of another. 
4..S Q12erat1.ng A.zeo..emen:c Mw Be }.;fodif.ied. This OP,eniting ;\greemcmt m.ay be 
modifie-4 or amended .from time to time 1:3nly by a written instrument a.do'pted and ~ecuted by all of 
c.be Members. 
4.8 .. 1 DMig:na:ted Re::iresematives. In the c.a.ae of a. member chat ls a corporarl.on, 
pan.'l~hip,, Jimited iiability company, or oih~r orga.o.ilaticm. aS8ociztian or entity (an "Entit'.t 
Memoer"1 such member shaJJ desi2Ila.-te one (1) indiv.idil3.l who elooe· !!hall be emided to .ittend 
meetings of the LLC a.t::id vota sucb""merriber1s.Sba..-ipg Ratio.· Entity memberJ ma.y cha.iige their 
designa~ed representatives. fh:3~ time ·to time by proVidi:ng the u.c v.,;,:h notice of Jm~ change in 
accordance. With the p-ro'l{LSions ofthjs Operating Agreem.e..'1.t. Ally change in an Ecrtify Mei::iber·s 
design'.a1ed represenutiv~ a.hall be effective: up.on tba LLC's receipt of notice of 3-1.!cb ch:,.zigc. 
4.8.2. ·]jght to Relv c.QPesignated Rem:eseatative. The LLC, and its memben, 
shiill have the right tc rely on the most recently appointed designated repre3entativc cf a., .E.ruity 
.Zv.l~mber. ·E3.C.L\ Enricy Metnber shalt be liable to indmr.rlif/, defa11d a.nd hold h?-.r.mfess the LLC a.qd 
tJ,c otliier memben from all co:st, He.bility .and damage: that any of such indemroiied perso.c.s m .. ::cy 
i11CJr (inciudmg, without lim.itation, a.nomeys' fees a..,ct cXJ)'"'..JJses) arising: from or relate.d ta any 
.dispute cooceming t~e authorii:y of an Entity Member's de.sjga11.ted represematlve. 
ARTICLE 5 
. ACCOCJ~'T.CNG A.i.'\fD RECORDS 
5. i .Boob of Acccunc. The LLC shall keep adequate books and records a.tits. 
.Principal place of busi'ness, ?l!tting forr..h at rue a:nd ac.ct1.ra.~e. accoum cfaU bu.~~~s~ cra:nsaccioos 
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erisi.ng cm.cf a..'1 din COllOection ,with the conduct oftne LLC. The Memoer3 agree that Jefr.ie-; 
W. Casey srui.ll be responsible for th~ boo~3 a.~ reccrd.s., ,.4u.1y Member ot' his designated have 
the rig:ln:, at ~y r~scu~b.[a time. to have.access ro a.id irupect ~'ld copY the cot1tents of .ruch 
bockl or recurds. Any Men1ber requesting ~cess to or imrpeC"Jcn cf such boob or t.eGon:fs 11ba.II 
µ,a;n.he reasonable cost -of such acces.. or inspection. · 
I ":. ' ' 
. . ... -· - . - . 
52 Fiscal Y esi:; The n::-<:al yeat of the I.LC shaU be tb~ cal~;d~ year. · 
"V 
SJ AccaunrinL! Re::,om. Wirhi.'1 ni.nety (90) days after the c.Ios.e of each fhcal ye;u-1 
each m;mber shall recciw an un.audited n:port of the act..nmies of ~he LLC for th.e preceding 
fist;al year, includfog a. copy of a bal~ ce sheet cf the LLC a.s of the. en..d of such year and. a 
staremenr of in corn~ or loss for such ye!Ir. . . . 
.. S.4 Ta..""< R~. °VY1tf1:io ninety (90) tjay~ a..ftcr the end of ea.ch :fhicaJ yea:-, each 
mcrnbe:r shall be furni.'3hed a ~atemeot sul"tablc fer u.se in tb'c: prepa;ation of the mi::mber1 .s 
mcocne tax r~tuni. &hmving th.e a.-ncunt:; of any dism'butiom., contrib\."tlon.s, gabs, fesses, profits, 
or credits allocated to t.~e mcmoor dU."lilg such fiscal year. 
'• . 
S.5 Tax ~...ratters PQI'tner. R.."llee :Baird shall be designated to a.ct a5 th~ tu 
m2.r.~er:; partnet ofthe-tLC pursuant ti? §623l(a)(7) of rhc Internal Revenue Code. Aro/ member 
designated as tax.,matter3 pa.rwer shalI ta.!<.::a :ru.c?J actii:in a.s may be pecegsary to cause each 0th.er 
metnher to become a notice partner u.itii.in th.e meaning of §622:l of-fi1e Code. P..J11 m~bcr wb.o 
is designated ta."'C matter partner ma.y not t;tl(e any action ccr,..tcmpLucd by §§o.222 through 6232 




6.1 AUocations Oeneralf!. Except as other;.vise provided in this Opera'ting 
Agreement> all items of income, gain, losa, deduction and c.redjf oft.lie LLC shall be ;tlloC9.1:i::d a.t::lQog 
ail the J:iember;, 'in proport£qn ta th~ir Sharing Ratios. 
15.2 Lo~s AII0ca:cio11s. Lasses of the llC sball be allocated to rhe member:s in 
ptoportion to their Sharing R.a.rl~s, exc.ept thac in the c!';.~e of a. los3 realized on the liquidation of the 
L.LC under Article 9 hcreo; one hundred percent (i ro%) cf sucn less shall be a:ltocated to th; 
memhe.rs wbo ha.\le m.ade ca.sh or agreed value cap}ial contributions to the LLC (m ¢e same 
rel~tionship as t!1efr r~spective ca pit~ account.! ~ave beeo. reduced t9 zero. 
. . . 
6.3 Net P.ro'fit Allocations. Net profits from the LLC's operations sh.all .fim be 
aUoc1:1ted co tJ,e·memben who receive cash or propecy dfatributiof.lS under Section 7.3 to the extC1!t 
o(th~ cash di.s"'.iibwtions received during t.he extent of the cash di3trlb.utions re.ceived 'du.Mag the 
applic:ab!e ~able year 'and then to the member;:; in propomon to :he respective Sha:.-ing ~do.s. . 
6.4 Ntr Gain AJlocatl9~- Net gaL1 from a sale of a.II or S"<.Jbstarrtia~y .~ of tb.e LLC's 









ass~1s s!ie.11 be a.11ocaterl ar.,c,ng d.; members L'l p-roporJiJn CD their ri:;peczive Sharing Ratios . 
~.S · Ca;:iir2J Acc.ou;i.'ts. An individual capital account shall be maintained for ep.c.h 
m.en;:ber. Each :me..."7:.ber' s caphal ac~mt s...\all be Q) credited with all capi:r.al con?foutiop.s by rucb 
. mern:ber. a.1d _the member.' 3 dfa~butive_share of aJJ income and g~n Qncludin~ any inco:rrie ex.empt 
from foac:rah:::come ~t); an,d. (ii) charge~ wit'2- the- :unourn Qf all 'di:3tribt.ifons to mch. member and 
the member3' s distributive 2:hare of losses 3.i.'1d deiiu.c.::tfons. Caoir:al a.ccou."'lta shall he mai~tainerl in 
accordance ~ith federal income tj.l. -accvunting principles M :iet forth m Treas. Reg. l·704-
1(b)(2)(iv) or any su~c::sscr provision. · 
6.6 Complfal)c~ l,l.,ith Section 704. The piavisions of.this Article 6 as tfa.e-1 rnlatc: to the 
rr,aintaaance of c2pii:aJ a.ccm.mrs a....-b inten4ed> a...'ld shall be conat.'Ued.,. and; if necessary, modi.tie.d a:. 
provided iu • .c\rtide 12, to cause i:he ~noi;:ation.'.{ of prant.s, loS"ses, LJ')COlli.O, gain a..-1d credit purm.i?Jlt 
to ;\.,.-tide 6 ta have subz.tantiaJ economic .efi'ec: under the Regulations prom"UlgiLted u.ader § §704(b) 
and 704( c) of the Code, in Jighc of the distr:"bu~ioos made put?1JrmC t6 A.rJcJe 7 and 9 and the capital 




7 .1 Dim:;ibutions ar Members' Di.scr:!tion. Except 113' otherwise provided in rris 
,Op·eratfog Agrr:ement, dfarn"oudons of the LLC's ca.sh .aw.il;ble for di:mibution shall be made at rem 
sew-amually for ~ch fl.:1cal year. 
7.2 Ca3h Available for"Di:stributi,:in. For purposes o.f ti.'u.J Ar"Jclc 7 the p.hra::i~ "ca.sh 
av:tilabie for distribution~· shall mean cash of the LLC t11hich the i.nempers rea.sooabty determine rnay 
be diSi:n'buted ;v;thout impairing the ~bility of the UC to .co.rry out its purposes. a.i""ter r.al9ng imo 
account the acru.al an~ .anticipated e-,q;eruics afthe L~S: a.1.d s1,1ch reserves as the members.reasonably 
deem ad~3ablc: to protect theLLC from :future cash s.horif!Ill.s. Upon distribution in accordau:ee w:ich 
this Article, the,ca.pitsl acccuot f~r .eaclt member shltll be chargl!d for the ~oum ofrbc payment ta 
thac membe:r. · ' · · 
7.3 Di:ltributian Schedule:. Distributions of the LLC' s casb. a.vJlil!3.blc: for dist.<'i.b1..l-tian - . 
sha.U be made f.n d1e folloi,;,1ng order of priorle1;: 
7.3. l Ret'\1111 ofCa.nir:al. Any ca.sh a.v.aJlable for distribution sbali be distn"buted to 
the members until ch~ ofornbcrs have received ca..~IJ distributions w.hic.h are returns of ca2ita! fo_r rbe 
fuJl ,;,•aJue of re member~· ca:ih O( /!greed Yalue capita.I contributions.. · 
7.3.2 · Rerna.tning Casa. :Ai.1y cash· availab-le for di3tri9!,)tion ~em.a.L."liog mer 
sarisfacdon of the ri::tu;:; of capital provid;d in Section 7J. I shall be dfatribute-d to the member~ in 
proportion to chefr rcspeciive Sbai"1r;;.g &tio$. 









·~~o~r.l. .cf ~~:rtnbucion ~d th~re is not encugh ;~sb e.vailsble · for di.mib~tion to cov~r all · 
mstr;bunc-ns m that pricnty careacry, the cash .available lor disrribu.cion shall be alloc.at~d ~'1d · 
d15:..ri~ut,ed to r.he rnemb-e,s en tided fo di:rtribm!pii v.--fthin iha:t priprity. cat;ig~~J in ~.he .relatii;ios.hlp 
which eacb cf the member's.respective claims in that priority cattg9r'f bear tQ the ,eta! claims of all. 
members in tli.J!t priority categoq. · · 
- ........... , ... . 
I • L.W' .JO 
ARrICLE 8 
.. , ............ - .. 
DiSPOSITION OF tvfE.ivffiERSBJ? IN1""".r:RE-?TS 
. . 
. 8. l Restriction~ on. Dis--oos-ition. No member cr-asaignce sb-aJJ sen, comtll:at'):e, gift, · 
enc:.~mber, .hypoth.ec~e, exchange or athc~se dispose of( collectively, "Transf~) aIJ O( any porcion 
ofhts Sha...."1Ilg.Ra.t10 without tha express, pnorur,a.nimous written cot::3ent of the .emaini.ng m.emb~ 
except~ p;o~Med in Sect'ioru 8.1, &.2, 9.J, . .9.4 a.od 9,5. Each member herebv acknowled~ the 
reasonableness Qf the restrictions on di.spcsiticm im.ppsed by this Operatfog Agre2r.nent in ;e,.v· of 
th~ UC's purposes and rherclarionship 9fthe me,:µbera. Ac:cordingly, 1.11c restrictions on disposition 
~ontained herein sluli be spedf.ca.lly enforceable, . . . 
. 8.2 Prohibited Tran~ers. Ariy purpori.ed 'I'ra.nsf.er of ~I or a..,y porti9n ofa Sharing Ratio 
that does no·t satisfy the requirements of Sectio:n 3.1 .shall be nuU au.d void !1J1d ofI?,f'J force or effect 
Wflatsoe~r; provided that, ift.\e LLC is required to rece~e·a Tr:i.1$:i:'"cr that.does noi meet such 
rnquiremencs ( or if the LLC, fa lts. so 1e di:icy-etion, elect:3 to recogniz~ e. :rransfer that does nor ~.fy 
.mch requirements), ·t,1e Transfe.r;ed Sharing Ratio shall be strictly !\mite~ to· the tra.nsf~ror's 
economic rights V'lith r~specr to the Trnns:forred Sharing ~..atio, which economic rights ma b~ applied 
('\)(ithoµr limiting any other Jegal .or equit!l,ble rights of the I.LC} to satisfy any debts., obli.gatior~~. or, 
liabilities. for dar;w.ges !hat the q:an3fcror: or assignee.of such S~aring Ratio may have to the UC. 
In the case of a Transfer or a.tempted transfer. cf a Si1.trin.g Ratio r.bar does not satisfy such 
r~q11iremerrts~ the pa.,-Je:s c:r,gag:in.g OC' D.rtempting to engage ln ;!Uc}j 1'nms:fer shall be liable ~O 
indell1.l'1Jfy, de~d and hold han:nJess th~ U..C a{lti t.\e other members from sill co.st, J:i31bilicy, and 
dama'ge thi:ct any of such indern.nilied per:Johs may incur (i,Jcludillg, 'Vvft.hout: limitation, i:ncrc~ez;:itaJ 
t~ liabilify and attorneys' ~e~s a:nd expenses) as a rcsuk of Sltch Tra."Jsfer or attempted Transfer a.r.id 
effo:rts to enforce the inde:mruty granted hci:c:by. · · 
. 8,3 Admis.,ion of ~3sim:iccs M Members. Subject to che ot1ier provisions ~ftbls A ... -ti.cle 
Z, an SJsignee ofa $~.ring Ra~io may be ad1nitted ta theLLC as a me."!lber 0uly upon a majority vote 
of !:he: rnernberg a.ad the satia'faction of such other texms o.nd canaitions as they shall require. 
S-.4 Rfaht:1 ofUnadmitted A~sii;mee.s. A _person who acquires ll Sh.arihg Ratio .but who 
is oat 1tdmiu:ed as a member pursuant to this Article a (an "A.s5(gpi;e") sh.ruf b~ em:itled only' to the 
ecooorriic rights\~th ·re:!-pcc,: to r1uch tran3fcrred Shai.-ing .Ratio in a.cconia.nce ~"i~.b this Operating 
~reement, and'she.11 have r.o rigl].t to 'voie on a.ny ma.tters as a 1ne1I1,ber1 sball have .noc right ro ·a,ey 
info.rrnation or aC"cauncing of.tie affairs <>f the .LLC, shalt not be enrit!ed to inspect che. boo.ks or 
recor~s ~t'theLLC, and slia!I oat have any of'thc: righ"..s of a rn.embci und'erthe Act or this Oper:itmg 
Ap;reemcnt. · · 











V/!THDP,A.WAL A>J'D DISSOLU!JQ:N 
9. 1 "i;irthcLraw~!. Each member agre,:s not ta ·~itbdraw from the LLC 1-vithout rbe · 
cQpJe:::it of itU other members. A voluntary '!}11th~rnwal in violation of this Section 9. l shall be 
e-rTecci.i'Jg'aft~·cl:!re~ ('3) .ncnths ',),,'nrten iJOtca ~c)jv::::,ecH::i tl::e manager:;, but ~hcll co.n~tr .. m:i a breach 
of mis Ope.~ti.ng Agreement .for which therLLC a.1d or.her mc:mbern ,hall have all remedi~~ oro-...ided 
under appJicabJe raw. · · · . . . 
9 .2 Event5 of Dhsolution. Except as otherwise prc\oid ed in thi<? Operating ~em.en!, 
!.he LLC shaO· dhs~rve upoq the earlicr·ot (a.) de.ai:h, inc·ompe:tcnce, dlssoltition., t~nninatfon al' 
f.of,fe.hu~ of the right co do bu$fuess g.f a.n.Enrlt'J ?vfomber, oa:nkruptcy orv,i1J-1dra"WaJ of a rnc::ober: 
(D) sale of all or subscai"lttally a11 ·oft1JC LLc•s a.ci.set.:i; (c) a vote of ti\e mesnber.; holding a1 least 
se1te.-rty-tivc percent (75%) of the Sharing Ratios; or ( d) ~pproval cf dissolution by a.n. unG::Oimcus 
voe~ cf the memb~f3. 
9.3 Effect ofDe-ath ofa Member. fa the event oft.he de<1.th of a Member, the rem<cining 
Members ma.y with.in.90 days electro: 
9 .3 .1 Continue th= LLC a.nd admit th.e deceased· Member's s:oau~e. estate or other 
bencfa::iar; as- a ~ember ii, place of the decc:ascii.remb~r, or · • · 
. ' 
. . 9.3 .2 . Continue the LLC ;u:noag the sun,iving Mernbcr11 and pu.rc.bse tpe; interest 
of the dece:ued Me."111;,er pursuant to the prpvi3ions cf Scccior.s 9. 8 ~,d 9.9. 
The ~ecti.arr·ahall b~ at the solo discretion of the sur,iving Members ai"'ld shall rc:q~re th~ir .. 
unai.imous consent If the s1.irviviog Members do not so elect, the LLC sha11 ~ dis36lved. . . 
9.4 Effe_g o.f\Vithdnw:aJ or Other Event. Upon th~ mcoT!).petcnce, ~ithdrawal, 
exp1;Jsi.on, bankr~ptcy, or dissolution of a Member, 'the remai.nlng Member:s may wh:11.i:n'ni:nory (90) 
daya, witho9i waiving my n:111edies in i:he case ofvolunrarJ withdra.>?al, elect to com:inile the µ...c 
amo:rig themsetve3 BJ~d to purchil.3e the interest of the !),ffocted Member pW'3uant to the _provisions 
· cf Sections 9.8 and 9.9. Th~ erection shafl be at tl,e sole clisqetion of.the remnir.ing ?Yfembers- an~ 
shaIJ require rhe:L- una.rumous'co~sent. If the remaining Member~ do nor so elect, the LLG ;i:ha!J be 
dissolved. · · 
9.S Put/Call Offerin.e;}focice. If a Me:mbe.t determlrres to Dispose 9-fhis Membersr..ip 
imerest for- ai1y r-eason at any time during ~he term of t.1us Operating Agreem;nt (tbe "Initia~g 
M~moer"), such Member shall give wri;ier: notiyc· (the."PuvC:2,11 Off'ering Notice'') of intent ro s:::U 
i=.11, but uot less tha.o all, o.f irs Men1lit:r3hip fotcrcsJ that ts tbe Otfared L,tere.st r:o th~ remaining 
M~mbcr (the. "Re3po.nding Member"). The ~espoudlng Member may v;,itbio -fifteen (I 5) days of 
receipt of th l:'tit/Call Offering Notice itsk for w.rhte.n cla.rifi~tion as. co any aspects of th-~ rut/Cali 
O:ffering N 6ticc. The foitfating Member ,ha.tl pro-vi de any cle.riti'cations the b.iti ?-:ing Mcmb-e.r q.eems 
· nppropria.t~ i;r.ithin five (5) day:s of r.cceipt of tbe request for c.l.arification_:-~. 
OPERA TINO AGR.E8vfr...C'iT - l l 
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, / , . 9 . .5. l Put/Call Qff'eri:w: Notice. If a Me.mbet defonnines to Di.;pose of .hls 
~~b:nmp Inter~ far any reason at iL'lY time, during the te~ of this Ope~ti.ng fgreecient (th~ 
nutia.tmg Member J, such Member shaU give written notice (the "Put/Call Offering Notice") of 
irite.'1t tq se!l all, but net Jess than all, of it.a Membership Interest rbat fa the Offered Interest to 't~11 
··:..,. , .. ·~, -:-.:e..:~~~~f !1~.:nb:r.\che ";esp.ond~~Memb;r'"). Iha Re~onding.M~°:ber may ;,i.thJn fmeen (15) 
days ~j r ~ce .. pt err tneP\JtJCah Offenlig·No.tice a.* for:wrmen ciaBlfi(-a!/.Q.TIB.a.s.to~-ri;t acpe~ oft.be 
Put/~a11 O:ffei ... 11g N9t:c.~. The Initiatlng Member GhaU provide· any clfl..rificatiorr~ the· I.citia1h~g 
Member deer.:i:o; appr°!:n·a:a wi!hl.1 fiv'e (5) days of raceipr of the reque-31: for cla.rincations. 
... ..... 
. · 9.S.1 Purr:.ha'se Price -Ti:~. Th!'! Initiating Membenha!l :;petjfy in its Offedng . 
Nu.tice._ t~e purchase pritt a.11d term3 at which the· Initisting Membe:- wcruld be -willing to purchase 
an undivided one hundred percenr (100%) intere:it lt? the: LLC. · 
9 . .5.3 .Exerdsc afPy.t/CaU. Upon rec.e1pt of the Put/Call Offering Notice, the 
~e:iponding Member shall i:;.e oblig.1ted either: · · , 
. , (a) To .sclJ tc ihe Initiating Member its Mcrnbersh.ip fotm:sts at a. p!ice 
and terms eguaJ to the amoum the R~ponding Member.would have been· entitled to receive upon. 
dls.soJution of the LLC pursu.a.".1.t fo the lfquidariao dlstriffi:<tfon provi~ons ~e-:: fo.r,.h, in Section 9.5 as 
if the LLC had sold r.hc P ropcrry to a t.Mrd p!tr'DJ, nt the price and terms set fon:h in" th .Put/Call 
Offering- Notice, or 
(b) To ptm::;ha.se .tbc Membenh.ip 11r.erest oftb.e L'litiating ?vf.ernbcrfqr r.he 
price aiid Cerros equal to tbe amoum: thelrtltiaii.-r::g Mam.b{)r would have been enti.µed to n:ceive upon 
dissoru\i.on ofth.e I:.LC pur:suant to the liquid.at~on dism'butlon- provisfonll set forth in Se=tian 9.6 as 
if the µ,c had sold the. .Property to a third pan:y, afch.c price and terms sot forth in Pu.~Call Offeri..,g 
Notice. · · · . · 
9.5.4 Notl.tiquion. The. Responding Member sba.U notifi the Li.itiacing Member 
oftts elec-cion with.in thirty (30) days after the; darcofreceipt ofcbe?urJCal1 Offering: Noi.ice.. Failure 
to give nqtice withio·th:: required tim; pe~od sh.l!.U be deemed an election by the R.e.sp.cn~g 
Member not .to porch..as.e the bffored Tnterest but rather to sell i-rn Membenhip Tnteres,: ·to tbe 
Inida:rion l',.fcrnber. Th.e thirty (30) day period sha.11 be e:-ctcnded far five (5) da:ys if the Responding 
Member has asked for clatificadons a3 set.forth above. 
9.5.5 Lapse of Offer. If the ~spondi1:ig Member fails to respond to i.1e Put/C~ 
Ofi'enng Notice, or followi.n_g an e[~ction by the Responding Member ta pur_ch3:5e the Offered 
Interes~ the}(esaonding Member fails to can.5\l/Tu.-rrn.r::: the p~rch.ssc of the. entire Offered l,rnerest in 
· accordance bere;~ith, then tbe .Responding Member aha.JJ be obligated to sell it.s c·nure Membe..;hlp 
Im:ercst to the Wriaiing Member under the same tenns a:nd condi-cians as provid:!d in the Put/CaJJ 
Offering No:ice. 
I •.-Jt-1" ...JU 
9 . .5.6 L.u.1ti,adan on Ex~rcisc. Nowrith::ta..."lqmg anytJ,iug co the contrary contained 
in rhis f-rtide 9: no :OispCJsition ofa Mem.bership foter~s.t :;l,,~J be permirtcd in the ~e.n\ ibllt si~ch 








. ·. 9.6 'Di°sr.~bi . n:icn U9ct1 bisaaJm:ic-n. Upon dissolution of the LLc· as provided in rhis 
· /t.ttrcle 9, the! proceed~ foe::e.from shall be applied. e..."ld cijs:;r.ilJv.td Ju thefallowfo!2'. oder. . . . .. '~ ,-.,.. 
9.6.1 Firn .. to pay secured debts ~o third parties and members (exdudjng a:::i.y d~b~ 
to be a.saw:::1ed pursuant to an asJ~ sal~, if any); rben . . · ' 
. . 
9.6.2, Sccon~.fri the case of the 11a];: of.sub~ta.."'ltially all oftbeLLC.:. a.,set~ .. tµ pay 
the c~st3 of such s2.ie; theo · .. 
9. 6.3 Third, ~o pay unsecured debts oitbe LLC o-.:z;ed to credicci:s other then 
member:s; cten 
9.6.4 Poui:h, ~o pay uns~cured d~bcs of il1e LLC owed to me.-:abci:-s: t11cn 
.' . 9.6.5. FLih., to m.!:}mber.s wbo 41te made ca5h c~pjtaJ or a.g:reeivalue contrihr:"Jo.ns 
ta the LLC to the e;rtimt of S\lCh cash ca-.pitaJ or a.greed value contriktio1ts; tben 
9. 6. 6 Tbe ba.l!..11ce1 if any1 to me.m~er::i in proportion to· thefr respective Snaring 
. 9. 7 ~istributiop~ and AJ~oca...~ons in P...e$w~cc toDi3DO&:'!d of Membership ~tef':,!SCS. 1f 
any Meq1.bership Iocerest is s0ld., M$igned, o.r Disposed of du:rjng any T~~Ia Year in f=Omplian<;=e 
with th~ EJfOYiSi'?r~f cfchh A'1.icle 9, Nee :P:rofit.s, Net Laa.sea, each item the.:c~J; anq all other items 
attribumbie to the Disposed o±: Membership Ioterest .tor such Te.xable Yero: :Jhall be divided and 
\l,Uocat~d berwe.et1 the transferor and tho A.ssig:nee by wking inca ~ccou~t th~ir varying Membership 
lntercsrs during such Ta:;:aoJe Year in accordance -;;.iith.code Section 706(d), using any convencfo.os. 
permitted by lav,1 and se/ectc:,i by the Member3. All Distributions ot or before fae date of ;ru,ch 
Disposmon .3ht1J.l b<?; made to the tra.na:reror,and all bbtributio'os rh,erea.."9:er sbaU l:ie rna1~ to the. 
Assignee. Solely fqr purposr;;.s of making ruch a.tlot.a?ions and Dis,oibtnion.s. the l,LC s]1all recognize 
such Disposition not Jater than the end of the ci[OJdar moni;.b during: ~hlch ii: is given nod~e cf such 
TJi.sp,o~hion, provided u)at, if the LLC i~ given notice: of a Disposition at least ten (10) Business 
pays prior ~o ch~ Disposition the 1LC .sh.al} recogniz:c such Dts£)osition as the dat: of such 
Di.spositlon, and p.-oviderl further t..hm1 if the :LLC does not re·ceive. a .1.1otice stating ch.r. date suc'h 
Member:.1hjp Interest was Disposed cf 1u1d su~h other infqrmation a.~ the Iv~e:nbers ma reasonably 
require within thl...•iy (.30) days after 1hc end of th~ Ta.~ab 1c Yea.:r during "Vhich the Diapositioo pc~rs, 
then 11.11 RUch it~m,s shllll be al}ocated and ;µI .Disrriputlons ~hall ·b·e made, to the Person who, 
a.cc"ording to ~he books a.n.d record:~ ofth~LLC, 1\'a.5 the.owner oftb~ ;'\lfember3h.ip Interest qn the !as; 
day of the Taxable Ye.ar during ·which tbe Dispo:s.ition c:1ccti,n. Ncithe: th13 LLC n.or aoy M~mbe, 
shaJl ina.1r any liabllit"/ for· malci'Dg a.Uocatioqs ll...'1d Distribtitior:is in a..r.:cordaw:c with the provisions 
··of thl3 Aniclo 9. 7, w.hethcr ·o.r ti.at any Member a.f rhe LLC hes kno-viedgo of any ·c:lispcsitioa of 
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. 9.8 Vah.1.:r1ion of Member's Interest. Upon an election ·by ;:heLLC to purchase tbe 
)nttrcs-! ofa Memberpur:mant to Section 9.3 or 9.4, 1hevalue of~ie a:f.fo~tedMernber's intC!!'est shall 
?e. ~.~-c_~ed ~~ a fuir marht value apprafaal of the Asaecs (tho "Appraisal"). T'ne Appr~sal shill 
be ~mpiered by· an 'MAI de$jgn.it..."'O ifppr[tiserfamIIiro- wtr:h :sirnilaq:ammercfa.l:p,rorsernqs, v.i¢ said 
appraiser to b.e aeiect~d by a majoric:i of the 0th.er Members. The value cf the O"q,lnersh::p.Interesi: 
shall be d.et.ennined ba&11-d on the fajr· rnarbt value as determined by the Appraisal and apportioried 
ct..'Tlon.s the Ow-ci~shlp 11t.crc::sts ia_ accordance ?,ith rhe dismbuti~n pr~visions. of Section 9.6. Sµch 
a.mount wcul<i be ~e same a.r11ot1nt attri~le to cbe same 0Wner5~p Jqterest if the Aasers were 
bein~ sold in the Appraisal csi.a.blished fuir market value and th~ resultant prc<:~ds apponfoned aa 
ser out in Section 9.5. 
9.9 ~te11t for Memb~1 s Inrercs:i;. The purcha.s~ price for a Member' a interest 
purchased pursuant to Section 9 . .3 or 9.4 shall be pa.id in 5 5Ub3tantially equaI, cons':!cntive annc.al 
pit,menc.s, including principal and intc.rcs-r. rnt;re/Jt shaJJ ac011e ~t the ra-t~ oft~npercent (10%) pe:-
annu'.;n. Th~ fir.st pfl.}'Ulern: shall be made at the dc~e of the trarisaation and the rubscqU:ent payments 
~l be made each yr.:ir on the anniver3,1zy ofthfl,t date. TheLLC may prepay the ren::airiing arnoum: 
of rhe purch.a.:,e price 1u any Cin,e, 
9.1 O l::ffect o'fP,rrc:hase c;fMernber'a for.er est. A Member shall cease to be i!Mernbernpon. 
the LLC's election to purchase the Me..::ber's interest pursuant to Section 9 . .3 or.9.4. During the 
period in v,rhich rhe LLC ls q:ia.k:ing pa.ymems to the fonµer Member, th.e form.u Member s!u.11 have. 
no rights as a M~ber i.u th UC. 
. ARTICL~ 10 
MJSCELbAi"i'"EOUS 
I 0.1 Addit:io.nat Dccurnentl. Ea.ch member' shall execute such ·1.1.ddiclonaJ.,dacum.ents 
.!lrld tak~ such actions as are n:~stmably requerte:d in order to complete or confum the transact-Jons 
co.ntemplatecl by tr.is Operari11~ Agr~ernem. · 
19.2 Headin§'s. Beadings in this Oper.ai:in~ /i,graemen.r a.re for convenienc:! orJy ~1d .3h.i=.ll 
not affect its .rr:ea.rung, 
l 0.3 ~-~Vl'!rabirir-1_ .. The inva.!Jd!cy er unenfc-rceabiJity of a.'ly pro-vision of th.is Operating 
Agrcernenc shall not a-;ffc:ct the vaiidity or enforceabw~ ofth~ rernaf.nirig pro~rision.s. 
10,4 T1iJrd-?arty Beneficfa.rieq. The prnvi:sien.s oftb.b Operating Agreement are in.tc~ded 
sol1:[y fqr tbe b;neftt of ~he members ao·d shall create 110 righ!3 or qb!igatioru eofo.rceab!e by any 
third part"'/, including credico,1 of ih LLC, ex-.ept il.S other.vise p~ovided l?y applicabte la.w. 
10,5 No 'Parmcrsh.i.P. L,tended fbr Ncmta.l( Purno,3es. The cn;emben have fq~ed the U:.C 
1Jnder t1e Act, and expressly do not i1u~d hereby to form a pattne~.ship uoder e:itb~r the Idaho 
' . TJnif91 m Paii:ie;r:s..hip Act nor rhe: Idaho 'Uruform I..lmited Pa.rtner.~hlp Ac.l. Tbe meml:)ers do ri~t·::· · 
. ·.' 
















1 _:• 1tn:end to Oe_Patu1er3 one to ai'.jothi:'!r! or partner-2. ss ro ~y chlrd piwy. To ~he ~::n.t any m~mber, by 
word or action.. represents to apot.be.: pcncn that any other member is 11 partier ortba{ the LLC·is 
~ piu-:nershi;\ the member mald.ng ~uc!1 wl"ong:fuJ represerrr.ation shall be jja.ble ro any other member 
... '!' ..... 
who inC' ... n·pgnon.e.f !i;rbility by reason or mch w-:angfu.l rep(e~ntatior.. . -
· la. 5 Earin~r~h.ii:i Iuten~jf!d fol Tax Pu.rnose~. The m.ember.s·have .formed the LLC under -· 
the. Act, and e:cp res.!ly do imend herl!by t c have the Lt..c clasjfi ed arid rreat:::d for purposes offed era.I· 
and si:~tf! incc-me ra;.rn.tion as a par..iler5hfp. · . . 
10, 7 Binding Effect. E..~cept a.s othen:vfoe pto',ided in t]1is Operating Agree.t:ient, ever-J 
covena.1t, term a..1.d provision of this Op\!ra.dng Asrae~ent sball be binding upon and im.rre fa the 
beneut cf the members ai1d their reape~tive hei.rai kg,mes, legal rapr~3enta.tive3, 3t.:.ccesson, 
transferees, a.'l.d a.~ .. igru. 
10: 8 CanstriJction,, Ever-; covene.rit, term and p.:rovfaiorts of this Operating Agre<>~ent 
shalf be construed simply acco.rcling to its fab-·mean.ing and no~ st.-rictly for or. aga.'pst any :member. 
The tar.ms ofthls Operating Ag-reeme.r:it are frmmde~ to e.tnbcdy the ec.onprn.ic rel<ltlons.hip among 
tha members and ab.all no~ be subject to modUication by, or be conformed -with, a.':ly a.ctji;ms by th~ 
Internal Rivemie St;rvice except as t~J,9 Operatipg Agree:nent m.ay be e:tpticitly so a..-nended acd. 
c;cccpt as may relate specttically to tbe flJing of te~ returns.· · 
10.9 Thne. Time is of the ~ssenc.e with respect to tlrls Operadng Ag::-ee:nem . 
. 10. IO ~D1Li.g Law. The ia-ws of the State of Jdaho shall govern the validity cf t)Jis 
Operating Agre·ernent, t.~e construction of [ts term:5, ad rhe itite:rpr:.ctati.oo afth~ rights and duties of 
the members. · 
10.11 Waii·1ergf Actjcn forPa.rrltion; No Eiil fo.r.i'aru,ershio Accc,1:0.ting. Each of the 
.members Irrevocably ,',·ajv~s any right that he may have to ma.iatain any action for partition -.vii:h 
respc'ct to ·a.1y oft.he coh1pany propeny. To the fi.illest extent permitted by Jaw, cr..cb member 
coven-ams not to fiJe a bill for a. limited liability cnr.no.aay accoUDtiag. . . . 
10.12 Coucteman Execution. This Operating Agree.~ent may be .exeC!.rted b·ar.,y number 
of countcip~rts·with the 3amc effect ns if all of t"he members had signed the sa.-rne documettt.' .AH 
~oum:erpan:s spafl be coast.rued cagecber a.nd snaU cc-ns-titute ono agreement. · . . . 
l 0.13 Snccific Perform.~. Each member agrees with the other, r;neJ'.nbers. char the 
members would be irreparably d.a.mage:d if .aJTy· of che provbior'ts of this Operadng A.g:reem~nt l!.ie not 
performed in accordance with th~ir speci.fic terms emd th.at q1anetary darriag,es would not provide an 
adequate remedy lM .;ucb eveut. According)y, it is a~e::l that, in a.9dition to any otllo/ remedy to 
11-·hic:i~ die non-br eachi.ng members r:n;..y be entitled, at Jaw ot In equity, the 11or::-brea.ching members 
31,p,U be ~ntith:d ~o injuncti·"e- relief to prevent brf!a.ch-es of the p,rovisfons of thi~ Opc-r.iti.-rig 
.. ;.gree.cnent and tpeci1k.i.lly co enforce rbe terms a.nd pro~1ision.s hercofin any ncci9.n institµte.d in ~y 
ce-i,un of the United S~ates or i\.."ly state thereof having subject matter jurisdicti.9n· the~a:'f . · :: · <· /. ,.:,': · 
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('"'r· . . l_ 0.14 Hotice. All ;;.oti ce~. demiL"J.dS,0 requests and ether COf1\-1"u1 .. mi.c~tions .req1;;ired er 
per;rutted her:;und~ a-ball b-~ in wT.it.ing and sh.al/ b~· d.eemed deiiv~red on tlle earlier cf (i) thret! (3) 
da.~ after ti11? d:ate cf P,o.sr.ing r;if register.ed or cer,:ified ms..!( ?dcressed io the .add..ressc; at rt.s r1dclress· 
&er for;:b hereja or !It such. cr..'1er address as s:ich' part ma.y have spec-iu.ed· theretof9ra b:y notice 
dclt\'ered in e.c~o:rdan.ce'witb this Sc...rtian, (ii) anempte.d d~livery or re:fimal to accept deli;very if sem: · 
b)( G"-0-1:!rie:;;: Gir -Gthe;, pcr-:3c;nc1! deJt,,er; serricc., .dt.(iii},J;cruru receip~ by the a.cl ctri;;~~.r~.r~_g£1.td!~~ pf c~9. .. . . . . _ 
method o( giving notice. '.fhe addresJes &ei: forth ln Article 21 as 11.'"Jleµded frcm'tiine ,6. time, ·shall · · 
be i..:sed for purpose3 of giving o otice: to rnemoent 
10. 15 PJg-hcs a..nd Retnedles CumuJF.:dve, The .rights and remed.ies provided by this 
Ope.rating Agiee.mem are cumulative 11.nd the,. use cf any one rig:it or remedy by any pa~/ shall ooc 
pr.eclude or waive ilie right ~o use any or all other remedies.. Said rightl a.>:u:I remedies e:re given in 
a<ld'itioa to a.11y o'ther rights the parries ma ~ave bey lil-.i-·1 statute, aidjnance or otherv11:is~. 
·10. J 6 We..ivcn. Thefar1~re of any pmyto seek red.ress fur violation of er to in3ist upon 
the ~ct performance of any c.avenant or condition of tJus Oper2:ting Agreement shitll i:iot prevent 
· a subs~quent act, which would h,we otiginaHy cou.stit-... 'tecl a violation, froJTl h,lving the effect of a.-, 
original violation. 
I0.17 Attorne-, .Fei:;3, In cha evem any action is instituted ta enforce. or d"e::errnine r.he 
pa.n:ies I rights or d-uriea arising ouc. of the ten.,1s of this Operating Agreement, tl,e prev-ailin.~ part sball 
rocowr reasonable a.rtorney f.ee.1 and cost., througJ, all levels of any actjon incurred in. such 
p~oceedlng. 
A.RTICI,E l J 
Du-LNITIONS 
I 
Th,e followfog terms used jn thfa Agrcem·ent alwil h?,"v'~ tie fo!Jcri:.;jng me.ani.0:gs (unJe~s 
ot.herwis~ eXJJ:ressly'i:irovidcd herein)~ . ' . . .. 
J l.J A.dhBteei b~ficit shall me:m, with respe:ct to any .m~rnber, tbe deficit ha.la.nee, if any, , 
fo such memoer's capital accour.t as ofth~ e11d of the r~f;vant fiscal year, after giving effect to tr,e 
falln-w-uig adj:Jstm.e.rrs: · · 
· · l l.1 .. 1 The c:apita.l account shall b~ inc,e-ased by any aJT1oums whi.cb sucb member 
is obiigat6d to te~tore p1...zr3uan'c to any provision of t~.s .Operati.og Agreemem or is deemed_ t0; he 
obUgai:ed ta restore put:m:rnt to the next t;:i the last se.ntences o(Regulado-ns Sect.i eris l. 704-2(,g)~ 1) 
a.nd .l. 704-.Z(i)(?): and 
1 J. I 2 The caoital account .qhaJl be decreas~d by the:: items described in S,~c'tipns 
l. 704-1 {b)(2)(ii)(d)(4), l 1oi1 (o)(2)(ii)(d)(5) and l 704-1 (b}('2)(ii)(d)(6) of tho R.~gufations. 
The f9;egoiog <lcfinit:ion of Adj\!stcci" Deficit is lnce.r.ded. co co-r.i.p!y wilh the pro•iifons o.f 
Section 1. 704-1 (b)(2)(H)(d) of tJ,e Regt.1Iatior,s and .,hall be imerpratcd cc-oslster,ly th~~,~1th,. , .. 
. , . . . .. . , ;;·: ,. . . . ~ :·. 
:. 
0008Si ... ,•,. 








. ~ 1 ~.2 Deprecfa~Q] shall mean, foi e!ch faccl/ year .. an. amcunt equai to .the d~~ciari.on. 
a.mor:-cn.t1on, Ot' pc.ber cost recovery deduction alJowable With respect to' an a~set fer such fisc-.J j-eai; . 
... ,.. .. 
. pmvidf!d, h?-wever, that if the gl"o~s- asset vajue of an as:;cc di:;%.r,, :from its adjus:ed basis fur federal 
income ra;c purpoaes at t11e ~egirrning of such focal ye::,i.r, Dcprec;iati9n shall be· an arnaµzn w~~h 
beaTs the sa..'ne ratio to suc.h begfoni.n8 Grosa As.set Va.Jue as ihe fecf~raJ iucon::.:e ta.."'; deorecfa.tion, 
B:mortizadon,. Or o'tlier cost recovery dedllcti.Ou for .9Ucn .fi.5~] Jew p~~S J9 .• Sttch b~niI}g. a~jl.l~ted 
tax bll!'lis; and furrher pro1,,id.cd, howev~,· that if the adjusted basfa for feder.nl L1con:ie. ex< purposas 
of nn ns~et !l,! the beginning of such fisccl ye.':l.r is zero. Depr.~ciatio.n shall be determined \ttith 
rcfcrenc;: to Sllcn beginning Gross Asser Value 1~.sfng any reaaof!ab(e met.hod ~eleqed bJ th~ managers. 
l I:J Gros& A.3aet Value .s)tall mcau a.ii a:.p~t's adjust;d basis for federaf income· ta.'t 
pinp,oses, e;i:~ept as f0II0w;3: 
l LJ.I The Idtfo1 Gross A.9set Value of any asset contribut~d by a mem.):rer to the 
LLC shall be th~ gross thlr market value of llUCh asset, as dctermi.ned by the conr..11:mting rner:n.be::; 
l 1.3.2 The Gross A.:1.set Values of all a.~s·ers shaJJ be adjuated. ti) equal their 
respective gross fair market val1Je6, as derennined by the members as of the :follsiwmg tunes: 
(a) i:he acquiaition of 11n additional interest L1J t.1-te LLC by any new or 
.existing member in ·exchange for more than a de rrJ.cimis capital conuibutian; 
(o) the discril:i;.:itian by the LLC to a member cf more than a de i:du.ir:::ia 
an:iounc of prnperty as considcr°atior. for~ intere,gt u1 the LLC; elld 
·. (c} the liquidation of the LLC ">vithln the meani..1g of'Regu1ations Section 
1. 704-I(b)(2)(ii)(g); provide<!,, however, the.t a4jumne:rt,;s pursuimt to clau.<Jes (i) ~d (ii} abov? $~.H 
be made ocly if the members r~ascna.bly determine th!').t such adju.stmcnt3 are n~c,e3sary o.r 
appropriate ro n~flect tbc relatrve Sharing R.arios oft:Jie members; 
. 11.3.3 The Grass A3sct Value· of any asset di.mibu~.d to any men1ber shall be 
a.dju sted. to eqt1al th~: gross fair ruai:~ec value of suc11 a33ej; on the qare of distribution as decermL •. ed 
by the distribut~e nnd the member3; . 
i 1.3.4 The Gro.ss Asset Values ofa.3sets shall be increased (a.r decreased) co r~e~t 
a~v adjusttnG:1t.s ta tbe a~usted ba~.i,~ of such a.'isets pu.r.ru am to Code. S-ection 7'3 4(b) or Cade s·ec.tion 
7:43(b)> but only to i:h~ extem: that sucJ1 a:dj1.1scments are taken .into account iu det.:imi:ii~rig Capital 
Accauncs pur::iua.nt to .l:',.'~gular.ion .Section 1. 704-l(b)(2)(iv)(m) hereof; provided, ho'YeYer1 that Gross 
A3set Value shall not be :u:ljusted pursuant to.rMG Section l 1.3.4 i:o· t~e e.\.ient the cuemb.ers 
dctcnn111e th.er an ddjusn:nam is ne:esr:a'ry er approptiatc [n ccnz:iectlon ""'i.tb a traru11ctton trui.t wou~d 
citJ1crwjs: result in ac ~dju~1tno.ot pursuant ra r.h.i.s S~ctio.n 11.3 .4; e.o.d . 
l l .J .5 lrthc Gross A.tm Value ofan as.sec ha! b-eer:. detcrrniced or.adjusted p~1rsui..'1t. •· ,: .. , , • .,.. 
. ... . ., . : . . . 










to Sec:ion. l J .3 .1, 11.J .2 or J 1 J .4 hereo~ m.ch Gro:is A.:Jset Yalu~ shall .\heri;afrb- be adji.i.ste;:1 by the 
Dcprecia~ari ti'<<!n into ac~otmt with. r:;:spect to such as3et for purposes of corn?,uting_ profit3. a.11.d 
losses, · 
l 1. 4 ,LLC. ~(inimum G~in sba.11 mean the ;a.me as "partner5J).ip .mi..-rimu1t1 gah::'' as set form 
·fo Sections 1. 70~2f;:i}(2:} a..,d l.704-2(d) Cifthe ReguJ.ation:i .... ,.. .: ... :,. ... .. ... , .... 
. t1.5 Mernbe.- Honrecourse Debi sha:11 have the ~eaning set forth it1 Scctio11 1. 704-2(b;( 4) 
of the Re:gulations for "p~ .. !t::ier noarecourse debt. •r · 
· J i.6 ~ember Nonrccour:~c Debr Minfr~u-~ Gain shall mca.1 !Ul. amount, ~Rith respect to 
each l'kmbcr N<?nrecoune Debt, equal- co th LLC Minimum Galn th.i.t would result i;f such. Member 
Nonre:c.aurse Debt were treated a..'l _a. NoN.;cour.sc Liabiliiy, dcteffilioed in accprdance ,;v-f th Seed on 
1.70'4-Z(i)(J) of the P.egu.laifons: · 
11. 7 Member Nanrecour:;e Ded_uctia.T"J shru.!. ha.ve me meaning set fcrJi in Secti OI'...S l. 704-
20)(1) ai1d ! . 704-2-(I)(2) of the Regu!atjona for "pa~er nowecaurse ded'uctions .. 11 
J 1.8 Nc.nreccuri~ Dedu, ... -tioM sbalJ ha.Ye the meaning ~et forth in $eqio.n ] .704-2(0)(1) 
of the ReguJa.tians·. · 
1 l. 9 ;l::lQ.nrecm.).nc Li2.bJJir,1 shall have the mea.-nug set' forth in Section J. 7 04-2 (b )(J) of · 
rbe Regulation,\. · · 
l I.1 O R~rzulatiam shall mean propas.ed, ·tempopry a.nd .finnl re~adons promulgated u~der 
thr:: Code in effeict a5 of·th~ d!!.te of filing me Articles and Che corresponding sectioos of MY 
regulationi sub.scguentiy js3u,ed th11~ ~rneud: or s..1pe:rs.ecle such regutations. 
12 .. ! 
order: 
A,~TfCLE 12 
CERTAIN T pX PROV1SI01'{S 
S oecia/ AJI oca.tiocrs. The follov,,ing soecia/ allocar1cn.s shall be rnade ir. tbe following . . 
. 12. l, .l · lvfinimur:.i Gaio Chargeback, E~cept a:; cth~rwise pmvic$ed in ~ectlon 1. 704-
2(f} of rhe .Regu/ation.."l promulgat~d under the Code in.et.feet as oftbe dare of.filing the·Ar~cbs an~ 
the carrespondir.g ·sec-Jons of any regufaric,ns sJ..}bsequently issued that amend ·or S',Iper:sede such 
regul.a.tiaru., norw~!hStdf.lding any other provision ofmi.s Article l:Z, if there ls a net cier;,e.a.~e fn .LLC 
lv.!ininnun Ga.hi durL,g acy tiscal yea.t\ ~ach IJlentber .shall. ?e speeia.l!y altocace,ci jterns of LLC 
-income a.r1d gain for ruch fiscal. year (and, if Mce5;sar1, S\lbsequent :fiscal yea.rs) in BJ1 SJ1lount equal 
tn ·.sui;:h inembe.(s share cf the net decrease in LLC Min.in1um Gain, det1'rrr'jned in accorda..,cc with 
Kegula.ticm Section I. 704-2(g). Allocatiot1s pul"suant to the previous .sentence shall be ma.c!e ln 
propc1rtion to t~e respective !.'7lounts required to be alloc.'l.tc:.d to cac.h member pu'rsi.rant therero. The / 
iiems ·co be so 1>.!loc.e:ted shall e determined ir. a.ccc-rda.;rce wifa .Sections l. 704-2(f)(5) and ·1.104- · ,.,;;,. 
I • "° • I 
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20)('.2) . of the Reguisticns. This Secucn 12. l s inter,ded to comp1y w("tb the .nuni..'::iuro gain 
c.hargeba:ck rnquire::nent Li Se~ca.1. 704-2(f; af t.l-ie Rd.~.i.!atioas .and aha.II be intar;iretep cot.siste.1·dy 
then~wit:h. · 
lZ.1.2 M.~mber Minimum Ga.in Ghar;;rnback. E,y.,cept as ot.1emise provid~d in 
Seccion 1-. 794..-~(l)( 4). of che-Regw!adona, n9t;wit~r..d.ing an other provision cf this /u'ti.ci.e .. P-. tf 
tnere is a oet decrease in Mentbe.r .Nanrecourse Debt l\,ilnirnum Ga1n attributi'!ble to a Membe. 
N onrecour5.e DeQt during a~y fiscal year1 each mertiberwho ba.s a sh~re ofth.e Member N onreco~rse 
Debt Minimt:tm Gai.n a-tributahfo to .ruch Member Nonrecou:seDcbc, det.:!rmined in accord3.11.ce V'litb 
Secti9n 1.704-2(1)(5)' of the r~gul..a.-tian~I sh.tll be specially l1:lioc.ated items ofLlC income~~ gal.a 
for such fiscal year {and, ifne1;:essar.y, .subsequent fiscal ye.a.rs)~ an ar,rou:Ltt equal to sucb mcrnb-er's · 
3ha.r~ of te net ~ecrease in M~rnber .Nonrecourse Debt .!v.finimurn Gain attributable to such Member 
Noir.recourse Debt, detemibedln accordance wi:tl,,Re-gula.tions Sectjon L704-2(i)(4). ftJlocatlcns 
pu."'3UaOi to the previous sentence sha!I be: made in proportion to the respecti-~ aii:1ouo.ts required to 
be allocated tci each member pur:rua.t;rt thereto. The items to be so allocar.ed shall be d~tennin.ed 1n, 
ac:corda."'lc~'with ~eciions l.704-2(i){4) and L704-2(D(2) qfthe ReguJi!,'tions. T.hi~ Sect1on 12.l.2 
is intended to comply·yvith the minimum gain chargeback requirc."I)ent in Section 1.704-2.((1)(4) of 
the Regulatio11s apd _sh.al] be i.aterprct:ed consistently therewith. · 
12.1.3 Ouali:fi~ Income Offset. Jn the event any member une~ectadly rec~ves any 
ailjuetments, aUoc.ations, or d1stribl/riona tj'escrib~ in Seaiqn l.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d.)(4). Secti~n 1. 704- · 
l(b)(2)(i)(d)(5) or Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(6) o:fthe Regulations, h:erns ofµC income and gain 
shall be o specialJy allocated to eao& S'..ich member in atJ. iuno\lnt a."1.d mann.er su~cient to eUrni..'late,. 
to the E?Kte.nt required by the Regufocion.s, the Adjusted Deficit of such mep:iber as qujckly as 
possible, prov5ded. ~nat an. allocanoa pu.r,¥1ant to this S~ci:i~n 11.1,3 shell be n1.acle c_nl.y-i-f and to rhe 
c:zj:cnc that such 1nemb~r wouki h<J.Yc an AdjuJtild Defi.c;t after all other allccarions provided for in 
this A;-t/cle 12 ·bave been tentatively mad~ as if tlris Section J 2.1.3 were not in ~hls Operating 
Agrscrne.nt. 
l ~- ).4 Gross focq_me Al1oca.tfan. In th<3 eve~t any member has s. denci~ Capital 
Account ai cpe ead of any .~seal' Jei>.t which ia·Jn e~cess of the :ium of; 
. (a) t.he amount such me~cr ls obligat::d co .resr:or:::i pursuant to a.,:y 
pro •risf.on of tlli3 Opc:r:1tu1g AJsI Ot:l'l'l.OlJC, IUJU 
(b) the amount such memb~ is deemed to b~ obligated to iesto,e 
pµrsmi.nt to the,nex~ to the last se..'ltences of .Regu!a!lan~ Sections 1.i04-2(g)(1) ar.1d 1. 704~i.(i)(5), 
e~ch such mer:iber shaU he $pecial1y a!Joc.atod itern.9 ofLLC income an-d gain in. the a.Jno1.n:1t of such 
excess as qukkJy .H possible, provided tba! au al!qcadon p-ursiia.nt to this Section 12.1,.4 shaJJ l;)c 
· ma.de oruy if ~d tu the e-.cTent tha.r such member would ~,,,ea deficit capital acco~lnt i:n' excess of sucq 
11ufo after all other allocations prov{ded for in this r.rticle I 2 have been made· as if Sectic;i 12: 1..3 
1,c.r:cof a=id trjs· Section 12.1.4 were not in this Operatio~·Ag;e.r:rncnr. · 
1.2. l .5 Nor.u·ec.01.,1nr. Deductions.. Nonre.co.ursc Deductions for aiJY fiscal year ~h.?-11 
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r~~ be special!y allocated to the :r.e~bcrs ~(J. p;opori.or: to their Sharing F,atioe.: 
· 12.1.6 Memb'erNanrecc-ursebdudon.s. A:iY.:1MemberNonraccur;~c.Deducr:icl"..s for 
a.,y qscal year shall b~ specially aJlo~ted tc rh.e memb~r wha bears· the econc~c ris.k of;Jc;iss wim 
respect to d1c Member N9rJec.our3e Debt. to which such Member Non~coo:r~ Deduci:icns ,:u:c 
- • · att:ribdablc.-i.n ·ac.:a:rda.1~e wi):J.1 Raguii:d!:lI'ls-Se.ctfon 1. 704-2(.i)( 1). , ,; _ •. . . .. . .• · 
i2. L 7 Sec.ti on 7 54 Aaiu:itJnecta.' To the extent ~n :i.d]u~tment to rlie adjUstt;!d r:ax be.5is 
of an.y LLC asser pu~,:;~aJlt co Cqds Sec'J.on i34(b) er Code Scccion 743(b). is requira<l, pur.;u~r to 
Regulati(?n~ Sccrion l.70:'t-l(b)(2)(iv)(~)(2) ~r Regulatious Sectjon l:704~J(b)(2)(iv)(m)(4). To be 
taken into acccu.11 in dernrm.inbg capital a.ccount.s as the result. of a dimibution to a ~ember i:n 
c?mplete liquidation of the me.11l.b-er' s :Sbering Ratio [n ~he L.LC,. the· amount of suc.b a~usnnent to 
capital accouot3 ~hail be treai:ed as an irem of gain (tftr.~ adjuscmc..'1t increases the °Qasb of the asse1:) 
or !as~ {i; the a~u.mnei:it in~~ses the basis ·of the as;:et) ar the !oss (ff the adji:m..-nent dc~.es ~ch. 
ha.sis) an.d such gain·· ar lqss sha[I be specially_ a11oc.lted tq the member in' accordance i;;.'ith their 
Sharing Ratias in the LLCin t~e e•,ent th.at Re~ationa. Section 1. 704-!(b)(2)(iv)(rn)(2) applies, or 
to the mem.b'er .to whom such distnbi..ij.on was made in the event that Regulations Section 1.704-
J{b){2)(iv)(m)(4) applies. · 
12.2 ,9ur.3.ti,,e A..lkiq_~. The allocations s~t forth in Section s 12-1 .1 tli.raug~ 12._1. 7 
hereof (tp.e '"Regula,ofJ .AJ!ocation.o;'') are intend~d to comply wh.l:r certain requitemem.s. of the 
R~guiarions.. 1t_is ~he iment of the. member::t that, ta the e:crant possible, al! Regrilirnry Allee.a.dons 
shall be offset either ,vith pilier R~gulatory Ailccatio..'1.9 or v.ri.th' specfaJ alfocai:ions or mbc:r items of 
com_pa,ny income,. ga!.a. Jo5s pr.deduci:ion pt.inuant to this Section 1'2.2-. !p.crefore, notwithsta.,.dlng 
a.ny other provision of this Article 12 (other than the Ragulatory fJlccaticns), the members s.ha.lf 
make s~~h offuetting spedaJ a.!Jo.:ation5 ofLLC income, gain, losa or deduction in wbarevennmner 
chcy deterr.rir.e appropriate so that, a.4.91" such off~e.tting ~loC4,tiooa are ma~e, each members' capital 
account fa, to tiie ~'tent poHtble, equal to the ca.pi~! accmmt such member would have had if the 
Regi,.la.tory Al!ocar.ions were not piL."1 of th.fa Operating Agreement 9:t1d a..!J LLC ft~ms were allocated 
uuI'3wmt to Article 6. 1n e;.::ercisine discretion under th.fa Section 12.2, the members shall take i.m:o 
~ccounr fiifufe R.egiilatory AJlaca~ions under Section 12. J. l and 12.1.2 that, althr.n.ign not yet ma.de, 
ara likely ta off~et other R~le.tory Alloc:adons pn:::"'.iously made under Sectic-~s· 12. J .5 .a...,d I 2.1.6. 
12.3. l Forpu~oses afdeteru:rirring th~ pm.frta, losses, or any at.Ji~ iter:::is aJJcca.ble 
to.any period, rr.o.tits, losses, a..,.d any such other items sha.U be d.et~J;1.ed.on e. daily, rnonti?Jy, or 
odrer ba.s\s, as determined by !he r;icmbers L1sing a..,y perm.iEsible m.ethcd under Code Sectiau 706 
and the Regu.latio.ns "thereun~er. · · · · · 
12.3.2 The membera a.re ~wll.re of ttie i.T:Jcome'tax c9nsequences of the allocations 
made by Article o and thi's .A.mcle, 12 1t.T1d .hereby agre-e to be hnl.lr.:d by the provisions of .Article 6 aDd 







: 1.2.3.3 Solely for p11rpases of dct:::nr..in:ing a rr:er;:ber's prcportionate share ofrb.e 
"exces~ nonr.::::ourse·!iabil.itres1' offoeLL9 ~ithin the meaning cfRegulatior.s Section 1. 7S.?·.J(a}(J ), . 
ths r;:,ember':: i..1rare.sts in LLC profrrs sh~ be in propcrticn to their Sha:ring Ranos. 
12.J.4 To tbc e.:{"i:e:rt: pe:-mitted by St:.ctfon l.704-2{h)(3) of tbe ,RcguLarionz, -r:i,'1e. 
· m~bera shafl endeavor·to··o:-eat di~tricutian~ of net: cl:.h from eperatior.s er net ca.sb. from sru'es.·cc. ~ 
net G,iSh from rafinar1.cing as haying peen m~de from the proceeds of a Nonrecourse Li4biUcy· or a 
.M~mber Nonrecaurs.e Debt o.nly ro the e;.:::.em thar such distribU1io.ns would cause .ct i:nc::-eas~ a:n 
Acljusi:ed Deficit for fl..'JY member . 
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AJ\i~cNDED AND RESTATEC 
ARTJCLES OF ORGANlZATlON 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
03 SEP I 2 fM 3: 3'3 
SECR£T/,RY OF STATE 
STATE OF HJAH9 I (Instructions on back of applicaticr.) 
1. The name of the limited liability company is: Real Homes, L.L.C. 
2. Tihe date the articles of organization were flied was: Janua"'y 1a, 2001 
The Articles of Organization are amended and restated to read: 
3. The name of the limited liability company is:_ ..... R i;;.ea .... JI-.J.LHl..l.lom.w;;e;..is..,_.-11 .......... L--:.:..r.~------
4. The latest date certain upon which the limited liability company wi!I dissolve is: 
'January 1. _2011 
7. ·The name and address of at least 1 manager or member. 
Name: Address: 
Dennis J. Sallaz. 1000 S. Roosevelt Boiae, Idaho -~::,10~ 
8. Signature of at least one manager, if any, or at least one member. 
Sign1eture --------
Typ~d Name Dennis J. Sa 11 az 
o,,,~ 
N . \/ 
Secretary of State use only 
I~ sa:ETMY llf STATE 
09/12/2003 05100 










SALL~Z & GATEWOOD Ll\W ~ [gj OOJ 
j PROMISSORY NOTE 
NOTE AMOUNT: $ I 0,800 Boise. Idaho 
Date: 06/ 10/05 
I PROMISE TO PAY to the order of ROY RICE, of Boise, Idaho, TEN THOUSAND 
EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS AND N0/100 DOLLARS ($10,800.00) payable in lawful 
money of the United States of America, with interest thereon from and after June 
10, 2005. until paid. at the rote of TWELVE PERCENT per annum ( 12%). Principal and 
interest ARE DUE ON DEMAND. 
If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note, I agree to pay such 
sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees. The maker and endorser hereon 
jointly and severally waive presentment for payment. demand. protest and notice 
of protest of non-payment of this note. 
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,l PROMISSORY NOTE 




I PROMISE TO PAY to the order of ROY RICE, at Boise, ldoho, TEN THOUSAND 
DOLLARS AND NO/JOO DOLLARS/$ 10,00.00J payable in lawful money of the United 
States of America, with interest thereon from and ofter September 2 J, 2005, until 
paid. at the rate of TWELVE PERCENT per annum (J 2%). Principal and interest ARE 
DUE ON DEMAND. 
If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note. I agree to pay such 
sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees. The mc·~er and endorser hereon 
jointly and severol/ywaive presentment for payment, demoncJ, protest and notice 
of protest of non-payment of this note. 
Doted this 2 J st doy of September, 2005. 
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:.) 
BILL OF S.A.LE 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That, DENNIS J. SALLAZ, the Party of the First Part, the Seller, for and in consideration of 
the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00), legal moni:y of the United States of 
America, to him in hand pa.id by ROY RICE, the Party of the Second Part, as Buyer, the receipt 
whereof is hereby acknowledged, does by these presents grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said 
Party of the Second Part, the Buyer, his successors and assigns, all right, title and interest to the 
following vehicles/trailers, more particularly described below, free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances, to-wit: 
2002 Yamaha Grizzly 660 A TV, VIN No. JY4AM02Y22C022268; 
1998 Yamaha Grizzly 600 ATV, VIN No. JY4AJ01WA011016; 
Tandem Axle 4 Place A TV Trailer 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the same unto the said Parry of the Set:ond Part, its successors 
and assigns forever. And does for himself, his heirs, successors and assigns covenant and agree, to and 
with the said Party of the Sec~nd Part, its successors and assigns, to warraut and defend the sale of 
said property, goods and chattels, hereby made unro the Party of the Second Parr, its successors and 
assigns, against all and every person and persons whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. the Party of the First Pa~ has hereunto ·;et his hand and seal this 
5th day of May, 2005, at Boise, Tdaho. 




































IN THE DISTRICT COORT OF THE FOORTH JODICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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POSITION OF DEN1'l1S Si>tl.LAZ Condenseit n.i 
TUNE 15, 2005 · 
Page 470 
Page '168 
C Do you want :o •• 
A )kay. Debra, what page is thac? 
3 Q I'm just referring to your exhibit. ff you could 
4 identify what items you have sold. 
5 A Sure. 
6 MR. DEVIS: she's asking about the four wheelers. 
7 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
8 MR. BEVIS: I don't know that I've got ·· 
9 THE WID1ESS: okay. Just the two Grizzlies, if you 
IO found them on your copy. I haven't found that them yet. 
11 MS. EISMANN: That is number 66 and 67. 
12 MR. BEVIS: on the left-hand side. 
13 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
14 BY MS. EISMANN: 
15 Q Okay. So, those two were sold? 
16 A Those two and the trailer that they are sitting on. 
17 Q You have listed two A1V trailers in Item 68. 
18. A Yes. 
19 Q And so one of the two are sold? 
20 A Yes. It's the one that holds four machines. One 
21. holds two machines and one holds four machines. The 
22 Grizzlies were on the one that holds four machines. 
23 Q And you stated in your descriptipa that you own 
24 them 50/50 with Darrell? 
25 A I do •• did. 
Q So, did he receive a portion? 
A No. He consented to the sale. 
Page 469 
2 
3 Q He basically relinquished his interest in it for 
4 you to sell it? 
s A I still owe him half a trailer, but he agreed that 




Q Okay. So, you sold trailer and the two ATV's •• 
A Yes. 
Q •· for those Items 66 and 67? 
Q You value at 4,00li i..Jari? 
2 A Yes. . 
c()J.lltnuruty asset. 
3 Q And you have characterized it as a 
4 A Yes. · . h G ·zz1 
9 ya1na a ri y, you 5 Q And you ·· and item 67, a 199 . . t t? 
6 valued at 2,500 dollars. That's a com111unit;' m eres · 
7 A Yes. d h . have state t e 
8 Q And one of the ATV ta1lers - you · 
9 one that carries four ATV's? 
JO A Yes. 
11 Q That you sold? 
12 A With the Grizzlies. , te t 
I 3 Q Okay. Now -· and you characterized your m res 
14 in the trailer as community? 
15 A As 50 percent. As community. h 
16 Q So, the value is - you valued the trailer w ea you 
I7 sold it at what figure? 500 't 
18 A Well, I had both of them at my half at<'. t'h8~75
1 
. 1cage ,or e . 
19 was just a package sale. Here is the pac 
20 There is no breakdovm. d ak di you m e your 
21 Q And when did you do that? When 
22 sale to Roy Rice? t t 
23 A It was the same day that I delivered the p~yi;en ;h 
24 you, would probably be the best way to tt'f to pm own e ·· '. 




MR. BEVIS: was mean ·· 
THE WITNESS: I brought it straight up bet.::1· ki f, h' ·ust oo ng or 1s 
MS. EISMANN: And that's okay. I'm) 
4 recollection. 





BY MS. EISMA.'fN: •• May 15th. 
Q So, you're thinking probably May of 
A April or May. 
Q April or May of 2005? 
A Yes. JO A Yes. 'd ou sa1 you 





d part rom a . . A Yes. 12 paid in two checks, one from Roy Rice an 1 b I Id. 0 may e s1ou 
Q To Roy Rice? J3 Evans loan. That's what my notes reflect, 5 · 
14 
15 
A Yes. 14 clarify. 
Q And we delivered the money to your attorney? J s A I think r paid 50 percent of his bill from each 
A 1 did. 16 source. ... e payment to 
17 Q Was 'that by your O\.'ll'l check or a check from Mr. 17 Q I see. And you're referring to the sat•• 
16 
18 Rice? 18 Mr. Bevis? 
A I believe I had to make it out payable directly to 19 A Yes. . ? 
, 13e:VlS, 
20 Jim is my recollection. 20 Q And what amount d1d you pay Mr. 
21 MR. BBYIS: I don't know. I didn't receive those. 21 A It would have been probably 15,000 ov:~ to ?v!r. 
22 BY MS. EISMANN: 22 Q And that was paid from the sale of dtC: 
19 
23 Q So, you had listed itein 66 on Exhibit 201, a 2002 23 Rice? 
24 to Yamaha Grizzly? 24 A Half. 
25 A Yes. 2S Q Half of the 7,500 dollars? 





$3.50 Fee* NOTICE OF RELEASE OF LIABILITY $3.50 Fee* 
PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY - ALL INFORMATION MUST BE COMPLETE - NOTIFICATION BY SELLERffRANSFEROR IS MANDATORY 
hicl< or Hull l~cntificauon Number (VIN or HIN) YtJr Mak< Body Styk Title Number 
1GBKP37W5K3302440 1989 WINN MH 98909668 
:lier's/Transferor's Full Legal Name(s): Daytime Phone: 
!lier 's Idaho Drivers License Number(s) or Social Security Number(s): 
jdress: City: Seate: ___ Zip: 
lomc:cer: Selling Price: $ Dace Deli.vered co Purchaserrrransferee: 
1rchaser'sffransferee's Full Legal Name(s.> & Idaho Driver's License Number(s): 
!dress: Cicv: Scace: Zip: Davtime Phone: 
Uwc hereby request chat chc: [d.:iho TraMportacion DcpUrrmenl 1nark it~ rccord.c; co indicate ch.ic the vehicle llr ·1csxcl de!\cribcd 1bove hai been rrans {c rrcd. Howc•,er. 1r/we underst.Jnd th.1.c lhc title record 
will remain in m'j/our namc(JJ uncil J new rdaho C:rtifk.11e of Title is Jpplicd for and i.,;,'iu.:d, recording 11,c: n.une(si ~1r ch(! nc:w <lwncr(s). 
x ___________________ S_i~-11-LJ_/l_,r_e_v_if_S_'e_ll_e_r(_;_Vf_ra-,-i:;j_e_r_o_r(-,·-,---------------'IE.....,XcMH-+IHSB-i"iT 
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PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALJE OF 
INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC 
@006 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 6th day of January, 2006, by and between 
GLENN 1REFREN and DENNfS J. SALLAZ, SELLER, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, BUYER. 
W IT NE S S ETH: 
WHEREAS, Sellers each· hold 100 % ownership interest in Real Homes LLC, which is all of 
the ownership interest therein, an LLC formed and recorded with the Idaho Secretary of State on 
January l 9, 200 l, and 
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties hereto that SeHers shall sell to the Buyer all of 
said Ownership Interest and all right, title and interest in and to all real property owned by Real Homes, 
LLC as set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements herein 
contained, 
IT IS HEREBY AGREED by a11d between th.e parties as follows: 
1. -Sellers hereby agrees to sell to Buyer and Buyer hereby agrees to purchase from the 
Sellers, alJ of said Ownership Interest owned by Sellers, being all of the O,;, nership Interest the:reof, 
subject to the terms and conditions herein set forth. 
2. It is understood and agreed that the total purchase pcice for said Ownership Interest 
shall be the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand and no/100 Dollars (.$250,000), lawful money of the 
United States of Arnerica.-to be paid by the Buyer to the Sellers as follows: 
(a) Buyer shall assume all recorded encumbrances against all real properties owned by 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF INTEREST rN REAL HOM:ES. LLC, P. l 
.. o·e·F~E~ND~IA~Nl!T!!'S~ 
-~ EXHIBIT 
I 3'12 .---RICE 02075 
000649
04/06/2006 16:JJ FAX 208 .. 126:J SALLAZ & GATEIVOOD LAW e ~007 . 
Real Homes, LLC; including, but not limited to, D. L. Evan~; Bank, Perry Harding, 
CPA, and Canyon County property taxes and Buyer shall hold Sellers hannless 
therefrom. 
(b) Said encumbrances include that certain Note and Deed of Trust held by Saxton Fruit 
Farms dated 02/13/2001 which is in default and set for foreclosure sale on January 6, 
2006, and Buyer agrees to pay same in full prior to sale. 
(c) The balance of said purchase price after payment of the title encumbrances shall then 
be paid by Buyer to Sellers in two equal cash shares from the net proceeds from sales, 
focome or other disposition of any or all of the said real properties herein. In any event 
said payment shall be made no later than 24 months from the: date hereof 
(d) Provided, however, that Buyer agrees to give Seller Dennis J. Sallaz an advance of 
$5,000.00 as a partial payment on his Attorney fees due to Jim Bevis prior to April 10. 
2006. 
3. SeHers represent, warrant and agree with the Buyer as follows: 
(a) That the Ownership Interest which is being sold ·herein cons1itutes I 00% of the 
Ownership of Real Homes, LLC; 
(b) The Sellers have good and marketable title to said Ownership Interest being sold and 
transferred hereunder with absolute right to sell, assign and transfer same to Buyei: free 
and clear of al1 liens, pledges, security interests or encumbral1ces and without any 
breach of any agreement to which he is a party. 
(c) The Sellers covenant that all real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC and being 
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... 
transferred herein are free and clear of al! encumbrances not listed herein. 
(d) Real Homes, LLC has free and clear title to said real properties and Sellers shall 
execute any and aJI documents requested by Buyer to transfer all interest therein to 
Buyer. 
4. Time is agreed to be of the essence of this Agreement and the performance thereof 
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors> 
administrators, personal representatives and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have hereuuto ~~t thefr hands the day and year in 
this Agreement :first above \vritten. 
REAL PRO.PERTIES, LLC 
BUYER: 
SELLERS: ll~/= 
By OJenn Trefrenitwner 
AL~ By Glenn Trefr~ 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC. P. 3 
RICE 02077 
000651
f 4/:~/2008 1Ul e FAX 208 J~6 12$:} e SALLAZ & GATEWOOD LAW 
PC 35773 
Exltlbi t • .l\. 
A ~tion oi! th• SO\ltmtaat Qua~t6r of tba .l'JQ;:-t:hea1t Quarter of 
Se<:ti.ou 17, Townohlp J l!loJ!'th, ltanqa 3 Waat of th'5 Doha X•rlcUau, 
c~ County, Idaho al1d is l111Dl:1l p~tioula..rly d111oc:rl.b6d a• fo1..J.cw.u 
COlilKlmCI:NG at tha ~rthwe11t t:oxn~ ot ~d Boutlnnuat °'1UU% of ~ 
llorthe.zwt ~er; t:hsud• 
South o· Js• 14• West a1ong the Weat boundary cf 111aid sou.th,re.i,t 
Qoal::'tel:' of the Jrort:heaat; Qu.Ut.a::r: a d::latllna• of 145.1.$ J!aat, thence 
llortb 8.9'" 4:5' 51• ltast pa.rall•.l With tha North boundary ct the 
lfOJ:"thaa•t Qwu-ter ot. •aid BeaUett 17 & diat.anca of 40. 00 t6~t to 
th• Tlltm lX>llff OJ' Bmnmr.DIG, thence aonti.Jxn.ing 
lrorth 99• !5' 51• hat plU;';a.].lal with ~r:id Borth bo1.mdAry at. 
diatu~ of 2~:9... 00 :f~u,t; thenee 
South o· 35• 1-1• wast puu.lln.1. with t:Jua W••t bcunda.zy 0£ ••id. 
Soutlnr&et QwLrt•r o.f tha lil'o:rthoa.st Q,.ulrter a di.11tanda o.f 18lJ .. Ob 
.le.et, thlblo• · 
Sou.th 99• 45' 51• lf'e11t pllilrallel 'With t:bc .No.th bounda.r., o:f aaid 
Ho:r:~ast QU.artex- a di.11taJ::t.c:le cd! 2-1!1. DO f••t1 the:n<::e 
North o• 35' 1&• hist J;)llnl.lel With the itesl: botlnda.1;y o:1! said 
South1-at Quarte:.r: of the No:rthoa.,,t Quart" a d:iiiltaDce of 180.00 
fe,ot tQ · the tt"O'li: l'O:rN"l' Oll' l'll!:GnmDro. 
PUCXL l.B · 
A · pol:'timi of tho, Sauthveat ~t•r of th<!: Bo:rthe4gt Quarter of 
Sectiou 1,. TownBh.lp 3 North, ~:a.uq• J Wost of tha Boiu• lt•~id..ian, 
caxxy,m Co\ZQty, Idaho and i• -..o:t:e particula~ly daao:d . hed ..\1!1 followo 1 
cmoaNCINC at the Xortmn,st comer of t111id Soutlnreat Qu.iu"ter of the 
ll-orth•ut Qttaxt:er1 thm1oe · 
South o• 3S • 14" West along tho Soutb bollndu,- of a.aid 
Southwo•t Qwlrtar ot thtt N'o:rthaaAt Qu.e.rta:r • diata:nx,a of 7~5.:J..5 
.f!••t1 thcloe 
!for~ S!r-~45' 51• Ka.at parallel ldth the >To:rth bow1dery--e-.C -the 
lfort:h .. at Qu.;\.rtc,.:r: of ,udd SO<Stion 17 a di11tanCQ of lU.00 ;feet to 
the "llUJlt PODn OF BBGDllltl.SG1 thenoa oontinui.ng 
llortb s9• ~s· s1• -:hJt parallel w-.1th •a.id N'o:r:th boundary a 
cll•tall.ce of -U9. 9.S :feet: to 2'. po~t Oil tbG cantarlilla of the Burri• 
Cal:l.a1. 1 than.oe 
Bo~th 45• 3.9' ,e• W••t a.long ud.d oant;orl:l.na a di•tanc• ot! 
~S8. 6~ foel:.r tblllllJe leaving add o~tet-11.n.e -.m1 ~a.ring 
Bo.il:4 99• -ts• .5l." Wut parallel v.tth tb.• Worth baa:ucl&J:y ct •aid 
Jro~thtwu1t Quarter a. d.1.J!lt.a:aew of 266, 82 :t11e1:.1 tha:no• 
No:r:t.h 0' J 5' 14 • :&a•~ pE!!•ll•l 'With tha Wer.t bo-unduy of ••.!cl 
Sgatbw••t Qwartar of the >rortha .. t Qu.4.rter a di11t.ianc:e of lB0.00 







SALLAZ & GATEWOOD LAW 
A portio:n ol thll Soutlrwut Qu.u-h:r:- o! t:.hAl Jiort:.h,e.a.itt Quttttr of 
Sctet.ic:a. 17. 'leiw:n..-h.ip 3 North, h.ng-, 3 Weet ot th• tlob10 Keridi.an, 
canyon County, ?dah.o im.d le uc~• pu-Ucula.rl:, di!i.!9cribed u follciv. r 
CCtilllK2fC!l.G a.t th£1 llro:c-tlnn•t oo:rnu of a*id Southwi.:it Qwa.rt•:r of the 
Nortben st Qua,xt:•x- 1 tl:11,nc G 
South o• 3S' l<i• w.at alcmg thft 1t'a111t haac.duy of •e..ld. Soutlnteet 
Quarter ot the ~rthd•t: Qmu:t•r a d.!ttt.hoa of 7-iS .15 fHt, thmao 
Werth er 4gr 31" .._.t pa.nllal witll th.a worth bcttnduy o! the 
Wort.hllasb Quuter o~ H-i.4--B•ol:ion 17- a di1t:.aim• l1l tC.OG i,.t, 
thello• · · 
South o• 35' 14 11 wut: pa.r•lbl with th• waat: bcuo.d.uy of •a.id 
800.thlN•t. Quut.er ot t.M llcnt.b.u.at Qua~l:u· • d:J.1t:u.o• o~ 110. 00 
faet: to the "l'llUS PODC"l' OI' :!IQ!lllfn1Q1 l:h.e:nc• 
Jll'oxth u• ,ts• 51• Ea.al: pus.il•l vith t:ha l!l'oi:th l>ou:n.d.&J:7 o.t ••id 
Ncirth.ea•t ou-rt·~ • diat.anaa of 1si.so feet, !:.hand• 
Sotlth o• 35' 14• Wut ~r.allel with t:hA 'tr•.ot boanduy ct aalcl 
SO\ltlift·at Qu.H-ta::z: of th.41 2forthaaat: Ouut•~ a di•tan.ca of lOl. 00 
!set, l:hcto• 
South a~ l.9' JS• W••t pa:n.lla1 'With~ South.~ ciL.ea.i"d. 
SoutlPNi•t · ~t~r o:f th• >torthoo.•t QU.a:r:tar • di•t.an.aa ct 15:l .5D 
.tant:, thane• 
!loxth o• 35' 1« • .Rot paral.lai with. th• Ye,i,t h<,und.ary of •a:td. 
Solltl:niNa•t Quarter of th• Northe.1L11t QWt:rte~ a di•ta.nce o.! 303. 09 
f•e2t to t:.he mtra ronrr op B:gGDll!f.llla. 
PllCEL 28 
JL port:ion Qf th• Sou~tJt Quart:•:r of U. No.rtheaat: Qua:r:t•r ot 
ll•otion 17", 'tuwwJh.!p l licrth, lllmge 3 West of th• D,oi11n J(eridillXl, 
ca.nyon Coanty, Idaho and its JDOra pa:i:tiau.l.uly dei,Qx-:lhad •• follotni: 
CC'laKXlilCDJG •t the N¢X"tmtent cam~ of 11aid southwest Qt.Lart•r ot th.a 
Nort.b.a:a._.t Qu,&rttU"J t.b.ane• 
South o· 3.5" 1-1'" Wut •long the W.at hon:nd.a:ry ot a.a.id South.r11•t 
~tor of thAt !kirthaa•t Qua.rtll"X" a cU•t:.anq• o:f 745 .1S featJ th~d• 
>kn-th u,· cs' 51• :r:».at pu-1.llel nth th.fl l'to:rth ~ of. the 
llorth.oaat Ql].a:rt:11r ot aa!d S&ctl.QU. 11 a. d.i•ta.nao 01! -l0.00 fHtJ 
th,mca 
South 0" 35• 14.• 'H•llt p.u:ttllel with tha W•at ~ of s.1id 
SeQth,n.gt ~t.z- Of the Northeut Q'tl.a.,';tct'l'.' a. dii;;bln:lG 01! :tt0 .~ 
f••t1 th41l1CG 
Horth a,· 45' 51• Eluit parallel vi.th th~ North bounduy of arld 
Nort.bAta•t ~tiar • dlatanc• ot 1!il .so ftH11t t:o tho TRUE ~:or.r OV 
»~, thWQ.C• oontln'l.1.1.ng 
North 89 .. -is• 51• b:11t parallo1 with uaid lforth .bQund.u:y • 
di.•u:nca cf 363 .J2 tet0t to ._ point on th• aonteirlin• of tha llurri• 
Cana.l 1 then.ea 
So,;zth ,s· 3.9 • ~a• W•r»t along Uid cmtterlil:le a. diatanc:l! of 
43~.9l fe•t; ~o 
Bouth 89" 39' 25• W'nat p.ara11.•l wit:.h th• South bou:ndaxy of .tclid 
8~1:hw.-•t Quarter of the llrortheaat QU.u:t«r • dJ.tttand• ol SS. 35 
:I!• o t: 1 l::h*Xl.Ce 
Jror:t:h o· 35, 14 • Ka.at pa.nlle1 with th• 1'0lllt boundary of •a.id 
Sou~•t Qwttt&r of tho Hor~t Qu.&rtor a dleta.nu• o~ JOi.eo 
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file i';o_; 200601847 
EXHIBIT A 
This parcel is a portion of Lot 14 of WESTVJEW SUBDIVISION, Canyon County, Idaho, 
according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 4 of Plats at Page 31, records of said County and 
situated in the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quar-ter of the Northwest Quarter of Sectio11 
21, Township 3 North, Range 2 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Southwest corner of $aid Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter; thence 
South 89°45' 35" East along the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 396.00 feet thence 
North 00° 02' 31'' East parallel with the West boundary ofsaid Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter oft he Northwest Quarter a distance of 30.00 ro the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING; thence continuing 
North 00° 02 1 31" East parallel with the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarrer a distance of 254.l O feet; thence: 
South 89<) 45' 35·• East parallel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
S0uthl11est Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 120,00 feet; thence 
South 00° 02' 31" West parallel with the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 2S4.l0 feet: th encl! 
Nonh 89.,45' 35" West parallel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 120.00 feer to the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGJNNTNG. 
This parcel is subject to ancJ in dudes the use of a 32.00 foot wide ingrcss-egn:ss 1rnd utility 
easement more particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING ar the Southwest corner of said Southeast Quarter o:- the Southwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter; thence 
South 89° 45' 35" East along the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 484.00 feet; thence 
North 00° 02' 31 '' Easr parallel wich the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Norrhwest Quarter a distance of 30;00 feet ro rhe TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING; thence 
North 00° 02' 31" East par.die! with the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 254.IO feet; thenct" 
South 89° 45' 35" East parallel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 32.00 feet; thence 
South 00° 02' 3 J'' West parallel with the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 254.10 reet; thenct' 
North 89° 45' 35" West parallel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
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OCT 3 0 2007 
J. JAVIC 1'1,WA.F.RO, Clerk 
SyJ HEATON 
OEPIJTY 
IN THE DISTRICT C01JRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN At~D FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REl'l~E L. BAIRD-SALLAZ, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 











Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSJONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on four separate occasions over 
a nine month period. The dates of trial were November 15, 2005, through November 19, 2006; 
April 10, 2006~ through April 14, 2006; July 17, 2006, through July 21, 2006; and July 27, 2006. 
A total of 16 days were utilized for the trial. There were several hundred exhibits admitted into 
evidence - many consisting of a substantial number of pages. 
The Plaintiff was present during the trial and represented by Debra L. Eismann, Esq, of 
Nampa, Idaho. The Defendant was also present during trial and represented by James A. Bevis, 
Esq, of Boise, Idaho. There were many pretrial motions that were considered by the Court, as 
well as many motions and litigation issues _during the period that this matter was tried. This 
matter was, at times, highly contentious and the parties and attorneys challenged the court's 
schedule for a long period of time. However, the Court wishes to note that both parties were · 
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counsel and the parties were all required to exercise a great deal of patience and flexibility in 
order to allow both parties to have a full, fair and complete trial. 
In addition, the Court required an inordinate amount of time to complete the Findings and 
Conclusions below. As i_ndicated in earlier correspondence, this was highly unusual for this 
Court. Pa..11: of the delay was due to the large volume of exhibits and the substa..11tial time between 
trial days, wbich required more of the Court's time in reviewing evidence it heard as far back as 
November, 2005. Part of the delay was due to the other circumstances, schedule and demands of 
the Court's time and duties throughout the last year. Finally, part of the delay was due to 
circumstances and demands upon the Court on a personal level, which the Court understands is 
probably not a concern of either party. Regardless of tl_ie causes of the delay, the Court wishes to 
sincerely compliment and thank the parties and their counsel for their patience. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Dennis and Renee were married on July 4, 1996. This action was filed on May 
27, 2004. The parties were divorced by this Court on July 28, 2005, vvith the issues of property 
and debt division remaining for trial. 
2. Long before the marriage, Dennis represented Steve Sumner and other entities in 
a lawsuit. He began work on this lawsuit in 1985 and was still acting as Sumner's attorney as 
late as August, 1999. In March, 1999, Dennis claimed that he was owed $377,398.60, plus 
interest for his fees and costs advanced and monies loaned to Sumner and his entities. The 
evidence established that as of August 5, 1999, he was owed $351,089.42. At that time, 
$269,204.60 of this was at least 120 days overdue .. There was no documentary evidence to 
establish how much of this was earned prior to July 4, 1996. The balance of $81,984.82 was 
current. 
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Boise, Idaho. Dennis has been J licensed and practicing attorney in the State of Idaho since 
1965. On March 15, 2004, Denn.is entered into a partnership which consisted of the law firm and 
Scott and lvfarjorie Gatewood. This resulted in the filing of an Election for Small Business 
Corporation named "Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd.". This election states that Dennis and Renee 
have a 90% ownership and the Gatevvoods have a 10% ownership in the law firm. 
4. Denn.is tenninated Renee's employment at the law firm on May 11, 2004. 
5. Prior to the marriage, Dennis acquired a one half interest in real property located 
in Grandview, Idaho. 
6. Prior to the marriage, in 1969, Dennis org,m.ized and/or became the owner of a 
corporation knovvn as National Financial Service, Inc. On May 11, 2004, Renee took $3,200.00 
from the account for th.is en tit/. 
7. Prior to the marriage, Dennis acquired a residence located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, 
Boise, Idaho. Denn.is' law office is operated out of this location. There is a mortgage on th.is 
property in the amount of $272,032.67. The monthly payment on this amount is $2,241.93. 
Dennis also receives rent from the law office in the amount of $3,400.00 per month. Plaintiff has 
abandoned her claim for any improvements to this property during the marriage. 
8. Dennis also acquired 3 properties prior to the marriage in June of 1991 from 
Kendra Bertsch-Sallaz. These are located in Grandview, Smith's Ferry and Ada County, Idaho, 
and are identified in defendant's Exhibits 240, 241 and 242. 
9. There exists a retirement account with Putnam Investments. The client number 
for that account is 0336644339. The balance in that account according to the latest statement in 
evidence is $40,160.99. The account consists of eight (8) separate funds. Only three (3) of the 
separate funds were opened before the marriage. The documentation for these three funds shows 
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:ont.:.-:_but:ons pr:;or to the .:na-na.ge of$: --"'4.67, .$3,140.25 and .s:.~95.90, fer a '.ot::i.l of 
$8,510.92. 
10. Dennis' grandmother, Bessie Matcham, died on March 26, 2000. Prior to that, on 
or about March 20, 2000, Dennis deposited $184,969.37 from her estate into his trust account. 
Between March 20, 2000, and August 15, 2001, all of this money was disbursed to the heirs 
except for $5,625.25. 
11. Dennis did not file an application to be appointed personal representative of his 
grandmother's estate until October 12, 2000. He was appointed on October 19, 2000. 
12. Dennis prepared and filed an inventory for the estate. However, this inventory 
was not signed by him. Instead, it was signed by Dennis' sister, Chris Snyder. The inventory 
did not list any loans made to any third parties as assets and the value of the estate was placed at 
$103,767.44. 
13. Chris purchased Renee's jeep in April, 2001, for $22,500.00. She used part of the 
monies paid to her out of the estate. The money was deposited into the Real Homes checking 
accol,Int. 
14. On June 18, 2003, Dennis signed escrow instructions relating to his receipt of 
payment of a settlement in th~ Sumner case, along with a confidentiality agreement regarding the 
settlement. 
15. On August 13, 2003, Dennis opened an account for his grandmother's estate at 
D.L. Evans Bank (hereinafter "estate account"). This was approximately 3 years after her death 
and approximately 3 years after he was appointed the Personal Representative of her estate. He 
authorized, in addition to himself, his brother Daryl and his daughter as signatories on this 
account. He also directed all statements and correspondence to be sent to his daughter's address. 
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16. Cn or cefoz.e Augu:::t 15, 200: rennis rece:ved $ 1.32,098.JO from the trust 
account of Richard Harris. This money was from the settlement of the Sumner litigation. 
However, the check received by Denn.is was made payable to "Estate of Bessie B. Matcham" 
(Dennis deceased grandmother). Dennis did not tell Renee about this money. He did not deposit 
the check into the law firm trust account. Instead, on August 15, 2003, he deposited the check 
into the account associated with his grandmother's estate. 
17. Dennis received additional moriJes from the Sumner settlement which he did not 
deposit into his trust account and did not tell Renee about at the time. These amounts were 
deposited as follows: $2,000.00 (August 29, 2003), $5,000.00 (September 8, 2003) and 
$198,000.00 (July 13, 2005). 
18. The total received during the marriage by Dennis from the Sumner settlement, 
was $387.098.00. 
19. Dennis signed Renee's name on a 2003 joint income tax return on October 4, 
2004. This return did not report the income he received from the Sumner case settlement. 
Although Dennis testified in his deposition that he advised Perry Harding, CPA about this and he 
said he would take care of it, Mr. Harding testified at trial that Dennis did not tell him about this 
money and he did not tell Dennis he would take care of it. 
20. In addition, Dennis spent a great deal of money from the estate account for 
personal living expenses follQ\.ving the deposit of the settlement monies. Dennis testified in his 
deposition that he began writing checks on the estate account for his personal use on October 8, 
2003. 
21. Dennis Vvithdrew $6,000.00 in cash from the estate checking account on August 
29, 2003 .. 
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Je:::"Jis ·vrote fote 3e~ar:ite $40,0CO.OO che-:lc on the estate accou:::-:: en :une 8, 
2004. They were payable to Daryl, Chris, Becky and Di.mi - all relatives of Dennis. It does not 
appear from the terms of the will that Diani is entitled to receive any share of the residue of the 
Matcham estate. These checks were not endorsed and were all run through the bank at the same 
time. Then, they were converted into cashiers checks, which were never endorsed. 
On July 13, 2005, Dennis deposited another $198,000.00 from the Sumner 
settlement into the estate checking account. On that same day, he wrote a check in the amount of 
$198,000.00 to D.L. Evans Bank ai-id had his brother Daryl sign the check. Four cashier's 
checks were purchased with this money, each in fae amount of $49,500.00, payable to Daryl, 
Chris, Becky and Dia...-u. As noted earlier, Diani is not entitled to receive any of the inheritance 
under the terms of the will. None of the four cashier's checks were endorsed by the payees and 
all four were run through the bank at fae same time. 
24. One of the 4 cashier's checks for $49,500.00 was re-deposited into the estate 
checking account on August 25, 2005. Li...1<:e'vvise, another one of these checks was re-deposited 
into the estate account on October 28, 2005. 
25. Dennis wrote a $500.00 check from the estate checking account to Tradesman, 
Inc. on August 25, 2005. 
26. Dennis vvrote another check from the estate account on August 31, 2005, in the 
amount of $25,807.00 for a closing on real property. This check was payable to Title One. 
27. In January, 2001, Real Homes, LLC was formed (hereinafter "Real Homes"). 
The Articles of Organization for this entity were filed with the Secretary of State on January 19, 
2001. Dennis is listed as the original registered agent and Renee is listed as the Manager. Both 
Parties signed the Articles. 
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23. fwo OpetaI::ng Agre:;m:;;:-:ts were introdi.:ced ii.1.to ev:c:eIJ.c..; .:-e1arding Real Homes 
- one by Renee and one by Dennis. 
29. The one provided by Renee is dated on its cover and on the signature page 
Januaq 19, 200 l, and is signed by Renee only. The testimony established that Dennis prepared 
this document. This document provides that Renee owns 100% of the membership of the LLC 
and that it is governed by its members. The document also provides that no additional members 
can be admitted except with a unanimous vote of the members. It also requires a majority vote 
of the members regarding all determinations, decisions, approvals and actions affecting the 
entity, as well as the business affairs of the LLC. Finally, this Operating Agreement specifically 
prohibit any amendments to the Agreement which change the number of votes or degree of 
consent required to approve or disapprove any matters that require a vote of consent and any 
amendments to provisions for allocations or distributions of profits, losses or cash. 
30. The one provided by Dennis is signed by Dennis and Glen Trefren. However, this 
document is not dated, either by way of a stated effective date in the agreement or on the 
signature page. Dennis and Glen Trefren are the stated members of the LLC, with a sharing ratio 
of 50% each. The document also states that both contributed an initial amount of $25,000.00. 
The evidence at trial established that Mr. Trefren did not make such a contribution. 
31. On February 11, 2002, the Annual report for Real Homes was filed with the Idaho 
Secretary of State. This report identifies Renee as the President of Real Homes. On February 
19, 2003, another Annual report was filed with the Secretary of State vvhlch also identified Renee 
as the president. The Annual report filed February 16, 2004, also identifies Renee as the 
president and secretary of real Homes. However, Dennis filed an annual report for Real Homes 
which listed he and Glen Trefren as manager-ovvners. He signed the articles as "co-owner". 
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32. On Septerr:.iJer 3, 2003, Denr.is SleC:. tl_i::enCed 2.lld Rest.1.ted .A...i~icles 01 
Organization for Real Homes 1,,iith the Idaho Secreta,.7 of State. Tnis document listed him as a 
member and he signed this document as "Owner". 
33. Renee opened a checking account for Real Homes on Januar; 19, 2001. 
34. Renee, signing as President, applied for an Employer Identification Number for 
Real Homes on April 17, 2004. 
35. In January, 2001, Glen Trefren was employed as a property "scout" for Real 
Homes, LLC. He was paid $300.00 to $400.00 per week. 
36. On February 15, 2001, Real Homes purchased 5 acres of property from Saxton 
Fruit Fanns located on Riverside Blvd., in Caldw'ell, Idaho (hereinafter "Riverside Property"). A 
deed of trust was executed naming Sa-xton as beneficiary in the amount of $43,900.00. 
37. The Riverside Property was later divided into 4 lots: IA, lB, 2A and 2B. Renee 
provided a letter to Canyon County authorizing Glen Trefren and a realtor to appear on behalf of 
real Homes regarding the conditional use permit required to divide the this property into the four 
lots. 
38. Renee moved into the Riverside Property, Lot IB, in August or September of 
2003, when she moved out of the marital residence, and continues to reside there. 
39. On February 10, 2004, Real Homes sold Lot lB of the Riverside Property to 
Dennis and Renee for $105,000. This property is also kno1,v11 as 15584 Riverside, Caldwell, 
Idaho. The deed from Real Homes was signed by Renee. This property was appraised on March 
30, 2005 and had a value of $152,000.00. The debt against this property is approximately 
$114,471.90, leaving a net value of $37,528.10. 
40. Pulother appraisal of the 15584 Property was admitted into evidence in July, 2006. 
This report is dated July 18, 2006, and lists a value of $280,000.00. 
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41. On A~gust 16, 2001, :-ier. '?re.;::en fora:.td bis Jvvn LL.: named "Tradesmar.. 
Contractors & Construction". Dennis prepared the Articles of Incorporation for him. 
42. On December 20, 2002, Dennis refinanced the property at 1000 S. Roosevelt. 
I 
Some of the community credit card debt was paid off at this tin1e. The total of all the va.rious 
accounts paid was $73,014.85. Although Renee testified that only $17,762.64 of this amount 
should be subject to reimbursement because that amount related to personal credit cards, there 
was no evidence that the balance was not also spent on community debt. 
43. Renee entered into a contract with the Hennifers to purchase real property located 
at 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho (hereinafter the "Hennifer Property"). Renee had been 
pasturing her horses there and the purpose was to acquire the property for the same. However, 
Dennis and Renee could not ultimately qualify for the loan to purchase this property. In order to 
acquire and close on this property, they had to obtain a loan from Dennis' brother, Daryl. Renee 
testified that following the dosing, Daryl signed a quitclaim deed to them. However, no such 
quitclaim deed was admitted into e"lidence and there is no evidence of recording of the same. 
44. Daryl testified that he has no out-of~pocket investment in the Hennifer property. 
Renee and Dennis are the only ones who have any such investment. They incurred expenses 
associated with the clean-up and remodel of the house on the property. Dennis collects the rent 
and pays the underlying mortgage. He also personally pays any shortfall between the rent and 
mortgage. Daryl pays no taxes on this property. In addition, Daryl's testimony at trial regarding 
the arrangement he had v,ith Dennis regarding this property is inconsistent with his testimony at 
his deposition and there is no documentation regarding this arrangement. 
45. On April 17, 2002, the Buckingharns purchased a strip of property from the 
Hennifer Property for the purpose of enlarging their yard. Renee was listed on the contract as the 
seller and the $14,750.00 proceeds from the sale were deposited into the Real Homes account. 
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46. Cn ti1at same date, the CampbeEs aiso iJ11r;;nased J st.i."ip of propert; from the 
Henn.ifer property. Renee was listed as the seller on that contract and the $12,250.00 proceeds 
from that sale were deposited into the Real Homes account. 
47. The value of the 916 S. Roosevelt (Hel1I'...ifer) property 1s approximately 
$180,000.00, with debt against it of approximately $115,000.00, leaving $65,000.00 in equity. 
48. On October 7, 2002, Real Homes purchased real property located on Smith 
A venue in Nampa, Idaho (hereinafter "Smith Property"). There was no secured debt against the 
property at the time of purchase. 
49. Dennis prepared a deed of trnst and promissory note in the ai'Ilount of $15,000.00 
to secure debt that he and Renee owed to Perry Harding, CPA. The note was signed by Renee as 
president of Real Hornes, and she and Dennis signed individually. 
50. Dennis testified that he stopped payments to the Saxtons on the debt owed to them 
by Real Homes because he ran out of money. Thus, Real Homes was defaulted on April 15, 
2004, on the underlying deed of trust. However, the balance in the Real Homes checking 
account as of April 1, 2004, was slightly over $70,000.00 and was almost $68,000.00 as of April 
30, 2004. 
51. $30,686.69 was transferred by Dennis on May 7, 2004, from the Real Hornes 
account to pay off a line of credit with D.L. Evans Bank. On that same date, he transferred 
$35,665.94 from the account into a cashier's check. On May 18, 2004, $30,000.00 was 
deposited into the law finn trust account. The balance of$ 5,665.94 has not been accounted for 
by Dennis. 
52. Dennis closed the Real Hornes checking account on June 2, 2004. 
53. Dennis filled out and signed a business credit application for Real Homes with 
D.L. Evans Bank on November 5, 2004. In that application, in which he acknowledged that his 
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answe::.-3 we:-e cnth__ 'U cin.d accurate, he states tlcat he is l,jQ% owner. Or. .\f c1e:nbe::- 3, 2004, he 
completed a financial statement with D.L. Evans regarding his personal guarantee on the loan to 
Real Homes. 
54. On November 15, 2004, Dewis filled out and signed an Annual Report for the 
Secretary of State for Real Homes, wherein he listed himself as owner-manager and signed as 
"owner". 
55. Also in the fall of 2004, Glen Trefren, through a bid submitted to Dennis, 
estimated the cost of construction work at the Smith Property at $30,950.00. 
56. Dennis signed a promissory note on behalf of Real Homes for $30,475.00 and on 
Febmary 4, 2005, D.L. Evans Bank recorded a deed of trust against the Smith Property to secure . . 
this amount. 
57. The Sa'<:tons proceeded with a Notice of Trustee's Sale on January 19, 2005, in 
order to foreclose against the Riverside property. The sale was scheduled for May 25, 2005. 
58. Later in February, 2005, Glen Trefren signed a quitclaim deed, as a purported 
member of Real Homes, LLC, granting all real property O"Wned by Real Homes to his LLC 
known as Tradesman, Inc. The deed also included Lot lB of the Riverside property which was 
owned by Dennis and Renee, not Real Homes. Dennis testified that he did not know about the 
quitclaim deed, but Mr. Trefren testified Dennis prepared it. 
59. There were several collection proceedings against Dennis and Renee in the spring 
of 2005, relating to Dennis' medical bills. It appears that these bills have been paid. 
60. Dennis sold 2 ATVs and a trailer to Roy Rice on May 5, 2005, for $7,500.00 to 
pay his attorney. 
61. On May 25, 2005, Glen Trefren filed a bankruptcy proceeding on behalf of Real 
Homes. He represented himself as an authorized agent. The Petition stated that the assets of 
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R~al Home:; :1ad a 12.me Jf :S _"45)00.00 with :;ecured c:;-ec:rccrs totali.J:.-g $99)96.00. The :_:ietition 
did not list any unsecured creditors. This resulted in the cancellation of the foreclosure sale by 
the Saxtons. 
62. Renee filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy upon the grounds that ~Ir. Trefren 
was not a member of Real Homes ai.1d had no authority to file such a proceeding. The 
bankruptcy court dismissed the proceedings on November 25, 2005. 
----63. Glen Trefren then, on June 6, 2005, and on behalf of his LLC (Tradesman), 
recorded a $250,000.00 lien against all real property owned by Real Homes, and the residence 
owned by Dennis and Renee (LotlB Riverside). 
64. Mr. Trefren recorded tv,io amended claims of lien on July 22, 2005. One was 
• 
against the Riverside property, including Lot lB, for $250,000.00. The other was against the 
Smith Property for $35,000.00. 
65. Despite this matter having been pending for over a year before trial was 
completed, Mr. Trefren was unable to provide even a single document to support any of his liens. 
Further, these debts were not listed in the bankruptcy filings he made on behalf of Real Homes. 
In fact, he testified under oath, that his intent in recording the lien was to cloud the title on all the 
real property. 
66. D_ennis testified that he turned over all but l 0% of his interest in the law firm 
named Sallaz and Gatewood. He testified that he turned over all his accounts receivable. 
However, there is no documentation regarding any of these facts and the Subchapter S Corporate 
documents from the year 2004 show him as a 90% owner. 
67. Theresa Pulliam, the accountant hired by Renee, valued the accounts receivable 
for Sallaz & Gatewood, as of July 28, 2005, to be $130,744.00. Part of her valuation was based 
upon an accounts receivable aging summary provided by Dennis' law office as of 12:06 p.m. on 
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October 2:5, 200:5. That suw"11ar; orJy lis,ed J accounts betvveen 31 and 60 days olci, totaii~1g 
$1,416.17, and no other accounts older than 60 days. That summary showed current accounts 
receivable to be $247,689.79 and those between 1 and 30 days to be $9,672.63. 
68. Ms. Pullian1 did not reduce the value of receivables based on taxes that would be 
paid upon receipt or for any payables due at the time. She did note that a reduction could be 
done in the amount of $4,650.00 for the payables and testified that the ta'C rate would be 25%. 
69. The accountant hired by Dennis, Perry Harding, reviewed Ms. Pulliam's opinion, 
did some independent review, and arrived at a lesser figure of $43,334.15. His valuation was 
based upon a "revised" accounts receivable aging summary, which showed only $15,952.12 as 
current, $27,167.92 from 1 to 30 days old, and the large figure of $179,883.53 as over 90 days 
old. These figures were arrived at after discussions between he and Dennis' office manager. 
70. Despite the figure of $15,952.12 as current, the firm was collecting in excess of 
$30,000.00. 
71. During the summer of 2001, Renee made arrangements through a friend who 
owned a Labrador stud to purchase a yellow puppy from Josh Edwards. 
72. On August 3, 2001, Dennis had semen extracted from his dog named "Vegas" for 
preservation of the bloodline. 
73. Renee picked up the puppy from l'vfr. Edwards on October 27, 2001. Renee 
named the dog Smooch. 
74. During the early pendency of this matter, the Court entered an order providing an 
equal sharing of possession of Smooch. This was done because Renee would not allow Dennis 
to take the dog on an annual hunting trip for approximately a week. 
75. For the most part, equal sharing of possession of-8mooch has worked fairly well. 
The only problem that has arisen since the initial order was last fall when Renee refused to 
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coc per2.:e with Dennis regarding llcc:er iuming trip and t.11e Court #as req·Jirec to eJ.ter an 
order allowing Dennis to have possession of the dog on specified dates. 
76. Renee filed this action on May 27, 2004. 
77. Renee's testified that her residence at the Riverside property was broken into on 
May 28 or 29, 2004, and again on July 27, 2004. On both occasions, the only area that was 
disturbed was the office. She te~tified that the items stolen were the hard drive from her 
computer, her file on Real Homes and the quitclaim deed from Daryl to Dennis and Renee 
regarding the Hennifer property. However, it does hot appear that she actively engaged the 
authorities in investigating these incidents to learn who might have done it. 
78. Following the parties' separation, the receipt of the Sumner settlement monies, 
and the disbursement of those monies through the estate account, on January 13, 2004, Dennis 
rented a new safe deposit box at D.L. Evans Bank. While this matter was pending, the Court 
entered an order providing that both parties view and inspect this safe deposit box together to 
confirm and/or determine the contents therein. On July 20, 2005, at approximately 4:33 p.m., 
Dennis and Renee went to the bank and inspected the box. However, on that same day, at 
approximately 3:55 p.m., Dennis went to the bank and accessed the box. Dennis was not truthful 
about this visit about one half hour before he was to meet Renee and further testified that he was 
not carrying anything with him when he accessed the box. However, the surveillance video from 
the bank shows that Dennis was in fact carrying a briefcase when he went into and when he left 
the safe deposit box. When the parties met and inspected the box 30 minutes later, there was 
nothing in the box: except some silver dollars. 
79. On December 9, 2005, Dennis received ·written notice through his law office of an 
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale for January 16, 2006. Renee did not receive this notice. 
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Pursuant to the Articles of Organization, Dennis is shown to be the registered agent, Janet Rice 
(Roy Rice's wife) is shown to be the manager or member, and Millis Anderson (DenrJs' 
secretary) signed the Articles as a member. 
81. Two days later, on January 6, 2006, Dennis and Trefren entered into a contract 
entitled "Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC". Dennis and Trefren are 
identified as "seller" and Real Properties is identified as "buyer". Roy Rice signed for Real 
Properties as a mai'J.ager. The contract recites that Dennis and Trefren own 100% of Real Homes 
and that they are selling all their ownership interest and all real property which includes all 4 
parcels of the Riverside property (including Lot IB) and the Smith Property to Real Properties 
for the sum of $250,000.00. Dennis and Trefren also warrant 100% mvnership of Real Homes 
and "good and marketable title free an clear of all leins, pledges, security interest or 
encumbrances and without any breach of any agreement to which he is a party". 
82. Trefren recorded a quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, as sole m.vner, member and 
manager of Tradesman. This deed purported to convey Lots IA, 2A and 2B of the Riverside 
property from his LLC (Tradesman) to Real Properties. This deed was dated January 6, 2006. 
83. Trefren recorded another quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, as co-owner, member 
and manager of Real Homes, LLC. This deed purported to convey the exact same property as in 
his deed from Tradesman, also to Real Properties. This deed was also dated January 6, 2006. 
84. Trefren recorded a third quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, which was also dated 
January 6, 2006, as co-m,vner, member and manager of Real Homes. This deed purported to 
convey the Smith property from Real Homes to Real Properties. 
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8::. On Ma::-:;il 5, 201]6, DenJ.""lis assigned his iLcerest in :he proceeds of the Januar; 6, 
2006, contract to his counsel in tbis divorce proceeding by preparing and signing WTitten 
assignment of that purchase and sale agreement. 
86. Neither the Jai1.i..:ary 6, 2006, Purchase and Sale Agreement or the March 6, 2006, 
Assignment thereof were disclosed to Renee or her counsel until April 10, 2006 (during trial). 
87. The parties acquired a 1989 Chieftan Motorhome during the marriage which is 
worth between $15,000.00 and $16,000.00. The parties do not dispute that this item may be 
awarded to Dennis. It does appear that this item was acquired with funds from a refinance on the 
1000 S. Roosevelt property in the a..111ount of $17,107.00. 
88. Dennis possesses a 1982 Rolls Royce automobile. Renee claims this was 
purchased during the marriage and Dennis claims it is his separate property. The value is 
disputed with Renee claiming it is worth $28,000.00 and Dennis claiming it is worth only 
$5,500. The documents pertaining to this vehicle are found in Exhibits 70 and 372. 
89. There exists a 1980 Porsche, the character of Which the parties dispute. Renee 
claims it is her separate property, but there is no supporting documentation for this claim. The 
value of this item is $5,500.00. 
90. Dennis acquired a 1954 Cadillac automobile long· before the marriage. Renee 
claims that community funds in the amount of $1,750.00 were expended on this vehicle. 
91. Comparing Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no dispute 
regarding either the character or assignment regarding the following items of property: 12, 14, 
15, 16, 22, 28, 29, 30A, 30B, 31, 32, 44, 44(a), 45, 48.1, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 69, 
69.3, 69.5 - 69.21,. 
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9:2. There are noLsehold applian.c.;s at the i OGO S. Roosevelt propt~'ty wb.ich che 
parties agree are community (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Item 77.1 and Defendant's Exlribit 201, Item 
71). The Plaintiff values these at $4,000.00 and the Defendant values them at $3,250. 
93. Numerous household items are listed in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 as numbers 77.2 -
77.61. Some of these are in Renee's possession, most are in Dennis' possession. It does not 
appear from Defendant's Exhibit 201, or the evidence, that Dennis objects to either the 
characterization of all these as community property or the proposed division in Plaintiffs Exhibit 
1. 
94. There are several firearms in Dennis' possession. Renee claims three were 
acquire~ during the marriage - the 12 ga. Binelli, worth $1,400.00; the Glock 9mm, worth 
$950.00; and the .22 Ruger, worth $800.00. Dennis agreed in his testimony that the 12 ga. 
Binelli and .22 Ruger were acquired during the marriage, \vith values of $450.00 and $125, 
respectively. He testified that the Glock was given to him by a third party. Neither party 
provided any documentation regarding value or dates regarding any any of the disputed items. 
95. There is one AQHA. horse and one APHA. horse. The parties appear to agree that 
the AQHA horse is a community asset. However, they dispute the character of the APHA horse 
with Renee claiming it "does not belong to the community". However, the Court is unable to 
locate any documentation regarding any third party ownership of this animal. It appears the 
animals are worth approximately $1,500.00 each. The horse tack appears to be gone as a result 
of theft. 
96. There is a 1950 Packard automobile that the parties agree is owned jointly (50/50) 
by them and Daryl's brother. The value is disputed between $1,500.00 and $3,000.00. 
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97. There is a 1CJ73 Oa...t::J \-;, :ntewater boat with trailer whi~h che parties agree is 
Dennis' separate property. Renee claims that community funds were expended on a new engine 
and other improvements. However, there was no documentation regarding these improvements. 
98. There is a 1949 Dreamboat Roadster which the parties agree is Dennis' separate 
property. Renee claims that community funds were expended on improvements to tliis item 
which enhanced the value. However, there was no documentation regarding these improvements 
or amount thereof. 
99. During the pendency of this action, Dennis sold the 2002 and 1998 Yamaha 
A TVs and the trailer for them. He received $7,500.00 for all three items, which the parties agree 
were community property. 
100. Following the parties' separation, Renee sold the 1994 Mitsubishi automobile and 
used the proceeds for expenses. 
101. Dennis possesses the 1995 Chevrolet Suburban, which he claims is not an asset of 
the community. Renee claims it is and argues the value is $9,000.00. 
102. Renee claims that the 1999 Yamaha was given by Dennis to her daughter. Dennis 
claims that Roy Rice mvns this ATV. The value of the item is uncertain. 
103. The 1967 Pontiac Firebird is community property. Renee values it at $6,100.00 
and Dennis values it at $1,500.00. There is no documentation regarding value. Dennis has 
possession of this vehicle. This vehicle should be awarded to Dennis arid the Court will assign a 
value of $2,500.00. 
104. There is an account with Capital Educators with a balance of $247.96. There does 
not appear to be a dispute that this is a community asset. 
105. The parties acquired several retirement accounts identified as Items 28 - 34 on 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201. As noted above, the only item that is disputed 
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is #30. Item 30 is J Putnam SEP~R.A account 4 0336644339. Dennis argues that this account 
was opened by him before the marriage and he claims it as his separate property. The value of 
this account, as of December 31, 2005 was $40,160.99. 
106. There was a brea.1< in on May, 2004, where a horse trailer and its contents were 
stolen. Dennis and Renee received $14,075.20 in insurance proceeds from Safeco Insurance. 
The contents of the trailer belonged to third parties and not Dennis or Renee. The value of each 
party's stolen items is accurately listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit #1. The Court ordered these 
proceeds to be held in Plai11tiff's attorney's trust account, with $1,247.97 to be paid towards a 
community debt on the Riverside property. 
107. Comparing Plaintiffs Exhibit #1 ai1.d Defendant's Exhibit #201, there is no 
dispute regarding the assignment of the following items of community debt: #82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96A & B, 97, 97.1, 97A, 98, 99, 101 (Plaintiffs Ex. 1), 102 
( all), and 104. 1 
108. There is a $30,097.38 community debt to Real Hornes, LLC, for monies taken 
from that entity and used for community expenses. 
I 09. Dennis claims that there exlsts a community debt to Roy Rice in the a.mount of 
$44,093.00, which he clain1s includes $8,500 owed on the Chieftan Motorhome. Dennis and !vfr. 
Rice had an arrangement, for many years, including prior to the marriage, where any family 
member of Dennis' could come into his business and pick out whatever they wanted and he 
would be able to get legal services from Dennis in exchange. There is an exhibit listing items 
and amounts ta.ken from Mr. Rice's business over the years. There is no documentation 
regarding how much, if any, legal services have been provided by dermis against this a.mount. 
1 Item 101 on defendant's· Exhibit 201 appears to be a debt of the law firm and not the community. 
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Mr. Ric~ testified chat he and Genny have ·'dcr.e a hell of a lot of business Jv ~r the 1a::::t 2i 
years". J\fr. Rice did lend the parties $8,500.00 to acquire the Motorhome. 
110. There is a debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service. Tne parties agree this is a 
community debt. The amoun_t owed is somewhere between $15,400.00 and $19,347.13. 
111. There is a debt owed to Perry Harding in the amount of $16,000.00. The parties 
dispute the division ofthis debt. 
112. Items 106.1 through 106.24 in Exhibit #1 identify Renee's separate property. 
Dennis does not object to the characterization of these items. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA\V 
1. The parties do not dispute that the property located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, 
Idaho, was acquired by Dennis prior to the marriage and is therefore his separate property. 
Accordingly, this property should be awarded to him as his sole and separate property. 
2. Likewise, the mortgage associated with the property at 1000 S. Roosevelt is the 
separate debt of Dennis. However, Dennis' separate estate is entitled to reimbursement, dollar 
for dollar, for the amount of community debt paid off through the refinance of this property in 
2002. See, Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1983); Josephson v. 
Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1989). This amount is $73,014.85. 
3. The three other properties acquired by Dennis from Kendra Bartsch~Sallaz in 
1991, are also his separate property and should be awarded to him as such. 
4. There is a dispute regarding the property located at 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise, 
Idaho. The facts above regarding this property (Hennifer Property), present difficulty for the 
court. Dennis argues that this property is not o-wned by him and Renee because his brother 
acquired the title when he bailed them out on their obligation. Renee argues that, despite the 
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:ack of a deed from Dani back to them, ~his Court should 31 ... ll determine that th.is oror.ert-y· is 
, 4 ;. 
owned by them because all the other "indicia of o'ivnership". 
Title by deed is not always the determining factor and there are times when 
circumstances 1r.-ill overcome the presumption of a deed. , In that regard, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has given the following sun1mary: 
Under Idaho law, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the holder of 
title to property is the legal owner of that property. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 
Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994); Russ Ballard& Family Achievement 
Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572, 579, 548 P.2d 72, 79 (1976). 
A rebuttable presumption imposes upon the party against whom it operates the 
burden of going forward with the evidence to rebut the presumption. I.R.E. 301. 
The magistrate considered the evidence an4 found that under "all other 
circum.stances and 'ind.icia' of ownership", the deed was not controlling and that 
the corporation did not own the O'Dell property. See Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 
44, 53, 324 P.2d 380, 385 (1958) ("Where title to property is taken in the name of 
one party but the consideration is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor 
of the party who pays the consideration."). 
AkAffee v. lv!cAffee, 132 Idaho 281,971 P.2d 734 (Ct. App 1999). 
Such is the case here. Daryl has title which he obtained when he loaned money to Renee 
and Dennis to close the transaction. However, Daryl has done nothing consistent with ownership 
by him. Instead, Dennis and Renee have made the payments, occupied the premises and made 
improvements on the property. Dennis collects the rent and pays the mortgage, including any 
shortfall between rent and mortgage. Dennis has continued to pay for expenses associated with 
this property. Renee pastured her horses on the property. Daryl pays no taxes on this property. 
Daryl even testified that he did the financing as an accommodation to Dennis and Renee. Other 
than loaning Dennis and Renee his name and money, Daryl has done nothing else consistent with 
being the O\.vner of this property .. Instead, all indicia of o\.v1lership points to Dennis and Renee. 
In addition, the Court is concerned with the evidence regarding the break in at Renee's 
residence. The evidence tends to show that Daryl did sign a deed conveying the property back to 
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.Jer.:iis 111d Rcnee,'Jut thar it w:i.s ~aken from her hor.J.e dur::...-ig :;,:e burglar:r. Tne Court caIJ. or:.1y 
speculate why such a deed was not recorded and cannot help wondering why the tw-o burglaries 
were never properly followed up with law enforcement. Nevertlieless, the Court does believe it 
is more likely than not that there was a deed back from Daryl which was taken from Renee's 
residence, which made it significantly more difficult to establish that this property is community 
property. 
Based upon the foregoing, Renee has met her burden of rebutting the presumption that 
Daryl is the owner of thJs property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that llie 916 S. Roosevelt 
(Hennifer) property is the commu:rity property of Dennis and Renee and that they owe Daryl a 
debt of $30,000.00 for the money he loaned them. 
The Court recognizes that this determination of ownership is not necessarily binding 
upon Daryl as he is not a party to this action. Thus, regardless of whether the Court awards this 
property to one of the parties or that it be sold, one or the other (or both) parties may be involved 
in resolving this issue before title is clear, including further litigation. Tnis Court cannot help 
with that situation which is the result of the parties own actions. 
It is the Court's determination that this property should be sold immediately, that the 
proceeds be applied to all outstanding debt against it, and any equity (approximately $65,000.00 
at the time of divorce) remaining should be awarded to Renee. 
5. There is a dispute between the parties regarding the community interest in Real 
Homes, LLC. Dennis argues, based upon the evidence he produced, that the community only 
has a 50% interest in this entity and its assets and liabilities. Renee argues that the community 
has a I 00% interest. If the Court determines that the Operating Agreement introduced by Renee 
is the original document, then she would be correct. If the Court believes the Operating 
Agreement produced by Dennis is the original, then Dennis would be correct. 
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In 'Jrder to r::so l.ve this is.me, the ':ourt :1as co,:sidered these wo documents, tl:e 
circumstances and other facts regarding Real Homes, the testimony of the parties and Mr. 
Trefren, and the consistencies and inconsistencies between all of this evidence. This ai.1.alysis 
includes, but is not limited to, the follovving hig.hlights. 
Several of ivfr. Trefren's actions and much of his testimony, were unsubstantiated and 
inconsistent with his claimed 50/50 ownership with Dennis of Real Homes. In particular, his 
signing of a quitclaim deed transferring all of the real property O'vvned by Real Homes to his LLC 
(Tradesman), apparently without Dennis' knowledge or approval, simply does not make sense. 
In addition, Mr. Trefren's recording on June 6, 2005, of his wholly unsupported claim of lien in 
the amount of $250,000.00 against all teal property owned not only by Real Homes, but also 
Dennis and Renee, seems to this Court to be concocted. In fact, he testified his intent was to 
cloud the title on all th~ real property! Further, Mr Trefren, apparently to further carry out this 
scheme, recorded amended claims of lien in July, 2005, to include Lot IB of the Riverside 
Property, and the Smith Property for $35,000.00. Again, Mr. Trefren could not produce any 
documents to support his claims on any of the properties. Further, if 1-fr. Trefren was already a 
member of real Homes, LLC, there was little reason for him to fonn another. Further still, Mr. 
Trefren's signing of a quitclaim deed on February 16, 2005, as a member of Real Homes, 
regarding all the property owned by Real Homes, including the Riverside Lot (lB) owned by 
Dennis and Renee, to his own LLC, is highly suspect given all the other documentation and 
efforts to eliminate all real property holdings of Real Homes. This seems particularly evident 
since Mr. Trefren testified that Dennis· prepared the deed, but Dennis testified that he was 
unaware of the deed. Finally, as a whole, Mr Trefren's testimony is not credible as much of it 
was either 1,,vithout basis or documentation, contradictory 1,,vith itself, or contradictory 1,vith others 
who testified, such as Roy Rice regarding his employment and firing of Mr. Trefren. 
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Llewise, Der.J'js actior.s, or rnactions, ar...d testimony were also incons;.stent and not 
such as to be expected of a 50/50 owner. There is no evidence that Mr. Trefren objected to 
Dennis' withdrawal of $30,000.00 in May of 2004, as his "personal funds". His testimony at his 
deposition and at trial regarding why tvfr. Trefren's name was not on the Operating Agreement 
that Renee produced was contradictory. As well, Dennis' interaction with Mr. Trefren a.'ld Real 
Homes was not consistent with a 50/50 ownership, at least until March, 2005. There is no 
evidence that he ever referred to or treated Trefren like an equal partner prior to that date. 
On the other ha..n.d, the Operating Agreement LTJ.troduced by Renee is actually signed and 
dated. Further, the filings with the Idaho Secretary of State in 2002, 2003 and 2004 (for the 
years 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively), were all filed in February of those years and each 
listed Renee as the President of Real Homes. For some reason, Dennis filed the 2004 annual 
report in November, 2004 - after the firing of Renee a.'1d the separation of the parties, and before 
the year had actually ended - and listed himself as "owner". Finally, Renee did engage in 
activities consistent with her ownership under the Operating Agreement she introduced into 
evidence. 
Upon consideration of these items, and others contained in the Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that the Operating Agreement which is signed by Renee should govern. That 
Agreement is dated January and designates her as 100% owner. 
As a result, Renee had 100% ownership in Real Hornes, LLC \.vhen it was formed and 
any changes without her consent or approval were without authority and therefore void. 
Accordingly, the community, through her ownership, retained a 100% interest in Real Homes, 
LLC, including all its assets and liabilities. This includes the Riverside Lots (except for Lot lB) 
and the Smith Property. 
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As with other properties, there ar~ pote:itial issues r::garding third party c.ai.ms 
concerning the assets of Real Homes, LLC. Unfortunately, this Court cannot adjudicate in a way 
that is binding, any claims of third parties. Therefore, the Court concludes that all holdings of 
Real Homes, LLC, should be sold immediately. Proceeds from the sale of a specific property 
should first be applied to any debt on that property. .~.r1y remaining proceeds from a specific 
property should be applied to remaining debt on other properties sold.2 
If, after all the assets are liquidated and the proceeds are used to pay debts of the LLC, 
there remains outstanding debt, then that remaining obligation shall be shared equally by the 
parties. If, there is a remaining surplus in proceeds, they shall be distributed first to Renee to 
satisfy any remaining equalization, then shared between the parties equally. 
6. The parties dispute both the character and value of the property located at 15584 
Riverside (Lot 1 B), which is the residence occupied by Renee. 
Although Dennis argues that this property is still treated by Glen Trefren as an asset of 
Real Homes, LLC, there is no credibl~ documentation to support this. As set forth above, "it does 
not appear wfr. Trefren is in the legal position he thinks he is. Further, the evidence clearly 
shows that the property was in fact conveyed from Real Homes, LLC, to Dennis and Renee. 
Finally, Dennis has not provided sufficient evidence to refute this. Therefore, the Court 
concludes that this item is community property. 
The value of this property as of March, 2005 (about 4 months prior to the date of divorce) 
was approximately $152,000.00. DeTu.1is provided an appraisal from July, 2006, which indicates 
the property has appreciated sub~tantially after the effective date of divorce. While this does 
show the value of this item has increased, the Court is required to value the assets as of the date 
of divorce, not a year later. See, Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 13 5 Idaho 596, 21 P .3 d 918 (200 I); 
2 See, Equalization Section below. 
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JldcAJJee, supra,· Desfosses v. Desfosses, 12:2 ~daho S34, 830 P.2d 1095 (C. App. 1992). Based 
upon the evidence, it appears tbat the value is likely closer to the figure in March, 2005. The 
Court understands Dennis' argument that the market did jump in 2005. The Court also 
tU1derstands that ilie comparables in the appraisal submitted by Renee are somewhat outdated. 
Hmvever, ilie record does not have sufficient evidence to determine how much, if any, the value 
jumped between March and July, 2005. To arrive at a different figure would require pure 
speculation by the Court.3 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that ~he value of thls asset, as of the date of divorce, 
vvas $152,000.00, with debt of $114,471.90, leaving equity of approximately $37,528.10. It is 
the Court's determination that this property should be awarded to Renee subject to the debt of 
$114,471.90. 4 
7. With regard to the settlement monies from the Surnn,er lawsuit received by Dennis 
during ilie marriage, the Court has carefully reviewed all the facts associated with these monies. 
In Idaho, the character of property as either separate· or community vests at the time it it 
acquired. Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411 (1983); Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 
555 P. 2d 385 (1976). It is presumed that all property acquired during the marriage is 
community property. LC.§ 32-906; Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431,860 P.2d 634 (199:3); Winn, 
supra. Thus, earnings of the parties during the divorce and up to the date of divorce are 
commwJty property. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976); Desfosses v. 
Desfosses, supra. 
3 The Curt notes that Defendant had more than ample opportunity to obtain an appraisal at or near the date of the 
divorce, or any time prior thereto while this matter was pending. He did not and chose to wait until a year later. In 
addition, the Court notes that defendant's appraiser did not discount his value back to the date of divorce or 
otherwise offer an opinion in that regard. 
' By awarding this property to Renee subject to the debt thereon, the Court is not in any way validating any claims 
of !ein, etc. by Mr. Trefren and the Court recognizes there main remai.n third party issues. However, those claims 
against this property (and any other properties) will have to be determined in some other action. Further, the Court 
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Generall;, the pa1cy assertir:J thac property is separaie has the burden of proof. Worzala 
v. fVor::ala, 123 Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (1996). This must be done with reasonable certainty 
and particularity. Houska v. Houska, 9 5 Idaho 5 68, 512 P. 2d 1317 (1973 ); Barton v. Barton, 
132 Idaho 395, 973 P.2d 746 (1999). This may be done through evidence of direct tracing or 
indirect tracing through an accounting. 1\tfartsch v. 1\tfartsch, 103 Idaho 142, 645 P .2d 882(1982); 
Josephson v. Josephson, szpra. 
The Sumner set'Jement monies were received during the marriage. The total of these 
monies is $387,098.00. Dennis testified that most of this money was earned before the marriage 
and was his separate earnings. Thus, he has the burden of sho·wing, with reasonable certainty 
and particularity, these moneys were not earned during the marriage. The evidence does not 
entirely support Dennis testimony. 
The only documents that arguably support this contention is the Amended Answer and 
Cross Claim he filed on March, 1999, and the summary and aging of the Sumner amounts 
provided at his deposition in August, 1999. However, these documents clearly establish that as 
of August, 1999, at least the current amount of $81,984.82 was earned during the marriage. 
They also establish that the balance of $269,204.60 was earned at least 120 days prior to August, 
1999. Approximately three years of this time was during the marriage (the parties were married 
in July, 1996). No other documentation was provided by Dennis to show when any of these 
monies were actually earned. In fact, there is no accounting or other documentation concerning 
the remaining $35,908.58 of the settlement monies deposited into the estate account. Without 
such accounting evidence, it is impossible for the Court to determine, with reasonable certainty 
or particularity, how much of this amount was earned by him before or during the marriage. 
notes that it does not appear that these claims are legitimate and have not been documented, making it unlikely they 
will be validated. 
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:_1 acdit:on, the bdance :;_· the evidenc; surrounci.ing the Sumner monies also does not 
help Dennis with rJs burden of proof. First, all the money from the Surnner settlement was 
received after the marriage. Second, he deposited this money into the account for his 
grandmother's estate account in.stead of his trust account or other appropriate account. Dennis' 
testimony that the reason he deposited this money into the account for his deceased grandmother . 
because she loaned him money in the past is not supported by the evidence. There are no loan 
documents substantiating such a debt and the estate inventory does not list such a debt to Dennis. 
Further, Dennis had already distributed $184,969.37 from his grandmother's estate betvveen 
March, 2000 and August, 2001. If he owed her money for a loan, why did he ta.1<:e his share of 
the estate at that time? Third, he distributed this money to others in his family, including Diani, 
who was not legally entitled to any of the Matcham estate. Finally, all of this vvas done during 
his marriage to Renee and without her knowledge. 
Based upon the foregoing, Dennis did not meet his burden of proof that all of the Sumner 
settlement monies were earned prior to the marriage. First, the Court concludes that $81,984.82 
was "current" as of August, 1999. Thus, the Court concludes that this amount was earned during 
the marriage and was community property. Second, this leaves a balance of $305,113.18 of the 
total deposited as Sumner monies ($387,098.00 - $81,984.82). Of that amount, $269,204.60 
appears on the aging report in August, 1999. The Court recognizes that this amount is quite 
large to have all been earned during the first 3 to 3 Y2 years of the marriage and that it is likely 
some of it was earned before. However, there is simply no competent evidence accounting for 
the dates that the monies were earned. Without something, there is no way to arrive at a figure 
with reasonable certainty or particularity. Accordingly, the Court has no alternative but to 
conclude that this money was also community property. Finally, there is no accounting for the 
remaining $35,908.58 deposited into the estate account as settlement monies. Again, without 
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such e·rider:ce, the COi.:re must conclude that this 1-.rr:ount was also community .Jroper:y as i.: was 
acquired during the marriage. 
Consequently, the Court ca.'1. only conclude that all the moneys received during the 
marriage from the Sumner settlement were community funds. The total of this amount is 
$387,098.00. 
The evidence further shows that $160,000.00 of this money was distributed to four of 
Dennis' family members on June 8, 2004. Another $198,000.00 was distributed to these same 
people on or about July 13, 2005. Thus, a total of $358,000.00 of the $387,000.00 in settlement 
monies was distributed to persons outside the community. The Court concludes that these 
community funds ivere expended for purposes unrelated to the community. See, Larson v. 
Larson, 139 Idaho 972, 88 P.3d 1212 (Ct. App. 2003), not reversed on review, 139 Idaho 970 
(2004). Accordingly, the Court will apportion this amount as part of Dennis' share of the 
community property division. Id; Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P. 3d 889 (Ct. App. 2001). 
It would appear from the evidence that the balance of the settlement money ($29,000.00) 
was used by Dennis for various personal expenses during the marriage and period of separation 
of the parties and the Court will not deem this as part of division of community property. 
8. The community also has an interest in the accounts receivable of Dennis' law firm 
up to the date of divorce on July 28, 2005. The evidence regarding the value of this asset is in 
conflict. To resolve this conflict, the Court looks at the methodology and detail applied by each 
expert, as well as other factors such as any personal interest in the outcome of this matter. In 
addition, the Court agrees with counsel for Dennis that consideration of taxes once such 
receivables may be paid is appropriate. See, Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 860 P.2d 634 (1993). 
While Ms. Pulliam's review appears to be more extensive and detailed, it does not appear 
that her opinion considers the effect of taxation upon payment of the receivables. Nor does it 
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ciscour:t -che value based upon age of t11e accounts. Also, she did not idjust for any payables LIJ.at 
Denn.is would be responsible for, which she noted could be considered and totaled $4,650.00. 
Nfr. Harding did factor in the effect of taxes and did discount for the age of accounts. However, 
he discounted all accounts receivable which were over 90 days old to a uniform value of 10% 
vvithout any basis for such extreme and uniform discounting. Further, he did so without 
considering the finn' s history concerning ·writing off bad debt, the pay history regarding most of 
the clients and was unaware of any work-in -progress, despite having access to all of the records 
of the firm. Finally, he does have an interest in the outcome of this matter, having a secured 
interest in real property in dispute in this case. 
Furt1Jer still, Mr. Harding's valuation was based upon a new set of revised numbers by 
the law firm which ~s. Pulliam did not have initially. This concerns the Court greatly for two 
reasons. First, these new numbers appear to be based upon "discussions" benveen Mr. Harding 
and the office manager and are not supported by documentation. Second, this is a theme 
throughout this case - there are numerous instances where there exist two documents with the 
same title, but containing different or new information. The best example of this is the two 
versions of the Operating Agreement for Real Homes, discussed above. As with those items, 
only one can be correct - one is false or concocted. In the case of the accounts receivable, Renee 
had no access to either of these summary documents and both were provided by Dennis. This 
gives at least the appearance that one of the summaries is concocted. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court believes that both expert's opinions are useful and 
based upon data that they were provided. However, their opinions are only as good as the data. 
On the one hand, it appears that l'vfr. Harding over discounted the value based upon his method of 
aging. In addition, the summary he used is suspect because it was revised after the first one 
provided to Ivfs. Pulliam and there is no supporting documentation. On the other hand, Ms. 
FINDINGS I CONCLUSIONS I ORDER - 30 
000685
.?ulliam did c.ot accci.:.nt for the e..::f ect o:f taxes ai:d has no a6i.:1g discount bec::mse her data .:id not 
contain any old accounts. 
In a....-1 effort to give due consideration to both opinions, based upon the most credible and 
documented evidence, the Court concludes that the accounts receivable should be valued at 
$130,744.00, less $4,650.00 for payables, for a total of $126,094.00. This amount should be 
further reduced by the 25% tax rate, which would be $31,523.5. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that the value of the accounts receivable assignable to Dennis as of July 28, 2005, is 
$94,570.50. 
9. The evidence was conflicting regarding Dennis' share of the accounts receivable. 
He testified that he turned over all but 10% of his interest to i\fr. Gatewood. However, he has 
provided no documentation to support this position. To the contrary, the Subchapter S 
documents in evidence show that he is a 90% owner. Accordingly, the Court concludes that as 
of the time of divorce, Dennis mvned 90% of the accounts receivable of Sallaz .and Gatewood, 
which was $85,113.45 ($94,570.5 X .90). For practical reasons, this asset should be a1vvarded to 
Dennis. 
10. With regard to the Putnam Investments retirement account, the balance at or near 
the time of divorce was $40,160.89. Dennis argues that the entire balance should be his separate 
property. Renee argues that all of this money is community in nature. The Court disagrees with 
both parties as the evidence does not support either entirely. 
This account is comprised of eight (8) separate funds. The evidence shows that 5 of these 
accounts were actually opened after the marriage and three were opened in 1994. However, the 
backup documentation from Dennis only shows a total of $8,510.92 accumulated in those three 
accounts before the marriage. There is no other evidence to support his claim that the rest of the 
funds are his separate property. As a result, he has failed in his burden of establishing that aU of 
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tl:e J.J."ney ir. tbs account is his separate _?rcperty. .-\.ccortingly, the Court concludes that 
$31,649.97 is community property and $8,510.92 is the separate propertJ of Dennis. The fund 
should be liquidated, and Dennis should be awarded $8,510.92 as his separate property, with the 
balance to be awarded to Renee. 
1 L After comparison of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no 
dispute regarding either the character, value ( or the value is minimal) or assignment of the 
following items of property: 12, 14, 15, 16, 22, 28, 29, JOA, 30B, 31, 32, 44, 44(a), 45, 48.1, 50, 
51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 69, 69.3, 69.5 - 69.21, As a result each of these items should be 
awarded to the listed party with the values as indicated. There is some discrepancy between the 
values assigned these items by the parties. Using Dennis' values, the division is approximately 
$4,000.00 in favor of Renee ($28,078.48 vs. $23,909.07). Using Renee's values, the division is 
approximately $800.00 in her favor ($29,243.48 vs. ·$28,454.07). Given these amounts, as a 
whole, the division is substantially equal. 
12. The household furnishings and appliances located at 1000 S. Roosevelt (Item 71 
on Defendant's Exhibit 201 and Item 77 .1 on Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) are community property. The 
parties agree that these items may be awarded to Dennis, but do not agree on the total value of 
them. The Plaintiff argues the value is $4,000, while the Defendant argues the value is 
$3,250.00. The Court concludes that the total value is $3,500.00 and that these items should be 
awarded to Dennis. 
13. The household furniture, appliances, etc., listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 as items 
77.1 and 77.2 - 77.61 are community property and should be divided according to the division 
proposed therein, except for the storage shed (Item 77.60). Thus, Renee should be awarded 
items 77.7, 77.8, 77.9, 77.10, 77.26, 77.34, 77.50, 77.51, 77.56 and 77.58. The total value of the 
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items awarded to Renee is $3 ,:25.00. ";~ms, the total value of the items remaining and awarded 
to Dennis is .'526,645.00. 
1 t1 -r . With regard to the firearms, the Court concludes that all but the 12 ga. Bineili and 
. 22 Ruger are the separate property of Dennis. Accordingly, all but these two should be awarded 
to him as his separate property. The Court further concludes that the value of the Binelli is 
$800.00 and the value of the .22 is $350.00. These items should be awarded to Dennis as part of 
the division of community property. 
15. With regard to any horses remaining, it appears that there is only one AQHA 
horse remaining and that it is community property. The parties dispute the characterization of 
the APHA. horse. The Court does not recall any documentation regarding this animal and will 
conclude that it is community property. The Court :further concludes that each horse is worth 
$1,500.00. Both horses should be awarded to Renee as community property. 
16. The community has 50% ownership in the 1950 Packard with Dennis' brother. 
The value of this interest is disputed between $750.00 and $1,500.00. There was no 
documentation regarding the value. The Court concludes that the community interest in this 
vehicle is $1,125.00. This item should be awarded to Dennis since his brother is the co-owner. 
17. With regard to the 1978 Oaks Whitewater boat and trailer, it is clear that this is 
Dennis' separate property. Renee claimed there were improvements to this item during the 
marriage, but no documentation was provided. Further, her value of the improvements was 
$9,800.00, while Dennis value of the boat and trailer together was only $9,000.00. It seems 
unlikely that a boat and trailer that is approaching 30 years old is worth much more than this and 
certainly there is value over and above any improvements. Accordingly, the Court cannot find 
that the community is entitled to any reimbursement for improvements to this item, or that the 
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value was erili.ar:ceci, ai1.c: concluc:es that it should be awarded tc De:nr...i.s as his sole and separate 
property. 
18. Likewise, the 1949 Dreamboat roadster is clearly Dennis' separate property. 
Renee's claims regarding improvements to this item are undocumented and the Court is therefore 
unable to find that the community is entitled to reimbursement for enhancement. Accordingly, 
this item is awarded to Dennis as his sole and separate property. 
19. The 2002 Yamaha ATV, 1998 Yamaha ATV and ATV trailer were sold to Roy 
Rice for $7,500.00 and the funds were used by Dennis for attorney's fees. Renee claims these 
items are worth more, but the Court cannot reach that conclusion. Accordingly, the $7,500.00 
proceeds from the sale of these items should be awarded to Dennis. 
20. With regard to the 1999 Yamaha ATV, Renee claimed it was given by Dennis to 
her daughter. It seems she is asserting ownership of this ATV on behalf of her daughter, despite 
Dennis' position that he did not give it to her daughter. However, it does not appear that she is in 
a position to do so. Under Idaho law, a community asset may not be given away without the 
consent of both the husband and wife. See, Estate of Hull, 126 Idaho 437, 885 P.2d 1153 (C.A. 
1994). In addition, as the proponent of this claim, Renee has the burden of proving such gift was 
accomplished. There is insufficient evidence to show that Dennis gave the A TV to her daughter, 
including evidence that he did, or now does, consent to such a gift. The Court therefore 
concludes that this item is community property and that it, or the proceeds from it, should be 
awarded to Dennis. 
21. The 1967 Pontiac Fire bird is in Dennis' possession. Although the parties appear 
to agree that this item may be awarded to Dennis, the value is disputed. The Court concludes the 
value of this asset is $3,500.00 and that it should be awarded to Dennis. 
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.:....:... WitJ1 ;-;;gard to the 1989 Ch.ie.fcai:. motor:iome, the parties do not dispute :hat i:his 
is a community property item and may be awarded to Dennis. The Court will assign a value of 
$15,000.00 to this item; which is the lower amount indicated by Renee. The Court chooses this 
value based upon the age of the vehicle. It also appears that the loan on this vehicle was paid 
with separate funds belonging to Dennis in 1998 when he refinanced the I 000 S. Roosevelt 
property. Therefore, Dennis is entitled to receive reimbursement for his separate property in this 
amount. See, Ustick, supra; Estate of Freeburn, supra; Gapsch, supra. 
23. The character and value of the 1982 Rolls Royce are disputed. Dennis has the 
burden of proving, to a reasonable certaint-;, that this item is his separate property. Worzalla, 
supra. 
There is no document in evidence· that clearly established when the vehicle was acquired 
by Dennis. The documents within Exhibit 372 are dated after the marriage, except for three. 
These three documents establish little, do not clearly relate to this vehicle and do not clearly 
indicate ownership by Dennis. However, Exhibit #70 is from the Idaho Transportation 
Departn1ent and does indicate the owner is Empire West, Inc, which is an entity of Dennis'. This 
is sufficient evidence to establish, to a reasonable certainty, that this vehicle is Dennis' separate 
property. Accordingly; the Court concludes that it is his separate property and will award it as 
such to Dennis. 
Since the Court has determined this item to be Dennis' separate property, the Court need 
not address the value. 
24. Likewise, the character of the 1980 Porsche is disputed with Renee claiming it as 
her separate property without documentation. Based on the same reasoning above, the Court 
concludes that Renee has not shown, to a reasonable certainty, that this vehicle is her separate 
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prc:_::e::-ry. Accor::iir.6ly, th.;;; CoUt-t ccncludes it is a corr..munitJ e1sset. The Court will assign the 
value given by Renee of $5,500.00 and will award this item to her. 
?-_), The 19 54 Cadillac Eldorado was acquired by Dennis long before the marriage. 
Renee claims that the community expended $1,750.00 on improvements to this vehicle. 
However, there is no documentation supporting this claim. Therefore, Renee has not met her 
burden as required to show that community funds were used and that such expenditures 
enhanced the value of the vehicle. See, Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 488, (2003). 
Accordingly, tliis item is awarded to Dennis as his separate property without reimbursement to 
the community. 
26. The parties do not agree regarding the character, value or disposition of the 1995 
Chevrolet Suburban. Renee argues it is a community asset wortli $9,000.00. Dennis argues it is 
not a community asset, but he is in possession of it. He argues it was owned by the law firm and 
then sold to his brother Daryl. There is little documentation in the record to give the Court a 
basis to reach a conclusion regarding the character of this asset. Plaintiffs Exhibit #72A does 
not establish the vehicle was acquired 1,vith community funds. It appears that National Financial 
Service, Inc. was involved 1,vith this vehicle. However, as noted elsewhere, this entity is the 
separate property of Dennis and the Court is unable to unravel the source or use of funds by this 
entity. The Court will conclude that this vehicle is not a community asset. 
27. The entity known as National Financial Service, Inc. was acquired by Dennis as 
early as 1969. Renee claimed this entity was transferred by Dennis.to her. However, the Court 
cannot recall that there is any documentation supporting such a transfer. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that it is Dennis' separate property. 
28. The entity and account for this entity were used by the parties during the marriage 
for various purposes which have not been fully traced. For example, the Ford Excursion was 
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title:: in the :1amc of :~us entir;, but used by the part:es. ALc, Renee cook $3,100.00 from the 
account on the day she was terminated by Dennis. It is not possible for the Court to sufficiently 
delineate which funds were used by which party, and for what purpose in order to determine how 
much in the account is separate and how much is community. Therefore, the Court concludes 
that Dennis should be awarded this entity and its account as his separate property. 
29. With regard to the Putnam SEPIRA. account# 0336644339, Dennis claims this as 
his separate property. Dennis has the burden of establishing when this account was opened and 
the source of all funds deposited. He refers to Exhibits 210B, 210C and 248 as support for this 
claim. However, those documents do not establish that this was an accolL.'J.t prior to the marriage. 
Without such documentation, his claim of separate property must fail. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that this account is a community asset with a value of $40,160.99. 
This item should be divided equally between the parties. 
30. There are two community bank accounts which the parties did not agree upon 
regarding balance, character or division. Account# 910403141 at D.L. Evans Bank appears to 
be closed. As a result, there is nothing for the Court to divide. The parties agree that there is a 
balance of $247.96 in the Capital Educators account #0000601990. The Court will award the 
balance in this account to Renee. 
31. With regard to the Safeco Insurance proceeds, Renee argues that these funds were 
received by the community on behalf of third parties who suffered losses exceeding the 
$14,075.20. The Court agrees. The evidence at trial established that the items stolen were the 
personal property of those parties and not Dennis or Renee. As a result, this money belongs to 
those parties and is in the nature of a community debt to them. The amounts due each are set 
forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit #I. This money should be paid to them according to these amounts. 
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3ince ch.ere will oe a shortfall, they should be paid their proportionate share, with the balai.1.ce of 
this "debt" to be assigned to Renee. 
32. After comparison of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no 
dispute regarding the assig..'ll!lent of the following community debts: #82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96A & B, 97, 97.1, 97A, 99, 101 (Plaintiffs Exhibit #1), 102 (all), and 
104. 5 As a result, each of these items should be awarded to the listed party as their 
responsibility.6 Essentially, this results in the assignment of all these debts to Dennis, except the 
VISA balance of approximately $2,900.00. Using Dennis' figures, the total he is assigned is 
$153,781.59. Using Renee's figures, the total assigned to Dennis is $146,719.63. The average 
of these two figures. is approximately $150,000.00. From this, and with regard to these items, the 
Court concludes that Dennis is assigned approximately $147,000.00 more of the community debt 
than Renee. 
33. With regard to the IRS debt, the amount is somewhere between $15,400.00 and 
$19,347.13. Dennis proposed that this debt be assigned to him, while Renee proposed it be 
assigned 50% to each. Since Dennis has been assigned substantially more than Renee with 
regard to the items immediately above, the Court concludes that this debt should be assigned 
equally between the parties. 
34. With regard to the $16,000.00 debt owed to Perry Harding, Dennis proposed he 
be assigned $8,000.00 and that Glen Trefren should be responsible for the other $8,000.00. 
However, based upon the Court's detennination regarding the Real Homes situation, the Court 
concludes that this entire debt is a community debt to be paid by both parties. Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that each party should be assigned one half of this debt. 
5 Item #101 on Defendant's Exhibit 201 appears to be a debt of the law firm and not the community. 
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:J :. With regard to d:e alleged debt to Dennis' brother Daryl for one half of the rents 
collected on the Grandview property, there is insufficient evidence to conclude this debt exists. 
There is no documentation regarding Daryl's ownership in that property and he testified in his 
deposition that he never made any claim for such rents. As a result, the Court concludes there is 
no community debt to Daryl for the court to assign. 
36. With regard to the alleged debt to Roy Rice, the Court is uncertain. On the one 
hand, Mr. Rice provided a list of items a.11d their values that were taken from his business by 
Dennis and/or Renee and/or her daughter. The Court has every reason to believe that this list is 
accurate as Mr. Rice was one of the more credible witnesses in the trial. He came across as a 
very honest, tell-it-like-it-is person, which the Court appreciated. Thus, the Court does not 
question that the members of the community received items of value from Mr. Rice. 
37. However, it was clear that the arrangement was that Dennis did legal work in 
exchange for items taken by his family. But, it was not clear which legal work applied to which 
items - on the list or off - or vvhen legal work was done, etc. It also appeared that this "open 
account" arrangement was in place before the marriage of the parties herein. 
38. This would seem to make it a separate debt of Dennis. In essence, Dennis agreed 
with Mr. Rice, before the marriage, that he or his family members, could obtain items and that 
Dennis would pay him back with legal services. Due to the nature of this arrangement, its 
ongoing nat:i..ire, and the lack of evidence regarding legal services actually provided, the Court 
concludes that the balance owed on this debt, if any, is not a community debt to be shared by the 
parties. Instead, it seems more of a separate debt of Dennis' and the Court will so conclude. 
6 The amount of Dennis medical bills is uncertain. His Exhibit #20 I lists most of them as having a zero balance, 
while Renee's Exhibit# I lists them as unknown. The Court concludes that these bills should be assigned co Dennis 
as he suggested, but the Court finds that none of these have any outstanding balance at this time. 
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~.i~i ,1.._;, 
39. The parties did receive $8,500.00 fror:1 i'vfr. Rice to acquire the Mccorhome. This 
portion of the claimed debt is a debt of the community and the Court will assign it to Dennis. 
40. With regard to the cornmunir; debt of $30,097.38 owed to Real Homes, LLC, it 
does appear that this a..111ount was taken from the Real Homes account and deposited into Dennis' 
personal checking account or sent to the IRS. Exhibit 205 does show where this money was 
spent and many of the items the Court recognizes as debts of the community ( eg. credit cards, 
George Hicks, .. .). The Court concludes that this money was expended on community debts and 
constitutes a debt of the corrununity to Real Homes, LLC. However, the Court need not address 
the assignment of this item due to the determination regarding the ownership of the LLC. 
41. The personal property listed as Items #106.1 Llrrough #106.24 should be 
confirmed as Renee's separate property. Any of these items which Dennis has possession of 
should be returned by him to her. If he no longer has possession, then Renee is entitled to a 
judgment for their value. 
42. The Court has struggled greatly with the issues and ultimate award of the parties' 
dog named "Smooch". Much attention has been given to this dog, and required of the Court, by 
the parties. The Court entered an order providing for equal time of possession of Smooch while 
this matter was pending. This was done for more than one reason. First, the Court recognized, 
and could relate to the fact, that this asset was very important to both pa..'iies. Second, how the 
parties dealt with the shared time of possession and with each other might shed some light on a 
fair and equitable award of the dog. This did indeed provide useful guidance for the Court. 
Finally, the Court knew that this matter would not be resolved in a short time frame and felt that 
since Smooch would likely be awarded to one party or the other, it would be most fair for them 
to both have as much an opportunity to enjoy him as possible. That time has now come. 
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GemJs ~~a3 irg-ued :he::.~ the Cour: shoul1i provic.e that Smo0ch be jointly owned by the 
parties, subject to motions in the future if they cannot agree as to times of possession. Tnis 
argument is inviting as the temporary arrangement has actually worl<ed fairly well. Frankly, the 
Court anticipated many more problems due to the parties' antagonism on so many other issues. 
No doubt, Smooch would be fine with such an arrangement - he is a Labrador - Labs love 
everyone. 
However, the Court declines to do as urged by Dennis as it would be contrary to the 
directives of Idaho law to divide all the community property. In addition, the parties do not need 
to be tied together in this fashion from this point forward. Assuredly, they would be back in 
Court again regarding Smooch and they do not need th.is. So, the Court must make a decision. 
In the pages and paragraphs above, it appears that during foe ma..rriage and while th.is 
matter was pending, Dennis was less than forthright with Renee about finances and assets. The 
Court has addressed those instances above, occasionally determining Dennis' statements or 
evidence to be less credible and often resolving conflicting evidence in favor of Renee, and 
awarding her share of foe community estate accordingly. HO\,vever, with regard to Smooch, 
there is no evidence that Dennis has engaged in similar types of deceit towards Renee. In fact, it 
is he who has been willing all along to share Smooch equally, including on a permanent basis. 
On the other hand, it has been Renee who has been less than cooperative and forthcoming 
regarding Smooch. Th.is required the entry of the temporary order at the outset of this litigation 
and further rulings by the Court when Renee refused to cooperate. Th.is tips the scale ever so 
slightly on this issue. 
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As a :esult, '.he Court c0r..cludes ~hat it woi.:;id ~e more fair and equitable co award 
Smooch to Dennis at this time. 7 
EQUALIZATION 
The Characterization and division of property and debt above is not equal. It results in an 
award of approximately $260,000.00 of the comnrnnity assets and $114,000.00 of the debt to 
Renee, for a net of approximately $146,000.00. On the other hand, Dennis is awarded 
approximately $501,000.00 in corr..munity assets and $155,000.00 of the debt, for a net of 
approximately $346,000.00. This results in Dennis receiving a difference of approximately 
200,000.00 in his favor. The Court felt constrained to do this for tvvo reasons. First, the Sumner 
monies are gone because Dennis gave them to third parties and/or used it himself. Therefore, 
none of these funds are available to be awarded to Renee and must be considered as awarded to 
Dennis. Second, it seemed impractical to award to Renee the accounts receivable at the law 
firm. Thus, the Court is left with this unequal division. 
Reducing the above amount by the amount of reimbursement Dennis is entitled 
($84,000.00 - refinance of 1000 S. Roosevelt and payment on Motorhome), reduces this amount 
to approximately $116,000:00. This is the amount that must be equalized. 
The Court has ordered the assets of Real Homes, LLC to be sold, which includes all the 
real property associated therevvith at the time of divorce. Once these properties are sold and the 
debts against them are paid, any surplus proceeds would be available and should be awarded to 
Renee to accomplish the equalization. The Court recognizes that there may not be sufficient 
surplus proceeds, if any, to accomplish this. The Court also recognizes that the sale of the 
properties held by Real Homes, LLC may be problematic due to the transactions by Dennis after 
.7 Alth9ugh Smooch is awarded to DeMis and he will be the owner, there is nothing preventing the parties from 
sharing on their own~ if they should be able to agree to do so. 
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the cate of civorce. In either of those ever.ts, the equalizatica cai.1. only be guaranteed by a 
judgment in favor of Renee against Dennis. 
As a result, the equalization shall be accomplished as follows. Renee shall be entitled to 
a judgment against Dennis in the amount of $180,000.00. Immediately upon the sale of the Real 
Homes community assets set ford1 above, and after payment of the debts associated with said 
property, any surplus proceeds shall be ini.JTiediately distributed to Renee and a satisfaction, or 
partial satisfaction, of the judgment shall be entered. If there is a.riy surplus proceeds (vvhich the 
Court recognizes is unlikely), then the proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties. 
ORDER 
Counsel for Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to prepare a Judgment and Decree 
consistent with the foregoing. 
DATED this ~day of October, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF i\tfAILING 
I hereby certify that on the !iJ day of October, 2007, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Debra L. Eismann, Esq. 
3016 Caldwell Blvd. 
Nampa, ID 83651 
James A. Bevis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 827 
Boise, ID 83701-0827 





IV1utaal R~lease and Settlemcnr Agreement 
. This Mutual ;-tease and Settlement Agreement is entered into and made effective 
this J!_ day 0~2010 between EUGENE RICE AND JANET RICE, husband and ·wife, 
REAL HOMES L.L.C. an Idaho limited liability company, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company (hereafter the "Plaintiffs") and RENEE BAIRD, an 
individual (hereafter "Defendant"). 
1. The ·parties acknowledge the purpose of this agreement is to extinguish any 
lli'1d all claims, disputes, actions a,'1d controversies currently pending or which could 
be asserted in the litigation styled Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, 
Real Homes, L.L. C. and Real Properties, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company v. 
Renee Baird, Dennis Sallaz, Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction, LLC., an Idaho limited liability company, Case No CV 09-11855 ("the 
subject litigation") pending in the Third Judicial District in and for the County of 
Canyon. The matters of record in the pending litigation are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
2. Reference to the parties and persons in privity with them is meant to include 
but is not limited to the officers, shareholders, directors, employees, agents, insurers 
subsidiaries, partners, customers, suppliers, dealers, distributors, affiliates and 
attorneys of, within, or related to the named party. 
3. The parties executing this agreement warrant and represent they have the 
authority to make and enter into this agreement and that each party is relying upon the 
representations and covenants made herein, all of which are deemed material. 
4. · The parties have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel prior to 
making this agreement and none are operating under duress. 
p - I 
EXHIBIT K 
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5. [n consideration of the mutual covenants agreed to herein and in consideration 
of the deeds exchanged by the parties, whereby Plaintiffs convey Riverside parcel 
lB, Canyon County, Idaho to Defendant, and Defendant conveys Riverside parcels 
lA, 2A, and 2B and a portion of Lot 24 of Westview Subdivision, Canyon County, 
Idaho, and whereby each party releases all Lis Pendens filings and for other good and 
valuable consideration, Plaintiffs agree to release, relinquish, waive, and extinguish 
any cu'ld all demands, rights, actions or claims which have been or could be asserted 
against Defendant and any person in privity with Defendant including but not limited 
to her employees, agents, insurers, customers, attorneys and representatives as of the 
effective date of this instrument. Defendant agrees to release, relinquish, waive, and 
extinguish any and all demands, rights, actions or claims which have been or could be 
asserted against Plaintiffs and any person in privity with Plaintiffs including but not 
limited to any officers, directors, employees, agents, insurers, customers, dealers, 
distributors, shareholders, partners, attorneys and representatives as of the effective 
date of this instrument. This release extends to every kind or type of claim related to 
or in any way connected with the facts underlying the subject litigation, including any 
claims knovvn or unknown, contingent or unliquidated, in contract or tort, or in the 
nature of unfair competition, copyright infringement, deceptive trade practices or 
other forms of liability whether under state or federal law including claims for 
monetary or injunctive relief arising from the beginning of time to the date and time 
of this agreement. 




7. TI1e effestive date )f this :-elease is :he date upon which th:s ~:'.i.st:1.imen: is 
signed by the parties, below. 
8. The Parties authorize their respective counsel to prepare and execute such 
papers as are necessary for dismissal of the pending litigation with prejudice upon 
payment of the amounts aforesaid and each party shall bear their own fees and costs. 
The Plaintiffs hereby authorize and direct its counsel to file a dismissal of the above 
mentioned litigation. 
I HA VE READ THE FOREGOING AGREEMENT AND HA VE HAD 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK LEGAL COUNSEL BEFORE 
EXECUTING THIS INSTRUlVIENT. 
Date: g'-3-/d 
Date: __ f'-----=3'--·-_/_0_· __ 
~ / ~ -;( 1?£« 
~MES, L.L.C. 
Date: ,f:, :3 ~ / IJ 
By: Eugene Rice 
Its: Managing Member 
r--} , /~-~~-
By: '-_; .. /,c.~·;:;G ; ,., --· Date: f -3 -/ C> 
/.'. AL PROPERTIES, LLC. 
By: Janet Rice 
Its: Managing Member 
~~ 
RENEE B;\JRD, individually 






JOI-W L. RUNFT 1 / 





ASSIGNMENT OF piJRCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 
INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in consideration of Assignee's continuing his representation, 
the undersigned Assignor does hereby sell and assign to Jim Bevis, Attorney at Law, Assignee, all 
proceeds due Assignor pursuant to that certain Purchase Agreement dated 1-6-06 by and between 
Assignor as Seller and Real Properties, LLC as Buyer, attached hereto as Exhibit "A", sufficient to pay 
any and all attorney fees and costs due Assignee by Assignor related to that certain legal action entitled 
Sallaz v. Sallaz, Case No. CV DR 040 I 075D, filed in Ada County, State of Idaho. The Assignee 
shall have full power and authority to enforce said Purchase Agreement to collect all sums due to him 
hereunder in his name and remit to Assignor any sum remaining therefrom. 
fN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned hereunto executes this Assig.nm.ent this 61h day of 
March, 2006. 
ASSIGNMENT OF PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 





02/01/2011 10:00 20~~-,2 LONGETEIGLAWTO~ 
2011-Feb-01 08:28 AH SALLAZ & GATEWOOD PLLC 2083J612.53 
ASSIGNMENT OF PURCHASE AGllEEMENl' FORS.ALE OJ 
INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC 
FOR VA.LUE RECEIVED, the undersigned Aasi:gnor do~ hereby sell and assian. to Ol=i: 
Tt11ften, Assignee, all of UBignor's right, titl1S and in~itl in and·fo· all' real ·elltatO set forth in. 
Exhibit 1'A''. ilttachod hereto and Incorporated llere!n by~. and to .all :l)!'QQMml 91.:Ut 
AS!fgnor l)Ul'Suant to that cenain Purchase Agn,emerit dated 1-6-06 by and between Aasianor 111. 
Seller, and Real Properties, LLC·aa Buyer, attached hereto aa Exhibit''B" and incol.])orated.herein 
by re.fm::nee.. 
The Anlgnee shall have 1\Jll power and authority to onfotce said PUrchlise Apement ti> 
collect all ~~ (iue him hereunder in his name, including 1111}' and all actions ne&Cl!llllJ tQ 
onfoioo the 1JIUJ1C against my and ·all of the aforeuid reel property. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. the undersigned hertunto executes tho ABsi20lllent thi& 10~. 






DE'NtHS J.. SAUAZ, [SB No. I 053 
Aftorney at Law 
P.O. Box: &956 
Horse~ 1.dali'.O 33701 
Telephone: pm~)-336-1145 
FacsimiJ:e: (20-8} 336-12:63' 
Pro Se 
ei 
IN" THE DfSTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICL:'\L. DISTRICT OF 
THE S.Tt\TE OF 1DAHO, lli\I At'iD FOR THE COtINTY OF ADA 
R.El'flS.E L.. BA.lRD-SALLAZ 
PfaimiffiRespandent,. 
DENNIS' J. SAllAZ,, 
Defendanr/Appdlant 
f Case l'fo. CV DR 04- 01015 .D 
TO~ RENEE L RAJRD. her attorney ~ DEBRA. L. EISMA.Ji'\f"N. whose ad:mess is 3016 
Court 
NOTJ:CE'. IS llEREBY GIVEN that:: 
appeals· against tb.e above-named P:tai:n:tif:t: to tfrre Disnict Court7 from tlie 1':fa.gistrate: C.Ol!lrt's 
Amend.ed Fmdmgs; of fact. Conc:hr:Sfo.us of Law and Order~ and Am;ended Fura:l Jnrl1gJ!lleDt Md 
2.. The Defendant has: the: 1ig:ht to appeal to the, Distiict Court :from the .&fagistrate 
Court''s: Amended. f.indiug,s. of Fact;. Conc:fusions· of Law and Order~ rud Amended Final 
NOTfCE OF' APPEAL .. .., 1 
000710
-\ 
Judgment and Decree, and the same are appealable Order(s) under and pursuant to I.A.R. 
1 l(a)(l), and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(a). 
3. The issues or1 appeal which the appellant then intends to assert in the appeal, are 
as follows: 
a. Did the Plaintiff commit fraud upon the. Defendant when she represented 
she· had recorded the Oregon maITiage certificate when she new she had 
1iot, and dicf Piaiiltiffcornmit fraud 1iport the Cot1rt when she testified she 
was married to the Defendant wheri she knew she had never recorded the 
Oregon marriage certificate. (Based upon newly discovered evide11ce). 
b. Did the Court ei:r in awarding properties and monies not specifically 
owned by the parties but w1:uch were separate business entities Defendant 
was engaged in with numerous other joint owners; and o;ver which the 
Coµrt did not have pro_penubject matter jurisdiction, including but not · 
limited to: 
Real Homes, LLC, 
Daryl Sallaz, 
Glen Trefren and his LLC, 
National Financial Ser.vice, Inc., 
Empire West; 
c. Did the Court err in mislabeling and awarding items of Defendant's 
personal property as community property and/or separate property; 
4. No Order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. A Reporter's Tran.script is reque~ted 9n all matters including: 
7/17/2006 Court Trial transcript;. 
2/13/2007 telephone conference hearing transcript; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2. 
000711
9/16/2008 hearing transcript; 
10/28/2008 hearing transcript; 
12/16/2008. telephonic 11earing transcript; 
2/24/2009 hearing transcript; 
5/19/2009 hearing transcript; 
6'. The Appellant requests a complete Clerk's Record pursuant to I.R.C.P; 83(n). 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that: 
A. A copy of this Notice of Appeal bas been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below in the following Certificate of 
Service; at the address shown a11d by the metl:iod indicated. 
B. That the Clerk of District Court will be paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the Reporter's Transcdpt. 
C. That the Appellate filing fee of $53.00 has been paid on this date to the Clerk of 
the District Court. 
D. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
DATED this i__ day of February, 2012. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL " 3 
000712
el e, 
CERT1FlCATE. OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTJFY that on this::(! day of February, 2012,.I caused to be served a 
true ~nd correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE. OF APPEAL to tlle following in the manner 
des.cribed below 
DE~RA L. ElS.wIANN, 
Attorney at Law 
3016 Cakfwe.UBlvd .. , 
Nampa, IdllbQ .83651 
Honoral:>le David C. Epis 
Ada County Courthous.e 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Raeann Ni~on, Transcnpts 
Ada County 'Courthouse 
200 W~ F~nt Str:eet 
Boise, ID 83702 
All other parties 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
:~S. MAIL, postage p~epaid 
a Facsimile to: 
a eMail:. ________ ~_ 
0 Other; 
.~ lv1AIL postage prepaid 
0 Facsimile to: 
0 eMail:. _________ _ 
0 Other: 
IB'lis. MAIL postage prepaid 










POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
REAL PROPERTY _____ . .. . . . .L·----····---' 
'1000 s. Rooseveii:eciise."ldaho·· ·- -- --··--··--· to be determlnedj ($272.032.67)1 
....... s --·-
·(no principal reducUon during marriage) 
Sep. 





Owned by Dennis Sallaa: before marrlage.248. Wails Fargo loan 
as of 6/15/05, 247. 3/98 refy. 248a. Loan proceeds dep lo 
Brookstreet, Item 28. Renee QC'd 2X 248b,c. 2d Dorr 10/8/99, 










2a •. ;e1s· s: RooseveiCiiaisa:· -·· -···-··-··-'----- r--- .. -- --~--}--·· .. --- ---- -----·-·-r-- ... ·---····- --------·-------- .. --· -···-·-·--·---·· ... 
iowned by Darryl. Funds paid by Buckingham lconUngent ! ! 
.. ·I· ---· 
•coUected by parties Is owed to Darryl odlucklnghams. j"abUlty I ; 
I ($30,000.00)1 
2a(I) 1Llabilily to Real Homes of one-half of $17,500 R·eal • -
, Homes Lien payment. 
i 
I 





--- ---·--···· ---··-· -----··· ···---------···-------.. -----. ·-·--·-- ····--···- ---· i-
I I 
2b -· ·~almburaamant dalm.iorcrecriicarc(paymeniafrorn-· ------\--- -~---- ---="l- --- ------------ ----~---
. closing of Walls Fargo rannanca 12120/2002 I I : 
3 .. . .. 15580 Riverside Road, Caldwell, ID. THE ONE-· •. 
iRENEE IS LIVING IN. 
:(50% lnteraat bu·t value aisled 11 whole value) 
1 , ($73,014.75)1 i248E . I , . 
---··--···········-·:--- -----.L---·--·· ·--··-·· ----·-----·-··t-.. ~. ·- ··-··--··· ··-······ --······-····-······ .... -··········--·-··-·- ... ·-····· .... 
$280,000.00: ($104,140.00)i $175,880.00 ' 










· POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
4 !taxdebton155S0(15884?) I ($4,441.41)J ($4,441.41) ! 
I i i I 
' I ! C 
' \=~=r~=~-.::::''""''i;,.; -+--- -+-- -··-·· 
I I ($30,000.00)! ($30,000.00) C 









...... L .. ___ _ 
i 
$66,000 moved out of business account; $36,000 of that paid on 1· 205 
debt owed by Real H?mes to DL Evans Bank, remaining $30,000 , 205A 
used to pay community expenses. ! 
8 ··-~lverslde Rd., Caldwell, ID-···-·----------.. -·--·-· ---·-------·-·---l-·-·----}·-------· ___ .. ··---··--·---··!··--··-· ··-·····-· -·-- ----------·--------·····--·---·-···· --····-··· ----- ····-1zuo-upu&1u 
i209 de!Jt 
(Parcel #03N03W171509) ; I 
,-- !Riverside Rd.,Caldwiin.io··------·-·--·---------- ----------------·\ ($7 l,OOO.OO)\-·--· $SO,OOO.OO; -------··---- SaxtondebtpaldbyRlce.RlceowesDennls/communlty ~2g~---··· 
j<Parcet No. 03N03W171506) -·-· ________ j 1----··---·-·-- 1-------- .. ·- approximately $60,000. See Item 19. ~ ~~~~-.. 
\209a 
8 tRiverslde Rd. Lot (bare land) i • j 1208 
9---~:;;:;:~::0:;P:::~~-~ooiso°%iii1iiiesi1>u1-·· ·-1----··-·· ·\-- -.. -.. ·-- ----- -··- ···I--···-· ··· ---- -····---·-----·-·-···--·-·- .. - -·----\-~~~~a~ -
1value staled Is whole value) , I Renee produced demand from First Am. Real Est. Tax Service for\ ' I ·, relmb. Because they paid Real Homes property taxes In error.- ·,·20s 
($1,981.26) J ) 
1 ! I Se? Ex. 206(aY Renee's #001046-As of 11/30/2004 per lax 1206(a 
·ra-1;;;;;-;,;;;..,-;..;.;;.,;;;;.,,.:.iii·-- -·- -· -·--·· ... t-,11.0>i.+-- --·-----+-· -----: _______ - ... -- -. --- : 
I I i ; Per Tax Assessment NoUca for 2 yaa111 • to ba aupplamanlad. \201 
I . I 
' 
Casa No. CV OR 04 01075 
Dall of Marriage: July 4, 1998 
Page 20122 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
11 lreal property lax due on parcel # •.• 508 (50% Interest l ($1,789.46)J S : 
!but value staled Is whole value) I j : l Per Tax Asssment Noice for 2001, 2002, and 2003 through 1 
tt()1==~-::--:.-:,:::::::--• - - +--r------ ------f-- --- ~-=-~:~=:~.-:.-,:,:;~-=~~c I 
J i I laxes paid on corporation's behalf Inadvertently. I a 
~- -1.~:,:;:t:::~:~::Sr::1joTntly ownedby ____ -···- - -·-······ -f\oo ~-S - ------r----.. Debt owed 10 Daryl for 1/2 or rental Income:. See .Qullclalm Deed :240·-·--
' Sep. from Kendra Sue Bertsch-Salla:a:, 6/21/1991. l2ss 
I J I I Shown In prior rlor Divorce Decree as Dennis' separate property. i 353 Deed 
13 ·!siiiiihstreei.reaipropertylnNami,a ·--··---- -- - 1--- ---t--- ------ ------- -r ... ··- --·-······ --------·--· .. ···--···· ·-··-·-·····-·-··· ···-···· ···-· ·-·i 
\ : I See Item 7 and I Real Homes real property. Sold to Rica. Rica assumed real 1311 
1 l analysis In brief. ! property tax debt. I 392 
13A \
1
0L Evans ConstrucUon Loan •. r (S30,47s.OO) - -----}--·---- ---------------··· ·--···-·······-··---·-- . ·····r ....... -.. . 
I Owned by Real Hamea LLC. $30,000+ DL Evans conatructlon 1330 
1, i loan. Ex. 311 la offer to purchase. Ex. 330 Is debt. Debt 1331 
paid/assumed by Rica. ; 392 
i 
C11e No. CV OR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Page 3 of 22 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
14 ;Federal Way Lot 50% lnlerest (other share owned by '1 S ! 
;Jim Scanlin) I ; 
15 Cougar Mountain Lat 50% Interest (other shared 
awned by Mike Standley) 
·rn- - fciear creelilotso%1iiieresiiouier·shai-e·owned by·· 
!Mike Standley) 
I • Qultclalm Deed from Kendra Sue Bertsch-Sallaz, 6/19/1991. ·1242 
Sep. I Prior Divorce Decree. 255 
------ 1- -+- ,-- -----\·-·····------------------ --1-· 
------1----+----- ' -·~---+ . ----. :~:::::,~:.-.. ~~~-~-
! I ! \239 I Sep See Quilclalm Deed 6/12/91 by Kendra Sue Bertsch-Sallaz. 
,, -·,. ---··,.,.., "......,-,.,..- -----~- ----~------,-----~ ---- ----------- --- -- --- -C 
! Grandmother) Estate, probate not completed. j I j 
j ' Sep. I Death CerUficate and Estate documents are Ex. 244. ;244 
i, ~\ ~-~~:::---"~~..":"."'...'.... ___ --¥----f----· ----~ ---+\ ------- ----·--------'-, ...... ___ ., _______ ,, ______ J1·~=--
I i 330 
\Real Hamai LLC Denny Is 50% owner and Glen \ \ I Denny's sap. $20,000 an 818/01 and $20,000 an 8/3/01 from 1!~~ 
ITrelren owna alher 60%. DL Even• Ck. Acct. # ... 2799 , $80 ooo oo ($62 500 00)1 Brookstreat 
1 s lapenad 2/11/05 wllh naw c:anatructlan loan proceeds. ! . . . . l i:iiinnla s2i.siiif relmburaam"iiiit"ciaiiii "pir eiC:-2a9A,'cki"1iia.-· ·1~: 23A, 
1• Ex. 331 (aid DL Evan, Acct. Stmts. Ex. 375) 1378. Bates 
Casa Na. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Maniaga: July 4, 1998 Page 4 af 22 
1001455 
f 244 last pg. 
I 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
! I $39,000.00 Ex. 314 Q, 380, 380A. Testimony of Harding. [
Scott Gatewood's) I I \ 
21 National Ananclal Services, Inc. ·· ------ ; t -S · · -----·---· ·· --------··-······-· ··· · ··- ----···· · -l----- ---·· 
I 1 Sep. $3,200.00 Renee look money on May 11, 2004. 1238 I 23aca1 
22 - · Eini>Tie·wes1 _______ --·· -- -------- · ------· -------- ·· -····----- --------· ---- ··--···- - ---·----- --- ------------------ ----------------·· +-------
sec. of Slate filings are Ex. 257(a) 1257 
l257(a) 
23 no Items for these numbers ------+-----·-'-- ----·-- --- ·---·- ··-···-·--·-----I-----------·-· · -·-- ·--·----· ···· ·-·--···--j 
~ I 
: ~.::_"'.'.'"'"'"' """"""''"._N_S __ •-------+------+-- ,_ ___ , _____ __,_ _______ ----------·---------------------L-----








Casa No. Cl/ DR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 199B Paga 5 of 22 
Margin Loan. Balance as of 6/30/05. Dennis' separate funds J' update 
deposited lo acct 3/20/1998 from Roosevelt Rely. See Ex. 210A 210 2d 
and Ex. 248a. 8/8/01 $20,000 w/d and 8/3/01 $20,000 w/d went ~pdale 
to Real Homes. $40,000 claim eppears In Item 19. 1 uA 248a 
Pl'a23A 
----------------------------·--·-- ---· 
Sea Summary or communltybDl1 paid from loan procead1. \211A 
i210A 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
30 I Putnam Investments SEP/IRA #0336644339/A79 3 $40,160.99 $40,160.99 s I 
518 42 3803 BBBW :210 B 
JOA- Putnam SEP/IRA (Renee's) $6,990.00 $6,990.00-~- · 
Slatemenl dated 1/1/05-6/30/05-2106 updale. Account opened In \update 
$l,2SO.OO July 1994 (before marriage). j210 B 
Stml Produced by Renee In supplemental response rec'd 
$6,990.00 7//13/05. "lnUdal amount Invested 1/26/98" - Supp 7/26/05 
Bates page 1365 
1210c 
--. r4BA __ 
2100 
-c-+---..,....=-_,_--_,.-~..,....---------·~•------~-----1------1-c--'------_.__-------1-----------------------~I -306 Renee's Simple IRA-Oppenheimer to be determined r------
1 
31 OperaUng Engineers Pension ConlrlbuUon 
32 John Hancock Venture Annuity (wai' Manulife 
. Flnanclal) #820741 
Owner la Dannis; Annuitant la Dannis; lncapUon Data 
la 10/3/1994 (before marriage) 
Cua No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
$9,755.00 $9,755.00 S 
$1,940.98 $1,940.98 S 
Sep, 
Paga Sof 22 
Sep. 
$100.00 See Renee's paystub dated 6/30/05 showing conlrlbuUon. 
See Renee's Ans. To Interrogatory #1 B. $9,368 Disclosed 
7/26/05 













33 ranuli[e Financial Venture Annully duplicate of #32? 
I 
~Items for these numbers ___ . 
;~ ~ 38 
~ --·-1N_V_E-ST_M_E_N_T_A_C_C_O_U_N_T_S/0S--TO_C_K_S _ 
40 \none 
POST TRIAL, EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
See Renee's Ans. To Interrogatory #10. $7489 
" I""™'"""" (CASH VALUE(----- •------------+-·-----·--- ----------
, __ ..,_ _____________ . --------•------l-----+------1---1------1------1-------------·--·---·--------1---
42 none 
43 CHECKING, SAVINGS, C.D, MONEY MARKET 
ACCOUNTS AND CASH 




CaH No. CV DR 04 01075 
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212 
$ 0 00 Plalnllfl'a value • agreed. Sae Balas #000069-0000103. Bal. aa of 280 
13 ' 3110/05 (Ex. 280). 281 
$2,488.48 Online banking printout produced by Ranaa as of 6/8/05. 280(a) 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
45 tersonal Account al DL. Evans, Dennis .J. Sallaz. $3,834.071 I $3,834.07 C ! : 
i ·, i Statement dated 7/8/05. /254-2d sup 
I $3,834.07 ; 2/11/2005-Ex. 254. 1254 
i · j Ex. 254 Supp Is stmts. 6/04-6/05. (acct opened 5/18/2004) 1254 supp 
46 --+,"'·"" e.;.;-;;;,;.;;..a.,,.,.,,,,T" ";"'-· ..-;L.-..... -r--. -- -· -~ -----· r- ---- ··-- :=. -In -Re-ne-e'-s ::::~~~-.- Se:~:1:~:;:o~:~,~--·-,2~-1 ----
' 1/912004 $1,823.11. I I . I .,- ··f ;;;.; ...... ""' =-- --- ... ,,._,,,,,,----- -----r ., ..... ,. " ------- -. -1- ... ,,. ,, • .,, ,,,. 0-... _,"""" .. - - • ,. --... L --
L - --·----- --· ---$247.96r-·-----1'. -·-$247.96 --- - ------ _____ :1-- _______ ·_ ... __ lrusl account of Plalnt1ffs attorney. ii 4il. ..1cajii1a1 eiii.ii:aiiirsiiciitioooo6ii1900, savings and 
,checking 
i I : $24 7 .96 ! Statements 5/04-6/30/05 • Ex. 302 i 302 




--·--r--·-··----···-·-·-··-· -- ·-·--· ------· 51 j 2000 Ford Excursion 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1998 
I SllpulaUon as to value. Renee produced Chrysler Financial . 336 1 ! S7•7oo.oo slatement-·showlng balance owing as of6/20/05 l · ! . i -$16,000.00 - ($18,06 - ($2,060.00) C - -· --- - - ,---- -- ! - - . 
I . 
I D.L. Evans Bank; auto deducted from bank account-no monthly ! i · (negative value) I statement received. jP's Ex. 72. 
! ! 
I 
Pagp 8 of 22 POST TRIAL El<HIBl'I ~O 1 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
52 :,.'.1989 Chleftaln31'Wlnnebago MH $15,000.001 ($8,500.00)J $6,500.00 1, : 
J Refy 1998 Ex. 248A paid debl lo 1 sl Sec. Bank. Rice has !. J I security lnleresL Debi of approx. $61,570 lo Vista Pawn. $8,500 303 I X . debt due Roy Rice Is Included In debt owed lo Vista Pawn, Item 338 i • J 100. 
j Dennis' separate property reimbursement claim of $17,500 
" -f., ......... ----------------- --------------+ ------ . --- -----------·--· ---------- -- ---------r .. -
I I 1· documents are Ex. 372. Plalntlff Incorrectly shows 82 Rolls as 83 11372 
246<\ 
! , Sep. Rolls J 
54"" . -~-Porsche928S·-----·- -·---------- ----------1-·--·-----·,··-ss:ooo.oo C .. -···-----·--------------·--------l-----
1 ' : I , sell and use proceeds lo pay Dennis testified value was between $4,000 and $5,000. Renee's I ! I I community debL schedule shows $5,500. ! 
55 ~aguarXKEConvertlble ------- r I S "' I =~ ... ,,,, .. ------·-·· -- -------t: 
$ ~,-- --- --+----1-------s-----+----------------------- -----F 
57 . 'SO Packard (50% ownership wilh Daryl-total value 
:$1,500) 
Casa No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
j l Sep, I 1303 
l i I 
···-·-·······-+···· ····-···-·!·· -····-·---·-··· ------ ··--·-·-··-···-·-·r--···---- - - .. -····--·---·-···· ---- -·· ···!·-··· $750.001 l $750.00 C 
$750.00 
Page 9 of22 
i 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
-----· 
58 :40 Cadillac Limo l I S I I 
60 
------~---------·--·--------- -----1 __ L ___ s __ Sep. ___ I "°':'00•"''.'"'·w-•.., ·--·-·---- 1:: 
61 179 Chevrolet 1/2 Ton 4WD I l · 
j I Sep. I Acquired titla 2/1/89 1303 
·--···--------L---------· 
63 178 Oaks Whitewater 26' Inboard boat w/lraHar I + ' +=- J_ 
1 I Sep. 
1 
1255 
64 --;1949DreamboatRoadster · ·--------- -----+- --1 --- -S-- ---------1---------------- ---··-- ----+--
! j Sep. I j 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marrtaga: July 4, 1996 
: I 
Paga 10 0122 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule . e 
----l1:::;:•; !\111!!~1-·li!~ll!il• .. :•• '!t•:• 1!•··••:••··················---
65 !1953 Cadillac 4 door sedan $2,500.00 I $2,500.00 S ! I 
-· . . . - -·------ -------......... _______ .. ____ I_________ ·-
f/,-- 1998 Yamaha Grizzly sold sold I ' 
$7 500 00 Dennis testified lhal II was never gifted lo Ashley. There Is no 
~ 
· ' · ; delivery of lhe supposed gift. 
I I 
68 (TVlraller .... ·-·-----.-ol_d_ - ii------ _r--- 1--1--
" I, ... ""'"""' ........... ""' u,, ... .,, ··---1------t --------- ------ -- -----------------·- _____ I ____________ .. 
.. .,,.. .. "'"""'"" -·"" '"' .......... ,.,..,, ··:_ 1::: -
-~---·---· --- ---------1---1-1--+-
]=~ ------+ ·I------+,,-·---··----- nol:_com-~""~=--------------L-
! ', 
I s1.soo.oo . 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
I ! 
Page 11 of22 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
69.3 Whitewater Rafi and Equlpmen-l --;-·· ---·-· •------l-------1------ll---l-·-----·1-------I-----------·------- I __ _ 
69.4 1999YamahaGrizzlyAlV --+ 
owned by Rica 
69.5 2002 Kawasakl Prairie A lV $5.000.00 -·----'1-------1-----------·--------------'------
$5,000.00 owned by flrm; lo be returned by Renee together wllh the trailer. 
--4------------ -----11-----~---~-----l---1------1------1-------------------------·--· 69.6 1997 Polaris 425 ATV 
69.7 2 Kawasaki Prairie 400 A TVs 
owned by Rlce 
69.8 1997 Kawasaki 300 
$500.00 
69.9 1 A TV 2 place 1lda by aide trailer 
69.10 1 A TV Zieman Trailer 
$1,200.00 In Ranee'• po111111on - Renee's value. 
'·e-9.-1-1 .i.,s"'11~de-""'1n,.....,,H"""1tc11.,....Tll""t""'T'""ra-::ll-ei""1 R=-a-ck.,...-------·'-----+-----1f----- i---ll-----.J------1--------------·-·-----·---·'---· 
Casa No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of t,larrtage: July 4, 1998 Paga 12 qf 22 
$75.00 Dannis' opinion of value. 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule e 
.---- ---·-
69.12 !Thule Storage Bin, Black I ! I I 
i I 4 I "'"'' o...,., ""-"~'= I 
:::f :::_· -~:~=---~= =~~~+=--~-==~-=-::~~-~ ~ -===--=~~~=-:~= 
~~ ------4------- ----~--
: $25.001 . __ j _____ . --· -
::t~~T:--~=:::=:~~- ----=~ -=~---·---- ----"~=1·-· --- ·------ . -----···------ -- --- --~ l _ l ___ .· --- X ____ 1 No value __________ ,. ____ 11, ____ _ 69.18 '!.Portable Battery Charger . I I! 
X No value 
. i-- -L --- -----.. ·--------·-····------ ......... ·---.. --~------·-69.19 t2F1a1GiissicirageTanks-·· :·---------·- ----·- ··. -----------·-, -----··--- ---------··--; ·---- -- I 
j I \ 
' \ $10.00 , Dennis' opinion of value. 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
I l 
Page 13 or 22 





69.20 5 Gas Cans for ATVs 
69.21 1990 Ford Bronco 
70 HOUSEHOLD GOODS, FURNISHINGS AND 
APPLIANCES 
71 Household lumlture, appllances, and furnishings et 
1000 S. Roose veil 
72 Anllque Firearm Collection 
73 2 AQHA Horses 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 




POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 







Sall and Use proceeds lo pay 
community debL 
Page 14 of 22 
No value 
Belongs lo Scott Gatewood 
Saa Exhibit 321(a). Value staled Is total or community Iiams. 
2 community guns (Banelll and Ruger) the values of which are 
Included In #71 above. Dennis doesn1 have Renee's dad's 20ga. 
Glock was Dennis' sap. property-value $250. Certain guns are 
itemized In the divorce Decree from Kendra at page 34. 
Wlfa says horsaa worth $8,000. 
321(a). 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
75 I Misc. Tack and Supplies $5.800.00 $5,800.00 C 
I 
n"°- Household lurnlture, appliances, a~ furnishings at to be determined to be determined 
Riverside home 
Sell and Use proceeds lo pay 
community debt Renee claimed Items were stolen. Exhibit 213. 
Renee's values for Items In her possession: 
#77.7 $120 #77.26 $500 
$2 505 00 #77.6 $180 #77.50 $300 
' . #77.9 $150 #77.51 $150 
#77 .10 $80 #77 .58 $725 
#77.58 $300 
'---L----------·------1·-----+-----+-----, --·1------l------·1----------------------<-----
77 no Items for these numbers 
78 
79 
80 DEBTS (OTHER THAN ABOVE-) ---
81 Debi owed to Daryl Sallaz for ~/2 ol rents collected 
and not paid to him. 
82 VISA, Ranee Baird Sallaz, 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 






Paga 15 of22 
Claim not pursued at trial. 
-$2,539.00 Simi. Dated 9/20/04 produced by P #000006 216 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
63 American Express, # ••• 71002 l, ($21,976.81) ($21,978.81) C 
84 Cabela's Visa 
'~CO-st_co_Wh-·o-1-es_a_le_C_re--d-lt_Ca_r_d ________ _ 
86 Direct Men:anl's Bank 
~ Discover Card 
66 Fleet Credit Card/Bank of America 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 

















P!!QB 16 0122 
Simi. 7/7/05 2172d Supp. 
Def.pd. $1,297 7/29-11/1 
Bal. 11/1 $20,806 
Stml 7 /6/05 2162d supp. 
Def.pd. $433 7/29-11/1; 
Bal. 11/1 $7013 
Simi. 6/18/05 219 supp. 
Def.pd $254 7/29-11/1/05 
Bal. 11/1 $2,939 
Simi. 6/20/05 220 supp. 
Def. pd. $633 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10 $8,121 
Stmt. 6/24/05 221 supp 
Def.pd $646 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10 $7,826 
Stml 6/20/05 222 supp. 
Def.pd. $977 7/29-11/10 
































' ' ,. ,. 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
f. Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
89 Home Depot Credit Card $0.00 $0.00 C 
90 Lowes Credit Card 
91 MBNA # ••. 7599 
92 MBNA # ••. 1206 
93 Wells Fargo Credit Card· 
94 Advanta Credit Card 
Can No. CV DR 04 01075 

















Paga 17 of22 
Supp. Is slmls 11/04-1nt05. Balance was transferred to Direct 223supp. 
Merchant's.· 
Stml 6/22/05 Is 224supp. 
Def.pd. $582 7/29-10/14 
Bal. 10/14/05 Is $0.00 (pd. In full) 
Stmt. 6/22/05 Is 225 supp. 
Def. pd $2,133 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10/05 $24,807 
Stmt. 6122/05 is 226supp. 
Def.pd. $2,129 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10/05 $27,222 
StmL 6/3/05 Is 2272dsupp 
Oaf.pd $628 7/29•11/10 
Bal. 11110/05 $8,398 

























98 Internal Revenue Service for 2000, 2002, and 2001 
96A Internal Revenue Service for 2003 
96B · Internal Revenue Service and Idaho State Tax 
Commission for 2004 
97 Idaho Slate Tax Comml11lon ror 2000, 2002, and 
2003 
Case Na. r:;,./ DR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
$0.00 
($15,400.00) {$15,400.00) C 
($15,400.00) 
Included in #96 C 
($5,938.00) ($5,938.00) C 
($5,938.00) 
paid with borrowed rundl: ae• ~ 
97.1 below 
Page 18 of 22 
Paid by Defendant - $2,300. 
See I.R.S. Letter/Statement dated 7/6/2005-Ex. 229A(1 ). See 
229A(1) 
229A{Feu) 
also tax summary; Ex. 229 
Bal. owing as of7/6/05 shown on Ex. 229{A){1). EsUmate 
including Interest and penalUes. See Ex. 250, $6838 tax due 
Federal Return. See also tax summary Ex. 229. 
Taxes due for 2004. Federal $4,369; State $1,569. 
Danni, paid ta avoid Lavy, borrowed rundl from Ray Rica. 









POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule e 
---·--····· 
97.1 !Debi owed lo Roy Rice ($10,883.00) ($10,883.00) ' I 
I , 
, ($10 883_0011 Dennis borrowed Iha funds from Roy Rica lo pay the Idaho State 1349 I . I T~ c--.. " '"" . ""· ' '" i-.... TO<c...,a.,., ,.,,,,,. --- ------ ($1,569.00) ($1,569.00) . c- ______ T _____ -· -----------------·-·--·--- ·---·--·-----f--·---
j I Amount shown above In Item 966. 1250(a) 
i i I 
"971j···rraxes.for2005-···-··--·-· .. ·--····· ·- ··- - ·-· ------- ·-··-------,----- ---· .... ·-·-·· --··-····-··t··-···----·-·---· --·------------------ ·-·····--·- ...... ···-··-··-·-··-··-r·--·· 
I ----- ------r· ($16,000.00)l(S10.on00)C- "-=--1.1°0:~---- T~, .. ,~.,,=·--~=---. ___ Tl ___ _ ~erry Harding CPA -·--··· r 
i ($8,000.00)1 Contingent claim owed to Trefren. I 
'9tABCTI••""- '"'- ·---··-· -----1 oz,o,ooJ 0z,0100J .- (S,.,o,.ooJi .... .,., ,:,.::----·---. ---·------1=--
! ·· --·· ----·· ----·--· -i- ----~----------· c--· ·-··-··---·-t--·--··· -·---· --------·--···--·--··-·······-·--· ···--·--·····-···---~----·-···--
,oo-f,,,• ·-..... (oo""'"'"-'' I IS<<,93.00)! """'M "·"" ..... "" "'"""''" -· I"· 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Paga 19 of22 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
101 I.R.S. Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing against Sallaz ($34.022.00) ($34,022.00) 
Law Offices Chartered 
102 Dennis' Medical Bills 
102A Aneslhesla Associates 
1028 Boise Radiology 
102C Boise Pathology 
102D Boise Gastroenterology 
102E Boise Orthopedic 
102F Card lo. Consultants 
1020 Cardlov. & Chest Surgery 
Casa No. CV DR 04 01075 















Page 20 of22 
Notices dated 4/28/06, for tax years 1996, 1997, 1999, and 2000; 348A 
certified letter dated 5/9/06. Tolal Is on Ex. 382 382 
Estlmale. Bills nol received yet, Insurance nol applied yel To be 
delermlned. 
As of 2/05 had been paid 
As of 1/05 had been paid. 
As of 1/05 had been paid. 
As of 5/04 the balance of $1,200 had been paid. 
As of 5/04 had bean paid 
As ot 5/05 had baen paid 















102H Greg Flint MD 
1021 Idaho Endoscopy 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
$0.00 
Ex. 333 H, 6/30/05 333 H 
As of 5/04 had been paid 3331 
1-1-0-2J-1-,l=D-X""P-at-ho..,.lo_g_y-----·------- ---·-----1----$-0-.0-0-+----- ---i,-----t-------l--------·---------·----+-----
102K lntermountaln Eye Clinic 
102L Dr. Johans 
102M Selah Medical Center/Dr. Spencer 
102N Berkey Heart Lab 
1020 Saint Alphonsus RMC 
Clise No. r:-1DR0401075 





Paga 21 of 22 
As of 5/04 had been paid 333J 
As of 6/04 had been paid 333K 
As of 11/03 lhe balance of $2,021 had been paid 333L 
As of 2/05 had been paid 
As of 8/05 had bean paid 333N 
A1 of 1tmt. 5/18/05. The SL Ala Ambulatory of $525. 79 waa paid, 333 0 
and Iha Lab of S 120 was paid. 








POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz A 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule • 
,.,. l""'"'•"MC I 
I 
1020 I Medical Bills from Procedure occurred on 7/11/05. 
103 Debt owed to Sallaz end Gatewood by Renee for 
, entering Into a SUpulaUon on 2/10/05 In Small Claims 
I Court whereby her and/or Ashley's debt for d,y 
I cleaning expenses of $181.49 was to be charged off 
against a Sallaz and Gatewood Account Receivable •• 
1M~cUon CollecUon Service - bill Incurred to Treasure I Valley Hospttal (addressed to "Dear Renee L Sallaz") 
105 TOTAL 
107 EQUALIZATION 
108 NET ESTATE TO EACH 
ca .. No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dela of Manlage: July 4, 1998. 
lo be determined 
($181.49) ($181.49) C 
($351.00) ($351.00) C 
($351.00) 




Paga 22of 22 
As of statements printed 3/8/05 and 12122/04. 333 P 
Bills not received yet. 




$49,694_68 community assets/debts to be redistributed to equalize division 
alter Oefandanrs separate property ralmburaamant. 
($102,858.15) 
($53,161.47) 





. Exhibit P 
000737
SALLA 7. & GATEWOOD. C:2.-rD. 
1000 South Rocsevelt Street 
Pest Offic~Bcx !956 3cise ID B3707 
Te!ephat1! (208J 336-l l 4.S 
Fac::;imi!e (208) 336-1263 
e-MaU: saUa:@sana:law.com 
F.A.CSIMILE TR.A..N"S11ISSION 
_£ ?AGES INCLUDING COVER. 
........ J /i ;q_; 
TO: -/oAN «~1"17' Fa:{ No.: 31/ 3 ... 3 ,;2 l/ ~ 
FROM: Sail.ez & Gat::wocd Pa=< No.: 336-126.3 / Ph: 336-1145 
SU'.SJ.ECT: 4 A~·.. .. ll/1/A ~.WN ~II 
COPYTO: NIA 
Comm.eno: J~: 
TrlIS IS TH3 ONLY COPY YOU \v1LL RECEIVE C 
'THE OlUOINAL rs TO FOLLOW By U.S. ?v<.A!L ---.A COPY WILL FOLLOW BY U.S. 'tYUJ!. 
Ca11fldcrtlallty Natico: Toa matadals wif:1 this faci~lle tr.1.isr.:.l!!lcn ara print: and c:on!!dc11dal ar.d a., tM prop<:rty or che 
rcndc:, rnc rnt'al":llation in (ha :natar!al I.; pr!vllo;c:! and la intandad ;nly for d,o 1ua of :he lndMdual(:) er cn.lily(ias) n=d &bovc. 
!fyo,i 1r: aoc :he: ln1e1dc:I racipicn~ be advised Chae any una.utfl.~ disalomc, cap)'lnr, :l!st.lbutian, or the ta.lc!nc; afilny acrlan 
In l'llllanci, on Um conLcnLT if this 1:1:11"-copcd lnf'or:naclon. Ir scrlc:t.ly prohlbit~d. rt yi:u ha.VI: received !ht.I io~imilo ll'ansmi.slaa In 





dba VISTA PA vVN 
B<1ise. Idaho 
DENNIS and RENEE SALLAZ 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boi.sa, Idaho 3J707 
R3: ACCOUNT DUE 115/96 • S/1/04 
Motor Home · Cash S 









2S pc variou:; disney 
S pc va..'"ious movies 
Hitachi I 0° chop saw 
Xe:ox 40.30 printer w/dua! t:-ays 
1'1dian case, quiver, anows-sr.a.kesk:n 
Pipe, horn, leather arrow heads, feathe:-
Cheyemrs ash bow_, leather sheather, quiv~ 
Mountain b1'!c! g:rey/blacldred 





Iamaca Me Tan 
Pewt:r mini auto collection. 
Tools 
Ste:eo 
















To Renee in Port!a.:.d. 
&nee (Nicole) 6/9S #1080723-1 
For anniver311ry #1089899-1 
For anniversary #1089509-1 
For birthday 11090426-2 
Renee's daughter4/95 #39614-2 
Renee's da.ughfer #1 059030-2 






160.00 7/2I/97 #10701.50 
l,Z00,00 7119191 #IOi0!08 
359.90 If.I 136S09-4 
















Alhley# l I3 U 8S-1 
000739
Car Ster!o 239.90 Ashley #!-1393 S 
VCR 149.98 Ashleyr #l l37i2I-2 
DVDP!aye: 217.98 As.iley fI-13204 
Dai:gfrtar # ! 13.5479-17 
Daughter#! l 3S479-! 8 
Daughter #ll3S5·80-19 
Oaughtarinl3 33 IO 1-1 
Outdoor stereo, floor speak~. CD, receiver 600.00 Renee 
R!d Guitar i.n black case 600.00 #1136814-1 
Mor.goose mountain bike 239.90 i¥I1J6856-1 
YID system. controller adapter 359.98 #1136995-l 
Oold cha.ill w:'Iv!a.ati.-q ruby 299.98 #I 080392-1 Renee 
Ring i°tl079263-l Rene5 
Men's dng 4.10 dwt :37784-1 Ranee 
Cha.in 91080406-18 Renee 
JVC sterw llllit w/6 disc CD 439.98 #1073282-l 
VID Nint."D.do w controller 239.90 #1082164-1 
Various video g3mes 69.98 ill 080836-2 
Craig CD pl.ayer w/2CD 139.98 if10779S7-J 
Fisher CD player 69.98 #1087109-2 
Gold 2.30 DWT II019556-3 
18.90WT #1092163-1 
Gold pearl earri.~ 69.93" ill070&08-2 
519.90 11-12523 
JeweL.--y 4S.OO #10889S0-2 Denny took 
Jewelzy 30.00 #!097973-! Den,,-,,y tcok 
Jewelry 28.00 #1072306~! Demly took 
Jewehy 65.00 #1072151-3 Denny took 
JeweL7 !10.00 #!085642-4 De.,ny tcok 
Fi.sh.i.,g poles 57.00 
Jewelry 30.00 #!085642-4 Denny took 
#tl3SS80-l9 Dau~hter 
#113361-1 Da:ighte: 
Konica Ca.-:1e:-a 179.90 # I-3149 
Chai"l. 299 . .90 
Twist w/3 dia 179.90 
Ea::ings l.399.90 #10SS08S·2 Den::y 
HP printer de!.k jet #105l5il·I 
4 pc green outdoor spe!!.hr 449.90 #1054855-1 
Smith Corona wod processor 259.90 #I-l 109S 
New Yor.k Fur S'.aop jac:bt #Jl505-l 
ACCOUr.rr • ROY RICE, P, 2 
000740
Shsr,i Caz=c:::rcer w/eqcipme:1.t 9i9.$Q #106052!-1 
Prmter 90 #1052914-1 
4Cd.s 20.20 # 1052620-4 
CD IO.IO #300i0~1 
CD 10.10 fl0Si22S-l 
2CDs 20.20 1053589-2 
CD 10.10 #lOS7337-l 
CD 10.10 1#1058092-1 
CD 10.10 #10S7580-l 
Cds 89.90 #1057599-3 
Fur coat 1,200.00 #10114-1 
Plumbing bldg maint:::itar.ce pa.'t:l sn.s6 #-
Fur coat 1,000.00 #30686-1 
Blue sapphire ring/baguettes 6,299.99 Rene: #I-4749 
Large m.arqui.s rlng 6,599.90 Renee #42150-1 
Men's flower 7 diamond ring 699.90 Renee i3S4&4-o 
T.dangie 10 diamond rL11g 6,2.99.90 Renee #48934-1 
Men's l ct :iolitaire 3,989.90 Rene:; 144602-1 
Men's 4 diam.and band 1,599-.90 Renee '213.88-2 
7 Marquis ladies ring 999.90 Renee #42211-4 
3 marquise 2 tearl 4SO.OO Renee 11050530-1 
3.10 band 179.90 Renee l23SOO·l 
2.90band 81.90 Renee i¥24S78-2 
J.OOBand 169.90 Rene:: §39938-2 
3.00 Band 159.90 Renee 134758-2 
1.70Band 89.90 Renee #3942.3-3 
5.!0Band 259.90 Renee #26449-I 
1.50 Band 89.90 Renee #33104-1 
3.10 Band 179.90 Renee #:23691- I 
2.6Band 149.80 Renee ti2282 l • I 
2.6Ba:u! 129.80 Rec.ee I 19064-1 
Hea.'1 w/diai;:iond chain 359.90 R:nee #49404-3 
Ring-squa.r: top 649.90 Renee # 1050603-1 
Ring, gold w/1 577.90 Renee #20805-t 
Men'f ring w/sq11J1r: design 239.90 ~:e #442So· l 
TOTAL Du"X (uot including interest) Sal,5i0 . .Sl 







INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE ISSUED: 0~-30-199Q 
No. ~1 Hix 
Return To 
Secretary af Stats 
Room 203, Statehousa 
Boise, ID 83720 
NO.~ Fe.: REQO!R£0 
Idaho Corporation Annual Report Form 
Due No Lacer Than November 1, 1 9 9 iJ 
1. Mailing Address - Please Correct 
R-~ INVESTMENTS, INC. 
PENNIS J. SALLAZ 
1000 S. RCOSEVELT 
BOISE ID 33705 
4. Names and Addresses of Officers and Directors 




Roy Rice 523 Vista Avenue 
Dennis J. Sallaz 523 Vista 
Roy Rice 
Janet Rice 




P. o. Box 8956 
P. o. Box 8956 
2. Registered Agent and Office 
OENNIS J. SALL.AZ 
1000 s. ROOSEVELT 
SOISE IO 
3. Incorporated Under The Laws 
of · IO . · 
NO: 091268 
;fl 
Qr! StatEt."" ~:-, 
:,:, 
~ 
Boise ID .... 
~ 
II II :-1 
.-,! 
Boise, ID 0 "Tl 
II . II 
VI 









5. Nature oi Business 6.1 certify that this Annual Reoort hA!'I heen examined by me and Is to the best of my knowledge 
true, correct a~ • ,, . · . 
Real & personal propertv _ · ~ 7-27-90 . . . - ~ 
investments Name r,:,::;;,t uen,~ ... • ::;a.L.Laz litle Secretary 





ART]CLES OF AMIND?\IIBNT 
TO 
R-R .INVESTMENTS, me. 











. 1$1 """"lJ 
These Am.des of Amendment and the following certificate is hereby made and eiec~d 
~~ 
purs11Jant to Sectioo 30-1-59, Idaho Cc<le, for the purpose of amending the Articles of 
Incorporation of R-R Investments, foe., an Idaho corporation, and to effect a change of name 
of said corporation to Rentals. & Royalties, Inc. 
The undersigned. MICHAEL RICE. President of said corporation, and RENEE BAIRD, 
Secretary of saii.dl corporation, do hereby respectively certify as follows; 
I. 
That a meeting of an of the stockholders of R-R Investments,: Inc., an Idaho corporation, 
was held on February 21, 1995, at ICOO Soutb Roosevelt, Boise, Ad.a County, Idaho, pursuant . . 
to Call and Waiver of Notice signed by a.II of tne··s.tockholders and filed in the minute book of 
the corporation. 
Il. 
That at such meeting, the foUowing resolution was presented aod upon rnot»on dufy made, 
seconded and umnimously carried, the same was adopted: 
BE IT RESOLVED. that Article J of the Autkles o.f 
Jncorporatfo111 of R-R Investments, Ire. be amended by deleting~ SECRETMY a: S'lITTE 
entire first Article and frlJserting in place thereof, the folJo~t 0000 6!128 2 
Cl t: 2aOO Cl.S'TI ~U 
CORP 
... ,.;.: ..:iU. UO= 30.00 
ARTICLES Of ~\tfENDMENT - 1 
:ft: C 
. ---_·-_-_-_--_-_----1-E"'*'Xr-11 BIT [y\ 
000745
"ARTICLE I 
The name of the corporation is Rema.!s & Royalties, Inc.• 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the President and 
Secretary of the corporation, respectively, be, and they are hereby, 
authorized to prepare a certificate of this resolution and 
amendment to the Articles o.f Jncorporation of this corporation and 
to fiJe the same with the Secretary of State for the State of Idaho, 
and to do aJl things necessarJ in order to duly effect the change of 
name of this corporation in accordance with this resolution. 
m. 
We further certilfy that we are the proper officers to execute this certificate, being the 
President and Secretary of said corporation, respectively, aoo we therefore execute these Articles 
of Amendment of Incorporation of said corporation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. We have hereunto set our hands and seals this A//!! day 
of February, 1995. 
AEL RICE, 
~~ 
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT - 2 
000746
VERlF'ICA 1'ION 
MICHAEL RICE. being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That I am the President in the above-entitled corporation; that I have read me within and 
foregoing Articles of Amendment. k.oo,w the contents thereof, and that the same is true and 
correct as J verily believe. 
ARTICLES Of AMENDMENT - 3 
.. ···-----:· -.. : ~ 
NOf ARY PUBLIC furl 






State of Idaho 
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
CAP.ITAL BROADCASTING INC. 
File number C I0'7814 
I, PETE T. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State· of Idlaho:, hereby certify 
th.at duplicate originails of Articles of fucorporation for the incorporation of the above 
named corporation, duly signed pursuant t.o the provisions of the Idaho- :Business 
Corporation Act, have been received in this office a.nd are found to conform to law. 
ACCORDINGLY and by vim.ie· of the authority vested in me by law, I :issue Hus 
Certificate oflnco,irporation and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Arn.des of 
Incorporation. 
Dated: September 28, 1994 
~(JI'~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
~-. 
EXHI BIT_..,.......bj __ 
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CERTIFICATE OP INCORPORATION 
CAPITAL BROADCASTING L~C. 
A CLOSE CORPORATION 
SH l~ II 5:> AH ·~ 
~f.(:~tTARY OF STHE 
PIRST. THE NAME OP THE CORPORATION IS CAPIT:.IX..L BROADCASTING 
INC. 
SECOND. THE PERIOD OF DURAT"ION I.S PERPETUAL. 
THIRD. THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS AND THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSE 
PROPOSED ·ro BE TRJ\NSP..CTED, PROMO'l,"ED )\ND CARRIED ON A.RE T'O ENGAGE 
IN ANY LAWFUL ACT OR ACTIVITY" FOR WHIC'H CORPORATIONS MAY BE 
INCORPORATED UNDER THIS ACT. 
FOURTH. THE A.MOUNT OP THE TOTAL AUTHORUED CAPITAL STOCK OP THE 
CORPORATION IS DIVIDED INTO 1000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK OF NO 
PAR VALUE. 
FIFTH. ALL OF THE CORPORATIONS ISSUED STOCK SHALL BE HELD BY NOT 
MORE THAN THIRTY (JO) PERSONS. 
SIXTH. ALL OF THE rss.UED STOCK OF ALl, CLASSES SHALL BE. SUBJECT TO 
THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFER PERM.I'F'l!'ED BY SECTION 30-12JA 
OP THE CORPORATION U\WS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
S"EVENTH. EACH STOCXHOLDER WILL OFFER TO '!'HE CORPORATION OR TO THE 
OTHER STOCKHOLDERS O,F' THE CORPORATION A THIRTY (JO} DAY FIRST REFUSAL 
OPTION TO PURCHASE HIS STOCK SHOULD Ii.E ELECT TO SELL HIS STOCK. THE 
P-RICE FOR ALL STOCK SHALL BE BASED ON 'Jl'HE BOOK VALUE OF THE COMPANY 
AT THE TIME OP THE SALE EXCEPT FOR STOCK THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY SELL~ 
EIGHT. CORPORATION SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO F1LE A SUB CHAPTERS AND 
TO USE THE 1244 PROVISION. . 
NINTH. THE CORPORATION" SHALL MAKE NO OFFERING OF ANY STOCK OF ANY 
CLASS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC O.PPERING WITHIN THE MEANING 
Of' THE UNITED STATES ·SECURITIES ACT OF 193.3,. AS IT MAY BE AMENDED FROM 
TI.HE TO TU1E. CORPORATE OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS SHALL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE IN'I'ERESTS OR OBLIGATIONS. 
TENTH. THE ADDRESS OP ITS INITIAL REGISTERED OFFICE IS 5 03 VISTA 
BOISE, IDAHO 83705 AND THE NAME OF ITS INITIAL REGISTERED 
AGENT AT SUCH ADDRESS IS ROY RICE, 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83-705 
E:LEVE:Nl'I.'H. THERE S.HALL BE ONE DIRECTOR CONSTITUTING THE INITIAL. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF THE PERSONS TO 
SERVE AS DIRECTORS tJIN1'IL THE FIRST ~NUAL MEETING OF SHARE HOLDERS 
OR UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS BE ELECTED AND OUAI..IFY. 
ROY RICE, 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 
000750
TWELFTH. 'FEiE NAME A."l\fD ADDRESS OF EA.CH INCOR.PORATOR: 
ROY RICE, 503 VIST.A 1 BOISE, IDAHO 83705 





State of Idaho 
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
"WESfERN BROADCASTING WC. 
File nmnber C 1W'813 
I, PETET. CENAERUSA, Secretary of S.tate of the State ofidaho, hereby certify 
that duplicate originals, of Articles of Lr!corporation for t.h.e incorporation of the above 
named corporation, duly signed pwsuant to the provisions of the Ida.ho Business 
Corporation Act, have· been received in this olfice and are found to conform to law. 
ACCORDl!NGL Y and by virtue of the authority ves.fed in me by law, I issue thls 
Cerlificate of Incorporation and attach hereto a duplicate od.g:inal of the Articles of 
Tu.corporation. 
Dated: September 28, 1994 
~{Ji>~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATIONSli tH I/ 5..1 AH t~ 
Sc.GRO ~k'f o~ STJ. r_ .. WESTERN BROADCASTING IllC. r ~ ~ 
A CLOSE CORPOIU\TION 
F'IRST. THE NAM,E OF THE CORPORATION IS WESTERN BROADCASTING INC. 
SECOND. THE PERIQrD OP DURATION IS PERPETUAL. 
THIRD. THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS A.NIB} THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSE 
PROPOSED TO BE TRANSACTED, PROMOTED AND CARRIED ON ARE TO ENGAGE 
IN ANY LAWFUL ACT OR ACT'IVITY FOR WHICH CORPORATIONS MAY DE 
INCORPORATED UNDER THIS ACT, 
FOURTH. THE AMOUNT OF THE TOTAL AUTHORHED CAPITAL STOCK OF THE 
CORPORATION rs DIVIDED INTO 1000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK OF NO 
PAR VALUE. 
PIPTH. ALL OF THE CORPORATIONS ISSUED STOCK SHALL BE HELD BY NOT 
MORE THAN THIRTY (30) PERSONS. 
SIXTH. ALL OF THE ISSUED STOCK OF ALL CLASSES SHALL DE SUOJECT TO 
THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS•ON TR.t'1-1SFER PERMITTED BY SECTION J0-12JA 
Ol? THE CORPORATION LAWS OF Tl:IB STATE.OF IDAHO. 
SEVENTH. EACH STOCKHOLDER WILL OFFER TO THE CORPORATION OR TO THE 
OTHER STOCKHOLDERS OF THE CORPORATION A THIRTY (JO} DAY FIRST REFUSAL 
OPTION TO PURCHASE HIS STOCK SHOULD HE ELECT TO SELL HIS STOCK. THE 
PRICE FOR ALL STOCK SHALL BE BASED ON THE BOOK VALUE OF THE COMPANY 
AT THE TIME OP THE SALE EXCEPT FOR STOCK THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY SELL. 
BIGHT. CORPORATION SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO PILE A SUB CHAPTERS AND 
TO USE THE 1244 PROVISION. 
NINTH. THE CORP·ORATION SHALJ.. MA.KE NO OFFERING OF ANY STOCK OF ANY' 
CLASS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC OFFERING WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF THE UNITED STATES ·SECURITIES ACT OP 1933, AS IT MAY BE AMENDED FROM 
TIME TO TIME. CORPORATE OF'FICERS OR DIRECTORS SHALL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR COR?ORATE INTERESTS OR OBLIGATIONS, 
TENTH. THE ADDRESS OF ITS INITTAL REGISTERED OFFICE IS 503 VISTA 
BOISE IDAHO 83705 AND THE NAME OF ITS INIT'IAL REGISTERED 
AGENT 1AT SU'CII ADDRESS IS ROY RICE 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 
ELEVENTH. THERE SHALL BE ONIE DIRECTOR CONSTITUTING THE INITIAL 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE NA.~ES AND ADDRESSES OF THE PERSONS TO 
SERVE AS DIRECTORS UNTIL THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OP SHA~E HOLDERS 
OR UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS BE .ELEC'fE.O AND QUALIFY. 




TWELFTH. THE· NAME AND ADDRESS OF RACH INCORPOJRATOR: 





SALLAZ LAW, CHARTERED 
D.Effl'IIS J. SALIAZ 
RAYMOND D, SCHILD 
Van Bishop 
Attorney at Law 
603'2"" Street' South 
:Nampa. ID 83651 
Deur Van: 
June 28, 2000 
JU e 
1000 sourn R00Sr:fflLl' 
POST Ol'l'JCfi BOX 89!SO 
BOIS8, lllt'UIO 3a':t01 
fflCJrlE: (208) 33&.1.14.5 
FAX: (208) 006-l.:Z&a 
In response ta your faxed; _l~f!.el'. of tdday' s d~ei~~~~i:4l'.,tn¥: .~i.:l'lt.~!i.il'.···-:··.:~tJp.iimY. . 
positio.n regarding the status of tltisentite "bullshit deal[t.it ··, . r µtµ'.\; squitm 
• hide the ball - crawl under his rocb .and tlten preyail, .. . .on:..Miu: .~: . :. ''Jj: 
pcrpotuato same is over, as it rehites to me and those prlvy·-ro'·~--, "·· ·, 
The entire aettlemenc af t:Jris case at all times was absolutely mutually it.nd uoivmmJJy 
agreed by all parties lUld attomeys to be a. '.3 agreement package on the terms presently set forth 
therein and with each agreement totl!llr dcpettdent qn the others. 
I personally was told by SUillller that :he had signed No. 2 and 3 as written and it would be 
delivered to Runft. Also, Sumner and I specifically agreed tl:!ar !would adjust any error:; in th~ 
Runft billing and Ftfer agreed to reassign all stock when he was paid plus hfu out of pocket costs 
which he reduced to $3,000. · 








.Ll·<!..Je _, IV I •C.I...J 
Letter to Van Bis.hop 
June 28, 2000 
Page Two 
My word ls absolutely solid gold and after litcnllly and ±iguritively carrying Samner for 
12 ye3t3 - including all attorney fees - cash costs· advances - cash ]QllllS - loan guarantees -
redeeming loan demuJra- eating tom of shit- bleeding profuaely- md the.a delivering these radio 
stations to him, in spite ofhimse~ it's'over. 
If Sumner want:; to question my wotd now then he better tighten bis cinch and grab bis 
4S3. because it's gonna be a hell of a lotinore than au 8· second ride . 
t>JS:da 











SA1.LAZ LAWOFFICES. CI-:IAffiBED 
DENNJS J,.$iUJ.,)Z . . . -
R.,\1'Jv(OND D. SC:HII.D 
July i 0, 2000 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 8.3702 
VmFacsimile: 34S-1 l29 






1000 Sortrn RooSJ:vn'I' 
.Po5'1' omca Box 8956 
.BOISE, I.at\HO 83101 ., 
PHoNli {208) 336-1145 
FA."t (208) :336,Uh3 
. . . . - ·~ 
I am verJ hnppy that you were able to ~ the :S.~i~-~-,t~~9iffii~»:1~/i(4J~e ·;.; 
agreement you bave w~ked out with Runft for all Defen4~tfi§iffir~Wi~\ffl"efmt~J~~fu..&~~ ; 





••. ft; .. 
That the balan~ due, on the Roy Rice.I Sumner loan be specifically included in the 
payment in the above Defendants' Settlement .A~nt. " .:: . 
That in return for the assignment or release of all of tbe Fifer/ R&R stock to 
Sumner, Fifer rccover.s a portion of bis out-of-pocket cosb in the sum of $3000.00 
from the above ~ettlem.ent .Agreement. 
< Upaa Sumners signature hereon I am prepared to e;cecuta his new loan documents. 
' ,,,,.1••S'--,:~~~ 
-Ace(.·· :and Agreed to .t.hls:.:~.-. ·-· ··F-to( :_· _ -~ , ... -·· ......... '"2000. 
cc: Van Bishop 
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June 18, 2003 
Mr. Van 0. Bishop 
Attorney at-Law 
L6 12'1h A ventie South 
Nampa, ID 83651 
D~ Mr.. Bishop: 
RE: Escrow Instructions 
El Sel'.AN'l'i LA\'f OFF, e 
Acting in your pdutiary ca:pacit'J as Trustee, upon receiving the signed Stipulation and Qrder for 
Dismis~alas to.Demuii J. Saliaz,.andRentals& Royaltiei, Inc.,C'R-RJandWHbut.Fife;i/appi:opriately 
sigi.,ed ~s ~~~~., her~In?ft~1·)eferred as Disniissal, you ~hajh1otify Steve Sumo~~ of such. 
llp6p. ie~tIJifpf the flinds fr9m th.e glosing of the sale! ofthe assets of Capital West, Inc. to 
First Westeril, Irtc';~Ji'.'~i~{ybu sh.ail: . . . ,· .. . 
1. f.'ilftheDts:rhiss'~l a:s refeired:to above with the Court. . . .. 
2. O~liY~t:to,]Jiiims i)Sallaz certifiedm/;id.s i1' the amount of$+50;000:;0Q,payable to 
I;:>~iiitlj~.-L S~lfizti:tr',pay.abte. as di:rected'~nwriting.by De1mis .t ~allaz . . 
3. I:J:eiiver:to::J)ettriii i Salicaz mt additi6rial amo\'.irit in certified.funds cir.$~ 2. 098. 09 for 1~if ~~t?~tf c~;Jf;.:~:{~1~:t;:,:f ti~~:!~R), payable· to··~Mis·J.··si11az:·or 
4. D~lfv.er to petim~ J. S:µiaz the" ptepaiei:l Promissozy Note in the amount of 
$2f8,000:00 m'iide paya~le• to De:tmilJ.· Saiiaz signdl. by First W~stern., pie. and 
Steve Sumner,. guarantor aud secured by 2nd assignment of promissory 11.Qt~ fre>rn 
Educa~onal Media Foundation, a non-profit Califol'Ilia corporatjon. Sii.id assignrilent 
and security fot'Ili.S and documents to be appro.veci by Dennis J. Sallaz. . 
5. hthe event this transaction does 116t close within 120 days hereof, Sallaz bas the 
option ta terminate same. 
Trustee 
Steve Sumner Van Bishop 
Approved and agi.-eed: I.')._\ ') ">' '-l 
~~ \\ .... 
~l 
1 
.. \0 ~ '1 
\'I~ ( l. 7 
























ut1no1u4 !TED 09:27 !1498 El SM.ANN LAW OFF. e 
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEl'v.ffiNT 
Thi,; .Coufidentialify AgTeement (hereinafter the ",A.~ee~-:i.ent") is made this __ day of 
___ ..., 2003, by and between Dennis J. Sallaz, an individual, Rentals & Royalties, Inc. ("R-R"), 
an Ida~o corporation (collectively "Sallaz"), and Capital West, Inc., au Idaho corporation ("Capital"), 
and First Western,_ Inc., an Idaho corporation ("First Western:"), and Steve Sumner (''Sumner). 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Stmmer and Capital owes money to Sallaz, and Capital West has signed a 
Promissory Note in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A", which is incorporated herein by this 
reference and restated a.s if set forth in fulL 
WHEREAS, rhe fact that Sumner and Capital West, Inc. has signed the note and agreed to 
make payments and Sallaz has accepted said note, is information that First Western, Sumner, Capital 
West and Sallaz would rather not have publicly disseminated; and 
WHEREAS, Sallaz, Sumner, Capital West and First Westem in consideration of the delivery 
and acceptance of the Promissory Note on the te.rms thereon, all parties are willing to honor each 
parties' concerns that all of the tenns of this transaction, including the Promissory Note, remain in 
confidence. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW TH:::EREFORE, it is hereby agreed between a!! parties as follows: 
1. Recitals. The foregoing recitals are hereby incorporated by this 
reference and restated as if .set forth in full as part and parcel of this Agreement. 
CONFIDENTIAUTY AGREEMENT, P. l 







1)6/:J0/04 WED 09:28 ·,49,, EISMANN LAW OFF. e 
2. Confidentiality. It is understood and agreed that t.'1e confidentiality of all 
provisions of th.is Agreement and the ~on-disclosure and non-publication thereof subsequent to the 
execution of this Agreement is a material part of the consideration recited herein. The parties 
acknowledge that the disclosure, dissemination or publication of the provision of this Agreement by 
any of said parties may adversely affect the others. The parties do further stipulate and agree that 
none of the terms of this settlement or any of the agreements or payments herein, including the 
aforesaid Promissory Note, req,i.1tre the filing by any of the parties of a federal 1099" form Qr any 
other ri:otifica:tion either to the United States, or any department thereof or any state or any 
department thereof and none of the parties hereto shall make said filing without the written consent 
of aU parties. The parties aclcnowledge thar disclosure, dissemination or publication of the 
provisions of this Release, by any of these parties, may adversely affect the other parties in an 
amount that cannot be presently determined and would be difficult to determine the exact amount of 
da.Jnages if disclosure was made. Because of that difficulty it is agreed that any parties releasing my 
of said information shall pay the sum of $25,000.00 as Liquidated damages to the other parties. All 
parties1 agreement not to disclose, disseminate, publish or od1er'wise make public information 
concerning.the agreement except and unless written consent of all L'1e parties hereto is obtained and 
except as may be necessary for a particular party lo disclose information for his or its individual or 
corporate ta..'< or other coUrt related purposes, shall be binding upon the parties for a period of thirty 
(30) years from 'the execution hereof and is severable from all other agr-eements, terms, conditions 
and covenants set out herein, which terms shall remain in full force and effect notwithstanding a.oy 
breach of the terms of this paragraph. 
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT, p.1 
000765
06/30/04 WED 09: 28 FAX • :,4498 EISMANN LAW OFF. e 
Dennis J. Sallaz 
CAPITAL WEST, lNC. 
President 
FIRST WESTERN, INC. 
President 
Sumner 
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SL,:---:narr Avcrais:::.l Renort - Limited Avpraisal .. _....., r ..... 
This is ,:i Summary Appraisal Report which is intended to comply wi:h the 
reporting requirements set forth under Standards Rule 2-2(c) of the 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. As such. it presents 
only limited discussions of the data, reasoning, and analyses that were used 
in the appraisal process to develop the appraiser's opinion of value. 
Supporting documentation concerning the data, reasoning, and analyses is 
retained in the appraiser's file. The depth of discussion contained in this 
report is specific to the needs of the client and for the intended use stated 
below. The appraiser is not responsible for unauthorized use of this report. 
Futhermore, in accordance with prior agreement between the client and the 
appraiser, this report is the result of a limited appraisal process in that 
certain allowable departures from specific guidelines of the Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice were invoked The intended 
user of this report -is cautioned that the reliability of the value conclusion 
provided may be impacted to the degree there is departure from specific 




Bevis, Cameron & Johnson, PA 
960 Broadway Avenue 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
· W. Bill Basham 
2701 N. 26th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Properties Owned By Real Homes LLC 
Canyon County, Idaho 
PURPOS:if OF THE APPRAISAL: To estimate market value as defined 
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency under 12 CFR, Part 





.; ..... 'J ,~, 
OCT O '6 2005 
000771
IN 1.E:NDE) USE OF TI-IB REFORT: 
For the sole purpose of assisting the client in making a determination as 
to the most probable seJJing price for the subject property if it were to 




EFFECTIVE DA TE OF VALUE: 
August 30, 2005 
DATE OF THE REPORT: 
October 1, 2005 
ADVALOREM: 
According to the Office of the Canyon County Assessor, valuation of the subject 
prnperties for purposes of taxation is as follows: 
Parcel #5R161570100 (714 Smith Avenue, Nampa, Idaho) 
Land ••••••••••••.•• $32,000 
Improvements ... $31,300 
Total ................... $63~0 (Year of200S) 
Paree) f#SR329240120 (Riverside Road, Caldwell, Idaho) 
Land ................... $34,005 
Impro~~ents ••• $28,500 .... , . 
I • 
Total.~: .. "." •• -...... $62,505 (Year of 2006) 
Parcel #SR329240000 (Riverside Road, Caldwell, Idaho) 
Land .......... : ...... $30,270 








Total ..•. .......... .•• :S3u,:-:-o \year of 2006) 
Parcei #SR329240110 {lliver:iide Road, Caldwell, Idaho) 
Land .............. "".. $30,540 
Improvements ... $5000 
Total .................. $35, 540 (Year of2006) 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
For purposes of the Office of the Canyon County Assessor, the properties 
that are the subject of this report are legally described as follows: 
Tax 01121, of the SWNE, Section 17-3N-3W (Caldwell) 
Tax 01119, of the SWNE, Section 17-3N-3W (Caldwell) 
Tax 01122, of the SWNE, Section I7-3N-3W (Caldwell) 
Tax 02625, of Lot 24, Westview Subdivision, Section 2I-3N-2W 
(Nampa) 
The appraiser has resean:hed the sale., history of the subject parcels over the recent 
past. From within those sources that are readily available and typically considered 
to be reliable, none has not transferred ownenhip during that period of time. 
APPRAISAL DEVELOPMENT AND REPORTING PROCESS: 
The appraiser has made a physical inspection 'of each property, reviewed descriptive 
data that is of public record as found in the Office of the Canyon County Assessor. 
- and considered comments provided by knowledgeable persons in the real estate 
industry. Information on similar small acreage properties that have either sold in 
the market -or are currently listed for salt.'- was gathered and analyzed. The 
sales comparison approach was then utilized to develop an opinion of market value, 
as well as a projection of the length of marketing time that will be required to 
achieve actual sale. 
·' . Per agree~!!Pt l)'ith the client, the appraiser did not use the income approach (not 
typically cousidered meaningful for properties of this type}, but did utilize the cost 
approach (for. those properties having stmetural improvements). However, under 
certain circumstances, any of these approaches might sometimes be considered 
meaningful.lo appraising properties of this type; as a consequence, the appraisal 
process did inv4>I!e departure from Standards Rule 1-4(a) and (b)I, ii, iv,v, and vi. 
This limited appraisal report sets forth only a summary of the appraiser's 







DESCRlPTION OF REAL EST_-\TE A:?PR.-\ISED: 
The subject properties on Riverside Road, Caldwell, are located approximately 3 1/2 
miles southwest of the City of Caldwell's downtown business core district. The 
present profile of the more general neighborhood area is basically that of large 
working agricultural entities, numerous small acreage residential properties, and an 
increasing amount of higher density subdivision development of both entry level and 
"step-up buyer" single family homes. Primary focus is toward reasonably close 
access to major centers for goods, services, educational facilities, employment, etc., 
along with the amenities of a semi-rural Jiving atmosphere. Marketing time 
requirements appear to be more or less in line to wltat is typical to this market area 
hi general, the supply-demand relationship for competitively priced properties 
remains basically in balance, and sales/financing concessions of any meaningful 
degree are not in evidence at this point in time. 
The parcels are not located within a FEMA-identified flood prone area that requires 
special flood inslll'aD.ce participation. Present zoning is designated as rural 
residential (RR), which allows low density single family residential development. 
Public utilities and municipal services generally available include electrical power, 
telephone, and police/fire protection; a community well serves u a domestic water 
source for each property, however, individual septic systems will be required. 
The configuration of one of the subject land parcels is somewhat Irregular 
(triangular), with the other two being of rectangular shape; general topography is 
basically flat to a gradual eastward slope. While two of the building sites are 
immediately adjacent to a paved public arterial (Rivenide Road), all will be 
accessed from a gravel surfaced private cul de sac lane. The site sizes vary, and 
approximate some 1.06, 1.03, and 1.45 acres respectively; general topography 
appears basically level to a gradual easterly slope. 
The subject property addessed as 714 Smith Avenue, Nampa, Idaho, is located 
approximately 1/2 mile west of the City of Nampa's central business core district-
basically bounded by Midland BlvdJ12th Avenue South, and Nampa-Caldwell 
Blvd./Lone Star Road. The present profile of the more general neighborhood area 
appears somewhat mixed, including older established subdivisions of entry level and 
"step-up" single family homes, newer in-fill residential development, and modest 
amounts of Ught neighborhood commercial Primary focus is toward close 
locational P.ft8~ relative to major center for goods, services, educational 
facilities, employment, etc. Marketing time requirements appear to be more or less 
in line to "tthat is typical to this market area in general, the supply-demand 
relationship for competitively priced properties remains basically in balance, and 
sales/finan~g concessions of any meaningful degree are not in evidence at this 
point in time. --
This property approximates some 32,00o+ square feet (0. 74 acre) in total size, is of a 
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( e~eepr..n rhat 1r Ja adjacent to an irr:ig:nfon lateral •• yl,lJiJe .:urn, pittcr, sidewalk, 
and ;an<i 3treet arterials are common to the surrounding neighbor.hood areas, the 
.mbject fronts to a portion ot Smith .·henue that has :none >f these improvements at 
this point in time. The property is not located within a FEMA-identiiied flood 
prone ana that requires special flood insurance participation; pnsent zoning ls 
designated as.single family residential (R-S), which allows for low density 
development ( one residence per 30,000 square feet of land area). While greater 
density might be achievable under the comprehensive plan for future growth, a 
rezone of the parcel would be required (and cannot be viewed u a certainty). All 
public utilities and municipal services typically avaiJable withia the Nampa city 
limits are either immediately available, or in close pro:mnity to the subject pareeL 
As previously indicated, two of the parcels are basieally unimim,ved (the assessor 
has assigned a token value to a lJmall move-on house on one, however, it has as yet 
not been permanently affixed to the land); the two remaining parcels have had 
concrete foundation systems put in place and older move-on "shell'' houses affixed 
thereto (Smith Avenue and Riverside Road). 
According to public records, title to the subject properties is in the name of Real 
Homes LLC; no current listings or options to purchase were discovered in the 
coune of this analysis. 
IDGHEST AND BEST USE: 
As Though Vacant: 
The only legally pemrlssable use of the subject properties is residential, and the likelihood 
of a zoning change would appear to be remote at this point in time. The only legally 
permissable use that is also physically possible would be a residential use. Consistent / 
with the legally permissable and possible uses, the most viable financially feasible uses 
are judged to be residential. as there are similar property profiles in the immediate 
neighborhood. The maximally productive highest and best use of the subject sites as 
though vacant. therefore, is judged to be as building lots for single family dwellings 
oriented toward a typical small acreage development profile. 
As Presently Improved: 
As previousl~ stated, there are no significant improvements to two of the subject 
properties ~Jhi~ point in time; the building "shell" status of the third and fourth 
properties is judged to represent a modestly higher return to the land than if the sites were 
vacant. · ·~·· · 
SUMMAllY OF Ai.~ALYSIS AND VALUATION: 
Following a review of historical market data pertaining to the past 12 months. those 










loc·teu oc Rive:side Road, Calc·,iielt, were accor:::ed con;;ideration and ap,re::u- as follows: 
Idene;Jcation: 
(Sales) 
Lot 3, Block I, Artist View Subdv. 
28820 Fannway Road 
Goodson Road (Listing #98192478) 
1212 W. Logan 
Lot l, Block 1, Futurity Acres 
(Current Listings) 
Lot l 0, Block I, Hafen Hills Subdv. 
Wander Lane (Listing #98209875) 
167'.39 Boehner Road 
Goodson Road (Listing #98211056) 
Deer Flat Road (Listing #98188492) 































From a review of recent market activity for residential building sites within the subject's I 
more general neighborhood marketing area (SW Nampa, SE Nampa, NW Nampa), it is 
apparent that the demand trend has been accelerating - and most dramatically over the 
past several months. While the supply for such property type has been maintained by 
further subdivision of large agricultural parcels in greater Canyon County- it would 
appear that those properties located closer-in are going to the higher premium in the 
market. Following a data search of available market information pertaining to the past 12 
months, those properties judged to be at least reasonably competitive to the subject land 
parcel located on Smith Avenue, Nampa, were accorded consideration and appear as 
follows: :1 
• .,,,. ! 
r • 
IdentificatiJn: Parcel Size: Date of Sale: Price: 
(Sales) • · · · 
147 Elmore'i\.ven'ue 
203 Elmore Avenue 
'·• 
0.32 Acre 9-2005 






~ ;ne St.. Redd CUs·.:ng 49303323) 
J.78 Acre 9-2CG5 S49,00v 
Fem Street \Listing #981935.53) 
0.44Acre 5-2005 $49,900 
Middleton Road (Listing#98187675) 
I.24Acres 8-2005 $56,000 
W. Iowa Avenue (Listing #98194590) 
l.12Acres 7-2005 $61,500 
N. 4th Street (Listing #98193366) 
l.3Acres 8-2005 $98,500 
Each of the properties comprising the array as presented above is of a similar locational 
status to that of the subject parcels, and all are judged to be at least reasonably 
competitive in terms of a most probable buyer profile. While some of the comparable 
sales are within platted subdivisions (which differs from the metes and bowids status of 
some of the subject parcels), any benefits of such circumstance is judged to be offset by 
the somewhat confining nature of the subdivision CC & R's. Observation of market 
activity for properties of this nature suggests that this buyer profile tends to more desirous 
of less restriction on how he is able to utilize his property than more, and in fact, may 
actually be willing to pay somewhat of a premium for this status. 
FINAL RECONCll,IATION: 
From a review of the foregoing, it would appear that a supportable xange in value on a per 
building site basis for those properties located on Riverside Road, Caldwell, would be 
roughly at the level of $33,000 - $48,000 - with the variance primarily a function of 
overall parcel size, locational status, oftsite influences (traffic noise, consistency of 
surrounding improvement types, etc.), and site utility (topography/configuration). The 
estimate of a most probable selling price for each: parcel is as follows: 
Parcel #5R329240120 (1.45 Acres) ........ $45,000 
Parcel #5R329240110 (l.06Acres) ........ $35,000 
Parcel #5R329240000 (1.03 Acres) ........ $35,000 
With regard tq the Smith Avenue property located in Nampa, Idaho -- under the 
restrictions ofits' existing zoning status - a supportable range in value appears to be at 
the level of$45,000 - $55,000, with stronger tendency to be toward mid-range. The 
estimate of~· most probable selling price for this parcel then, is as follows: 
Parcel #5Rl6lPOI00 (0.74 Acre) ......... $50,000 .. · ... 
In terms of the "move-on" shell residential structures that have been put in-place on the 
Smith Avenue site and one of the Riverside Road building sites, while both being of 





would couib• ;;: :0 a higher :eturn to tht: m:derifng site il'..an if the :and were Ya ~ant ant. 
ava'iab!e for ·:se. "V'nile obi.iously a ver1 suL~e;;frre 1pproximation of what incremental 
price a buyer in the market might be willing to pay ror these in-place stru.:;tu,:al sheil-cype 
improvements, value recognition is nonetheless accorded as follows: 
714 Smith Avenue, Nampa ................ $7,000 (roughly approximating $8 per sq. ft.) 
Parcel #5R329240I20 ••••••••••...•.••.•••• $23,000 (roughly approximating $12 per sq. ft.) 
In summation, the most probable selling prices of the four properties owned by Real 
Homes LLC as identified within this report -- if marketed individually and under typical 




W. Bill Basham 
--
000778
. ~ :· . : 
/ / . 
/ "· 
I 
SUBJECT PHOTOGRAPH ADDENDUM 
aorrcwer!C:ient ,_Ml_cii_a_eJ_. '_lict_,o_rv~----- ------------ ---- -------------------
Address 1419 :,,.,eiana ilva. 
l (,f'J CJiL'He! i.ender/C!ient !daho ·.c - ~encent :lank 
' ·• 
.. ,., .,, 
·t'· I, 
:.iunr _:-, von 
Dolf good by Unlled Systems Softwate Company (BOO) 969-0727 
Unit Ne _N~/A ______ _ 
s· ,1e Idahc Zip ;J~3 ~a::~E~u~5 _____ _ 





SUBJ1EC7 JJHOTOGl!UPH AD!DENCIUM 
I 
3orrower/Client !:!!!'.~·'_'t~,ctc~, ~r_, ___ _________ _ ___ ---- ----------- --------
Addrnss 1419 ce-,,~aM 31Vd. Unit No. _w~r,. _ _ _ _ __ _ 
c;ty ~ ldwe!I Ca:miy C:cn~vc~,n_. _______ Stare laaho Zio Code ~83~6~0~5 ____ _ _ 
j !J:nderJC:ierr Idann'-"-~"'d"'er;'-'e"'nL=·0:c.··..,_c.::.3an=k--------------------------- -------
. 
t-
De,Ignad by Uni tad Svst•m• Soflwilrc Comp.1ny (COO) 969-0727 




/ S0rrower/C:i1mt --M-"ic'-'-ha'-'el--' __ li--c-=--cr_,_1 ____ _____________ _ _ ____________ _______ _ 
I Address 1-2'.9 C &,eiand 3lvd. Uni! No. __ N/ __ A _____ _ 
I ::tv C.a!dwe. Gaunr/ ,.._w_r _,r__ State :aar.o cip G,1de 3:!6, _5 ___ _ 
1 
2 nae: .. :,ent .dcro mde,::enaef'c ean: 










- ··r r- .- ·- -••!f.,.'" " 1-------····· ··-_ ....... ... _ ........... _.···· , __ ._ ... .. .. _ . .. ... _. __ ···~·· 
StJBJEC1 PHOTOIGRAiPH ADDiENCUM 
3crrcwef/Client .... Mc.ci  .... na"'ei .... · .... ·n.... ::o .... rv-'-----------------
, Ac.1rsss :..11.g ,:1?1~ :- ... 0 31v"' 
i c· 1 :a1dwe1I 
/ ..:;~aer;C:ien ' ·1.1aho Ir:ct~ce!ldE: " ::ank 
: :t...:y : .1n~;-· __ _ 
Designed by lllllted Syslems Software Company (800) 969-8727 
Unit No. __ ' 11 .... 'A ___ _ 
















IJmcteriC:ient ---------- - CJ~ ' I IJnit No. 
-___ ,,..;.._:======-=-= Slate ·· r d 
---:=: _ ·-==========-===============-===~~~~-lP~· ~ ~e~~~~~~~J 
-----------~-_3~7...0~----_....----_J5-.,..,;4:=.,.0~0",:..'------\ 
0 






















-----·- ·- --···- -- ------·- .... _ ... 





Ci~/ Lerdei:~/C~li;en;t ________ _:__~==-
P!.AT MAP 







' "'t ...... 
-----
000784
• • •H · '>'"'""Z • ~lie No. clMlaM. Pilge·#15• ."(&~O. 
t 1; 2ave ~searshe:1 .. -- ;Qofo:;t matKer ,reu_ ma na•;~· .;.t£C.e . 1 J°!inimt;i'lf ,:f lire!:: .1!C'o.'li ,oles r,'.f -;rocenies :nc?t oimilar 
,ma proxfr ~ ,, . .c, ihei oli!l1ec: ,iicpefii(@: · r,sfae~110n m: .he la!'es; ::nmpa1ieu,1: ana1ysfs ar.Ei ·1ave ,.iac'e 111C lar .:s:!usfme::itwhen 
1owc·fa,2 c.t ,-ei!ec;: :he ;11aiket ,'.l!actiorn ;fl. :flc,a !.:ms.oli ,-igniiicant"lariarion. 1 a signmc:im item in 1 comparanre properi'f 
is zuoerior :1, ,ir more, favma!Jfe: man;. ;~e· -mii.j,,ct :µmpe.Tf;. I! nave made· a negaiive adjusiment to reduce the adjusted sales price, 
of the comparable and', il a sfgniiicaRt item in, a comparable1 property is inferior to, or less favorable than the subject property; f. 
have made :1 positlve:adjusfment!to· if:lcrease•the:adjustedl sales; price·of. the comparable. 
2. r have taken into consideration tfie;factors. that:have an, impact on value in my development of Ifie estimate of market value in 
the appraisal report I; have• not knowingly withhe!dianl! sigJ1ificant:information from. the appraisal report and I believe, to tlie liest 
of my know1edge, that all statements. andinformatirm in the, appraisal report are true and correct 
3. I stated, in the appraisal report, only:my owni personaf\. unbiased, and professional analysis, opinions, and conclusions, 
which·are sJbject only to the contingenttand: limiting conditions:specified in this form. 
4. I nave 11D present or prospective·interest in the property that is the subject of this report, and I have no present or prospective· 
personal interest or bias with respect to the participants iru the, transaction: I did not base,. either partially or completely, my 
analysis and/or the estimate at marlietvalue in: the·appraisal. reparton the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status,. 
or national origin of'eilhef the prospective owners.or occu11ants of the subject property or of the present owners or occupants: 
of the, properties. in the vicinity ofthe,sulijirct pmperty: 
5. I have ro present or contemplated: future interest in: the, subject property, and. neither my current or future employment 
nor my corrpensatton;for pertormihg:this:a1Dpraisat is contingent on.the appraised value of the property. 
6. lwas net required to. reporf:a predetermiiledvaliiJe· otdlreclion ii1:value that favors the cause of the client or any related party,. 
the amount cf the value estimate,, the:attainrnent' afa.sp.ecific, result,. or the occurrence of a subsequent event in order to receive 
my· compensation and/or employment lbr, p!!dorming; !lie: appraisal(. I did not base the appraisal report on a requested minimum 
val)Jalitm, a specific valuation,. or thaneed to,approve a; specifli: mortgage loan. 
7. I pertormed: tliis appraisal irn eonfomuly'witll! the: Uniform Sfarndiuds.ot Professional: Appraisal Practice that were:adopted 
and promufgatelf. by the Appraisal StmdarM Bbarrt oflhe: ApprafaaJ1 F.oundation and that were in plaee as oflhe ette.ctlve dale of 
this appraisal:, with. the; exception otthe:depart\Jre provisioir. ottliose Standards, which does not apply. I acknowledge that an 
estimate.of 1 reasonabl~ time. for exp.osure: in; the: opena marlietds a\ cooditiorn ih the definition of market value and' the estimate 
I developed: is consistent witbtne' rmlketiilg: lime: noted:i11: the:11eighbornood sectton, of this report, unless I have·otheiwise 
staled In the recoaciliation saction: 
8. I have parsonally inspected ttle: intedorand! extllrior areas. of tl\e subject property and !he. exterior of alE properties-listed' as 
comparable:; in t~e appraisal; report. Ui:Jrther certily that! hav~ noted' any apparentoi known, adverse conditions in !he subject 
improvements, on. the,subj.ect.sile; oro11.an1site·within; the iltunel'liate:vicinity of.'the:subjectproperty of. which I am aware 
and have made adjustments forthese,adverse conditions ini mt analysis ofthe property value to. the extent that! had market 
evidence to,supportthemd havealso1commerntedabouttthe:ettectoftlieadverse conditions on the marketability of the subJect 
property. 
9. 1: personelly prepared all caneli:Jsions.andiopinions: abouflhe real estate lliatwere· set forth in the appraisal; report; ii r relied on 
significant i;:rofessionat assist_ancefrom'any iiadMcfualf orindividi:Ja1s in the,performance of the appraisal or the preparation of 
the appr:aig report, r hav~ ~ed slilch1 iildlviouat(s). and disclosed the specific tasks: performed by ll'lem in the reconciliation 
section of ttis:appraisall raport. rcertify tliat any ihdiilirfual so named is qualified to perfonn the tasks •. I have notauthorired 
anv.one to make a. change to·.any item, in the report; therefore~ itan: unauthor.ized change is made to the appraisal report, I: wilt take 
no responsibility for it. · · 
swamsm AiPPUR!lmS cmlf!Clfflllll: Ir a· supervitory appraiser signed the appraisal report, he o~ she certmes and 
agrees !flat: t directly supllliVise the appraiser who: prepared the, appraisal, report, have reviewed the appraisalireport; agree, with 
the sratemerlts and conclusions oftfle, appraiser\. agr~e: to be bound! by the appraiset's cerlifi.catlons numbered 4 through, 7 above; 
and amtaklilgi !ult: respo~ibility fbrlheappraisali and tne appraisal report .. 
lDlllllESS If :PRDPBT'f IPPIADSB: "'!4-'-'T=-9'-=0.::.:tNe.::.:l=.an:.::ctc:;elvd=l·..::ca=1d::.::wet:::::,..I, .:::Td::::ah"'o..:::83:.:6::::05"--------------
APPRAISER: 
Signature: UV~. o: ·.~L.:1<11 
Name: w. B.il! Basham 
Date Signed August ts, 200s 
State CertilicaNon # : ~CAA~' · ·-"53=·---------
or State UcES1se #:. 
State: ~rdah=c _____________ _ 
E;iplratlon Date of Certilicatio11 orUcense: 4-te-200& 




State Certltlcation #: 
orS!ate·License #: 
State! ----------------
Expiration Date of Certification or License:. 
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llllEfllJH:rlillil.l IJIIF :1Ull,l3!:'t 1ffll!JIE: Th·e:::nostprofuaci'e: pnc.1, ':11iich a oroperty ~110ufd' bring in i ,::ornpE'iitive and open market 
'Jne°e-r alf i or,uitions :equ:~;•e to a. fain,afe. 'he: : 11,yer'ifld ,e!!E,'.. ,a8h Jr.:ing arur.emly; .<ncwJ'ecge;;biy and 1ssuminq. 'he .Jnc~ 
·s. ,1m ,ff2s:e.:J j.,! :mdoe :nr.irnm .. :ilmlic:f .n .. hi.: Jeri;;itic11 'a, :r~ :onsuntnaicr:> -1 , ::ai'e Js J/ ~ ip,c:tiea· date 2r"1 :he 1ai:sing 
cf :ftfe 're Gil seller :o: i:uyer ·:, lier ;cmilli©ns: ·11tT&,.i:by( .:,~:): °""'!K :,ai ,:,M,\::i 1m :ypc, '\1 :rmi··~(ec; ;-;?'i oath par;ie~ ire weft 
fnlormed .:.,- 'NBfi 1dvfacd\ sn1:, .~acrt; O.(;~f~ ir.l wf.mr -m: ,:on~i.rner:t .1iS-.@;:rn ~e-e.t imer~sr;_ ~~} .1 ma~onsbilf :ime iS affowerl iCr 
~x~osure .'11 /he oc1;:1 marf<et, Al payment :ss made in tenms, .:iti cash ih itS. :!1ol fars or i1 ierms ai !inanc:af arrangements 
c~mparab fe ifiere!o; ancf (SJ the pric3: repr.isent11 the normaJi mnsideraffon ior the propeffy sord: unaifec:ed by spec:al ar creative· 
financing crr sales concessions:•· granted bi' anycne,associated witfi· the, sale: 
• Adjustments to the comparabfos. must b'e made far, special or creative financing or safes concessions. No adjustments are 
necessaiy forthose costs whicflare:normall\rpaidi by·sellers-as a•resullof tradition:or law in a market area; these costs are 
readily identifiable since the seller pays these costs: in virtually alt sales· transactions. Special or creative financing. adjustments 
can be made to the comparable: property bY' comparisons to. financing, terms· offered by a third party institutional lender that is not 
already involved in the· property or transaction. Any adjustment should nat be calculated on a mechanical dollar for dollar cost 
of the flnancinq or concession, but, the doflar,amount ofi any adjustment should approximate the markers reaction to the financing 
or concessions based on tire appraisers judgment 
CIDlffllllGEl'IT OD IUMmlll& rtml1fDmOl\lS: The: appraiser's certiflcatltm that appears in the appraisal reportis subject to. 
the following conditions: 
1. The appraiser will: not be· responsi~fe:for matters, ot a lega[ nature: that affect either the property beings appraised or the tilte 
to it Toe appraiser assumes that the, title' is.good and marketable,and\. therefore, will not render any opinions about Ule title .. 
The propert,i is appraised on the: basis' ofitbein!)! undenesponsible· ownership. 
2. ·The appraiser haS'. provided a:sket'ch' i'ni the: appraisal: report to show·approxirnate dimensions of the improvements and the 
sketch Is indudedi only to assist the' reader of tile: rep'.ort: in visualizing tho, property amt understanding; the appraisers detennfnatlon 
of its size; · 
3. The, appraiser has-examined the avaifable ftoodrnaps; thar are: provided'by, the Federal Emergency Managerner:1tAgency {or 
otherdilta sc;urces) amt has noted: iR' the:appraisal reportwfuetfuer.the!subjectsifeis located in an identified Speciaf Flood Hazard 
Area B'erause the• appraiser is; notasur.Je~or.., he or.she makes. no1 guarantees., express or implied, re~ing this determination; / 
4. The, appraiser will not. give,testimiirny· orapperu: iiT imurt because· lie: on she' madil' an appraisal of the•property in· question; . 
unless specific arrangements: to db: so: hav.e, bllen: rmade'.belorehand. 
5. Thll' appraiser mas estimated 1hil' val\Je'ot the:lano ih Ifie' cost~proacl'.ll aUts highest and best use and· the improvements: 
at their contributory value:. These'separate 931\lations otthe land and iinpr011ements must not be used in conjunction with any 
other appraisal: aml: are· invalid: if: they are SO' used:. 
6. , The appraiser has noted in, the:appraisa!i repurt. any, adverse; conditions: (such as, needed repairs, depreciation. the preserace- of 
fuazardous: wastes, tokic substances~ etc;}otlseivedi durihg: tl\e.lilspectlon of: the subject property or that he or she becamw aware 
of dUring the n(irmaf rese3£(:ij.in110l!leu' lh periorming the, appraisat. Unless: otheiwise stated in the appraisal report, lhe,appraiser 
lias no IUTowledge of any. ~fcfden 1:lrnnapparent com;Htions;ofthe property, or adverse en11lronmental conditions (including. the, 
· presence of hazardillils, w~tes,. toxie· subslallces1, ete.J' thatrwoul'd maRe !lie, pr.opeity more. or fess valuable; and has assumed 
that. there are no sui:li conditior-is and makes: no gmuantees or, wammtres;, express; or iinpfiea .. regarding the· condition. ot the 
pmperty1• The1appraiser will not be: responsiole fbranysueh, coAditions, that do exist or for any engineering; or testing that mi!tlt: 
be reqµired to discovenhe1her such condflions; exist BecalilSe the· appraise~ is not ag expert in, the field at env.ironmental: hazards, 
file appraisal' report must nof: be consideredi as an environmental: assessmentrof tine property; 
7:. Toe appraiser obtained the information, estimates; and opinions:that were expressed In the appraisal reportfromsources,that 
he or, she considers io be retiab1e.:ami! beliiNes' them. to bll1 rnueand correct The appraiser does not assume responsibility for the' 
accuracf of such-Items tpatwerefumished by otheqrarties~ 
81. The appraisenvill not. discrose, tire contents oftlhe,appraisal: repor,t except as provided for in the Uniform Standards ot 
Professional' Appraisal l?ractlce;. 
i 
9l. The appraiser has based his or. her appraisal· repor;t amdvaliJaUon concrusion; for an appraisal. that is subject to satisfactory 
completion, repairs, or alterations; on tfie,assumption that compf'etl'on ot: the tmprovements wilt be performed in a workmanlilie 
manraer. 
lt:l. The appraiser must· provfde: his- or fier prlmr.·wrritten: consentb'efore,the render/client specified, in the appraisal report. can 
distribute the· appraisal report (incfuding cond1:1sfons abuut the prop-ertY value,. tfle. appraisers idenbly and professional! 
designations, and· references-lo any· professfonat appraisaB organiiations• orthe: firm with which the appraiser is associated)' 
to: anyone.other than the borrower: the mortgagee: or ifs: successors: am:lassigns;. the mortgag~ insurer, consultantS; professional. 
appraisali organizattons; any· state or federally aJ)proved flnantiat: fnstifutlbn;: or any, deP,artmen~ agency,. or instrumentality of 
the United States or any state orthe District of.Columbia; except that the lerider/clientmay distribute tile property;descriplfen1 
section, of the report on&y to datr. cuilei:tion: er.reporting servh:e(s) without having to obtain the appraiser's priorwritten comrenl 
The appraiseT'swrttten consent and· approval: must also be; ootained: before the: appraisal can ~If conveyed by anyone to the· 
pablicthroaghadvertisihg, publfo rela1ions. news:, safes,. orothermedfa. 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JERI HEATON 
DEPUTY 
JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 
Post Office Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: 208-331-1170 
Facsimile: 208-331-1529 
Vernon K. Smith (ISB 1365) 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 1107253 
) 
) 
) VERIFIED REPLY TO SECOND 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
) AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND 
) THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND 
) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendants. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 











VERIFIED REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND 




DENNIS SALLAZ an individual, DENNIS 
SALLAZ in his representative capacity of 








SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an ) 
) 
Idaho Corporation, SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an ) 
Idaho Professional Limited Liability Company, ) 




) ________________ ) 
DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 



















COMES NOW Counterdefendants, Dennis Sallaz in his representative capacity of Sallaz 
and Gatewood Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc., and Sallaz and Gatewood Law 
Offices, PLLC, and Sallaz Law, Chtd. ("Counterdefendants"), by and through their counsel of 
record William A. Fuhrman, of the firm JONES+ GLEDHILL+ FUHRMAN+ GOURLEY, P.A., 
and, in reply to Defendants' /Counterclaimants' ("Counterclaimants") Second Amended 
Counterclaim, admit, deny, and affirmatively allege as follows: 
VERIFIED REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND 





1. Some or all of Counterclaimants' counterclaims may fail to state proper claims for 
relief and should be dismissed. 
2. Counterdefendants deny each and every allegation in Counterclaimants' Second 
Amended Counterclaim unless specifically admitted in this Reply to Second Amended 
Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial. 
II. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
3. Paragraphs 1 through 4 of the Second Amended Counterclaim are admitted. 
4. Paragraph 5 is admitted to the extent Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered is an Idaho 
corporation. 
5. Paragraph 6 is admitted. 
6. Paragraph 7 is admitted only to the extent that Sallaz Law, Chartered is an Idaho 
corporation. 
7. In answer to paragraph 8, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz is a licensed attorney 
who currently practices at Sallaz & Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC, a professional limited liability 
corporation which has a principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, Idaho 83705. 
Sallaz and Gatewood, Chartered and Sallaz Law, Chartered are inactive corporations. It is 
affirmatively alleged that Dennis Sallaz ceased practicing law through Sallaz Law, Chartered in 
approximately 2003, and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chartered, in approximately 2009. 
8. Paragraphs 9 and 10 are admitted. 
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9. In answer to paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, it is admitted only that this court has 
jurisdiction and that venue is appropriate in Ada County. It is denied that Counterclaimants were 
damaged in excess of $50,000. 
10. In answer to paragraph 14, it is admitted only that, at various times, Dennis Sallaz 
provided legal services to Counterclaimants. 
11. Paragraph 15 is denied. 
12. In answer to paragraph 16, it is admitted only that Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
was one of numerous firms which provided legal services to Counterclaimants. 
13. Paragraph 17 is denied. 
14. In answer to paragraph 18, it is admitted only that, at times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
15. In answer to paragraph 19, it is admitted only that, at times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
16. Paragraphs 20, 21, 22 are denied. 
17. Paragraph 23 is denied. 
18. Paragraph 24 is denied. 
19. Paragraph 25 is admitted on information and belief. 
20. Paragraph 26 is denied on the basis that it is unduly vague. 
21. In answer to paragraph 27, it is admitted only that as part owner in A Vista Pawn, 
Dennis Sallaz received certain goods from that entity. 
22. Paragraph 28 is denied. 
23. Paragraph 29 is denied. 
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24. In answer to paragraph 30, it is admitted only that a copy of the Articles of 
Organization of Real Homes, L.L.C. is attached as "Exhibit A" to the Second Amended 
Counterclaim and that it was filed with the Secretary of State on January 19, 2001. It is denied 
that "Exhibit B" is a true and correct copy of the original Operating Agreement of Real Homes, 
L.L.C. 
25. In answer to paragraph 31, it is admitted only that Renee Baird was listed as a 
manager of Real Homes, L.L.C., in the Articles of Organization filed on January 19, 2001 and in 
the Operating Agreement. 
26. Paragraph 32 is admitted. 
27. Paragraph 33 is admitted. 
28. Paragraph 34 is denied. 
29. Paragraph 35 is admitted. 
30. Paragraph 36 is admitted and it is affirmatively alleged that Glen Trefren was also 
an owner of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
31. Paragraph 37 is admitted. 
32. Paragraph 38 is denied. 
33. Paragraph 39 is denied. 
34. In answer to paragraph 40, it is admitted only that Real Homes, L.L.C. conveyed 
15584 Riverside Rd., Canyon County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz for $105,000 to be held in 
trust for Real Homes, L.L.C. 
35. Paragraph 41 is denied. 
36. Paragraph 42 is admitted. 
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Paragraph 43 is denied on the basis that it is unduly vague. 
Paragraph 44 is denied. 
37. 
38. 
39. Paragraph 45 is admitted. It is affirmatively alleged that Counterclaimant Roy 
Rice never loaned the funds represented in the two promissory notes to Dennis Sallaz. 
40. Paragraph 46 is denied except to the extent that it is admitted that a purported Bill 
of Sale for the ATVs and trailer is attached to the Second Amended Counterclaim as "Exhibit F." 
41. In answer to paragraph 47, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the Second Amended Counterclaim. It 
is affirmatively alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said SUV s to Rice but that Rice 
never paid for said SUV s and the sale was never completed. 
42. In answer to paragraph 48, it is admitted only that a copy of the title of the 
motorhome is attached as "Exhibit H." It is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Motorhome. 
43. Paragraphs 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, and 54 are denied. 
44. In answer to Paragraph 55, it is admitted only that the document attached as 
"Exhibit Z" to the Second Amended Counterclaim speaks for itself. 
45. In answer to paragraph 56, it is admitted only that the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement is attached as "Exhibit I." 
46. Paragraph 57 is admitted. 
47. In answer to paragraph 58, it is admitted only that the terms of the purchase 
agreement for sale of interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. speak for themselves. 
48. Paragraph 59 is admitted. 
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49. Paragraph 60 is denied. 
50. Paragraph 61 is denied. 
51. Paragraph 62 is denied. 
52. Paragraph 63 is denied. 
53. Paragraph 64 is admitted only to the extent that Real Properties, LLC, made an 
advance payment of$5,000. 
54. Paragraph 65 is denied on the basis of a lack of sufficient information to form a 
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein. 
55. Paragraph 66 is admitted. 
56. Paragraph 67 is admitted but it is affirmatively alleged that the Magistrate Judge 
did not have jurisdiction to make the ruling he did. 
57. Paragraph 68 is denied. 
58. In answer to paragraphs 69 and 70, it is admitted only that Renee Baird's claim of 
ownership in some or all of Real Homes, LLC and/or Real Properties, LLC, and/or their assets, 
was known to Counterclaimant Roy Rice at the time he entered into the Purchase Agreement for 
the Sale oflnterest in Real Homes, LLC. 
59. In answer to paragraph 71, it is admitted only that on or about November 4, 2009 
Eugene "Roy" and Janet Rice filed an action to quiet title in Canyon County as Case No. CV 09-
11855. 
60. Paragraphs 72 and 73 are denied. 
61. Paragraph 74 is admitted. 
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62. In answer to paragraph 75, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was included as a 
defendant in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
63. Paragraph 76 is denied. 
64. In answer to paragraph 77, it is admitted only that "Exhibit K" appears to be a 
copy of a Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement, and denied as to the remainder on the basis 
of lack of information to form a belief as to its truth. 
65. In answer to paragraph 78, it is admitted only that the Mutual Release and 
Settlement Agreement attached as Exhibit K speaks for itself and is denied as to the remainder. 
66. In answer to paragraph 79, it is denied that Counterdefendants committed nay 
fraudulent, malicious, negligent, and/or wrongful acts. 
67. Paragraphs 80 and 81 are denied on the basis of lack of information to form a 
belief as to their truth. 
68. Paragraph 82 is denied. 
69. Paragraph 83 is denied. 
70. Paragraph 84 is admitted. 
71. In response to paragraph 85, it is admitted only that the Assignment of Purchase 
Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC attached as "Exhibit L" and "Exhibit M" to 
the Second Amended Counterclaim speak for themselves. 
72. Paragraph 86 is denied. 
73. Paragraph 87 is admitted. 
74. In response to paragraph 88, it is admitted only that the Notice of Appeal attached 
as "Exhibit N" speaks for itself. 
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75. Paragraph 89 is denied on the basis of lack of information to form a belief as to its 
truth. It is denied that the appeal is a tactic to delay this litigation or to prevent Counterclaimants 
from asserting the doctrines of collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, or res judicata. 
76. In answer to paragraph 90, the prior paragraphs of this reply to the second 
amended counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
77. Paragraph 91 is admitted but it is affirmatively alleged that Counterclaimant Roy 
Rice never loaned the funds represented by the two promissory notes to Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz. 
78. Paragraphs 92, 93, 94, and 95 are denied. 
79. Paragraph 96 is admitted. 
80. Paragraph 97 is denied. 
81. In answer to paragraph 98, it is admitted only that the terms of the promissory 
notes speak for themselves. 
82. Paragraphs 99, 100, and 101 are denied. 
83. In answer to paragraph 102, the prior paragraphs of this reply to the second 
amended counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
84. Paragraphs 103 and 104 are denied. 
85. Paragraphs 105 and 106 are denied. 
86. Paragraph 107 is denied. 
87. In answer to paragraph 108 it is admitted only that the Court's Order attached as 
"Exhibit J" to the Second Amended Counterclaim speaks for itself. 
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88. In answer to paragraph 109, it is admitted only that the documents attached as 
"Exhibit O" and "Exhibit P" speak for themselves. 
89. In answer to paragraph 110, it is admitted only that the document attached as 
"Exhibit Q" to the Second Amended Counterclaim speaks for itself. 
90. Paragraph 111 is denied. 
91. Paragraph 112 is admitted only to the extent that, for a limited time, Dennis Sallaz 
provided legal advice in forming, and was the registered agent for, "R-R Investments, Inc." 
92. Paragraphs 113, 114, 115, 116, and 117 are denied. 
93. Paragraph 118 is admitted only to the extent that Steve Sumner was once a client 
of Dennis Sallaz. 
94. Paragraphs 119, 120, 121, 122, and 123 are denied. 
95. In answer to paragraph 124, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was involved in 
litigation against Steve Sumner over unpaid legal fees which resulted in a settlement in 2003, the 
matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case 
No. 96812, the pleadings of which sp~ak for themselves. 
96. Paragraph 125 is denied. 
97. In answer to paragraphs 126 and 127, it is admitted only that the pleadings filed in 
Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case No. 96812, speak for 
themselves. 
98. Paragraph 128 is denied. 
99. Paragraph 129 is admitted. 
100. Paragraph 130 is denied. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - I 0 
000796
101. In answer to paragraphs 131 and 132, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was 
involved in litigation against Steve Sumner over unpaid legal fees which resulted in a settlement 
in 2003, the matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., 
et al, Case No. 96812, the pleadings of which speak for themselves. The other allegations of 
these paragraphs are denied. It is further affirmatively alleged that the settlement funds obtained 
in the matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, 
Case No. 96812, were for unpaid legal fees, the nature and character of which being a contested 
issue in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce action, Ada County Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M, and were 
expressly included in the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order that was filed 
of public record on or about October 30, 2007. 
102. In answer to paragraph 133, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz deposited 
settlement funds representing unpaid legal fees obtained in the settlement of the matter being 
entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case No. 96812, 
the pleadings of which speak for themselves, into a bank account for the Estate of Bessie B. 
Matcham. 
103. Paragraph 134 is denied on the basis of lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. It is further denied that Counterclaimants were entitled to any settlement proceeds from 
Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case No. 96812, and that 
the pleadings filed in that case speak for themselves. 
104. In answer to paragraphs 135 and 136, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was 
involved in litigation against Steve Sumner over unpaid legal fees which resulted in a settlement 
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in 2003, the matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., 
et al, Case No. 96812, the pleadings of which speak for themselves. 
105. Paragraph 13 7 is denied. 
106. Paragraph 138 is denied. 
107. Paragraphs 139, 140, 141, 142, and 143 are denied. 
108. In answer to paragraph 144 and 145 it is admitted that Dennis Sallaz was the 
personal representative for his grandmother's estate and that he deposited portions of the 
settlement funds into his grandmother's estate. It is denied that any of the settlement funds were 
due to Counterclaimants. 
109. Paragraph 146 is denied. 
110. Paragraph 14 7 is denied on the basis oflack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
111. In answer to paragraphs 148 and 149, it is admitted only that Roy Rice requested 
that Tom Henry steal documents from the Sallaz and Gatewood law office which request was 
denied. All remaining allegations in paragraphs 148 and 149 are denied. 
112. Paragraph 150 is denied. 
113. Paragraphs 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, and 156 are denied. 
114. In answer to paragraph 157, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
115. Paragraphs 158, 159, and 160 are denied. 
116. In answer to paragraph 161, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
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117. Paragraph 162 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
118. Paragraph 163 is denied. 
119. Paragraph 164 is denied. 
120. In answer to paragraph 165, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
121. Paragraphs 166, 167, 168 are denied. 
122. In answer to paragraph 169, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
123. Paragraph 170 is denied. 
124. In answer to paragraph 171, is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
125. Paragraphs 172 and 173 are denied. 
126. In answer to paragraph 174, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
127. Paragraph 175 is denied. 
128. In answer to paragraph 176, it 1s admitted only that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
129. Paragraph 177 is denied. 
130. In answer to paragraph 178, it 1s admitted only that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
131. Paragraphs 179, 180, 181, 182, and 183 are denied. 
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132. In answer to paragraph 184, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
133. Paragraph 185 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
134. In answer to paragraphs 186 and 187, it is admitted only that any fiduciary duties 
owed by Dennis Sallaz to Counterclaimants are those provided for by Idaho law. 
135. Paragraphs 188, 189, 190, and 191 are denied. 
136. In answer to paragraph 192, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
137. Paragraph 193 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz, denied as to the remainder. 
138. Paragraphs 194,195,196,197,198,199,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,207, 
208,209,210,211,212,213,214,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226, 
227,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240, and 241 are denied. 
139. In answer to paragraph 242, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
140. Paragraph 243 is denied. 
141. In answer to paragraph 244, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the counterclaim. It is affirmatively 
alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said A TVs to Rice but that Rice never paid for said 
A TVs and the sale was never completed. 
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142. In answer to Paragraph 245, the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
speak for themselves. 
143. In answer to paragraph 246, it is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Winnebago, and it is admitted that a copy of the title for the Winnebago is attached as "Exhibit 
H." It is further denied that Counterclaimants have a valid interest or claim against said 
Winnebago as any debt has previously been paid. 
144. Paragraphs 247,248, and 249 are denied. 
145. Paragraph 250 is denied on the basis oflack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
146. Paragraph 251 is denied. 
147. In answer to paragraph 252, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
148. Paragraph 253 is denied. 
149. In answer to paragraph 254, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the Second Amended Counterclaim. It 
is affirmatively alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said ATVs to Rice but that Rice 
never paid for said A TVs and the sale was never completed. 
150. In answer to paragraph 255, it is admitted only that a demand was made for the 
return of said A TVs and A TV trailer. 
151. Paragraphs 256 and 257 are denied. 
152. Paragraph 258 is denied on the basis of lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
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153. Paragraph 259 is denied. 
154. In answer to paragraph 260, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
15 5. In answer to paragraph 261, it is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Winnebago, and it is admitted that a copy of the title for the Winnebago is attached as "Exhibit 
H." It is further denied that Counterclaimants have a valid interest or claim against said 
Winnebago as any debt has previously been paid. 
156. In answer to paragraph 262, it is only admitted that a demand was made by 
counsel for Counterclaimants for the return of the Winnebago. 
157. Paragraphs 263,264,265,266,267, and 268 are denied. 
158. In answer to paragraph 269, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
159. Paragraph 270 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
160. Paragraph_s 271,272; 273,274, and 275 are denied. 
161. In answer to paragraph 276, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
162. Paragraph 277 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
163. Paragraphs 278,279,280, and 281 are denied. 
164. In answer to paragraph 282, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
VERIFIED REPLY TO SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 16 
000802
. . • 
Paragraph 283 is denied. 165. 
166. In answer to paragraphs 284, 285, 286, and 287, it is admitted only that Idaho 
Code § 18-7803( c) speaks for itself and denied as to the remainder. 
167. Paragraphs 288,289, and 290 are denied. 
168. In answer to paragraph 291, it is admitted only that Idaho Code § 18-7803( c) 
speaks for itself and denied as to the remainder. 
169. Paragraphs 292,293,294, and 295 are denied. 
170. In answer to paragraph 296, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
171. Paragraph 297 is denied. 
172. Paragraph 298 is admitted. 
173. Paragraphs 299 and 300 are denied. 
174. In answer to paragraph 301, it is admitted that Rice is purported, by fraud, to have 
been issued a Certificate of Title for the Cadillac, but the copy which is attached as "Exhibit Y" 
is illegible. It is affirmatively alleged that the Certification of Title for the Cadillac which is 
attached as "Exhibit Y" is invalid as a result of Rice's fraudulent acts. 
175. Paragraphs 302, 303, 304, and 305 are denied. 
176. In answer to paragraph 306, it is admitted only that the document attached as 
"Exhibit A" to the Verified Complaint speak for itself. 
177. In answer to paragraph 307, it is admitted only that the application for Title Stop 
speaks for itself. 
178. Paragraph 308 is denied. 
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Paragraph 309 is admitted. 
Paragraphs 310, 311, and 312 are denied. 
179. 
180. 
181. In answer to paragraph 313, the prior paragraphs of this reply to second amended 
counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
182. Paragraph 314 is denied. 
183. Paragraph 315 is admitted. 
184. Paragraphs 316 and 317 are denied. 
185. In answer to paragraph 318, it is admitted only that Rice sought to have issued a 
Certificate of Title for the Cadillac but the copy which is attached as "Exhibit Y" is illegible. It 
is affirmatively alleged that the Certification of Title for the Cadillac which is attached as 
"Exhibit Y" is invalid as a result of Rice's fraudulent acts. 
186. Paragraphs 319,320,321, and 322 are denied. 
187. In answer to paragraph 323, it is admitted only that the document attached as 
"Exhibit A" to the Verified Complaint speak for itself. 
188. In answer to paragraph 324, it is admitted only that the application for Title Stop 
speaks for itself. 
189. Paragraph 325 is denied. 
190. Paragraph 326 is admitted. 
191. Paragraphs 327, 328, and 329 are denied. 
192. Paragraph 330 is denied. 
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193. The remaining paragraphs of Counterclaimants' Second Amended Complaint are 
requests for relief to which no answer is required. To the extent further answer is required, 
Counterdefendants deny the same. 
III. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
194. Counterclaimants' claim for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by set-off 
for various amounts due and owing Counterdefendants. 
195. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by their negligence, fault and legal 
responsibility. 
196. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the negligence, fault or liability of third 
parties for whom Counterdefendants are not legally responsible. 
197. Counterclaimants have failed to mitigate their alleged damages, if any. 
198. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, equitable 
estoppel, and judicial estoppel, and fraud. 
199. Counterclaimants' damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced in that the damages 
sought by Counterclaimants' could have been avoided if Counterclaimants had acted reasonably 
prior to filing their counterclaim. 
200. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by the 
doctrine of unclean hands. 
201. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. 
202. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
203. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
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204. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
205. Some or all of Counterclaimants' claims are barred because they should have been 
raised in the pending Canyon County lawsuit, CV 2009-1185 5. 
206. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, 
including but not limited to, Idaho Code§§ 5-216, 5-217, 5-219, 5-222, 5-224. 
207. Counterclaimants' claims are barred or reduced by Counterclaimants' own breach 
of the subject agreements which are alleged to have been entered into. 
208. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred by the failure of 
Counterclaimants to substantially perform the terms of the alleged agreements. 
209. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by a failure to provide the consideration 
which forms the basis of certain of the agreements at issue. 
210. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
211. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to post an undertaking required 
by Idaho Code§ 8-303. 
212. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to satisfy the pleading 
requirements ofldaho Code § 18-7801 et seq. 
213. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to plead predicate acts 
constituting a pattern of racketeering. 
214. This action has just commenced and discovery has not yet taken place. 
Counterdefendants reserve the right to amend, modify and supplement their affirmative defenses as 
the action progresses. 
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Counterdefendants have been required to retain the services of legal counsel to defend this 
action and they are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code§§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
V. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Counterdefendants hereby demand a trial by jury of not fewer than twelve (12) persons. 
VI. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, having fully responded to the Counterclaimants' Amended Counterclaim, 
Counterdefendants pray for judgment against Counterclaimants as follows: 
1. That Counterclaimants' Second Amended Counterclaim, and each cause of action 
and/or claim stated therein, be dismissed with prejudice, with Counterclaimants taking 
nothing thereby. 
2. That the Court award to Counterdefendants their costs and attorney fees incurred herein. 
3. That the Court award to Counterdefendants such other and additional relief as to the 
Court deems just and appropriate. 
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Counterdefendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs further allege, as a Third Party Complaint against 
Third-Party Defendants Eugene (Roy) Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, as follows: 
VIII. 
PARTIES 
1. Third-Party Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz is an individual residing in Ada County, Idaho. 
2. Third-Party Plaintiff Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., is a professional limited liability 
corporation with its principal place of business in Ada County, Idaho. 
3. Third-Party Defendant Eugene (Roy) Rice is an individual residing in Ada County, 
Idaho. 
4. Third-Party Defendant Janet Rice is an individual residing in Ada County, Idaho. 
5. Eugene Rice and Janet Rice are, and at all times material hereto were, husband and 
wife, and the marital community comprised thereof resides in Ada County, Idaho. 




I. Third-Party Plaintiffs Dennis Sallaz in his representative capacity of Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation (hereinafter "Third-
Party Plaintiffs"), hereby incorporate the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint, together with 
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Paragraphs 1 through 214, inclusive, set forth herein. In addition, Third-Party Plaintiffs aver as 
follows: 
2. Third-Party Plaintiffs did, at various times, perform legal services at the request of, 
and on behalf of, Third-Party Defendants and/or their entities. 
3. In exchange for the legal services of Third-Party Plaintiffs, Third-Party Defendants 
agreed that Third-Party Plaintiffs were entitled to compensation and therefore allowed Third-Party 
Plaintiffs to collect a portion of their fees in the form of goods from Third-Party Defendants' former 
business "A Vista Pawn, Inc." 
4. The above-described exchange covered only a fraction of Third-Party Plaintiffs' fees 
for services rendered. 
5. Third-Party Plaintiffs have never been paid for the balance of its fees owed for the 
rendition of such services, the balance of which is approximately $300,000.00. 
6. Third-Party Plaintiffs are entitled to payment from Third-Party Defendants of all 
amounts currently due and owing plus pre and post judgment interest accruing thereon at the 
maximum rate permitted by Idaho law. 
7. In addition, to the extent, if at all, Third-Party Defendants are entitled to any funds 
from Third-Party Plaintiffs arising out of the Counterclaim, Third-Party Plaintiffs are entitled to a 
set-off against all amounts, if any, owed to Third-Party Defendants. 
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X. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Third-Party Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
for the prosecution of this action. 
XI. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Third-Party Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of not fewer than twelve (12) persons. 
XII. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Third-Party Plaintiffs pray for entry of judgment in their favor and 
against Third-Party Defendants as follows: 
1. That Counterclaimants' Second Amended Counterclaim, and each cause of action 
and/or claim stated therein, be dismissed with prejudice, with Counterclaimants taking nothing 
thereby. 
2. That Third-Party Plaintiffs be awarded damages for all sums due and owing by 
Third-Party Defendants together with pre and post judgment interest thereon at the maximum rate 
allowed by Idaho law. 
3. That the Court award to Third-Party Plaintiffs their costs and attorney fees incurred 
herein. 
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'. 
4. That the Court award to Third-Party Plaintiffs such other and additional relief as to 
the Court deems just and appropriate. 
DATED this __/_i_ day of January, 2013. 
JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
By ~.~-irm ___ _ 
Attorneys for Counterdefendants 
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ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
DENNIS SALLAZ, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the Counterdefendant/Third-Party Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. That 
he has read the within and foregoing Verified Reply to Second Amended Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, knows the contents thereof, and that the facts 
therein stated are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
DENNIS SALLAZ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this __ day of January, 2013. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at ____________ , Idaho 
My Commission Expires _________ _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this {h day of January, 2013, a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing document was forwarded by the method indicated and to the following: 
J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Iver J. Longeteig 
Attorney at Law 
5304 Turrett 
Boise, ID 83703 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Marcy Fox 
Sallaz & Gatewood, PLLC 
1000 S. Roosevelt St. 
P.O. Box 8956 
Boise, ID 83707 
Gabriel McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St. #302 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
[[ ~./ U.S. Mail 
vf Hand-delivered 








[ ] Hand-delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 345-1129 






[ ] . Hand-delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 345-9982 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
DENNIS SALLAZ, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the Counterdefendant/Third-Party Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. That 
he has read the within and foregoing Verified Reply to Second Amended Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, knows the contents thereof, and that the facts 
therein stated are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ;t#day of January, 2013. 
NotPublic forlaho. 
Residing at "31,(.A,L, , Idaho 
My Commission Expires JO ,,;)/ .. ,)()!It, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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J. KAHLE BECKER (ISB # 7408) 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 333-1403 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: kahle@kahlebeckerlaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
e :====-=--=--=-=F-IL'""'.~.D:,-M.~73,,__, ,2~~.,__ 
FEB O 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 





EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 




DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD Chtd., SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD PLLC, and SALLAZ LAW Chtd. 
and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, 
Chtd, Inc. an Idaho Corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
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ANSWER TO THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 




DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative capacity of ) 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD Chtd. and SALLAZ ) 
AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
vs. 
EUGENE (Roy) RICE and JANET RICE, 
Husband and wife, 









COMES NOW Third-Party Defendants Eugene (Roy) Rice and Janet Rice, by and 
through their counsel of record, and having filed a Second Amended Counterclaim and 
Counterdefendants having filed their Third Party Complaint with amended allegations, answer 
Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows: 
1. Third-Party Defendants deny each and every allegation of Third-Party Plaintiffs' 
Complaint not otherwise specifically admitted herein. 
PARTIES TO THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
2. Third-Party Defendants admit Paragraph 1 of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
3. With respect to Paragraph 2 of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint, Third-Party 
Defendants admit that Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. is an Idaho business entity however, due to the 
existence of both Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., Inc. as well as Sallaz and Gatewood, PLLC as 
Idaho Business entities Third-Party Defendants are without information sufficient to form an 
opinion as to the truth or veracity thereof and therefore deny the same. 
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4. Third-Party Defendants admit paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Third-Party Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
5. Third-Party Defendants incorporate their Answer to the Complaint and their 
allegations in their Second Amended Counterclaim to the extent a response is deemed necessary 
to the incorporation portion of Paragraph 1 of the General Allegations of Third-Party Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. Third-Party Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of 
the General Allegations of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
6. Third-Party Defendants admit that Third-Party Plaintiffs performed legal services 
for Third-Party Defendants in that Dennis Sallaz was the personal and business attorney for 
Third-Party Defendants and their business entities for approximately 25 years. Third-Party 
Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the General Allegations 
of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
7. Third-Party Defendants admit that Third-Party Plaintiffs performed legal services 
for Third-Party Defendants in that Dennis Sallaz was the personal and business attorney for 
Third-Party Defendants and their business entities for approximately 25 years. Third-Party 
Defendants further admit that Dennis Sallaz, his relatives, agents, and employees took tens of 
thousands of dollars of items from A Vista Pawn, Inc. in a trade out arrangement for legal 
services which were to have been rendered by Dennis Sallaz and, at times, Sallaz and Gatewood, 
Chtd. Third-Party Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of the 
General Allegations of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
8. Third-Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 
7 of the General Allegations of Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
9. The Third-Party Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
10. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims for damages, if any, are barred and or/reduced by a 
set-off for various amounts due and owing by Third-Party Plaintiffs to Third-Party Defendants. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
11. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims are barred by application of the doctrines of 
estoppel, equitable quasi-estoppel, judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, res judicata, and fraud. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
12. Plaintiffs claims and damages, if any, are barred or reduced by Third-Party 
Plaintiffs' failure to exercise their duty under Idaho law to mitigate or reduce their damages. In 
asserting this defense, Third-Party Defendants do not admit any fault or responsibility, or that 
Third-Party Plaintiffs have suffered any damages. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
13. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims for damages are barred and/or reduced by the 
doctrine of latches. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
14. Third-Party Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are barred or reduced due to Third-Party 
Plaintiffs' own breach of the agreement to provide legal services to Third-Party Defendants by 
committing the negligent and intentional acts described in the Counterclaim. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
15. Third-Party Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are barred or reduced by the application of 
the doctrine of unclean hands. Specifically, Third-Party Plaintiffs violated several Rules of 
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Professional Conduct and committed negligent, fraudulent, and intentional acts described in the 
Counterclaim. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
16. Third-Party Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are barred or reduced by their own fault, 
negligence, and legal responsibility. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
17. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred or reduced because Third-Party 
Plaintiffs have by their own acts, omissions, or conduct waived whatever rights they may have to 
the fees for legal service they claim. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
18. Third-Party Defendants assert the affirmative defense of in pari delicto, in equal 
fault or wrong. By making this defense Third-Party Defendants do not hereby admit to any 
wrongdoing. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
19. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred or reduced by the doctrine of bad 
faith. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
20. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred or reduced by the applicable 
statutes oflimitations contained in Idaho Code§§ 5-216, 5-217, 5-222, and 5-224. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
21. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred by IRCP 13(a) because these 
claims should have been brought in Canyon County Case No. CV 2009-1185. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
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22. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred by the doctrine of accord and 
satisfaction. 
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
23. Third-Party Plaintiffs' claims, if any, are barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
Discovery has just begun in this matter and therefore Third-Party Defendants specifically 
reserve the right to amend their Answer to Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint to assert additional 
affirmative defenses as the same may become known. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Third-Party Defendants have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in 
connection with defending this matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of 
suit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 120(3), and 12-
121. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
1. That Third-Party Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed and held for naught and that 
Third-Party Plaintiffs take nothing; 
2. For an award of Third-Party Defendants' attorney's fees and costs incurred in the 
defense of this action; and, 
3. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and appropriate. 
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DATEDthis 6 day of February 2013. 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants and 
Third-Party Defendants 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Third-Party Defendants hereby demand, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, that the issues properly triable by a jury be tried before a jury. Third-Party 
Defendants will not stipulate to a trial ofless than twelve (12) jurors. 
DATED this 5 day of February 2013. 
~KAHLE BECKER 
At:ey for Defendants/Counterclaimants and 
Third-Party Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this _;J_ day of February 2013, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
William Fuhrman 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman & Gourley 
225 N. 9th St., Ste 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Iver J. Longeteig 
5304 Turret 
Boise, ID 83 703 
V. K. Smith 
1900 W. Main 
Boise, ID 83702 
Gabriel McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St. #302 











__ Personal Delivery 
_x__ Facsimile 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
and Third-Party Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AD 





EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, and MICHAEL 
RICE, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE RICE AND JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in 
his representative capacity of Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd. and SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD, CHTD. INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., 
and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
CHTD. INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-OC-2011-07253 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER ON (1) SALLAZ'S 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS, (2) 
SALLAZ'S MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER, (3) RICES' 
RULE 36(A) MOTION 






















EUGENE (ROY) RICE AND JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on (1) Counterdefendants' (Sallaz's) Motion to Stay 
Proceedings, (2) Counterdefendants' Motion for Protective Order, and (3) Counterclaimants' 
(Rices') Rule 36(a) Motion. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The parties have been in active litigation since April 11, 2011 when Plaintiff filed a 
Complaint for the return of a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado which the Rices allegedly repossessed after 
Mr. Sallaz failed to repay a loan. Sallaz argues that Eugene (Roy) Rice previously released his 
lien on that Cadillac, while Rice argues that his signature releasing the lien was forged. Janet and 
Roy Rices filed an Answer and Counterclaim on April 28, 2011. The Counterclaim asserted 
several claims, including allegations that Mr. Sallaz, an attorney, (1) wrongfully withheld 
$387,000 that was owed to the Rices in connection with the settlement of a case in Twin Falls 
(the "Sumner Matter"), and (2) billed them for services over the course of their 25-year 







agreement with the Plaintiff, under which the Plaintiff would provide legal services and credit 
those services against the value of (A) items taken from Defendant's pawn shop, and (B) 
equipment rented from Defendant's equipment rental company. 
Since the filing of their initial pleadings, the parties have engaged in contentious 
discovery which has been the subject of various motions throughout the case. A dispute over 



























discovery requests, specifically the Rices' Eighth Set of Requests for Admission served on Mr. 
Sallaz, brings the parties before the Court again here. Through their Rule 36(a) Motion, the Rices 
argue that Mr. Sallaz did not answer their Requests for Admission as required under IRCP 36(a), 
and as such, the Court should deem those Requests admitted. Through their Motions, 
Counterdefendants argue that the Requests for Admission were served for an improper purpose: 
facilitating a criminal perjury investigation against Mr. Sallaz. As such, Counterdefendants seek 
(1) a protective order which would allow Mr. Sallaz to not answer the requests for admission, 
and (2) a stay in the proceedings until any criminal investigation has concluded. 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court will DENY Counterdefendant's Motion to Stay 
Proceedings, GRANT Counterdefendant's Motion for Protective order IN PART, and DENY the 
Counterclaimants' Rule 36(a) Motion. 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Both of these Motions stem largely from Roy Rice's Eighth Set of Requests for 
Admission to Dennis Sallaz, numbered 124 thru 151. Requests numbered 124 thru 139 ask Mr. 
Sallaz to admit that his signature appears on certain checks, that he deposited certain checks, that 
he received funds from certain checks, that the repayment of certain checks was secured by 
promissory notes at issue in this litigation, and that certain checks were for Mr. Rice's purchase 
of ATV's. Requests numbered 140 thru 145 ask Sallaz to admit that he has committed perjury, 
suborned perjury, provided false discovery responses, and committed forgery at various times. 
Requests numbered 146 thru 151 ask Sallaz to admit that he drove the Winnebago at issue in this 
case to Yuma, Arizona at various times and/or that Darryl Sallaz did the same. 



























Through his Motion for Protective Order, Sallaz argues that the Requests for Admission 
discussed above were served solely for the purpose of harassing him. As such, Sallaz seeks an 
Order relieving him of the obligation to respond to them. 
Through his Motion to Stay Proceedings, Sallaz argues that Counterclaimants have 
propounded discovery for the improper purpose of furthering a criminal investigation. Sallaz 
requests a stay in these proceedings until any such criminal investigation has concluded so that 
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not infringed upon. 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Under I.R.C.P. 26(c), "[u]pon motion by a party or by the person against whom discovery 
is sought, and for good cause shown, the Court ... may make any order which justice requires to 
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense." The Court's order may provide, for example: 
( 1) that the discovery not be had; 
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, 
including a designation of the time or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that 
selected by the party seeking discovery; [or] 
( 4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be 
limited to certain matters .... 
As the Rule suggests, the party seeking a protective order bears the burden of demonstrating 
good cause. US. ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 175 (C.D. Cal. 2001). To establish 
good cause, the party must submit specific facts as opposed to stereotyped or conclusory 
statements. Id 
Whether to grant a protective order under I.R.C.P. 26(c) is a matter vested in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Selkirk Seed Co. v. Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 104. If appealed, the trial 



























court's decision will be affirmed if (1) the court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) the court acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently with 
any applicable legal standards; and (3) the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
PARTY ARGUMENTS 
Sallaz argues that a protective order is appropriate because the Requests for Admission 
discussed above were clearly served for the purpose of harassment. Rices argue that the Motion 
should be denied because these Requests are relevant to several of their claims, including their 
claim for racketeering. 
THE MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER IS GRANTED IN PART. 
Requests numbered 124 thru 139, which relate to the cashing, depositing, and signing of 
checks, simply ask Mr. Sallaz to admit or deny a factual allegation. These requests also appear to 
be reasonably calculated to the discovery of evidence that is both admissible and relevant to 
Rices' various claims. As such, the Court will, in its discretion, DENY the Motion with respect 
to these Requests for Admission, and Counterdefendants are hereby ORDERED to respond to 
these Requests within ten days. 
Requests numbered 145 thru 151 are similarly straightforward. These requests simply ask 
Mr. Sallaz to admit that he and Darryl Sallaz drove the Winnebago at issue to Arizona at various 
times. These questions do not require a legal conclusion and appear to be relevant to Rices' 
claims concerning the Winnebago. As such the Court will, in its discretion, DENY the Motion 
with respect to these Requests for Admission, and Counterdefendants are hereby ORDERED to 
respond to these Requests within ten days. 




























Requests numbered 140 thru 144 are another matter altogether. They blatantly ask Mr. 
Sallaz to admit that he committed various crimes. The Court finds that these requests were 
served solely for the purposes of harassing and annoying Mr. Sallaz, and as such, the Court will 
GRANT Sallaz's Motion with respect to them. 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 
Whether to grant a stay of proceedings pending the resolution of related proceedings in 
another court is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. Continental Cas. Co. v. 
Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 834 (1995). If appealed, the trial court's decision will be affirmed if (1) 
the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court acted within the outer 
boundaries of that discretion and consistently with any applicable legal standards; and (3) the 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id 
Neither party cited any cases from the Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals 
regarding when the trial court should stay civil proceedings pending the resolution of criminal 
proceedings. 1 This Court does however find the following guidance from the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals persuasive and applicable: 
The Constitution does not ordinarily require a stay of proceedings pending the 
outcome of criminal proceedings. In the absence of substantial prejudice to the 
rights of the parties involved, simultaneous parallel civil and criminal proceedings 
are unobjectionable .... Nevertheless, a court may decide in its discretion to stay 
civil proceedings when the interests of justice seem to require such action. 
Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F. 3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
1 In Continental Casualty Company v. Brady, cited in the paragraph above, a civil litigant moved to stay the 
proceedings pending the resolution ofrelated civil proceedings. 










In the exercise of this discretion, the Court should primarily consider the extent to which 
the moving party's Fifth Amendment rights are implicated. Id The moving party's Fifth 
Amendment rights may be implicated greatly when, for example, (1) the subject matter of the 
civil and criminal cases overlap significantly, (2) an indictment has been returned or is an 
eventuality, and/or (3) there is evidence that criminal prosecutors are seeking to control, rather 
than passively benefit from the civil proceedings. Aspen Financial Services v. Dist. Ct., 289 P. 
3d 201,201 (Nev. 2012). 










(2) whether staying the proceedings would prejudice the non-moving party, (3) the convenience 
of the court in the management of its cases and the efficient use of judicial resources, ( 4) the 
interest of any interested non-parties, and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil and/or 
criminal litigation. Keating, 45 F. 3d at 324-325. 
PARTY ARGUMENTS 
Sallaz argues that the Requests for Admission show that Counterclaimants are using civil 
discovery to further a criminal investigation, which implicates his Fifth Amendment right against 









gathered in this case to the Boise Police Department. Although the progress of the Boise Police 
Department's perjury investigation is unknown, Rices' desire to use civil discovery to further a 
criminal investigation warrants a stay in the proceedings. 
Counterclaimants argue that the Motion to Stay should be denied because no criminal 
charges have been filed against Mr. Sallaz. The lack of formal charges and the uncertainty over 
the status of any criminal investigation weighs heavily against granting the Motion. Granting the 









Motion would also greatly prejudice Mr. Rice because he is in poor health and a prolonged stay 
in the proceedings could delay the resolution of this case until after he passes away. 
THE MOTION TO STAY IS DENIED. 
In an exercise of discretion, the Court finds that staying the proceedings is unjustified 
under the circumstances. While the subject matter of the criminal perjury investigation overlaps 
with the claims in this civil case, there is no indication that an indictment is an eventuality or that 



















Sallaz's Fifth Amendment rights are not implicated to a degree that would justify delaying the 
proceedings. 
Accordingly, the Motion to Stay is DENIED. 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' RULE 36(A) MOTION 
The Requests for Admission discussed above were served on February 11, 2013. Rices' 
counsel received Mr. Sallaz's responses on March 13, 2013 via hand-delivery. The response 
notifies the Rices of Sallaz' s objections to to Requests numbered 124-151 and indicates that a 
Motion to Stay and Motion for Protective Order were forthcoming. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
IRCP 36(a) allows a party to serve written requests for admission upon any other party. A 
request for admission is admitted "unless, within 30 days after service of the request ... the party 
to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer 
or objection addressed to the matter." 




























THE MOTION IS DENIED BECAUSE THE OBJECTIONS WERE TIMELY MADE. 
The record indicates that Mr. Sallaz's objections to these Requests for Admission were 
hand-delivered to Rices' attorney exactly thirty days after the Requests were propounded. Since 
the objections were timely made, Counterclaimants' Motion under Rule 36(a) to deem those 
requests admitted is DENIED. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Counterdefendant' s Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED with respect to 
Requests for Admission No. 140-145, but DENIED with respect to Requests for 
Admission No. 124-139 and 146-151. 
2. Counterdefendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings is DENIED. 
3. Counterclaimant's Rule 36(a) Motion is DENIED. 
4. Counterdefendants are hereby ORDERED to respond to Requests for Admission Nos. 
124-139 and 146-151 within ten days of the entry of this MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND ORDER. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this // ~ day of April 2013. 
Ronald J. Wilpe 
District Judge 
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EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
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vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in 
his representative capacity of SALLAZ 
AND GATEWOOD, CHTD., and 
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Counterdefendants. 
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DENNIS SALLAZ, in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
CHTD., and SALLAZ AND 




EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
PROCEEDINGS 
This matter came before the Court on a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by the 
Counterclaimants/Third-Party Defendants and taken under advisement on April 3, 2013. Other 
pending motions are or will be addressed in separate memoranda. 
As Counterclaimants, Eugene (Roy) Rice, and his wife, Janet Rice, moved for Partial 
Summary Judgment on one of their fourteen (14) Counterclaims against Dennis Sallaz in his 
individual capacity and in his representative capacity of his law firms. As Third-Party Defendants, 
Mr. and Mrs. Rice moved for Summary Judgment of the Sallaz Law Firms' Third-Party Complaint. 
For the reasons stated below, both parts of the motion are DENIED. 



























PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF COUNTERCLAIM COUNT II AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM 
Dennis Sallaz filed this lawsuit on April 11, 2011 seeking either the return of his 1954 
Cadillac, which the Rices repossessed after Sallaz (allegedly) failed to repay a loan to them, or the 
value of the car. Marcy Fox was later added as an "Involuntary Plaintiff' by order of the Court on 
August 25, 2011 because her name appears on a title. 
On April 28, 2011, the Rices filed an Answer and Counterclaim. In the Counterclaim, the 
Rices named Sallaz individually and Sallaz in his representative capacity of his law firms, Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., Inc. The Counterclaim was amended twice, most 
recently on January 8, 2013. 
On September 14, 2011, Sallaz in his representative capacity only, and not in his individual 
capacity, filed the Third-Party Complaint against the Rices. In it, Sallaz claims the Rices owe his 
law firms approximately $300,000 in fees for legal services performed for the Rices and/or the 
Rices' "entities." 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is "rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter oflaw." See also First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790 (1998). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) provides that an adverse party may not simply rely upon mere 
allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine 
issue for trial. See Rhode house v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211 (1994 ). The affidavits either 






















supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and 
show that the affiant is competent to testify. Id. 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be 
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851,854 (1996). Generally, 
liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the court to draw all 
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Williams v. Blakley, 114 Idaho 
323, 324-25 (1988). If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence, the motion should be denied. Friel v. Boise City Housing Authority, 
126 Idaho 484,486 (1994). 
ANALYSIS 
Count II of the Second Amended Counterclaim is styled, "ACTION TO RECOVER SUMS 
DEPOSITED IN TRUST ACCOUNT." This claim stems from Sallaz's testimony during his 2006 
divorce trial that he and/or his law firm then owed approximately $44,000 to the Rices. The Rices 
claim they only discovered this money was owed to them after they reviewed the records of the 
Sallaz divorce. The Counterdefendants deny that they are holding any of the Rice's money in a trust 
account. The Rices have not produced evidence that money being held in trust by Sallaz or his law 







judgment in favor of the Counterclaimants on this claim is DENIED. 
The THIRD-PARTY CLAIM for unpaid legal fees is denied because there are genuine issues 
of material fact about the date the Sallaz law firms last performed legal work for the Rices. Sallaz 










claims his firm performed legal services for the Rices as recently as 2008 or 2009. This assertion 
would contradict Sallaz's testimony in his divorce case that he performed no work of substance for 
the Rices past 2005 or 2006, but the divorce trial was in 2006. Sallaz's 2011 claim that he 
performed legal work for the Rices after 2006 for which he has not been paid is not inconsistent with 
his 2006 trial testimony. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel will not operate to bar Sallaz from asserting his 
Counterclaim in this case where the issue of money owed to the Rices by Sallaz was not fully 
litigated between Sallaz and the Rices at the 2006 divorce trial. Sallaz's law firms, as Third-Party 

















the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable anyway. This argument is not well taken. Estoppel 
doctrines are applied" ... not only against actual parties to prior litigation, but also against a party 
that is in privity to a party in a previous litigation." Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 
1216 (9th Cir.2011). Nevertheless, the doctrine is inapplicable here where there is a question about 
whether and to what extent Sallaz's debt to the Rices in 2006 was a business or personal debt; 
whether the issue regarding the debt was identical to the debt issue in this Counterclaim; and even 
whether the Judgment in the divorce case is "final" where it is presently under appeal. 
The four year statute of limitations does not operate to extinguish the Counterclaim because 
the claim was filed less than four years after the last services were allegedly performed in 2008 or 
2009. Because Roy Rice and Dennis Sallaz were very close friends for 25 or 30 years, they never 
reduced their attorney/client relationship to writing. Rather, the evidence in the record supports the 
theory advanced by Sallaz that the account was in the nature of an oral contract. Idaho Code § 5-222 
provides the statute of limitations on accounts based on oral contracts begins to run on the date of the 
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last item proved on the account. There is a genuine issue of material fact about that date so 
Summary Judgment in favor of the Third-Party Defendants is denied. 
The Rices also argue that Sallaz is charging too high an interest rate on the fees he claims are 
owed. Citing Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, the Rices contend that 12% per annum applies where there is 
no writing evidencing the debt. However, the written invoices evidencing this claimed debt provide 
for an interest rate of 1.5% per month, so 18% per annum is not illegal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count II of the Counterclaimants' 
Counterclaim is denied. Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this :1/ ~y of May 2013. 
District J 
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DENNIS SALLAZ, in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
CHTD., and SALLAZ AND 




EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court on the Counterdefendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The Court heard oral argument on May 9 and May 10, 2013. Bill Fuhrman, Vernon 
Smith, and Erika Judd argued on behalf of the Counterdefendants (hereinafter, "Sallaz"). Kahle 
Becker argued on behalf of the Counterclaimants (hereinafter "Rice," or "Rices"). At the conclusion 
of oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
INTRODUCTION 
This action commenced in 2011 when Dennis Sallaz filed a Complaint to recover a 1954 
Cadillac Eldorado that the Rices allegedly wrongfully repossessed. Shortly thereafter, the Rices filed 
a counterclaim stemming from various dealings between themselves and Mr. Sallaz over the course 
of a twenty-five year attorney/client relationship. The Counterclaim was most recently amended in 
January, 2013. It sets forth fourteen claims for relief. Sallaz now moves for summary judgment on 
eleven of these claims. Two of the remaining counterclaims relate to the Cadillac. Sallaz has not 
moved for their dismissal. Another counterclaim relates to Sallaz's alleged failure to pay amounts 
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due under two promissory notes. Similarly, the Court will not address this claim in detail since 
Sallaz has not moved for summary judgment with respect to it. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Prior to the commencement of this litigation, Dennis Sallaz was the Rices' personal and 
business attorney for approximately 25 years. During this time, Sallaz formed several business 
entities on the Rices' behalf including R-R Investments, Inc., Capital Broadcasting Inc., and Western 
Broadcasting, Inc. Sallaz and his law firms represented the Rices and their business entities at 
various times. The attorney-client relationship was never reduced to writing. 
One such entity that the Rices owned during this time was a pawn shop called "A Vista 
Pawn." The Rices allege in their Counterclaim that in order to pay Sallaz's legal fees, the Rices 
allowed Sallaz to take items from the pawn shop (hereinafter, the "trade-out agreement"). 
Throughout this litigation, the Rices have alleged that Sallaz has taken items from the shop in excess 
of fees the Rices owed him. 
In addition to a dispute over amounts due under the trade-out arrangement, the Rices have 
brought counterclaims arising from various investment ventures in which Sallaz was allegedly 
representing them. One of these ventures was a real estate transaction in Canyon County through 
which the Rices purchased property from Sallaz and his then-wife Renee Baird. The parties refer to 
this transaction as the "Real Homes/Real Properties" transaction. In short, the Rices allege that as a 
result of this transaction, which was completed in January 6, 2006, they obtained property that had a 
cloud on the title (as a result of Sallaz's divorce from Ms. Baird), and sold property to Mr. Sallaz for 
much less than what Sallaz knew its appraised value to be. 
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This transaction gives rise to several of the Rices' counterclaims, including legal malpractice, breach 
of fiduciary duty, action to recover funds in a trust account, and unjust enrichment. The Rices' 
counterclaim for fraud arises from Sallaz's alleged concealment of the unethical transaction, and 
Sallaz's assurances that notwithstanding the cloud on the title, they had no reason to worry. 
Another transaction in dispute here is referred to by the parties as the "Sumner Matter." Rices 
allege in their Second Amended Counterclaim that in 1994 they loaned money to Steve Sumner, who 
was a friend of Sallaz' s and the owner of several radio stations. The Rices claim that as collateral for 
this loan, they received shares of stock in the corporations that owned the stations. Rices allege that 
these stock certificates proved to be worthless. Throughout this time, Sallaz represented Sumner in a 
legal matter. The Rices assert that they were parties to this litigation as well based on their 
ownership of some of the stock of companies named in the case. While the details are complex, the 
Rices' claim against Mr. Sallaz is relatively straightforward: The Rices contend that Sallaz was their 
attorney for purposes of the Sumner Matter, that Sallaz received $387,000 in settlement funds that 
should have been paid to the Rices, and that Sallaz never remitted that money to them. Like the Real 
Homes/Real Properties transaction, the Sumner Matter gives rise to claims including legal 
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. 
The various allegations of misconduct malpractice also form the basis for Rices' claims (1) 
that Sallaz violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, (2) that Sallaz, together with his law firms, 
engaged in racketeering activity giving rise to a Civil RICO claim, (3) that Sallaz, together with his 
law firms, aided and abetted the commission of tortious acts against the Rices, and ( 4) that Sallaz 
violated the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Rices also claim they loaned Sallaz money on various occasions and that Sallaz never 
paid them back. Specifically, the Rices assert that Sallaz owes them money under promissory notes 
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m the amounts of $10,000 and $10,800 that were executed in June and September of 2005. 
Additionally, the Rices claim that Sallaz sold them two ATV's (and a trailer) but never delivered 
them. These allegations gives rise to claims for conversion and claim and delivery. Additionally, the 
Rices allege that they loaned Sallaz money to purchase a motorhome in 2003 pursuant to an oral 
agreement, and filed a lien to secure this debt. The Rices now seek to foreclose the lien against the 
motorhome. 
In sum, the Second Amended Counterclaim asserts fourteen theories of liability. Sallaz has 
moved for partial summary judgment on eleven of these claims, as follows: 
A. Action to recover funds in a trust account, count 2; 
B. Unjust enrichment, count three 
C. Legal malpractice, count four; 
D. Breach of fiduciary duty, count five; 
E. Fraud, count six; 
F. Conversion, count seven; 
G. Claim and delivery, count eight; 
H. Foreclosure oflien, count nine; 
I. Aiding and abetting the commission of a tortious act, count ten; 
J. Violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, count eleven; and 
K. Civil Racketeering, count twelve. 
The three claims not included in the instant motion for partial summary judgment are counts thirteen 
and fourteen ( quiet title and slander of title), concerning the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado, the alleged 
wrongful repossession of which was the basis for Sallaz's complaint that initiated this lawsuit. Count 
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is of the Rices' Counterclaim is an action to recover amounts due on the promissory notes previously 
discussed. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) provides that summary judgment is "rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." See also First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 
654, 657 (1998). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) provides that an adverse party may not simply 
rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing 
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 
( 1994 ). The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would be 
admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. Id. 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be 
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 70 
(1996). Generally, liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the 
court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Williams v. 
Blakley, 114 Idaho 323, 324-25, 757 P.2d 186, 187-88 (1988). If reasonable people could reach 
different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the motion should be denied. 
Friel v. Boise City Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484, 486, 887 P.2d 29, 31 (1994). 
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Sallaz moves for summary judgment on Rices' counterclaims for legal malpractice regarding 
(1) the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction in Canyon County; (2) the Sumner matter in Twin 
Falls County; and (3) alleged violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. After setting 
forth the relevant law, the Court will address each instance of alleged malpractice in tum. 
The elements of a legal malpractice claim are: (1) the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) failure to perform the duty; and 
(4) negligence on the part of the lawyer proximately causing damage to the client. Harrigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 135 (2004). 
Under Idaho Code §5-219(4), an action to recover damages for professional malpractice must 
be brought no later than two years after the cause of action accrued. City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 
Idaho 656, 659 (2009). The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff has a cause 
of action against the professional. Id. at 661. Because damages are an essential element of the 
professional negligence claim, the plaintiff's cause of action does not accrue until there is "some 
damage." Id. There must also be objective proof that would support the existence of some actual 
damage. Id. 
REAL HOMES/REAL PROPERTIES TRANSACTION 
The parties do not appear to dispute, at least for purposes of this motion, that the Real 
Homes/Real Prope11ies contract was executed on January 6, 2006. For the purposes of a legal 
malpractice claim, Sallaz argues that any duty to advise Rice to seek advice from independent 
counsel and any duty to disclose a potentially adverse claim to the ownership interest in Real 
Homes, LLC and/or the real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC, arose prior to this date. Even if 
this duty was breached, Sallaz argues that Rice either knew or should have known of an adverse 
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claim against the real estate involved in the transaction by July 21, 2006, when Rice testified in the 
Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce case and was questioned by the Court regarding his knowledge of Renee 
Baird's claim of ownership. Rice also argues that on July 25, 2006 Baird filed a lis pendens against 
two properties purportedly conveyed to Real Properties, LLC, and when this lis pendens was filed, 
Rice incurred "some damage," and the statute of limitations thus began to run. Since the applicable 
statute of limitations ran two years thereafter (in 2008), Rices' counterclaim, filed in April 2011, was 
untimely. 
Rice argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run when the lis pendens was filed 
because Sallaz reassured Rice throughout the course of the transaction and subsequent litigation that 
there was no reason for him to worry. See generally, Affidavit of Rice. In support of their contention 
that Sallaz was his attorney throughout this process, Rice points to bills from Sallaz indicating that 
Sallaz specifically billed the Rices for representing them in the sale of the underlying real estate 
during the course of Sallaz's divorce. Rice also argues that Sallaz was still his attorney as late of 
May 2010 when Sallaz drafted wills for the Rices. Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Berry v. McFarland, Rices argue that since Sallaz agreed to handle additional matters for 
the Rices well into 2010, the attorney-client relationship continued at least until this date. 153 Idaho 
5 (2012). To the extent Sallaz argues that an attorney-client relationship did not exist between 
himself and the Rices during the relevant time, Rices argue that the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship is ordinarily a question for the jury, where as here, the existence and scope of the 
relationship was not reduced to writing. Warner v. Stewart, 129 Idaho 588, 593 (1997). 
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THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING WHETHER SALLAZ COMMITTED LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE IN THE COURSE OF THE REAL HOMES/REAL PROPERTIES TRANSACTION. 
The motion for summary judgment of this claim is denied because there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to (1) whether Mr. Sallaz committed legal malpractice during this course of the Real 
Homes/Real Properties transaction; and (2) whether Mr. Sallaz fraudulently concealed such 
malpractice, tolling the applicable statute of limitations. 
The Court finds that the Rices' evidence, discussed above, demonstrates that genuine issues 
of material fact exist with respect to each element of their claim for legal malpractice. The billings 
from Sallaz to the Rices during the relevant time period gives rise to a reasonable inference that 
Sallaz was their attorney during this time and that he owed them a duty of care as a result of this 
relationship. Additionally, the Court agrees with Rices that consistent with the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in Warner v. Stewart, the existence and scope of the attorney-client relationship is 
appropriately reserved for the trier of fact in light of the decades-long relationship between Rices 
and Sallaz. 
With regard to the remaining elements of the prima facie case for legal malpractice, Rice's 
sworn testimony that Sallaz advised him that he had "nothing to worry about" when the lis pendens 
was filed, gives rise to a reasonable inference that Sallaz failed to perform his duty, causing the 
Rices to incur damages. This evidence also gives rise to the reasonable inference that Sallaz 
fraudulently concealed that injury (e.g. clouded title to the real estate, payment in excess of the 
property's appraised value). As such, the Court agrees with the Rices that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists as to whether the two-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice was tolled. See 
Idaho Code § 5-219( 4) (tolling the statute of limitations where the fact of damage was fraudulently 
concealed from the injured party). 
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The Rices contend that in 1994 they made loans to business entities owned by Steve Sumner, 
namely Capital Broadcasting, Inc. and Western Broadcasting Inc. The Rices allege that they made 
these loans through one of their business entities: R&R Investments, Inc. The Rices allege that 
Sallaz represented them in this transaction, that Sallaz received settlement proceeds of 
approximately $387,000 from Steve Sumner, and that Sallaz did not remit this money to the Rices. 
Mr. Rice became aware of Sallaz's receipt of these funds in 2008, when he read the judgment from 
the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce case. However, Rice contends that when he read the judgment, he did not 
know all of the facts and circumstances surrounding Sallaz's receipt of these funds, and he did not 
know if the stock he owned in the radio station entities provided him additional security. 
With regard to this legal malpractice claim, Sallaz argues that the record clearly shows that 
(1) Rice, individually, was not a party to the Sumner Matter; (2) the real party to the transaction, 
Rentals & Royalties, Inc., was represented by Wes Wilhite and not Mr. Sallaz; (3) Rice did not own 
the entity, R-R Investments, that supposedly made the underlying loan to Steve Sumner; and (4) 
even if Rice had an ownership interest in R-R Investments or any related or unrelated interest in the 
Sumner Matter, any claim arising therefrom is time-barred. 
The Rices argue that genuine issues of material fact exist in regard to their legal malpractice 
claim. While Sallaz denies or claims he has no knowledge of any loan due to Rice from Sumner, 
Sallaz refers to the existence of such a loan in a July 10, 2000 letter to Vernon K. Smith. June 1, 
2012 Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker, Exh. P. Further, a file from the Sallaz and Gatewood law firm 
indicates that Sallaz represented Roy Rice and Vista Pawn in connection with a loan to Steve 
Sumner. Id. at Exh. S. This evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Rice 
loaned money to Mr. Sumner in some capacity, and whether Mr. Sallaz represented him in the 
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transaction. As was revealed in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce proceedings, Sallaz personally received 
the funds at issue. Id. at Exh. X. 
The Rices' argument in response to the statute of limitations is similar to their response in 
regard to the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction: (1) Sallaz utilized his position as Mr. Rice's 
attorney to lull Mr. Rice into believing that Sallaz was representing his interests in the Sumner 
litgation; and (2) Sallaz fraudulently concealed his misconduct, thereby tolling the applicable statute 
of limitations. 
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING WHETHER SALLAZ COMMITTED LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE IN THE COURSE OF THE REAL HOMES/REAL PROPERTIES TRANSACTION. 
The motion for summary judgment of this claim is denied because there are genuine issues of 
material fact as to (1) whether Mr. Sallaz committed legal malpractice during this course of the 
handling of the Sumner Matter; and (2) whether Mr. Sallaz fraudulently concealed such malpractice, 
tolling the applicable statute of limitations. 
Sallaz's apparent possession of Sumner files identifying Rice as the client casts doubt on 
Sallaz's assertion that no attorney-client relationship existed between himself and Mr. Rice. Further 
the correspondence between Sallaz and other attorneys, as well Sallaz's testimony in his divorce . 
case, gives rise to the inference that Rice loaned Sumner money in some capacity, that Sallaz 
obtained the repayment funds, and did not remit those funds to Mr. Rice. Additionally, that Rice did 
not become aware of Sallaz's receipt of those funds until 2008 gives rise to an inference that Sallaz 
fraudulently concealed the fact of repayment from Mr. Rice. The record is also unclear when the 
alleged concealment ended because although Rice first learned of Sallaz's receipt of the settlement 
funds in late 2008, Rice's sworn testimony reflects that he still thought his interests were protected. 
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Since the record does not clearly indicate when this concealment ended, the Court cannot say exactly 
when the statute of limitations began to run with respect to Rices' Sumner claim. 
The evidence described above directly conflicts with Sallaz's arguments that Roy Rice was 
not a real party in interest (because he did not own R-R Investments) and that attorneys other than 
Sallaz represented Rentals & Royalties, Inc. In light of this conflicting evidence in the record, the 
motion for summary judgment is denied. 
VIOLATIONS OF THE IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Sallaz moves for summary judgment on Rice's claim that Sallaz and Sallaz & Gatewood 
committed legal malpractice by violating the sections of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
which prohibit attorneys from soliciting substantial gifts from their clients or engaging in conflicted 
interest transactions. The Rices rely upon Sallaz's alleged failure to repay promissory notes and 
Sallaz's allegedly fraudulent conduct in the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction in support of 
this claim. 
Sallaz correctly notes that the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are not designed to be a 
basis for civil liability. IRCP, Scope, § 20. While the violation of an applicable rule may be evidence 
that the standard of care has been breached, a violation is not actionable per se. Id. 
The Court wholly agrees with Sallaz's argument in this regard. As such, the Court will grant 
Sallaz's motion for summary judgment on Rices' legal malpractice claims arising from alleged 
violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Sallaz argues that since the allegations in support of Rice's claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
are indistinguishable from the claim for professional negligence, the same two-year statute of 
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limitations applies to this claim as well. Sallaz argues that since this claim, like the professional 
negligence claim, is time-barred, Sallaz summary judgment should be granted. 
As indicated above, the Court does not find as a matter of law that the professional 
negligence claim is time-barred. Accordingly, the same argument is unavailing with respect to the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
To the extent that Sallaz has argued that breach of fiduciary duty is not a claim separate from 
professional negligence, the Court denies summary judgment on this theory as well. Sallaz presented 
no legal authority for this argument and the Court has not found any binding precedent that requires 
a dismissal. 1 Having failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the 
motion is denied. 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
A prima facie case for unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was a benefit 
conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and 
(3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to 
retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof." Vanderford v. Knudson, 144 
Idaho 547, 557-558 (2007). 
Sallaz argues that summary judgment should be awarded on the unjust enrichment claim 
because "there is no legal or evidentiary support for a claim that Sallaz or Sallaz and Gatewood are 
in receipt of funds to which Rice is entitled." Memorandum in Support at 29. This argument fails as 
1 Courts in surrounding jurisdictions are split as to whether a client may sue his attorney for both breach of fiduciary dut 
and legal malpractice. Some have concluded that if both claims arise from the same operative facts, the breach of fiducia 
duty claim should be dismissed. Tucker Firm, LLC v. Alise, 2012 WL 252790 at *5 (N.D. Ill., 2012). Others have allowe 
the client to plead breach of fiduciary as an alternative theory of recovery. See Brenner v. Miller, 2009 WL 1393420 at *2 
(S.D. Fla. 2009). Others have allowed the client to pursue both claims, under a theory that a breach of fiduciary is 
violation of the attorney's duty of loyalty, while legal malpractice is a breach of contract. See Abdulla v. Klosinski, 898 F. 
Supp. 2d 1348, 1361-1362 (S.D. Ga., 2012). 
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a matter of law because continued possession of the property in a strict sense, is not an element of 
the claim. Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion for summary judgment on the unjust 
enrichment claim. 
ACTION TO RECOVER AMOUNTS DEPOSITED IN A TRUST ACCOUNT 
As the Court of Appeals stated in Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, "an attorney-client 
relationship generally imposes upon the law firm a contractual obligation, analogous to that of an 
agent or trustee, to account for funds received in the course of legal representation and to pay the 
client any sums to which he may be entitled." 104 Idaho 234 ( Ct. App. 1983 ). 
Sallaz argues that Rices' claim is deficient because the Rices cannot point to any trust 
account with funds that belong to them. The Court agrees with this argument. The cause of action 
itself assumes that the funds owing to the client have been deposited into an account. Without 
evidence that any such deposit has been made, and without any evidence regarding the account into 
which those funds were deposited, the claim must be dismissed. 
Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the motion for summary judgment on this claim. 
CIVIL RACKETEERING AND AIDING AND ABETTING THE COMMISSION OF A TORTIOUS ACT 
To state a claim for relief under Idaho Code § 18-7803, the claimant must prove both the 
existence of an enterprise and a connected pattern of criminal activity. An enterprise is defined as 
any sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business, labor union, association, or other legal 
entity or any group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as 
well as licit entities. § 18-7803( c ). A "pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least 
two incidents of racketeering conduct, such as fraud, that have the same or similar intents, results, 
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accomplices, victims or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics and are not isolated incidents. § 18-7803( d). 
To establish the existence of an enterprise, Rices allege that the various Sallaz with which 
Sallaz has been associated are enterprises within the meaning of the Idaho Code. Sallaz argues, and 
this Court agrees, that the Rices have not produced any evidence of any agreement or association 
among these various entities to engage in the alleged predicate acts, such as forgery and fraud. Rices 
argument, that the various law firm entities can associate even though Sallaz owns a controlling 
interest in each, is threadbare and elevates form over substance. 
The Rices' claim for aiding and abetting the commission of a tortious act is similarly 
deficient. The claim presumes the active participation of two or more people in the commission of a 
tort. Since Sallaz has a controlling interest in the Counterdefendant law firms, the Court does not see 
how the law firms could, as individual entities with separate minds, have participated with one 
another in the commission of any tortious act. 
As such, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment on the Civil Racketeering claim 
and the Aiding and Abetting the Commission of a Tortious Act claim. 
VIOLATIONS OF THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
"To have standing under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code § 48-601, et seq, 
the aggrieved party must have been in a contractual relationship with the party alleged to have acted 
unfairly or deceptively." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846 (2010). Claims for violations of 
the consumer protection act must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. 
Idaho Code§ 48-619. 
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Sallaz re-asserts the statute of limitations argument made in support of the motion for 
summary judgment with respect to legal malpractice. As discussed previously, the Court does not 
find the statute of limitations argument prevailing. However, the Court will grant the motion for 
summary judgment on this claim because it is wholly indistinguishable from the Rices' claims for 
legal malpractice. 
As such, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment on the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act claim. 
FRAUD 
The prima facie case for fraud requires (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; 
( 4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; ( 5) his intent that it should be 
acted on by the person and in the matter reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his consequent and 
proximate injury. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845 (2010). These elements must be plead 
with particularity. Id. 
Sallaz argues that the fraud claim should be dismissed because ( 1) Rices fail to address 
'consequent and proximate injury' with respect to the alleged misrepresentations; (2) Rices have not 
plead the fraud claim with the requisite particularity; and (3) the claim is, in substance, a claim for 
professional malpractice and is time-barred for the reasons stated previously. 
The Court disagrees with these arguments. As discussed in the context of the legal 
malpractice claims, the Rices have produced evidence tending to show that they relied on Sallaz's 
statements concerning their involvement in the Sumner Matter and they were injured because they 
did not receive funds to which they were entitled. The Court also finds that the allegations and 
evidence in support of the Rices' legal malpractice claims satisfies the standard for particularity. 
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Evidence of specific communications between Sallaz and other attorneys, as well as statements he 
made during his divorce proceedings demonstrate that genuine issues of material fact remain with 
respect to this claim. 
Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim. 
CLAIMS FOR CONVERSION AND CLAIM AND DELIVERY 
The Rices' conversion claims stem from allegations that (1) Sallaz is wrongfully in 
possession of two all-terrain vehicles ("ATV's") and a trailer which are owned by Rice pursuant to a 
bill of sale, executed on or about May 5, 2005 ( also the subject of the claim for claim and delivery); 
(2) Sallaz is in possession of funds owing to the Rices. 
As Sallaz notes in his briefing, a cause of action for conversion normally accrues as soon as 
the property is wrongfully taken or retained, and the statute of limitations for conversion is three 
years. Freiberger v. Am. Triticale, Inc., 120 Idaho 239, 241 (1991), Idaho Code§ 5-218. Likewise, 
the statute of limitations for claim and delivery is three years. Id. 
A TV's AND TRAILER 
Sallaz argues that with respect to the A TV's and trailer, the conversion and claim and 
delivery claims accrued no later than May 5, 2005, when the bill or sale was executed. Rices argue 
that these causes of action did not accrue until late 2010, when Sallaz and his law firms became 
adverse to them. The Rices argue that until the litigation began, Sallaz's possession of the Rices' 
property was not wrongful. From the time that the bill of sale was executed until the litigation began, 
Rices argue that they relied upon Sallaz's assertion that their interest in the property was secured. In 
short, the Rices argue that the statute of limitations was tolled because of inaccurate, fraudulent 
statements made by Sallaz. 
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The Court agrees with the Rices that the longstanding relationship between themselves and 
Mr. Sallaz gives rise to an inference that they did not become aware that Sallaz's possession of this 
property was wrongful until just before this action was commenced. The Rices have argued, and the 
Court agrees, that in cases such as this, the issue of when a claimant discovered the underlying fraud 
is a question appropriately reserved for the trier of fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765 (1991 ). 
FUNDS 
Sallaz argues that the conversion claim concerning funds held by Sallaz is legally deficient 
because the Rices do not identify any specific funds as wrongfully withheld property. Taylor v. 
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826 (2010). In response, Rices appear to argue that the specific funds retained 
by Sallaz are sums due on promissory notes. 
Since the underlying claim here is thus an action to recover on a promissory note, the Court 
will grant the motion for summary judgment on this conversion claim on grounds that it is wholly 
duplicative of the Rices' claims to enforce the promissory notes. 
FORECLOSURE OF LIEN 
The Rices' claim for foreclosure of lien is an attempt to foreclose upon a lien on the 
motorhome. The lien purportedly secures a debt of $8,500 owed to Rice pursuant to an oral 
agreement between Rice, Mr. Sallaz, and Renee Baird made in 2003. 
In support of the motion, Sallaz argues that Rice cannot foreclose on any lien against the 
motorhome because ( 1) Rice transferred the lien to his son, Michael before the counterclaim was 
filed; and (2) the underlying debt is time barred, since actions on oral contracts must be brought 
within four years. Idaho Code § 5-217. 
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In response, Rices have produced a UCC search from the Secretary of State's website 
showing that Rice has a valid lien against the motorhome, which was recently renewed for another 
five years. With regard to the statute of limitations on oral contracts, the Rices argue that the 
limitations period is tolled on account of Sallaz's concealment of the motorhome. 
It is well-settled that in response to a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the 
motion must point to evidence in the record showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. While 
the Rices allege in their opposition brief that Sallaz concealed the motorhome, thus tolling the 
applicable statute of limitations, they have not identified any specific evidence in the record to 
support this contention. Since there is no dispute that the loan for the motorhome was made in 2003, 
the Court finds that the statute of limitations ran on the underlying debt in 2007. Since any action on 
the underlying debt is time-barred, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment on the claim 
for foreclosure of lien. 
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Sallaz's motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part, and denied in part, as follows: 
A. Action to recover amounts held in a trust account: DENIED 
B. Unjust Enrichment: DENIED 
C. Legal Malpractice: GRANTED with respect to alleged violations of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct; otherwise DENIED. 
D. Breach of fiduciary duty: DENIED. 
E. Fraud: DENIED 
F. Conversion: DENIED with respect to the ATV's and trailer; GRANTED with respect to the 
promissory notes; 
G. Claim and delivery: DENIED 
H. Foreclosure of Lien: GRANTED 
I. Aiding and Abetting the Commission of a tortious act: GRANTED 
J. Violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act: DENIED 
K. Civil Racketeering: GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. r 
Dated this 7 day of June 2013. 
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DENNIS SALLAZ, in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
CHTD., and SALLAZ AND 




EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
This order is amended to correct clerical errors in the original. 
This matter comes before the Court on the Counterdefendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The Court heard oral argument on May 9 and May 10, 2013. Bill Fuhrman, Vernon 
Smith, and Erika Judd argued on behalf of the Counterdefendants (hereinafter, "Sallaz"). Kahle 
Becker argued on behalf of the Counterclaimants (hereinafter "Rice," or "Rices"). At the conclusion 
of oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
INTRODUCTION 
This action commenced in 2011 when Dennis Sallaz filed a Complaint to recover a 1954 
Cadillac Eldorado that the Rices allegedly wrongfully repossessed. Shortly thereafter, the Rices filed 
a counterclaim stemming from various dealings between themselves and Mr. Sallaz over the course 
of a twenty-five year attorney/client relationship. The Counterclaim was most recently amended in 
January, 2013. It sets forth fourteen claims for relief. Sallaz now moves for summary judgment on 
eleven of these claims. Two of the remaining counterclaims relate to the Cadillac. Sallaz has not 
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moved for their dismissal. Another counterclaim relates to Sallaz's alleged failure to pay amounts 
due under two promissory notes. Similarly, the Court will not address this claim in detail since 
Sallaz has not moved for summary judgment with respect to it. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Prior to the commencement of this litigation, Dennis Sallaz was the Rices' personal and 
business attorney for approximately 25 years. During this time, Sallaz formed several business 
entities on the Rices' behalf including R-R Investments, Inc., Capital Broadcasting Inc., and Western 
Broadcasting, Inc. Sallaz and his law firms represented the Rices and their business entities at 
various times. The attorney-client relationship was never reduced to writing. 
One such entity that the Rices owned during this time was a pawn shop called "A Vista 
Pawn." The Rices allege in their Counterclaim that in order to pay Sallaz's legal fees, the Rices 
allowed Sallaz to take items from the pawn shop (hereinafter, the "trade-out agreement"). 
Throughout this litigation, the Rices have alleged that Sallaz has taken items from the shop in excess 
of fees the Rices owed him. 
In addition to a dispute over amounts due under the trade-out arrangement, the Rices have 
brought counterclaims arising from various investment ventures in which Sallaz was allegedly 
representing them. One of these ventures was a real estate transaction in Canyon County through 
which the Rices purchased property from Sallaz and his then-wife Renee Baird. The parties refer to 
this transaction as the "Real Homes/Real Properties" transaction. In short, the Rices allege that as a 
result of this transaction, which was completed in January 6, 2006, they obtained property that had a 
cloud on the title (as a result of Sallaz's divorce from Ms. Baird), and sold property to Mr. Sallaz for 
much less than what Sallaz knew its appraised value to be. 
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This transaction gives rise to several of the Rices' counterclaims, including legal malpractice, breach 
of fiduciary duty, action to recover funds in a trust account, and unjust enrichment. The Rices' 
counterclaim for fraud arises from Sallaz's alleged concealment of the unethical transaction, and 
Sallaz's assurances that notwithstanding the cloud on the title, they had no reason to worry. 
Another transaction in dispute here is referred to by the parties as the "Sumner Matter." The 
Rices allege in their Second Amended Counterclaim that in 1994 they loaned money to Steve 
Sumner, who was a friend of Sallaz and the owner of several radio stations. The Rices claim that as 
collateral for this loan, they received shares of stock in the corporations that owned the stations. The 
Rices allege that these stock certificates proved to be worthless. Throughout this time, Sallaz 
represented Sumner in a legal matter. The Rices assert that they were parties to this litigation as well 
based on their ownership of some of the stock of companies named in the case. While the details are 
complex, the Rices' claim against Mr. Sallaz is relatively straightforward: The Rices contend that 
Sallaz was their attorney for purposes of the Sumner Matter, that Sallaz received $387,000 in 
settlement funds that should have been paid to the Rices, and that Sallaz never remitted that money 
to them. Like the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction, the Sumner Matter gives rise to claims 
including legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. 
The various allegations of misconduct malpractice also form the basis for Rices' claims (1) 
that Sallaz violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, (2) that Sallaz, together with his law firms, 
engaged in racketeering activity giving rise to a Civil racketeering claim, (3) that Sallaz, together 
with his law firms, aided and abetted the commission of tortious acts against the Rices, and ( 4) that 
Sallaz violated the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Rices also claim they loaned Sallaz money on various occasions and that Sallaz never 
paid them back. Specifically, the Rices assert that Sallaz owes them money under promissory notes 




























m the amounts of $10,000 and $10,800 that were executed in June and September of 2005. 
Additionally, the Rices claim that Sallaz sold them two ATV's (and a trailer) but never delivered 
them. These allegations give rise to claims for conversion and claim and delivery. Additionally, the 
Rices allege that they loaned Sallaz money to purchase a motorhome in 2003 pursuant to an oral 
agreement, and filed a lien to secure this debt. The Rices now seek to foreclose the lien against the 
motorhome. 
In sum, the Second Amended Counterclaim asserts fourteen theories of liability. Sallaz has 
moved for partial summary judgment on eleven of these claims, as follows: 
A. Action to recover funds in a trust account, count two; 
B. Unjust enrichment, count three 
C. Legal malpractice, count four; 
D. Breach of fiduciary duty, count five; 
E. Fraud, count six; 
F. Conversion, count seven; 
G. Claim and delivery, count eight; 
H. Foreclosure oflien, count nine; 
I. Aiding and abetting the commission of a tortious act, count ten; 
J. Violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, count eleven; and 
K. Civil Racketeering, count twelve. 
The three claims not included in the instant motion for partial summary judgment are counts two, 
thirteen, and fourteen. Counts thirteen and fourteen, quiet title and slander of title, relate to the 1954 
Cadillac Eldorado, the alleged wrongful repossession of which was the basis for Sallaz's complaint 
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that initiated this lawsuit. Count two is an action to recover amounts due on the promissory notes 
previously discussed. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) provides that summary judgment is "rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." See also First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 
654, 657 (1998). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) provides that an adverse party may not simply 
rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing 
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 
(1994). The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would be 
admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. Id. 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be 
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 70 
(1996). Generally, liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the 
court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Williams v. 
Blakley, 114 Idaho 323, 324-25, 757 P.2d 186, 187-88 (1988). If reasonable people could reach 
different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the motion should be denied. 
Friel v. Boise City Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484,486, 887 P.2d 29, 31 (1994). 
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Sallaz moves for summary judgment on Rices' counterclaims for legal malpractice regarding 
(1) the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction in Canyon County; (2) the Sumner matter in Twin 
Falls County; and (3) alleged violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. After setting 
forth the relevant law, the Court will address each instance of alleged malpractice in tum. 
The elements of a legal malpractice claim are: (1) the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) failure to perform the duty; and 
( 4) negligence on the part of the lawyer proximately causing damage to the client. Harrigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 135 (2004). 
Under Idaho Code §5-219(4), an action to recover damages for professional malpractice must 
be brought no later than two years after the cause of action accrued. City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 
Idaho 656, 659 (2009). The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff has a cause 
of action against the professional. Id. at 661. Because damages are an essential element of the 
professional negligence claim, the plaintiffs cause of action does not accrue until there is "some 
damage." Id. There must also be objective proof that would support the existence of some actual 
damage. Id. 
REAL HOMES/REAL PROPERTIES TRANSACTION 
The parties do not appear to dispute, at least for purposes of this motion, that the Real 
Homes/Real Properties contract was executed on January 6, 2006. For the purposes of a legal 
malpractice claim, Sallaz argues that any duty to advise Rice to seek advice from independent 
counsel and any duty to disclose a potentially adverse claim to the ownership interest in Real 
Homes, LLC and/or the real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC, arose prior to this date. Even if 
this duty was breached, Sallaz argues that Rice either knew or should have known of an adverse 
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claim against the real estate involved in the transaction by July 21, 2006, when Rice testified in the 
Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce case and was questioned by the Court regarding his knowledge of Renee 
Baird's claim of ownership. Rice also argues that on July 25, 2006 Baird filed a lis pendens against 
two properties purportedly conveyed to Real Properties, LLC, and when this lis pendens was filed, 
Rice incurred "some damage," and the statute of limitations thus began to run. Since the applicable 
statute oflimitations ran two years thereafter (in 2008), Rices' counterclaim, filed in April 2011, was 
untimely. 
Rice argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run when the lis pendens was filed 
because Sallaz reassured Rice throughout the course of the transaction and subsequent litigation that 
there was no reason for him to worry. See generally, Affidavit of Rice. In support of his contention 
that Sallaz was his attorney throughout this process, Rice points to bills from Sallaz indicating that 
Sallaz specifically billed the Rices for representing them in the sale of the underlying real estate 
during the course of Sallaz's divorce. Rice also argues that Sallaz was still his attorney as late of 
May 2010 when Sallaz drafted wills for the Rices. Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Berry v. McFarland, the Rices argue that since Sallaz agreed to handle additional matters 
for the Rices well into 2010, the attorney-client relationship continued at least until this date. 153 
Idaho 5 (2012). To the extent Sallaz argues that an attorney-client relationship did not exist between 
himself and the Rices during the relevant time, Rices argue that the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship is ordinarily a question for the jury, where as here, the existence and scope of the 
relationship was not reduced to writing. Warner v. Stewart, 129 Idaho 588, 593 (1997). 
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THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING WHETHER SALLAZ COMMITTED LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE IN THE COURSE OF THE REAL HOMES/REAL PROPERTIES TRANSACTION. 
The motion for summary judgment of this claim is denied because there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to (1) whether Mr. Sallaz committed legal malpractice during this course of the Real 
Homes/Real Properties transaction; and (2) whether Mr. Sallaz fraudulently concealed such 
malpractice, tolling the applicable statute of limitations. 
The Court finds that the Rices' evidence, discussed above, demonstrates that genuine issues 
of material fact exist with respect to each element of their claim for legal malpractice. The billings 
from Sallaz to the Rices during the relevant time period gives rise to a reasonable inference that 
Sallaz was their attorney during this time and that he owed them a duty of care as a result of this 
relationship. Additionally, the Court agrees with the Rices that consistent with the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in Warner v. Stewart, the existence and scope of the attorney-client relationship is 
appropriately reserved for the trier of fact in light of the decades-long relationship between the Rices 
and Sallaz. 
With regard to the remaining elements of the prima facie case for legal malpractice, Rice's 
sworn testimony that Sallaz advised him that he had "nothing to worry about" when the lis pendens 
was filed, gives rise to a reasonable inference that Sallaz failed to perform his duty, causing the 
Rices to incur damages. This evidence also gives rise to the reasonable inference that Sallaz 
fraudulently concealed that injury (e.g. clouded title to the real estate, payment in excess of the 
property's appraised value). As such, the Court agrees with the Rices that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists as to whether the two-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice was tolled. See 
Idaho Code § 5-219( 4) (tolling the statute of limitations where the fact of damage was fraudulently 
concealed from the injured party). 
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The motion for summary judgment for legal malpractice arising from the Real Homes/Real 
Properties transaction is DENIED. 
SUMNER TRANSACTION 
The Rices contend that in 1994 they made loans to business entities owned by Steve Sumner, 
namely Capital Broadcasting, Inc. and Western Broadcasting Inc. The Rices allege that they made 
these loans through one of their business entities: R&R Investments, Inc. The Rices allege that 
Sallaz represented them in this transaction, that Sallaz received settlement proceeds of 
approximately $387,000 from Steve Sumner, and that Sallaz did not remit this money to the Rices. 
Mr. Rice became aware of Sallaz's receipt of these funds in 2008, when he read the judgment from 
the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce case. However, Rice contends that when he read the judgment, he did not 
know all of the facts and circumstances surrounding Sallaz's receipt of these funds, and he did not 
know if the stock he owned in the radio station entities provided him additional security. 
With regard to this legal malpractice claim, Sallaz argues that the record clearly shows that 
(1) Rice, individually, was not a party to the Sumner Matter; (2) the real party to the transaction, 
Rentals & Royalties, Inc., was represented by Wes Wilhite and not Mr. Sallaz; (3) Rice did not own 
the entity, R-R Investments, that supposedly made the underlying loan to Steve Sumner; and (4) 
even if Rice had an ownership interest in R-R Investments or any related or unrelated interest in the 
Sumner Matter, any claim arising therefrom is time-barred. 
The Rices argue that genuine issues of material fact exist in regard to their legal malpractice 
claim. While Sallaz denies or claims he has no knowledge of any loan due to Rice from Sumner, 
Sallaz refers to the existence of such a loan in a July 10, 2000 letter to Vernon K. Smith. June 1, 
2012 Affidavit of J Kahle Becker, Exh. P. Further, a file from the Sallaz and Gatewood law firm 
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indicates that Sallaz represented Roy Rice and Vista Pawn in connection with a loan to Steve 
Sumner. Id. at Exh. S. This evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Rice 
loaned money to Mr. Sumner in some capacity, and whether Mr. Sallaz represented him in the 
transaction. As was revealed in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce proceedings, Sallaz personally received 
the funds at issue. Id at Exh. X. 
The Rices' argument in response to the statute of limitations is similar to their response in 
regard to the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction: (1) Sallaz utilized his position as Mr. Rice's 
attorney to lull Mr. Rice into believing that Sallaz was representing his interests in the Sumner 
litigation; and (2) Sallaz fraudulently concealed his misconduct, thereby tolling the applicable statute 
of limitations. 
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING WHETHER SALLAZ COMMITTED LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE IN THE COURSE OF THE REAL HOMES/REAL PROPERTIES TRANSACTION. 
The motion for summary judgment of this claim is denied because there are genuine issues of 
material fact as to (1) whether Mr. Sallaz committed legal malpractice during this course of the 
Sumner Matter; and (2) whether Mr. Sallaz fraudulently concealed such malpractice, tolling the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
Sallaz's apparent possession of Sumner files identifying Rice as the client casts doubt on 
Sallaz's assertion that no attorney-client relationship existed between himself and Mr. Rice. Further 
the correspondence between Sallaz and other attorneys, as well Sallaz's testimony in his divorce 
case, gives rise to the inference that Rice loaned Sumner money in some capacity, that Sallaz 
obtained the repayment funds, and did not remit those funds to Mr. Rice. Additionally, that Rice did 
not become aware of Sallaz's receipt of those funds until 2008 gives rise to an inference that Sallaz 
fraudulently concealed the fact of repayment from Mr. Rice. The record is also unclear when the 
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alleged concealment ended because although Rice first learned of Sallaz's receipt of the settlement 
funds in late 2008, Rice's sworn testimony reflects that he still thought his interests were protected. 
Since the record does not clearly indicate when this concealment ended, the Court cannot say exactly 
when the statute of limitations began to run with respect to the Rices' Sumner claim. 
The evidence described above directly conflicts with Sallaz's arguments that Roy Rice was 
not a real party in interest (because he did not own R-R Investments) and that attorneys other than 
Sallaz represented Rentals & Royalties, Inc. In light of this conflicting evidence in the record, the 
motion for summary judgment for legal malpractice arising from the Sumner Matter is DENIED. 
VIOLATIONS OF THE IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Sallaz moves for summary judgment on Rice's claim that Sallaz and Sallaz & Gatewood 
committed legal malpractice by violating the sections of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
which prohibit attorneys from soliciting substantial gifts from their clients or engaging in conflicted 
interest transactions. The Rices rely upon Sallaz's alleged failure to repay promissory notes and 
Sallaz's allegedly fraudulent conduct in the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction in support of 
this claim. 
Sallaz correctly notes that the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are not designed to be a 
basis for civil liability. IRCP, Scope, § 20. While the violation of an applicable rule may be evidence 
that the standard of care has been breached, a violation is not actionable per se. Id 
The Court wholly agrees with Sallaz's argument in this regard. As such, the Court GRANTS 
Sallaz's motion for summary judgment on Rices' legal malpractice claims arising from alleged 
violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Sallaz argues that since the allegations in support of Rice's claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
are indistinguishable from the claim for professional negligence, the same two-year statute of 
limitations applies to this claim as well. Sallaz argues that since this claim, like the professional 
negligence claim, is time-barred, the motion for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim should be granted. 
As indicated above, the Court does not find as a matter of law that the professional 
negligence claim is time-barred. Accordingly, the same argument is unavailing with respect to the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
To the extent that Sallaz has argued that breach of fiduciary duty is not a claim separate from 
professional negligence, the Court denies summary judgment on this theory as well. Sallaz presented 
no legal authority for this argument and the Court has not found any binding precedent that requires 
d. . 11 a 1sm1ssa. 
Accordingly, Sallaz's motion for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim is 
DENIED. 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
A prima facie case for unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was a benefit 
conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and 
(3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to 
1 Courts in surrounding jurisdictions are split as to whether a client may sue his attorney for both breach of fiduciary dut 
and legal malpractice. Some have concluded that if both claims arise from the same operative facts, the breach of fiducia 
duty claim should be dismissed. Tucker Firm, LLC v. Alise, 2012 WL 252790 at *5 (N.D. Ill., 2012). Others have allowe 
the client to plead breach of fiduciary as an alternative theory of recovery. See Brenner v. Miller, 2009 WL 1393420 at *2 
(S.D. Fla. 2009). Others have allowed the client to pursue both claims, under a theory that a breach of fiduciary is 
violation of the attorney's duty of loyalty, while legal malpractice is a breach of contract. See Abdulla v. Klosinski, 898 F. 
Supp. 2d 1348, 1361-1362 (S.D. Ga., 2012). 
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retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof." Vanderford v. Knudson, 144 
Idaho 547, 557-558 (2007). 
Sallaz argues that summary judgment should be awarded on the unjust enrichment claim 
because "there is no legal or evidentiary support for a claim that Sallaz or Sallaz and Gatewood are 
in receipt of funds to which Rice is entitled." Memorandum in Support at 29. This argument fails as 
a matter of law because continued possession of the property in a strict sense, is not an element of 
the claim. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment on the unjust 
enrichment claim. 
ACTION TO RECOVER AMOUNTS DEPOSITED IN A TRUST ACCOUNT 
As the Court of Appeals stated in Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, "an attorney-client 
relationship generally imposes upon the law firm a contractual obligation, analogous to that of an 
agent or trustee, to account for funds received in the course of legal representation and to pay the 
client any sums to which he may be entitled." 104 Idaho 234 (Ct. App. 1983). 
Sallaz argues that Rices' claim is deficient because the Rices cannot point to any trust 
account with funds that belong to them. The Court agrees with this argument. The cause of action 
itself assumes that the funds owing to the client have been deposited into an account. Without 
evidence that any such deposit has been made, and without any evidence regarding the account into 
which those funds were deposited, the claim must be dismissed. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment on this claim. 
CIVIL RACKETEERING AND AIDING AND ABETTING THE COMMISSION OF A TORTIOUS ACT 
To state a claim for relief under Idaho Code § 18-7803, the claimant must prove both the 
existence of an enterprise and a connected pattern of criminal activity. An enterprise is defined as 
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any sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business, labor union, association, or other legal 
entity or any group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as 
well as licit entities. § 18-7803( c ). A "pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least 
two incidents of racketeering conduct, such as fraud, that have the same or similar intents, results, 
accomplices, victims or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics and are not isolated incidents. § 18-7803( d). 
To establish the existence of an enterprise, Rices allege that the various law firms with which 
Sallaz has been associated are enterprises within the meaning of the Idaho Code. Sallaz argues, and 
this Court agrees, that the Rices have not produced any evidence of any agreement or association 
among these various entities to engage in the alleged predicate acts, such as forgery and fraud. Rices 
argument, that the various law firm entities can associate even though Sallaz owns a controlling 
interest in each, is threadbare and elevates form over substance. 
The Rices' claim for aiding and abetting the commission of a tortious act is similarly 
deficient. The claim presumes the active participation of two or more people in the commission of a 
tort. Since Sallaz has a controlling interest in the Counterdefendant law firms, the Court does not see 
how the law firms could, as individual entities with separate minds, have participated with one 
another in the commission of any tortious act. 
As such, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment on the Civil Racketeering claim 
and the Aiding and Abetting the Commission of a Tortious Act claim. 
VIOLATIONS OF THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
"To have standing under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code § 48-601, et seq, 
the aggrieved party must have been in a contractual relationship with the party alleged to have acted 
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unfairly or deceptively." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846 (2010). Claims for violations of 
the consumer protection act must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. 
Idaho Code § 48-619. 
Sallaz reasserts the statute of limitations argument made in support of the motion for 
summary judgment with respect to legal malpractice. As discussed previously, the Court does not 
find the statute of limitations argument prevailing. However, the Court GRANTS the motion for 
summary judgment on this claim because it is wholly indistinguishable from the Rices' claims for 
legal malpractice. 
FRAUD 
The prima facie case for fraud requires (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; 
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be 
acted on by the person and in the matter reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his consequent and 
proximate injury. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845 (2010). These elements must be plead 
with particularity. Id. 
Sallaz argues that the fraud claim should be dismissed because (1) Rices fail to address 
'consequent and proximate injury' with respect to the alleged misrepresentations; (2) Rices have not 
plead the fraud claim with the requisite particularity; and (3) the claim is, in substance, a claim for 
professional malpractice and is time-barred for the reasons stated previously. 
The Court disagrees with these arguments. As discussed in the context of the legal 
malpractice claims, the Rices have produced evidence tending to show that they relied on Sallaz's 
statements concerning their involvement in the Sumner Matter and they were injured because they 
did not receive funds to which they were entitled. The Court also finds that the allegations and 
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evidence in support of the Rices' legal malpractice claims satisfies the standard for particularity. 
Evidence of specific communications between Sallaz and other attorneys, as well as statements he 
made during his divorce proceedings demonstrate that genuine issues of material fact remain with 
respect to this claim. 
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim. 
CLAIMS FOR CONVERSION AND CLAIM AND DELIVERY 
The Rices' conversion claims stem from allegations that (1) Sallaz is wrongfully in 
possession of two all-terrain vehicles ("ATV's") and a trailer which are owned by Rice pursuant to a 
bill of sale, executed on or about May 5, 2005 (also the subject of the claim for claim and delivery); 
(2) Sallaz is in possession of funds owing to the Rices. 
As Sallaz notes in his briefing, a cause of action for conversion normally accrues as soon as 
the property is wrongfully taken or retained, and the statute of limitations for conversion is three 
years. Freiberger v. Am. Triticale, Inc., 120 Idaho 239, 241 (1991), Idaho Code§ 5-218. Likewise, 
the statute of limitations for claim and delivery is three years. Id. 
A TV's AND TRAILER 
Sallaz argues that with respect to the ATV's and trailer, the conversion and claim and 
delivery claims accrued no later than May 5, 2005, when the bill or sale was executed. The Rices 
argue that these causes of action did not accrue until late 2010, when Sallaz and his law firms 
became adverse to them. The Rices argue that until the litigation began, Sallaz's possession of the 
Rices' property was not wrongful. From the time that the bill of sale was executed until the litigation 
began, Rices argue that they relied upon Sallaz's assertion that their interest in the property was 
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secured. In short, the Rices argue that the statute of limitations was tolled because of inaccurate, 
fraudulent statements made by Sallaz. 
The Court agrees with the Rices that the longstanding relationship between themselves and 
Mr. Sallaz gives rise to an inference that they did not become aware that Sallaz's possession of this 
property was wrongful until just before this action was commenced. The Rices have argued, and the 
Court agrees, that in cases such as this, the issue of when a claimant discovered the underlying fraud 
is a question appropriately reserved for the trier of fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765 (1991). 
The motions for summary judgment on the (1) conversion and (2) claim and delivery claims 
in regards to the ATV's and trailer are thus DENIED. 
FUNDS 
Sallaz argues that the conversion claim concerning funds held by Sallaz is legally deficient 
because the Rices do not identify any specific funds as wrongfully withheld property. Taylor v. 
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826 (2010). In response, the Rices appear to argue that the specific funds 
retained by Sallaz are sums due on promissory notes. 
Since the underlying claim here is an action to recover on a promissory note, the Court 
GRANTS the motion for summary judgment on this conversion claim on grounds that it is wholly 
duplicative of the Rices' claims to enforce the promissory notes. 
FORECLOSURE OF LIEN 
The Rices' claim for foreclosure of lien is an attempt to foreclose upon a lien on the 
motorhome. The lien purportedly secures a debt of $8,500 owed to Rice pursuant to an oral 
agreement between Rice, Mr. Sallaz, and Renee Baird made in 2003. 
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In support of the motion, Sallaz argues that Rice cannot foreclose on any lien against the 
motorhome because (1) Rice transferred the lien to his son, Michael, before the counterclaim was 
filed; and (2) the underlying debt is time barred, since actions on oral contracts must be brought 
within four years. Idaho Code§ 5-217. 
In response, the Rices have produced a UCC search from the Secretary of State's website 
showing that Rice has a valid lien against the motorhome, which was recently renewed for another 
five years. With regard to the statute of limitations on oral contracts, the Rices argue that the 
limitations period is tolled on account of Sallaz's concealment of the motorhome. 
It is well-settled that in response to a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the 
motion must point to evidence in the record showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. While 
the Rices allege in their opposition brief that Sallaz concealed the motorhome, thus tolling the 
applicable statute of limitations, they have not identified any specific evidence in the record to 
support this contention. Since there is no dispute that the loan for the motorhome was made in 2003, 
the Court finds that the statute of limitations ran on the underlying debt in 2007. Since any action on 
the underlying debt is time-barred, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment on the 
claim for foreclosure of lien. 
CONCLUSION 
Sallaz's motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part, and denied in part, as follows: 
A. Action to recover amounts held in a trust account: GRANTED 
B. Unjust Enrichment: DENIED 
C. Legal Malpractice: GRANTED with respect to alleged violations of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct; DENIED with respect to the Real Homes/Real Properties Transaction; 
DENIED with respect to the Sumner Matter. 
D. Breach of fiduciary duty: DENIED. 
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E. Fraud: DENIED 
F. Conversion: DENIED with respect to the ATV's and trailer; GRANTED with respect to the 
promissory notes; 
G. Claim and delivery: DENIED 
H. Foreclosure of Lien: GRANTED 
I. Aiding and Abetting the Commission of a tortious act: GRANTED 
J. Violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act: GRANTED 
K. Civil Racketeering: GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this~ of June 2013. 
Q 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 



























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
s~ 
United States Mail, on this :h.f day of June 2013, one copy of the foregoing as notice pursuant to 
Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys ofrecord in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W Main St, Ste 400 
Boise, ID 83 702 
William A. Fuhrman 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, PA 
225 N 9th St, Ste 820 
PO Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Gabriel J. McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W Front St, Ste 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Vernon K. Smith Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W Main 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Nicholas A. Warden 
Attorney at Law 
344 W. Hale St., Ste 303 
Boise, ID 83 706 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada Coun , 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST 






EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, and MICHAEL 
RICE, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in 
his representative capacity of SALLAZ 
AND GATEWOOD, CHTD., and 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, CHTD., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
Case No. CV OC 2011-07253 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING 
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER AND MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
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DENNIS SALLAZ, in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
CHTD., and SALLAZ AND 




EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court on the Counterdefendants' Motion to Reconsider and 
Motion for Sanctions. The Court heard oral argument on November 13, 2013. Bill Fuhrman and 
Vernon Smith argued on behalf of the Plaintiff/Counterdefendants (hereinafter, "Sallaz"). Kahle 
Becker argued on behalf of the Defendants/Counterclaimants (hereinafter "Rice," or "Rices"). At the 
conclusion of oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The factual background and procedural history is well-known to the parties and was recently 
set forth in this Court's Amended Memorandum Decision and Order ("Order") on 
Counterdefendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, issued on June 20, 2013. In that Order, 
the Court dismissed several of the Rices' counterclaims, but determined that genuine issues of 
material fact existed regarding the Rices' counterclaims for unjust enrichment, legal malpractice re: 
Real Homes/Real Properties, legal malpractice re: Sumner Matter, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, 
conversion of all-terrain vehicles, claim and delivery if all-terrain vehicles. In denying summary 
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judgment on these claims, the Court determined that Mr. Rice's allegations that Mr. Sallaz has 
fraudulently concealed his misconduct precluded a finding that the statute oflimitations had run with 
respect to these claims. 
Eight days before the Court issued its Order, and again on September 25, 2013, Mr. Rice was 
deposed again in this matter. On October 28, 2013, Sallaz filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's 
June 20, 2013 order on grounds that during these two depositions, Mr. Rice was unable to identify 
his signature on his affidavit filed in opposition to Sallaz's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Sallaz now argues that Mr. Rice's deposition testimony demonstrates that his earlier affidavit should 
be stricken. Sallaz also seeks an award of sanctions for the filing of an affidavit in bad faith. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
As stated above, the basis for Sallaz's motion to reconsider is his argument that the Rice 
affidavit should be stricken. As such, the legal standard in this case is set forth in Rules 1 l(a)(2)(B) 
and Rule 56(e). Sallaz's request for sanctions stems from his argument that the Rice affidavit was 
filed in bad faith. That motion is thus brought under Rule 56(g). 
RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE ll(A)(2)(B) 
The Motion to Reconsider is brought under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B): 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at 
any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the 
entry of the final judgment. 
"A rehearing or reconsideration in the trial court usually involves new or additional facts, and 
a more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact. Indeed, the chief virtue of a reconsideration 
is to obtain a full and complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be 
ascertained, and justice done, as nearly as may be." Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat 'I Bank, 
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118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990) (quoting J.L Case Co. v. McDonald, 16 Idaho 223, 
229, 280 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1955)). "The trial court must consider new evidence that bears on the 
correctness of an interlocutory order if requested to do so by a timely motion under Rule 
ll(a)(2)(B)." PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184 
(2009). 
When considering a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order, ''the trial court should take 
into account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the [that] 
order." Johnson v. North Idaho College, 153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012) (quoting Coeur 
d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). The 
moving party has the burden to bring the court's attention to new facts. Id. The trial court does not 
have to search the record to determine if there is any new information that might change the facts 
deemed to be established. Id. However, neither Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) nor Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. 
explicitly state that new facts are needed. Johnson v. North Idaho College, 153 Idaho at 62, 278 P .2d 
at 932. "A motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the court - when new law is applied 
to previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously presented law, or any 
combination thereof - to reconsider the correctness of an interlocutory order." Id. 
The trial court's decision on a motion for reconsideration will be reviewed on appeal for 
abuse of discretion. Commercial Ventures, Inc., v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 
212 (2008). The trial court acts within its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as 
discretionary; (2) acts within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistent with applicable 
legal principles; and (3) reaches its decision through an exercise of reason. Justad v. Ward, 147 
Idaho 509, 511 (2009). 
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MOTION TO STRIKE UNDER RULE 56(E) 
IRCP 56( e) states: 
Affidavits [ filed in opposition to or in support of a motion for summary judgment] shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against the party. 
"T[he Supreme] Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's 
determination of the admissibility of testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary 
judgment." Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 244 (2012). "A trial court does not abuse its 
discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of 
discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of 
reason." Id. at 244-45. 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER IRCP 56(G} 
IRCP 56(g) states: 
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits 
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused that 
party to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Neither party cited to any Idaho appellate decisions regarding the standard of review for an 
award of sanctions under Rule 56(g). Federal courts applying the analogous federal rule however 
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have stated that bad faith in this context is "a deliberate or knowing act for an improper purpose." 
Raher v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2011 WL 4832574 at 8 (D. Oregon) (citing Ninth Circuit 
opinions). 
PARTY ARGUMENTS 
Sallaz argues that at various times during his June 12, 2013 deposition, Mr. Rice stated that 
he did not recognize his signature on the affidavit he filed in opposition to Sallaz's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. Since Mr. Rice cannot confirm that he signed his affidavit, Sallaz argues 
that Mr. Rice is not competent to testify as to the matter contained therein. As such, Sallaz argues 
that the Court should strike the affidavit, and grant the motion to reconsider. Additionally, Sallaz 
argues that Rice filed the affidavit in bad faith, and as such, sanctions should be awarded under Rule 
56(g). 
Rice argues that his inability to recognize his signature on the affidavit is evidence only of 
his age and the complexity of this case. It does not establish that he is unfamiliar with the facts set 
forth in that affidavit. Mr. Rice states that he signed the affidavit before a notary public, and argues 
that Sallaz has no evidence that the notary stamp is fraudulent. Mr. Rice argues that the notarized 
affidavit is self-authenticating and thus admissible under Rule of Evidence 902. 1 
THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER IS DENIED. 
Mr. Sallaz correctly notes that at various times during his most recent deposition, Mr. Rice 
stated that he was not sure if the signature on his affidavit was his. However, at no point was Mr. 
23 1 Idaho Rule of Evidence 902(8) states: "Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is no 
required with respect to the following: ... (8) Acknowledged Documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate o 
24 acknowledgement executed in the manner provided by law by a notary public or other officer authorized by law to tak 
acknowledgements." 
25 
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Rice questioned as to whether he was familiar with the facts set forth therein. As such, the Court 
finds in its discretion that Sallaz has not demonstrated that Mr. Rice is incompetent to testify 
regarding the matters set forth in his affidavit. Additionally, absent some proof of fraud, the notary 
stamp establishes that Mr. Rice signed his affidavit. 
THE MOTION FOR SANCTIONS IS DENIED. 
As discussed above, Sallaz has not demonstrated that Rice is unfamiliar with the facts set 
forth in his affidavit. The Court finds that determination precludes a finding that the Rice affidavit 
was submitted in bad faith for purposes of Rule 56(g). 
CONCLUSION 
1. Counterdefendants' Motion to Reconsider is DENIED. 
2. Counterdefendants' Motion for Sanctions is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
'!"--
Dated this a 5' day of November 2013. 
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EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Counterc laimants, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in 
his representative capacity of SALLAZ 
AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., and SALLAZ 
AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1107253 
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DENNIS SALLAZ, in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Third Party Defendants. 
The counterclaimants, Eugene and Janet Rice, have moved for permission to seek 
punitive damages against the counterdefendants, attorney Dennis Sallaz and the law firm Sallaz 
and Gatewood, Chtd. ( collectively, "Sallaz"). The motion was argued and taken under 
advisement on April 21, 2014. For the reasons explained below, it is granted. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
This action's factual and legal background is summarized in the Amended Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Counterdefendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment entered on 
June 20, 2013 ("Decision"). That background will not be reiterated here, except as necessary to 
address the issue of punitive damages that is now at hand. 
This is not the Rices' first motion for permission to seek PU?itive damages. Their prior 
motions were deemed premature. More specifically, Sallaz was given the opportunity to seek 
summary judgment against the Rices' counterclaims before the issue of punitive damages would 
be entertained. Sallaz has now had that opportunity, and several of the Rices' counterclaims 
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survived Sallaz's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the time is right to decide 
whether the Rices may seek punitive damages. 
Among the Rices' surviving counterclaims are those for legal malpractice (which 
survived only in part), unjust enrichment, and fraud. Those are the relevant counterclaims. The 
Rices' counsel tied the motion for permission to seek punitive damages to them when pressed in 
open court on April 21 to tie the motion to particular counterclaims-a point not clearly 
addressed in the Rices' moving papers. (As explained below, a request for punitive damages is 
not an independent claim and must be tied to one or more underlying claims.) 
Somewhat more narrowly, the Rices' moving papers identify two particular strands of 
alleged wrongdoing as the justification for seeking punitive damages. 
The first is that Sallaz commingled personal funds and client funds in a law firm trust 
account. Summary judgment has been granted, however, against the Rices' trust-account-
commingling counterclaim, given their failure to identify any funds of theirs on deposit in a 
Sallaz trust account. (Decision 14.) Moreover, if the voluminous case file in this action 
somewhere holds evidence that the Rices sustained a loss simply by virtue of commingling by 
Sallaz, rather than by virtue of some other alleged wrongdoing, the Rices have not pointed the 
Court to it. Accordingly, the commingling angle does not contribute materially to the Rices' bid 
for permission to seek punitive damages. It will not be discussed further. 
The second, and more extensively discussed, strand of alleged wrongdoing identified in 
the Rices' moving papers is the episode called the "Sumner matter." The Sumner matter forms 
part of the basis of the Rices' counterclaims for legal malpractice and unjust enrichment, and it is 
the entire basis of their fraud counterclaim. It was discussed at some length in the Decision, in 
which the Court specifically determined that the evidence relating to the Sumner matter 
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warranted a trial on the counterclaims for legal malpractice and fraud. (Decision 10-12, 16-17.) 
(Given the nature of the argument Sallaz raised for summary judgment on the counterclaim for 
unjust enrichment, there was no need to mention the Sumner matter in that context.) 
The Sumner matter involves an alleged loan of $40,000 by the Rices to Steve Sumner, 
arranged by Sallaz as the Rices' counsel. Sumner owned radio stations. The Rices' version of 
events is that (i) Sallaz told them they had received stock in two of Sumner's radio stations as 
collateral for the loan, (ii) the loan was not repaid and the stock was bogus or at least worthless, 
(iii) Sallaz repeatedly told Roy Rice that Sallaz was pursuing collection of the loan in a separate 
lawsuit being called the "Sumner litigation," (iv) the Sumner litigation eventually settled and 
$387,000 in settlement proceeds were paid to Sallaz, (v) Sallaz kept the settlement secret from 
the Rices, and (vi) Sallaz kept all of settlement proceeds for himself, depositing them into an 
account held by his grandmother's estate, which had nothing to do with the Sumner litigation. 
Sallaz's version is that no $40,000 loan was ever made by the Rices to Sumner (although a 
smaller loan may have been made to and repaid by Sumner), that Sallaz did not represent the 
Rices in connection with any such loan, and that the settlement money Sallaz received in the 
Sumner litigation was compensation for Sallaz's representation of Sumner. Sumner has testified 
by affidavit that there was no $40,000 loan, but he did receive and repay a $10,000 loan. 
The previous presiding judge, whose retirement resulted in the reassignment of this 
action to this Court, concluded that the Rices' version of the Sumner matter has enough support 
in the record to warrant a trial. (Decision 10-12, 16-17.) That conclusion was premised on Roy 
Rice's affidavit testimony, as well as on, among other things, (i) a July 10, 2000 letter in which 
Sallaz tries to ensure that "the balance due on the Roy Rice/ Sumner loan be specifically 
included in the payment in [a settlement agreement relating to the Sumner litigation]," (ii) a 
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Sallaz law firm file folder suggesting Sallaz was engaged to represent the Rices in making a loan 
to Sumner, and (iii) Sallaz's admitted receipt of the Sumner litigation settlement proceeds, none 
of which was paid the Rices. 
II. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
"Punitive damages are not favored in the law and should be awarded in only the most 
unusual and compelling circumstances." Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N Pac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 
241, 249, 178 P .3d 606, 614 (2008). They are, however, an appropriate remedy if the claimant 
proves the opposing party's "oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct" by clear 
and convincing evidence. LC. § 6-1604(1) ( emphasis added). 
To so prove, the claimant must "establish ... two factors: a bad act and a bad state of 
mind." Seiniger, 145 Idaho at 250, 178 P.3d at 615 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
"bad act" requirement is met by evidence that the opposing party "acted in a manner that was an 
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The "bad state of mind" requirement is met by evidence that the opposing party performed the 
"bad act" with "an understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences" and in "an 
extremely harmful state of mind, whether that be termed malice, oppression, fraud or gross 
negligence; malice, oppression, wantonness; or simply deliberate or willful." Id (internal 
quotation marks omitted) ( emphasis added). 
Advance judicial permission is required before a claimant may seek punitive damages. 
LC. § 6-1604(2). Permission must be granted if, "after weighing the evidence presented" for 
consideration at a pretrial hearing, the court concludes the claimant has "a reasonable likelihood 
of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." Id Thus, to obtain 
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permission to seek punitive damages, the claimant must show "a 'reasonable likelihood' ... that 
the defendant performed a bad act with a bad state of mind." Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. 
Co., 145 Idaho 313, 319, 179 P .3d 276, 282 (2008). 
Additionally, it is important to recognize that "[b]efore a plaintiff can recover punitive 
damages, he or she must be entitled to legal or equitable relief." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 
670,675, 183 P.3d 758, 763 (2008). In other words, a request for punitive damages is not a 
freestanding claim; instead, it is merely a request for a particular remedy-an award of punitive 
damages-upon proof of an underlying claim. Id; Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline 
Corp., 132 Idaho 754,771,979 P.~d 627,644 (1999) (affirming the denial of permission to seek 
punitive damages because the plaintiff"did not have viable underlying claims"). Accordingly, to 
satisfy section 6-1604(2), the claimant must show not only a "reasonable likelihood" of proving· 
at trial the "bad act" and "bad state of mind" that are essential to any award of punitive damages, 
but also a "reasonable likelihood" of proving an underlying claim. 
Whether the claimant has made that showing is a discretionary decision. St Alphonsus 
Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,499,224 P.3d 1068, 1088 (2009). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
As noted above, the Rices request permission under I.C. § 6-1604(2) to seek punitive 
damages in connection with their claims for legal malpractice, unjust enrichment, and fraud. To 
get permission, they first must show a "reasonable likelihood" of proving those claims at trial-
they cannot possibly have a "reasonable likelihood" of proving entitlement to punitive damages 
without a "reasonable likelihood" of proving the underlying claims they hope will give rise to the 
remedy of punitive damages. 
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Idaho case law does not seem to explore the meaning of the phrase "reasonable 
likelihood," as used in section 6-1604(2). A plain English interpretation of that phrase, in the 
Court's mind, is a realistic chance-a chance too great to be discounted as simply unlikely, even 
if not great enough to be probable. That view is in line with judicial interpretations of that same 
phrase in other (admittedly unrelated) contexts. E.g., Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556,564 (3d 
Cir.2004) ("A 'reasonable likelihood' means merely showing a realistic chance that the 
petitioner can at a later time establish that asylum should be granted."); Alvarez v. Superior 
Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 863 n. 4 (2007) ("'Reasonable likelihood' ... has been construed to 
mean something less than more probable than not, yet greater than something that is merely 
possible.") (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
Applying that view of the phrase's meaning, the Court concludes that the Rices have 
shown a "reasonable likelihood" of proving their underlying claims for legal malpractice, unjust 
enrichment, and fraud, insofar as those claims are based on the Sumner matter. All of them 
survived Sallaz's motion for summary judgment (Decision 10-17), meaning they have enough 
factual support to be trial-worthy. That the claims are strong enough to have survived summary 
judgment goes some of the way to establishing the requisite "reasonable likelihood," or realistic 
chance, that the Rices will prove them at trial. It does not go all way, however, given that a 
different legal standard applies in this context than on summary judgment. On summary 
judgment, weighing the evidence is impermissible. By contrast, in deciding whether to grant 
permission to seek punitive damages, weighing the evidence is mandatory. LC.§ 6-1604(2). 
According to the record, Roy Rice says that he gave Sallaz $40,000 to fund a loan to 
Steve Sumner (another Sallaz client), that Sallaz told Rice the loan was secured by stock in 
Sumner's radio stations, that Sallaz repeatedly told Rice that Sallaz was trying to collect on the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- PAGE 7 
000896
loan through the Sumner litigation, that Sallaz told Rice the Sumner litigation was ongoing even 
after it had settled, and that Rice learned years after the fact (and not from Sallaz) that Sallaz had 
received some $387,000 in settlement proceeds in the Sumner litigation, none of which was paid 
to the Rices. In addition, the record appears to show that Sallaz created two broadcasting 
companies for Rice, which could have been used to create a misimpression that the Sumner loan 
was secured by stock in Sumner's radio stations, as Rice says he understood would be the case. 
(If the record contains evidence of some other purpose for which those two broadcasting 
companies were formed, the Court was not directed to it.) Further, the record contains at least 
some evidence that Sallaz agreed to represent Rice in making a loan to Sumner (whom he also 
represented) and knew of a "Roy Rice/ Sumner loan" and the need to provide for its repayment 
in connection with settling the Sumner litigation, yet the Rices did not receive any payments in 
connection with that settlement, while Sallaz received some $387,000, which for some reason 
was deposited into an account held by the estate of Dennis Sallaz's grandmother. 
It is conjectural whether this evidence, when counterbalanced against Sallaz's contrary 
evidence (which appears to be mainly testimonial rather than documentary in nature), ultimately 
will persuade a jury to find in the Rices' favor. The outcome at trial seems likely to depend on 
the jury's assessment of Roy Rice's credibility versus that of Dennis Sallaz-an assessment the 
Court is not in a position to make in this context, not yet having heard either man testify in open 
court. Not having the ability to make a credibility determination in this context, and not having 
been pointed to documents that make Sallaz's version of events substantially more likely to 
represent the truth than Rice's version of events, the Court cannot say that the counterclaims at 
issue (including the fraud claim, which requires proof by clear and convincing evidence instead 
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ofby a mere preponderance) are unlikely enough to succeed that the Rices have no reasonable 
likelihood of proving them at trial. 
From that point, the Rices still must show, in order to obtain permission to seek punitive 
damages, a "reasonable likelihood" of proving at trial their entitlement to punitive damages. 
Again, to be entitled to punitive damages, the Rices must prove a "bad act" by Sallaz and a "bad 
state of mind" on Sallaz's part. E.g., Seiniger, 145 Idaho at 250, 178 P.3d at 615. 
"[F]raudulent ... conduct," if proved by clear and convincing evidence, warrants an 
award of punitive damages. Idaho Code§ 6-1604(1). Indeed, '"[i]t is well established in this 
state that punitive damages may be awarded when the defendant has committed fraud."' 
Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211,221, 923 P.2d 456,466 (1996) (quoting 
Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700,710,682 P.2d 1247, 1257 (1983)). Accordingly, the 
already-reached conclusion that the Rices have a "reasonable likelihood" of proving their fraud 
claim practically compels the conclusion that the Rices have a "reasonable likelihood" of 
proving their entitlement to punitive damages in connection with that claim. In other words, a 
"bad act" and a "bad state of mind" are inherent in committing fraud. There is evidence that 
Sallaz represented or purported to represent Roy Rice in making a ~oan to Sumner (whom Sallaz 
also represented), misled Rice about the security for the loan, misled Rice about whether the loan 
was being collected through the Sumner litigation, misled Rice about the status of the Sumner 
litigation, and kept all of the Sumner litigation settlement proceeds without disclosing the 
settlement to Rice, despite knowing of an outstanding loan by Rice to Sumner. That evidence 
might or might not prove to be credible in the crucible of trial, but it cannot simply be discounted 
now, given that the contrary evidence seems no more powerful now in the absence of a 
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meaningful opportunity to evaluate the parties' credibility. Accordingly, the Court grants the 
Rices permission to seek punitive damages in connection with their fraud counterclaim. 
The same conclusion obtains with respect to the Rices' counterclaims for legal 
malpractice and unjust enrichment, insofar as those counterclaims are based on the Sumner 
matter. Although those counterclaims have different elements than the fraud counterclaim, they 
depend on proof of the same operative facts. Thus, they present essentially the same prospect of 
proving a "bad act" and a "bad state of mind." 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that the Rices are granted permission to seek punitive damages against 
Sallaz in connection with their counterclaims for legal malpractice, unjust enrichment, and fraud, 
insofar as those counterclaims are based on the Sumner matter. Within 10 days of the date of 
this order, the Rices shall file a third amended counterclaim reflecting this grant of permission. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ t,,\°1, 
Dated this_\_ day of ~2014. 
Jaso . Scott 
DIS~JUDGE 
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Erika Judd 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, PA 
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Vernon K. Smith, Jr. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 WMain 
Boise, ID 83702 
J. Kahle Becker 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1020 W Main St, Ste 400 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Gabriel J. McCarthy 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
401 W Front St, Ste 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
q<J U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Elecjronic Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
k) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( J Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
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1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
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Phone: (208)333-1403 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: kahle@kahlebeckerlaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
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EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 




DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD Chtd., SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD PLLC, and SALLAZ LAW Chtd. 
and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, 
Chtd, Inc. an Idaho Corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
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DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative capacity of ) 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD Chtd. and SALLAZ ) 
AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
vs. 
EUGENE (Roy) RICE and JANET RICE, 
Husband and wife, 











COMES NOW Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, (hereafter 
"Counterclaimants"), by and through their counsel of record, J. Kahle Becker, and Gabriel 
McCarthy, and hereby state and allege the following in support of their amended Counterclaim. 
PARTIES 
1. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is an individual residing at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 
83705. 
2. Counterclaimant Janet Rice is an individual residing at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 83705. 
3. Eugene and Janet Rice are husband and wife and the marital estate of Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice resides at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 83705. 
4. Upon information and belie±: Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is an individual residing at 
1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
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5. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered is an 
Idaho S-Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., 
Boise, ID 83705. 
6. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC 
is an Idaho Professional Limited Liability Company having its principal place of business 
at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
7. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz Law Chartered is an Idaho S-
Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 
83705. 
8. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is an individual who is a 
representative of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered, an Idaho S-Corporation having its 
principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705, Sallaz and 
Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC, an Idaho Professional Limited Liability Company having 
its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705, and Sallaz Law 
Chartered, an Idaho S-Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. 
Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
9. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is the Personal 
Representative of and Attorney for the estate of his deceased grandmother, Bessie B. 
Matcham. 
10. Upon information and belief, Marcy Fox is an individual who was made an involuntary 
plaintiff by order of this Court and is residing at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the above named Counterdefendants pursuant to 
LC.§ 5-514 and other applicable laws and rules. 
12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to and by virtue of 
Idaho Code § 1-705 and other applicable laws and rules. The damages herein exceed 
$50,000. 
13. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404, venue is proper in Ada County since all of the parties 
reside therein. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
14. Dennis Sallaz was Counterclaimants' Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice's personal and 
business attorney for approximately 25 years. 
15. Dennis Sallaz owns 90% of the interest in Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
16. Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. was Counterclaimants' Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice's 
personal and business attorney since it was founded in 2003. 
17. Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC is the successor m interest to Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. 
18. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
19. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. 
20. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz Law, Chtd. 
21. Dennis Sallaz and Counterdefendants failed to clarify which of the three business entities 
named as Counterdefendants was representing Counterclaimants and their interests at 
various points in the attorney client-relationship. 
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22. Dennis Sallaz and Counterdefendants failed to clarify which of the three business entities 
named as Counterdefendants held Counterclaimants funds and property at various points 
in the attorney-client relationship. 
23. Dennis Sallaz formed many business entities on behalf of Counterclaimants Roy and 
Janet Rice including but not limited to: R-R Investments, Inc., Capital Broadcasting, Inc., 
Western Broadcasting, Inc., New Communications, Inc., Far Less Auto Rental, Inc., A 
Fantasy Limos, Inc., B B Auto Sales and Repairs, Inc., Aztec Precast, Inc., Ultimate 
Arms, Inc., Luxury, Inc., Clearwire Wireless Communications, Inc., Advanced 
Technology Systems, Inc., and Real Properties, LLC. 
24. Counterdefendants Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood represented some of these and other 
entities as well as Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice in litigation as well as many 
personal and business transactions. 
25. There has never been a formal engagement letter between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants. 
26. Counterclaimants have been billed by Counterdefendants for legal services and 
Counterclaimants have paid said bills. 
27. Counterclaimants have also allowed Counterdefendants and their agents to take in excess 
of $61,000 worth of items from Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice's former business 
"A Vista Pawn." 
28. Said items were to serve as a retainer in the event legal services were ever required from 
Counterdefendants for Roy Rice or his business entities. 
29. Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were married on July 4, 1996. 
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30. Real Homes, L.L.C. was formed on January 19, 2001. A copy of the Articles of 
Organization filed with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State on January 19, 2001 is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and a copy of the Operating Agreement is attached hereto 
as "Exhibit B." 
31. Dennis Sallaz's then wife, Renee Baird, was listed as a manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
in the Articles of Organization filed on January 19, 2001 and in the Operating 
Agreement. 
32. Renee Baird moved out of the Sallaz residence in August of 2003. 
33. On September 12, 2003, Dennis Sallaz filed Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State for Real Homes, L.L.C. 
stating that management was henceforth vested in members and that Dennis J. Sallaz was 
a manager and member/owner. A copy of the Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization filed with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State on September 12, 2003, 
is attached hereto as "Exhibit C." 
34. Renee Baird did not sign or approve the Amendment to the Articles referred to m 
preceding paragraph. 
35. Dennis Sallaz signed documents as an owner and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
36. Glenn Trefren is a longtime friend of Dennis Sallaz, client of Dennis Sallaz, and client of 
Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. 
37. Throughout the existence of Real Hornes, L.L.C., until its conveyance to Real Properties, 
LLC on January 6, 2006, Glenn Trefren signed documents as an owner and manager of 
Real Homes, L.L.C. 
38. Glenn Trefren had no ownership interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. or in any assets thereof. 
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39. Throughout the existence of Real Homes, L.L.C., until 2005, Renee Baird signed 
documents as an owner and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
40. On February 10, 2004 Real Homes, L.L.C. conveyed 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz, husband and wife for $105,000. The alleged 
purpose of this conveyance, as explained to Counterclaimants, was to enable the Sallazes 
as title holders to obtain a loan using the property as collateral on the understanding that 
the proceeds would be used to improve and benefit the property. The promise to use the 
proceeds allegedly was the consideration for the conveyance. 
41. Renee Baird signed the quitclaim deed, which conveyed 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz, as President of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
42. The petition for the divorce of Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird was filed on May 27, 2004. 
43. During the Divorce proceedings, Dennis Sallaz was in need of money. 
44. Dennis Sallaz withdrew approximately $65,000 from the Real Homes checking account 
and placed some of this money in his or Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd.' s trust account. 
45. Dennis Sallaz executed two promissory notes with Counterclaimant Roy Rice for 
$10,000 and $10,800 at 12% interest. Those promissory notes are attached hereto as 
"Exhibit D" and "Exhibit E." 
46. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 
Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an A TV trailer which are owned by Counterclaimants. 
The Bill of Sale for said ATV's and ATV trailer is attached hereto as "Exhibit F." 
4 7. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said A TVs and A TV trailer to 
Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See deposition of 
Dennis Sallaz, pp. 468 -471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
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48. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz owned a Winnebago Motorhome VIN 
1GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien holder on. 
A copy of the title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
49. Dennis Sallaz used his position as Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" and Janet Rice's 
longtime personal and business attorney to influence and induce Counterclaimants Roy 
and Janet Rice to enter into a business transaction for the purchase of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
50. Defendant Sallaz did not inform Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice that they should 
obtain independent legal counsel. 
51. In the course and scope of the attorney client relationship with Counterclaimants, Dennis 
Sallaz created an entity which became "Real Properties, LLC" as a vehicle for 
Counterclaimants to purchase "Real Homes, L.L.C." 
52. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants that Renee Baird had not approved 
the September 12, 2003 Amended and Restated Articles of Organization for Real Homes, 
L.L.C. 
53. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants of Renee Baird's interest in Real 
Homes, L.L.C. or the assets thereof. 
54. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants that they had obtained an appraisal 
of the value of the real estate owned by Real Homes, LLC in the latter paii of 2005. 
55. Said appraisal valued the real estate owned by Real Homes, LLC at $195,000 and is 
attached hereto as Exhibit Z. 
56. Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated January 6, 2006 and the 
Representations of Counterdefendants, Counterclaimants believed they purchased 100% 
of the rights, title, and interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. for $250,000 by way of their 
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interest in Real Properties, LLC. The Purchase and Sale Agreement is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit I" and lists the real property purportedly transferred in an attachment thereto. 
57. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement purportedly on 
behalf of Real Homes, L.L. C. 
58. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz represented and warranted to Counterclaimant that they 
had full authority to transfer the ownership and assets of Real Homes, L.L.C. to Real 
Properties, LLC in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
59. One of the parcels listed as an asset of Real Homes, L.L.C. in the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement was 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID. 
60. Dennis Sallaz represented to Counterclaimants that title to 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID reverted to Real Homes, L.L.C. upon the filing of the deed of trust securing 
the loan described above and that Real Homes owned said property at the time of the sale 
to Real Properties, LLC on January 6, 2006. 
61. Based on the representations of Dennis Sallaz, Counterclaimant Eugene Rice believed he 
purchased 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID in addition to other properties 
described in the attachment to the Purchase and Sale Agreement "Exhibit I," when the 
entity Dennis Sallaz created for Counterclaimants, "Real Properties, LLC," purchased 
"Real Homes, LLC" on January 6, 2006. 
62. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz warranted to Counterclaimants that Real Homes, L.L.C. 
had title to and full authority to transfer the ownership of 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
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63. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Counterclaimants, through Real 
Properties, LLC, expended $63,402.82 to extinguish the debt owing on 15580 Riverside 
Rd, Canyon County, ID and prevent a foreclosure sale of the same. 
64. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Counterclaimant Eugene Rice made an 
advance payment to Dennis Sallaz in the sum of $5,000 at closing. 
65. Counterclaimants, through Real Properties, LLC, expended in excess of $140,000 which 
funds were to be utilized in maintaining and improving the subject properties. 
66. On October 30, 2007 Magistrate Judge David C. Epis issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in Renee L. Baird-Sallaz v. Dennis J Sallaz, Ada Co. 
Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit J." 
67. The Order declared that Renee Baird owned 100% of Real Homes, L.L.C. and neither 
Dennis Sallaz or Glenn Trefren had authority to transfer the Real Homes, L.L.C. or, 
consequently, any assets thereof to Real Properties, LLC. Id. 
68. Dennis Sallaz did not inform Counterclaimants of this Order. 
69. The Order created a cloud on the title of the properties purportedly transferred to 
Counterclaimants via their ownership of Real Properties, LLC. 
70. Counterclaimants found out there were some issues with the Real Homes, L.L.C./Real 
Properties, LLC transaction when they obtained The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order on their own. 
71. At the urging of Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz and based on his representations that, 
Judge Epis misconstrued the Real Homes, L.L.C./Real Propert.ies, LLC transaction and 
that Renee Baird had no interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. or the assets thereof, on 
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November 4, 2009 Eugene and Janet Rice filed an action to quiet title, seek declaratory 
relief, and pursue other causes of action in what became known as Canyon County Case 
No. CV 09-11855. 
72. Based on the attorney client relationship that existed between Dennis Sallaz and Roy 
Rice, Roy Rice interpreted these conversations as Dennis Sallaz was providing legal 
advice to him in the course and scope of his attorney client relationship with 
Counterdefendants. 
73. Roy Rice relied on Dennis Sallaz's representations regarding the Real Homes/Real 
Properties transaction and Mr. Sallaz's representation that Judge Epis had ruled 
improperly by awarding Real Homes, L.L.C. and the subject properties to Renee Baird. 
74. Dennis Sallaz, Renee Baird, and Glenn Trefren were named as Defendants in Canyon 
County Case No. CV 09-11855 and were represented by independent counsel. 
75. Dennis Sallaz was included as a defendant at his insistence that the marital community of 
Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were necessary parties to quiet title to the subject real 
estate. 
76. During the course of discovery, Roy Rice, learned that Mr. Sallaz was providing 
inaccurate information regarding the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction. 
77. On or about August 2, 2010, Renee Baird and Eugene and Janet Rice settled all claims 
which existed between them by and through the Mutual Release and Settlement 
Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit K." 
78. Pursuant to the settlement reached between the parties thereto, title to the Riverside 
parcels and 714 Smith were quieted. 
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79. During settlement conversations Counterclaimants had with Renee Baird, in the summer 
of 2010, the Rices learned of fraudulent, malicious, negligent, and wrongful acts of 
Counterdefendants. 
80. Mrs. Baird provided Mr. Rice with copies of the transcripts of Mr. Sallaz's testimony 
from depositions in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce which alerted Mr. Rice to the wrongful 
actions of Counterdefendants described herein. 
81. Thereafter, Counterclaimants began investigating the actions of Counterdefendants with 
respect to the Real Homes L.L.C./Real Properties LLC transaction described above as 
well as other matters associated with their relationship with Counterdefendants. 
82. Counterclaimants learned that Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and 
fraudulently withheld information relevant to Counterdefendants' deceitful and 
fraudulent "legal representation" of Counterclaimants. 
83. Counterdefendants continue to conceal, misrepresent, and fraudulently withhold 
information relevant to their deceitful and fraudulent "legal representation" of 
Counterclaimants. 
84. Dennis Sallaz was unhappy with the settlement reached between Counterclaimants and 
Renee Baird in the Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
85. Dennis Sallaz assigned his interest in the Real Homes Real Properties contract to Jim 
Bevis (Mr. Sallaz's attorney from his divorce) and Glenn Trefren. See Assignment of 
Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC attached hereto as "Exhibit 
L" and "Exhibit M." 
86. Dennis Sallaz continues to litigate Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855 and desires to 
assert cow1terclaims through his longtime friend, client, and associate Glenn Trefren. 
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87. Dennis Sallaz's current attorney in the present action, J. Iver Longeteig, 1s Glenn 
Trefren's attorney in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
88. On February 9, 2012 Mr. Sallaz appealed his divorce based on the grounds that he was 
not actually married to Renee Baird. See Notice of Appeal attached hereto as "Exhibit 
N." 
89. Counterclaimants contend that this appeal is nothing more than a tactic to delay this 
litigation and an attempt to prevent Counterclaimants from asserting the doctrines of 
collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, and res judicata. 
COUNTI 
ACTION AGAINST DENNIS SALLAZ FOR COLLECTION ON PROMISSORY NOTES 
90. Counterclaimants restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
91. That Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz signed the promissory notes attached hereto as 
"Exhibit D" and "E." 
92. That Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz received $10,800 and $10,000 from 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice pursuant to said promissory notes and testified 
to the receipt of said funds in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See Post Trial Exhibit 20 I, 
Husbands Property and Debt Schedule at 19 attached here to as "Exhibit O." 
93. There is now a balance due and owing for the principal amount of $20,800. 
94. That by law and by the terms of the agreement, Counterclaimants are entitled to an 
interest charge of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance. 
95. That per the terms of said promissory notes, principal and interest on said promissory 
notes are due on demand. 
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96. That on or about March 24, 2011 due demand has been made upon Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz prior to the filing of this action. 
97. That Counterdefendant Sallaz refused or neglected to pay to Counterclaimants the above-
mentioned sum despite demands made by Counterclaimants. 
98. The terms of said promissory notes provide "if action is commenced to enforce payment 
of this note, I agree to pay such sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees." 
99. Counterclaimants are entitled to and hereby request a judgment for the principal and 
interest due on said promissory notes. 
100. Counterclaimants further request an award of post judgment interest. 
101. That as a result of Counterdefendant Sallaz's failure or refusal to pay said sum, 
Counterclaimants have been required to retain an attorney for the collection of this 
outstanding amount and has and will incur attorney's fees and costs of suit, which 
Counterclaimants are entitled to recover of and from said Counterdefendant pursuant to 
agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Counterclaimants are informed and therefore allege that the sum of 
$5,000.00 is a reasonable sum to be awarded to Counterclaimants for attorney's fees 
herein, in the event the matter is uncontested and a greater sum if contested. 
COUNT II 
ACTION TO RECOVER SUMS DEPOSITED IN TRUST ACCOUNT 
102. Counterclaimants restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
103. On or about January 14, 2011, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.5(f) 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice requested an accounting of all sums obtained, 
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received, or held by Counterdefendants on behalf of Counterclaimants or any entities 
Counterdefendants formed or represented on their behalf. 
104. On or about January 14, 2011, pursuant to IRPC 1.5(f) and 1.8(c) Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice requested an accounting of all gifts from Counterclaimants which 
were obtained, received, claimed, or held by Counterdefendants. 
105. On or about February 16, 2011 Counterdefendants responded that they did not have any 
funds in their trust account belonging to Counterclaimants. No accounting or other 
documentation was produced to support this denial. 
106. On or about February 16, 2011 Counterdefendants responded that they did not have any 
record or recollection of any gifts obtained, received, or claimed to be from 
Counterclaimants. No accounting or other documentation was produced to support this 
denial. 
107. Counterclaimants are aware of and Counterdefendants have admitted to owmg 
Counterclaimants approximately $61,000 for items taken from Counterclaimant's former 
business "A Vista Pawn, Inc." 
108. This debt was assigned to Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz in his divorce from Renee 
Baird. 
109. Dennis Sallaz has made an admission that he owes Roy Rice for the items Mr. Sallaz 
took from Mr. Rice. See Post Trial Exhibit 201, Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
from Sallaz v. Sallaz at 19 attached hereto as Exhibit 0. See Also May 26, 2009 Letter 
from Dennis Sallaz on Sallaz and Gatewood's fax cover sheet attached hereto as "Exhibit 
P." 
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110. Counterclaimants had an ownership interest in a business entity named "R-R 
Investments, Inc." See R-R Investments, lnc. 1990 Annual Report Form attached hereto 
as "Exhibit Q." 
111. The "R&R" in "R-R Investments, Inc." was meant to stand for Roy Rice and as such the 
entity was regularly referred to by Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants as simply 
"R&R." 
112. Counterdefendants provided legal advice in forming and were the registered agent for "R-
R Investments, Inc." 
113. Counterdefendants altered corporate filings with the Office of the Secretary of State for 
"R-R Investments, Inc." without the authorization or signature of Counterclaimants. See 
Articles of Amendment for R-R Investments, Inc. attached hereto as "Exhibit R." 
114. Counterdefendants or their agents forged the signature of Defendant Michael Rice in 
fraudulently "authorizing" the Articles of Amendment which purported to change the 
corporate name of "R-R Investments Inc." to "Rentals and Royalties, Inc." See Articles of 
Amendment for R-R Investments, Inc. attached hereto as "Exhibit R." 
115. Michael Rice's purported signature was insufficient authority to amend the articles of R-
R Investments, Inc. 
116. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants of the amendments referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs and "Exhibit R." 
117. The whereabouts of and the value of the assets of R-R Investments, Inc. are unknown due 
to the negligent, willful, fraudulent, and reckless actions of Counterdefendants described 
below. 
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118. Steve Sumner was in the business of owning radio stations and was a longtime client of 
Dennis Sallaz's. 
119. Dennis Sallaz introduced Steve Sumner to Roy Rice because Steve Sumner was in need 
of money. 
120. In 1994 Dennis Sallaz encouraged Roy Rice to loan Steve Sumner approximately 
$40,000. 
121. Dennis Sallaz represented to Roy Rice that, as his attorney, Dennis Sallaz would draw up 
stock certificates which would provide Roy Rice security in radio stations owned by Mr. 
Sumner in exchange for said loans. 
122. In exchange for this loan, Counterclaimants supposedly received 1000 shares stock in 
each of the corporations which purportedly owned said radio stations "Capital 
Broadcasting, Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. See "Exhibit S" and "Exhibit T" 
attached hereto. 
123. These shares were to have constituted the entirety of the ownership of Capital 
Broadcasting Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. and based on representations made by 
Mr. Sallaz, Mr. Rice believed that he had adequate security for his loan. 
124. Mr. Sallaz engaged in complex litigation regarding the ownership of radio stations owned 
by Steve Sumner. This case became Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest 
Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
125. Mr. Sallaz orchestrated a collusive defense of Steve Sumner and his radio stations from 
attacks by outside creditors by asserting claims against Mr. Sumner and his business 
entities. See June 28, 2000 letter from Dennis Sallaz to Van Bishop produced by 
Counterdefendants in discovery as Runft 0000234-Runft000235 attached as "Exhibit U." 
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126. 1t is conceded that Capital Broadcasting, Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. were not 
parties to Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., el al, Case No 
96812. 
127. Rather, Steve Sumner, Capital West, Inc., Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., Rentals and 
Royalties, Inc., and Sallaz and Doolittle Chartered were named parties. 
128. Mr. Sallaz made statements and acted as though he was representing Counterclaimants' 
interests in recovering on the aforementioned loan to Steve Sumner by continuing to 
litigate Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 
96812. See July 10, 2000 Letter from Dennis Sallaz to Vernon K. Smith attached hereto 
as "Exhibit V." 
129. Vernon K. Smith is Mr. Sallaz's counsel herein and in Canyon County Case No. CV09-
11855. 
130. Mr. Sallaz repeatedly assured Mr. Rice that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz was 
protecting Mr. Rice's interest and that Mr. Rice's loan would be re-paid when the case 
settled. 
131. Mr. Sallaz settled the Sumner Matter for approximately $387,000 without informing 
Counterclaim ants of said settlement or the amount of their interest therein. 
132. ln the settlement, Mr. Sallaz directed that the sums due to Rentals and Royalties be paid 
to him. 
133. Sometime around or during the years of 2003-2005 Dennis Sallaz directed that several 
payments totaling said $387,000 settlement be deposited in the bank account for the 
estate of Bessie B. Matcham. 
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134. Counterclaimants contend that the $387,000 or a large portion thereof represents the 
principal and interest of the loan they made to Steve Sumner. 
135. A letter to Van Bishop referring to the Sumner Matter and the involvement of "Rentals 
and Royalties, Inc." is attached hereto as "Exhibit W" and illustrates that 
Counterdefendants referred to "Rentals and Royalties, Inc." as "R-R." 
136. The settlement agreement in the Sumner Matter also included a Confidentiality 
Agreement, attached hereto as "Exhibit X," which stated "The parties do further stipulate 
and agree that none of the terms of this settlement or any agreements or payments herein, 
including the aforesaid Promissory Note, require the filing by any of the parties of a 
federal 1099 form or any other notification either to the United States, or any department 
thereof or any state or any department thereof and none of the parties shall make said 
filing without the written consent of all parties." 
137. Counterdefendants made material misrepresentations to Counterclaimants regarding the 
status of settlement negotiations of the Sumner Matter which made it impossible for 
Counterclaimants to verify the precise nature of or status of this very complex case. 
138. Mr. Sallaz provided false discovery responses herein which made it difficult for 
Counterclaimants to seek repayment of the loan, verify the precise amount of said 
settlement which is due to Counterclaim ants, and ascertain the location of the funds due 
to Counterclaimants. 
139. Mr. Sallaz continued to inform Mr. Rice that the case was ongoing long after it settled. 
140. The Confidentiality Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit X" made it impossible for 
Counterclaimants to verify the precise nature of or status of this very complex case. 
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141. Dennis Sallaz had a fiduciary obligation to hold the funds which were due to Mr. Rice in 
trust. 
142. Dennis Sallaz had a fiduciary obligation to inform Mr. Rice of the settlement of the 
Sumner litigation. 
143. Counterdefendants comingled said settlement funds which were due to Counterclaimants 
with funds of their own. 
144. Counterdefendants comingled said settlement funds which were due to Counterclaimants 
with the estate of Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz's deceased grandmother Bessie B. 
Matcham. 
145. Dennis Sallaz 1s the Personal Representative of and Attorney for his grandmother's 
estate. 
146. After the receipt of said $387,000 settlement Dennis Sallaz expended funds held in the 
account for the estate of Bessie B. Matcham for his personal use. 
14 7. Counterclaimants discovered that Counterdefendants had in fact settled the Sumner 
litigation during their investigation in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
148. Counterclaimants asked representatives of Sallaz and Gatewood, specifically Thom 
Henry, for information regarding the status of the Sumner litigation and the loans Mr. 
Rice had made; however, said requests were ignored. 
149. Rather, Mr. Henry tried to convince Mr. Rice to refrain from initiating litigation against 
Dennis Sallaz. 
150. Counterclaimants learned additional information regarding Mr. Sallaz's settlement of the 
Sumner litigation and bis failure to distribute the proceeds thereof to Roy Rice during 
settlement discussions with Renee Baird in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
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151. Counterdefendants continued to conceal the true nature of their misrepresentations such 
that Roy Rice has only been able to begin to comprehend Counterdefendants' wrongful 
actions following a court ordered inspection of Counterdefendant's law firin after a 
Motion for Sanctions was granted against Dennis Sallaz in Canyon County Case No. CV 
09-11855. 
152. Counterclaimants obtained additional information from Counterdefendants, regarding 
their misrepresentations as to the Sumner litigation, following a Motion to Compel, a 
Motion for Sanctions, and a Motion for Additional Sanctions which were granted herein. 
153. ln addition to other sums and property described herein, Counterclaimants are owed 
$387,000 plus interest as a result of the Mr. Sallaz's settlement of the Sumner matter and 
failure to distribute any portion of said proceeds to Roy Rice. 
154. The $61,000 of items taken from Vista Pawn was also to have been held in trust as a 
retainer in the event Mr. Rice needed legal services. 
155. Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice are entitled to and hereby request this Court 
issue an order for the above balance, as well as any additional sums determined by the 
trier of fact to have been wrongfully withheld by Counterdefendants, plus pre and post-
judgment interest. 
156. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover its attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 




157. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
158. It would be unjust for Counterdefendants to retain or benefit from the sums and property 
obtained from Counterclaimants described herein. 
159. Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice are entitled to and hereby request this Court 
issue an order of restitution for the above balance, wrongfully withheld sums mentioned 
herein, and wrongfully withheld property described herein plus pre and post-judgment 
interest. 
160. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to ldaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNTIV 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
161. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
162. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants 
Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz Law, Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
163. Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC is a successor in interest to Sallaz & Gatewood, 
Chtd. 
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164. In connection with the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction described above, 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz entered into a business transaction with 
Counterclaimants in violation ofldaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a). 
165. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz 
and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. had a duty to advise and give Counterclaimants and give 
reasonable opportunity to obtain independent legal counsel, to inform Counterclaimants 
in writing of the essential terms of the transaction, including but not limited to whether 
Counterdefendants were representing Counterclaimants in the transaction. 
166. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. breached their duty to 
advise Counterclaimants to obtain independent legal counsel. 
167. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. fraudulently and 
knowingly concealed the material misrepresentations described herein. 
168. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. engaged in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 8.4. 
169. Counterdefendants had a duty to notify Counterclaimants of the receipt of funds which 
Counterclaimants had an interest in. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 S(a). 
170. Counterdefendants breached their duty to notify Counterclaimants of the receipt of funds 
which Counterclaimants had an interest in. This breach was a violation of Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.1 S(a). 
171. After a reasonable request, Counterdefendants had a duty to provide an accounting for 
fees and costs claimed or previously collected. See ldaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
l .S(f). 
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172. Counterdefendants breached their duty to provide an accounting for fees and costs 
claimed or previously collected. 
173. This failure to provide an accounting for fees and costs was a violation of Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.5(±). 
174. Counterdefendants had a duty of competent and diligent representation as well as 
adequate communication. See Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4. 
175. Counterdefendants breached their duties of competent and diligent representation as well 
as adequate communication by the actions described herein. 
176. To the extent Counterdefendants contend any of the funds or items of personal property 
mentioned herein were gifts from Counterclaimants, Counterdefendants had a duty not to 
solicit substantial gifts from Counterclaimants. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
l .8(c). 
1 77. To the extent Counterdefendants contend any of the funds or items of personal property 
mentioned herein were gifts from Counterclaimants, Counterdefendants breached their 
duty to not solicit substantial gifts from Counterclaimants and violated Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.8( c ). 
178. Counterdefendants had a duty not to engage in a conflict of interest transaction which 
there was a significant risk the representation of Counterclaimants was materially limited 
by Counterdefendants' responsibilities to other clients as well as Counterdefendants' own 
self interest. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l .7(a)(2) 
179. Counterdefendants breached this duty and engaged in a conflict of interest transaction 
which there was a significant risk the representation of Counterclaimants was materially 
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limited by Counterdefendants' responsibilities to other clients as well as 
Counterdefcnda111s' own self interest. 
180. If this Court determines the statute of limitations has run on any of the counterclaims 
asserted herein, as a retained attorney, Counterdefendants had a duty to advise 
Counterclaimants as to the statute of limitations on said claims. 
181. Counterdefendants breached their duty to advise Counterclaimants of the statute of 
limitations on said claims. 
182. By reason of the foregoing negligent actions, Counterclaimants have suffered general and 
special damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact including but not limited to 
the following damages: 
a. Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $50,000 111 attorney's fees as a 
direct and proximate result of the negligent, willful, and malicious actions 
described herein. Those fees continue to accrue. 
b. Counterclaim ants executed promissory notes in favor of Counterdefendant Dennis 
Sallaz for the principal amount of $20,800 and interest at 12% per annum. 
c. Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items taken by 
Counterdefendants for which legal services were not performed. 
d. Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of 
the Sumner Matter. 
e. Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of punitive damages pursuant to Idaho 
Code ~ 6- 1604. 
183. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
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matter and are entitled to recover its attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Jdaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Jdaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNTV 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
184. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
185. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
186. Counterdefendants had fiduciary duties to Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice 
in connection with the legal representation and business transactions described herein. 
187. These fiduciary duties include but are not limited to the duty of loyalty, the duty to avoid 
self dealing, the duty to avoid comingling assets, the duty to keep and render accounts, 
the duty to furnish information, the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill, and the 
duty to take and keep control. 
188. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants were negligent, willful, reckless, 
outrageous, malicious and fraudulent and therefore breached said fiduciary duties. 
189. Counterdefendants negligently, fraudulently, and willfully concealed their deceitful and 
wrongful actions from Counterclaimants. 
190. By reason of the foregoing negligent, willful, and malicious actions, Counterclaimants 
have suffered general and special, damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact 
including but not limited to: 
a) Counterclaima111s have expended in excess of $50,000 m attorney's fees as a 
direct and proximate result of the negligent, willful, and malicious actions 
described herein. Those fees continue to accrue. 
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b) Counterclaim ants executed promissory notes in favor of Counterdefendant Dennis 
Sallaz for the principal amount of $20,800 and interest at 12% per annum. 
c) Counterclaimants are owed $61.000 for the value of the items taken by 
Counterdefendants for which legal services were not performed. 
d) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of 
the Sumner Matter. 
191. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VI 
FRAUD 
192. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
193. A longstanding attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz Law, Chtd. and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
which entitled Roy Rice to rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
194. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations ro Roy Rice inducing Roy Rice to loan 
fw1ds to Mr. Sallaz's client, Steve Sumner. 
195. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
196. Mr. Sallaz intended that Roy Rice act on this misrepresentation. 
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197. Mr. Rice agreed to make a loan of approxima1ely $40,000 10 S1eve Sumner based on Mr. 
Sallaz's assurances that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz would prepare the documents 
securing said loan. 
198. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
199. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
200. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that he would prepare 
documents, as Mr. Rice's attorney, providing Roy Rice securi1y for his loan to Steve 
Sumner. 
201. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
202. Mr. Sallaz intended that Roy Rice act on this misrepresentation. 
203. Mr. Rice agreed to loan to Steve Sumner approximately $40,000 based on Mr. Sallaz's 
assurances that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz prepared documents adequately 
securing said loan. 
204. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
205. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
206. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice regarding Roy Rice's security 
interest, in the form of stock, in certain radio stations. 
207. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
208. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by believing for many years that he had 
adequate security for his loans to Steve Sumner, that were increasing in value due to the 
accrual of interest thereon, in the form of stock certifica1es prepared by Dennis Sallaz. 
209. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
210. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
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211. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. 
Sallaz was representing Roy Rice's interest in recovering the principal and interest due 
on said loans to Steve Sumner by litigating Sawtooth Ener;.,ry Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest 
Broadcasting. Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
212. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
213. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney to secure a resolution 
to or assert any claims necessary in Sawtooth Energy Reserves. inc. v. Northwest 
Broadcasting. Inc .. et al, Case No 96812 that would protect Mr. Rice's interest in the 
loan he had made to Mr. Sallaz's client, Steve Sumner. 
214. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
215. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
216. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that Sawtooth Energy Reserves, 
Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812 was still in litigation when in 
fact it had settled. 
217. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
218. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing an 
independent case against Steve Sumner. 
219. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis Sallaz. 
220. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
221. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
222. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice by failing to notify Roy Rice 
that Mr. Sallaz had received approximately $387,000 as the settlement of Sawtooth 
Energy Reserves. inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 968 J 2. 
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223. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
224. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing an 
independent case against Steve Sumner. 
225. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis Sallaz. 
226. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
227. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
228. Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice when Roy 
Rice learned of the settlement and inquired as to the status of the funds Roy Rice believed 
he was owed, and Sallaz and Gatewood tried to convince him not to file suit and refused 
to provide further information to Mr. Rice. 
229. Counterdefendants knew these representations were false. 
230. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing an 
independent case against Steve Sumner. 
231. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis Sallaz. 
232. As Mr. Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on 
Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. 's assertions. 
233. Mr. Rice did not know that Counterdefendant's representations were false. 
234. Counterdefendants have made material misrepresentations in their discovery responses 
herein which have made it difficult for Mr. Rice to learn the full nature of the wrongful 
actions of Counterdefendants. 
235. Counterdefendants knew these representations were false. 
236. Mr. Rice acted on these misrepresenta1ions and was unable to amend his counterclaim 
until such time as Mr. Sallaz was compelled and sanctioned to produce certain documents 
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from Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 
96812 in this case and Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
237. As a party to litigation wherein the opposing party is 10 truthfully respond to discovery, 
especially where the opposing party is an actively practicing attorney, Mr. Rice had the 
right to rely on Counterdefendants to truthfully respond lo discovery. 
238. Mr. Rice did not know the true nature of the fraudulent actions of Counterdefendants 
until Mr. Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood were compelled by Court Orders to produce 
certain documents. 
239. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants were willful, reckless, outrageous, malicious 
and fraudulent. 
240. By reason of the foregoing Counterclairnants have suffered the damages including but not 
limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $50,000 in attorney's fees as a 
direct and proximate result of the negligent, willful, and malicious actions 
described herein. Those fees continue to accrue. 
b) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of 
the Sumner matter. 
c) Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of punitive damages pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 6-1604. 
241. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VII 
CONVERSION 
242. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
243. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 
Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an A TV trailer which are owned by Counterclaimants. 
The Bill of Sale for said ATV's and ATV trailer is attached hereto as "Exhibit F." 
244. Counterdcfendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said A TVs and A TV trailer to 
Counterclaimant Eugene Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See deposition of Dennis 
Sallaz pp 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." See also Husband's Property and 
Debt Schedule at 11 attached hereto as "Exhibit O." 
245. Accordingly, the Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Sallaz v. 
Sallaz divorce awarded the proceeds of this sale to Dennis Sallaz. 
246. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is or was in possession of a Winnebago Motorhome VIN 
l GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien holder on. 
The title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H.'· 
24 7. Counterdefcndants are in possession of funds described herein which are due and owing 
to Coun1erclaimants. 
248. Coun1erdefondan1 Dennis Sallaz has not extinguished Counterclaimant's lien on said 
Motorhomc. See also Husband's Property and Debt Schedule at 9 attached hereto as 
"Exhibit O." 
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249. Counterdefendants wrongfully refuse to surrender possess10n of and have asserted 
wrongful dominion over said funds, ATVs, trailer, and Motorhome. 
250. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said funds, ATVs, trailer, 
and Mo10rhome and for general and special damages incurred by reason of said ,vrongful 
possession. 
251. As a resuh of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to ldaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VIII 
CLAIM AND DELIVERY 
252. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
253. Counterdefendant Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 Yamaha 
and a 1998 Yamaha, and an A TV trailer which are owned by Counterclaimants. The Bill 
of Sale for said ATV's and A TV trailer is attached hereto as "Exhibit F." 
254. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said ATVs and ATV trailer to 
Counterclaimant Eugene Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See deposition of Dennis 
Sallaz pp 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
255. Prior to filing this complaint. demand has been made by counsel for Counterclaimant for 
the return of said ATVs and ATV trailer. 
256. Counterdefendants refuse 10 surrender possess10n of and have asserted wrongful 
dominion over said ATVs and ATV trailer. 
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257. Counterclaimants are entitled to immediate possession and control of said ATVs, and 
ATV trailer. 
258. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said ATVs and ATV trailer 
and for general and special damages incurred by reason of said wrongful possession. 
259. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNTIX 
FORECLOSURE OF LIEN 
260. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
261. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is or was in possession of a Winnebago Motorhome VIN 
I GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien holder on. 
The title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
262. Prior to filing this complaint, demand has been made by counsel for Counterclaimant for 
the return of said Motorhome. 
263. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz has not extinguished Counterclaimant's lien of $8,500 
on said Motorhome. See also Husband's Property and Debt Schedule at 9 attached hereto 
as "Exhibit O." 
264. Counterdefendants refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted wrongful 
dominion over said Motorhome. 
265. Counterclaimants are entitled to immediate possession and control of said Motorhome. 
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266. Alternatively, Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of damages of $8,500 plus pre 
and post-judgment interest. 
267. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said Motorhome and for 
general and special damages, including but not limited to pre and post-judgment interest, 
incurred by reason of said wrongful possession and failure to satisfy said $8,500 lien. 
268. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNTX 
AIDING AND ABETTING IN THE COMISSION OF A TORTIOUS ACT 
269. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
270. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimant and Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz. 
271. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendant Sallaz were willful, reckless, outrageous, 
malicious, fraudulent, and tortious. 
272. Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and fraudulently and wrongfully withheld 
information regarding their willful, negligent, and fraudulent actions described herein. 
273. Counterdefendants Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Sallaz Law, Chtd., and Sallaz and 
Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC aided and abetted in the commission of said willful, 
reckless, outrageous, malicious, fraudulent, and tortious acts. 
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274. As a result of the foregoing, Counterclaimants suffered and are entitled to an award of 
general and special damages in an amount to be proven by the trier of fact. 
275. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaim ants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT XI 
VIOLATION OF THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
I.C. § 48-601 et seq. 
276. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
277. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
278. Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and fraudulently and wrongfully withheld 
information regarding their willful, negligent, and fraudulent actions described herein. 
279. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants violated provisions of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act LC. 48-601 et seq including but not limited to: 
a) Passing off goods or services as those of another; 
b) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, 
sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods; 
c) Causing likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation, 
connection, or association with, or certification by, another; 
d) Engaging in acts or practices which is otherwise misleading, false, or 
deceptive to the consumer; and 
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e) Engaging in any unconscionable method, acl or practice in the conduct of 
trade or commerce as provided in l.C. 48-603(c); 
280. As a result of the foregoing, Counterclaimants suffered and are entitled to an award of 
general and special damages in an amount to be proven by the trier of fact. 
281. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
XII 
CIVIL RACEKTEERING (VIOLATION OF J.C. § 18-7805) 
282. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
283. The actions described herein constitute a pattern of criminal behavior including but not 
limited to violations of I.C. §§ 18-2403(2)( d)(l) (Theft by False Promise); 18-
2403(2)(b) (Theft by Trick); 18-2407 (Grand Theft); 18-1905 (Falsification of Corporate 
Records); 18-4501 (Perjury); 18-4510 (Subornation of Perjury); l 8-3601(Forgery); 49-
5 l 8(Forgery of Lien Cancelation on Vehicle Title); 30-14-501 (Securities Fraud). 
284. Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. is an enterprise under J.C. § l 8-7803(c). 
285. Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices PLLC is an enterprise under J.C. § l 8-7803(c). 
286. Sallaz Law Chtd. is an enterprise under l.C. § l 8-7803(c). 
287. The estate of Bessie B. Matcham is an enterprise under J.C. l 8-7803(c). 
288. The pattern of criminal behavior is ongoing including most recently perjury, forgery, 
grand theft of the A TV's, trailer, and Motorhome, and the forgery of Mr. Rice's signature 
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allegedly releasing the lien on the title certificate Mr. Sallaz is utilizing for his claim and 
delivery cause of action. 
289. Counterdefendants caused the signature of Janet Rice to be forged on the certificate of 
title of a 1979 Mercedes Convertible VIN 10704412049659, which was owned by 
Counterclaimants, and utilized unlawful means to have the Idaho Department of 
Transportation issue a certificate of title in the name of involuntary Plaintiff, Marcy Fox. 
290. Counterdefendants caused a lien to be recorded on the certificate of title of the 1979 
Mercedes Convertible in favor of National Financial Services. 
291. National Financial Services is an enterprise under J.C.§ 18-7803(c). 
292. By reason of the foregoing willful, criminal, and malicious actions, Counterclaimants 
have suffered general and special, damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact 
including but not limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants executed promissory notes in favor of Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz for the principal amount of $20,800 and interest at 12% per 
annum. 
b) Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items taken by 
Counterdefendants for which legal services were not performed. 
c) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the 
settlement of the Sumner Matter. 
d) Counterclaimants are owed $7,500 as a result of Counterdefendants 
refusal to surrender the ATVs and Trailer and $8,500 for 
Counterdefendants refusal to surrender the Winnebago motorhome. 
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293. Pursuant to ldaho Code l 8-7805(a) Counterclairnants are entitled to treble damages and 
the cost of suit including reasonable attorney's fees. 
294. This Court should immediately invoke its power under Idaho Code 18-7805( c) and order 
the production of the ATV's, trailer, Mercedes, and Winnebago motorhome described 
herein. 
295. This Court should invoke its powers under Idaho Code 18-7805(d) and a) Impose 
reasonable restrictions on the future activities of Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz Law, Chtd., Sallaz 
& Gatewood Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC including but not 
limited to their ability to transfer, assign, or conceal assets to avoid satisfying any 
judgment rendered herein and b) Order the suspension or revocation of Mr. Sallaz's 
license to practice law. 
COUNT XIII 
QUIET TITLE 
296. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
297. Eugene "Roy" Rice was the first lien holder on a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VJN 
546265334 which was owned by Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz. 
298. Said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado is the same Cadillac Eldorado that 1s the subject of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
299. Dennis Sallaz failed to satisfy said lien on the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
300. In January or February, 2011 Counterclairnant Eugene "Roy" Rice lawfully repossessed 
the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
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301. On or about February 1, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice was issued a 
Certificate of Title by the Idaho Department of Transportation for the 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado which is attached hereto as "Exhibit Y." 
302. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is the lawful owner of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
303. Dennis Sallaz attached a false certificate of title for said Cadillac Eldorado to his Verified 
Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
304. Dennis Sallaz or his agent forged the signature of Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice 
on said false certificate of title in purporting to release said lien. 
305. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice did not release his lien in favor of Dennis Sallaz. 
306. On or about January 4, 2011 Dennis Sallaz purported to assign whatever interest he 
allegedly had to "Marcy Fox" by way of an Assignment of Title on the false title attached 
to Dennis Sallaz's Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
307. On or about March 20, 2011 Dennis Sallaz filed an application for Title Stop stating "My 
car was stolen out of a locked storage lot within the last 20 days and a duplicate title was 
forged and filed with the Idaho Department of Transportation in the name of Eugene 
Leroy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice on February 1, 2011 (see attached). The original title 
was never lost. The application for duplicate title was fraudulent and there was not any 
valid debt owed at the time of theft and no repossession has been done and it 1s 
imperative that this title be frozen pending the filing of a theft report and com1 action." 
308. The representations in the application for title stop were false. 
309. Dennis Sallaz has filed a Complaint for claim and delivery and obtained a Temporary 
Restraining Order preventing Counterclaimants from disposing of said 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado. 
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310. The above referenced actions by Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz have created a cloud on 
the title of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and prevented Counterclaimants from disposing 
of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
311. By reason of the foregoing claimants have suffered general and special damages and are 
entitled to an order quieting title for said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado in the name of Eugene 
"Roy" Rice. 
312. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code § § 12-120, 12-120(3 ), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT XIV 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
313. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
314. Eugene "Roy" Rice was the first lien holder on a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VIN 
546265334 which was owned by Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz. 
315. Said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado is the same Cadillac Eldorado that 1s the subject of 
Plaintifrs Complaint. 
316. Dennis Sallaz failed to satisfy said lien on the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
317. In January or February, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice lawfully repossessed 
the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
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318. On or about February 1, 201 1 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice was issued a 
Certificate of Title by the ldaho Department of Transportation for the 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado which is attached hereto as "Exhibit Y." 
319. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy"' Rice is the lawful owner of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
320. Dennis Sallaz attached a false certificate of title for said Cadillac Eldorado to his Verified 
Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
321. Dennis Sallaz or his agent forged the signature of Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice 
on said false certificate of title in purporting to release said lien. 
322. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice did not release his lien in favor of Dennis Sallaz. 
323. On or about January 4, 2011 Dennis Sallaz purported to assign whatever interest he 
allegedly had to "Marcy Fox" by way of an Assignment of Title on the false title attached 
to Dennis Sallaz's Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
324. On or about March 20, 2011 Dennis Sallaz filed an application for Title Stop stating "My 
car was stolen out of a locked storage lot within the last 20 days and a duplicate title was 
forged and filed with the ldaho Department of Transportation in the name of Eugene 
Leroy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice on February 1, 2011 (see attached). The original title 
was never lost. The application for duplicate title was fraudulent and there was not any 
valid debt owed at the time of theft and no repossession has been done and it 1s 
imperative that this title be frozen pending the filing of a theft report and court action." 
325. The representations in the application for title stop were false. 
326. Dennis Sallaz has filed a Complaint for claim and delivery and obtained a Temporary 
Restraining Order preventing Counterclaimants from disposing of said 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado. 
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327. The above referenced malicious actions by Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz have created 
a cloud on the title of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and prevented Counterclaimants from 
disposing of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
328. By reason of the foregoing malicious actions and Counterdefendant's slander of title 
claimants have suffered general and special damages. 
329. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
330. Counterdefendants by their conduct, have engaged 111 an extreme deviation from 
reasonable standards of conduct, and have engaged in gross, willful, outrageous, 
malicious, wrongful and wanton conduct, and, therefore, this Court having Granted 
Counterclaimant's Renewed Motion for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Damages, 
Counterclaimants seek the recovery of punitive damages against Counterdefendants on 
their claims of legal malpractice and fraud and in such amounts as will be proven at trial. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants pray that this Court: 
A. That Counterdefendants be restrained by lnjunction from disposing of, injuring, or 
concealing the said funds, Motorhome, ATV's and ATV trailer from 
Counterclaim ant. 
B. That an Order be issued requmng Counterdefendants to return said funds, 
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Motorhome, ATV's and ATV trailer to Counterclaimants. 
C. That in the event Counterdefendants have lost, concealed, or refuse to return said 
funds, Motorhome, ATV's and ATV trailer to Counterclaimant that an Order be 
issued that Counterclaimants be awarded $7,500 for said ATVs and ATV trailer, 
$8,500 for said Motorhome, and $480,000 plus pre and post judgment interest. 
D. That Counterclaimants be awarded general and special damages against 
Counterdefendants jointly and severally. 
E. Counterclaimants pray that this Court enter judgment against Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz for the principal and interest due on the two promissory notes; 
F. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for sums due and owning 
from Counterclaimants' trust account. 
G. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of unjust 
enrichment against Counterdefendants; 
H. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of legal 
malpractice against Counterdefendants; 
I. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of breach 
of fiduciary duties against Counterdefendants; 
J. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of fraud 
against Counterdefendants; 
K. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
Conversion against Counterdefendants; 
L. Award Counterclaimants general damages for their claims of Claim and Delivery 
against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 44 
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M. Award Counterclaim ants general and special damages for their claim to foreclose 
on their lien against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
N. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of aiding 
and abetting the commission of a tortious act against Counterdefendant Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd.; 
0. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of violation 
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against Counterdefendants; 
P. Award Counterclaimants treble damages for their claims of violation of the 
Racketeering Act, Idaho Code 18-7805(a). 
Q. Award Counterclaimants punitive damages on their claims for fraud and legal 
malpractice. 
R. Award Counterclaimants their costs and attorney's fees in connection with this 
action; and 
S. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, costs and fees under and pursuant to 
Idaho law, from the date of entry of judgment in this matter until full satisfaction 
of the judgment. 
T. A ward Counterclaimants any other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
DATED this L day of May 2014. 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 45 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this _j__ day of May 2014, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing THIRD AMENDED COlJNTERCLAIM was served upon counsel as 
follows: 
William Fuhrman 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman & Gourley 
225 N. 9111 St., Ste 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
V. K. Smith 
1900 W. Main 
Boise, ID 83702 
Gabriel McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St. #302 
Boise, ID 83 702 
THJRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAJM, P. 46 
v.-SMail +r-__ ~ P~ersonal Delivery 
Facsimile 
~SMail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
_(US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
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Tc the S.actatar; of.State cf Idaho 
Corporations Divjsion 
700 West Jeffers..."n Reem 203 
P.O. Box 8:.3720 • Boise, ID 83720-0080 
t</ ~ . 
/ ~' ~ ·>~ ,J! ~€ nan:ie o?·~the iimited liability company fs: __ r.._ea_l_H_cir._.c._~s_L_._L_.c_. _________ _ .. ~ -..,..:.. __ ;.,;__ _____________________________ _ 
I ~~ .·.· Z Th.e)a_ddreSs cf the initial registarad offica is: lOOO S · F.cosevel t St· 
c;" C:i · (net 1 PO Sax) 
Boise, ID 83705 . 
--------------------- and the name of the initial rag1stered 
agent .at that address is: __.;._D_e_nr_ii_· s_J_. _s_a_l_l_az _____ _;_ _____________ _ 
Signature cf registered agent: ------------------------,-
3. The latest data certain on vvhich the limited liability company will disso/ve:_.;.;1_-...;.1-_2_0_1_1 __ _ 
4. Is management cf the limited liability company vasted in a manager or managers? 
~ Yes D No (c.":ec!< 3RJropriate !:ex) 
5. lf management is vested in one er mora manager(s), list the name(s) and address{es) of at 
least one initial manager. If management is vested in the members, list the name(s) and 
addrass( es) of at least one initial member. 
Name: 
Renee L. Baird 
Address: 
1000 S Rcosevelt St Eoise, ID 83705 
01/19/2001 09:00 
c:(: 2~ CT: ~H £4-f: 37~ 
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a..'1 Idi-;o Llmit~d Liability Compa..1y 
. Tbe u..--,d er:ii5:aed me::nber~,. degiring to farm a. lii:~.h~d /jabiJiry campan·1 unccr c.he IdE.bo 
Lidte.d LJ'abi1it'J Company Act ~the '"Act") hereby agree as followa: · -
ARTICLE 1 
FO.R.11v{ATION 
1 r . i N;!.,TJC. The name oftbe Jimit~.d liabi!ity company (th~ :'LLC') i; REAL ;TOMES, 
LLC. 
J .2 ,!<VJ.ides of Or-sanization ... ~rticles of crganlzarfon were fifoci w'it.11 the Idaho Secr~1..,y 
of S caI!! on _Ja.nUarj 191 200 L . . , . . . 
1.3 ~rincil?~ Pf ace (?f Business: The principal office ~fthe. L~C sh.111 initially be located 
at J 000 S .. Roo.sevclr Scr~et, Bpise, Xdaho 83 705. The membe.."'3 p;ay r~locat~ ~e prfocipa..l a.ffice or 
e,'.itaolish adti.frian;tl o:ffic~s from rL.-u.e 1:q rime in their discratioc. . 
1.4 _ReaLste;ed Office an'd :ReE!8tered A2em:. Tb~ LL C's lrutiaJ i~gjsrered affi~"' shall b~ 
ar l GOOS. Rco?evelr Streei:, Boise, Id.abo 837rJS, and the na.n:ie of jt:, initial regfato/.ed agent at such 
;iddrc.ss sbaIJ be-Denn.ls J. $aTiaz .. The rnemberl r;nE.J change, the regfatcred office! and reg:ia;:e:ri!d 
agent trol:l thni! to time in their discretion. · · 
· 1.5 -~~: P~rc<?1~. Th~ I..LC i.s organhed co-k./~-- ..6,.& ,1 ....&~ 
n.nd to .engage. m any other Lawful busni.ess. . · . - · 9 
1.6 AJtre~men.i;. The membcr:i. e;<ecuring the Operating Ag:rcsment' .hereby agree ta the 
terms ~r;d condit:ian3 ofthe Operacing Agreement, a.a it may from time to time qe amended according 
fo it~: tcrm.3. To the ern:ent a1r; P:ovision: ·of rhe Operating ,Agreement is p_roluoited or ineffective 
under the Act, rhc Ooe,rai:Lig'A.g-raemcnt shall be consid~re;d an:iende<l ta the: smallest d.e-8J,"ee pcissi"'o/e 
in order ro make th~ Opern~'lg Agreement effective under th? A~. In tbc evenr i:h.e Act is 
subacqucntly a.men~ed or int.crprcti;d i!] suc.J-1 a WrJ.Y rq maki:: vafid a.ti"} provision cf rbc Ope.r~ting 
Ag:rcemer;t r.,iat was-·formerly inv!!lid, such provision s:hall be c.!?n~id~r::rl ~o b~ valid from the 
effc.ctive date of such i.riterprera.tian ·or ~nendment. Further, it is the exprc:ss intennon of che 
me..~ber.'i i:hat the LLt; be trea.t~p as a par..nership for purp-o~e;i of fod":l'a.i and stil.re taxaripn. 7iie 
members· agre~ to take such actions ai:id make such elecrions a., may be neceJsary or convei:tienr to 
cn.mr~ ;;b,it tbc LLC b~ tre11ted as a partner3Np. If ic is derermined tl:uu: cfic i.Lt L,;. or wiJJ not he 
classified .as a pa.rr:nenhi,p under t..1-ie Jr.tema] Revenue Code (rhc "C~de"), tben the· 0 pcm.ting 
A,gtecrn~t .;/iall be: consick.;-ed e.meoded ta th.e smal.l~st qegrcq po:is.i'b!e in: what~:r ip.a.rmer · 
oecen!aI;/ to ensure tJ-iar the LLC is or sh.ill be traatecfas. a.pa...:Jership.undt!r tbi! Code fo·r purposes 
or federal a.,"Jd state ca...ution. 
000949
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11:Ei.vIBERS, CO:NTRIBUTIONS. A~D INTL~STS 
2.1 N"~e.1. Addre~t-.es andJpi:;icl Ccrm:rib~J:t2n~. ~he n~cs an.d addreS3e$ of tire i,.,iti~ 
membe:-3 qf the LLC, and roe ·agnied value afthet,r respi;:ctive irutia.J capira.l ccn.tribudcns a.Itd initial 
per¢:;;r:1t~gc O\'i::lern:np lnterests in tqe LLC (the ''Sharing R2tios'') .1r~a_s a~~t!!d _in t~e chart ~clew, 
subject to the adjuatmen t n s p-rovidcd in thl.s Artlpl~ 2. Each of the rnenb.en a.s· his initial 
cam:ribution h?-3 contributed his undh-;ded one-half(%) inter~lit L11 a:i.d ;.o th9r:e cemh1 two parcels 
of ccnimer~ia! re::i/ esure, morn pi!rJr;,Jla.:-Iy described on Exhiqit A arrn.ched haret6, toge!her with 
. aiJ appurti!nanc_es, and a.,y e:d:S'cirig leases, contract:; at agre~ent:5 ~ciating the.r~to. 
Agr.eed ·~.,r alue of Contribi1don · Sil_.a..'1"1_,')" E..atio i . . ' 
~enee Brurd 
l 000 S . .Ro oseve!t 
Bols:e., Id alto :n 705 
$50,000 
Limita.Con cfLtabili~,, .Each member's J]abilitv shall be lil:!11ted tc- the ma;cimtlm =,: - .. 2.2 
extent perm.it-red by applicable !aw. Th~. failure of the LLC to qbsctYe a.ny fo'rmalicfos ~ 
requirements relating to t1e CJ{ercisc of it~ p9wers er management ofits bu3ines~ or affairs ~rutll n~f 
be grounds fer irnpming per;;,ona! lil'..bility on the mcmbern of the Ji~bilities of the LLC. . .n . 
.... , 
·2. J ;NoLiabitit-v for LLC Debts; Personal Gnarantees. ~o\ member shall nor be pei-gonaJ/J" 
liable fC?r e.ny debts or Jo~scs cf L.he LLC b-~·and his respectiv~ cap(i:al comnhutj.oru. except ~-l 
ather:wi.,;1:: required. by Iaw. Notv1itbJtanding tne for~going, the m~mbers shall execute per.1ari1l 
gu'2rin~ee;, fer Joans mad.z to rhe LLC as and only to ciJe cxiem r~quirc~ by foture l end~:rs.. · . . .. .. 
· 2.4 Other ]1Jsin~sa o,O,ferd;,ers, Excepc a.s m:1y bt;J other?11i$e pro-.rideq in ag:recrr;eo}:3' 
amcng tbe IJJl;)a:Jbers :.i.nd the LLC, nny member m;iy engage indcppdencly or V-i/\th other'3 1n other 
busiaes:;; ar.q invcstli!enr vemur~l of cery nature and descripi:5on ~nd fillfill ha'"/e no obligation to 
acco1,.,r.t to th~ LLC for sucb bu sines;; or investmE:rJts ar _for busine~s or iuvest.-nen c oppo·r,~unitic.s·. 
2.5 Addifianal Members. Additional membcn shall not be ad.rr.itted except upou a 
wmmi:nou:1 vote ofrhe mcmberJ, 
2.6 AddhionaJ C2.Dit&l. 
2.6.1 Additiannl Contributions. Except~ set fon:,1 in this Section .2.6, n.o member 
gbaJJ me r&1uired or pcrr.nitted to mak:;l any capital comributlbns. In ibe event chat a:t any ti.me, 
pursuanr. to a t.mJ.nimous vote of Che meq,berl, the me.i."Tibers d<)tennine rhat a:dditioaal .fund:i are 
req'ui.red 'by rbc. LLC for iu bt!s.ines.!: 6r any af ic.:i abligaf.i.ona, c;::;peri.ses, cosrs, liabilities or 
ocpcnditures, the r.::embers :u,aU be reguirei:£ to contribute sucb ndditioni:iJ fund.'! in proportion co thr::ir 
Sha.ring Ra.tics, llJ'lle3~ tho members elect by rn~jo-ricy voti: ta he:ve the llC f;iorrow the a.'"nount 9{ 
s\J!ch acdiriouaJ funds needed, ·If the memben have determined thac tl1t· member.:1 shafJ rnake ':m . .. •, 
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a.dp.i.ricnal capit?] ~·m;.ribucion pynuant to th~ Section 2.6, .I, and a rn~ber fa.Ha to ma.IQ it.3 req:ufred 
PPr'~on of ~be ad~1tian,al c~piW contrjbuticn (a "Ncn-Ca~r:ribt1ring Member"), rben those membeG 
making. ~he:r reqmre.d pomon of the a.dditicv:af capiral: comriburfon (i'Cont-:ibvtir.g Marnbe:r~'? may 
elect .e1t~~r of 0~ fc.llov..ing; 0) to !!dju,sr the SJ1a,ing Ratio.s of tpe Cam..'1"b1.1ticg, and· Non-
Ccni:r.ibu~:ng ~!ernbe.rs by increasing r:he ~')hari.ag'.Rzrios of the N,)n-Cootrinuting Membe~i); or (li) 
~e. ~or,tnou~?g Mem~.s may,. in a.dq.ition ro ~y oth~r Jegp.J r,ern.e~ies ~YaiJable, 4,:i proporrion to 
~heir 0w1'!er.llmp .Inrcr~sta er a..:J otherwise ~gr(!cd by the Ci:mtr.ibt.i.ing Memh~. csnm"but~ additionlll. -· • 
.runds to cove.- such amoum C.hat has not been cont:'ibuted 
I • , 0 I • 
2, 6.2 AdhMtment to Sha...-inr;r Ra.tios. The S.hari.nf)" .Ratios of each Contributing 
Member sb.aJl be me.eased by Adju.stment Pe!;-~nt.age xi whi~h shall .be calcuiar.ed fo; ~cb 
CoJ1i:ributillg Member accordi..t1g to the formula ~ct forth below. ·For purposes of ~.his for:nuJa,' the 
plrr.ase "Addrtio.nai Capital Contrioution" shall Jiean. the add~tiona1 capha.J conmautian.3 mado, &:; 
each Conrribt.iing MembtJ;' punua...,t to. a caplt!1 ~all under ~cctio.q 2.5.'J, The Total Capt"..al 
Conr.rilrutions of lill .Members to De.te shaU· /includc the agreed value of the initial capital 
·cc.otribuCion.9. as set forth in .Section 2.1 above. I . . 
' Adjustmeat => 
Percemage:X 
Amount of AdditionaJ Canital Contribution 
Total Capital Comd]?utiona + Sum of All f...d<litiomtl 
of ~1 Mem.o~,r:3 to Dine Capir.a.J Contnoutions 
The rcspectrve SJ~aring Ratios oft.he Non-Cont..'ibt.<ting fyfe~be.:s .shall be: de.i:r~sed 
(bur not below zero) by each such :rnember3 pro rata sbarc (btt~ed on the cob] Sharing R.<!tios of the 
No'J-C?ntdb11ti.rm Members) of Adjustment Percentage X. · 
2.n.J Co.ruribmio11 of AddJtion:t! Fund.3. Ifa Cont:tt'bt.'1iDg Member elects to . · 
coorribute addition~) ~ds to c..:.Ver such ~mom:n: th~t h~ not" been, contributed by a. Non:-
Coutn'butin,g 1fomber,. ti'le adva..,ce shall be deemed a demand )o:in by the Coomlluting Member or 
Mllill.b~rs 'to ~he Non-Comribut~og Member bearing inter~st at rhe .ca;c oftwclve percem (12%) per 
.innum from the dg,te the o.dvaJ1r.::e fa made. To the extc:11t of suc.b ndv.i.n.ce plus intereS!, any 
di.qribution.s otherwise due to the Non-Contn1ruting Member sh.all, tnstea.d be paid l'.O the 
Contributing Mcp1be:r or Memben (pro rat.i with the a.mount~ advanced by e.1ch Contributing 
Member) who mad~ such ·comribution. 
· 2. 7 Inte,~st on Cecitll.l Cor.tributionft. Ex.ct!pt. a; prnvided in Section '.2.5.3, no im~rcst. 
shaU b~ pe.id on capital conrrihutions . 
. 2. a .Loans. The LLC may bo,;ow money from any member of chird panies upon such 
comm~rcf ally ,ea5oneble terms a.r:d .::o.qdiCi(?l'i.:!- is may be approved by Che. me.mber:,. 
2. 9 Ri!tht;; of1'1dem.ni.fi.c2.rion. The LLC, or it3 receive, o; rrustcc, snall·indemnii:,,·, hold 
hnrmless, n.nd pay' al/ judg:n.crt!S a.t)d c.fo.i.nis a.a?Jn~t each ffiC!T'.be-r for a.li ca:.t.;, lo~~es, Habiliril!S and 
da.n)agcs pft.id or accrued' by sue{~ mcC1.ber by r~son of any ac-c pcn:ormed or ot;tin;4ed t~· be 
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.; :· l O Title fo;ura~c~. I.ri the eve0t .~.c LLC s1.rffcro any less. whi.ch 1~ compensable through 
the c.;~Je. Lilsura,"Jce olr'-12.1r,ed oy me~~r ~nrui; J.. Sallaz any: payment~ ir:Jde uhd~r such policies will 
be paid to De~ni.s J. Sallaz a,'Jd not the LLC. · ·- · . . . 
. ~:1-·--~-------~---._,~-,,~. -iITSANn DVTlES OF ME10BERS 
. ' . . . . 
3. l M:am.gcrr:cnt 11,1d Vori.:g Rigbr.'.!, A1J rnember3 ~ha b.ave nqc .Dil]soda~ed -~hall oe 
_en.tirJe_d to vote an any c,atrcr sµbmirti!d to a vote of rhe Mem.bcn. fio""P?eve,
1 
As<iignees :i:baJl not 
oe ent:Jtled to .vote or. any manel3. 
. : J. l .1 Ac(J Recui.rir:g { Msiority Vore. .Except .aa othcrwi.;:e provided )n Artie.le 
J ..J .2 or othe,rwise in rhis Opern.ti.n~ AE:rei::ment, cll deterrrunatiom deci:sions approvals ind actions • ...... ...... . . l ] 
affe:::t:in& the Lt..c a.nd its business ar.d ilffair.s shall be determlnc.d, ll)ade, approved, or authodzed . 
9nly.,by the afuroatiYe 9ote of a Ml_iority of the ¥ember3J ~xcfoding a.,y intara-:ted .MClI!ber and 
c:cc!uding ·a..iiy A3signe~. .. 
. . 
3.I.2 Acts .R.e__guirlng TJnaQ.irwus Vd1c. Norw!thsta.ndi.ng hi:ide 3.1.1, the 
folJowing matrers,, pcci.sions and actions sha!J not oq m:J.dc Of tJ.l(e:n witbat.:.t the t;.na;iirrmus Vote Of 
all of r!ie Memben, excluding any i..mcrc.stc!d Mcmbk a.ad t:;X.;ludbg any A.'ljjgnce: . ~ 
(a) a.ny a.~endmem to thls Operating Ag:reetrteni tbat cbar1ge~ the 
purnber of votc:s or degree of consent rcguircd co approve or d'isapprove:11iJy p-1at:ers that r2:quirr~ vcce or consent; end . 
(p) .i .. ny :unendment to A.'""ticle 6 or Arµqle 7 of this Operating 
. J.2 _tJJthoritv ofMerribers to Bi.nd rh~J-----1!:. TheM(!')Jlber::: hereby agree that ao 
one Member s~hll have the amharity cu mc1ke repn:::ient.1tiaUJ or war.axrties, or ~ter into conn-aces 
on behalf of the LLC, ta.\:e any action 11.s ru1 f1.gcn c for the llC, or oth~.r,vfse bfod the LLC: JG.t1.er, . · 
a Maj on ti; shill be req~ired to mak-e represemations or warranties, or en~er into con.tracts on behalf . 
~fibe LLC, take any ~ctioo. as an agcnc for the LLC, w otherwis:! bind tbe LLC ro Pers~n::. baving 
knowledge. of ruch determinacion. Ti:1c foJlo•,i1i.ng ru:tion.s, without limitation, s.haU requi..re a:Z,,ujorit'J 
vace; 
3.2. l the fo.~titution, prasecmion nnd d~fonae ofar.y proceed.ing in u,e LL~>.s mune: ,·' 
3. 2, 2 the pt)rchase, receipt, lease or other a.cguisitio.a, O\.YT',ership, holding, 
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. 1,l4 the entari;n.g i~to ·con;rncts and gtiar<lllties; incurring of lia:biiities; bcrrowing 
money, JS~ance of notes~ bond.,, and other obligatiC:!1.;;; a;id the sccunog cf auy of.its obligations by 
illGCTgage or pl edge er -:my -of ir.1 Pnpen:i; ·or income; · 
J.2.5 the .!eridi~g.of moneyi invescmcr;t·aiid r;;ii~11est11em oft.he LLC3 .fuil£.fa a.id 
nc:!ipt a:nc;i holding cf Property as 3-'.!curir;y for repayment, including, w.itb'out liD.lita.rion., the .to~TJg 
ofmon<..y to, aqd otherwise belpfrig Members, officers, emp!oye-eg, and agents; 
3.2.6 chc conduct of die LLC's buajn.e~s, the est.ab1fa1unem ofliC offices-, and tbe 
exercise of the powers of the llc within or v,,itJmm the Seate; · 
J .2. 7 the appointment of emplo.J)etls 1i.nd agects of the ILC,.tb.e defining of their 
duties, tbe _estiblishmcnt of ¢cir ~crnpensation; 
3.2.8" the: pa.J:tr:ent ofpen.'lions ru)O e3t~blishment of pet}~.ion plans, pension t.tUst.i, 
profit 3haimg. plans, a.'1d benefit andinc~mive p)a."13 fur aII or any of the current or fa.--mer 1-femben, 
employees, and agenc.:, o;ftbe UC; · 
~.2.9 ihe making of d.cnatio!l.'l tot.he public ·welfue or for religious charii: .. "'.blt:, 
scitntific, Urer:uy or educational purposes; 
oftheL~C; 3.Z,10 ,he pa:yment or donaf:ion, or a:ny other act tba.t furthers tbe business and affair.:, 
3.2.1 l the payment cf c01~pensarion, or additional cor.npensarion to any or ail 
ivfomber3, and ernpfoye:!3 on a.ccoum of 31'.!YVices pre;,.iou.~ly rondereQ to the Hmiced liabilizy 
compnny, Whet:he; or not an ag:recme:ir to pay such compensation was made before ruch services 
were render!.!d; · · 
3 .2.12 u'ie p.urcbast": ofio.5urauce on fb.:: life ofa~y of hs t,,b:r:b·!r:;) or' cmploy~s for che benefit of tbe LLC; 
3 .2.13 the particip.a.rion in pz.rt:-:eoh.ip agreements, joint venture$, or other 
as.:iociatfons eif any kind ~vfrh. any pc.son or per:Jons; 
3. 2.14 the intjem.r.i.fication of.t1e·rnber.s or any other Penion. 
3 .3 Mai o.::i!._Y.. ·\yhenever an,Y matter i.:i required or allowed tci be approve<l by a Jr,,iajori-ry 
ofrhe Members or a Majcrriry oftbe rcrnainir.rg i',femb~r:i undpr the Ac.to; the- Opcra.tJng Agraernem, 
such matter eha!J bii corrn:ide:red approved 9r cor.i~snta!tj ta upon c.he rec!!ipt afthe affirmative a.pprova! 
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( al) L~e M~b~5 entit.1e~ _co vqta ?n J particular me.n~r. for this p~rpqie, the Shs.rmg Ratios cf cll, 
~fr:mb~.: 311a~ ?e co.nsidered qi determirj~g whether a Majonr:</ rui.ve V<:i1:·ed·ln favor cf au action, 
11:-2spect...1Vc or. Whether or not ·a M~mbcr participates in 31.JCh vote. A.3sigq·~e$ and, in the case of 
apprn·valsto Wl~dr...w~ where COllS~C oft.be i"?malnfog Members is i'equired, disscciaring 1',-fepbef~ 
shaII rioc be co?s1dered .Mem~eo .er.tttled co ·1ote for the purpcae of ~etc~inirig a }42.jorit:t- In che 
cas~ 0.f a M~wcr wb.a bas d1.:;pos~d of that .Mep,b~'i .~nti('<! 1v.(emb~w!'up .l;ncct'e:rt to p.."'1 A53jgnee, 
but ems J;.Jct aeen removed ~ a h-fomber, the Sharing Ratio of such Aia1ine·:: sb~J '6e ·corisi.'defei:! iii 
deteurJwing a 1£Jjority und. such Memb~'s vace or c;:ansem· shall be d;;cr;n,inf;d b? .RZcb Shai,ng 
RAtfo. : · · · - -
AR.TICf'..B 4 
MEETING A!'IJ? A2vfENDMENT 
4. l Gey,_er_aj. Acti-011'3 a"!}d d:ci.5io~.s requfrbg the approval of tb.e M.embers· pur.:;uar,t 
re a.ny pro~,ision 6ftbi~ Operating Agreement may.be m.ichorized·or made either by vote cf the 
required m1mber 9f Mcmb cr~ ca~ex1 at e meeting of the Memb~s,· or by une.t'J-!X].ous 1;1.,ntten · 
c~nscnt w:id1out a. meeting. In s.ddf.ian,·emergenC"'/ action:1 tna.y be taketl Ln ,accorda,_'1ce with the 
pr6vi.:1ions of .A ... rticle 4.6 hereof. 
4.2 Me~irrn:s. Any Member may call a. meetiag i:a copsid;r approval of an ~io~, or 
I ,· 
decision under any provision ofi:his Operru:mg Agce-~·ment by de.livering to each otber·Membernotic~· 
of rhe rime a..cid purpoee of such meefolg ac ka.s-t five: (5) busines3 ds.ys bcrore the _de.y of sw:J 
meeJfng, A Member m~y waive the ~cquironem of notice of a ~ecrfog ei~'ler by attending such 
cneeri...i:J_g qre..s:ecufo1g a wrict~n waivo:: before or•mer guch rn~tbg. Any such meeting shall be held 
dtirin,g ·the LLC's norma:l busines.3 h9un:; ac its principal place qf b11.sinM.'.i tin[ess !\Jl of the arh~r 
ivfo.mbers cor,sel"!,: in .writing Q.r by their atte.odance ar such meeting to its be.ing held a.t ll.iJ.arb,er 
Jo<;a~on or time_ Notwi-cli.standfog any qther provi.iion of fofa Op~r1ting Ag.rec.qJenr, if all the 
member? hold a me~ting at a.11y time and place, !luch mc:!1:ing ahcll be vall,d w:i:t.hol.lt calf or notice 
ilnd any ls.-wful. action taken 1'.! such meedng shall be the actian of the member.;. · . . . 
4,3 Meetinas 1£Y.Jdeuhone. Meeting:i o.f i.be members may be hdd by confcr~ncc 
telephone G(' by ariy othtr mca,ns of ci:im,muni~arioq by which a,IJ P?-rticipa;ts can he.Af' e~.cb. other 
simufi:a11em..1~ly curing the- meeting, and sucb pardciparion tfo..!J cor..Jdture prcse:nc~ .in pl:)i:-:,on a.i. tbe 
1.ncecing. 
. . . . 
4.4 Un;tilmJc.us Consent. Any },.fomber may.propose that r.he UC a\.!tnoti;z:c an 2.cti_on 
or d ccision pui,u?-nt to zuiy provision o-f this Oper~ring /1._grc!:menr by i.:ruini.mous writt~n c_c:mserrr of 
aU Members in· lieu of a meeting. A Member's writren con.seat may be eYi~enct!~ rr.1 his signature 
on a cou.n~.crpart of tbe proposal or by a sepatlte. .writing (including fac3irnile) ti'1at ide::i1,u6es t.he 
P~?po.sal ,;t,11i1i reni;ooable speciflciD' nn.d s.111.t~s tJ,at such ~.(ember consents to suqh proposal. 
4.5 V 01.e bv Proz;y, A~ Mimbcr may vo~e ( or cx~c'Lltc a. writt~n 'cons e;;1t) by pro;.;/ given. 
to a.riy other l•&mbe:-. Any such proxy must be In wncing·!l:od muat identi.f<; che specific rneetin~ror 
macrnr to which the: pr.c;("j applies or »2.re. that it S:_oplies to all m·att<:~i5 (SL!_bject ·w spe~,n~d 
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reservario~s, i'f e.;;y) corning befqre tbe .W-,C for approval u.nder any provision of r.fab Operating 
Agrec...'1l.::m priorlo ~· specified dare (which ~hall not be later t~an the .5nt ar ..sJive:rvary of the date on 
·which such prDX"f i,; given). Any snch proxy shall be revocab{.:: ai a..rry rime and shall not be effectiva· 
il1 :1.J1Y zneerlng ar which the Memb~'. giving s1Jc~ proX'J ia in anencLmcc. 
·· ·· 4.6 · .Ernenrencv Procedures. Natwh-hstandfog any oth~r p.ra,"1.,14ip~ ~er.co£: in the evec.t 
true fyfep1bers who cnu!d authorizr:: a LLC ai.:tico or decision at a duJy ~a.Ued. rne~ring reasonably 
dei.eDIIme. in :vriting, cbat r.he llC is faeing a aign.ific;am bu.siness emergency that ref[uin:s · 
irnrnc~ia.:re aciioa, such Memben may, wit'i.our c_ompJying wit)l gane~Uy applicable procedures. for 
meeting$ or actions by unanimou:i _conse-u~ ai.Jthocize any action or decisico tbat .they deem 
re;isonabiy f?Cce.sa8JJ ro a.JJaw the-LLC to bene:tir .fro1n. a 1lgnifica.1t op porn.mi r;J or ~o protect the ~LC 
from significant Joss or damage, pro";1ded° ti\at rhey m~e re.:1s.onabJe efforts u:r.1der the ciru.imm,mces 
to co~rcact cnnsu.lr al} MembeG.conceming 3uch \I.CTIOn or dacisfon and t'ie r~son why such acciori. 
or deci:tlon rr.,,s! ·be made '.?lithout ob.3erving genernl.ly ·applicable procedups. 
· ..... · ,4. 7 R~cords. The UC shall maii~tai,-i permaneut rec.n.r.d::i of ail actions rak;:.n by tb.e 
M-2;--nbers pursuam to ~J provision· of this bp~rating }':'::-rccrnent, inc!c.dil",g minutes of ail LLC 
me~i~8; ropi~!I of all o.ctionli ri.l.::en by consenr of the Membe~s) a..>1d copies of all pro;des pUf.>U:u1t 
m ~drich one M~mber votes or e~ecmes a cm.is.em cm bei1alf of another. 
4-.3 Q;;eratrng Ane..emen.r 1.\,fav Be ~/t4odJ.f.ied. This Ooen1tin.g -~?Teern.ent m.ay be 
modffie-q. or amended from time. to time <:nlY by~ writ,ej) instnJm~t ado·pt:::d and' ex~cuted by all of 
c.be Members. 
4.S .. 1 De.;:ig:na-t.ed R.erre.,e.nratives. In ~he c.aae of a. member chat is a corpora.rion., 
1x1nri~nhip;· limited iiabiliry company, or oth~r organization, as.sodzdon or entity (an 1~ntit'.f 
Member"), such r.ic.mber sna.lJ designate ·one (l) iudividual who ruona· shall be entitled to .1tteud 
me-etings of th~ LLC at:id vote. sucb member/ s _Sha..-ipg Ratio .. Entity membef3 rn~.y change their 
design~~ed represemarjves. frc;in~ thne ·co time by providi.--1g the Ll~C with notice of !lrn;-:h change in 
accord;:;:r,ce With the provLsions oftbis Operating Agreement. Any change in an Eatit'J Me1:1ber's 
desig:1ared represcntJ.tlYt? ahall be cffecti•1e up.on tbe LLC' s receipt of notice of -9.uch ch;uigc. 
4.8.2 ·Fight to Relv o,Qpe:sigJ.1ated Reur~sentative. The LLC, and its membef3, 
shfill. ht1vt: che r.ight to rely on rhe most recenr.ly appoint:!d d~si-gr,acetl rq:Jre.'leut'J.fr,rc of a,., .Entity 
.lv(~mber. ·E3..C.h Enriry Metuber shill be lbbJe to ind~,nif;, defand a.r.id hold h:1.rm!e-.ss t:he LLC ~P 
~he- other members from aJJ co:st, Jie.biJity .and damag~ that any of such in.denmiued persor...:5 rr~::iy 
incur (indl.rdiJ1g, '1-Vithout limJtation, anomeys' fees a.net 1::x~nse:i.) ari1i.ng: from or rdat~d ~o any 
.dispute concerning t~e aut.horir:y of an Entity Member's dc.5igria.ted represenradve. 
ART1CLE 5 
. ACCOUNT.EN'G A.,."{D RECORDS 
5.1 ,Bcok.s of Acccu nc. The LLC shaH keep adequate boob and records at its. 
Pr in.cipa! plac-a of bu ~i'ness, H:tting forth ll.t rue and 1,<.ca.J.ra:~~ accounr cf. aU bu.~~~s~ tr:l,nsactioos 
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eri.sing om. cf d...'1 ciin counedon ,with the conduct of the LLC. The Membeu agree that Je;;, e:-; 
W. Cas:ey ~i111ll be iespi:msible for th~ boa~3 a.1[i .reccrd.s., ~<1,..1y Member or bis design2.ted have 
the rig:Jrc., at any fi:;lsou~bla rime, to h,r1e.acces3 ro a.1d in.wect a.1d coov tbe cements of such 
boc!G or .records. A.:iy Member requcsr.ing acce~s to or i,1~pecti~n cis~ch boob or ri=cords sba11 
P,6.'j the reason ab! e cost of such acce5"i or i:nspccri on. · 
5.2 Fisc.:1J Y ~; Ti1e fucal year of the llC shtll. b~ th; ca1~;d; year. 
'V 
5.3 Accaimriniz .Re:,c;,:s, %thin ni.ne~/ (90) daJs after the dose of each focal ye;rri 
cu:cb m~mber shall reecive an un2.udited n,por: of the activities of ~he LLC for the pn:ceding 
fisr;.a.l year, including a copy of a ha.lance sheer of the LLC a.s of tJ1e en..d of such year and a 
staremecr ofincomf:! or Joss for such year. . · . 
. . 5.4 Tax. Re:rnms, \Vith;n ninety (90) qay~ a.ficr tbe end of ea.ch focal yes;-, ca ch 
member skll be .fu.rni~he:d a £t11terntot suitable fer u3c i.u t1'ir! preparation of the member's 
income tax return, showing the a.."'!lounts of any distribution~ contributions, gm.s, fo:.-11es, prufas., 
or credits al.located ta ~~e mcmbor du..'Wg ruc.h .fiscal year. 
.. . 
5.5 T:1.X ~.1fqtters Parmer. Reuee J3aird shall be designated t-0 act as rhe ta.:t 
matter:; partner of th e.tLC pUGUal1.r tq §6231 ( a)(7) of the Intemn! Revenue Code. Ar...y CJ ember 
designl!red a.1 r.a;;:..matterJ partner shaJI ta!<2 wcJJ action a.s may be pecessary to cawc each oilier 
rnet.nher re become a notice pcrtmr withL1 the meaning of §6223 oft'le Code. Arzy m~ber wh.o 
is des.i~ated uix matter parmer ma.y oat take a.1y action ccnt~platc~ by §§6Z22 through 6232 
oft.'xdntema! ~~enue Code.,,.ithoUt th~ cor1gem of the member.s. 
ARTICLE6 
ALLOCATIOi\/S 
6.1 .AJJocations Generalfr Except as othery,ise provided in this Operating 
1\.greemem) all irems ofincorue, gain, Jo3;i1 deduction and credit oft.he I.LC sba.11 bi! ;tl!oc.1t:::d a~9og 
all rhc pernber;, in propordqn ta 1he.ir Sharing .Ratios. 
6.2 Lo,s Al!oca.tion.s. Lm:ies of the LLC sbi!ll be aliocitcd to rh:! memo::':!':; in 
proportion ro their Sha.ring R2..<l~s, exc.ept thac in the C~:\C of~ ]as:1 reali?;ed on the liquidatioo of the 
LLC u.;der Article 9 hcreo±: or:.e hundred percent (i 00%) of ~uch less sharl be ~ltocaccd to th; 
rnembe;s who na·,1e made ~a.sh or a.greed va1ue capfral contributions to the LLC (in th~ sa..111c 
reJ~tio.mhlp as t/1eir r~spective capit~ accounu ~i:!Ve beeu reduced ~9 zero. 
6.3 Net F~out Al\acations. Net profas rrom the LLC'.s operations sh.all .firrt be 
nUoc11ted to tJ,e·member3 who receive ca.sh oc property clistributiof.lS under Secrton 7.3 ta the_ exte11t 
o,(r.he cc13h di.5"..rib~ition.s received during t.he: extent of the cash distrihutic·ns received 'duno.g the 
appUcab.!e t.u{ab)e year ·and tbim to the me.mberJ in p.roportion to ,.he respective Shadng ~do.s. . 
6.4 Ncr Gain AJlocad_o~. Ncr gai.,, 6-cm a sale ofal! ar .rubstarrtlJ.~lr.:ill o.ftbe LLC's 
J •LU' ,.JO 
I 
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q.5 · C2.;::iit2l Accou;i1s. An indivfduaJ capital account shall be maintained for ep.c.b 
me,.,ber. &ch _member's caphal ac~mt s...\111 be Q) credited with aJJ capr.al corrµ1bacic)1S by mch 
mem:be.r ,u1d me member. a di.micutiye share of aD income and gain Oricluding ariy income ex.empt 
· from fodc.::rnl'ir:come ta;,::); an.d (ii) clnrjed wit.'i- the- .:unoum d all "di:3tnbL'-tians' to ~ch m~mber and 
the members' 3 distrii:mfr,e sha-re ofiosaes and de<lu~tfons. Caoi,d accou.'lta shall he ma.i~rainerl in 
accordance ',;fith federal i:.1comc t,a:t -acc0unting principles M ~et forth in Trea:s. Reg. l-704-
J(b)(2)(Jv) er any su~ccssor provision. · . · 
6.6 CornpifaDc,e \\-ith s~ction 704. The pjovisian.s ofthis ti.rtic!e 6 as rhey relate to th:: 
r,nainrnoa.nce of c.apiraJ lcco1.i.nrs a.,.-re inten4ed, a..1d shall be conat..'lled, and; if necessary, modw.e.d a:r 
provi.d.;d ia A..nicJe l 2, iO cause me ~!1oi;:atlon.~ of pra-tjts, lo/ises, iJ1com0, gain 1L1d credit purstJ?-nt 
to ) ... rtide 6 to have sob~t.mtial ecor:iornic .etfuct under tne Regulations prcm:rulgi!-ted under § §704(b) 
a.on 704(c) ofthe Code, in Jighc of the distributioos made put?lJa.nC µ'l A.rJcJe 7 and 9 and t.he capiral 
concibur:ions me.de pur.manc to Mele 2. 
.Ai.~TICLE 7 
DISTR:IBUTfON'S 
7.1 Dip:r:ibvtiaps ar Members' Discr~tion. Exdept {13° other1Yisc pro1,.,ided in this 
,Operating Agreement, di.rrn~oudor:.s of the LLC's cash 1!.Y.!ilablefor dfs1ribution sha17 be me.de at least 
ser.ro-aM11a1Iy for ~ach fl3cal year. · 
7.2 C::Llh Available for"Di::itributi•)f\ For pt!rpolie.3 of thfa .N"Jclc: 7 the phrn."l~ '"ca.,;h 
av:tilab1e for distribution" shall mean cash of the LLC ivhich ,:he memj:).'!rs rea!!ooably determine may 
be dis;rfouted ,::.,;tl,out impairing tbe ~bilrty of tho l.LC to _co.rry oti! jt3 purposes, ai4:er ca..\jng into 
i;lccount the aci;-,1.al en~ .anticipated e--,epenscs oftheL.~~ and S)..lchregerves as the r.m.:mben_re.asonably 
deem ad,~i,ablc co pro teer. the LLC fram future cash sJ1onfa:IJs. Upon dhbibucion in accordai:i.c.: 'Wich 
this .Atticle, tbe caulral aL:coum for en.cit member sbtll be chargl!d for t~e l}:Iloum of rbc p;,.ymcnt ro . ' . . . 
that membe:r. · · · 
7.3 Di:itrihu.tfon Schedule. Distributions oftlie ll~'s c.Jisb av.a.iJ.~blc for disr..r.i.b1.,tian 
sha.U be mude in tlle follo,;;,-5ng order afpriorlt';: 
7.3. I Return ofCaniral. Any caJh a"r:allable for distribution sbaUbc distnouted to 
the member., until t.he ci·embcrs h;we received c~sh dlstribution.s w.hich are returns of C.'!.j:i.:a[ fo_r rbe 
fuJl value of re member .. ' caBh o( 11.grc..:d value capi~al contributions.. · 
7.3.2 . Rema.ining Casa. Ai.1y cash· a.vaUab-!e for dfam~µtion ~em.aining .m~ 
sarisfacdon cf r.he ri::tum of capital prcvided in Sect.ion 7.J. l shall be: di..rnibute-d to the member;! in 
proportion to tbc.ir rci;peciive Sb.ai-;r.;.g Ratio$. 
7.4 Sh.~.-c.d Prio.6tjes. Tfrbcre is m.'.'.lr.e than a.ne me:mber who is eni.itled i.o rhe s;:rr.ie. 
' . 
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'priorir/ cf ~i~bur:ion and tht:re is not e;icugh cash avaIJeble ·fur diJdbution to ca,11::t nJ.] · 
cfai:f,but:ions in t}µt pricrir:;- care3cr1, the c~h available rbr dis,ribucion sha1J be allacac~d ~-id · 
<li5:..rfout,:d ro rnc member.} entitled fo di.rtribm}oii withir, tba:t pri9ri~~ C:lceg~~/ in {he relarii;ioshlp 
which eacb cf the member' J .r~spcctive daims in that priority cat-=g9r'/ be2..r tQ the- ,Gill cJafrns .of .all. 
members in tli..zt priority category. · 
- ............ ,,.. 
ARrICLE 3 ....... 
DISPOSITlON OF .?vfEL'v!BERSHIP INT.c.RE~TS 
. . 
. 8 .. I Restriction_:! on. Disuos~tion. No member er ·asaig:;ce sbaJ) sen, cor:;trloute, gift, · 
enc;~t:iber,. hJpot~ec~e, ex-cbE.nge orochc~se dispose of( collectively, "Transf1c;:-~) a!1 O( any pon:fon 
ofh1s Sha.,ng.Rat10 withou~ the. expr:::ss, pnoru.rya.nimous v.ritten con:3er.t of the ,emaining memb£(9., 
except .as provided it! Secdoru 8.1, 8.2, 9.J, .9.4 and 9,5. Each member heref.:.•1 a.cknowledP.r;s the 
• ,I ,;;i • 
reasonableness Qf the restrictions oo. dispos.itiat1 imp,oaed by this Operatir.g Agr~rueut in view of 
th~ LL C's purposes and the rnla.tionship 9fthe me!!,lbera. A~cordingly, fhc restricrior..s on disposition 
_conr.ained herain shall be spedficaJJy enforceable, 
. B.2 Prohibited T;an,rlers. Any pury.,on:ed Transfer of ~I or any po/:Lii;m of a Sharing Ratio 
rh-at does not satisfy the requiranxents of Sectio11 8. l sball be null aud void ~d of)?o force or effect 
WI!atrne-;ter; provided that, if L\e LLC is required to rece~e· a Tr:i.1.s.rer that. does no~ meet such 
rnq_uiranents: (or if the LLC, fa it:. sole dfacretion, elect:3 to recogniz~ a Transfer thar does nor sati;ify 
such requirement::;), ·t.'ia Transfo.rred ShJtting: Ratio shall be strictly !\mite~ to· i;ht! tran.'lf~ror's 
economic rights with respect to the Transferred Sha.'ing-?'-'ltio, which econon:i.ic rigb.cs ma be applied 
(Viitho~t limiting any other Jeg.al .or equiqi.ble rights of the LLC) to satisfy any debts, obliga.cior~,, o:F 
lia.bilh;jes .for dar;,.ages that the q:an3fcror: or &ssignee,of such S~aring Rado may have w the LLC. 
fo !he ca~e of a Transfer or arrempted transfer. of a S1Jaring R.:a.tio mat does not satisfy such 
r~q11iremerrt.,, tbe panJe.s cr,ga.gmg or attempting to engage jn :iuc:h Tr;msfer shall be liable i:o 
indelllJ!Jfy, d.e.fr;rtd and hold hannless th!) ilC and th,e other inember:i from itll cost, Ji_abiliry, .and 
darr.izg~ tiwt any of sucb indemnL.'ied pe.ruons may incur (iricluding, '7r-ithout' limitation, uicrc..q~raJ 
tf!.X linbility and attorneys' ~.ee;s arJd expenses) as a rcsuit of SlLch Transfer or attempted Tnmsfcr aud 
etfo:r"JS co enforce the inderrJ1J1)' gro.nted hereby. · · 
. 3,3 Admis.,ion of .A3si£nc~s ~s Members. Subject to che other provisions ~ftbis A ... -ti.cle. 
8, an a.isignee of a Shrtring Ra~io may- be admitted ta the LLC as a mer,lber od.Iy upon a majar:icyvote 
of ~he member:, and the Sc.tisfacrioa of suc.h other re,rrns o.nd conditions as they .shall require. 
S.1 Rirzht., ofUnadmirted A~;;ii:::neeJ. A perrnn who acquires a Sha.ring Ratio -birt who 
is cot admitre:d as a mell).ber pursuant ro this Article iJ (an "A . s1ig;Jce") shruT b.e entjt!ed only to the 
ecooorriic rights \~ch ·re~pcct to ,quch tra-n3forred Sharing Ratio in acconianc.e ""i~.b this Open.ting 
A~reement, e.ud·shl!U have no rigl}t to voie on ~iY rna.tters :J.i !l. cnem,ber1 sbo.l! have .noc right ro ·aµy 
infonnatioa or accounting of.the affairs of the LLC, shalt 110c be enritied £D inspect dJe. ba.o.ks or 
recor~s ~Ethe. LLC, and !Sliall oot have. any of the: rights of a member unaer th::: Ac, or trti.s Operating 
Agreement. 
OrI:::RAlING AG1:IJ!i:.r\IB.NT - i 0 
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Vi!'tHDRA.WAL tl)D) DISSOLU'TIQ}( 
HG, 2tc 
9.1 \:trthrJGwa!, .Each tnember agre-:s not to ·~iibdraw from the .LLC 1Y1thout rbe · 
copse:Jt of rill other members. A vohm.tary -..,;ith~rnwal in violation of trus Section 9.1 shall b.e 
~Te~\lttafr~c~·e~ ('3) ,"iJCi;th-5 •.:v'rirte:a ;wt:C1! ~c/i'1CTeG·t:J th~ ~anage-r:i, but &hclJ co.n:;:btJ.f.C ~ breach 
at rbis Ope..<!,..ing Agreement for wtich th(:'LLC a..1d orher trn::m.bera ~hall have all remedfo3 orov1ded 
unde, appJ~cabJe raw. · · · 
9 .2 Ev ems of Dbsolution. Except a3 othern:isa pro,,id ed in. tbi~ Operating Aarzemenr, 
.t.h~ LLC s_halJ· &tJ!)lYe upor. rhe earlier· of. (a) Marh, i.ucompetcnce, dissolticlon, r~nninat.ic~ or 
fof,fe.1tur;! ofthe right rn do bu;,iness qfan .E.r.rit1; Member, ba:nkruptcy or '?tit.hdri.i:waJ of a menber; 
(b) sale of all or subsca.i1ti::1lly all ·of die LLC's a.:J.set.s; (c) a vote of r..he rnember:s- holding at lea.st 
se.~·e.-rfJ-fivc percent (75%) of tbe Sharing Ratios; or (d) {lpproval c-f di:tsalutian by aJJ. unrmimi:::us 
vote of the mernb~f3. · · 
9.3 Effect ofDeat.h ofa Member. la the eve:.1t cf t.he death ofaMemb~, tpe remaking 
Membe.r-3 may with.in.90 days electro: 
9.3 .1 Ccntinue the LLC /lnd ad111ir the deceased· Member's spau:,e_. t?S'tate or other 
bencfafa.r<J as a ~ei-nbc, in place of the deccl!.scd Member; or · 
. . 
. . 9.3.2 . Continue the LLC fl.DJOOg the surriving M.embcrn and pcrchase tl;ie interest 
afrne dece::ued Me.-nqer pursuant to the prp'Vi.sions c.f Seccior.s 9.8 ~nd 9.9. 
The ~lection-\ghall b; at the sole disc;-etion of the Sl.l!"living Members ai,d shall n:q~ire th.~i.r .. 
u~cmimous consen1. If the sn!"".,.1vi.og Members do not so elect, the LLC,9ha1l ~e dis36!ved. 
9 .4 Eff~cy- of Withdnw,1J 1)r Other Event_ Upon th.~ i.ncof:Cpetcnce, \t.ithdrawaI, 
eX?!J)si.on, b~nkr~ptcy, or dissolurion of a Member, 'the remai.ning Members may within 'nm.cry (.90) 
days, witho\n waiving imy n:P']~dies in the e2..sc ofvo)unra.r; withdr;r,;yal, dect to conr.in1.i.e the µ.,.c 
amo0g thems:e!ves !!.IJd to purchi!-'le !he i.nterest of ihe ~ffocted Member punu:rnt to the .rrovision:; 
· cf Section., 9.S and 9.9. The e[cction sbafl be al t},e sole d.i:icre1:ion of.the .remnining Members- a.."l~ 
shall require cheiT una.rti.rnou:.··co~sent. Iftbe rei.na.ic.ing Member~ do nor so clccr, rhe LL\: ~hhll be 
d~~~d . . 
9.5 Put/C~/1 Offerine·Nocice. If a Me:mbet de.termirres to Dispo:<1e 9fbis Membeisr.Jp 
jmcrest for. a.i1y reason at any time during ,he term of i:.,\is Operating Agreem~nt (the "Inma::mg 
Mi::mber"), such .Member sh.all give Wilfte;: noti<;;c.(tbe.".Put/C:e,JJ Offering Nocicc'') of intent (G ~eu 
P.fl, but ?Jot les., tha.£7 all, o.f irs }.,{::m~t!fship fotcrcs~ c:1.at ts Che Offered L,terest to th~. remaining 
M~mbcr (t:hE', "Re3pam:!.i.ng Member"). The ~espo·ud!ng Ivfombi!r may v:,,icl:iia -fifteen (I 5) days of 
receipt of ch .t''Llt/CalJ 0.tfcring 1'iodce l.l'SK for wriitan cJa.rificat.ion as. co any a.spt:cts of the .Fut/Ci.11 
Offering Notice. Th:!: foJrfating Member $h11.II pro-vidc !l.DY derititarions the b..iti?-dng Mcrnbt:.r q.e.ems 
, nppropria.t~ \.7,ith.in five (5) d11.y·s of rccdpt of tbe request. for clari6ca.tiori:-o::-. 
Of'.E::H.A TINO AGR.EEJvfr:}iT - I I 
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. . 9.5. I _ Put/C111l Qff'eii:w Nofu. ff~ Member determines to Dis~ose of ;\is 
;(~b~rnup Int~r~ tor a...1y re.asan at ,1.riy t!mc. d~rir.g the. tc:--cri of this Opeq.ting fg:reeoent (th~ 
,rntia,fmg Member J, such Member .:iliaU g,ve '\\'rlf::en notice (the 1'Put/Ca.il Offering Notice") of 
frik1t tq sell ail, but n ct Jess tban aJJ, of JG Membership Inter~st rbat fa the Offered Inrere.st to 't.~o. 
... _ ... ·~, -'.-.:~~~~f,~i.~:11b:.\the "~esp_on~f~,,fornb:r') The &:Pondlng.M;mber may ;,ithJn fifteen (15) 
days ~i r~ce,.pr en: ilicPut·Ca.110.rren~g·Nctice aa~ for:vmrren ciar-i!ka.t~ns.as.to,.µcy: a~er;:ts oftl)e 
Put/Call Offering NC?tic~. The Initla-rh1g Member shall prvvide · any cie.rifica.tiocs: the' Idtia1ing 
Member ciecr:J:r appr°!:ri'a~!3 i,yfrbi.n 6-ve (5) days of recdpt of chc request for clari:fic.ations. 
...... 
. · 9.5.2 Pu.rc.h~s<lricc - Tr.rm;;, The: Ini.tiating M:ember ~hall :::petjfJ in h.s Offering 
Nu.ti ce. the purchase priC!: a:.'1d tc.rrnJ ar which tbe foitfatng Membe-:- would b~ .::..rilling to purchase 
.a.i.1 undivided one hundred percem (100%) intere.:it lf? the LLC. 
9.5.3 Exercise af:?ytJC~1!. Dpon receipt of the Put/Ce.Ji Offering Notice, the 
~e5ponding Member 3ha.!l qe oblig.1ted ~ither: 
, (a) To .sdJ ~o the foiriating Member iu Membership Interests u.t a p;ice 
and tem;s e.quaJ to the amouni: the Re~pnnding ?vJember. would have been· t!htitled to rc:~ive upon. 
dls.soJution o:f thc LLC pursu.aat fo the lfquidacioa dlstribi;ition prnvfa.ioos ~e<.: forc.h. m Section 9,6 as 
if tbe LLC ha.d sold rbc P ropcrty to a third pi!.ri:Y, at the price ii.Lid terms 3et forth in' th Put/Call 
Offering Notice, or 
(b) To p1Jrcha.sc .the Membenh.:p 11r.emst oftb.e Initiating Menibcrfqr the 
pric;c; and ccrms equal to rbe amou,.,i: thelnitiirti.-r:g Mem.bdr would h..wc been entitled to r~ceive upon 
dissolm~on of the lLC pur:suanr to the Jiqwd.aricn di.stributior: provisforn1 ser. forth in se~i:ion 9.6 as 
if th~ 1=,LC ha.cl sold tha Property ro a third parry, at ·chc price and tc:nm sot for..h i.a Pu.11.CaU 0.tfe:.i,'lg 
Notice. · · . · 
9.5.4 lfotifiqrion. The_ R.espondine Member shaU notifi the fairiacing }r.fombcr 
of its elec-rion with.in thiw; (30) days after th~ dari:ofr:1!:ceipt ofr.:hePutlCall 0-fferin,g: Notice. Failure 
to g:ive nqric:! within· the required tun~ pei:iod sh.nU be deemed .an election by th.:; R.e3pcc.~g 
Mamoer not .to pOfch.as.c the Offered Interest but rather co sell frs Membership foterest ·co rbe 
L1fria.rio.t1 ~{ember. The rhL--ry (3 0) day period sh all be e:ucnd.ed for nve (5) days if the Rc::sponding 
Member bas asked for cL1.tifica;ions a.3 set.forth above. 
9.5.5 Vpse of Offer. If the ~.spondirig ~.;ferr,ber fails co respond to i.ie Put/C~ 
Orreritig Nonce, or followi.riz an cf ~ciion by the Responding Member ta pu~ch3:5e: the Offered 
Interes~ rhe:Re.sDanding Member'fai!.s ta comllmrna.re the pwrchssc of the cntir~ Offer::d I;mera:.c in 
· accordance bere;.i,,ith, tben the Responding Member .!!haH be obJjgated to sell it.s c'ntirl! Me-mbe~b.ip 
Imercst to the foiriaiit'!g Jl1fomb er under the same terms a:nd condi!icns as provide·d in chi; Put/Call 
Offer-fog Norice. · 
9 . .5.6 .Li.t1tJ,a;;ion on Exercise. Notw:th:;t:i_.11q1.ig anything co. tlte contrary contained 
in rhis f-rticle ~ no .Oispasirjon of a Mem.ber;;hip Inter~s.t .~n~J be pe:rrnirtcd in the e;ven\ ihG.t su.ch 
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. ·. 9.6 'Dr'm:~ln.;-;:ion U"9ot1 bisJgJutfon,. Upon dia.'lo[utlcn ohhe LLC.as provided in rhis 
· A.i,1cle 9, tbc ,c-rcceclfa ~he,-,e.from sha.ll be applied. e..tJd dis:.,fov.td )n :he . .fol_towfog:_ order: 
-;- 'l, •, 
9.6.1 First, ro pay se:cu~ed debts ~o third p3JtieS and men:be.rs (exdi..:dfog a:::1y d~bc; 
to be asolX)ed pUJsu.1nt to an aeJ~ sal~, if ai1y); rben . . · ' 
. ' 
9.6.2· Sccon':1,,L1 the case otthe ;ial~ of.sub~ta..'1tially all ofrbe.LLC, a;;set~, tp pay 
the c~st3 of such s~ie; then · , . 
'9.6.3 'Third, to pd.y Un3ecur1;d debta of t'be LLC owed to c:cditcrs other the..r; 
r.nemben; rl)en 
. . 9.6.5. FL'th, w m.~mbers who h.e:ve made casb cnpitaJ or agreed value contril:n:tio;JS 
ta the LLC to the extent of sµc;1 cash Ci.1-.pi,aJ or a.greed value contributio~s; then 
Ratios. 
9.6.6 Tbe balrnce, if any) to rne.m~er:i in proportion to· their respective Shllring 
. 9. 7 Distribution~ and AJioca...rions 1n R..es~P,ct to D\300.~:~d of MembenJ,.ip ~ter2sts. If 
any Mer{i.bership Interest is sold, a:;:-i,§11~ or Disposed of durjng any T~~lc Year fo: ,complian~e 
with the provisi~r:s'o.fchi., Anick 9, Nee ProntsJ Net Lasses> each item tber<!~:f; anq :in other it~ms 
attribumbie to the Di.soosed of Meml:>enhfo Imeresr .cor such T~x.J.ble Year. ;fr:aU be divided and 
,;i.Hocmed berwe~tt t,1e t~ansferor and the A.s~ignee by rnking imo ~ccoupt th":ir varying Mcmbe:rJhip 
.I.rtterl!St'.3 during such. T~a'o/e Yee.r in accordance ,vith. code Section 706(d), u.qfrlg any convenrioos . 
pera1..hted by lav; a.nd seJectc9 by t.he Member.1. AJl Distributions or; or before the date of ;ru;ch 
Disposftion 3h11/.I be; ma.de to the tra.nsferor,and all bbtributia'os rb~a..-4:er sbalJ b~ rna:~h rn che. 
A:.signee. Solely fqr pu,posc.s of Olil.king rnch a/1.ot.adc-ns l1Jd Dis,tribntion,~. the I,.I ,C sJ!cll recognize 
such .Disposition not .later than r:he end afthe c,i'[endar mom.b during ~hich it is given noci.ce of such 
Di..sp:o~ition, provided r~at, if the LLC i~ given notice of a Disposition at letUt czn (!O) Bust.ness 
pay$ P:riM ~o Che! Disposition the lLC .shaU recognize such Dtsgosition as the dat~ of such 
Disp~sh:io'rl., and p;ovjde<l further thm1 if the LLC does not receive. a J.1ocice si:c1ting rhr. da.;e SJ.lch 
Member:ilup fotcr~.st was Diaposed cf And suph other in.form~tion a..~ the Ivie::nbers ma rcasoaabJy 
require with1n rhl.rty (.3-0) days a.f.r.cnhc t!))d oftl1~ Ta:<ab1c Year during '¥hi ch che Disposition .OC0-Jrs, 
then fl.ll such it~ms shnll be aUocatcd and '111 .DisrnputJons ~ha.1.1 ·b·e rnade, to the. Person who, 
a.cc~rding to the books s.ri.d record,~ ofth~ LL(;, :Vas the owner ofrb¢ Member3h.ip foterest qn the !ss~ 
eiiiy of the Tax:ab!e Y~a.- during ·wb.ich che Disp.os.itian occ~. Ndthe: ,he LLC n.or any M:~mbe, 
shid! inctw nny Uabllity for· 11111kiug aaUocatioq~ !lJld Dimibutior:is in o.ccorda.ncc "Rith the provisions 
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. 9.3 Yal"Ua7ic·r! of Member1a Inter8ft. Upon an election ·by ;:he LLC to purcb.a.se !be 
'• 
.,im:::rcst ofa \frrnberpur;:mani: to Section 9.J or 9.4, the value of ~he atfe~ted M,.m1.ber's inrE!resr s.ha.H 
?e_ 9.~:.,e:rym~ed b~ a t~ir market value appraiaal of the A:,a ec.i ( tho "Appraisal"). The Appra_.isaJ shaJJ 
be (:OmpJcred by· an ~iAl de$ignat..."'Q a'ppr~se(faii'Jliar wtth :simUaq:ommerci'J.lprop·erds;, i..vi¢ said 
appraiser to Qe 3eiec:1:~d by a majoriry'of clie or.her Members. The value of the 0'?1Ilership. Imeresc 
shall be d.crermined bas.1;;<l on the fajr· marbt value a, determined by t~c Appra13al and apponioned 
cr.mong the O•..v.::e.:Jhip for.cr~sts io accordance ?-ich the di.'lmburio1J proviaions ofScctio.o 9.6. S1,1ch 
a.rnount would be qie same a.mot1nt 0.ttribur;i.ble to tbe s3.II).e Ownergbip Jqterc:3t if cbe Aa3ers were 
being sold IIt the Aooraisal cs-ra.blfahed fuir marht vah.ic and i:h:! re:sult:uit arc<.:~d8 aooor-Joned aa ;, 
ser oiJt in Seccion 9·.6. ' " .J 
9.9 .rrne.nr for lvfomb-er1 s Intercsr. The purcha...~e price for a Member';, lnrerc:st 
purchased pursuant to Secrioo 9.J or 9.4 sh<1ll be paid b 5 .,;ub,m.ntiaIJy equal, cons~cutive annual 
payments, incJudifJ§ principal and intc,rcsr. rtJt~re/JC shaJJ ac~rue ~t the I'i!fa oft~n percent ( 10%) pe:-
annurn. Th~ fu5t pilymen-c sh.:.:.11 be made at the clo~c ofche trMsaction and the subscq\lent p2.yments 
s.h.a!l be made each y'!ar on the annive:r.!,J.ry ofthf-J.t date. Tbe.LLC may prepay µie rcn::airµng amoum 
of the purchil..'.le price :u a.1y time. 
9. IO ~tfect ofFun::base ofMeuxber's Tnterea1. A Member shall cease to be aMembc.rn:po11: 
the. LLC's elcctioQ to ourcb.a.1e the Mernber's interest oursw1,.1t to Section 9.3 or 9.4. Dur'.llg the 
period in Vthich [he LL .. C ls ipa.king pa.ymem:, to the fo~er Member, the for.n~r M~mbe;- s.fu.11 have 
no righ~s as a. M~ber i.u th LLC. 
. ARTICLµ 10 
MJ SCE.Lb!u"i ""E OU S 
J0.1 Add.itior.ai Documenh. Each mem.bej-' shall ex:ec1.nc suc.h ·add1donal-<loGUm.ents 
and tab such actions~ are r~?,sbr:ably requested in order-to complet:! or ~onfum the trmse.ction.s 
conrernp1 ate.d by trjs Operari.n~ Agn:ement. 
10.2 Headi.nss. Beadittg.s in this Opecnir.&" .'\grzer.:.en.r are fo, comcni~nc~ orJy ,'l,1d_3h.a.Jl 
net ilffe.c:t its .meaning, 
l 0.3 ~-~v~rabi!i,0 1_ •• The invaJ.idity or urrenfc.rceabilicy of a.'ly pro,r.sion of th.is Open.ting 
Agrcenen[ shall nae a:flcct the vaiidity or enfurC:':iJ.bilit:y oftbe rernaf_ni.'1g pro?isio11g_ 
10.4 ]~jrd~Party Benefida.rie.~. The prcvi::iior,.s oftb.b Operating Agreement are in.tee.deed 
S<Jldy fqr' "1he b~nefic of ~he mcmbeis and shall create 110 righr3 or qb[igatioru enfo.rceab!e by any 
th.i;d pfl.t"J, inc.Ju ding credico,r of ih LLC, ex-.ept :i.s otherrY:3e p~ovided l:ry applicabte Jaw. 
l 0.5 No °F'Vu.'l'crshfu L,t.:nded for Non-tax Purno .. ~es. The m:emben have foJ1!?ed the Lt.C 
1~nd~r ~he Act, and e:t'pres11ly do not ipterid he,reby to form a partile(.ship \.tader ert.btr the Idaho 
. TJnifoi rn Paritier:;hip Act nor the: fdabo Uniform Limited Pa.nnershi.P Ac-x. Tbe mem~ers do n?t:· ·· · , . 
• I ,,• ,I 
or B.A 1TNG A OR.[iE)\,!E2'iT - 1.:i. 
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for:md re ~e_Patzner.J cr;.e to a~other1 c, p.::ru1er.; ,:;s ro .'Ill; chfrd p~y. To the ex;:~nt. any me.mber, by 
word or acr,on. rcpre.~ents to e.poth~~ pcr-:;ori that any other m~ml::cr is 11 part1e;- or t.ia~ the LLC •is 
a p~ner:;hip, rhe member mili.ug 2uch w"Tor.g:fuJ represem,nion shall be liable ro aoy at.her member-
who Jr;.C'Jro·pgnonal liability by R:'!Jon or such \11;'ongfr1J r•ipn~~eht.itior.. . ' 
,,.~. . .. 
· 1 a. 6 ~-n~t~/-,it; luren13F~d fot Tax PU8o::i~. Tb.e memt~rs· have for.ncd the L.LC ui::-d~r _. 
tbe Act, and ex:pres::Jy do imend hereby ra ha Ve the LLC cl,mified and rreat:::c forpuroc5es of federal· 
and st~tf! in.cc-me raxmion as a par.nerahip. . • . . 
10, 7 ,Binding Effect. Except as other.vine provided in r~is Operating Agrce.1:1ern; eve:;;y 
covena..1t, term and prnvi.iion of this Qp~racing Agrzement sball be. binding upon and inure fa the 
benefit Of the members o..i.d their reilpective hei/3, Jcjp.taes, Jega! r2pre3~tatwe3, 3UCCeSSOG, 
transferees, ru,d as.,igru. 
I 0: 8 Ca.nifructio!l., Every covens.nt, term e ..'1d proviaior1..s of this Opc~ting Agre~?1e-.nt 
shalf be construed simply according ta its f.:ur·mean.ing- and no~ st..-rictiy for or. agair,st any me:rnber. 
The tam::s oftbis Opc::-a::fog Agreement are [o.rende~ to embody foe ec.o.n_ornic reJ.'ltiomihip among 
Jhc members and shall not be ,mbject to modili.cation by, or be cMfonned ·with, Z.'ly a..ci:~~ms by th~ 
Int.cm a! R:!.venue S~rvice except a3 tHs Operati,ng Agre-ement may be e:tplicitly so a.-nended acd. 
except as may relate apecfficaJJy to rbe .filiJJg of te.x returns.· · 
10.9 Time. Time is of rhe cs!Jence with respect to i:his Operating Ag:-ee:nem . 
. 10. IO ~;;,i11g Law, Tbe i.'l',l,'3 of the State of Jdaho shall govern the validity cf tp.is 
Operaring AgTe'$meut, t]:ie conB1:ructfon of its krm~, ad rhe ioterpr.ctatian of the. rights a.Dd duties of 
t.lic members. 
10.1 l \VaiTJer qf Action for Pa.cition; No Biil fo·r Pattne.rship Accc•mting. Each oft'1e 
.membc:-s irrevocably ,v,1iv~s a..1y right tbac he may have to maintain a'ny action for- p.arrition ,,vfrb 
re3pc'ct to ·any of the coinpany propen1. To the fuUesr exi:~t pennltted by Jaw, cacb member 
coven-ams not tO fi]e a bill for a Jimired /iabib'ry cor;no1LOy accounting. 
. . . 
10. ! 2 Couater.:rnn Exacution. This Operating A.greeinent m.ay be .e:{e~ured b·ar.,y number 
of c oun tcrparts ·with the .:Jame cffe:ct I:!:. if all of frie members had. signed the sa.-ne document.' All 
~OU1:]t~rpiln.:l Spl'..f/ b_e G0[1StI11:!d tage[ber /L.lJ s}iaU CGllJtitute One agreement. ' 
l 0.13 Sr:.ccific Perform.~. Eacr.. member agrees wi(.h the at.her, r,ier'11bers. t.har tb.e 
member :i wotdd be irreparably dc.rmi.g':!d if .any' of ch e provfsior'ts of this Opera~L'1g Asreemt;?nt ll.ie not 
perfonned in accordance wirh th!?ir speci.fic terms irnd th.at I)1onetary darriag-:s would not pro1;jde an 
adequate remedy iM .!:ucb eveor. Acc::orrlL,gJy, (tis agreed that, ir. a.~idition to any or!Jqr remedy to 
11,,•h]c.h tl1e non-brC,:!chlng members cu.y be entitled, at law ot in equity, the f!On-breac.hine; oiemberg 
Jhllll ba l:lmirJ:!d ~o injunc:,j•..,e, relief to prevent br~11.ches of the p,rovisfons of thfa Opcrnt,..,1g 
... Agreement and .spcci!kally co en.force rbe terms md provisions hc:n:of in any nctL?n institµtet:1 in ll.ny 
cerur. of the United S~arcs or a...y stmr! thereof havtng. subject marrer jurisdicti,9n· the,:-e:,of . · · · -._,. i. ,.:,'. 
. : . , I .' . 
"'d"!·As·t:;\2 .v--....1~·,. ..._;.J,,. 




10 '4 1,.- . All · i . · 
_. . .1 1 , at1ce. · notlce~. d2wiL!LS, requem and crher COIJ'...;',J!Jn.i.cqt]orrs rcq1.;ire:d er 
pernitted her:;undc.'f aball b-~ i11 w1irmg 3.Dd Jh.all a~· cfoemed deiiver:;d o·a the earJfor cf (i) rhree (J) 
day-3 after thi? darn cf P,Osnng ?f register::d or cer;:ified mail,· ~dc.r~ssed 10 the ;i.dd.res3c~ a.t rts address· 
sec forth hereja or ?1 Sllch cc.her a.ddrass 2s .s:ich' part may have spec1fid then:tof9rc by notice 
delivered in E?.·~l'.!o:rd2.n.ce' v.-iw1 this Sc.-rti ,)n, (ii) memptd d~livery or re:fusal to accept deli;ver1; if sem: · 
b;r< GOl:lrie; or.otbe;:p~nc;n<-il deliyery ser;:icc., _dr.(iii).,aQ.lctl rBceip~ by tbe addrr:iw~e.,r?g_?.r_d{~~~ .p{c~~ ·" , ... 
method of giving noi;\ce. The. addresses oec fort\ fo: Article 2, as !1..-ne:.1ded from time r6. time, sbail · 
be i..:sed for purposc3 cf giving notice: to memb~rn. 
10.15 PJt2fo:s and RetnedJes CumulF..tivc, The .rights and remedies provided b7 this 
Operating Agreement am cumulative nnd tho· use cf any one rig~t or remedy by my pa~; shall aoc 
preclude or waive ilie right ~o U&e any ar all other remedies .. Said right3, aw:l remedies e:re givt:il Lr, 
add.itioo lo a:ny o'tber rights rl.ie parties ma pare bey Lii'i statute, ord1nance er ofaer?,11s~. 
·10. J 6 We.ivcr.:;, The fail~re of a.17 p2..11.y to seek re·d.ress for vicfo.tioJJ of er to .in3ist upon 
the ~ct performance of any.covenant or rntdition of this Opera,ting Agreement shitll ~ot prevent 
· a subsequent act, which would h,1ye i)riginally coustituted a vfo!acion, froJ!l ha Ying the effect of ru'1 
original 1,.,iolation. 
lO. J 7 Atrornev F ec.'J. In t.h~ evenr any action is instituted ta enforce. or d~en:nine the 
pan:Jes, rigr.m or dmiea a.-is,ing ou~ of the tern1s of thfa Operating .Agreement, tl:1e pn:'-laiiin.~ pan shall 




Th.e foilow~ng ter:.ns ~sed jn thfa Agreen1ent 3lwll h~.Vi! the fo!Jmvj;-,g m~ing.s (unk~s 
othenYis~ e>..']J:ressly'providcd herein)~ . ' . . ' 
J l.J A.ditJst,,,:i b~ficit .1hrul me:1.-::, with respect to J.fJ}' .m.(:ruber., tbe deficit balance, if aoyl , 
L~ such rocmoer' 3 cap iul accourt us of the e·.nd of the r~l'~vc.nt fiscal year, af.:er giving 1:ffect to the 
fo!Jrnving adj:.istm.ern:s: · · 
· ] l. Ll rn~ c::i.pJral accauiit sha.!1 bt inc,e'i!Sed by any amaums whli:h such member 
is cibjjg.,ted ro te~to,e pur:;uari't to an1 provision of th:is .Operating Agreel]'!em or is deemed. r~ he 
obUg.:i.red r.o restore putmatJC co rhe ne;rt t;:, i.he la.st se.ntence:i o(RsguladGJJS Sectiom 1. 704-2(g)~ 1) 
and .l. 704-1(i)(~): amJ 
1 J. 1 2 The caoirn.l account .~hall be decreil3~d by th.e items described in S,;cupns 
l. 704- J (b)(2)Cii){d)(4), l 70~ l (o)(2)(ii)( d)(5) 11nd l 704-1 (b }(2)(ii)(d)(6) of the: R~gu!ati ons. 
Tbe fo:egoing dc:finicion of Adjusted· De±icir is incer.detj co co.r:iply wiih t.h.e pro•,1i~ion3 of 
$ccrion I. 704.-1 (b)(2)(ii)(d) of the Regtilatior,s arid .,hall be i:nrerpnlt~d cco~is~:~dy th~~'t-ith.. . . • .. 








('') . : 1 ~. 2 DS'Cr,::ci~t.ion shaJ/ mean, foi c~ch focal ye.1;1 an. .micurr:: equal to. the d~~ciari.on. 
amoi:7cat.1on, or prber co.st recc1,·ery deductfon l.lJowrrblc with Tl:~8pect to' an as::;et for S"J cb fi: sc-.J year, . 
. provided, h?-wever, tlJat 1.fthe 3!''J~.:r asse~ va)wc of an as:;cc di~r1 .from its ;1.dj1.1~3d ba.sis fur federal 
incomr: ra;c purpoJe~ at rJie pegirrnirg of ruch focal year, Dq.irec:iati9n 3haU be· au amcµIn w~sh 
bea?"s the sarne rat3a to suc.h begfoning Grosa Assa Value as the fecforaJ incor:::e ta,'1 deo:reda.tion, 
~ ·.· ..... ·· &mortiz~don,. Or o·t.~er cost. recover:-< ded11ccio11 for .9UC0 Ji;e2] Jew .Q~a,(.5 JO}µ£* beg:ippi~g. a~jl.l~ied 
tax ba:ii3; and further pro1,.ided, howev~r; that if the adjusted ba.sb for fed em.] i.1.-:on:ie. ca;,;; purposas 
of 1111 as:iet !l,I the begiruiing of such fisccl ye.1r fa zero. Depr-~cia:tio.n sbaU be determined -with 
reference to stJch begirin.ing Gross A?;Ser Value nsfng any reasof!ab{e met;iod ~elected by th~ 
mwagers. 
I I) Gros1. AJaet Value s}u.11 mean. a.,1 as~?t's adjustyd basis for federal income' t:1.."t 
pmpos~s, ex;:ept 11s foilow.3: 
l 1.3.1 The IrJdal Gross A3set Value of any a&ict contribut(!d by a me-m]:}e: ta the 
LLC sh.ill be rh~ gross fo.ir rrurl:ct value of roch a.ssct, as d~ermi.n;d by tile cont."rbtl1ing member; 
. . '• 
l l.3.2 The Gross A.:1sct Value3 af all irns·ern shaJJ be adjuated to, equaJ tbeir 
respective gross fair market vahJe6, M derctmined by LJJe n:t~bcr;.:; a3 of the foll~wmg times: 
(a) i:he acqufr,ition of p.n addinonal intere;;t h:1 the lLC by any ne,,:;; c, 
existing member in ·exc.he.r;ge for more than .1 de rrJ.nlini.s capital com:ribution; 
(D) the disc:ibutian by the LLC to a member of more than a de :rrJn1r.::is 
a.rziou.:i of pr:""Jperty as considcr~tioc for .;in iota1:ur i!1 the LLC; imd 
( cJ the liquidation of the LLC ~-ithi.n the meaning of Regulations Section 
L 704---l(b)(2)(ii)(gt provides however, that a.4jumn.e.n_fs pur;;ua!lt to cl.a.u.ses Ci) i:ryd (ii) abOV? s;uu 
be made acly if chc members reasonably determit)c th~t such. adju.stmcnt:1 are nc.c,e33ar'/ a.r 
lpproy.iaie ro reflect tbc relative. Sh~ring Rario1: ofclle members; 
. 11 .3 ..3 The v.oss A.nct Value· of any a.s:;et dimibut~.d to any member shaU be 
adju~ed .to egw!l tli~: gwss fair m~}cc value of sucT1 a3aet on the qate of distribution as dc:termi.i,.ed 
by the dlstributE:c ru,d t'lc:: members; · 
11.3.4 The Gross Asset Values of asset3 shaJJ be increased (or decreased) co reflect 
a~'' adj1.w.1ui:.:at.s to tbe adjusie.d ba,.i,, of such a...~s::u pur5llam to Cade. S~ctio.n 7'J 4(b) or Code Sec.ti on 
~43(b)> but ot1.ly ro rhe:; ext~m: that such zdjustmems ara ta!<e.n into accoum b dete.rrn.ini.n_g Capital 
Accauncs pur::iu ant to 1:(~gul.ar.ion Sec.lion l. 704-l(b)(2)(i•,)(m) hereof; provided, hovyr;ver, tr.at C-ra~;; 
Asse~ Value i;ha!1 nae be :uljumd pursuant to.rhf..s Section l l.3.4 co· r~e axtent the cuemb.ers 
<lctcr;n~e th.ar an 8djustmel'J-C is ne::.e:;::;a'r; er approptiatc in ccn.i:ectJon ,.,,;_tb a n-au.sa:ctfon t,,at wou!.d 
orJicr,0~ re.sulr: in an ~dJu~1mcnt ptirsuam ro rt.is S::-ctio.n 11.3 .4; e.o.d 
I • ..J..J' -)Q 







to Se!:'jcn l i .3 .1, l J .J .2 or J 1 .3 .4 herc-o~ suc.h 6o8s ,,l,.j.set Yalu~ shell .ihereaf::6- be adjJ..i~d by tl1e 
D9recia~o;i ta.k'!:;, into accatmt ·.,vith.r;;spect re. such as:iet for purposes of computing_ profl!3. and 
losses, · 
· l J. 4 ,LI£: j\unirnur:i Cr.ain sba.Jl mean the ;am~ as "par<-t.!ier3}:up .mfrrimDJU g;tlr;'' as set form 
·fo S,;ctiom 1. 70~2fo}(2:; arid l. 704-1(d) CTfthc P..egul-2:tion:1 .... ,.. .: ... :,. ... , ....... ,. _ 
.t 1.5 MemberHooreccune Debi shall have the ,:uem.i1g se~ for.h in Sr.c:tioo 1. 704-2(b)( 4) 
" "' P I t' fi " d ' ' . or r:1e ,.,r:gu a 1011s or p~nr.ier nonre:cour.se eot. ' 
· 1 i.6 ~/(ember Noo.rccc-Lir::c Debr)vf.in.i~u.~ Qain shaIJ mca.~ !J.,.'1, api..ou.ut, vnrh respe~ to 
each M...ernbcr N<::nrecourne Debt1 equal- co th LLC Minimum Gain rhat would result if such ·Member 
Norin:caurse Debt were treated o.s_;l NoN.;cour.~c Liabilhy, dc12rr.1ined in accprdance \\iu1 Sccrion 
I. W4-2(i)(3) of the Reg11.laifon:i:: · 
11. 7 Memt:er NanrecouGe Ded_uctio~s shcl!. ba.vc ~he meanJng set for-Ji in Sect5or.s l. 704-
20)(1) a."1d I. 704-2-{i)(2) oft.he Regu1atf cna for "pa:rc~er ncnrecourse ded'uctions.11 
J 1.8 Na_11.recoursc Deductions sbaJJ hn:,r:: rhe meaning 4ct fQTLh in $eqion J .704--2(0)(1) 
of the ReguJa.tions. · 
1 J.9 :t{Qn.reco1Jnc L:2bJJi~r shall have the mea.i-nng set' fonh in Section J .70'4-2(b)(J) of · 
r,~e Regulatlon.1. · 
•· 
l I. l O Re,zulatiom :ih.al! mem propos.ed, ·tempopry and flm1l re@}Jarioas promulgated uuder 
tht! Code in e:fftict as of-thy date of fi!U1g the .A..rtides and the correspondmg seccicios of fJ.rtY 
regufotior.:r SUCSC(JUt!ntJy j$3U,ed thn_f ~')1.eud or Sl.lpenece SUCO regulatioCS. 
12 .. 1 
order: 
A,1?, Tf CLE 12 
CERTAIN TAX.PROVISIONS 
.SQ~cia/ AJlocatiocs. The foJlo-,,,.ing .;necfa./ allocation., sha:.!! be me.de ir. tbe following . . 
. 12. l. I · IYfinimur.1 Ge.in Charg_cbac_~, Except aG- oih~rwise pro•.iic;l'ed in ~cc1ion J. 704--
2(£} of rhe kgulaiion.~ promulgat~d under the Code in.effect !!.3 oft.he dgre of.filing tne·A.r"~cl:::s and 
cbe correspon.dir;g sections of -:J.ny regttfark,us sµbsequently issued t~at amend ·or supersede. such 
regul11.ciaru, norw(thsrd!.ldJng a.iy other pro'risioo of ch.is Article 1 z, if the.re Is a nl:i rlecrease In .LLC 
lv.finirnu.m Giin dut~,g 11cy fiscal yea;, .each member .she.!!. be specia!!y altoca-ted items of LLC 
.incomr.. arid g;tin for such fiscal. year (and, ifllece~sar/, stibscquenr fiscal years) in a., iunounc equal 
LO ·.suc;h inembe(s share of the net decrease in LLC i'vfin.imum Gain, dec~jned in accorda.nce with 
H..:gula.ticrn Scc·don I. 704-2(g). Alloca.tians pursuant to !:he pravious ser,tenr.e shall be: .made i.n 
pro pc1rtio11 to lh.e re.spec.tivc 2-.ruouncs iequired to· be alloi.:.tti:d rn each member pu'rsi1ant tli.rrero. The ( 
ii::~ms ··co be so ~11 ocz,ed shall e dctem-.inect irr :..ccc-rde.;,ce with .Sections J. 704-2(f)( G) and· J. 704- ·. !<·· . . .. . : 
Ol?E.JV, TJ:J\m 1\ Ci-REEMENT - lg 
I '--'L..I .....,U 
I • , 
/:· . 
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2.G)C2) _of che Rcguistion:i. T:1is Sccnan 12. l s int~~ded to comply w(rb rhc .min.bum gain 
ciirrrgeb:rck .r~guirem~nt L1 Se~co.1. 704-2(r; of the R.e'.~..1lar.on.;1 2u.1d iJha.11 be inter;reter:i cor-.c'liste,i,:ly 
~~ili . . 
12.1.2 M~mber Mlnimum Gain Cna.ry:clJacli:. Except '18 ot.'ienvise provl d~d in 
Secrian 1 ... 704~)(i:)( 4 ). of cbe·.RegJJ!adons, nai:Vfithmn.d.ing im other provision of thi.J fi.,.·'ti.cte .. P. if 
tliere is a a.et decre1LSe in Member .Nonre~ou.rse Debt 1\-foimum Gain attributqble to a Memb~ 
Nonrecourse Det,t during a~y Bscal year, each mernberwho bilS a .9h~re ofth.e Member Nonreco~r:i.e 
Debt Minimum Gain. a,tibmabfo to mich Mcmbe:-Nanr~cou:seDcbc1 dex."!rmined in accorda;1.ce. "?11th 
Sectiipu l. 704-2(i)(5)' of the rtgu!.a-tfon31 shall be specialjy a)Jocated items ofL!.C income~~ gam 
fer ruch fiscal .rear (and, ifneces~ar.J, .::ubseguenr fi.sd yea;-3) ir;i an ap-l'Quttt equal to sucb m.cmb-~r's. 
sha:re: of tr: ner qecrc-ase in M~rnbe.r No:nrecour,,e Debt .!v.finimtJm Gain amibutable to such Member 
Nonrec.?lJr:3a Debt, d.eterrnbed ill accord.ancc wti:h Re:gulatiom Sectjon l. 704--2(i)( 4). ..6-Jlocatioos 
pu,"mliU:ii to the prnvi ous ~ante nee shaU he: made J.n proportJon to the res.pecti·~ ai.'llouci:s reqcired to 
be :t!Jocattd tci each member purStJa.r.n: thereto. The iter.111 to be so alloc2.r.ed shall be c:f ~1:ennined ln: 
ac:con::la.1ce'with ~eciions l.704-2(i)(4) and J.704-2(j)(2) qft.}1.e ReguJ'!-tion.s. Thi$ Section 12.l.2 
is intended ta cornpty·:Vith the minimum gain cli.<!rgebackrequirc..T.ent in Section l.704-2.((i)(4) of 
the Regulations atJd .shall be iDterprcud cansistenUy rberewith. · 
12.1.J Oualif.i;p Income Offset. )ii the event any member ur.,expecr:cdly rec!!ives a;iy 
adjuerments, aUocations, or distriblJUOn."3 tjesc;;:ibcp m Secclqn 1. 704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(4), Sectign 1. 704- · 
l(o)(2)(ii)(d)(5) or Sectioo 1. 704~1(b)(2)0i)(d)(6) of the Regul:i.tioM, h:ems o~¥C inco:qi~ and gain 
.~hall boo specially alloca~ed to eaoh S'1Jch member in an amount a.,d maJmer sufficient to eLirnine.tc,. 
to the ertent requ.irt?d by the :R.egufation.9, tbe Adjusted Deficit of such me-pitier a..5 quickly as 
possibie, provided. ~hat an. allacarioo pu.quam ;o this S~ccl~n 11.1.3 shall be rnade a_nly·if a.ud to ihe 
extent that such 1nemb~r Wollld h~'lo a.n A<ljuated Deticjt afkr a.11 other alfocatio.t'ls provided for in 
this J\.i,icle 12 ·bave been tem-ati,1ely mad!! a5 if this Section ]2.1.3 were not i'n ~hfa Opera.ti.r.g 
Agracment. 
I,?.). 4 Gross Income AJ1ocatio11. In th~ eve::.t any mct.iber h.s s. defidt Capital 
Account ,H r./Je ead of any ~.'lc.1J ye;;>..r which ia ·Jn e;~ce:,s of the ~um of; 
(a) t.J1e arr;ount snch member i!. obligatc:d ro res~or~ parsuant to a.r:iy 
provi.s/on ofd1b Opcr:ilulg Agic::;n_c:rJ(, IUJU 
(b) the 1:.moW1t such memb~ is detmcd to 0!'! obligated co iesto,e 
p_u.rsuant to the,nex~ to th.clllSt sentences ofR.e.311/ajon:1 Sec.tio;.s 1.704-2(g)(1) aod l.704-i(i)(5), 
c.~ci, such met:1ber shaU he specialiy a!locat.od itern.9 ofLLC income an-d' gain in tbe a.Jnoum of sucli 
excess as quickly a·~ possible, proV'ided tht! a.u allqcadon pur.s~ant to t.his Section .1.2.1 . .4 ~haJJ !;,c 
· made onJy if a::id tu the c.crent thar sucb member would ~',le a deficit cap~aJ acconm in' i::.xcess of sucq 
llUrn. afier a/! other aJJoc.ntions prov(ded for in this f.rticle 12 have been made· as if Secticp ii: 1..3 
/,c.rcofa::id t1'js" Section l J.1.4 were n.::1t in this Operatio~Ag;e!:mcnt. · 
l.2. l .5 Nor..i-ecq_~nr. Deductions .. Nonre.ca'ur3c Deductions for any fisc.!l:! ye~r sh~! 
' ' 





(""': be special!:; allocated to tl,e :r.ec:-;bc,~ (n p,opor.iDG to rheir Sh;i_ring F,.atios: 
· 12.1.6 Member Nonrccc-urse bdudons. AnyM~mberNonra.ccur:seDeducciol's for 
a.1y faca) yeu shall b~ specially a.Jloqted to rh.e m£111b~r wba bea:s· 'the econor;nic risk c-f:lc:iss wirh 
respect to d1c Member N9qrecour3e Deb;, to whicb such Member Nonrecour-.x'! Deducricos ~c 
· attnbdab)c.-in ·ac;;o,;:ia.1c_e wiµ1 Reg1tfod.0J1S·S e.ci:ion 1. 704-2(j)(l). , ,; ___ . . .. . .. · 
12.1. 7 Section 754- Aaju~t.mect~.' To the extent a.n ~dju~trPent to the adju:n~d r:ax ba..<:is 
of any LLC SS,'h!t pnr.n;ai1t co C:qdz Secti.on i3 4(b) or Code Section 7 43(b). is rE:quirad, pur51182f1: to 
R~gu/atiqn~ S2crion l.70:4-l(b)(2)<iv)(m)(2) 9r Regulatious Sectjoo I:704-J(b)(2)(iv)(m)(4). To be 
ta..brr into ace.own iil. dernrmirJng capita.I accounts as the result. of a dimibution to a ~ember in 
c?mplere liquidation of the member's She.rin3 Ratio [n fr,e l.LC,. the· run aunt of f!lch a;Jj11st..,H~nt ro 
c:a.pical .1ccouat~ ~hail be treai:ed as an irern cf giin (iftr.y adjuscmc:1r tnc:;-ca!ieS the ~ash of 1he a.sse~) 
or !as~ (if the a¢ju.m1?enc iiic{~ses lhc basis ·cf,h.e as;et) a.nhe !oss (iftbe adj1.1s;;.ment dcc;rc.l!.es s.Jch 
basis) BTJ.d such gai1r or lqss s.h.1.ll be 9pecially. ailoC.lt~d tq tbe member i:1· accortlanc-e v.'it.1 thei:.-
Sharfog Ratios in the LLC in t~e e·1cnt thai Re~ation.1 Section 1. 704-!(o)(2)(iv)(m)(2) applies, or 
to che member .to wboiu such distribution was made in tne evenr tbar.Rcgulations Section l.704-
7(b)(2)(iv)(m)(4) applies. · 
I2.2 _9y,r.:i.tive . .aJJo~atigog. The allocations s~t forth in Section sl2.1.l rn.rough 12.). 7 
hereof (t)J.s ''Regulaior1 .til!ocation.~'') are inteud~d to comply wir.h certain requirements. of the 
Regulations . .It_i5 tbe imem of the member3 tnar, ta i.be e:crent poS3ib1e, all Re.giJ.farnry Allor.adon.s 
shall be offset either with pilie, R~gu!arory .,..\Dccatio,1.s or with spcciaJ allc-~a1io.11S or rrrbcr items of 
com_pa,ny income,. gru.n, loss or. d edt.::ction pqr3uant to this Section 12 .2.. 'fl?.crdore, ootwithsta..,;:iL"Jg 
.my other provi.9inn of this Arude 12 (other than the Ragulatory f..llocations), the members &.ha.JI 
make Sl\.c.h offsetting special aJJ o<:.'1.tioo.'J of LLC incc m e1 gain, lo.sa or deduction in wbacever o:i.;mnei 
~hey deterr..ine appropriate so that, a:.4.9r such off~etting ~lo0~foo;.,.1trc ma~e. each membcrs' capital 
accoum fa, to tl1c e;...1.~nt pi:m.tbJe, equal to th~ ca.pita! account ~ch member would have had if the 
Regi.;la.iOry Al( ocarions were not pa..,-:1 of this Operating Agreement epd al! LLC it~ms were allocat~d 
uur:rnim t to Ar.:ic!c 6. ln exercising: discretion under th.i.g Section 12.2, the me:tnbcrs shall take im:o 
~ccounr fi1ti.l(e R.eglllatory AJJ.oca".ions under Section l 2.1.1 and 12. l .2 thar, although not yd ma.de, 
are Hkeiy to offset other Re~lacoq A.llocadans pr~\iou.sly mad~ under Secticns· 12. J .:5 a.rid I 2.1.6. . . . 
12..J Otl.1.t:r Allocation Rubs. 
11.3. l Fo,pufi?oses ofdete~ng th~ profiw, los3cs, or any otJicr frems al)oe,wle 
to.any period, pr:ofas, losses, a,,.d a.'ly such other itt:ms sha!l be i:£.e.cermi.ned_oo e. d.2:iJy, rnontbly, or 
odrer ba.~/s, as determined by ~1.c C1cmb1::rs L1sin3 any permi;sible m.::thod under Code SectimJ 706 
and rne ,Regulations ¥he,eull~ET. . . . 
.. 
12.J.2 The mo::mb-ern are awr.re of the incorne'tax c9nsequences of{_i1e a:Jlocations 
rn.'!d e by Article 6 and thi; Arricle 12 md .h·::reb:r agre-a to be hnunc by the provisions of Aftide 6 aDd 
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: 1.2.3.3 Solely for purposes of dct:::&Jning a rr:er;:ber's p.rcpor'don.1te share cfr.b.e 
"e:r.ces~ non.rc::ourse.liabiiitie..s)' of foeLLC witmn rhe mec.n.ing cfRegulatiocs Semon 1. 7.5rJ(a)(J ), . 
the r;:,ember'~ L1ccre.:3t.9 in LLC prnnrs sh~ be in propcrJon to their Sh.rring lu.:ios. 
12.J. 4 To tbc e;q::::-n: pemuttc:d by Se.cticm I. 704-2{h)(.3) of tbe ;Rcgu[arion~, fhe. 
mernben sbaI..! endeayor·tff·b-e:at distributions of .oe;- ci:,h fro8 0peratior.s er net c2:ili from sales. cc..~ 
ner. c;a.sh from rcii.nancing as ·haying peen m~de from the proceeds of a No.tlfecourse Li~billr:y· or a 
M~mbcr Nonrccourse Debt o.nly to the e;.:r~m thar such disb:ibutio.ns would caus,:! .c1 rnc:-ease an 
Adj\.1si:ed. Deficit for nny member . 
. ADOPTED ;;{foctive as of the i.f &y o.f Janu.~ry) 2001, by tJ:;e\mdcf,igned, consdruting .l.]J the men1/:;en; of the LLC: · 
------c--=--:-
Renee Bairo 




• • FiLf::u EFFECTiVE 
28G 
AJVlENDED AND RESTATEC 
ARTJCLES OF ORGANiZATiON 
Lf~;UTED LIABILITY COMPANY 
(Instructions on back of application) 
03 SEP l 2 PM 3: 33 
SECRETi\HY OF STATE 
STATE OF IOAH'© 
1. The name of the limited liability company is: Real Homes, L.L.C. 
2. lfhe date the articles of organization were fiied was: -J.4-At.J-<l•a~.,..*Y~l~o:.....,-2'""0,ll..OC.!.-1 ____ _ 
The Articles of Organization are amended and restated to read: 
3. The name of the limited liability company is: ___ Rea J Homes, ! . L r,. 
4. The latest date certain upon which the limited liability company will dissolve is: 
January 1, 2011 
. . 
6. The management of the limited liability co "'f" r y shall 
D Manager(s) ca Mernoers. 
7. The name and address of at least 1 manager or member: 
Name: Address: 
Dennis J. Sallaz. 1000 S. Roosevelt Boiae, Idaho '1?}101.°"S' 
8. Signature of at least one manager, if any, or at least one member. 
Sign~ture --------
Typ~d Name Dennis J. Sa 11 az 
Owner Secretary ol State use only 
rDflJ-0 ~MY CF rnm: 
09/12/2003 05109 
CX: ~ CT: ~H Bff1 71H7& 
1 @ 33.88" 38.8<! ~C I 2 




SALU.Z &: GATEWOOD LAW • 41JOOJ 
J PROMISSORY NOTE 
NOTE AMOUNT: $ ID.BOO Boise. Idaho 
Date: 06/ l 0/05 
I PROMISE TO PAY to the order of ROY RICE, of Boise, Idaho, TEN THOUSAND 
EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS AND N0/100 DOLLARS ($ 10.800.00) payable in lawful 
money of the United States of America, with interest thereon from and after June 
10, 2005. until paid. of the rote ofTWELVE PERCENT per annum/ J 2%). Principal and 
interest ARE DUE ON DEMAND. 
If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note, I agree to pay such 
sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees. The maker and endorser hereon 
jointly and severally waive presentment for payment, demand. protest and notice 
of protest of non-payment of this note. 
Dated this _j_ day of June, 2005. 






u q 1 ·Jou u u 6 l 6 : J 2 FAX 2 0 8 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD Ui' 
PROMISSORY NOTE 




I PROMISE TO PAY to the order of ROY RICE, at Boise, ldoho, TEN THOUSAND 
DOLLARS AND NO/ l 00 DOLLARS/$ I 0,00.00J payable in lawful money of the United 
States of America, with interest thereon from and ofter September 21, 2005, until 
paid. ot the rote of TWELVE PERCENT per annum fl 2%). Principal and interest ARE 
DUE ON DEMAND. 
If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note. I agree lo pay such 
sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees. The mc·~er and endorser hereon 
jointly and severally waive presentment for payment, demoncl, protest and notice 
of protest of non-payment of this note. 
Doted this 21st day of September, 2005. 
PROMISSORY NOTE$ I 0,0009-21-05 
000972
04/06/200/i 16: J2 FAX 208 :JJ -6:l SALLAZ & GATEWOOD LAW 
I '41004 
BILL OF SALE 
) 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That, DENNIS J. SALLAZ, the Party of the First Part, the Seller, for and in consideration of 




'• , . .-' 
.:.. ..... 
) 
America, to him in hand pajd by ROY RICE, the Party of the Second Part, as Buyer, the receipt 
whereof is hereby acknowledged, does by these presents grant, bargain, se !l and convey unto the said 
Party of the Second Part, the Buyer, his successors and assigns, al! right, title and interest to the 
following vehicles/trailers, more particularly described below, free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances, to-wit: 
2002 Yamaha Grizzly 660 A TV, VIN No. JY4AM02Y22C022268; 
1998 Yamaha Grizzly 600 ATV, VIN No. JY4AJ01 WAOl 1016; 
Tandem Axle 4 Place ATV Trailer 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the same unto the said Parry of the Set:ond Part, its successors 
and assigns forever. And does for himself, his heirs, successors and assigns covenant and agree, to and 
with the said Party of the Sec~nd Part, its successors and assigns, to warraut and defend the sale of 
said property, goods and chattels, hereby made unto the Party of the Second Part, its successors and 
assigns, against all and every person and persons whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Party of the First Pa:0 has hereunto ·,et his hand and seal this 
5th day of May, 2005, at Boise, Idaho. 
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DENNIS J. SALLAZ, 
9 Defendant. 
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rUNE 15, 2005 
• Page 470 I 
Page '163 
C: Do you .,,va11t :o ·· 
A )kay. Debra, whar page ;::; d,m? 
Q I'm just referring to your exhibit. 
4 identify what items you have sold. 
3 If you could 





MR. BEVIS: she's asking about the four wheelers. 
THE W!TNESS: Yeah. 
MR. BEVIS: I don't know that I've got --
TIIE WITNESS: okay. Just the two Grizzlies, if you 










MS. EISMANN: That is number 66 and 67. 
MR. BEV!S: on the left-hand side. 
Tiffi WITNESS: Yes. 
B°¥ MS. EISMANN: 
Q Okay. So, tbose two were sold? 
A Those two and the trailer that they are sitting on. 
Q You have listed two AW trailers in Item 68. 
A Yes. 
Q And so one of the two are sold? 
20 A Yes. It's the one that holds four machines. One 
21 holds two machines and one holds four machines. The 
22 Grizzlies were on the one that holds four machines. 
23 Q And you stated in your descriptipn that you own 





Q You nlt:c at 4,00v i, . .ian? 
A Yes. ·t t commun1 v asse . 
Q And you have characterized it as a , 
A Yes. ·. · yainaha Grizzly, you 
Q And you·· and item 67, a 1999 . . t ? rll ty m er est . 
6 valued at 2,500 doUars. That's a co11ur1U 
7 A Yes. d h }1ave state t e 
8 Q And one of the ATV tailers ·- you 
9 one that carries four ATV's? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q That you sold? 
12 A With the Grizzlies. · te t 
13 Q Okay. Now -- and you characterized your m res 
14 in the trailer as community? 
15 
16 
A As 50 percent. As community. h 
trailer w en you 
Q So, the value is -- you valued the 
17 sold it at what figure? 500 . t 
! 8 A Well, I had both of them at my half at f t,hBUT75
1 
. 1<age or e . 
19 was just a package sale. Here is the pac 
20 There is no breakdown. d ak d' you m ·e your 
21 Q And when did you do that? Whel1 1 
22 sale to Roy Rice? t t 
23 A It was the same day that I delivered the p~yidnen °th 
,<"J to pm own e 
24 you, would probably be the best way to u.1 · 
25 A I do ·• did. 
25 exact day, because I brought it. 
Page 471 
2 
Q So, did he receive a portion? 
A No. He consented to the sale. 
Page 469 
MR. BEVIS: was mean -· 
b h. · · ght bere, 2 THE WITNESS: I rotlg t rt stral up ki f h' . st loo ng or 1s 
Q He basically reLinquished his interest in it for 3 MS. B!SMANN: And that's okay. I'm Jll 
4 you to sell it? 4 recollection. 
5 A I still owe him half a trailer, but he agreed that 5 1HE WITNESS: Maybe a month ago. 
J 
6 I could sell th~m. 6 BY MS. EISMANN: -- May 15th. 










A Yes. 8 A April or May. 
Q -- for those Items 66 and 67? 9 Q April or May of 20057 
A Yes. IO A Yes. 'd 0u sa1 you 
Q For 7,500 dollars? 11 Q Now, you had further testified that '/ f D L d part rom a . . 
A Yes. 12 paid in two checks, one from Roy Rice an 1 b I ld. 0 may es 1ou 
Q To Roy Rice? l J Evans loan. That's what my notes reflect, 5 · 
A Yes. J 4 clarify. . , . I r~om each 
Q And we delivered the money to yo\lr attorney? J 5 A I think r pru.d 50 percent of his b1! ' 
A l did. l 6 source. e payment to 
Q Was.that by your O\Vrl check or a check from Mr. 17 Q I see. And you're referring to the sa111 
18 Rice? l 8 Mr. Bevis? 
A I believe I had to make it out payable directly to 19 A Yes. . ? 
17 
. I3ev1s. 
20 Jim is my recollection. 20 Q And what amount did you pay ~fr. 
MR. BBVlS: I don't know. r didn't receive those. 21 A It would have been probably 15,000 even. t Mr t..ef..TVO . 
22 BY MS. E1SMANN: 22 Q And that was paid from the sale of t,, 
23 Q So, you had listed item 66 on Exhibit 20 J, a 2002 23 Rice? 
.24 to Yamaha Grizzly? 24 A Half. 
25 A Yes. 25 Q Half of the 7,500 dollars? L.:.----------------__L, __ ,;__ _______ -=p---:.468 - Page 471 
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$3.50 Fee* NOTICE OF RELEASE OF LIABILITY $3.50 Fee* 
!!"LEASE PR.fr.ff CLE.-\RL'r' - ALL L\/FOIU[ATION i'rJUST BE COMPLETE - NOTTFICATTON BY SELLER!TR..\.NSFEROR [S MAi'll)ATORY 
~ Hull fdcmifkal.ion Numb(r (VIN or HIN) Yc:Jr M:ite Body S1yk Tide Number 
lGBKP37W5K3302440 1989 WINN MH 98909668 
··'s/Transferor's Full Legal Name(s): Daycime Phone: 
's [daho Drivers License Number(s) or Soc ial Security Number(s): 
$S' C ity: Seate: ___ Zip: 
<!'ter: Sell ing Price: $ Dace Deli.·;e red (0 Pure haser/TrJns feree: 
:1ser 's!Transferee 's Fu ll Legal Name(s) &. [daho Driver's License Number(s): 
i5: Cirv: Srnte: Z ip Davri me Pho ne: 
'I! h<!r.:by request chill chc ltJ.:i.ho Tnn.'ipOrtJ!ion Dcpa11mcnl mark it,;; record.,; co indic;i tc: ch;11 th( vchidc nr ·:cssc:I ckscribcrJ :1bove h:i~ tan 1r:.1ns[an:c1. Howc·,cr. 0f/w<: undc: rstJnd thnt 1hc ,i1k record 
will rem~in in m;,tour nJ,ni:(.~) unul .l new fd:1lrn C.:rririt.:011! nf T ille is Jppl ii:d for Jnd i.1;,,;ucd , recordin g 1hi: n,unc(H \1f th<! ni:·.Y ,)wni:rf.'i). 
x ___________________ --,·.....,vrt::H-·• ' l fri--T l _t 
Si•,pw111 n: uf s~11~11 i )ITrn11:./eror(fl t.:AH. u 1 ~--D---
000976
e • OV06/2006 16:J.2 FAX 208 ,-0 _263 SALLAZ & GATElVOOD LAW 
JPURCHASlE AGlRJEJEMEN'f fOJR. SALJE OF 
INTEREST JN JRJEAL HOMES, LLC 
@006 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 6ih day of JanuaJy, 2006, by and between 
GLENN TREFREN and DENNIS J. SALLAZ, SELLER, andREALPROP.ERTIES, LLC, BuYER. 
W IT NE S S ETH: 
W.HEREAS, Sel.lers each hold 100 % ownership interest in Real Homes LLC. which is all of 
the ownership .interest therein, an LLC fonned and recorded with the Ida.ho Secretary of State on 
January J 9, 2001, and 
WHEREAS, it is the mutual ,:lcsire of the parties hereto that Sellers :;hall sell to the Buyer all of 
said Ownership Interest and aH right, title and interest in and to all real property owned by Rea] Homes, 
LLC as set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements herein 
contained, 
IT JS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties as follows: 
] . -Sellers hereby agre-:.s to sell to Buyer and Buyer hereby agrees to purchase- from the 
Sellers, aH of said Ownership Interest owned by Sellers, being all of the Ownership interest thereof: 
subject to the terms and conditions herein set forth. 
2. It is understood and agreed that the total purchase pcice for said Ownership Jnte,est 
shall be the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand and no/100Dollars ($250,000), lawful money of the 
United States of America.-to be paid by the Buyer to the Sellers as follows: 
(a) Buyer shall assume all recorded encumbrances against all real properties owned by 
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Real Homes, LLC; including, but not limited to, D. L. Evan~; Bank, Perry Harding, 
CPA, and Canyon County property taxes and Buyer shall hold Sellers hanniess 
therefrom. 
(b) Said encumbranc~s include that certain Note and Deed of Trust held by Saxton Fruit 
Fanns dated 02/13/2001 which is in default and set for foreclosure sale on January 6, 
2006, and Buyer agrees to pay same in full prior to sale. 
(c) The balance of said purchase price after payment of the title encumbrances shall then 
be paid by Buyer to Sellers in two equal cash shares from the net proceeds from sales, 
foco.me or other disposition of any or all of the said real properties herein. In any event 
said payment shall be made no later than 24 months from tht; date hereof. 
(d) Provided, however, that Buyer agrees to give Seller Dennis J'. Sailaz an advance of 
$5,000.00 as a partiaJ payment on his Attorney fees due to Jim Bevis prior ro April 10. 
2006. 
3. Sellers represent, warrant and agree with the Buyer as follows: 
(a) Timt the Ownership Interest which is being sold herein const itutcs I 00% of the 
Ownership of Real Homes, LLC; 
(b) The SelJers have good.and marketable title to said Ownership Interest being sold and 
transferred hereunder with absolute right to sell, assign and transfer same to Buyer free 
and clear of al! liens, pledges, security interests or encumbrances and without any 
breach of any agreement to which he is a party. 
(c) The Sellers covenant that all real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC and being 
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transferred herein are free and clear of all encumbrances not listed herein. 
(d) Real Homes, I"'.LC has free and clear title to said real properties and Sellers shaII 
execute any and all documents requested by Buyer to transfer a!J interest therein to 
Buyer. 
4. Time is agret':d to be of the essence of this Agreement and the performance thereof 
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of tb.e heirs, executors> 
administrators, personal representatives and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have hereuuto -'.>~t their. hands the day and year fo 
this Agreement :first above written. 




By Glenn Trefre~ 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC, P. J 
000979
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PC 35773 
Kxltlhi t • A.. 
A. portion 0£ t:ha aoutmr-oat Qua.:t't&r o! tba No:r:th,H.11t OWU,t,ar of 
So<:tiou 1.7, Townahlp J North. ll.~11 J fla.ut o! tM ncd.at11 X•:tld..ia.u, 
CIIUij't'.lXl County, Idm..ho rmd i llr :mo~ patiaulaxly diSocrl.b ~ 1.11 J!o1.l0Wl!f 1 
~!NO at t:l:la .bfor.tfuiml!lt c<:i:rncr o-r. a-1.id Soutln«H)t Qularte:r of ~ 
Nor t.hc:ita t Qua..rtor; t.h~ • 
South o· 35' 1-i• West ;;iloug the Neat ~ry of 111aid Sou.t:h'Jf"'01"t 
Qw).l;te:z;, of ·the Nort:.haJut Quu:tol:' & di.u:~0111 o:1! 1-i5.1S fast, t:lumae 
llorth 9.9• {.5' 5.1" R.ast :pa.x;allllll ld.th th111 N'orth baundu:y ot tho 
Northaall\lt Qwt..rtm:i:- ot. said Btu!UM 17 a dii,t.i,.ncllt of. 40. t'JO !~~t to 
thllll tttne PODl'l' OF n~uxmr.nio, th.m.aa oontb:xttlm, 
North a1• B • 51"' Kaai;; plL1:al1d with ~l!:3id .North boundary a 
d.ua~o.f :B~. 00 !~ot~ thtl1;\(!a 
South o· 35 • 1-P Wa,at pa.ro.llal. with th4 W••t bouncu.zy of said 
Southvaat Qu.u"be,r o.t !:ha No:t:thoaat Q,u..rtar ...._ ctiiftanatt 0£ 180. 00 
f~t, th4hl,::t<D • 
&on.th 89• ~5' 51• ff~11t plll-r2tllPJl '.tlth t'ha No..th boundary o:f ~aid 
Hort.MlQst Qua:rt~:c a. di,1t.a.lJ,(;Jt& of '.U!J. DO f••tr thence 
}forth o· 35' 14• :Kitnt p,t1N.llal lrlth tha tf'eut hottndiizy ot said 
South.~nt Qun:rta:.t.- of the Nort.ho11.1,r1: ~rt.r a d.i9t:.ance of 100.0() 
.f sc t; to . tln, ttux romr 0~ B'l'X}nm:nro . 
PllCXL l.B · 
A· :po:r:t.iO'U oi' tho, Sautl:na-ent Qtnxt.1:c of th<!:! Nm:the.1u1t QUartcr of 
Section 17. '.1:o'amnhlp 3 North. :R;uigs 3 Wo:srt of the, Eoiur11 lhu:!di.w, 
Canyon County, Idaho &nr1 .Le JDQJ:e p~tlcuJ.11:.r;ly duuorihed ~l!I follow~ 1 
~~ at tho N"orth,mnt co:r:n-,r 0£ nald Soul.:m<&twl: Quarter of the 
Horth•u t Qtul:c t "r 1 t.h 0010 o 
South o• 35 • 1-1" l'?Gxl: along tho Beuth baund;J.ry" of o~id 
B<>utmro111t Qu.art&r ot tho Nortrul.:tt.d t Q-u.arto::r a diutana• of 7i5. :\.5 
.f11•t;1 thsntJGl 
nar~ s.r-~45~ 51'" ~a.at parallel nth th.Q North boundn:r:y-o:e the 
Hort:.hna~t Qua.rtox of n~id S(K)tion 17 ~ diut..DcQ at A91.QO fgot to 
th4' nu:ra: PODIT OF ll&aIID:tnro, theno0 oontl.nuing 
North a9• -i.5' 51." .}!._;tt pm.rallttl v-lth teaid N'o:x;th bound.r.rry a 
diatance of ·U.9. 9.S :t'oet to l:\ poil\l: on tbfJ cantia.rlinQ of the Bt;u;ri11 
Ca.na11 th11MJ.tl~ 
Bo"Uth 45• 3.9' 10• w,uit tlong 1J;sid osntorl:i.nn • cli$'t.UWt1 01! 
.:l58.5~ !ootJ t.bllmO• laaving add o4tnt~rli.n6 and ~iu-ing 
Bc,u~ 9.9• '45' .51" t<••t para.llel v.tth th.- North bcro:udal:y of lll'.<11d 
No'.t"th0&nt Quuto:r a. cll,19t.1mc• of .l~6, 8A .tontJ t:hano• 
North o• 35' J..t• E••t x,ar•ll:el rltb thn Wiltrt boundary ol 111.-ld 
Boutm,••t ~rter of th~ Northn•~t Quarter & diBtill.Ilc• of lR0.00 
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A per t.i Cil c 1 t.b.:n 8 outhw·u !: Qu.;rrt u- 0 .e t.b4, :Nor th MJJ t Qt.u.rt!/Jr o £ 
Soct.ion. 17, Tow:o.•hlp 3 North, bngl') 3 ?1fo,3t; of the 130!:to Xf!r.id.la:n, 
~ County, !ch.ha and .h DOJ:{G putioult.rly do1.1crib.ad u follOVll r 
~UKl at tha )lo:r-tlnrru:t oornu of o~id B0utltw(.·.1t Qw.U:tm:r of tho 
North.t411uc t pwa.r be;:i;- 1 th one o 
South o· JS' 1"'1• w.at •l~ thl'I Wast~ of 1Jtld aoutlnNuJt 
Qu.i,:ct:•r ot the North.._111t ~t•x: a; d.ht:tho111 o:f 715 .15 fut, l:h.trioo 
lio:rth O 9" 4 l'P 31" ~ t pu:.llitl with thG Jlortb. b<,rtnd.u:y o t the 
:M'ortluua,.b Ouut•~ o ~ :n-J.d--B11otion l '7- .-, di11n:.r,n:o11 ll..( .._a. Ov !tl6f! 1 
thella• · · 
Bout.h o• .l5' 1•" wut p11.:n.lhl ~th th, W1HI: bounduy of 11tld 
B<"tH:.hwcrat Quut~r ot tbA lb!:~t Q,arl:.al:" ll1. d:J.11ta.no.a o~ lSO. 00 
f •et to th• n:tn PO nrr Ci' :ft'.XQ.rmr.oa'Q J thAn«l ti 
r.to:i:th 99• '4:!S' 31• :g,aa1: puul•l with thn N'o,:th ~:r:y o:f 111;aid 
Northsiut Qwu:t•:r a d:!•t:.snaa ot lS::, .50 tut, t.h.tnd• 
S~th o• 35' 1-P W011t p.arall,a,1 1rlth t1iAI 'thiot bo\lnduy a, ail.id 
Boutnv."/1t QU..U'tr1.11l:' of th$ ll'orth:u1.&1t Quu-t.•::i: a dl•tan.ci. of JOl. 80 
fe,..atJ tlualo• 
BOtl.th. s.rr l.9' JS .. WHt ~lhl '!Jtr!t.h ~ South.~ oX:-tl'd 
Southw-arct:·Quart~r o:f th• Northoo.•t Qu,·u:tar lil. d1;i1btnna of 151.50 
.t 0: ft t , t:h IJr.O.C. 
!lo:rth o· 35' 1>A"' .R11.at :paralh.i w-lth. t:h11111 "1ileitt .bound.Acy of 111:aid. 
Soutlnir,ai1t Quaxt~r of th• Northea,1Jt puiu-bu:- m. di~bmce ot 303. 09 
t1&1'1t: to t:ho TRUR POINT 02' BJI~ • 
.A. portion of th.a Soutmmi,t Qua.:rt:'*X- o! th.l!l Northeiut: Qmtrt~r ol! 
I1oaot.~on 17", Trnwi:uthlp 3 liro:rt:h. ~ .3 W411at of th,a, noi1111 1'(~:ridl..1.n, 
CMtyon County, Id.a.ho and itt mo:ra ~~tiau.la.rly &1H::i:l.bad ._., :foll~: 
~crmJ o11.t th,n Northver.tt:. cai;na,r Of llllA.id Sout.Jnrest Qtl,U't&r Of t:1:U\ 
Nor\:..ha3.2 t Qtu.rtar / ~<!'11 
South o• 35' 1-i"' w,ut 1!1\long thG W.ut bottn.d,u:y o-f.. =id .Ooutl:oriust 
"QU.4.rtor of t.hAI Ncrt.ha.a11t ~tin: 111. d .. h1bnq111 o.f 74S.1S J'.Of!ltJ thlt.lnd.fl 
:U<n:t:h a1• 45 • 51• X:Ut pu11.lhl 1dth th.ls Uorth bound.uy o:f. tho 
l(ort:h.oaat QWIX"I:.Dllr of .ltl!l!d S&ctl.cu 17 111. d.ii,t.ando 01! 10. 00 £'/HttJ 
tht:xn.~11 
B<>uth o• 35' 1-P ~l,a111t pttll.llol rlth t.lur W•at: ~ of axid 
S-ou\::hk,,,,vt Qa:-.rt..r ot t:.h,, No.t:t.hl!J!Ut: Qn.&..,>;tor a. dlG t..=<5 of :!..!IO. Q-0 
f••t.1 t.b.nco 
North a.9• '4.5' 51" E.ust 1)4r~ll~l vith tho Nort.h bounduy of atld 
NortlwtaJ11t Qu.J,_rta:r; lit di.uui.ncH1 ot 1~J ,.SO f,-at to th.,. TRUE roDM.' OY 
l3:XO:rior.om, th lliCilO • o on t lnu.ing 
>To1:th er -!S • 51 • Jb.::ct para.llt,l wit:h uaid lfo:rth houn,d.u-y i11I 
d.i•un.ca ot 363 .:;3:Z !/!lot to ll point: on th• oc,ntlllrli.n11 of th.a l3ur:d.a 
C..:.Olll 1 thane.it 
l?outh 45• 39• -4 8 • W',o,t .along u..id cmttttrli.Ae a d.iata.nc:a of ____ _ 
~3~.9~ foot; ~o 
south u~· 39' 25• Wnut :pua11.•l vit:h 1:h• South ~:ry of •~id 
Southw,,la#·t ~teix of t:ha lirorthda.at:. Qua"l'ttu: .at. dil'ltti.nd• ol 55, 35 
t t ~ t: 1 t:lJ..4cQ.C., 
?to~th. o· 35, 1i • R~nt p.u·a.llal with th,. W-cii,t: boundary of 11a.id 
SOU~!l9t Qllio:'tl)r of th.., Hort:b4.aat Qu.artor Jl d.iata.ntJ111 of 302.80 
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EXHIBIT A 
This parcel is a portion of Lot 14 of WESTVJEW SUBDIVISION, Canyon County, Idaho, 
according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 4 of Plats at Page 31, records of said County and 
situated in the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
11, Township 3 North, Range 2 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon Counry, Idaho aad is more 
particularly describe:d as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Sou rhwest corner of said Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter; thence 
South 89°45' 35" East along the South boundary of said Sourheast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of rbe Northwest Quarter a distance of 396.00 feet thence 
North 00° OZ' Jl '' East par.illef wirh the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter oft he Northwest Quarter a distance of 30.00 ro the TRUE POlNT 01" 
B'£CINNINC; tfience continuing 
North 00° 02' Jl" East parallel with rhe West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarrer a dis ranee of 254.10 feet; th enc,: 
South 89° 45' 35·• East parallel with the South boundary of said Sou rhea.st Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter or rhe Norrhwest Quarter a distance of 120.00 feet; thence 
South 00° 02' 31" Wesr paralleJ with the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwesr Qua.-fer of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 254.JO feet; thenct? 
Noni: 89"45' 3.5" West parallel with the South boundary of said Sourheast Quarter of the 
Southwesr Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 120.00 feer to the TRUE POI.NT OF 
BEGINNTNG. 
This parcel is subject to ancl includes the use of a 32.00 foot wide ingrcss-egre'is and utiliry 
easement more particularly desi:-rihed as foflows: 
COMMENCING ar rhe Southwest corner of said Southeast Quarter o:- the Southwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter; thence 
South 89° 45' 35" East along the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of rhe 
Southwest Quaner of the Norrhwesr Quarter a dis ranee of -184.00 frer; thence 
North 00., 02' 31" East pa mile! wirh the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwesr Quarter of the Norrhwest Quarter a distance of J0.00 fret ro rhe TRUE POINT Of 
BEGINNING; 1l1ence 
Norrh 00° 02' 31" East parallelwich the West boundary of said S0uthe11st Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 2.S4.I0 fett; thence 
Sourh 89° 45' 35" East parallel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwesf Quarter 32.00 fret; thence 
South 00° 02' 3 ]'' \.Vest paralld with the West boundary o! said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter :l disfance of 254.10 feet; theocr 
North 89° 45' 35" West parallel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 




-NO. ___ ~-= 
- i'll1;0~· ~ -
tM_ P.M. ·  -
J. u.-1.VIC 1·iAVA.F.RO, Clerk 
SyJ. HEATON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
RENEE L. BAIRD-SALLAZ, 
PlaintHT, 
v. 











Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on four separate occasions over 
a nine month period. The dates of trial were November 15, 2005, through November 19, 2006; 
April 10, 200(( through April 14, 2006; July 17, 2006, through July 21, 2006; and July 27, 2006. 
A total of 16 days were utilized for the trial. There were several hundred exhibits admitted into 
evidence - many consisting of a substantial number of pages. 
The Plaintiff was present during the trial and represented by Debra L. Eismann, Esq, of 
Nampa, Idaho. The Defendant was also present during trial and represented by James A. Bevis, 
Esq, of Boise, Idaho. There were many pretrial motions that were considered by the Court, as 
well as many motions and litigation issues _during the period that this matter was tried. This 
matter was, at times, highly contentious and the parties and attorneys challenged the court's 
schedule for a long period of time. However, the Court wishes to note that both parties were· 
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counsel and the parties were all required to exercise a great deal of patience and flexibility in 
order to allow both parties to have a full, fair and complete trial. 
In addition, the Court required an inordinate amount of time to complete the Findings and 
Conclusions below. As indicated in earlier correspondence, this was highly unusual for this 
Court. Part of the delay was due to the large volume of exhibits and the substantial time between 
trial days, which required more of the Court's time in reviewing evidence it heard as far back as 
November, 2005. Part of the delay was due to the other circumstances, schedule and demands of 
the Court's time and duties throughout the last year. Finally, part of the delay was due to 
circumstances and demands upon the Court on a personal level, which the Court understands is 
probably not a concern of either party. Regardless of t~e causes of the delay, the Court wishes to 
sincerely compliment and thank the parties and their counsel for their patience. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Dennis and Renee were married on July 4, 1996. This action was filed on May 
27, 2004. The parties were divorced by this Court on July 28, 2005, with the issues of property 
and debt division remaining for trial. 
2. Long before the marriage, Dennis represented Steve Sumner and other entities in 
a lawsuit. He began work on this lawsuit in 1985 and was stil1 acting as Sumner's attorney as 
late as August, 1999. In March, 1999, Dennis claimed that he was owed $377,393.60, plus 
interest for his fees and costs advanced and monies loaned to Sumner and his entities. The 
evidence established that as of August 5, 1999, he was owed $351,089.42. At that time, 
$269,204.60 of this \.Vas at least 120 days overdue .. There was no documentary evidence to 
establish hO\.v much of this was earned prior to July 4, 1996. The balance of $81,984.82 was 
current. 
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Boise, Idaho. Dennis has been J licensed and practicing attorney in the State of Idaho since 
1965. On March 15, 2004, Dennis entered into a partnership vvh.ich consisted of the law firm and 
Scott and i'vfarjorie Gatewood. This resulted in the filing of an Election for Small Business 
Corporation named "Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd.". This election states that Dennis and Renee 
have a 90% owners.b.ip and the Gatewoods have a 10% ownership in the law firm. 
4. Dennis terminated Renee's employment at the law firm on May 11, 2004. 
5. Prior to the marriage, Dennis acquired a one half interest in real property located 
in Grandview, Idaho. 
6. Prior to the marriage, in 1969, Dennis organized and/or became the owner of a 
corporation known as National Financial Service, Inc. On May 11, 2004, Renee took $3,200.00 
from the account for th.is entity. 
7. Prior to the marriag~, Dennis acquired a residence located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, 
Boise, Idaho. Dennis' law office is operated out of this location. There is a mortgage on this 
property in the amount of $272,032.67. The monthly payment on this amount is $2,241.93. 
Dennis also receives rent from the law office in the amount of $3,400.00 per month. Plaintiff has 
abandoned her claim for any improvements to this property during the marriage. 
8. Dennis also acquired 3 properties prior to the marriage in June of 1991 from 
Kendra Bertsch-Sallaz. These are located in Grandview, Smith's Ferr; and Ada County, Idaho, 
and are identified in defendant's Exhibits 240, 241 and 242. 
9. There exists a retirement account with Putnam Investments. The client number 
for that account is 0336644339. The balance in that account according to the latest statement in 
evidence is $40,160.99. The account consists of eight (S) separate funds. Only three (3) of the 
separate funds were opened before the marriage. The documentation for these three funds shows 
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:or..t:-:_but:ons pr;or to tb.e ~"Tc:.ge of $' - ~4.67, 33, l ~0.3 5 and .£:: ,:95.90, fer 1 ~ot:i.l of 
$3,5 l 0.92. 
10. Dennis' grandmother, Bessie Matcham, died on March 26, 2000. Prior to that, on 
or about March 20, 2000, Dennis deposited $184,969.37 from her estate into his trust account. 
Between March 20, 2000, and August 15, 2001, all of this money vvas disbursed to the heirs 
,: $ ~ 6Y? -except 1or ), _),_). 
11. Dennis did not file an application to be appointed personal representative of his 
grandmother's estate until October 12, 2000. He was appointed on October 19, 2000. 
12. Dennis prepared and filed an inventory for the estate. However, this inventory 
was not signed by him. Instead, it was signed by Dennis' sister, Chris Snyder. The inventory 
did not list any loans made to any third parties as assets and the value of the estate was placed at 
$103,767.44. 
13. Chris purchased Renee's jeep in April, 2001, for $22,500.00. She used part of the 
monies paid to her out of the estate. The money was deposited into the Real Homes checking 
acco1,1nt. 
14. On June 18, 2003, Dennis signed escrow instructions relating to his receipt of 
payment of a settlement in the Sumner case, along with a confidentiality agreement regarding the 
settlement. 
15. On August 13, 2003, Dermis opened an account for his grandmother's estate at 
D.L. Evans Bank (hereinafter "estate account"). This was approximately 3 years after her death 
and approximately 3 years after he was appointed the Personal Representative of her estate. He 
authorized, in addition to himself, his brother Daryl and his daughter as signatories on this 
account. He also directed all statements and correspondence to be sent to his daughter's address. 
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16. Cn or befoi·e Augu.::~ 15, :2002. Denn.is rece:ved $!32,093.JO from the trJs~ 
account of Richard Harris. This money was from the settlement of the Sumner litigation. 
However, the check received by Denn.is was made payable to "Estate of Bessie B. Matcham" 
(Dennis deceased grandmother). Denn..is did not tell Renee about this money. He did not deposit 
the check into the law finn trust account. Instead, on August 15, 2003, he deposited the check 
into the account associated with his grandmother's estate. 
17. Dennis received additional morjes from the Sumner settlement which he did not 
deposit into his trust account and did not tell Renee about at the time. These amounts were 
deposited as follows: $2,000.00 (August 29, 2003), $5,000.00 (September 8, 2003) and 
$198,000.00 (July 13, 2005). 
18. The total received during the marriage by Dennis from the Sumner settlement, 
was $387.098.00. 
19. Dennis signed Renee's name on a 2003 joint income tax return on October 4, 
2004. This return did not report the income he received from the Sumner case settlement. 
Although Dennis testified in his deposition that he advised Perry Harding, CPA about this and he 
said he 1,vould take care of it, Mr. Harding testified at trial that Dennis did not tell him about this 
money and he did not tell Dennis he would take care of it. 
20. In addition, Dennis spent a great deal of money from the estate account for 
personal living expenses following the deposit of the settlement monies. Dennis testified in his 
deposition that he began writing checks on the estate account for his personal use on October 8, 
2003. 
21. Dennis withdrew $6,000.00 in cash from the estate checking account on August 
29, 2003 .. 
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2.2. Je=1.is ·:vrote fou:- 3c"ar3.te $40,000.00 cr..e·:lc on the estate accou::.: en .:une 8, 
2004. They were payable to DarJl, Chris, Becky and Di.mi - all relatives of Dennis. It does not 
appear from the tenns of the will that Diani is entitled to receive any share of the residue of the 
Matcham estate. These checks were not endorsed and were all run through the bank at the same 
time. Then, they were converted into cashiers checks, which were never endorsed. 
?" ~.J. On July 13, 2005, Dennis deposited another $198,000.00 from the Sumner 
settlement into the estate checking account. On that same day, he \.vTote a check in the amount of 
$ l 98,000.00 to D.L. Evans Bank and had his brother Daryl sign the check. Four cashier's 
checks were purchased with this money, each in the amount of $49,500.00, payable to Daryl, 
Chris, Becky and Diani. As noted earlier, Diani is not entitled to receive any of the inheritance 
under the terms of the will. None of the four cashier's checks were endorsed by the payees and 
all four were run through the bank at the same time. 
24. One of the 4 cashier's checks for $49,500.00 was re-deposited into the estate 
checking account on August 25, 2005. Likev,ise, another one of these checks was re-deposited 
into the estate account on October 28, 2005. 
r _.), Dennis wrote a $500.00 check from the estate checking account to Tradesman, 
Inc. on August 25, 2005. 
26. Dennis wrnte another check from the estate account on August 31, 2005, in the 
amount of $25,807.00 for a closing on real property. This check was payable to Title One. 
27. In January, 2001, Real Homes, LLC was formed (hereinafter "Real Homes"). 
The Articles of Organization for this entity were filed with the Secretary of State on January 19
1 
2001. Dennis is listed as tl1e original registered agent and Renee is listed as the Manager. Both 
Parties signed the Articles. 
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2,3. Two Opet:11:;1g A.gre-;m:Lts were introdt.:ced iuto ev:c:enc.; :eJarding Re:.1i Homes 
- one by Renee and one by Dennis. 
29. The one provided by Renee is dated on its cover and on the signature page 
Januar; 19, 2001, and is signed by Renee only. The testimony established that Dennis prepared 
this document. This document provides that Renee owns I 00% of the membership of the LLC 
and that it is governed by its members. The document also provides that no additional members 
can be admitted except with a unanimous vote of the members. It also requires a majority vote 
of the members regarding all determinations, decisions, approvals and actions affecting the 
entity, as well as the business affairs of the LLC. Finally, this Operating Agreement specifically 
prohibit any amendments to the Agreement which change the number of votes or degree of 
consent required to approve or disapprove any matters that require a vote of consent and any 
amendments to provisions for allocations or distributions of profits, losses or cash. 
30. The one provided by Dennis is signed by Dennis and Glen Trefren. However, this 
document is not dated, either by way of a stated effective date in the agreement or on the 
signature page. Dennis and Glen Trefren are the stated members of the LLC, with a sharing ratio 
of 50% each. The document also states that both contributed an initial amount of $25,000.00. 
The evidence at trial established that Mr. Trefren did not make such a contribution. 
31. On February 11, 2002, the Annual report for Real Homes was filed with the Idaho 
Secretary of State. This report identifies Renee as the President of Real Homes. On February 
19, 2003, another Annual report was filed with the Secretary of State which also identified Renee 
as the president. The Annual report filed February 16, 2004, also identifies Renee as the 
president and secretary of real Homes. However, Dennis filed an an.i.1ual report for Real Homes 
which listed he and Glen Trefren as manager-ov,ners. He signed the articles as "co-ovvner". 




Orgar..ization for Real Homes 1,-vith the Idaho Secretai.; of State. This document listed him as a 
member and he signed this document as "Owner". 
33. Renee opened a checking account for Real Homes on Januar; 19, 2001. 
34. Renee, signing as President, applied for an Employer Identification Number for 
Real Homes on April 17, 2004. 
35. In January, 2001, Glen Trefren was employed as a property "scout" for Real 
Homes, LLC. He was paid $300.00 to $400.00 per week. 
36. On Febrnary 15, 2001, Real Homes purchased 5 acres of prope1iy from Saxton 
Fruit Farms located on Riverside Blvd., in Caldwell, Idaho (hereinafter "Riverside Property"). A 
deed of trust was executed naming Saxton as beneficiary in the amount of $43,900.00. 
37. The Riverside Property was later divided into 4 lots: IA, lB, 2A and 2B. Renee 
provided a letter to Canyon County authorizing Glen Trefren and a realtor to appear on behalf of 
real Homes regarding the conditional use permit required to divide the this property into the four 
lots. 
38. Renee moved into the Riverside Property, Lot IB, in August or September of 
2003, 1,,vhen she moved out of the marital residence, and continues to reside there. 
39. On February I 0, 2004, Real Homes sold Lot I B of the Riverside Property to 
Dennis and Renee for $105,000. This property is also kno1,,v11 as 15584 Riverside, Caldwell, 
Idaho. The deed from Real Homes was signed by Renee. This property was appraised on March 
30, 2005 and had a value of $152,000.00. The debt against this property is approximately 
$114,471.90, leaving a net value of $37,528.10. 
40. ,i\.nother appraisal. of the 155 84 Property was admitted into evidence in July, 2006. 
This report is dated July 18, 2006, and lists a value of $280,000.00. 
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n. On A:..gust 16, :2001, ,--::-1er:. -~~rcLen for;-cd llis JWTI I.L2 named "Tradesm;;,r:. 
Contractors & Construction". Denn.is prepared the faJticles of Incorporation for him. 
42. On December 20, 2002, Denn.is refinanced the property at 1000 S. Roosevelt. 
Some of the community credit card debt was paid off at this time. The total of all the various 
accounts paid was $73,014.85. Although Renee testified that only $17,762.64 of this amount 
should be subject to reimbursement because that amount related to personal credit cards, there 
was no evidence that the balance was not also spent on community debt. 
43. Renee entered into a contract with the Hennifers to purchase real property located 
at 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho (hereinafter the "Hennifer Property"). Renee had been 
pasturing her horses there and the purpose was to acquire the property for the same. However, 
Dennis and Renee could not ultimately qualify for the loan to purchase this property. In order to 
acquire and close on this property, they had to obtain a loan from Denn.is' brother, Daryl. Renee 
testified that following the closing, Daryl signed a quitclaim deed to them. However, no such 
quitclaim deed was admitted into evidence and there is no evidence of recording of the same. 
44. Daryl testified that he has no out-of-pocket investment in the Hennifer property. 
Renee and Dennis are the only ones who have any such investment. They incurred expenses 
associated with the clean-up and remodel of the house on the property. Dennis collects the rent 
and pays the underlying mortgage. He also personally pays any shortfall benveen the rent and 
mortgage. Daryl pays no taxes on this property. In addition, Daryl's testimony at trial regarding 
the arrangement he had \Vith Dennis regarding this property is inconsistent with his testimony at 
his deposition and there is no documentation regarding this arrangement. 
45. On April I 7, 2002, the Buckinghams purchased a strip of property from the 
Hennifer Property for the purpose of enlarging their yard. Renee was listed on the contract as the 
seller and the $14,750.00 proceeds from the sale were deposited into the Real Homes account. 




46. Cn bat s2.me c'.ate, the Can::ipcel2s 1iso p1,rj1ased -1 st.zip of property frcm the 
He1mifer property. Renee was listed as the seIJer on that contract and the $12,250.00 proceeds 
from that sale were deposited into the Real Homes account. 
47. The value of the 916 S. Roosevelt (Henn.ifer) property 1s approximately 
$180,000.00, with debt against it of approximately $115,000.00, leaving $65,000.00 in equity. 
48. On October 7, 1002, Real Hornes purchased real property located on Smith 
Avenue in Nampa, Idaho (hereinafter "Smith Property"). There was no secured debt against the 
property at the time of purchase. 
49. Dennis prepared a deed of tmst and promissory note in the an1ount of $15,000.00 
to secure debt that he and Renee owed to Perry Harding, CPA. The note was signed by Renee as 
president of Real Homes, and she and Dennis signed individually. 
50. Dennis testified that he stopped payments to the Saxtons on the debt owed to them 
by Real Homes because he ran out of money. Thus, Real Homes was defaulted on April 15, 
2004, on the underlying deed of trust However, the bala..11ce in the Real Homes checking 
account as of April l, 2004, was slightly over $70,000.00 and was almost $68,000.00 as of April 
30, 2004. 
51. $30,686.69 was transferred by Dennis on May 7, 2004, from the Real Homes 
account to pay off a line of credit with D.L. Evans Bank. On that same date, he transferred 
$35,665.94 from the account into a cashier's check. On May 18, 2004, $30,000.00 was 
deposited into the law firm trust account. The balance of$ 5,665.94 has not been accounted for 
by Dennis. 
52. Dennis closed the Real Homes checking account on June 2, 2004. 
53. Dennis filled out and signed a business credit application for Real Homes with 
D.L. Evans Bank on November 5, 2004. In that application, in which he acknovvledged that his 




completed a financial statee-1ent with D.L. Evans regarding his personal guarantee on the loan to 
Real Homes. 
54. On November 15, 2004, Dewjs filled out and signed an Annual Report for the 
Secretary of State for Rea] Homes, wherein he listed himself as owner-manager and signed as 
"owner". 
55. Also in the fall of 2004, Glen Trefren, through a bid submitted to Dennis, 
estimated the cost of constrnction work at the Smith Property at $30,950.00. 
56. Dennis signed a promissory note on behalf of Real Homes for $30,475.00 and on 
Febrnary 4, 2005, D.L. Evans Bank recorded a deed of trnst against the Smith Property to secure . . 
this amount. 
57. The Saxtons proceeded with a Notice of Trustee's Sale on January 19, 2005, in 
order to foreclose against the Riverside property. The sale was scheduled for May 25, 2005. 
58. Later in February, 2005, Glen Trefren signed a quitclaim deed, as a purported 
member of Real Homes, LLC, granting all real property ovvned by Real Homes to his LLC 
known as Tradesman; Inc. The deed also included Lot lB of the Riverside property which was 
owned by Dennis and Renee, not Real Homes. Dennis testified that he did not know about the 
quitclaim deed, but Mr. Trefren testified Dennis prepared it. 
59. There were several collection proceedings against Dennis and Renee in the spring 
of 2005, relating to Dennis' medical bills. It appears that these bills have been paid. 
60. Dennis sold 2 ATVs and a trailer to Roy Rice on May 5, 2005, for $7,500.00 to 
pay his attorney. 
61. On May :25, 2005, Glen Trefren filed a bankruptcy proceeding on behalf of Real 
Homes. He represented himself as an authorized agent. The Petition stated that the assets of 
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R-:al I-fome:, 12c a 1:me Jf L:.J.j,JOO.OC With ,;ectired c;-ec:,rr:-,s totalin-g '.JJ99,396.00. The ;:ietition 
did not list any unsecured creditors. Tbs resulted in the cancellation of the foreclosure sale by 
the Saxtons. 
62. Renee filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy upon the grounds that Ivfr. Trefren 
was not a member. of Real Homes and had no authority to file such a proceeding. The 
bankruptcy court dismissed the proceedings on November 25, 2005. 
63. Glen Trefren then, on June 6, 2005, and on behalf of his LLC (Tradesman), 
recorded a $250,000.00 lien against all real property owned by Real Homes, and the residence 
owned by Dennis and Renee (Lotl B Riverside). 
64. Ivfr. Trefren recorded tvio amended claims of lien on July 22, 2005. One was . 
against the Riverside property, including Lot IB, for $250,000.00. The other was against the 
Smith Property for $35,000.00. 
65. Despite this matter having been pending for over a year before trial was 
completed, Mr. Trefren was unable to provide even a single document to support any of his liens. 
Further, these debts were not listed in the bankruptcy filings he made on behalf of Real Homes. 
In fact, he testified under oath, that his intent in recording the lien was to cloud the title on all the 
real property. 
66. Dennis testified that he turned over all but I 0% of his interest in the law firm 
named Sallaz and Gatewood. He testified that he turned over all his accounts receivable. 
However, there is no documentation regarding any of these facts and the Subchapter S Corporate 
documents from the year 2004 show him as a 90% owner. 
67. Theresa Pulliam, the accountant hired by Renee, valued the accounts receivable 
for Sallaz & Gatewood, as of July 28, 2005, to be $130,744.00. Part of her valuation was based 
upon an accounts receivable aging summary provided by Dennis' law office as of 12:06 p.m. on 




October 25, '2005. That SUCTL""Ilarv orJ·r lis~ed 3 accounts bet,veen 31 and oO days old, totali.1£ 
, ,I ~ 
$1,416.17, and no other accounts older than 60 days. Tnat summary showed current accounts 
receivable to be $247,639.79 and those between 1 and 30 days to be $9,672.63. 
68. Ms. Pulliam did not reduce the value of receivables based on taxes that would be 
paid upon receipt or for any payables due at the time. She did note that a reduction could be 
done in the amount of $4,650.00 for the payables and testified that the tax rate would be 25%. 
69. The accountant hired by Dennis, Perry Harding, reviewed Ms. Pulliam's opinion, 
did some independent review, and arrived at a lesser figure of $43,334.15. His valuation was 
based upon a "revised" accounts receivable aging swmnary, which showed only $15,952. 12 as 
current, $27,167.92 from 1 to 30 days old, and the large figure of $179,883.53 as over 90 days 
old. These figures were arrived at after discussions between he and Dennis' office manager. 
70. Despite the figure of $15,952.12 as current, the firm was collecting in excess of 
$30,000.00. 
71. During the summer of 2001, Renee made arrangements through a friend who 
01,,vned a Labrador stud to purchase a yellow puppy from Josh Edwards. 
72. On August 3, 2001, Dennis had semen extracted from his dog named "Vegas" for 
preservation of the bloodline. 
73. Renee picked up the puppy from Nfr. Edwards on October 27, 2001. Renee 
named the dog Smooch. 
74. During the early pendency of this matter, the Court entered an order providing an 
equal sharing of possession of Smooch. This was done because Renee would not allow Dennis 
to take the dog on an annual hunting trip for approximately a week. 
75. For the most part, equal sharing of possession ofSmooch has worked fairly well. 
The only problem that has arisen since the initial order was last fall when Renee refused to 
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coc per:::e vvit11 Denn.is rc;gardin.g mcLer :iuming trip ar:d rbe Court ,vas :·eq1irei~ to nte.:: an 
order allowing Dennis to have possession of the dog on specified dates. 
76. Renee filed this action on May 27, 2004. 
77. Renee's testified that her residence at the Riverside property was broken into on 
May 28 or 29, 2004, and again on July 27, 2004. On both occasions, the only area that was 
disturbed was the office. She testified that the items stolen were the hard drive from her 
computer, her file on Real Homes and the quitclaim deed from Daryl to Dennis and Renee 
regarding the Hennifer property. However, it does not appear that she actively engaged the 
authorities in investigating these incidents to learn who might have done it. 
78. Following the parties' separation, the receipt of the Sumner settlement monies, 
and the disbursement of those monies through the estate account, on January 13, 2004, Dennis 
rented a new safe deposit box at D.L. Evans Bank. While this matter was pending, the Court 
entered an order providing that both parties view and inspect this safe deposit box together to 
confirm and/or determine the contents therein. On July 20, 2005, at approximately 4:33 p.m., 
Dennis and Renee went to the bank and inspected the box. However, on that same day, at 
approximately 3:55 p.m., Dennis went to the bank and accessed the box. Dennis was. not trutru.-'ul 
about this visit about one half hour before he was to meet Renee and further testified that he was 
not carrying anything with him when he accessed the box. However, the surveillance video from 
the bank shows that De1111Js was in fact carrying a briefcase when he went into and when he left 
the safe deposit box. \\/hen the parties met and inspected the box 3 0 minutes later, there was 
nothing in the box except some silver dollars. 
79. On December 9, 2005, Dennis received ·written notice through his law office of an 
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale for January 16, 2006. Renee did not receive this notice. 
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80. The e::tit:i .~-:ovvn as "Re::: .. ?roF iies, LLC" was ~or;:ned on January +, 2006 . 
. Pursuant to the A.rticles of Organization, Dennis is shown to be the registered agent, Janet Rice 
(Roy Rice's wife) is shown to be the manager or member, and Millis Anderson (Delli'Js' 
secretary) signed the Articles as a member. 
81. Two days later, on January 6, 2006, Dennis and Trefren entered into a contract 
entitled "Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC". Dennis and Trefren are 
identified as "seller" and Real Properties is identified as "buyer". Roy Rice signed for Real 
Properties as a manager. The contract recites that Dennis and Trefren own 100% of Real Homes 
and that they are selling all their ownership interest and all real property 1;vhich includes all 4 
parcels of the Riverside property (including Lot lB) and the Srriith Property to Real Properties 
for the sum of $250,000.00. Dennis and Trefren also warrant I 00% ovvnership of Real Homes 
and "good and marketable title free an clear of all leins, pledge,5, security interest or 
encumbrances and without any breach of any agreement to which he is a party". 
82. · Trefren recorded a quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, as sole owner, member and 
manager of Tradesman. This deed purported to convey Lots IA, 2A and 2B of the Riverside 
property from his LLC (Tradesman) to Real Properties. This deed was dated January 6, 2006. 
83. Trefren recorded another quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, as co-owner, member 
and manager of Real Homes, LLC. This deed purported to convey the exact same property as in 
his deed from Tradesma,n, also to Real Properties. This deed was also dated January 6, 2006. 
84. Trefren recorded a third quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, vvhich was also dated 
January 6, 2006, as co-owner, member and manager of Real Homes. This deed purported to 
convey the Smith property from Real Homes to Real Properties. 







8i. On lvfa::::;n 5, 2006, Der.u""2is a..:sirmed his imere;:;t in :he oroceeds of the Januar:, 6, 
~ ' , 
2006, contract to his counsel in this divorce proceeding by preparing and signing vvritten 
assignment of that purchase and sale agreement. 
86. Neither the Jan~ary 6, 2006, Purchase and Sale Agreement or the March 6, 2006, 
Assignment thereof were disclosed to Renee or her counsel until April 10, 2006 (during trial). 
87. The parties acquired a 1989 Chieftan Motorhome during the marriage which is 
worth between $15,000.00 and S 16,000.00. The parties do not dispute that this item may be 
awarded to Dennis. It does appear that this item was acquired with funds from a refinance on the 
I 000 S. Roosevelt property in the an1ount of $17,107.00. 
83. Dennis possesses a 1982 Rolls Royce automobile. Renee claims this was 
purchased during the marriage and Dennis claims it is his separate property. The value is 
disputed with Renee claiming it is worth $28,000.00 and Dennis claiming it is worth only 
$5,500, The documents pertaining to this vehicle are found in Exhibits 70 and 372. · 
89. There exists a 1980 Porsche, the character of Which the parties dispute. Renee 
claims it is her separate property, but there is no supporting documentation for this claim. The 
value of this item is $5,500.00. 
90. Dennis acquired a 1954 Cadillac automobile long· before the marriage. Renee 
claims that community funds in the amount of $1,750.00 were ~xpended on this vehicle. 
91. Comparing Plaintiffs Exhibit I and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no dispute 
regarding either the character or assignment regarding the following items of property: 12, 14, 
15, 16, 22, 28, 29, 30A, 30B, 31, 32, 44, 44(a), 45, 48.l, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 69, 
69.3, 69.5 -69.21,. 





9:2. ~here 1re h.oueholc appiianc.;s at the l OGO S. Roose,;elt propt. ;y which ~he 
parties agree are community (Plaintiff's Exhjbit 1, Item 77.l and Defendant's Exl1ibit 201, Item 
71). The Plaintiff values these at $4,000.00 and the Defendant values them at $3,250. 
93. Numerous household items are listed in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 as numbers 77.2 -. . . 
77.61. Some of these are in Renee's possession, most are in Dennis' possession. It does not 
appear from Defendant's Exhibit 201, or the evidence, that Dennis objects to either the 
characterization of all these as community property or the proposed division in Plaintiffs Exhibit 
l. 
94. There are several firearms in Dennis' possession. Renee claims three were 
acquire~ during the marriage - the 12 ga. Binelli, worth $1,400.00; the Glock 9mm, worth 
$950.00; and the .22 Ruger, worth $800.00. Dennis agreed in his testimony that the 12 ga. 
Binelli and .22 Ruger were acquired during the marriage, with values of $450.00 and $125, 
respectively. He testified that the Glock was given to p.im by a third party. Neither party 
provided any documentation regarding value or dates regarding any any of the disputed items. 
95. There is one AQHA. horse and one APHA horse. The parties appear to agree that 
the AQHA horse is a community asset. However, they dispute the character of the APHA horse 
with Renee claiming it "does not belong to the community". However, the Court is unable to 
locate any documentation regarding any third party ownership of this animal. It appears the 
animals are worth approximately $1,500.00 each. The ~orse tack appears to be gone as a result 
of theft. 
96. There is a 1950 Packard automobile that the parties agree is owned jointly (50/50) 
by them and Daryl's brother. The value is disputed between $1,500.00 and $3,000.00. 




97. Theri: is a l '17J O,ib ,;, ;1itewater boat wif1 trniler whd1 che par,:es agree is 
Denrjs' separate property. Renee claims that community funds 1,vere expended on a new engine 
and other improvements. However, there was no documentation regarding these improvements. 
98. There is a 1949 Dreamboat Roadster which the parties agree is Dennis' separate 
property. Renee claims that community funds were expended on improvements to this item 
which enhanced the value. However, there was no documentation regarding these improvements 
or amount thereof. 
99. During the pendency of this action, Dennis sold the 2002 and 1998 Yamaha 
ATVs and the trailer for them. He received $7,500.00 for all three items, which the parties agree 
were community property. 
100. Follovving the parties' separation, Renee sold the 1994 Mitsubishi automobile and 
used the proceeds for expenses. 
101. Dennis possesses the 199 5 Chevrolet Suburban, which he claims is not an asset of 
the community. Renee claims it is and argues the value is $9,000.00. 
102. Renee claims that the 1999 Yamaha was given by Dennis to her daughter. Dennis 
claims that Roy Rice owns this ATV. The value of the item is uncertain. 
103. The 1967 Pontiac Firebird is community property. Renee values it at $6,100.00 
and Dennis values it at $1,500.00. There is no documentation regarding value. Dennis has 
possession of this vehicle. This vehicle should be awarded to Dennis arid the Court will assign a 
value of $2,500.00. 
I 04. There is an account with Capital Educators with a balance of $247.96. There does 
not appear to be a dispute that this is a community asset. 
105. The parties acquired several retirement accounts identified as Items 28 - 34 on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201. As noted above, the only item that is disputed 
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Mr. pj c: testified [hat he 21:d Genny have ·'..:iGr.e a hell of a lot of business JV~r the 1a.'.::t 2j 
years". Mr. Rice did lend the parties S8,500.00 to acquire the Motorhome. 
110. There is a debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service. The parties agree this is a 
community debt. The amount owed is somewhere between $15,400.00 and $19,347.13. 
111. There is a debt owed to Perry Harding in the amount of $16,000.00. The parties 
dispute the division of this debt. 
112. Items 106.1 through 106.24 in Exhibit #1 identify Renee's separate property. 
Dennis does not object to the characterization of these items. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties do not dispute that the property located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, 
Idaho, was acquired by Dennis prior to the marriage and is therefore his separate property. 
Accordingly, this property should be awarded to him as his sole and separate property. 
2. Likewise, the mortgage associated with the property at 1000 S. Roosevelt is the 
separate debt of De1111js, However, Dennis' separate estate is entitled to reimbursement, dollar 
for dollar, for the amount of community debt paid off through the refinance of this property in 
2002. See, Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1983); Josephson v. 
Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1989). This amount is $73,014.85. 
3. The three other properties acquired by Dennis from Kendra Bartsch-Sallaz in 
1991, are also his separate property and should be awarded to him as such. 
4. There is a dispute regarding the property located at 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise, 
Idaho. The facts above regarding this property (Hennifer Property), present difficulty for the 
court. Dennis argues that this property is not owned by him and Renee because his brother 
acquired the title when he bailed them out on their obligation. Renee argues that, despite the 
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:aci( of a deed from Dai-:ti bad~ to the1-:1, ~his Colli-t should 3,,ll determine that this prorerty is 
ovvned by them because all the other "indicia of ownership". 
Title by deed is not always the detennining factor and there are times when 
circumstances will overcome the presumption of a deed .. In that regard, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has given the following srnnmary: 
Under Idaho law, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the holder of 
title to property is the legal owner of that property. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 
Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994); Russ Ballard & Family Achievement 
Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572, 579, 548 P.2d 72, 79 (1976). 
A rebuttable presumption imposes upon the party against whom it operates the 
burden of going forward with the evidence to rebut the presumption. I.R.E. 301. 
The magistrate considered the evidence and found that under "all other 
circlLrnstances and 'indicia' of ownership", the deed was not controlling and that 
the corporation did not own the O'Dell property. See Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 
44, 53, 324 P.2d 380, 385 (1958) ("Where title to property is taken in the name of 
one party but the consideration is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor 
of the party who pays the consideration."). 
lvlcA!fee v. }v!cAJJee, 132 Idaho 281,971 P.2d 734 (Ct. App 1999). 
Such is the case here. Daryl has title which he obtained when he loaned money to Renee 
and Dennis to close the transaction. However, Daryl has done nothing consistent with ownership 
by him. Instead, Dennis and Renee have made the payments, occupied the premises and made 
improvements on the property. Dennis collects the rent and pays the mortgage, including any 
shortfall between rent and mortgage. Dennis has continued to pay for expenses associated with 
this property. Renee pastured her horses on the property. Daryl pays no taxes on this property. 
Daryl even testified that he did the financing as an accommodation to Dennis and Renee. Other 
than loaning Dennis and Renee his name and money, Daryl has done nothing else consistent with 
being the O\.v11er of this property .. Instead, all indicia of ownership points to Dennis and Renee. 
In addition, the Court is concerned with t]1e evidence regarding the break in at Renee's 
residence. The evidence tends to show that Daryl did sign a deed conveying the property back to 
FINDINGS I CONCLUSIONS I ORDER - 21 
001002
• e j '-~ ,fj.• 
~ . d·~ ' h. ' , h' d. ' 1 ~, C . Jer :11s ill · ~'<.;;nee, Jut t .2£ It 1ivas taxen trom er noue ur:,ig '.,:e ourg,ar:1. i i1e ourt can or:.1y 
speculate why sucb a deed 'Nas not recorded and cannot help wondering why the two burglaries 
were never properly followed up with law enforcement. Nevertheless, the Cowi does believe it 
is more likely than not that there was a deed back from Daryl which was taken from Renee's 
residence, which made it significantly more difficult to establish that this property is community 
property. 
Based upon the foregoing, Renee has met her burden of rebutting the presumption that 
Dary] is the owner of this property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the 916 S. Roosevelt 
(Hennifer) property is the community property of De.r..nis and Renee and that they owe Daryl a 
debt of $30,000.00 for the money he loaned them. 
The Court recognizes that this determination of ownership is not necessmi]y binding 
upon Daryl as he is not a party to this action. Thus, regardless of whether the Court awards this 
property to one of the parties or that it be sold, one or the other ( or both) parties may be involved 
in resolving this issue before title is clear, including further litigation. This Court cannot help 
with that situation which is the result of the parties own actions. 
It is the Court's determination that this property should be sold immediately, that the 
proceeds be applied to all outstanding debt against it, and any equity (approximately $65,000.00 
at the time of divorce) remaining should be awarded to Renee. 
5. There is a dispute between the parties regarding the community interest in Real 
Homes, LLC. Dennis argues, based upon the evidence he produced, that the community only 
has a 50% interest in this entity and its assets and liabilities. Renee argues that the community 
has a 100% interest. If the Court detennines that the Operating Agreement introduced by Renee 
is the original document, then she would be correct. If the Court believes the Operating 
Agreement produced by Dennis is the origfaal, then Dennis would be correct. 
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In ')fder to r=;:scl.ve this is .. m.e, the ':curt '.1as co;:sidered these '.wo documents, tl:e 
circumstances and other facts regarding Real Homes, the testimony of the parties and Mr. 
Trefren, and the consistencies and inconsistencies between all of this evidence. This analysis 
includes, but is not limited to, the following hig.rJights. 
Several of &fr. Trefren's actions and much of his testimony, were unsubstantiated and 
inconsistent with his claimed 50/50 ownership with Dennis of Real Homes. In particular, his 
signing of a quitclaim deed transferring all of the real property owned by Real Homes to his LLC 
(Tradesman), apparently without Dennis' knowledge or approval, simply does not mak:e sense. 
In addition, Ivlr. Trefren's recording on June 6, 2005, of his wholly unsupported claim of lien in 
the amount of $250,000.00 against all teal property owned not only by Real Homes, but also 
Dennis and Renee, seems to this Court to be concocted. In fact, he testified his intent was to 
cloud the title on all the real property! FUi.'iher, Mr Trefren, apparently to further carry out this 
scheme, recorded amended claims of lien in July, 2005, to include Lot lB of the Riverside 
Property, and the Smith Property for $35,000.00. Again, Mr. Trefren could not produce any 
documents to support his claims on any of the properties. Further, if l'vfr. Trefren was already a 
member of real Homes, LLC, there was little reason for him to form another. Further still, Mr. · 
Trefren's signing of a quitclaim deed on February 16, 2005, as a member of Real Homes, 
regarding all the property owned by Real Homes, including the Riverside Lot ( lB) owned by 
Dennis and Renee, to his own LLC, is highly suspect given all the other documentation and 
efforts to eliminate all real property holdings of Real Homes. This seems particularly evident 
since Mr. Trefren testified that Dennis· prepared the deed, but Dennis testified that he was 
unaware of the deed. Finally, as a whole, Mr Trefren 's testimony is not credible as much of it 
was either vvithout basis or documentation, contradictory with itself, or contradictory with others 
1,,vho testified, such as Roy Rice regarding his employment and firing of Mr. Trefren. 
FINDINGS I CONCLUSIONS I ORDER~ 23 
001004
• 
Lbwise, Der.u1js actior.s, or inactions, ar:d testimony were also inconsistent and not 
such as to be expected of a 50/50 ovvner. There is no evidence that Mr. Trefren objected to 
Dennis' withdrawal of $30,000.00 in May of 2004, as his "personal funds". His testimony at his 
deposition and at trial regarding why lv'Ir. Trefren's name was not on the Operating Agreement 
that Renee produced was contradictory. As well, Dennis' interaction with Mr. Trefren ai.-id Real 
Homes was not consistent with a 50/50 ownership, at least until March, 2005. There 1s no 
evidence that he ever referred to or treated Trefren like an equal partner prior to that date. 
On the other hand, the Operating Agreement Lr1troduced by Renee is actually signed and 
dated. Further, the filings with the Idaho Secretary of State in 2002, 2003 and 2004 (for the 
years 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively), were all filed in February of those years and each 
listed Renee as the President of Real Homes. For some reason, Dennis filed the 2004 annual 
report in November, 2004 - after the firing of Renee and the separation of the parties, and before 
the year had actually ended - and listed himself as "owner". Finally, Renee did engage in 
activitie~ consistent with her ownership under the Operating Agreement she introduced into 
evidence. 
Upon consideration of these items, ar1d others contained in the Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that the Operating Agreement which is signed by Renee should govern. That 
Agreement is dated January and designates her as I 00% owner. 
As a result, Renee had 100% ownership in Real Homes, LLC when it was formed and 
any changes without her consent or approval 1,.vere without authority and therefore void. 
Accordingly, the community, through her ownership, retained a 100% interest in Real Homes, 
LLC, including all its assets and liabilities. This includes the Riverside Lots (except for Lot IB) 
and the Smith Property. 




As with other properties, U1e.::-e an potential issues r::garding third pai"""t'; c,mms 
concerning the assets of Reru Homes, LLC. Unfortunately, this Court cannot adjudicate in a way 
that is binding, any claims of third parties. Therefore, the Court concludes that all holdings of 
Real Homes, LLC, should be sold hr,mediately. Proceeds from the sale of a specific property 
should first be applied to any debt on that property. Any remaining proceeds from a specific 
property should be applied to remaining debt on other properties sold. 2 
If, after all the assets are liquidated and the proceeds are used to pay debts of the LLC, 
there remains outstanding debt, then that remaining obligation shall be shared equally by the 
parties. If, there is a remaining surplus in proceeds, they shall be distributed first to Renee to 
satisfy any remaining equalization, then shared between the parties equally. 
6. The parties dispute both the character and value of the property located at 15584 
R.iv~rside (Lot 1 B), which is the residence occupied by Renee. 
Although Dennis argues that this property is still treated by Glen Trefren as an asset of 
Real Homes, LLC, there is no credibl~ documentation to support t.\is. As set forth above, it does 
not appear Mr. Trefren is in the legal position he thinks he is. Further, the evidence clearly 
shows that the property was in fact conveyed from Real Homes, LLC, to Dennis and Renee. 
Finally, Dennis has not provided sufficient evidence to refute this. Therefore, the Court 
concludes that this item is community property. 
The value of this property as of March, 2005 (about 4 months prior to the date of divorce) 
was approximately $152,000.00. Dennis provided an_appraisal from July, 2006, which indicates 
the property has appreciated sub~tantially after the effective date of divorce. \Vhile this does 
show the value of this item has increased, the Court is required to value the assets as of the date 
of divorce, not a year later. See, Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 21 P.Jd 918 (2001); 
2 See, Equ~lization Section below. 
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McAjfee, supra,· Desfosses v. Desfosses, 12.2 :dabo .534, 8~o P.2d 1095 (C. App. 1992). Ba.sed 
upon the evidence, it appears that the value is likely closer to the figure in March, 2005. The 
Court understands Dennis' argument that the market did jump in 2005. The Court also 
understands that the comparables in the appraisal submitted by Renee are somewhat outdated. 
However, the record does not have sufficient evidence to determine how much, if any, the value 
jumped between March and July, 2005. To arrive at a different figure would require pure 
speculation by the Court. 3 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that ~he value of this asset, as of the date of divorce, 
\Vas $152,000.00, with debt of $114,471.90, leaving equity of approximately $37,528.10. It is 
the Court's determination that this property should be awarded to Renee subject to the debt of 
$114,471.90. 4 
7. With regard to the settlement monies from the Sumner lawsuit received by Dennis 
during the marriage, the Court has carefully revie\ved all the facts associated with these mofljes. 
In Idaho, the character of property as either separate or community vests at the time it it 
acquired. Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411 (1983); Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 
555 P. 2d 385 (1976). It is presumed that all property acquired during the marriage is 
commwlity property. LC. § 32-906; Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 860 P.2d 634 (1993); Winn, 
supra. Thus, earnings of the parties during the divorce and up to the date of divorce are 
commwJty property. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976); Desfosses v. 
Desfosses, supra. 
3 The Curt notes that Defendant had more than ample opportunity to obtain an appraisal at or near the date of the 
divorce, or any time prior thereto while this matter was pending. He did not and chose to wait until a year later. In 
addition, the Court notes that de.fendant's appraiser did not discount his value back to the date of divorce or 
otherwise offer an opinion in that regard. 
~ By awarding this property to Renee subject to the debt thereon, the Cow-t is not in any way validating any claims 
of lein, etc. by Mr. Trefren and the Cow-t recognizes there main remai.n third party issues. However, those claims 
against this property (and any other properties) will have to be determined in some other action. Further, the Court 
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'Jenen::11-;, the 021.cv asser:i.Lz tha~ oronert-' is ser,ara,e bs the burden of oroof Wor:::ala 
"' J. "' ...; . .I, .l, ) r- 1-
v. Wor:::ala, I 23 Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (I 996). This must be done with reasonable certainty 
and particularity. Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 512 P. 2d 1317 (1973); Barton v. Barton, 
132 Idaho 395, 973 P.2d 746 (1999). This may be done through evidence of direct tracing or 
indirect tracing through an accounting. /v!artsch v. A·lartsch, 103 Idaho 142, 645 P.2d 882(1982); 
Josephson v. Josephson, supra. 
The Sunmer settlement monies were received during the marriage. The total of these 
monies is $387,098.00. Dennis testified that most of this money was earned before the marriage 
and was his separate earnings. Thus, he has the burden of showing, with reasonable certainty 
and particularity, these moneys were not earned during the marriage. The evidence does not 
entirely support Dennis testimony. 
The only documents that arguably support this contention is the Ai.'Tiended Answer and 
Cross Claim he filed on March, 1999, and the summary and aging of the Sumner amounts 
provided at his deposition in August, 1999. However, these documents clearly establish that as 
of August, 1999, at least the current amount of $81,984.82 was earned during the marriage. 
They also establish that the balance of $269,204.60 was earned at least 120 days prior to August, 
1999. Approximately three years of this time was during the marriage (the parties were married 
in July, 1996). No other documentation was provided by Dennis to show when any of these 
monies were actually earned. In fact, there is no accounting or other documentation concerning 
the remaining $35,908.58 of the settlement monies deposited into the estate account. Without 
such accounting evidence, it is impossible for the Court to determine, with reasonable certainty 
or particularity, how much of th.is amount was earned by him before or during the marriage. 
notes that it does not appear that these claims are legitimate and have not been documented, making it unlikely they 
wiJJ be validated. 
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~--1 accit:on, the b.J2.nce :/ rte evidenc; sur:rcur:.C:ing the Swnner monies also does not 
help Dennis with /,js burden of proof. First, all the money from the Su111..ner settlement was 
received after the marriage. Second, he deposited this money into the account for his 
grandmother's estate account instead of his trust account or other appropriate account. Dennis' 
testimony that the reason he deposited this money into the account for his deceased grandmother . 
because she loaned him money in the past is not supported by the evidence. There are no loan 
documents substantiating such a debt and the estate inventory does not list such a debt to Dennis. 
Further, Dennis had already distributed $184,969.37 from his grandmother's estate betvveen 
March, 2000 and August, 2001. If he owed her money for a loan, why did he take his share of 
the estate at that time? Third, he distributed this money to others in his family, including Diani, 
who was not legally entitled to any of the Matcham estate. Finally, all of this was done during 
his marriage to Renee and without her knowledge. 
Based upon the foregoing, Dennis did not meet bis burden of proof that all of the Sumner 
settlement monies were earned ptior to the marriage. First, the Court concludes that $81,984.82 
was "current" as of August, 1999. Thus, the Court concludes that this amount was earned during 
the marriage and was comnnmity property. Second, this leaves a balance of $305,113.18 of the 
total deposited as Sumner monies ($387,098.00 - $81,984.82). Of that amount, $269,204.60 
appears on the aging report in August, 1999. The Court recognizes that this amount is quite 
large to have all been earned during the first 3 to 3 Yi years of the marriage and that it is likely 
some of it was earned before. However, there is simply no competent evidence accounting for 
the dates that the monies were earned. Without something, there is no way to arrive at a figure 
with reasonable certainty or particularity. Accordingly, the Court has no alternative but to . 
conclude that this money was also community property. Finally, there is no accounting for the 
remaining $35,908.58 deposited into the estate account as settlement monies. Again, without 
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such e1ideIJ.ce, the Cccrc musr concluc:e that this .:.rr.ount was also coITu'Titmit; )TOper:y as i, 1iv3.s 
acquired during the marriage. 
Consequently, the Court can only conclude that all the moneys received during the 
marriage from the Swnner settlement were community funds. The total of this amount is 
$387,098.00. 
The evidence further shows that $160,000.00 of this money was distributed to four of 
Dennis' family members on June S, 2004. Another $198,000.00 was distributed to these same 
people on or about July 13, 2005. Thus, a total of $358,000.00 of the $387,000.00 in settlement 
monies was distributed to persons outside the community. The Court concludes that these 
community funds 1,,vere expended for purposes ur.uelated to the community. See, Larson v. 
Larson, 139 Idaho 972, 88 P.3d 1212 (Ct. App. 2003), not reversed on review, 139 Idaho 970 
(2004). Accordingly, the Court will apportion this amount as part of Dennis' share of the 
community property division. Id,· Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P. 3d 889 (Ct. App. 2001). 
It would appear from the evidence that the balance of the settlement money ($29,000.00) 
was used by Dennis for various personal expenses during the marriage and period of separation 
of the parties and the Court will not deem this as part of division of community property. 
8. The community also has an interest in the accounts receivable of Dennis' law firm 
up to the date of divorce on July 28, 2005. The evidence regarding the value of this asset is in 
conflict. To resolve this conflict, the Court looks at the methodology and detail applied by each 
expert, as well as other factors such as any personal interest in the outcome of this matter. In 
addition, the Court agrees with counsel for Dennis that consideration of taxes once such 
receivables may be paid is appropriate. See, Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 860 P.2d 634 (1993). 
While !\'Js. Pulliam' s review appears to be more extensive and detailed, it does not appear 
that her opinion considers the effect of taxation upon payment of the receivables. Nor does it 
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ciscow:t ,he va!ue 02sed upon age of tile accounts. Also, she die not :,djust ior any payables that 
Dennis would be responsible for, which she noted could be considered and totaled $4,650.00. 
?vfr. Harding did factor in the effect of taxes and did discount for the age of accounts. However, 
he discounted all accounts receivable which were over 90 days old to a uniform value of l 0% 
without any basis for such extreme and unifonn discounting. Further, he did so without 
considering the firm's history concerning writing off bad debt, the pay history regarding most of 
the clients and was unaware of any work-in -progress, despite having access to all of the records 
of the firm. Finally, he does have an interest in the outcome of this matter, having a secured 
interest in real property in dispute in this case. 
Further still, Mr. Harding's valuation was based upon a new set of revised numbers by 
the law firm which Ms. Pulliam did not have initially. This concerns the Court greatly for two 
reasons. First, these new numbers appear to be based upon "discussions" between Mr. Harding 
and the office manager and are not supported by documentation. Second, this is a theme 
throughout tJ.Js case - there are numerous instances where there exist two documents with the 
same title, but containing different or new information. The best example of this is the two 
versions of the Operating Agreement for Real Homes, discussed above. As with those items, 
orJy one can be correct - one is false or concocted. In the case of the accounts receivable, Renee 
had no access to either of these summary documents and both were provided by Dennis. This 
gives at least the appearance that one of the summaries is concocted. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court believes that both expert's opinions are useful and 
based upon data that they were provided. Hovvever, their opinions are only as good as the data. 
On the one hand, it appears that iVfr. Harding over discounted the value based upon his method of 
aging. [n addition, the summary he used is suspect because it was revised after the first one 
provided to lvis. Pulliam and there is no supporting documentation. On the other hand, Ms. 
FINDINGS I CONCLUSIONS I ORDER -30 
001011
• ,) e 
") JJ' d' ' · · C ,' ·- ' . < 1-, • •' I 1 ' ''d . u ,12£1 IG r:i.ot accct:.nt ... or t11e e.::ect er mxes ar:a u1s no ::16:Lig c:1scoc.nt oecac.se ner Cata ~1 · not 
contain any old accounts. 
In a...i effort to give due consideration to both opinions, based upon the most credible and 
documented evidence, the Court concludes that the accounts receivable should be valued at 
$130,744.00, less $4,650.00 for payables, for a total of $126,094.00. This amount should be 
further reduced by the 25% tax rate, which would be $31,523.5. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that the value .of the accounts receivable assignable to Dennis as of July 28, 2005, is 
$94,570.50. 
9. The evidence was conflicting regarding Dennis' share of the accounts receivable. 
He testified that he turned over all but I 0% of his interest to wfr. Gatewood. However, he has 
provided no documentation to support this position. To the contrary, the Subchapter S 
documents in evidence show that he is a 90% owner. Accordingly, the Court concludes that as 
of the time of divorce, Dennis owned 90% of the accounts receivable of Sallaz and Gatewood, 
vvhich was $85,113.45 ($94,570.5 X .90). For practical reasons, this asset should be avvarded to 
Dennis. 
10. With regard to the Putnam Investments retirement account, the balance at or near 
the time of divorce was $40,160.89. Dennis argues that the entire balance should be his separate 
property. Renee argues that all of this money is community in nature. The Court disagrees with 
both parties as the evidence does not support either entirely. 
This account is comprised of eight (8) separate funds. The evidence shows that 5 of these 
accounts ~vere actually opened after the marriage and three were opened in 1994. However, the 
backup documentation from Dennis only shows a total of $8,510.92 accumulated in those three 
accounts before the marriage. There is no other evidence to support his claim that the rest of the 
funds are his separate property. As a result, he has failed in his burden of establishing that aU of 
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•I- . .i . • h' ·· · " C l -i h •1-e :n,.ney ir, u11s account 1s . is senarate Jronerr-y. ...\.ccorcmalV, t1,e Jurt cone uues t, at 
" "- A. C .! 
$31,649.97 is community property and $8,510.92 is the separate property of Dennis. The fund 
should be liquidated, and Dennis should be awarded $8,5 l0.92 as his separate property, with the 
balance to be awarded to Renee. 
IL After comparison of Plaintiffs Exhibit I and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no 
dispute regarding either the character, value ( or the value is minimal) or assignment of the 
following items of property: 12, 14, 15, 16, 22, 28, 29, 30A, 30B, 31, 32, 44, 44(a), 45, 48.1, 50, 
51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 69, 69.3, 69.5 - 69.21, As a result each of these items should be 
awarded to the listed party with the values as indicated. There is some discrepancy between the 
values assigned these items by the parties. Using Dennis' values, the division is approximately 
$4,000.00 in favor of Renee ($28,078.48 vs. $23,909.07). Using Renee's values, the division is 
approximately $800.00 in her favor ($29,243.48 vs. ·$28,454.07). Given these amounts, as a 
whole, the division is substantially equal. 
12. The household furnishings and appliances located at 1000 S. Roosevelt (Item 71 
on Defendant's Exhibit 201 and Item 77.1 on Plaintiff's Exhibit I) are community property. The 
parties agree that these items may be awarded to Dennis, but do not agree on the total value of 
them. The Plaintiff argues the value is $4,000, while the Defendant argues the value is 
$3,250.00. The Court concludes that the total value is $3,500.00 and that these items should be 
awarded to Dennis. 
I 3. The household furniture, appliances, etc., listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 as items 
77.1 and 77.2 - 77.61 are community property and should be divided according to the division 
proposed therein, except for the storage shed (Item 77.60). Thus, Renee should be awarded 
items 77. 7, 77.8, 77.9, 77. l 0, 77.26, 77.34, 77.50, 77.51, 77.56 and 77.58. The total value of the 
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items awarded to Renee is $3,~_15.00. ·::ms, the total value of the items remaining and awarded 
to Dennis is $26,645.00. 
111 .. With regard to the firearms, the Court concludes that all but the 12 ga. Binelli and 
. 22 Ruger are the separate property of Dennis. Accordingly, all but these two should be awarded 
to him as his separate property. The Court further concludes that the value of the Binelli is 
$800.00 and the value of the .22 is $350.00. These items should be awarded to Dennis as part of 
the division of community property. 
15. With regard to any horses remaining, it appears that there is only one AQHA 
horse remaining and that it is community property. The parties dispute the characterization of 
the APHA. horse. The Court does not recall any documentation regarding this animal and will 
conclude that it is community property. The Court further concludes that each horse is worth 
$1,500.00. Both horses should be awarded to Renee as community property. 
16. The community has 50% ovmership in the 1950 Packard with Dennis' brother. 
The value of this interest is disputed between $750.00 and $1,500.00. There was no 
documentation regarding the value. The Court concludes that the community interest in this 
vehicle is $1,125.00. This item should be awarded to Dennis since his brother is the co-ovmer. 
17. With regard to the 1978 Oaks Whitevvater boat and trailer, it is clear that this is 
Dennis' separate property. Renee claimed there were improvements to this item during the 
marriage, but no docmnentation was provided. Further, her value of the improvements was 
$9,800.00, 1,,vhile Dennis value of the boat and trailer together was only $9,000.00. It seems 
unlikely that a boat and trailer that is approaching 30 years old is worth much more than this and 
certainly there is value over and above any improvements. Accordingly, the Court cannot find 
that the community is entitled to any reimbursement for improvements to this item, or that the 
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value was eriliar:cec, anc:: conclu,~es that it should be awarded tc Dermis 1s his sole and separate 
property. 
18. Likewise, the 1949 Dreamboat roadster is clearly Dennis' separate property. 
Renee's claims regarding improvements to this item are undocumented and the Court is therefore 
unable to find that the community is entitled to reimbursement for enhancement. Accordingly, 
this item is awarded to Dennis as his sole and separate property. 
19. The 2002 Yamaha ATV, 1998 Yamaha ATV and ATV trailer were sold to Roy 
Rice for $7,500.00 and the funds were used by Dennis for attorney's fees. Renee claims these 
items are worth more, but the Court cannot reach that conclusion. Accordingly, the $7,500.00 
proceeds from the sale of these items should be awarded to Dennis. 
20. With regard to the 1999 Yamaha ATV, Renee claimed it was given by Dennis to 
her daughter. It seems she is asserting ownership of this ATV on behalf of her daughter, despite 
Dennis' position that he did not give it to her daughte.r. However, it does not appear that she is in 
a position to do so. Under Idaho law, a community asset may not be given away without the 
consent of both the husband and wife. See, Estate of Hull, 126 Idaho 437,885 P.2d 1153 (C.A. 
1994). In addition, as the proponent of this claim, Renee has the burden of proving such gift was 
accomplished. There is insufficient evidence to show that Dennis gave the A TV to her daughter, 
including evidence that he did, or now does, consent to such a gift. The Court therefore 
concludes that .this item is community property and that it, or the proceeds from it, should be 
awarded to Dennis. 
21. The I 967 Pontiac Fire bird is in Dennis' possession. Although the parties appear 
to agree that this item may be awarded to Dennis, the value is disputed. The Court concludes the 
value of this asset is $3,500.00 and that it should be awarded to Dennis. 




With ,·ig:nd to the 1989 Ch:iefou: motorh.ome, the parties c.,J not dispute :hat rhis 
is a community property item and may be awarded to Dennis. The Court will assign a value of 
$15,000.00 to this item, which is the lower amount indicated by Renee. The Court chooses this 
value based upon the age of the vehicle. It also appears that the loan on this vehicle was paid 
with separate funds belonging to Dennis in 1998 when he refinanced the 1000 S. Roosevelt 
property. Therefore, Dennis is entitled to receive reimbursement for his separate property in this 
amount. See, Ustick, supra; Estate of Freeburn, supra; Gavsch, supra. 
23. The character and value of the 1982 Rolls Royce are disputed. Dennis has the 
burden of proving, to a reasonable certaint<;, that this item is his separate property. Won:alla, 
supra. 
There is no document in evidence· that clearly established when the vehicle was acquired 
by Dennis. The documents within Exhibit 3 72 are dated after the marriage, except for three. 
These three documents establish little, do not clearly relate to this vehicle and do not clearly 
indicate ownership by Dennis. However, Exhibit #70 is from the Idaho Transportation 
Department and does indicate the O"Wner is Empire West, Inc, which is an entit<; of Dennis'. This 
is sufficient evidence to establish, to a reasonable certainty, that this vehicle is Dennis' separate 
property. Accordingly; the Court concludes that it is his separate property and will award it as 
such to Dennis. 
Since the Court has determined this item to be Dennis' separate property, the Court need 
not address the value. 
24. Likewise, the character of the 1980 Porsche is disputed with Renee. claiming it as 
her separate property without documentation. Based on the same reasoning above, the Court 
concludes that Renee has not shown, to a reasonable certainty, that this vehicle is her separate 
FINDINGS I CONCLUSIONS I ORDER - 35 
001016
e 
prc::e:-i:y. Accof'iir:.6ly, th.-:: Court ccr.cludes it is a cornmur.Jt/ ssset. The Court will assign the 
value given by Renee of $5,500.00 and 1,,vill award this item to her. 
r _), The 19 54 Cadillac Eldorado was acquired by Dennis long before the marriage. 
Renee claims that the community expended $1,750.00 on improvements to this vehicle. 
However, there is no documeniation supporting this claim. Therefore, Renee has not met her 
burden as required to show that community funds were used and that such expenditures 
enhanced the value of the vehicle. See, Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 488, (2003). 
Accordingly, this item is awarded to Dennis as his separate property without reimbursement to 
the community. 
26. The parties do not agree regarding the character, value or disposition of the 1995 
Chevrolet Suburban. Renee argues it is a community asset worth $9,000.00 .. Dennis argues it is 
not a community asset, but he is in possession of it. He argues it was owned by the law firm and 
then sold to his brother Daryl. There is little documentation in the record to give the Court a 
basis to reach a conclusion regarding the character of this asset. Plaintiffs Exhibit #72A does 
not establish the vehicle was acquired with community funds. It appears that National Financial 
Service, Inc. was involved with this vehicle. However, as noted elsewhere, this entity is the 
separate property of Dennis and the Court is unable to unravel the source or use of funds by this 
entity. The Court will conclude that this vehicle is not a community asset. 
27. The entity known as National Financial Service, Inc. was acquired by Dennis as 
early as 1969. Renee claimed this entity was transferred by Dennis' to her. However, the Court 
cannot recall that there is any documentation supporting such a transfer. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that it is Dennis' separate property. 
28. The entity and account for this entity were used by the parties during the marriage 
for various purposes which have not been fully traced. For example, the Ford Excursion was 
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titled in tte 1arn;; of :~1is entir;, but useJ by the part:es. ALc, Renee rook .$3,.200.00 from the 
account on the day she i,vas terminated by Dennis. It is not possible for the Court to sufficiently 
delineate which funds were used by which party, and for what purpose in order to determine how 
much in the account is separate and how much is community. Therefore, the Court concludes 
that Dennis should be ai,varded this entity and its account as his separate property. 
29. With regard to the Putnam SEPIRA account# 0336644339, Dennis claims this as 
his separate property. Denn.is has the burden of establishing when this account was opened and 
the source of all funds deposited. He refers to Exhibits 210B, 210C and 248 as support for this 
claim. However, those documents do not establish that tliJs was an account prior to the marriage. 
Without such documentation, his claim of separate property must fail. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that this account is a community asset with a value of $40,160.99. 
This item should be divided equally between the parties. 
30. There are two community bank accounts which the parties did not agree upon 
regarding balance, character or division. Account # 910403 I 41 at D.L. Evans Bank appears to 
be closed. As a result, there is nothing for the Court to divide. The parties agree that there is a 
balance of $247.96 in the Capital Educators account #000060 I 990. The Court will award the 
balance in this account to Renee. 
3 l. With regard to the Safeco Insurance proceeds, Renee argues that these funds were 
received by the community on behalf of third parties who suffered losses exceeding the 
$14,075.20. The Court agrees. The evidence at trial established that the items stolen were the 
personal property of those parties and not Dennis or Renee. As a result, this money belongs to 
those parties and is in the nature of a community debt to them. The amounts due each are set 
forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit #1. This money should be paid to them according to these amounts. 
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.3ince ch.er:: \,Vill oe a shortfall, they should be paid their proportionate share, with the balar1ce of 
tbs "debt'' to be assigned to Renee. 
32. After comparison of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 20 I, there is no 
dispute regarding the assignment of the following community debts: #82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
89, 90, 91, 9:2, 93, 94, 95, 96A & B, 97, 97.1, 97A, 99,101 (Plaintiffs Exhibit #1), 102 (all), and 
104. 5 As a result, each of these items should be awarded to the listed party as their 
responsibility. 6 Essentially, this results in the assignment of all these debts to Dennis, except the 
VISA balance of approximately $2,900.00. Using Dennis' figures, the total he is assigned is 
$153,781.59. Using Renee's figures, the total assigned to Dennis is $146,719.63. The average 
of these two figures is approximately $150,000.00. From this, and with regard to these items, the 
Court concludes that Dennis is assigned approximately $147,000.00 more of the community debt 
than Renee. 
33. With regard to the IRS debt, the amount is somewhere between $15,400.00 and 
$19,347.13. Dennis proposed that this debt be assigned to him, while Renee proposed it be 
assigned 50% to each. Since Dennis has been assigned substantially more than Renee with 
regard to the items immediately above, the Court concludes that this debt should be assigned 
equally between the parties. 
34. With regard to the $16,000.00 debt owed to Perry Harding, Dennis proposed he 
be assigned $8,000.00 and that Glen Trefren should be responsible for the other $8,000.00. 
However, based upon the Court's determination regarding the Real Homes situation, the Court 
concludes that this entire debt is a community debt to be paid by both parties. Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that each party should be assigned one half of this debt. 
5 Item #IO I on Defendant's Exhibit 201 appears to be a debt of the law firm and not the community. 
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3 5. With regard to tl:e alleged debt to Dennis' brother Dari! for one half of the rents 
collected on the Grandview property, there is insufficient evidence to conclude this debt exists. 
There is no docwnentation regarding Daryl's ovvnership in that property and he testified in his 
deposition that he never made any claim for such rents. As a result, the Court concludes there is 
no community debt to Daryl for the court to assign. 
36. With regard to the alleged debt to Roy Rice, the Court is uncertain. On the one 
hand, ivir. Rice provided a list of items and their values that were ta.1<:en from his business by 
Dennis and/or Renee and/or her daughter. The Court has every reason to believe that this list is 
accurate as Mr. Rice was one of the more credible witnesses in the trial. He came across as a 
very honest, tell-it-like-it-is person, which the Court appreciated. Thus, the Court does not 
question that the members of the community received items of value from Mr. Rice. 
37. However, it was clear that the arrangement was that Dennis did legal work in 
exchange for items taken by his family. But, it was not clear which legal work applied to which 
items - on the list or off - or when legal work was done, etc. It also appeared that this "open 
account" arrangement was in place before the marriage of the parties herein. 
33. This would seem to make it a separate debt of Dennis. In essence, Dennis agreed 
with Mr. Rice, before the marriage, that he or his family members, could obtain items and that 
Dennis would pay him back with legal services. Due to the nature of this arrangement, its 
ongoing nat1...1re, and the lack of evidence regarding legal services actually provided, the Court · 
concludes that the balance owed on this debt, if any, is not a community debt to be shared by the 
parties. Instead, it seems more ofa separate debt of Dennis' and the Court will so conclude. 
6 The amount of Dennis medical bills is uncertain. His Exhibit #20 I lists most of them as having a zero balance, 
while Renee's Exhibit# I lists them as unknown. The Court concludes that these bills should be assigned to Dennis 
as he suggested, but the Court finds that none of these have any outstanding balance at this time. 
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39. The parties did :eceive $8,500.00 fror..1 Ivfr. Ric;; to acquire the Mctorhome. This 
portion of the claimed debt is a debt of the community and the Court will assign it to Dennis. 
40. With regard to the community debt of $30,097.38 owed to Real Hornes, LLC, it 
does appear that this an10unt was taken from the Real Homes account and deposited into Dennis' 
personal checking account or sent to the IRS. Exhibit 205 does show where this money was 
spent and many of the items the Court recognizes as debts of the cornmunity ( eg. credit cards, 
George Hicks, ... ). The Court concludes that this money was expended on community debts and 
constitutes a debt of the community to Real Homes, LLC. However, the Court need not address 
the assignment of this item due to the determination regarding the ownership of the LLC. 
41. · The personal property listed as Items # 106. l llrrough # 106.24 should be 
confirmed as Renee's separate property. Any of these items which Dennis has possession of 
should be returned by him to her. If he no longer has possession, then Renee is entitled to a 
judgment for their value. 
42. The Court has struggled greatly with the issues and ultimate award of the parties' 
dog named "Smooch". Much attention has been given to this dog, and required of the Court, by 
the parties. The Court entered an order providing for equal time of possession of Smooch while 
this matter \-Vas pending. This was done for more than one reason. First, the Court recognized, 
and could relate to the fact, that this asset was very important to both parties. Second, how the 
parties dealt with the shared time of possession and v,rith each other might shed some light on a 
fair and equitable award of the dog. This did indeed provide useful guidance for the Court. 
Finally, the Court knew that this matter would not be resolved in a short time frame and felt that 
since Smooch would likely be awarded to one party or the other, it would be most fair for them 
to both have as much an opportunity to enjoy him as possible. That time has now come. 
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Gem_is !J.23 rr;ped :he.' the Cour: shoul 1i provice that Smo,Jch be jointly owned by the 
parties, subject to motions in the future if they cannot agree as to times of possession. This 
argument is inviting as the temporary arrangement has actually worl<ed fairly well. Frankly, the 
Court anticipated many more problems due to the parties' antagonism on so many other issues. 
No doubt, Smooch would be fine with such an arrangement - he is a Labrador - Labs love 
everyone. 
However, the Court declines to do as urged by Dennis as it would be contrary to the 
directives of Idaho law to divide all the community property. In addition, the parties do not need 
to be tied together in this fashion from this point forward. Assuredly, they would be back in 
Court again regarding Smooch and they do not need this. So, the Court must make a decision. 
In the pages and paragraphs above, it appears that during the marriage and w}'1Jle this 
matter was pending, Dennis was less than forthright with Renee about finances and assets. The 
Court has addressed those instances above, occasionally determining Dennis' statements or 
evidence to be less credible and often resolving conflicting evidence in favor of Renee, and 
awarding her share of the community estate accordingly. Havvever, with regard to Smooch, 
there is no evidence that Dennis has engaged in similar types of deceit towards Renee. In fact, it 
is he who has been willing all along to share Smooch equally, including on a permanent basis. 
On the other hand, it has been Renee who has been less than cooperative and forthcoming 
regarding Smooch. This required the entry of the temporary order at the outset of this litigation 
and further rulings by the Court when Renee refused to cooperate. This tips the scale ever so 
slightly on this issue. 
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As a :esult, :he Court cJr.cludes '.hat it woud '.:;e more fair and equitable (0 award 
Smooch to Dennis at this time. 7 
EQUALIZATION 
The Characterization and division of property and debt above is not equal. It results in an 
award of approximately $260,000.00 of the cou.1.nrnnity assets and $114,000.00 of the debt to 
Renee, for a net of approximately $146,000.00. On the other hand, Dennis is awarded 
approximately $501,000.00 in co.rr..munity assets and $155,000.00 of the debt, for a net of 
approximately $346,000.00. This results in Dennis receiving a difference of approximately 
200,000.00 in his favor. The Court felt constrained to do this for two reasons. First, the Sumner 
mo11jes are gone because Dennis gave them to third parties and/or used it himself. Therefore, 
none of these funds are available to be awarded to Renee an.cl must be considered as awarded to 
Dennis. Second, it seemed impractical to award to Renee the accounts receivable at the law 
firm. Thus, the Court is left with this unequal division. 
Reducing the above amount by the a.mount of reimbursement Dennis is entitled 
($34,000.00 - refinance of 1000 S. Roosevelt and payment on Motorhome), reduces this amount 
to approximately $116,000.00. This is the amount that must be equalized. 
The Court has ordered the assets of Real Homes, LLC to be sold, wh.ich includes all the 
real property associated therewith at the time of divorce. Once these properties are sold and the 
debts against them are paid, any surplus proceeds would be available and should be awarded to 
Renee to accomplish the equalization. The Court recognizes that there may not be sufficient 
surplus proceeds, if any, to accomplish this. The Court also recognizes that the sale of the 
properties held by Real Homes, LLC may be problematic due to the transactions by Dennis after 
7 Although Smooch is awarded to Dennis and he will be the owner, there is nothing preventing the parties from 
sharing on their own ; if they should be able to agree to do so. 
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the date of Givorce. In either of those ever:.t.s, the equalizatirn C3..t1. only be guaranteed by a 
judgment in favor of Renee aga.inst Dennis. 
As a result, the equalization shall be accomplished as follows. Renee shall be entitled to 
a judgment against Dennis in the amount of $180,000.00. Immediately upon the sale of the Real 
Homes community assets set forth above, and after payment of the debts associated with said 
property, any surplus proceeds shall be i.rr...mediately distributed to Renee and a satisfaction, or 
partial satisfaction, of the judgment shall be entered. If there is any surplus proceeds (which the 
Court recognizes is unlikely), then the proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties. 
ORDER 
Counsel for Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to prepare a Judgment and Decree 
consistent vvith the foregoing. 
DATED this Mclay of October, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the !:tJ day of October, 2007, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Debra L. Eismann, Esq. 
3016 Caldwell Blvd. 
Nampa, ID 83651 
James A. Bevis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 827 
Boise, ID 83701-0827 
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is #30. Item _jQ is a Putnam. SEP~R:\. accou..11t # 0336644339. Dennis argues that this account 
was opened by him before the marriage and he claims it as his separate property. The value of 
this account, as of December 31, 2005 was $40,160.99. 
106. There 1,vas a break in on May, 2004, where a horse trailer and its contents were 
stolen. Dennis and Renee received $14,075.20 in insurance proceeds from Safeco Insurance. 
The contents of the trailer belonged to third parties and not Dennis or Renee. The value of each 
party's stolen items is accurately listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit # 1. The Court ordered these 
proceeds to be held in Plaintiffs attorney's trust account, with $1,247.97 to be paid towards a 
community debt on the Riverside property. 
107. Comparing Plaintiffs Exhibit #1 and Defendant's Exhibit #201, there 1s no 
dispute regarding the assignment of the following items of community debt: #82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96A & B, 97, 97.1, 97A, 98, 99, 101 (Plaintiffs Ex. 1), 102 
(all), and 104. 1 
108. There is a $30,097.38 community debt to Real Homes, LLC, for monies taken 
from that entity and used for community expenses. 
109. Dennis claims that there exists a community debt to Roy Rice in the an1ount of 
$44,093.00, which he claims includes $8,500 owed on the Chieftan Motorhome. Dennis and Mr. 
Rice had an arrangement, for many years, including prior to the marriage, where any family 
member of Dennis' could come into his business and pick out whatever they wanted and he 
would be able to get legal services from Dennis in exchange. There is an exhibit listing items 
and amounts ta..1<en from Ivfr. Rice's business over the years. There is no documentation 
regarding how much, if any, legal services have been provided by dennis against this amount. 
· 1 Item IO I on defendant's· Exhibit 20 l appears to be a debt of the law finn and not the communit'j. 
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This Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement is entered into and made effective 
~ ffe.!F~ 
this 'J.; day o~~ 2010 between EUGENE RICE AND JANET RICE, husband and wife, 
REAL HOMES L.L.C. an Idaho limited liability company, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company (hereafter the "Plaintiffs") and RENEE BAIRD, an 
individual (hereafter "Defendant"). 
l. The parties acknowledge the purpose of this agreement is to extinguish any 
a ,.,,-1 a 11 cla;""'S d;s~•1+0 s a,..+;,..,,.,S aI"'d C'"'n+,.,..." 0 '""; 0 S C"IT0 ,.,+l 0 p 0 nrl1",.,,,. 0'" ,,,h;,..b C0"1d l.l.U l .l..lll > .I. }'LLI,,,., > Vl.1V1.l. l U.LL!VVV!Jl\,,,, LU V.J.LLJ -......J.U.L.ll5 l. vYH.l'-'.1 LU 
be asserted in the litigation styled Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, 
Real Homes, L.L. C. and Real Properties, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company v. 
Renee Baird, Dennis Salim, Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction, LLC., an Idaho limited liability company, Case No CV 09-11855 ("the 
subject litigation") pending in the Third Judicial District in and for the County of 
Canyon. The matters of record in the pending litigation are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
2. Reference to the parties and persons in privity with them is meant to include 
but is not limited to the officers, shareholders, directors, employees, agents, insurers 
subsidiaries, partners, customers, suppliers, dealers, distributors, affiliates and 
attorneys of, within, or related to the named party. 
3. The parties executing this agreement warrant and represent they have the 
authority to make and enter into this agreement and that each party is relying upon the 
representations and covenants made herein, all of which are deemed material. 
4. · The parties have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel prior to 
making this agreement and none are operating under duress. 
p - I 
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5. [n consideration of the mutual covenants agreed to herein and in consideration 
of the deeds exchanged by the parties, whereby Plaintiffs convey Riverside parcel 
IB, Canyon County, Idaho to Defendant, and Defendant conveys Riverside parcels 
IA, 2A, and 2B and a portion of Lot 24 of Westview Subdivision, Canyon County, 
Idaho, and whereby each party releases all Lis Pendens filings and for other good and 
valuable consideration, Plaintiffs agree to release, relinquish, waive, and extinguish 
any and aII demands, rights, actions or claims vvhich have been or could be asserted 
against Defendant and any person in privity with Defendant including but not limited 
to her employees, agents, insurers, customers, attorneys and representatives as of the 
effective date of this instrument. Defendant agrees to release, relinquish, waive, and 
extinguish any and all demands, rights, actions or claims vvhich have been or could be 
asserted against Plaintiffs and any person in privity with Plaintiffs including but not 
limited to any officers, directors, employees, agents, iU:surers, customers, dealers, 
distributors, shareholders, partners, attorneys and representatives as of the effective 
date of this instrument. This release extends to every kind or type of claim related to 
or in any way connected with the facts underlying the subject litigation, including any 
claims known or unlmown, contingent or unliquidated, in contract or tort, or in the 
nature of unfair competition, copyright infringement, deceptive trade practices or 
other forms of liability whether under state or federal law including claims for 
monetary or injunctive relief arising from the beginning of time to the date and time 
of this agreement. 





7. The effe::tive date Jf this ~e!ease is :he date upon which th;s ~t;,stnimen, is 
signed by the parties, below. 
8. The Parties authorize their respective counsel to prepare and execute such 
papers as are necessary for dismissal of the pending litigation ,vith prejudice upon 
payment of the amounts aforesaid and each party shall bear their own fees and costs. 
The Plaintiffs hereby authorize and direct its counsel to file a dismissal of the above 
mentioned litigation. 
I HA VE READ THE FOREGOING AGREEMENT AND HA VE HAD 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK LEGAL COUNSEL BEFORE 
EXECUTING THIS INSTRUMENT. 
~ 'Jff,,r~ 
./ Rffil HOMES, L.L.C. • 
By: Eugene Rice 
Its: Managing Member 
(··7__ ' / ... ··;:7 ·-
By: '>:':../L--.7'1_e':;;c \_/)C/'._.-Y----·· 
/REAL PROPERTIES, LLC. 
By: Janet Rice 
Its: Managing Member 
Date: '5(-3"-/d 
Date: &1 ·-3 ·-/ 0 --~-----
Date: J?-,. 3' - /tJ 
Date: f -3 -/ () 
~~ Date __ J---"--~-a.,___0_/0 _ 
RENEE B..\,JRD, individualJy 
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ASSIGNMENT OF PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 
INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in consideration of Assignee's continuing his representation, 
the undersigned Assignor does hereby sell and assign to Jim Bevis, Attorney at Law, Assignee, all 
proceeds due Assignor pursuant to that certain Purchase Agreement dated l -6-06 by and between 
Assignor as Sell er and Real Properties, LLC as Buyer, attached hereto as Exhibit "A", sufficient to pay 
any and all attorney fees and costs due Assignee by Assignor related to that certain legal action entitled 
Sallaz v. Sallaz, Case No. CV DR 040107 5D, filed in Ada County, State ofldaho. The Assignee 
shall have full power and authority to enforce said Purchase Agreement to collect all sums due to him 
hereunder in his name and remit .to Assignor any sum remaining therefrom. 
fN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned hereunto executes this Assignment this 61h day of 
March, 2006. 
ASSIGNMENT OF PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 
INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC 
001031
02/01/2011 10:00 206 ,,2 
e 
LONGETEIGLAWTm. .. 
2011-reb-01 08:28 AH SALLAZ iii GATEWOOD PLLC 2083Jii12..61 
ASSIGNMJi:NT OF PURCHASE AGREEMENT FORS.ALE Oi 
INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC 
FOR VALVE RECEIVED, tho undersigned Aasi_gnar doi,i, hereby :ioll and aasian. ti> Glen 
T.tliften, A.ssi~, all of llSlligrtor's right, titl~ and mterc,~t in and to· all' realeatato set forth in 
Exhiblt .,A'', attaohcd hereto and incoiporated .hmfn by t~ference, and to all .prai;~ <JtJe 
A.t~gnor .Ptll':1uant to that certain Puroha$e Agroemerit dated l..(i-06 by and between A.85ig,n.or 11.11 
Seller, and Raal Properties, uc·aa Buyer, attached hereto as Exhibit'tJ3" and incoryorated.herain 
by reference.· 
The Amslgnae shall have ftlll power and authority to onfotce said ·Purohiise A~ent. to 
collect all 11umq (iue him hereunder in his nruno, including my and all 11Ctions neces3lUJ tQ 
eoforc-o tho 1uune agawt fJJlY and·sll of the aforellJUd real property. 
IN WJTM!SS WHEREOF, tha undersigned hCNunto executes tho Aasif4IDilent thia 10~ 




Df},JNLS 1.. SALLAZ, [SB N'o. WS.3, 
Altomey at ta.w 
P.O. Bo:x: 8:956 
Bofo;:e~ fdaho 33707 
Te'lephoue: (20B) J:3'6-K 1.45 
Facsin1iie~ (20'80) 336-1263 
Pro.Se 
IN" THE Off.STRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICT.-\L DIS'IRK"'Ji" OF 
T'f.IB STi~TE OF IDAHO, ffi\lAND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REN'EE L BAIR.D-SA.I.L.AZ t C11s.e: No.. CSlDR 0-4'- 0 f.015 D 
Pfti!i:utifflRespondeHt, 
-vis-· NOTICE OF AP:PEAL 
Defendanlf'AppeHant. 
TO~ RENEE L BAJRD, her attorney~ DEBRA L. EJS~!AJ,f:"N, wih.os:e a.dm.ess i£ JQI 6 
NOTICE'. IS HEREKY G1VEN Hrnt 
L Pnrs:urr.n.t. to klmha, Rules oJf Civil Pr.oeedm:e~ Rnl:e 8J(f}, t'ne Defendant hereby 
appeafs· agai:nst the ithave-n:mned P:1ai:ntiff, to the: JD'ist:rict Court,.. from the M:.1gi:stratc: Co1'1,rt's. 
.A.mended Ffaadmgs; of Fact, Conchrsfons of Law· and: Order;. and: .+\.mende:d[ Fir:ral Jncl1gm:ent and 
De·crec er.11te1:ed' or.11. Jru1ml!f'J 4,. 2°'12, hy The: Honorable .JD.a~idl C .. Epis;., Magistrate Jr1:d'g,e. 
2.. The Defendant has: the .1tigJ1t: to appeal tn the, .[)fatrict Co:urt from tfu:e &fugistr.ate 
Comt's: Ame11ded Finding,s. of Fact; Ca11c:rusions ofLav;r and Order~ and Amencie:d Fina] 
NOTT.CE OF APPEA.L -, ] 
001033
• 
Judgment and Decree, and the same are appealable OrdeJ(s) under and pursuant to I.AR. 
1 l(a)(lJ, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(a). 
3. The issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to assert in the appeal, are 
as follows: 
a. Did the Plaintiff commit fraud upon the Defendant when she represented 
she, had recorded the Oregon maniage certificate when she new she had 
not, and did'Pfaintiffcommit fraud upon the Court when she testified she 
was married to the Defendant whert she knew she had never recorded the 
Oregon man-iage certificate. (Based upon ne\vJy discovered evide11ce). 
b. Did the Court. err in awarding properties and monies not specifically 
owned by the parties but which were separate business entities Defendant 
was engaged in with numerous other joint owners~ and over which the 
Court did not have proper-subject matter jurisdictfon, including but not 
limited to: 
Real Homes, LLC, 
Daryl Sallaz, 
Glen Trefren and bis LLC, 
National Financial Ser,vice, Inc., 
Empire West; 
c. Did the Court err in mislabeling and awarding items of Defendant's 
personal property as community property ancVor separate property; 
4. No Order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. A Reporter's Transcript is requested on all matters including: 
7/17/2006 Court Trial transcript; 
2/13/2007 telephone conference bearing transcript; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
001034
• 
9/16/2008 hearing transc1ipt; 
J0/28/2008 hearing transcript; 
12/16/2008. telephonic hearing transcript; 
2/24/2009 hearing transcript; 
5/19/2009 hearing transcript; 
• 
6. The Appellant requests a complete C1erk's Record pursuant to I.R.C.P. SJ(n). 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that: 
A. A copy of this Notice of Appeal bas been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below in the following Certificate of 
Service; at the address shown a11d by the rnetl:iod indicated; 
B. That the Clerk of District Court will be paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the Reporter's Transcript. 
C. That the Appellate filing fee of$53.00 has been paid on this date to the Clerk of 
the District Court. 
D. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
DATED this_:!_ day of February, 2012. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
001035
• 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of.February, 2012,.I caused to be ser:ved a 
true and correct copy ofthe foregoingNOTICE OF APPEAL to the following in tJ1e manner 
described below 
DEt?RA L. ElSlvfANN, 
Attorney at Law 
3016 CaldweHB:Jvd., 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
Honorable David C. Epis 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Raeann Nixon, Transcl'ipts 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
All other parties 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
~S. MAIL, postage p~epaid 
0 Facsimile to: 
0 eMail: -----------
0 Other; 
~: MAIL postage prepaid 
0 Facsimile to: 
0 eMail: __________ _ 
0 Other: 
~S. I\,JAIL postage prepaid 
0 Facsimile to: 




i 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho 
· (no principal reduction during marriage) 
POST TRlAL EXHlB!T 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
::i::.i::.~::.i:·.;··::::·:·:v::·;·:f_:.A(.;_;~.:.;:··:·Au: .•. ·.i .•.tJ.~······D.!:·:·.·:·.·:····::;~:·.···.:····:····:····:···:·.:· .. :·.· sn.•:.i:·.··:oj·······:E•.M·······Bi.·.•T: .•. 
1
.·.·.:.•:·.•.: . . ~::···::•: .• : .···:···:·::···::.:.~.-.: .• :·.•::····.:,.~ .•. [ .;.·.:·~.'·: .• :"·:uu::···· .•. r .•.•. ·.····:·: .• :·.·.:·:.·:·. :~;1lli~i1~:ittl! :: l . ; I\ .. .. '"'' .. . . . . . . :::::::\t)}\i:U~s:A°Nh:ttat:JIJ+l>?</:U: 
--- •..• • . . j ·-·---·--·· .. -· ---~-





! i \ 
Owned by Dennis Sallaz before marriage,248. Wells Fargo loan 
as or 6/15/05, 247. 3/98 rely. 248a. Loan proceeds dep to 
Brookstreet. item 28. Renee QC'd 2X 248b.c. 2d Dorr 10/8/99. 
248d. Rely 12/20/02. 248E. 
:za -------L---- -----t---·-···· -· --- ----- -----·---t--- . -- -----····- -------·- -·------- -- --· --.. ---··--·--··· - -916 S. Roosevelt. Boise. · - ... !$30,000 \ l 
iowned by Darryl. Funds paid by Buckingham !contingent ; \ 
·collected by parties is owed to Darryl or Buckinghams. !liability 
2a[i) 1 Liability to Real Homes or one-half of $17 .500 Real-· 
, Homes Lien payment. 
2t> iReimbursement claim for credit card payments from 
.closing or Walls Fargo refinance 12/20/2002 
i ··-·- - .. ·i ·-·------
\ 
\ ----·-·-·,--·--·· --t-----.. 
; 
($30.000.00)\ 









3 · isseci R,;;;,s,cie Roiici. ·caiciwei1. iii. r""i:i'aONe-- .. · 
'RENEE IS LIVING IN. 
i I , 
-·-··--·· ........ ;. -- ______ . .J....._ _____ .. ._ .• ----··-··· -------------·· "···· ......... -·-··· ......... ____ .. __________ .. .. 
$280,000.00' ($104, 140.00)\ $175,660.00 
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5 /___ . ·-------------------··--·- ----- --- . ·---.... ----- ----· i Community debt awed ta Real Homes far lhe net loan 
/ proceeds used lo pay community debts 
fRiverside Rd .• Caldwell, ID · ·-··- ·· ·--- ---··---·---·-
i(Parcel #03N03W171509) 
6 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
.·.·.·.·.·.· ··.·,·.·.·.·.······.·· 
:::::;:::t@;*:M@##ti#.8f//%¥,H--:-*::::'i--i-i-::::,;--:_f-.;.;.;-;..;.;..;.;.m-'r."'*~M"'rr.~.;.;.;.j-~~-+,;~~~-+,;~""""~~~~~~~ ··.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·. ····.·.··.·. 
·••·•••ttMt ®~[~ 1 0~!~ •c;.-..• • •••~tf J[~~ii~• ·•••···•r· ~;;;;i;;J&.;$J;;~t~+;; i IIttt:' .. ($4.441.41)1 ($4,441.41) ! 
C 
i 
. ___ __[ _________ ·--·-·---f·------- ------ ·----.. -
I I I ($30,000.00)/ ($30,000.00) C 












$66,000 moved out of business account; $36,000 of that paid on[ 1
205 
debt owed by Real Homes lo DL Evans Bank, remaining $30,000 ,
2
0SA 
used to pay community expenses. ! 
! J 
~ . - . -- ------ ·-------- -i. 7 ··-, Riverside Rd., Caldwell, ID · ·-· - ·· -· - - · - -




··-----------·!· ---------------- ---- -------·---------------..... -------- ... ---· ·-·-· ------- ------:,uo"tlpu,m, 
L. __ . ____ _ ;209 det,i 
8 tRiverside Rd. lot (bare land) 
__ i(Pa!ce! No. 03N03W171508) _________ .. -------
ii ;real property lax on parcel. .. 509 (50% interest but 
jv9:lue slated is whole value) 
I 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
1--------------






i ! -1--------------- -----
' ($1,036.14)i I 





Page 2 of 22 
· -- -- Saxton debt paid by Rice. Rice owes Dennis/community 
approximately $60,000. See item 19 . 
····-- --·····------------···-----··-··-· .. -
•209a 





'209 debt . -----··-··-!· ----·-·-··-·· 
Renee produced demand from First Am. Real Est. Tax Se,vice for: 
reimb. Because they paid Real Homes property laxes in error.- I 206 
See Ex. 206(a)i Renee's #001046-As of 11/30/2004 per tax ;206(a) 
notice. ' 
. -· -----------····-·- --·-·- ·--·-
Per Tax Assessment Notice for 2 years - lo be supplemented. 
[207 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
11 \real property tax due on parcel # ... 508 (50% lnleresl i ($1,789.46)1 S 1 
;but value stated ls whola value) I i 
! l.
1 
·1 PerTaxAsssment Notca tor 2001, 2002, and 2003 through \1208 
11/30104. 
1i(a)1\:t~~:~:·::~~:!~::~s~~-:-~i-::;:-i~-:o-.ls_a_dde_d_\_o_ - ....•.. -r· -- -r- -----------· -r-- .. --- ::.~=::::~=~:.-,:~ .:,~"'""""'"~"'i,,.,,, 
' --- _1 --·---··---··------- ---·---·-----·--
12 : Grandview House/Real Property jointly owned by 
13 
13A 




!_ ___________________ ···-·· -· 
I Smilh Street real property in Nampa 
l 
i DL Evans Construction loan 
l 
\ 
\ I i taxes paid on corporation's behalf inadvertanlly. \ 
--·---·----·-lno~----- S ---------l-- ---·--···J---------···-·---···-----··-····-·-···--·---i----
[ · \ : l Debt owed lo oa~t ror 1/2 or rental income: Sea Quitclaim Deed 
\ \ Sep. · from Kendra Su~Bertsch-Salla%, 6/21/1991. 
\240 
!255 
I I Shown In prior rior Divorce Decree as Dannis' separate property. . I \353 Deed 
I I I ·-1·-··---··---r---·- ---· ----· ·-----·---- --:· ··· --- --·--·-··· -----·-····---··- ·--···- .... -- .-----. 









See item 7 and Real Homes real property. Sold lo Rice. Rice assumed real \311 
analysis In brief. i property lax debl ! 392 
I \ 
- ------~------- ----------------··· ---·-·-···· --·-··----·-- . ···-+-. 
Owned by Real Homes LLC. $30,000.,. DL Evans construction 
loan. Ex. 311 is offer to purchase. Ex. 330 is debt. Debt 






Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
Page 3 of 22 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :(}t>H}U:%\\YJ?Hfil\%f\\\}\:\\J\{i .::::c:::::::>::::::::::::::::::>:t>:::>>t>>::::c>::/: •/:::::::::: :Wui:BirJBifi{~dfo:&fH· :::·::::.::::<: .. :::::·:i.:::::::::.::::::::::::::::\:::::::::;.;::::::.: :;:::::;:::::::: ... ·.·.::::::: ... 
14 ;Federal Way Lot SO% interest (other share owned by · ' S I 




\·cougar Mountain Lot 50% Interest (other shared 
\owned by Mike Standley) 
\ 
+c:1ear Creek Lot 50% Interest (other share owned by 
j Mike Standley) 
Sep. i 
i I -·--··--··--·-·· \ ·- ·· ·····-· -·····r ..... ··-··--· if-· ·· ·· -··--·-·-----·l···-··-· - ·- · 
Quitclaim Deed from Kendra Sue Bensch-Sallaz, 6/19/1991. 
Prior Divorce Decree. 
1242 
:255 
-..... --··-- .. ·------ .. -·---- ---- ..... --- ··+ 
! 1 
\I Sep. l See Quitclaim Deed 6/19/1991 from Kendra Sue Bertsch-Salla.:. \241 
-------·· ··-···-·------!\-------·· ·-·--- -·----~ ...... ______ :r:~:~iv-~rce-~::~~~------------- __ ;~~---. 
s \ 
I i Sep. \ See Quitclaim Deed 6/12/91 by Kendra Sue Bensch-Salla.:. \;;; 
' I I i 
17 '1/4 Interest In Bessie Matcham Estate (Dennis' 
; Grandmother) Es late, probate nol completed. 
--·- ---·- --
11-- - --- ·---~--------- -- s-·- ---- --\--- --- ---·- -----·-------------- ·--····-·-· ---- --· · ·-- · --- ~·- · 
I , . 
i I Sep. \ Death Certificate and Estate documents are Ex. 244. \244 
I 
I -·· ____ _l __ .. ____ J_ ____ -·---· ----~----·---·-·-------·-------··-··---· ----··--·--·-·---------··\----------
--BUSINESS INTERESTS: I ! I . 




! Real Homes LLC Denny Is 50% owner and Glen 
!Trefren owns olher 50'/o. DL Evans Ck. AccL # ... 2799 
\opened 2/11/05 with new conslnicUon loan proceeds. 
:· Ex. 331 (old DL Evans Ace!. Simls. ex. 375) 
Casa No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
i I i 1·2asa . , I 
I \, \ i2S9b 
1330 
l I \J31 
· i Denny's sep. $20,000 on 8/S/01 and $20,000 on 8/3/01 from \332 
\ $BO,OOO.OO ($620500.00)i ~~0n~:t~~~:soo reimbursement claim per Ex. 2B9A, cks 1378, ·'1!:; 23A, 
1376. Bales 
Page 4 of 22 
(001455 
; 244 last p9. 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
. . Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
_-_._-. .#::__.·:· _  .: _.-._ ••._., __ ~ •. •. · .. ·_-.·_ .. _.-.•~ ..• -.. -._.:_._.-_._:··.~·_.·_ ...•• _-_· •. : __ ~ .• -.•. 0···.e· •. .~S .. _C.···.~.···r···p······T:.:-.·r·.·:o·····N:.:;; ;;-_ .•_. =·-.. ·_ •. -._ •. ··_·_.-• -."_·v·····-~A-.•.. .t-.•··~·.0: ... -... -.. _·.:s ·--_-_ •• ,.·_·_.~-~~~~;;F_._-... \_- .·.y~,;·_-.;.-_"·u.~--~--.-··._.:._:·.·_._ ... -,·.:··C·····./·S;:·.:·:-.·_-:·· .• ~_ •Htll: ..  .• ··A:.·.N·.:.··o· .. :.~·:·: .. : •. _,: •. '. •. :.:_~·:·:·.··_1:p:.:_-•. ~.~F·~.-·:·:~:.::.•._.: .• :'.t ·.c • :ii ___ --------
'° 1:·:::: ;.:::::',:''";; 0% -·""" '""" SO% " "" .. ~::;; ••• i 1 n, ' '" I "' ' Mt;;1m;;2J;;;;foi~M > ' "'" 
_____ L_ -- ----·----·-· ! \ $39,000.00 \ Ex.314Q,380,3BOA. TestimonyofHarding. 'i· 
21 _ ralfonal Financial se~ices, Inc .. -· =-=~- ------\\- - 1 _--- -s - ~::----i--"'"'"' R•:=-:~ -~,~ :,,,, ,oo, Fi!,:, 
22 jEmplreWest 1 -- ·-·----- ---- ---------- -·------·--------------------------- ··\··-------
~;;;;-,-;.;;;;.;;;;.--- ------±' _J_
1 
----···-- --· ---- - ·-- _J__ Sec. of State filings are Ex. 2~7~~) -·-- ------ \~!;(a) 
25 ' \ . 
2s \ i I 
27 RETIREMENTACCOUNTS/PLA~- -i T ------- -----------------·----------------·--r--------
25 rookstreeVRetirementAccount#OHN579054 $60,296.02\ ($31,123.44)\ . $29,172.55 S ··-- . - ------·-------------··----·-------------------- -1:
1
::---· 
Separate deposited to acct 3/20/1998 from Roosevelt Refy. See Ex. 210A 210 2d \ \ 




j I and Ex. 248a. 8/8/01 $20,000 w/d and 8/3/01 $20,000 w/d went updala 
1 
! \ to Real Homes. $40,000 claim appears in Item 19. 21 uA 
" 1 • .., •••••• """"'~"'""""'""-'"" I 1-----· C ----t------- ------------------·- -- :'.!~3A l 
\ community debts. \ I ! I 
\will supplement wilh back up documents. \ ($7,500.00)1 Sea Summary of community bills paid from loan proceeds. \211A 
\ \ I I 1210A 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 
Data of Man1age: July 4, 1996 
Paga 5 ol 22 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
30 IPutnam Investments SEP/IRA #03366.44339/A79 3 $40,160.99 I $40,160.99 s 1 
i""""°""w . [,rn, I 
' 1 $ 2S 
00 Statement dated 1/1/05-6/30/05-2106 update. Account opened In !update . 
; 
35"A. Putnam SEP/IRA (Renee's) 
$6,990.00 $6,9So.oo • -c-- · 
1
• O. July 1994 (before marriage). i210 B / 
1210 C 
--1248A --·-
Stml Produced by Renee in supplemental response rec'd 
$6,990.00 7//13/05. "lntilial amount Invested 1/26/98" - Supp 7/26/05 
Sates page 1365 
I 
210D 
==--1=--,-=~·-:-a:-:--::::--,-,----·-----1-.,._-,-,-..,........,.f-----+------1::c--·t------1--·-----,----------- ___________ I __ 306 Renee's Simple IRA Oppenheimer lo be determined C r---
31 Operating Engineers Pension Contribution $9,755.00 
32 John Hancock Venture Annuity (was"Manulife 
Financial) #8207 41 
I Owner is Dennis; Annuitant is Dennis; Inception Dale 
J1s 1013/1994 (before marriage) 
I 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 





Page 6 of 22 
Sep. 
$100.00 See Renee's paystub dated 6/30/05 showing contribution. 1 
121a(a) I 
i I 
See Renee's Ans. To Interrogatory #1 B-.-$--9-,3 _8_8_D_ls-cl-o-se-d---r--· 
7/26105 1276 












POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
::::-... ·.·.·>>.'..·.·.···-:-:-:,:-·.·. . ·.· •·. ·.·,:-:: . .: ... :.·-:-·.·-:.·-:· :-<:::-:-:-:-:-:-:::::::::-:-:::::,:-::.,:::::-.:::::::.:_:::::::::.:::::::.:_:;:.::::::::: -·::::::;:::-· .. : :,·- .. ·.·:···: :•:- :- .. :-:-:-:-: ·.:: :-.-:-:-:-: ... · -: ·,: .. · ... ·.: ':-· ....... ·.·.· .· .· :-.· ·.·. .· ... · .. ·:-. ·.·.· .. -:· .... ·.· ... . :::::::::::::::::::;/i)/{\{(1~}((((~~\~}1\tf1~}~~~{~/(\~/( .. ·.· ·.·. ·.·.·.·.· .. ·.·.· ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·. · .·.· .. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·. ·· HU.S:S~i;;b1S·i:fif6.PCiSEi:i' . ·.: ·.·.· ·.· -:-:-:-.-.. ·.-.-: -:-:-:-:.:-:.:-:-: :-. ·-:-.·. ·-.·:: ···· ··- .. ·-: ... ·.: .-: .-:·: ·. ·. ·. · · . · -· ·.-:: · 
33 \Manulife Financial Venlure Annuity duplicate of #32? J I 
J=, ..... ---------- , .. ·~ .. ·, ""· '° '"~""'"" "'· "'" ·~--
!3~91 ~ 'I 1 --~ INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS/STOCKS -t 
7--·---------- ~~~--- ···---=-~\ 
~-\LIFE INSURANCE (CASH VALUE} ----- -+---
:: ~-:C-K-IN_G_, S-A-V-IN_G_S_, C-.D-.-M::E:=-KE-T --- l-----1------1------I~:--_-_· -----r----l--------------·--·------·---------·-
ACCOUNTS AND CASH I 
44 
Sl 30.00 3/10105 (Ex. 260). 281 \#B2an11 k_o0r8t8h4e9w7 est Checking; Renee Ba_i_,d,-·.S_a_li_az_; __ , __ _,,,=-$1""3"'0,....0:-::0+------t---;;:;$:-;l;;:;30•.0-;0.IC·--· ---+·----- 212 Plaintiffs value• agreed. See Bates #000069·0000103. Bal. as of 280 ________________________ ._._ ___ _ 
.44(ar~ of America Checking #79585535 $2,498.48 $2•498·48 II 
!--···· $2,498.48 Online banking printout produced by Renee as of 6/8/05. 2SO(a) 
\ I I 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Paga 7 of 22 
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Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 




[Joint DL Evans Account No. 910403141 
I 
! 
1---- ... -··. -··-· - ··-· .. --! Safeco Insurance Claim Proceeds 
i 
.. 1-----·····--··--·----------·---···--·--





49. -k,EHICLESNESSELS: -- . - .. 
50 ·-··12001 Dodge Truck. 3/4 lon4WD·-
1 
! I 





Statement dated 7/8/05. 
2/11/2005-Ex. 254. 
Ex. 254 Supp is slmts. 6/04-6/05. {acct. opened 5/18/2004) 
---·------·--- ·-·--------·-··- ··-- --·------- - ---
Statements In Renee's possession. See 000104 -000190. Bal. 
1/9/2004 $1.823.11. 
. 
'. 254-2d sup I 
'254 
\254 supp 
$14,075.201 i $14.075.20 c· -- -·-·--·--
! I 
·-·I ·- ··-··-·-·--··-· -· ·-··-··---·------··-------·- ··-· ·-
1 . ···--·------·-· -···. ·-i· ----
I : 
---···s247.96r·------·+-··-$247.96 ---·-· ·-------·-+···-·-
I ! ' I . 
' $ 14 075 20 Per Order entered 3/212005 the check was lo be deposited lo the i213 ' · trust account of Plaintiff's attorney. 
·------··--------- --------·----- i 
. i 
$247.96 
-=--1---. -• t. "·'"°"° C --- --- - j ____ - =~==.::.::..::.=.::. -=-===~=::_:.::.:: 
\ I 
Statements 5/04-6/30/05 • Ex. 302 
[302 
I Stipulation as to value. Renee produced Chrysler Financial i ! I S7,7oo.oo statement· showing balance owing as of 6/20/05 !336 
1 
·- - ·- ···- ---m:,oo.oo~ ""·°'"·"''I '"·"''·"°' ,-- -· ------i----. ---------- ------------'. · - -
1 D.L. Evans Bank; auto deducted from bank account-no monthly: iP's Ex. 72_ 
I 
51 ~ Ford Excursion · 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4. 1996 
(negative value) statement received. 




POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
----,m•••••••·•,••···••1¥~•\ \~~··~• ff~:=iflE~: .• tt..••~~~~~~~;t~~·•·•••····•·•;·•••••··+·••·•·t••••••••••····••·•••··•·••····································· .. ••1---9 
....•.... ··•·•·•·•·•······· ·•·•·•• %~;~;;;i\6&\ I•••····•·•···· ··•·•••v,coe•••••••tI~kf J•itm••• .;;/~·••• tfaijJ~~•••••••I:@iJ•:•••••· •••••• i•••••.•••••••••iiJ~~~J~i~i~jJg~f ~•••••• I••·•··•·••>••Irn'!t''. 52 ! 1989 Chienain 31' Winnebago MH $15,000.001 ($8,500.00) ! $6,500.00 
Refy 1998 Ex. 248A paid debt lo 1 sl Sec. Bank. Rice has 
I X debt due Roy Rice is included in debt owed to Vis la Pawn, ilem 
338 
1 




! I I 100·---·-------. --·-·-·-------·------248A : I ~:0:n~~·ss:~1~;1e property reimbursement claim of $17,500 j 
53 -·-rz Rolls Royce ---· ·-·-- -··----·- ------- --·--- --- j --- -+ ·---S • - ----t-. ---- --. - -- ------·--··--··-·-·-·-·----···-··-···-i-- ---
I !,Ji Sep. I documents are Ex. 372. Plaintiff incorrectly shows 82 Rolls as 83 J 3
72 Rolls i 
I 
1 
1· 1 i s-i .. ··!80Poracii~92as·---------·-----· ---------- -·------··-r $5,000.00 c -·------------------·-------·--+·-- -----· 
I I 
: I J sett and use proceeds to pay Dennis testified value was between $4,000 and $5,000. Renee's 
: I I --"'" - ··~· "·'"'- , " ;.., ..... "'"'~···· r I , _______ T ______ ------------·----------- ·----··-·-··----------·-i03 
·--··----- --- ____ fl _________ jl ______ S -=--+-. ____ ::·~::m, ------- ______ Jl:5 si;' . -j39-Jag~ar Co"iivertible _________ _ 
57 
I ! . Sep. I i 303 






i- - $750.00 c-- --· - __ .;.,_ ____ ------ . -· ·····- -·---·- .... --- - - . (. 
$750.00 : 
I 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
Page 9 of 22 POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
912512006;2:55 PM 
001045
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule e 
-----
58 '.40 Cadillac Limo i : s i t 
' ! I 1303 
59 Ta Roiis Ro7c-.-si,ortseii"a;:; -----·--·--···- ----+-- ----1-- ---- , -- ~:-----\----- -·---- --- --------- · --- ---- -\:~~ 
iiff ·-154 Cadillac Eldorado Convertible ------\-- ------r- -- S - :~~- --r-------::qui~~d-:::~-:~:~~~:·subj~~:::~----- ------·· ------~-
61 
k----------- ·--------
;79 Chevrolet 112 Ton 4WD 
I 
\ 
s·2···-·\2000 Sidekick.Trailer 3/horse slant (insurance_ 
\proceeds) 
t' I -----------~------------------ - [,,, ----~- -~- --- -- ~ ''" t----- ,,=;,oo""~~:"~ -·· --- --- -- - ----+- -.. 
i I I I 
\ \ ; $4,460.00 Plaintiff stated that the proceeds were $4,460. 121sa 
63-\780a-ks_W_h-itewatsr26' in-bo-ard boa-I w-1-lra-ii.T ___ ------~----- -l-----S------+-------·--------·-·---- -----·---------t------
.. -~. "'"'""."""~"'" ------------l----1------ ' -~- -- +------------- ·---- --· --- ·---· -- ______ __J:__ __ _ 
' I I 
, Sep. / 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Paga 10 of 22 
I 
I 




POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule e 
--- ___ · 
55 /1953Cadillac4doarsodan $2,500.001 .
1 
$2,500.00 S !I ! 
boJ 
66 --1002 Yamaha Grizzly ATV --- ·· - --··-·--· ---- -----1-----~------- ---· -·· · s,, ----\-- ---"'":""' e,:• --- ... __ ----· .l255 _____ _ 
--1-------··· ····---- -··· ---------- -:~,~-- --------1
1




Yamaha Grtzz.ly $?,SOO.OO '· Dennis testified that it was never gifted la Ashley. There Is no 
' delivery of the supposed gift. 
68--\;:;;=r;,;i,~;:------ - . sold ---- r----- --- 1---- \----· 
-69-l-19-94-Milsublshi 2d~or(pra_c_e_ed_s_fr-amsa-lo-lh-.r-.o-f)-- ----·\ \----- - - -- - ---- - -- I $< "" OO .,,,.,,. ... ~,: •• : •• :::.". ,.~-00~:,:--~ -
I _______ --------1------1------ ---1------i ---·--r--ss.11ch.;-v~Tsu-bu-,b-a_n ______ _J_I j ' 
\ • ---- ~I --- .. -----=-~-co_m:~-nit_,~~:_ _______________ J! -------·-·· 
69.2 ~.Pontiac Flreblrd --·- --·---------· --·---- \ 
1 I I 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 
Data of Man1age: July 4, 1996 
I $1.500.00 
1 1 
Page 11 of 22 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
69.3 Whitewater Raft and Equipment . \ 
69.4 1999 Yamaha Grizzly A TV 
69.5 2002 Kawasaki Prairie A TV 
69.6 I 1997 Polaris 425 A TV 
I 
69.7 2 Kawasaki Prairie 400 ATVs 
69.B 1997 Kawasaki 300 
--------1-----1-----1----·----------- l __ _ 
I I 
------+------l-o-w-ne_d_b_y_R-lc_•--------·--·----------L __ · 
$5,000.00- --.. l 
$5,000.00 owned by firm; lo be returned by Renee together wilh lhe tr~~~- ·---
---·---1-----1-------+-----I---
-----1------1-------!-----l---1-----,-------1--------------------_J----
owned by Rica \ I 
$500.00 I 
69.9 1 A TV 2 place side by slde trailer -t--- 1· 
=-c-+-=-=-----:.-::---1---r--~1-·,_____1---+--69.1 O 1 A TV Zieman Trailer l 
69.11 Slide-In Hitch TIit Trailer/ Rack 
Case No. CV CR 04 01075 
Cale cf l',1arria9a: July 4, 1996 
t- $1,200.00 In Renee's ponesslcn - Renee's value, ------·--- ----·· 
$75.00 l Dennis' opinion or value. I 
I I I 
Page 12 qi 22 




POST TRIAL EXHlBlT 20'1 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
69.13 :Tan Storage Sin · ·· ! ! 
I . . • 
o,.i, \,,aoow~•,------·· ____ .. _____ .... ----·-·-·-·------t--- __ :--.. -... ·--\~- ---:::::: ------------··--·+--- i 
69.lS~c Changer --- ---·-~-----\------- ------+------- ---------t----
69.1ii°\C.B.Raciio------------------.. _ .. __ ----- --~----- -----"'~---- --- - -·--------------------- . - ...... -- --- - . -- ... [ ____ ,, -
i i $10.00 I l 
esn\T-oO"'foy -- t --+-------~----:---~~-=---------.. --------·---·- -- ··--r---·-1 
I -- _L __ -- ------+--------- ·---··----·----------+·---\ 
~··r··".::~,~=:•.~== ~-----L_. __ \ __ -~~-- -~ ______ :_:~-~------- __ _ _ ...... _J ___ , 
69.19 !!2 Flat Gas Storage TanKs · I . \ j 
$10.00 , Dennis' opinion of value. 
1 I : 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
Page 13 of 22 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
69.20 5 Gas Cans for A TVs X \ 
No value 
1--69.21 1990 Ford Bronco 
70 HOUSEHOLD GOODS, FURNISHINGS AND 
APPLIANCES 
Belongs to Scott Gatewood 
t-~1 
-l---~----,--1-~------i--.,=1;:;----1-i-----1----1 ' 
71 Household furniture, appliances, and furnishings al $3,520.00 $3,520.00 C i---
1 ODO S. Roosevelt \ l $3,520.00 See Exhibit 321(a). Value stated is total of community Items. 1321(a). 
-----------l-----=-~f------!---:;.,..,,-"""'~~1..-~1------t-------l--------------~--~---~L_____ -72-·+An,---,U~qu-e-F"'i-,e-a-,m--=c--:,ollection $10,000.00 $10,000.00 S l~--




Casa No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date or Marriage: July 4, 1996 
$6,000.00 
Sep. 
2 community guns {Benelli and Ruger) the values of which are L 
included in #71 above. Dennis doesn't have Ranee's dad's 20ga. 
Glock was Dennis' sap. property-value $250. Certain guns are 
itemized In the divorce Decree from Kendra at page 34. 
$6,000.00 C 
Sell and Use proceeds to pay Wife says horses worth $6,000. \ 
community debt. -!------------------------~---
Page 14 of 22 
\ .l 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
75 JMisc. Tack and Supplies $5.800.00 $5.800.00 C 
J
1 
Sell and Use proceeds Lo payl · 
community debL Renee claimed items were stolen. Exhibit 213. 
ro Household furniture, appliances, amJ fumishin~ to be del;;m;ned ~------4-l_o_b_e_d-et-e-rm-l-ne...Jd'-- l------------l·------------------------1---__ _ Riverside home 
I 
77 no items for these numbers 
78 
79 
80 DEBTS (OTHER THAN ABOVE) 
Renee's values for items ln her possession: 
#77.7 $120 #77.26 $500 
#77.8 $180 #n.5o $300 
$2,5o5.oo #77.9 $150 #77.51 $150 
#77.10 $80 #77.56 $725 
#77.58 $300 
1··-1 
i ------l------+------+-----1---l-____ ____. ______ 1 ___________________________ J ___ _ 
------=--------•------1------1----- ---1------+-----1-----------------------+---1 and not paid to him. 
I-B-1--+,,0-e-bl_o_w·e·--,-d lo Daryl Sallaz for )/2 of rents collected C I 
82 I VISA, Renee Baird. Sallaz, 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale ot Marriage: July 4, 1996 
($2,538.72) 
X Claim not pursued at trial. 
($2,538.72) 7 
·$2,539.00 Stmt. Dated 9/20/04 produced by P #000006 
Page 15 of 22 
216 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
83 !American Express, # ... 71002 f ($21,978.81) ($21,978.81) C 217-2dsup. 
+ 217supp. Stmt. 717/05 2172d Supp. ($21,979.00) Def.pd. $1,297 7/29-11/1 Bal. 11/1 $20,806 376 217 upda.10 217 84 Cabela's··-V-is_a ______ ,___ _____ l-----+-==-cc-:-=-+---,~=-=-=·1-=:-- l-----+------1----------------------,.._---($7,296.40) ($7,296.40) C 
85 CostcoWh~reditCard-------l-----+-==-==--:c:-:-t--~-=~:c+,,----
($3,027.69) ($3,027.69) C 
86 Direct M.;ii:ant's Bank 





Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of MaCTiage: July 4, 1996 
($6,324.84) ($6,324.84) C 
($8,14s.ni ($8,146.77 ) C 
($10,024.34) ($10,024.34 ) C 






Simi. 7/6/05 2182d supp. 
Def.pd. $433 7/29-11/1; 
Bal. 11/1 $7013 
Stmt. 6/18/05 219 supp. 
Def.pd $254 7/29-11/1/05 
Bal. 11/1 $2,939 
Stmt. 6/20/05 220 supp. 
Def. pd. $633 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10 $6, 12.1 
Stmt. 6/24/05 221 supp 
Def.pd $646 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10 $7,826 
Stml. 6/20/05 222 supp. 
Def.pd. $977 7/29-11/10 




























POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
89 Home Depot Credit Card $0.00 l $0.00 C 
90 Lowes Credit Card 
91 MBNA# ... 7599 
92 MBNA # ... 12oa· 
93 Wells Fargo Credit Card 
94 Advanta Credit Card 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 















($6,622.31 ) C 
($6,622.00) 
($15,254.6 3) C 
($15,255.00) 
Page 17 or 22 
Supp. Is stmts 11/04-1n/o5. Balance was transferred to Direct 
Merchant's.· 
Stmt. 6/22105 Is 224supp. 
Def.pd. $582 7/29-10/14 
Bal. 10/14105 Is $0.00 (pd. In full) 
Stmt. 6122105 is 225 supp. 
Def. pd $2,133 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10/05 $24,807 
Simi. 6122105 is 226supp. 
Def.pd. $2,129 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10/05 $27,222 
Simi. 6/3/05 Is 2272dsupp 
Def.pd $626 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10/05 $6,396 










226 supp .. 
376 · 














POST TRJAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
••••• i • ;•••·················································· ;.... • "'-.:·-··:· •. ......  • •. V u .•..•• _.A···-·· 1.tu ••. · •.E·N·:···-k·:·-··:· •. ·1... ~ .•.. ·.·_·· .. ·: .... :·-····.· ... : .• D .• .•• . ,E .. _r:J
4
_T·:····,:·-·: =•-·--·:···:·._ ..• : ...... : •..•...• :_ .• _.v·::r_iAr. : t.t.••.·1._._:··-.:···: .. :_ .. ····,·f_ •• J.l. I .. ·._.· .• :····:·.··H·;_t_.fst.•8• •. ·t.•A .•.. fN1.t_.D::t .• _"•:··-··:·~_.:· •...• · :·:····:0 .. 9:: •. i.f.t_if•.·s·~··.:·:··:·p:·:··:··:·:··:··: ·-::·:·.··-···· ... :: •. _ •.:.• :, ........... ::·-··:··:··:·:·:·:·····-··········-······'.··H····-··.U·! ••.••. S,·.····A·:•••N ..•.••• D •..••.•.. : •. 1,1.·•:•0 •.••. l.t. jN·····T·;:····.······":·:·-·-·:·_·· .. ··_.:_ •..•... :. __ :·:·:··.:;_·:···:··-····.······:·:·:··;··:·:·:·.·:• ... _:::·:·:·-·-·:·-.-'·.··:·i···' .•. N_··to··J,····:::•:1:·· 1· ~ ®~~~I~;,~~ . - ... . . . . .. . . . . .. ... ._ . . 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
95 George Hicks, for Property Dispute. $0.00 $0.00 C 
96 Internal Revenue Service for 2000, 2002, and 2001 
96A Internal Revenue Service for 2003 
9613 .. Internal Revenue Service and Idaho State Tax 
Commission for 2004 
Idaho State Tax Commission ror 2000, 2002, and 
2003 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
($15,400.00) ($15,400.00) C 
Included in #96 C 
($5,936.00) ($5,938.00) C 
paid with borrowed funds; see C 
97.1 below 




Paid by Defendant - $2,300. 
See I.RS. Letter/Statement dated 7/6/2005-Ex. 229A(1). See 
also lax summary; Ex. 229 
Bal. owing as of 7/6/05 shown on Ex. 22S(A)(1). EsUmate 
including interest and penalties. See Ex. 250, $6636 tax due 
Federal Return. See also tax summary Ex. 229. 
Taxes due for 2004. Federal $4,369; State $1,569. 
Dennis paid to avoid Levy, borrowed funds from Roy Rice. 






















l---------.. -·---·-·--97Aiidaho Slate Tax Commission for 2004 
i 
I 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
i ($10.883.ooil ($10.aa3.ooi · J I 
I I 
($lO.B8J.OO)I Dennis bor'.o".ed lhe fu?d• from Roy Rica lo pay the Idaho Stale 1349 
1 
1 
Tax Comm1ss1on lo avoid a levy. 
1 
-- -($1,569.0ortl ($1,569.00) -C ·-·-----ii,---------------------------·-··--- ·------.. ----+-
25
0(a) -
Amount shown above in item 968. 125( 
I I I S111··1ra~~for2oos-·-----·-- ........... - -- ·-· --·-·--· r-·-------r---- ---· ...... -.-.. -- .. -.. ---.... -. --; ·---.. ----------· --·-------------------.. ---- .. -.. ---.. -·----r----.. 
I i , 
j one-half lane-half Tax liability unpaid lhrough date of divorce. !
1 I : I 








_ -----·----- ---------- ----------·---------- ------+
11 
----- -
98 ferry Harding CPA ----- ... 
[ Contingent claim owed lo Trefren. 
I 
i 
gg-·tABC nre and Auto, Inc'. ___ .. __ ---- ··---· -----·-- >--($-2-,1-0-3-.9-0)+11-·"'($"'2-. 1"'0~3-=.s""o) C- [ ·--------------·----------- ·----. --...... _ .. - .. - __ ! ______ _ 
I _J,_______ .. ~~~~ o-3-.9-ol, --.. - :::~~= 112:~--- . __ ---·- _ _ _ __ __ __ _ ______ ... _~
1
31 o ____ 1 100 --;Vista Pawn debl .(not included abovaT ..... - ·- _, .... ----.. - .. _,_ - t·- . ' C 
' 1 [$44. 093.00 J / loci""" $8.500 owed lo ffi~ ,~ CMoHaO "''°"""'"· i 338 I 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 





102 Dennis' Medical Bills 
102A Aneslhesia Associates 
1028 Boise Radiology 
102C Boise Paihology 
1020 Boise Gastroenlerolagy 
102E Boise Orthopedic 
102F Cardio. Consullants 
10213 Cardlov. &°Chest Surgery 
Ca&a No. CV OR 04 01075 
Cale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
($34,022.00) 









Paga 20 0122 
Notices dated 4126/06, far lax years 1996, 1997, 1999, and 2000; 348A 
certified letter dated 5/9/06. Total is an Ex. 382 382 
Estimate. Bills not received yet, Insurance not applied yet. Ta be 
determined. 
As of 2/05 had been paid 
As of 1/05 had been paid. 
As of 1/05 had been paid. 
As of 5/04 the balance of $1,200 had been paid. 
As of 5/04 had been paid 
As of 5/05 had been paid 












102H Greg Flint MD 
1021 Idaho Endoscopy 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husj:)and's Property and Debt Schedule 
$0.00 
Ex. 333 H, 6/30/05 333 H I ----1 
As of 5/04 had been paid 3331 
--·>-----------···------- -------1----$-0-.0-0-1----- ___ , ______ , ______ \ __________________ _:__ --·--+-------1. 
102J IDX Pa\hology 
102K lntermountaln Eye Clinic $0.00 
l-1-0-2L-I-D-r-.-Jo-h-an_s _______________ ------+----$-0.-0-0-1----- ---•-------
102M Selah Medical Center/Dr. Spencer 
102N Berkey Hearl Lab 
'i 020 Saint Alphonsus RMC 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
$0.00 
$0.00 
Page 21 of 22 
As of 5/04 had been paid 333J 
As of 6/04 had been paid 333K 
-----1--------------------·--·-----
As or 11/03 the balance or $2,021 had been paid 
As of 2/05 had been paid 
As or 6/05 had been paid 333N 
As of atmt. 5/18/05. The SL Als Ambulatory of $525. 79 was paid, 333 0 
and the Lab of $120 was paid. 
I 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's P,op,rty and Debt Schedulo • 
102P J Saint Lukes RMC - j 
I 
1020,Medical Bills from Procedure occurred on 7/11/05. 
I 
As of statements printed 3/8/05 and 12/22/04. 
333 P 
lo be determined 
Bills not received yet. 
103 JDebl owed to Sallaz and Gatewood by Renee for · 
1 entering Into a SlipulaUon on 2/10/05 in Small Claims I ($181.49) ($181.49) C 
I Court whereby her and/or Ashley's debt for dry 
jcleaning expenses of $181.49 was to be charged off 
1
237 I against a Sallaz and Gatewood Account Receivable. • I 
1~1Aclion Collecllon Service - bill Incurred to Treasure . --------1---(..,.$3~5-1·~.0-0,-1) --~($'"3~5~1 ~.0.,.0)'1c~- ·------!--·---- I--------------·-·--·--------~---- -
Jvauey Hospital (addressed lo "Dear Renee L Sallaz") I 
i ""'·"'' ,~, °"~ .,.,,. I"' 
I'°"' ... ,, ....... ""'·"'·"' ""·'"·" ~ 
I 
$49 694.68 community assets/debts to be redlslci~uted to equalize division!, I '"''·"'·"' . ·""' o,, .... ~. "'-· ,.,.., ••••• ,,-.. , . 





!NET ESTATE TD EACH I , . -----+---
($53,161.47) ($53.161.47) ~ 1 L_.L: _______________ J.... ____ ..L ____ ..L. ____ 1,__ _ _._ ____ -1. _____ '-------------- -~ 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1G96. 
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FACSI1'1ILE TR_A.NS1ilSSION 
_£ PAGES INCLUDil\lG COVER 
....,... / /') ~/ 
TO: -Jo.rJN KUN7 T" 
FROM: Salhz & Gat:wood ta;( No.: 336-1263 / Ph: 336-1145 
su-nJEcT: /2t A,:'., .. I/,;/~ f.2p;n1 dsf/ 
COPYTO: NIA 
Conunenb: ...pl..t.-
THIS IS THZ ONL y COPY YOU 1iv1LL RECEIVE L 
Tiffi O lUGINAL rs TO FOLLOW BY U.S. 11 ..AII, ---
A COPY WILL FOLLOW BY U.S. ?vUJL 
Can!ldc:rtJqflty Notfca: Tho matachls with this C.ml::i!le tr:i.,sr:::L"!lc~ llrQ privat: and con/'!dcntl~I ar.d a."\I thG property o(chc 
•cndc:, rnc lnfar:nation in \ha :riatar!al Li: privllo;c:i and 11 inrandad only for th• Ula a!tha JndlvtdUIII(:) or cnlil)'(ias) nllJll.Clci 1bavc. 
lfy1111 sr: not :he Jnrc:.11k:I racipicn4 be advbcd that any unautllari.:i:d disalo:urc, cop~Jn.r, dbt;lbutian, or the lal:in1t al'an)I Bccfan 
In rolfanco OIi Um contents if thi: .alc,iccpcd lntlmnaclari Ir scrterly prohlbitad, Itycu ha.ve received th!s iac~!mllo tr1111smiss!ao In 
or.or, plciu~ lmmcd/atcly aatiii' u3 ~;, tc!cpbonc co sr.!111Qa t'cr tho r,turn of the forwardod dccumcnll :o us. Thank You. 
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DENNIS and RENZE SA.!...Lfi.Z 
l 000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, Idaho 8]707 
ROY RICE 
dba VISTA PA \YN 
B(lise. Idaho 
f 
R.Z: ACCOUNT DUS 7/5196 • S/1104 
Motor Home · Ca.sh $ 









25 pc vuiou:; dis::ioy 
S pc va:ious movies 
Hitachi 10" chop saw 
Xe:ox 4030 printer w/ducl t:ays 
kdia,1 case, quiver, arrows-snabs.'61 
Pipe, horn, leather arrow heads, foathe: 
Cheyelllt~ a~i bow., leather s.hea6er, quive: 
Mountain bi!c:'! grey/black/red 





Jamaca Me Tan 
Pewrer mlrJ auto coliection 
Tool.; 
Ste:-eo 















To Renee in Portla..:.d 
Rene:: (Nicole) 6/98 #10&0723-1 
For ari.nivermy flIQg9g99.1 
For a.nniver3ary #1089509-1 
For birthday 91090426-2 
Renee's da.ughter4/95 #39614-2 
Renee's daughter #10590:30-2 





7i25/97 # 1070373 
160.00 7121197 #I070i50 












AJhley#J 137121 ~2 
A3bley 8/J/02 illl 30141-I 
Ull0532S-l 
Ashley#l 13118 5-1 
AJhley#I-13935 
#112525-6 








Outdoor ster!o, floor speah:, CD, recei~1er 







A..shleyr #113712 ! ·2 
Ashley ffef-13204 
Dac:ght?r #! 135479-17 
Danght!n' # I 135479-J 8 
Daught~ #l 135j80-l 9 
Daughtar #1133310 !-1 
#1136814-1 
Mor.goose mountain bike 
VID system controller adapter 
Gold cbafo w,1vfaatrq ruby 
Rh1g 
Men 1s ring 4.10 dwt 
Chain 
NC stereo unit w/6 disc CD 
YID Nint~ndo w controller 
Various video _glmes 
Craig CD pl.ayer w/2CD 
Fisher CD player 
Gold 2.30 DWT 
18.90WT 








Koc.ica C.'.L.":1 ~a 
Chab 
Tw!3t w/3 dia 
Eadngs 
HP printer de.u jet 
4 pc green outdoor speak!r 
Smith Corona word processor 
New York Fur Sbop jacbt 




































#1088950-2 Denny took 
#l097973-I Deri."'ly teak 
# 1072306-I Denny took 
#1072151-J Denny took 
#!085642-4 Denny tcok 











Shar,, Car.::c::;rc.e::- w/equipment 979.~0 #!060521-1 
Prfnter 90 ~!0529!4-I 
4Cds 20.20 #1052610-4 
CD IO.IO #JOOiO·I 
CD 10.10 11057225-1 
2CDs 20.20 1053589-2 
CD 10.10 #1057337-1 
CD 10.10 11058092-1 
CD 10.10 11051580-1 
Cds &9.90 #1057599-3 
Fur coat 1,200.00 1#10I 14-1 
Plumbing bldg mainfenbr.ce pa.1:3 597.56 II 
Fur coat 1,000.00 #306'86-! 
Blue sapphire ri.ng/baguet'.e.s 6,299.99 Rene: #I-4749 
Large marquis ring 6,599.90 Renee 142150-1 
Men's tlower7 diam.ondri,:,.g 699.90 Renee #35484-6 
Triangi..e 10 diamolid ring 6,299.90 RAnce :4g934-1 
M::n':1 l ct 3olitairc 3,989.90 Rene~ 144602-1 
Men'& 4 diamond hand 1,599-.90 Renee #2118&-2 
7 Marquis ladies ring 999.90 Renee #42211-4 
3 marquise: 2 L'!ar.1 450.00 Renee #1050530-1 
3.IOband 179.90 Renee '123500-l 
2.90 band 81.90 Renee f/24578-2 
J.00 Band 169.90 Rene~ f/39938-2 
3.00 Band 159.90 R.er.eis 63475&-2 
t.70 Band 89.90 Renee #39423-3 
5.!0Band 259.90 Re~ #26449-I 
l.50Band 89.90 R.er.ee~33104-I 
3.10 Band 179.90 Renee·#:::3091-1 
2.o Band 149.80 Renee #22 821 • I 
2.6 Ba:id 129.80 R.ecee i 19064-1 
Hea.-t w/dian.ond cha:n 359.90 Renee #49404-3 
Ring-gquare top 649.90 Renee # 1 050603~ l 
Ring, gold w/1 577.90 R~ee #20&05-I 
Men's ri::::ig w/sqllar! de.;ign 239.90 R~ee :44256-1 
TOTAL Du"E (n.ot i.:::.cluding int.m:st) S61,5i0.51 
ACCOUNT· ROY RJC2, P. 3 
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No. 91 ,Ax 
Return To 
Secretary of Stata 
Room 203, Statehousa 
Bois.a, ID 83720 
'\ 
INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE 
Idaho Corporation Annual Report Form 
Due No Later Than November 1, 1 9 Q J 
1. Mailing Address - Please Correct 
R-R INVESTMENTS, INC. 
i>ENN1S J. SALLAZ 
1000 S. ROOSEVELT 
BOISE ID 83705 
4. Names and Addresses of Officers and Directors 




Roy Rice 523 Vista Avenue 
Dennis J. Sallaz 523 Vista 
Roy Rice 
Janet Rice 




P.O. Box 8956 
P.O. Box 8956 
ISSUED: 06-30-1990 
2. Registered Agent and Office 
DENNIS J. SALU,Z 
10/JO S, ROOSEVELT 
80ISE ro 
3. Incorporated Under The Laws 













Boise, ID a ~ 
II II <n 
Boise ID -l > 










5. Nature oi Business 
Real & 
8. I certify that this Annual Reoort h::1S'l heen examined by me and is to the best of my knowledge 
true, correct anrl " . ,..,~--
1? er son al propertv~{_...--- - ..:,.Date 7·-27-90 . 
investments Name r:t::,t uen,~~ .., . ~a.L1.az Title Secretary 




ART]CUS OF A.M.END1\i1ENT 
TO 
R-JR JlNVESTMENTS, me. 
* * * * * 
,p 3: 
rn ~· a 





. L~ """',;/J 
Thiese Actjdes o.f Amendment and the following certificate is hereby made and dec~d 
~ ffi 
pms.11Janl to SectioDJ 30~1-59, Ida.ho Cede, for the pwrp,ose of amending the Articles of 
Jncoiporation of R-R Investments, Bnc., an ldaho corporation, and to effect a change of name 
of said corporation to Rentals & Royalties, Jric. 
The uooersigneo. MICHAEL RlCE> President of said corporation, and RENEE BAJRD, 
Secretary of saiidl corporatio,n, dJo YJereby respectively certify as follows; 
I. 
That a meeting of all of the stockholders. of R-R Investments, Inc., an Idaho corporation, 
was held on February 21, 1995. at 1000 South Roosevelt, Boise, Ada County, (daho, pursuant . . 
to Call and Waiver of Notice signed by a.II of the··s.tockholders and filed in the minute book of 
the corpomr.ion. 
Tl. 
That at soch meeting, the following resolution was presented and upon motion dufy made, 
seconded and umnimous.Jy carried, the same was adopted: 
BE IT IRESOL VED,. that£ Anucle J of nhe AjJ'tucles o,f 
hlcorporatfon of R.-R Investments, Inc. be ameooled by deleting~ SfCl£TAAY a= STITTE 
entire first Artide and i&J,serting in pface thereof, the follo,i~D 0900 6cl1123 2 
cx t:: 2'2!300 a..sn .+22+1 
CORP 
.jU.UO= 30.00 
ARTJCLES OF AlvfENDMENT - l 
ft: C 
•;: •f .·, •• '.t~f: 
""""---'--"''""-" ------~--- .... _____ ··- ··-··--·--····· :·~· . "-·-·-"-·'"-__ --_---------,F1--,:)l\-l'(H+BlT . M 
001064
"ARTICLE I 
lflhe 111ame of the corporation is IRemafa & Royalties, fnc. • 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Presidelile and 
Secrewy of the corporation, respectively, be, ai.nd they aire hereby, 
authorized to prepare a certifica[e o.f this resolution and 
amendrnem to the Articles of Bncorporation of [his corporation and 
tto fiJe the saut11e with tfue Secretary of State for the State of Bdlaho,, 
and to do al/l things. necessary in order to duly effect the change of 
name of this corporation il!lJ accoiroomce WD[h this resolution. 
m. 
We further certiffy t:h.at we are the proper officers to execute !his certificate, being the 
Pres.idlent and S.ecrenary of said corporation, respectively, and we therefore execute £hese Articles 
of Amendment of Iocorporatfo.11 of said corporation. 
JN WITNESS WHEREOF, We Hlave hreret.mto set our hands. aind seals this A//!! day 
of Feb,mary, 1995. 






MlCHAEL RICE,. befog; first dl!lly s.worn l!lpon oath, deposes and says: 
That I am the Presvd.e!}tt in nhe a:bove-entritJed CO[])oration; that I ha:ve read t.he within and 
foregoing Articles of Amendment, know the contents thereof, and that the same is. true and 
correct as J verily believe. 
Residing at Boise, Jdaho 5 q q My Commissiolll' Exp,ure-s: - - /.,p 





CERTIF!CA TE OF INCORPOlR:ATION 
OJF 
CAPITAL BROADCASTING INC. 
file number C IW8']4, 
h 
I, PETET. CENiAR'RUSA, ~rera.ry off State of the Sfafr.e of Idaho, herelby certify 
that dupbcafe originals of Arftides o.f .H.nco,rporatio,n for fhe mcorporation of the above 
na.m.ed co·:rporati.oon, dUJly signed pmsuanfi: @o fhe pt"ovis.ions: of the Idaho Business 
Corpo:raition Act, have b€en recei.ved in this office a.nd are found to conform to law. 
ACCORDJ!NGL Y and by virrne· of fo.e· a:uthori:ty ves.tted in me by law, I iissue trus 
Cerfillcate of .llncorpornf:i!olfl! and attach hereto a dupikate o·riigmal of foe Artides of 
w1corporaifio·n. 
Daited: Septemb€r 2S, 199'4 
(2;.(/1'·~ 
SECRETARY OF STA TE 
EXHIBIT 1\1 
001067
00 ·ozi: =OO ··oar ~,r 
dHO:J 
g,:moi, usn FOO : , io 
2 SOO,ff 0060 S-~'1£6T 
1t1Jl1S ~ A!AfBlfCJS 0ilffl1 
CERTIFICATE OP. INCORPOJRA1'10N 
CAPITAL BROADCASTING INC. 
A CLOSE CORPORA.T'IONI 
3Er l~ I J 5j. AH '~ 
<;U~f.TAR't t)f: STHE 
F'IRST. THE NAME OP THE CORPORA.'FION IS CAPITAL BROADCASTING 
INC. 
SECOND. THE PERIOD OP DURATION IS PERPETUAL. 
TffllRD. THE NATURE OF THE l!H.JS.HTE:SS AND THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSE 
PROPOSE'l!J ·ro HE TRANS!<.CTJED, PROMOTED AND CARRIBJDi ON ARE T'O ENGAGE 
INI ANY LAWFUL ACT OR ACTIVIT'Y F'OR WHICH CORPORATIONS MAY BE 
INCORPORATED UNDER 'rH:n:S A.CT. 
FOURTH. THE AMOUNT OP THE TOTAL ALITHORHED CAPITAL STOCK OF THE . . 
CORPORATION IS DIVIDED IN'fO 1000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK OF NO 
PAR VALUE •. 
F'IFTH. ALL OF THIE CORPORATIONS ISSUED S'FOCK SHAl.L BE HELD BY NOT 
MORE THAN T'HIRTY (30} PERSONS. 
S][XTH. ALL OF THE ISS.UE:J[} STOCK OF ALL CLASSES SHALL BE. SUBJECT TO 
THE FOLLOWI1'JG RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSP.EH PERMITTED BY S.ECT'ION J0-12JA 
OP THE CORPORATION LAWS OP THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
SEVENTH. EACH STOCK.I-DOLDER WILL OFFER TO TH'E CORPORATION OR TO THE 
OTHER S.T'OCKHOLDERS OF' '.l!'UE' CORPORATION A THJ!.RTY (JO} DAY FIRST REFUSAL 
OPTION TO PURCHASE HIS S'!'OCK SHOULD HE ELECT' TO SELL HIS STOCK. THE 
PRICE FOR ALL STOCK SHALL .BE BASED ONI 'll'HE BOOK VALUE OF THE COMPANY 
AT THE TIME 0-F' THE SALE EXCEPT ~~OR STOCK T'HAT THE PRESIDENT MAY SELL. 
EIGHT. CORPOJRA.'TION SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO F1LE A SUB CHAPTERS AND 
TO USE 'fHE 1244 PROVISION. 
NINTH, 'l'HJE CORPORATION SHALL MAKE NO OFF'E.i:UNG OF ANY STOCK OF A...l\JY 
CLASS WHICH WOl!JLD CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC O.FF'EEHNG WITHIN THE MEANING 
OP THE' UNITED STATES ·SECURIT'I.E:S ACT OF 19JJ, AS IT MAY BE AMENDED FROM 
THIE TO TI.ME. CORPORATE OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS SHALL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORAT'E INTERESTS OR OBLIGATIONS. 
1'ENTH. THE ADDRESS OP ITS INITIAL REGISTERED OFFICE IS 5 OJ VISTA 
BOISE, IDAHO 83705 AND THE NAME OF ITS INITIAL REGISTERED 
AGENT AT SUCH ADDRESS IS ROY RICE, 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 
ELEVE:N'I'H. THERE SHALL, BE ONE DIRECTOR CONST.I'li'UTING THE' INITIAL 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE NAMES AND ADDRESS.ES OF 'FHE PERSONS TO 
SERVE A.S DIRECTORS lJIN'FIJ.. THE FIRST Jµ-l'NlJIAL MEETING OF SHAl{E HOLDERS 
OR UNTIL THEIR SUCCESS;ORS HE: ELECTED AND QUM..IF'Y. 
ROY RICE, 503 VIS'Jl'A, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 
001068
• 
TWELFTH. THE NIP.ME /!,.ND ADDRESS OF EA.CH IN CORPORA.TOR: 
ROY RICE, S.03 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 837ns 
DATED 9-Jg - 91--
001069
l=-
tale of l ho 
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPO:JRATION 
OF 
WESI'E:RN BROADCAS'JJING J!NC. 
File nuunber C 1W813 
l, PETET. CENARRUSA, &?cretrry of State of the State ofida,ho, hereby certify 
that dupBka.te miginai1s, of ArHdes of fuco-rporation frnr th.e mcorporntion of the above· 
named corporation, du:Jy s.igned pmsua.nt fto f'he pro,visfons of the Idaho Busmess 
CorporaiHon Ad, have been fe{:eived in this o.ffice and are found to conform to- law. 
ACCORDlINGL Y and by virtue of ~he· authority ves.fed in me by law, I i!ssue thls. 
Cerliificate of Jncorpoiraffon and attach hereto a,, dup]irate or:ii.g:i:na1 of the Artides of 
focorporaifion. 
Dated: September 28, 1994· 
~{!!)~ 
SECRETARY OF STA TE 
,,,.... 





oo ·0.21 =OO ·oai: I!) 1 
d~O;:J: 
'398ot usm H&O ::, JO 
, 609lf 0060 8-2M"66 i 
JJ.~lf!J!l'B @«RI 
CERTIFICATE OF 1NCORPORATION3EJ, id JJ S.1 AH r9~ 
Sf:CRfH.k'f O, 
WESTERN. BROADCASTING INC. . · f ST.HE 
A CLO.SE CORPORATION 
l:IRST. THE NA,'<1E OP THE CORPORATION IS WESTERN BROADCASTING INC. 
SECOND. THE PERIOD OP DURATION IS PERPETUAL. 
THIRD. THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS. AND THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSE 
PROPOSED TO BE TRfu"<JSACTE'.D, PROMOTED AND CARRIED ON ARE TO ENGAGE 
IN ANY LAWFUL ACT' OR ACT'IVIT1( FOR WHICH CORPORATIONS M..I\Y OE 
INCORPORATED UNDER THIS ACT. 
fOURTlL THE AMOUNT OF THE TOTAL AUTHOR I lED CAPITAL STOCK OF THE 
CORPORATION IS DIVIDED DITO 1000 SH2\RES OF COMMON STOCK OF NO 
PAR VALUE. 
FIFTH. ALL OF THE: CORPORATIONS ISSUED STOCK SHALL BE HELD BY NOT 
MORE T'HP .. .M THIRT'Y (JO) PERSONS. 
SIXTH. ALL OlF' THE ISSUED S.TOCK OP ALL CLASSE:S SHALL OE SUI3JECT TO 
THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS• ON '.ll'fu.iNSPER PERMITTED BY SECTION J 0-12JA 
OP THE CORPORATION LAWS OF THE STATE.OF IDAHO. 
SEVENTH. E.ACH ST'OCKHOLDER WILL OFFE.R TO THE CORPORATION OR TO THE 
OTHER ST'OCKHOLDERS OF THE CORPORATION A THIRTY (JO) DAY FIRST REFUSAL 
OPTION TO PURCHASE HIS STOCK SHOULD HE: ELECT TO S:ELL HIS STOCK. THE 
PRICE FOR AL.L STOCK SHALL BE BASED ON THE BOOK VALUE OF THE COHPANY 
AT THE TH!E OF' THE SALE EXCEPT FOR STOCK THAT THE. PRESIDENT MAY SELL. 
EIGHT, CORPORATION SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO PILE A SUB CHAP'rER S AND 
TO USE THE 1244 PROVISION. 
NINTH. THE CORP.OR.t\TION SHALL HAKE NO OFJ'ERINIG OJF ANY STOCK OF ANY 
CLASS WHICH WOIJLD CONSTITU'T'E A PUBLIC OFFERING WITHIN T'HE MEANING 
OF THE UNITED STATES ·SECURITIES ACT OP 1933, AS IT MAY BE AMENDED FROM 
TINE TO TIME. CORPORATE OF'FICERS OR DIRECTORS SHALL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE INTE'.RESTS OR OBLIGATIONS, 
TENTH. THE ADDRESS OP ITS INITIAL REGISTERED OF.FI CE IS 503 VISTA 
BOISE, IDAHO 8;3705 MID THE NAME OF ITS INITIAL REGISTERED 
AGENT AT SUCH ADDRESS IS ROY RICE 503 VIS'l!'A, BOISE, IDAHO 83 705 
ELEVENTH. THERE SH.i-,LL BE: ONIE DIRECTOR CONSTITUTING THE INITIAL 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AJ".-ID THE NAflES AND ADDRESSES OF THE PERSONS TO 
SERVE AS DIRECTORS UNTIL THE FIRST ANNUAL HEETTNG OF SHAl{E HOLDERS 
OR UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS BE ELECTED AND QUALIFY. 





'T"l'il'ELFTH. THE· N.~"Y1E A..'m ADDRE:SS OF BACH. I1<TCORF.'0JRATOR: 
ROY R.ICE, 50,J; VISTA, BOIS.E, IDA.HO 83705, 





BALld"lZ LAW. CHARTERED 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ 
RAYMOND D • .SCtlII,D 
VnnBisbop 
Attorney at Law 
603'2°" Street South 
l't~pa. ID 33651 
DenrVan: 
June 28, 2000 
e 
JU 
1000 sourn ROOS6fflL'l' 
1'051' Ofl'lCB BOX 091'6 
BOll!38, IDIUIO ll!:1'10'1 
PIICJrlE: (208) 21311-1145 
FA."'C: (208) 336-1.163 
In response to your' faxed: .l~l!er of todays dateifi'.~mis.'· :.: .. . . ", . .'. J'fttt~,r.illii.#'.~,~ my . 
poaitio.n regarding the status of'tt#entlte bullshit dew.Ml · · · ··,;;:· ~s~iat~ squum 
• hide the ball - ~awl und~ ~ ~.ch -llild tlten pre_y~:~~f~OQ~_t;Qmp_ .. Jitftl~: 
perpotuato same 1s over, a! tt relates to me and tbose pnvy·ro me. 
The: 01tire settlement of this ~ at all times was absolutely mutually iJnd lllllYcr:saJJy 
agreed by all partit!-'l and nttorneys to be a. 3 agreement package on the tenas presently set forth 
therein nod with each agreement totally dependent qn the otbcrs. · 
1 persona11y was told by Sumner that .he bad :Jigned No. 2 and 3 as written and it would be 
delivered to Runft. Also, Sumner and I specifically agreed that Iwauld adjust any errou in the 
.Runft bi1Jing and fifer agreed to reassjgn n1l stock when ho was paid plus h.i:1 out of pocket costs 
which he reduced to $3,000. · 





Letter to Van Bishop 
June 18, 2000 
Page Two 
• _, e ru 
My word 1s absolutely solid gold und after litcm.lly and .tiguritively carrying Sunmer for 
12 y!W3 - including all attorney fees - cash costs· advances - cash Ionus - loan gu.arll1ltee3 -
redeeming loan de:fuults" eating tons of shit - bleeding profu3cly- and then deUve.ring these racHo 
$tatiomi to him, in spite ofhi.mse~ it's'over. 
re Sumner wants to question my wom now then he better tighten his cinch and grub his 
ass, hecal!se it's gonna be a hell of 11 lot more tfuu1 iin 8 aecond ride. 
bJS:da 






~ · .. 




sAI,LAZ. LA wo.FFICES, cr-:UU?IEREJ) 
DcNNJS J,.$A.LL,iZ . . .. 
RAY.MONO D. 8cmr;o 
ru1y io, 2000 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 West 1f.am Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Vm Facsimile: HS-1129 




1000 SoU'rn Roo/5l:V61.'f 
Pos-r Omc.a BOX 6956 
l30IS'E, IoAI:!o 83101 , 
I'HONB (208) 336-1145 
FA..: (WB) 336,12h3 
I am veq happy tfau you were abie to arrange tbo Saw.t~eili:thlfaiouHuiiiii¢jrlgjab~iJ'b;:, ,~-
agreem~ you have w~r-ked 011t with Runft fol' all Defendlri!~{J¥&-e.:;.vn~;p:t't:f&u.bJ~~fo1-tli~~ ;; 
c;i:,11frmatio.n of followmg terms: · 
1. 
2. That the balari~ due ori the Roy R1ce/ Sumner lOlIIl be specifica11y included in the 
payment in the above D~endants' Settlement .Agree~ent. .:: . 
3. That in return for the assignment or release of all of tbe Fifer/ R&R stock to 
Sumner, Fifer recovers a portion of bis out-of-pocket cost:! in the sum of $3000.00 
from the above Settlement .Agreement. 
' Upon Sumnen aignature hereon I am prepared to executi: his new loan documents. 
cc: Van Bishop 
Wes Wilhite 
JohnRunft 
STEVE SillvJNER ·r. 
., 
,. 
··•·· .~, .~~ ~. 
·,: 
''•: ·., 









uo; JIJl u·.;. 
June 18, 2003 
Mr. Van G. Bishop 
Attorney acLaw 
i6 12'1h A v:enue South 
Namp: ..a ID 83651 
. ' . 
D~ar Mr.. Bisli9p: 
· e.1'1q!HJ 
RE: Escrow Instructions 
El 5/IANN LA!f OFF. 
Acting in yo,i; fiduciary cap~cizy as Trustee, upon rec.;ving the signed Stipulation and Qrd,er for 
Dism.is~al.as toDenms 1. Ball~ anµ Rentals & Ro yaJ ties~ 1nc A."R-.RJ and Wilbur Fi,f er·:~pp~opriately 
sigi;ed as J:rriden, her,e.inaftrei· pe:ferred as DisniissaI; yoti ~ha:il-notify Steve Su,moerof su?:-Ji·: . . ' .. ~. .. . . . ... ' ._, .• ·. .. . 
llpop. re~iip(9:f tJie. ~µqs ~m .~~ gJpsing of the s~l~ ofth~ assets of C~piral Wi~ Inc: to First We~teril, ffic~:0:al'tihltij~\y8u. shaI1: . . . ,. . . 
1. fiie'ih~ Di;.iriiss'.~l ~S·.refeired:to aoove with:the CotU,t. 
2. D.~lfy~f:to,'D,~11aj~;Jtf~~fazctitified'~ds- ifl the amount ofS15.0;00Q:OO:spa;yapleto 
Qi;ri'pfs .. L $al1a±i6rJJi,(yabi'eas dfreC:ted'tn:writing\y Pennis l Sa1Jaz 
3.. l)eli Ver.% PehriifJt Sali,u ail acftHtiorial airiQtfut in, certified funds o{ $3 21098 . 09 ,.£qr f ~}jJ~lht!~:t::tt:tJl!~Jj~\:f ~) j;ayabJO to DeMi,',, s,'.1Jfu,or 
4. DeliYer t~ pe·~$. J. S:µiaz tlie.pt~pared· Promissozy Note in the amount of 
$2fitOOO'.OO:in'~de·.''p.tj,"a~.le to De~wFJ.·S~ii"az' si~df.by First W;~ste~Jflc. and 
Steve Sumner,._ guarantor and secured .by 2~d a,~signment of pjori1:issofy·.~-i;>te :thm1 
Educaµona! Media F Oi.mdation, a i:ioa-p~ofit Califotnia,corporariotL s_~ld <1:SSi~ent 
arid security fornis and documents to be approveq~ by Dennis J. Sallaz. . 
5. fu: the event th.ls ·n-ansactfou do~s not clo.se wicl1in 120 days hereof, Sallaz has the 
option to terminate same. 
Steve Sumner 
Approved and agreed: 






\ ~ .,, 
At 
1 ~lo 1 ,, 
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CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
T:'li s Covfo:leri.tialit:y Ag:eement (hereinafter the "f.;;;ee~-:ienr") is made this __ :;ln.y of 
____ 2003, by and between Denn.is J. Sallaz, an individual, Rentals & Royalties. Inc. ("R-R"), 
an Idaho corporation (collectively" Sallaz"), and Capital West, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("Capital"), 
and First Western,. fnc., an Idaho corporation ("First Western"), and Steve Sumner (''Sumner). 
REClTALS 
WHEREAS, Sumner and Capital owes money to Sallaz, and Capital West has signed a 
Promissory Note in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A", w},ich is incorporated herein by th.is 
reference and restated a.s if set forth in fuIJ, 
WHEREAS, the fact that Sumner and Capital West, Inc, has signed the note and agreed to 
make payments and Sallaz has accepted said note, is information that First Western, Sumner, Capital 
West and Sallaz would rather not have publicly disseminated; and 
WHEREAS, Sallaz, Sumner, Capital West a:'ld First Westem in consideration ofthe delivery 
arid acceptance of the Promissory Note on the terms thereon, all pat1ies are willing to honor each 
parties' cone.ems that all of the terms of this t.ansaction, including the Promissory Note, remain in 
confidence. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed between a!] parties as follows: 
l. Recitals. The foregoing recitals are hereby incorporated by this 
reference and restated as if .set forth in full as part and parcel of this Agreement. 
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2. Con...fidentiality. It is understood and agreed that tl1e confidentiality of all 
provisions of this Agreement and the ~on-disclosure and non-publication thereof subsequent to the 
e:cecution of this Agreement is a material part of the consideration recited herein. The parties 
acknowledge that the disclosure, dissemination or publication of the provision of this Agreement by 
any of said parties may adversely affect the others. The parties do fwther stipula1e and agree that 
none of the tenns of th.is settlement or any of the agreements or payments herein, including the 
aforesaid Promissory Note, req.uire the filing by any of the parties of a federaJ 1099 form or any 
other notification either to the United States, or any department thereof or any state or any 
department thereof and none of the parties hereto shall make said filing without the written consent 
of all parties. The parties aclcnowledge thar disclosure, dissemination or publication of the 
provisions of this Release, by any of these parties, may adversely affect the other parties in an 
amount that cannot be presently determined and would be difficult to determine the exact amou.rit of 
damages if disclosure was made. Because of that difficulty it is agreed that any parties releasing my 
of said information shall pay the sum of $25,000.00 as Liquidated damages to the other parties. A!J 
parties' agreement not to disclose, disseminate, publish or ot'J.erwise make public information 
concerning.the agreement except a.,d unless written consent of all L'1e parties hereto is obtained and 
except as may be necessary for a particular party to cEsclose infonnation for his or its individual or 
corporate ta.."<: or other court related purposes, shall be bindlng upon. the patties for a period of thirty 
(30) years from 'the execution hereofmd is severable from all other agreements, te1ms, conditions 
and covenants set out herein, which terms shall remain in full force and effect notwithstanding any 
b-reach of the terms of this paragraph. 
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREE!vIBNT, p.1 
l4I 00 J 
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Dennis J. Salhz --
CAPITAL WEST, INC. 
President 
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This fs ::: Summary Appraisal Report which is intended to comply whh the 
reporting requirements set forth under Standards Rule 2-2(c) of the 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. As such, it presents 
only limited discussions of the data, reasoning, and analyses that were used 
in the appraisal process to develop the appraiser's opinion of value. 
Supporting documentation concerning the data, reasoning, and analyses is 
retained in the appraiser's file. 'fhe depth of discussion contained in this 
report is specific to the needs of the client and for the intended use stated 
below. The appraiser is not responsible for unauthorized use of this report. 
Futhermore, in accordance with prior agreement between the client and the 
appraiser, this report is the result of a limited appraisal process in that 
certain allowable departures from specific guidelines of the Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice were invoked The intended 
user of this report is cautioned that the reliability of the value conclusion 





Bevis, Cameron & Johnson, PA 
960 Broadway A venue 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
W. Bill Basham 
2701 N. 26th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Properties Owned By Real Homes LLC 
Canyon County, Idaho 
PURPOSEbF THE APPRAISAL: To estimate market value as defined 
by the Office of the ComptroUer of the Currency under 12 CFR, Part 
34, Subpar·t C-Appraisals, 34-42 Definitions (f). 
'·~ 





fr-rT2l'iDE..J USE OF 1TJ: R.2:FORT: 
For the sole purpose of assisting the client in making a determination as 
to the most probable selling price for the subject property if it were to 




EFFECTIVE DA TE OF VALUE: 
August 30, 2005 
DATE OF THE REPORT: 
October 1, 2005 
ADVALOREM: 
According to the Office of the Canyon County Assessor, valuation of the subject 
properties for purposes of taxation is as follows: 
Parcel #SR161S70100 (714 Smith Avenue, Nampa, Idaho) 
Land •..•.••••. , •.•• $32,000 
Improvements ••• $31,300 
Total ................... $63,300 (Year of 2005) 
Parcel #SR329240120 (Riverside Road, Caldwell, Idaho) 
Land ................... $34,005 
Improve~enfa •.• $28,500 
,,;,, . ' . 
Total .'.~:'."''.""'"'······· $62,505 (Year of2006) 
Parcel #5RJ29240000 (Riverside Road, Caldwell, Idaho) 
Land ........... : ....... $30,270 




T ut:l; .... ...•.•.•. ..• :SJ,j,.:-70 {Year ol .J!l06) 
Paree! #SH:32924011 !1 (r.Jyu:ii<le ;1,oiuJ, Caldwell, Idaho) 
Land ................... $30,540 
Improvements ... $5000 
Total ................... $35,540 (Year of2006) 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
For purposes of the Office of the Canyon County Assessor, the properties 
that are the subject of this report are legally described as follows : 
Tax 01121 , of the SWNE, Section 17-3N-3W (Caldwell) 
Tax 01119, of the SWNE, Section 17-3N-3W (Caldwell) 
Tax 01122, of the SWNE, Section 17-3N-3W (Caldwell) 
Tax 02625, ofLot 24, Westview Subdivision, Section 2I-3N-2W 
(Nampa) 
The appraiser has researched the sales history of the subject parceh over the recent 
past. From within those sources that are readily available and typically considered 
to be reliable, none has not transferred ownenhip during that period of time. 
APPRAISAL DEVELOPMENT AND REPORTING PROCESS: 
The app:-aiser has made a physical inspection 'of each property, reviewed descriptive 
data that is of public record as found in the Office of the Canyon County Assessor . 
- and considered comments provided by knowledgeable persons in the real estate 
industry. Information on similar small acreage properties that have either sold in 
the market -or are currently listed for salt.-- was gathered and analyzed. The 
sale:i comparison approach wa:i then utilized to develop an opinion of market value, 
as well as a projection of the length of marketing time that will be required to 
achieve actual sale. 
,, ' 
Per agree~~µt with the client, the appraiser did not we the income approach (not 
typically considered meaningful for properties of this type), but did utilize the cost 
approach (for_ those properties having stn1ctural improvements). However, under 
certain circumstances, any of these approaches might sometimes ho considered 
meaningful)n appraising properties of thi., type; as a consequence, the appraisal 
process did involl'e departure from Standards Rule 1-4(a) and (b)I, ii, iv,v, and vi. 
This limited appraisal report sets forth only a summary of the appraiser's 





DESCR1PTION OF REAL EST_ ... TE AuPR-USED: 
The subject properties on River.iide Raad, Caldwell, :ire located appro:timately 3 1/'.2 
miles southwest of the City of CaldweH' 3 downtown business cor e district. The 
present profile of the more general neighborhood area is basically that of large 
working agricultural entities, numerous small acreage residential properties, and an 
increasing amount of higher density subdivision development of both entry level and 
''!itep-up buyer" single family homes. Primary focus is toward reasonably close 
access to major centers for goods, services, educational facilities, employment, etc., 
along with the amenities of a semi-rural living atmosphere. Marketing time 
requirements appear to be more or less in line to what is typical to this market area 
ht general, the supply-demand relationship for competitively priced properties 
remains basically in balance, and salcs/fmancing concessions of any meaningful 
degree are not in evidence at this point in time. 
The parcels are not located within a FEMA-identified flood prone area that requir es 
special flood insurance participation. Present zoning is designated as rural 
residential (RR), which allows low density single family re.,idential development. 
Public utilities and municipal services generally available include electrical power, 
telephone, and police/fire protection; a community well serves as a domestic water 
source for each property, however, individual septic systems will be required. 
The configuration of one of the subject land parcels is somewhat irregular 
(mangular), with the other two being ofrectangular shape; general topography is 
b1uically flat to a gradual eastward slope. While two of the building sites are 
immediately adjacent to a paved public arterial {Riverside Road), all will be 
accessed from a gravel surfaced private cul de sac lane. The site sizes vary, and 
approximate some 1.06, 1.03, and 1.45 acres respectively; general topography 
appearn basically level to a gradual easterly slope. 
The subject property addesscd as 714 Smith Avenue, Nampa, Idaho, is located 
approximately 1/2 mile west of the City ofNampa's central business core district -
basically bounded by Midland Blvd./12th Avenue South, and Nampa-Caldwell 
Btvd./Lone Star Road. The present profile of the more general neighborhood area 
appears somewhat mixed, including older e3tablished subdivisions of entry level and 
"step-up" single family homes, newer in-fill residential development, and modest 
amounts of light neighborhood commerciaL Pr:imary focus is toward close 
locational P,Jiit:tjmity relative to major center for goods, services, educational 
facilities, employment, etc. Marketing time requirements appear to be more or less 
in line to ·».:hat is typical to this market area in general, the supply-demand 
r elationship for competitively priced properties remains basically in balance, and 
sales/rmani;µig concessions of any meaningful degree are not in evidence at this 
point in time. 
T his property approximates some 32,00o+ square feet (0.74 nere) in total size, is of a 
rectangular configuration, and is basically level in terms of overall topography 
001085
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( e::i:<!pth1 ,h:it ir ;a a..1;,icent to 1n irr:g:nion lafonl., 1,-:,ail1; ~rnrb., ;'.I tier Jidcwalk, 
:md ,;a·t·d ,trect :irt~ria13 ue common to th! w .::rouncimg ·ndg.hborhood areas, the 
.iul>jc1:: front3 to a portion o{ Smith Annuc ,h:u has none 1i ihese improvement3 at 
this point in time. The property i.'I not located within a FE1"L-\·identified flood 
prone area that requires 3pecial flood insurance participation; present zoning is 
designated as.single family residential (R-S), which allows for low density 
development (one residence per30,000 square feet ofland area). While greater 
density might be achievable under the comprehensive plan for future growth, a 
rezone of the parcel would be required (and cannot be viewed ss a certainty). All 
public utilities and municipal services typically available within the Nampa city 
limits are either immediately available, or in close proximity to the subject parcel. 
, 
As previously indicated, two of the parcels are basically unimproved (the assessor 
bas assigned a token value to a small move-on house on one, however, it has as yet 
not been permanently affixed to the land); the two remaining parcels have had 
concrete foundation systems put in place and older move-on "shell" houses affa:cd 
thereto (Smith Avenue and River3idc Road). 
According to public records, title to the subject properties is in the name of Real 
Homes LLC; no current listings or options to purchase were discovered in the 
cour:ie of this analysis. 
HIGHEST AND BEST USE: 
As Though Vacant: 
The only legally permissable use of the subject properties is residential, and the likelihood 
of a zoning change would appear to be remote at this point in time. The only legally 
permissable use that is also physically possible would be a residential use. Consistent / 
with the lcgaliy permissable and possible uses, the most viable financially feasible uses 
are judged to be residential, as there are similar property profiles in the immediate 
neighborhood. The maximally productive highest and best use of the subject sites as 
though vacant. therefore, is judged to be as building lots for single family dwellings 
oriented toward a typical small acreage development profile. 
As Presently Improved: 
As previously; stated, there are no significant improvements to two of the subject 
properties ~tpii~ point in time; the building "shell" status of the third and fourth 
properties is judged to represent a modestly higher return to the land than if the sites were 
vcicant. .-~-· 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND VALUATION: 
Following a reviesiv of historical market data pertaining to the past 12 months, those 
properties judged to be at least reasonably competitive to each of the subject land parcels 
, ,~ 
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IJeni:_Jcaticn: 
(SaJe3) 
Lot 3, Block 1, Artist View Subdv. 
28320 Farrnway Road 
Goodson Road (Listing #98192478) 
1212 W. Logan 
Lot 1, Block 1, Futurity Acres 
(Current Listings) 
Lot 10, Block 1, Hafen HilJs Subdv. 
Wander Lane (Listing #98209875) 
16739 Boehner Road 
Goodson Road (Listing #9821 I 056) 
Deer Flat Road (Listing #98 I 88492) 
e 
Parcel Size: Dat ! of Sale: Price: 
1.29 Acres 9-2005 $44,000 
l.42Acres 7-2005 $37,000 
1.7 Acres 3-2005 $34,900 
0.75 Acres 7-2005 $37,000 
2 Acres 3-2005 $48,900 
0.75 Acre 6-2005 $39,500 
0.65 Acre 7-2005 $45,000 
0.9 Acre 9-2005 $32,900 
1 Acre 7-2005 $49,900 
2 Acres 1-2005 $35,000 
From a review of recent market activity for residential building sites within t.'1e subject's 
more general neighborhood marketing area (SW Nampa, SE Nampa, NW Nampa), it is 
apparent that the demand trend has been accelerating - and most dramatically over the 
past several months. While the supply for such property type has been maintained by 
further subdivision oflarge agricultural parcels in greater Canyon County --- it would 
appear that those properties located closer-in are going to the higher premirun in the 
market. Following a data search of available market information pertaining to the past 12 
months, those properties judged to be at least reasonably competitive to the subject land 
parcel located on Smith Avenue, Nampa, were accorded consideration and appear as 
follows: . ~; 
.~·,(' 
IdentificatiJ~: Parcel Size: Date of Sale: Price: 
(Sales) 
147 Elmore'Avenue 










: .:ne SL..· s..~,it: ::..;:: ·'ng f9303323) 
,).73 Acre 9-::GGj S4~,00i, 
Fem .3tre:!t \lisri,1g #93 i935.53) 
0.4-4 Acre 5-2005 $49,900 
Middleton Road (Listing#981&7675) 
l .24Acres 8-2005 $56,000 
W. Iowa Avenue (Listing #98194590) 
1.12 Acres 7-2005 $61,500 
N. 4th Street (Listing #98193366) 
1.3 Acres 8-2005 $98,500 
Each of the properties comprising the array as presented above is of a similar locational 
status to that of the subject parcels, and all are judged to be at least r~asonably 
competitive in terms of a most probable buyer profile. While some of the comparable 
sales are within platted subdivisions (which differs from the metes and bounds status of 
some of the subject parcels), any benefits of such circumstance is judged to be offset by 
the somewhat confining nature of the subdivision CC & R's. Observation of market 
activity for properties of this nature suggests that this buyer profile tends to more desirous 
of less restriction on how he is able to utilize his property than more, and in fact, may 
actually be willing to pay somewhat of a premium for this status. 
FINAL RECONCILIATION: 
From a review of the foregoing, it would appear that a supportable range in value on a per 
building site basis for those properties located on Riverside Road, Caldwell, would be 
roughly at the level of $33,000 - $48,000 - with the variance primarily a function of 
overall parcel size, locational status, offsite influences (traffic noise, consistency of 
surrounding improvement types, etc.), and site utility (topography/configuration). The 
estimate of a most probabie selling price for eacli pare::! is as follows: 
Parcel #5R329240120 (1.45 Acres) ........ $45,000 
Parcel #5R329240110 (1.06 Acres) ........ $35,000 
Parcel #5R329240000 (1.03 Acres) ........ $35,000 
With regard tQ the Smith Avenue property located in Nampa, Idaho --- W1dcr the 
restrictions of;its' existing zoning status --- a supportable range in value appears to be at 
the level of.$45,000 - $55,000, with stronger tendency to be toward mid-range. The 
estimate of ii' inost probable selling price for this parcel then, is as follows: 
Parcel #5}U61_570IOO (0.74 Acre) ......... $50,000 
In terms of the "move-on" shell residential structures that have been put in-place on the 
Smith A venue site and one of the Riverside Road building sites, while both being of 






Vf')UlJ CVL .. J"iQ. ,.; :J ,1 higher 3!turn. :o th~ W:de!."iY;U!l site ~~ilii .;f ~.h~ ~ d \Vere 11';:. ::mt J.J'lL. 
:iva'':iol,: for .se. Nhile ob,.iously aver; subje;ti·;,;-l!)_Fc::imation ofwbn.t 'nc:e;nenr.:tl 
pric:! J buyer :.n me ;nar!<et ,night be will.i..'1g to pay ,or these in-place stru..,m..al she!l-rype 
improvements, value recognition is nonetheless accorded as follows: 
714 Smith Avenue, Nampa ................ $7,000 (roughly approximating $3 per sq. ft.) 
Parcel #5RJ29240120 ...................... $23,000 (roughly approximating $12 per sq. ft.) 
In summation, the most probable selling prices of the four properties owned by Real 
Homes LLC as identified within this report -- if marketed individually and under typical 




W. Bill Basham 
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A:?'P'R!!ll5iE':"i S 1::~:lilf:l!;~oliJ!'&: ,he: i.pprai~er <:ciiHics 1f!d ,greet hat': ' 
~!~ !: 2av~ ~'.~e:w:~e:1 _,- ;cofr:~~.-- ~n8"f:ktr ~r1;.;_ ma· ha1L:· /it!:P...::;.~ . ; .. ninirrn.::m .J T1rn:- ·ec~nr ;ules :;:i ) rocerii F.~ JlC?t ~imi!ar 
:_jn£f proxi - .: ~ ~c= ihe:· :t:L.1eG! )CC~ef?f ;0: · 1sfaEf~1fon frt J1re. !"CJ'es; cnmpoTi"~a,1- :maiyshY ;if.ti ·1i.1ve .~ace ~ jc ''ar :....:/ustm~:1r~'lthen 
wpr- "·';;,.: ':a ·cl!ec:,: :he :1mxer :e2crion :B Jic ··a Tums,,t ;igniiicant ·,ariation. if a signmc:m1. item in I cc,;:;p;;r.:rbi'e proper.1 
fs oUsc,ior :J, ,Jr more, favorJ.lilJe: H1an;. ,~e· WiiJ.cst 91operty; fl have: made a negaiive adjusimeni to reduce ihe adjustect sa les pric3 
,Ji ihe comparab le and', if a.significant item in, a comparable: property is inferior to, or less favorable than lhe subject property, [ 
have made~ positlve-adjustmenf'to· increase the:adjustedl sates; priceof:lhe comparable. 
2. I have t;ken into consideralion the factors. thathave an, impact' an value: in my development of the estimate of market value in 
lhe appraisal report. I have not knowingly withhefd:any-signllicantinformation from the appraisal report and I believe, to lhe best 
of my knowledge, that all starements and rnformalion, in the appraisal report are true and J;orrect 
3. I staled, in the appraisal report, only·my owrnpersonal\. unbiased, and professional analysis, opinions, and conclusions, 
whicn,are sJbject only to the·contingentand limiting. condilions:specified in this lorm. 
4. I have nn present orprospectlveinterestin lhe proper.ty thar is the subject of this report, and I have no present or prospective 
personal in!w)rest or bias with respect to lhe participants.Im the· transaction: I did not base, either partially or completely, my 
analysis amt/or the estimate of market value in: lhe·appraisal report on the race, color, religion, sex, handic.ap, familial status, 
or national origin of either the prospectiv1rnwners.or occupants of the subject property or of the present owners or occupants 
oflhe: properties in lhe vicinity of the subject. proper:IY,, 
5. I have- ro present or confemplaled. future: interest irn the,subiect:property, and neither my current or future employment 
nor my corr pensalion: forpertorming:this:appraisal is· CGntingenton the.appraised value of lhe property. 
6. Lwas net required to repor:t: a predetermined value· or directiondttvafue !hat favors the cause of the client or any related party, 
the amount of the value estimate, the attainment' ofaspecilic:result, or the occurrence of a subsequent event in order to receive 
my compensation and/or emplol(rnent lbr pm:fmming; the, aP,praisat: I diet not base lhe appraisal report on a requested minimum 
valuation,.a specific valuation, or the' need fo, approve a, speeiffe mortgage loan. 
7. I performed: this appraisal irn conformity wit~, the: Uni lb rm Standards.of Professional. Appraisal Practice that were: adopted 
and promul:1Jated by the Appraisal: Standards: Bbard o! The. Apwraisal, Fo,undation and. that were in place as of: the effective date of 
this apprais;1I,. with the' exceptibm oft he, departure provision~ ottl\osa Standards, which dbes not apply. r acknowledge that an 
estimafe. on 1 reasonabf:e time for exposure: in lbe. open martier, is a, comdiliorn ih the definition of market value and' the estimate 
I developed is consistent with, the' marnetihg; limc: noted' in. the: neighborhood seclion of this report, unless I have otherwise 
stated lh thE reconciliations-action: / 
8. I have porsonally inspected the Interior andr exterior areas oflfie,subject property and lhe. exterior of all. properties listed' as 
comparabl1n. in the appraisal: report,. I: furthercertil\ttha! lhaVClAotecfany apparent or IUlown;adverse conditions in lhe subject 
improvemenfs, on lhe, subj.eel sile; oror1any; site within: the, immei;Jiate: vicinity ot: lhe subject property of, which I am aware 
and have made adjustments forthese:adverse: conditions in, my. analY.sfa,ot the property value to Ule extent Jhat.f had market 
evidence to,support them:. I have also, commented ab:out lhe.etlectofthe adverse conditions on the marketability of lhe Sllbject' 
property. 
9. I personally prepared all conelusions·.and! opinions: abour:the real estate lliatwere set. forth in the appraisal report: II r relied Ofli 
significant ,::rofessional assistance· from, an.1 fradi~id\Jal: oriildlvidilals. in the, performance of the appraisal orJhe preparation of. 
the appr:aisa! report, I hav~ named suchlindl\llaual(s}. amt.disclosed the specific tasks: pertormed by them in the reconciliation 
section of !tis appraisal roport H:ertify that any individual so named is·qualified to perform the tasks:, I have not authorized 
anyone to fl7ake a chang:e to·_any item in the report; therefore·, it an: unauthor.ized change is made to the appraisal report, I: will talte 
no responsibility for ii. · 
SllJJJPl!Eilllii:WIRl'1 JllflllP!RIIAll!iE!la':S ClEml'IllFIICi\\lT!®lll': !f· a supeNi~ory appraiser signed the appraisal report, he or she cerlilies and' 
agrees that: ! directly supewise lhe appraiser who: prepared lhe·appraisal-report, have reviewed the appraisal: report; agree with 
the slatememts and conc!Uslons· of lhe:appraiser;. agr.ee:to be bound! by the appraise(s cerlificatlons numbered 4 lhrough 7 above, 
and am taking, tuft respon~ibility for lhe- apµraisaf: and the appraisal report.. 
M>IPIWSic!ii: 
Signature: [,U3 a ·.~~<1&f 
Name: w, am. Bastlam 
Date Signed August 18, 200s 
Slate Certification #: _CAA_·_· -_53_. ----------
or State license #: 
Slate: ~rdah_ c ______________ _ 
bplration Dateiof Certification or License: +-1e,20u6, 
Fraddl• Mac fo1m 43g (&,11,, 10l'l8) f'a9•·2of Z: 




Slate Gerti If cation #: 
or Stale' License·# : 
Slate:---------- -------
Expiration Date of Certification or License: 
0 Old O Did Not Inspect: Property 
Thll 10,m was ,eproduccd by Unl!cd Sy,1om,-S0l1w>1e Company (BOO) 969-0727 
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WlET.100·HT;rm, ffi1F .VliHFJ&':''!I ~.91,U.!l!E:· The: most pmbatie: prrC.1, which ::i property j1ouio· Jrfng !n 1 ;wmpeiilh1{; and :Jpen marftei: 1' 
mcer all :or,uilions .equ .. ;:'g in 3. fa1f':nlii: 1i: ·· 1yer 31'1d ,e!! :,r .,:,c~ ;r::ing :irurlP.nily, :<ncwi'ecqe:;bfy ·1r.a ,ssuminq 'he .)f iCJ 
·s· .;or· ::H :-:--:cd ';-•! :mdUe .;ri(~:1ius~. :'r.:ciic:f. .n .. hl.. 1e~ir.Jti01·1 .~".!· .f~ ~.orsJntr!e1ic·1:: -: : .2-;ife .J~ Jf :J :p~c:r iea' uafe- jf.~ '.he- ;Jassing 
ct :ir!e :rch,1 ,2ller .o: s1,yer ·,raer ;m,ciitfons·:1ms,. 0i:Jy·: .\/ '""'.e' ··:c' :: ,!,ti,, ll.J .yr:, c: .. ' ;1 rori"::iec; ,;:;1; :Jeth par;:e~ ;r.~ w.efl 
tnicrme"d !r NB!L ~dvi~cd\. 3n;: .:ach oc~ifitJ. ir.i ·;vhar .w: .. ;on::i,nef~ . i;j. •}\·:111 ~q~.r !mer.1st~ :2-) -1 ;c;i~or.::h~',! :ime ;s ;3i!bwed-iCr 
:xcosure .r. ihe •,ce:1 ,11arke\ . ii cay, ;;enLs,made in iern:is'ilf; cash :n diS. ,1oilarJ or i1 terms ,ii :inanc:al :mJngernant-s 
r:~mp;;r;;bfe thereto; afld (5r /he prfc3; tepre~ents ,he normal' wnsideraffon ior fhe property so ld unaifec'.ed ay spec:al ar ~:eative-
rlnancing or sales concessions:• granted iiy;any.c~e,associatcd wilh :he 3ale, 
• Adjustments to the· comparabfos most: be made for special of creative financing or sales concessions. No adjustments are 
necessary for those costs whfch'are:normally paid: by·sellars as a:resultof tradition·or law in a market area; lhese cosls are 
readily idenliliabfo slhce the seller pays these· costs: in virtually all sales transactions. Special or creative financing adjustmenls 
can be made to the comparable: property by comparisons to. financing, terms· offered by a third party inslitutional lender that is not 
already involved in the property ortransaGtion. Any adjustment should mil be calculated on a mechanical dollar for dollar cost 
of the linancinqor concession, Mthe dollanamount or any adjustment:should approximate the marl<cl'5 reaction to the linancing 
or concessions based on the-appraisers, ji.Jdgmenr: 
CIDM1J'JUS(G[El\11 AIWIG m11m11m ~:Jll\\llIDmlIDl\1$: ThlJ!appraiser's certificalion that appears in the appraisal report is subject to 
the-following conditions: 
1. The appraiser will: not be· respoAsl~le: fiJr matters of a lega[ nalure: thaf affect either the property bein[ appraised or the title-
lo it. The appraiser assumes that the' litie' is.gooct and marketable,and;, llierefore; will not render any opinions about the litle .. 
The properr;i is appraised on lhe: basis: of:itbeing; under responsible ownership. 
2. "The appraiser has: provided a:sket'cb' ihi the· appraisal: report: to show·appmximate dimensions of the improvements and tlie-
sketch Is. included' only to assist the' readeir otllie! report. in visualizin~; the: property and understandinrn the-appraisers determinatiorr 
of its size. · 
3. The, appraiser has examined the available flhmt maps: thar are: provided by lhe Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (or, 
other data sources) amt has noted! irn the api,raisaf reportwfuelliefthe1subjecl~ile'is located in an identilied Special flood Hazard: 
Area. Because the· appraiser is; notasur1e1mr,, he onha: makes. no,gua;antees, express or implied, reaardini: ihis deiermination, 
4. The appwiser will not, give testl'miiay· orappear ii:t court ber;ause· he· on she: made an appraisal of the• property in question, 
unless specific arrang;ements. to do sa: liave, been: rmad~,oeforehanct: 
5. Th!l'appraiser l'las estimated tha: val\Je: of: tbe landi in !he, cost approach; at' its highest and best use and the improvements 
al their contributory value; These,separate ~aluatioris otthe'iand'and improvements must not be used in conjunction with any 
other appraisal: and are- invalid: if, tl\e1 a/'e' so used;. 
6 .. · The appraiser has noted in the:appraisal; repurt.aoy adverse, condil'ionS"< (such as, needed repairs, deQrecia!ion, lhe presence-of 
~azardous- wastes, toxfo substances~. etc;} observedi diJrihg, theJnspectlon of. the subject. property or that he or sh&. becam& aware 
of during thenoimal researcfy,.inv0lved' Irr periorming: the appraisaL Unless: otherwise slated in the appraisal report; the·appraiser 
has no knowledqe at any ~faden:'or unapparent conditions; of the prnQerfy orad~erse' environmental conditions. (including. the, 
presence of hazardoes: w~tes,, tilKi<>: substances;. et'e.J' tflaf woul'd make !be: property mar&. or less valuable; and has assumed 
that. there are: no such condilioris· and makes: no !J.uaranlees or wai;ranties; express or irnplied', regarding the condition oJ the 
propeftY.,. Th8'appraiser will not be responsible for any such, conditions that do exist or for any engineering;or testing that might 
be reqµired to discoverwhether such condilibr,s; exist Becalilse: lbe• appraiser: is no! ari expert in the field of environmental: hazards, 
the appraisal report must not be consideredlas an environmental, a6sessment· of the property. 
7'. The appraiser obtained lhe· information, estimates, and opinions that were expressed in !he appraisal report from sources that 
he Of she considers io be reliabl!f aml1 belie~es: tt\em to be! lwe and correct. The appraiser does not assume responsibility forthe: 
accurac'{ at such· Items tratwere furnfslied by other parties. 
8l The appraiser will not discl'ose,lhe0contents oftlieappraisal: report except as provided lor in !he Uniform Standards of 
Professional' Appraisal Pra.ctlce. 
~·· 
9l. Tiie appraiser has based his: orber appraisal report and valuation concrusion for an appraisal lhat is subject to satisfactory 
complelion, repairs, or alterations, on the. assumption that: compfetl'on: of the Improvements will be peiformed in a workmanlilie 
manner. 
HJ. The appraiser must provfde. hfa.or her prfbr-Mitten:conseotoelbre:lhe render/client specified· in the,appraisal report. can 
distribute the appraisal report (incf'uding cond.\Jsfons abuut !he property value,. the appraise(s identity and professional' 
designations·, and references to- anY.' prolessro·naf appraisal: organizations' or the. firm with which the appraiser is associated) 
to· anyone olher than the borrower: the mortgagee: or its successors: and.assigns; the mortgage insurer, consultants;· professional 
appraisal organizations; any stile or federally a·pproved linanciar institution;: or any, departmen~ agency,. or instrumentality of 
the United Stales or any state or llie District of. Columbia; e~cept that Um lerader/client may distribute the property description, 
section of !he report onty to data· coll'eclforr: or.reporting servir.e(s) williout having lo obtain the appraise(s priorwrilten consenl 
The appraise(s written consenr and· approval must also be obtained! before lhe appraisal can be' conveyed by anyone to the 
public lhrough·advertising, pulJffc rela1ions; news:, safes,. or.othermedfa 
Freddi• Mac fo11n 439 (6/93, U\/98) lllo•·lo12· 
lllls Jorm·,m reproducod:t,y Unl~d Sr,,1,ms SollwaroCompani·(BOO) 969-8727 
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J. KAHLE BECKER (ISB # 7408) 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 333-1403 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: kahle@kahlebeckerlaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants . 
e NO·---~F=-1LE=o-J~',O~:s5...--A.M .. ____ ,P.M __ "------
MAY 1 2 201\ 
CHRISTOPtiER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA THIESSEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 






EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 




DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD Chtd., SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD PLLC, and SALLAZ LAW Chtd. 
and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, 




) Case No. CV OC 1107253 
) 
) CORRECTED THIRD 


































DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative capacity of ) 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD Chtd. and SALLAZ ) 
AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
vs. 
EUGENE (Roy) RICE and JANET RICE, 
Husband and wife, 










COMES NOW Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, (hereafter 
"Counterclaimants"), by and through their counsel of record, J. Kahle Becker, and Gabriel 
McCarthy, and hereby state and allege the following in support of their amended Counterclaim. 
PARTIES 
1. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is an individual residing at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 
83705. 
2. Counterclaimant Janet Rice is an individual residing at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 83705. 
3. Eugene and Janet Rice are husband and wife and the marital estate of Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice resides at 2679 Palouse, Boise, ID 83705. 
4. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is an individual residing at 
1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 2 
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5. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered is an 
Idaho S-Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., 
Boise, ID 83705. 
6. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC 
is an Idaho Professional Limited Liability Company having its principal place of business 
at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
7. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Sallaz Law Chartered is an Idaho S-
Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 
83705. 
8. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is an individual who is a 
representative of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered, an Idaho S-Corporation having its 
principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705, Sallaz and 
Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC, an Idaho Professional Limited Liability Company having 
its principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83 705, and Sallaz Law 
Chartered, an Idaho S-Corporation having its principal place of business at 1000 S. 
Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
9. Upon information and belief, Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is the Personal 
Representative of and Attorney for the estate of his deceased grandmother, Bessie B. 
Matcham. 
10. Upon information and belief, Marcy Fox is an individual who was made an involuntary 
plaintiff by order of this Court and is residing at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, ID 83705. 
CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 3 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the above named Counterdefendants pursuant to 
LC. § 5-514 and other applicable laws and rules. 
12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to and by virtue of 
Idaho Code § 1-705 and other applicable laws and rules. The damages herein exceed 
$50,000. 
13. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404, venue is proper in Ada County since all of the parties 
reside therein. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
14. Dennis Sallaz was Counterclaimants' Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice's personal and 
business attorney for approximately 25 years. 
15. Dennis Sallaz owns 90% of the interest in Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
16. Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. was Counterclaimants' Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice's 
personal and business attorney since it was founded in 2003. 
17. Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC is the successor in interest to Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. 
18. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
19. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz and 
Gatewood, Chtd. 
20. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz Law, Chtd. 
21. Dennis Sallaz and Counterdefendants failed to clarify which of the three business entities 
named as Counterdefendants was representing Counterclaimants and their interests at 
various points in the attorney client-relationship. 
CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 4 
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22. Dennis Sallaz and Counterdefendants failed to clarify which of the three business entities 
named as Counterdefendants held Counterclaimants funds and property at various points 
in the attorney-client relationship. 
23. Dennis Sallaz formed many business entities on behalf of Counterclaimants Roy and 
Janet Rice including but not limited to: R-R Investments, Inc., Capital Broadcasting, Inc., 
Western Broadcasting, Inc., New Communications, Inc., Far Less Auto Rental, Inc., A 
Fantasy Limos, Inc., B B Auto Sales and Repairs, Inc., Aztec Precast, Inc., Ultimate 
Arms, Inc., Luxury, Inc., Clearwire Wireless Communications, Inc., Advanced 
Technology Systems, Inc., and Real Properties, LLC. 
24. Counterdefendants Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood represented some of these and other 
entities as well as Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice in litigation as well as many 
personal and business transactions. 
25. There has never been a formal engagement letter between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants. 
26. Counterclaimants have been billed by Counterdefendants for legal services and 
Counterclaimants have paid said bills. 
27. Counterclaimants have also allowed Counterdefendants and their agents to take in excess 
of $61,000 worth of items from Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice's former business 
"A Vista Pawn." 
28. Said items were to serve as a retainer in the event legal services were ever required from 
Counterdefendants for Roy Rice or his business entities. 
29. Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were married on July 4, 1996. 
CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 5 
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30. Real Homes, L.L.C. was formed on January 19, 2001. A copy of the Articles of 
Organization filed with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State on January 19, 2001 is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and a copy of the Operating Agreement is attached hereto 
as "Exhibit B." 
31. Dennis Sallaz's then wife, Renee Baird, was listed as a manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
in the Articles of Organization filed on January 19, 2001 and in the Operating 
Agreement. 
32. Renee Baird moved out of the Sallaz residence in August of 2003. 
33. On September 12, 2003, Dennis Sallaz filed Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State for Real Homes, L.L.C. 
stating that management was henceforth vested in members and that Dennis J. Sallaz was 
a manager and member/owner. A copy of the Amended and Restated Articles of 
Organization filed with the Office of the Idaho Secretary of State on September 12, 2003, 
is attached hereto as "Exhibit C." 
34. Renee Baird did not sign or approve the Amendment to the Articles referred to m 
preceding paragraph. 
35. Dennis Sallaz signed documents as an owner and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
36. Glenn Trefren is a longtime friend of Dennis Sallaz, client of Dennis Sallaz, and client of 
Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. 
37. Throughout the existence of Real Homes, L.L.C., until its conveyance to Real Properties, 
LLC on January 6, 2006, Glenn Trefren signed documents as an owner and manager of 
Real Homes, L.L.C. 
38. Glenn Trefren had no ownership interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. or in any assets thereof. 
CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 6 
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39. Throughout the existence of Real Homes, L.L.C., until 2005, Renee Baird signed 
documents as an owner and manager of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
40. On February 10, 2004 Real Homes, L.L.C. conveyed 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz, husband and wife for $105,000. The alleged 
purpose of this conveyance, as explained to Counterclaimants, was to enable the Sallazes 
as title holders to obtain a loan using the property as collateral on the understanding that 
the proceeds would be used to improve and benefit the property. The promise to use the 
proceeds allegedly was the consideration for the conveyance. 
41. Renee Baird signed the quitclaim deed, which conveyed 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz, as President of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
42. The petition for the divorce of Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird was filed on May 27, 2004. 
43. During the Divorce proceedings, Dennis Sallaz was in need of money. 
44. Dennis Sallaz withdrew approximately $65,000 from the Real Homes checking account 
and placed some of this money in his or Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 's trust account. 
45. Dennis Sallaz executed two promissory notes with Counterclaimant Roy Rice for 
$10,000 and $10,800 at 12% interest. Those promissory notes are attached hereto as 
"Exhibit D" and "Exhibit E." 
46. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 
Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an ATV trailer which are owned by Counterclaimants. 
The Bill of Sale for said ATV's and ATV trailer is attached hereto as "Exhibit F." 
4 7. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said A TVs and A TV trailer to 
Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See deposition of 
Dennis Sallaz, pp. 468-471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
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48. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz owned a Winnebago Motorhome VIN 
1GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien holder on. 
A copy of the title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
49. Dennis Sallaz used his position as Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" and Janet Rice's 
longtime personal and business attorney to influence and induce Counterclaimants Roy 
and Janet Rice to enter into a business transaction for the purchase of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
50. Defendant Sallaz did not inform Counterclaimants Roy and Janet Rice that they should 
obtain independent legal counsel. 
51. In the course and scope of the attorney client relationship with Counterclaimants, Dennis 
Sallaz created an entity which became "Real Properties, LLC" as a vehicle for 
Counterclaimants to purchase "Real Homes, L.L.C." 
52. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants that Renee Baird had not approved 
the September 12, 2003 Amended and Restated Articles of Organization for Real Homes, 
L.L.C. 
53. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants of Renee Baird's interest in Real 
Homes, L.L.C. or the assets thereof. 
54. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants that they had obtained an appraisal 
of the value of the real estate owned by Real Homes, LLC in the latter part of 2005. 
55. Said appraisal valued the real estate owned by Real Homes, LLC at $195,000 and is 
attached hereto as Exhibit Z. 
56. Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated January 6, 2006 and the 
Representations of Counterdefendants, Counterclaimants believed they purchased 100% 
of the rights, title, and interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. for $250,000 by way of their 
CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 8 
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interest in Real Properties, LLC. The Purchase and Sale Agreement is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit I" and lists the real property purportedly transferred in an attachment thereto. 
57. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement purportedly on 
behalf of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
58. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz represented and warranted to Counterclaimant that they 
had full authority to transfer the ownership and assets of Real Homes, L.L.C. to Real 
Properties, LLC in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
59. One of the parcels listed as an asset of Real Homes, L.L.C. in the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement was 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID. 
60. Dennis Sallaz represented to Counterclaimants that title to 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID reverted to Real Homes, L.L.C. upon the filing of the deed of trust securing 
the loan described above and that Real Homes owned said property at the time of the sale 
to Real Properties, LLC on January 6, 2006. 
61. Based on the representations of Dennis Sallaz, Counterclaimant Eugene Rice believed he 
purchased 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, ID in addition to other properties 
described in the attachment to the Purchase and Sale Agreement "Exhibit I," when the 
entity Dennis Sallaz created for Counterclaimants, "Real Properties, LLC," purchased 
"Real Homes, LLC" on January 6, 2006. 
62. Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz warranted to Counterclaimants that Real Homes, L.L.C. 
had title to and full authority to transfer the ownership of 15584 Riverside Rd, Canyon 
County, ID in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
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63. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Counterclaimants, through Real 
Properties, LLC, expended $63,402.82 to extinguish the debt owing on 15580 Riverside 
Rd, Canyon County, ID and prevent a foreclosure sale of the same. 
64. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Counterclaimant Eugene Rice made an 
advance payment to Dennis Sallaz in the sum of $5,000 at closing. 
65. Counterclaimants, through Real Properties, LLC, expended in excess of $140,000 which 
funds were to be utilized in maintaining and improving the subject properties. 
66. On October 30, 2007 Magistrate Judge David C. Epis issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in Renee L. Baird-Sallaz v. Dennis J. Sallaz, Ada Co. 
Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit J." 
67. The Order declared that Renee Baird owned 100% of Real Homes, L.L.C. and neither 
Dennis Sallaz or Glenn Trefren had authority to transfer the Real Homes, L.L.C. or, 
consequently, any assets thereof to Real Properties, LLC. Id. 
68. Dennis Sallaz did not inform Counterclaimants of this Order. 
69. The Order created a cloud on the title of the properties purportedly transferred to 
Counterclaimants via their ownership of Real Properties, LLC. 
70. Counterclaimants found out there were some issues with the Real Homes, L.L.C./Real 
Properties, LLC transaction when they obtained The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order on their own. 
71. At the urging of Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz and based on his representations that, 
Judge Epis misconstrued the Real Homes, L.L.C./Real Properties, LLC transaction and 
that Renee Baird had no interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. or the assets thereof, on 
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November 4, 2009 Eugene and Janet Rice filed an action to quiet title, seek declaratory 
relief, and pursue other causes of action in what became known as Canyon County Case 
No. CV 09-11855. 
72. Based on the attorney client relationship that existed between Dennis Sallaz and Roy 
Rice, Roy Rice interpreted these conversations as Dennis Sallaz was providing legal 
advice to him in the course and scope of his attorney client relationship with 
Counterdefendants. 
73. Roy Rice relied on Dennis Sallaz's representations regarding the Real Homes/Real 
Properties transaction and Mr. Sallaz's representation that Judge Epis had ruled 
improperly by awarding Real Homes, L.L.C. and the subject properties to Renee Baird. 
74. Dennis Sallaz, Renee Baird, and Glenn Trefren were named as Defendants in Canyon 
County Case No. CV 09-11855 and were represented by independent counsel. 
75. Dennis Sallaz was included as a defendant at his insistence that the marital community of 
Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird were necessary parties to quiet title to the subject real 
estate. 
76. During the course of discovery, Roy Rice, learned that Mr. Sallaz was providing 
inaccurate information regarding the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction. 
77. On or about August 2, 2010, Renee Baird and Eugene and Janet Rice settled all claims 
which existed between them by and through the Mutual Release and Settlement 
Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit K." 
78. Pursuant to the settlement reached between the parties thereto, title to the Riverside 
parcels and 714 Smith were quieted. 
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79. During settlement conversations Counterclaimants had with Renee Baird, in the summer 
of 2010, the Rices learned of fraudulent, malicious, negligent, and wrongful acts of 
Counterdefendants. 
80. Mrs. Baird provided Mr. Rice with copies of the transcripts of Mr. Sallaz's testimony 
from depositions in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce which alerted Mr. Rice to the wrongful 
actions of Counterdefendants described herein. 
81. Thereafter, Counterclaimants began investigating the actions of Counterdefendants with 
respect to the Real Homes L.L.C./Real Properties LLC transaction described above as 
well as other matters associated with their relationship with Counterdefendants. 
82. Counterclaimants learned that Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and 
fraudulently withheld information relevant to Counterdefendants' deceitful and 
fraudulent "legal representation" of Counterclaimants. 
83. Counterdefendants continue to conceal, misrepresent, and fraudulently withhold 
information relevant to their deceitful and fraudulent "legal representation" of 
Counterclaimants. 
84. Dennis Sallaz was unhappy with the settlement reached between Counterclaimants and 
Renee Baird in the Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
85. Dennis Sallaz assigned his interest in the Real Homes Real Properties contract to Jim 
Bevis (Mr. Sallaz's attorney from his divorce) and Glenn Trefren. See Assignment of 
Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC attached hereto as "Exhibit 
L" and "Exhibit M." 
86. Dennis Sallaz continues to litigate Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855 and desires to 
assert counterclaims through his longtime friend, client, and associate Glenn Trefren. 
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87. Dennis Sallaz's current attorney in the present action, J. Iver Longeteig, 1s Glenn 
Trefren's attorney in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
88. On February 9, 2012 Mr. Sallaz appealed his divorce based on the grounds that he was 
not actually married to Renee Baird. See Notice of Appeal attached hereto as "Exhibit 
N." 
89. Counterclaimants contend that this appeal is nothing more than a tactic to delay this 
litigation and an attempt to prevent Counterclaimants from asserting the doctrines of 
collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, and res judicata. 
COUNTI 
ACTION AGAINST DENNIS SALLAZ FOR COLLECTION ON PROMISSORY NOTES 
90. Counterclaimants restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
91. That Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz signed the promissory notes attached hereto as 
"Exhibit D" and "E." 
92. That Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz received $10,800 and $10,000 from 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice pursuant to said promissory notes and testified 
to the receipt of said funds in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See Post Trial Exhibit 201, 
Husbands Property and Debt Schedule at 19 attached here to as "Exhibit O." 
93. There is now a balance due and owing for the principal amount of $20,800. 
94. That by law and by the terms of the agreement, Counterclaimants are entitled to an 
interest charge of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance. 
95. That per the terms of said promissory notes, principal and interest on said promissory 
notes are due on demand. 
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96. That on or about March 24, 2011 due demand has been made upon Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz prior to the filing of this action. 
97. That Counterdefendant Sallaz refused or neglected to pay to Counterclaimants the above-
mentioned sum despite demands made by Counterclaimants. 
98. The terms of said promissory notes provide "if action is commenced to enforce payment 
of this note, I agree to pay such sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees." 
99. Counterclaimants are entitled to and hereby request a judgment for the principal and 
interest due on said promissory notes. 
100. Counterclaimants further request an award of post judgment interest. 
101. That as a result of Counterdefendant Sallaz's failure or refusal to pay said sum, 
Counterclaimants have been required to retain an attorney for the collection of this 
outstanding amount and has and will incur attorney's fees and costs of suit, which 
Counterclaimants are entitled to recover of and from said Counterdefendant pursuant to 
agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Counterclaimants are informed and therefore allege that the sum of 
$5,000.00 is a reasonable sum to be awarded to Counterclaimants for attorney's fees 
herein, in the event the matter is uncontested and a greater sum if contested. 
COUNT II 
ACTION TO RECOVER SUMS DEPOSITED IN TRUST ACCOUNT 
102. Counterclaimants restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
103. On or about January 14, 2011, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.S(f) 
Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice requested an accounting of all sums obtained, 
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received, or held by Counterdefendants on behalf of Counterclaimants or any entities 
Counterdefendants formed or represented on their behalf. 
104. On or about January 14, 2011, pursuant to IRPC 1.5(£) and l.8(c) Counterclaimants 
Eugene and Janet Rice requested an accounting of all gifts from Counterclaimants which 
were obtained, received, claimed, or held by Counterdefendants. 
105. On or about February 16, 2011 Counterdefendants responded that they did not have any 
funds in their trust account belonging to Counterclaimants. No accounting or other 
documentation was produced to support this denial. 
106. On or about February 16, 2011 Counterdefendants responded that they did not have any 
record or recollection of any gifts obtained, received, or claimed to be from 
Counterclaimants. No accounting or other documentation was produced to support this 
denial. 
107. Counterclaimants are aware of and Counterdefendants have admitted to owmg 
Counterclaimants approximately $61,000 for items taken from Counterclaimant's former 
business "A Vista Pawn, Inc." 
108. This debt was assigned to Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz in his divorce from Renee 
Baird. 
109. Dennis Sallaz has made an admission that he owes Roy Rice for the items Mr. Sallaz 
took from Mr. Rice. See Post Trial Exhibit 201, Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
from Sallaz v. Sallaz at 19 attached hereto as Exhibit 0. See Also May 26, 2009 Letter 
from Dennis Sallaz on Sallaz and Gatewood's fax cover sheet attached hereto as "Exhibit 
P." 
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110. Counterclaimants had an ownership interest in a business entity named "R-R 
Investments, Inc." See R-R Investments, Inc. 1990 Annual Report Form attached hereto 
as "Exhibit Q." 
111. The "R&R" in "R-R Investments, Inc." was meant to stand for Roy Rice and as such the 
entity was regularly referred to by Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants as simply 
"R&R." 
112. Counterdefendants provided legal advice in forming and were the registered agent for "R-
R Investments, Inc." 
113. Counterdefendants altered corporate filings with the Office of the Secretary of State for 
"R-R Investments, Inc." without the authorization or signature of Counterclaimants. See 
Articles of Amendment for R-R Investments, Inc. attached hereto as "Exhibit R." 
114. Counterdefendants or their agents forged the signature of Defendant Michael Rice in 
fraudulently "authorizing" the Articles of Amendment which purported to change the 
corporate name of "R-R Investments Inc." to "Rentals and Royalties, Inc." See Articles of 
Amendment for R-R Investments, Inc. attached hereto as "Exhibit R." 
115. Michael Rice's purported signature was insufficient authority to amend the articles of R-
R Investments, Inc. 
116. Counterdefendants did not inform Counterclaimants of the amendments referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs and "Exhibit R." 
117. The whereabouts of and the value of the assets of R-R Investments, Inc. are unknown due 
to the negligent, willful, fraudulent, and reckless actions of Counterdefendants described 
below. 
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118. Steve Sumner was in the business of owning radio stations and was a longtime client of 
Dennis Sallaz's. 
119. Dennis Sallaz introduced Steve Sumner to Roy Rice because Steve Sumner was in need 
of money. 
120. In 1994 Dennis Sallaz encouraged Roy Rice to loan Steve Sumner approximately 
$40,000. 
121. Dennis Sallaz represented to Roy Rice that, as his attorney, Dennis Sallaz would draw up 
stock certificates which would provide Roy Rice security in radio stations owned by Mr. 
Sumner in exchange for said loans. 
122. In exchange for this loan, Counterclaimants supposedly received 1000 shares stock in 
each of the corporations which purportedly owned said radio stations "Capital 
Broadcasting, Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. See "Exhibit S" and "Exhibit T" 
attached hereto. 
123. These shares were to have constituted the entirety of the ownership of Capital 
Broadcasting Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. and based on representations made by 
Mr. Sallaz, Mr. Rice believed that he had adequate security for his loan. 
124. Mr. Sallaz engaged in complex litigation regarding the ownership ofradio stations owned 
by Steve Sumner. This case became Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest 
Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
125. Mr. Sallaz orchestrated a collusive defense of Steve Sumner and his radio stations from 
attacks by outside creditors by asserting claims against Mr. Sumner and his business 
entities. See June 28, 2000 letter from Dennis Sallaz to Van Bishop produced by 
Counterdefendants in discovery as Runft 0000234-Runft:000235 attached as "Exhibit U." 
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126. It is conceded that Capital Broadcasting, Inc. and Western Broadcasting, Inc. were not 
parties to Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 
96812. 
127. Rather, Steve Sumner, Capital West, Inc., Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., Rentals and 
Royalties, Inc., and Sallaz and Doolittle Chartered were named parties. 
128. Mr. Sallaz made statements and acted as though he was representing Counterclaimants' 
interests in recovering on the aforementioned loan to Steve Sumner by continuing to 
litigate Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 
96812. See July 10, 2000 Letter from Dennis Sallaz to V emon K. Smith attached hereto 
as "Exhibit V." 
129. Vernon K. Smith is Mr. Sallaz's counsel herein and in Canyon County Case No. CV09-
11855. 
130. Mr. Sallaz repeatedly assured Mr. Rice that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz was 
protecting Mr. Rice's interest and that Mr. Rice's loan would be re-paid when the case 
settled. 
131. Mr. Sallaz settled the Sumner Matter for approximately $387,000 without informing 
Counterclaimants of said settlement or the amount of their interest therein. 
132. In the settlement, Mr. Sallaz directed that the sums due to Rentals and Royalties be paid 
to him. 
133. Sometime around or during the years of 2003-2005 Dennis Sallaz directed that several 
payments totaling said $387,000 settlement be deposited in the bank account for the 
estate of Bessie B. Matcham. 
CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 18 
001115
134. Counterclaimants contend that the $387,000 or a large portion thereof represents the 
principal and interest of the loan they made to Steve Sumner. 
135. A letter to Van Bishop referring to the Sumner Matter and the involvement of "Rentals 
and Royalties, Inc." is attached hereto as "Exhibit W" and illustrates that 
Counterdefendants referred to "Rentals and Royalties, Inc." as "R-R." 
136. The settlement agreement in the Sumner Matter also included a Confidentiality 
Agreement, attached hereto as "Exhibit X," which stated "The parties do further stipulate 
and agree that none of the terms of this settlement or any agreements or payments herein, 
including the aforesaid Promissory Note, require the filing by any of the parties of a 
federal 1099 form or any other notification either to the United States, or any department 
thereof or any state or any department thereof and none of the parties shall make said 
filing without the written consent of all parties." 
13 7. Counterdefendants made material misrepresentations to Counterclaimants regarding the 
status of settlement negotiations of the Sumner Matter which made it impossible for 
Counterclaimants to verify the precise nature of or status of this very complex case. 
138. Mr. Sallaz provided false discovery responses herein which made it difficult for 
Counterclaimants to seek repayment of the loan, verify the precise amount of said 
settlement which is due to Counterclaimants, and ascertain the location of the funds due 
to Counterclaimants. 
139. Mr. Sallaz continued to inform Mr. Rice that the case was ongoing long after it settled. 
140. The Confidentiality Agreement attached hereto as "Exhibit X" made it impossible for 
Counterclaimants to verify the precise nature of or status of this very complex case. 
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141. Dennis Sallaz had a fiduciary obligation to hold the funds which were due to Mr. Rice in 
trust. 
142. Dennis Sallaz had a fiduciary obligation to inform Mr. Rice of the settlement of the 
Sumner litigation. 
143. Counterdefendants comingled said settlement funds which were due to Counterclaimants 
with funds of their own. 
144. Counterdefendants comingled said settlement funds which were due to Counterclaimants 
with the estate of Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz's deceased grandmother Bessie B. 
Matcham. 
145. Dennis Sallaz is the Personal Representative of and Attorney for his grandmother's 
estate. 
146. After the receipt of said $387,000 settlement Dennis Sallaz expended funds held in the 
account for the estate of Bessie B. Matcham for his personal use. 
14 7. Counterclaimants discovered that Counterdefendants had in fact settled the Sumner 
litigation during their investigation in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
148. Counterclaimants asked representatives of Sallaz and Gatewood, specifically Thom 
Henry, for information regarding the status of the Sumner litigation and the loans Mr. 
Rice had made; however, said requests were ignored. 
149. Rather, Mr. Henry tried to convince Mr. Rice to refrain from initiating litigation against 
Dennis Sallaz. 
150. Counterclaimants learned additional information regarding Mr. Sallaz's settlement of the 
Sumner litigation and his failure to distribute the proceeds thereof to Roy Rice during 
settlement discussions with Renee Baird in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
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151. Counterdefendants continued to conceal the true nature of their misrepresentations such 
that Roy Rice has only been able to begin to comprehend Counterdefendants' wrongful 
actions following a court ordered inspection of Counterdefendant's law firm after a 
Motion for Sanctions was granted against Dennis Sallaz in Canyon County Case No. CV 
09-11855. 
152. Counterclaimants obtained additional information from Counterdefendants, regarding 
their misrepresentations as to the Sumner litigation, following a Motion to Compel, a 
Motion for Sanctions, and a Motion for Additional Sanctions which were granted herein. 
153. In addition to other sums and property described herein, Counterclaimants are owed 
$387,000 plus interest as a result of the Mr. Sallaz's settlement of the Sumner matter and 
failure to distribute any portion of said proceeds to Roy Rice. 
154. The $61,000 of items taken from Vista Pawn was also to have been held in trust as a 
retainer in the event Mr. Rice needed legal services. 
155. Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice are entitled to and hereby request this Court 
issue an order for the above balance, as well as any additional sums determined by the 
trier of fact to have been wrongfully withheld by Counterdefendants, plus pre and post-
judgment interest. 
156. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover its attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 





157. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
158. It would be unjust for Counterdefendants to retain or benefit from the sums and property 
obtained from Counterclaimants described herein. 
159. Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice are entitled to and hereby request this Court 
issue an order of restitution for the above balance, wrongfully withheld sums mentioned 
herein, and wrongfully withheld property described herein plus pre and post-judgment 
interest. 
160. Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of punitive damages pursuant to Idaho Code § 
6-1604 for Defendants' conduct related to the Sumner Matter. 
161. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT IV 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
162. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
163. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants 
Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz Law, Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
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164. Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC is a successor in interest to Sallaz & Gatewood, 
Chtd. 
165. In connection with the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction described above, 
Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz entered into a business transaction with 
Counterclaimants in violation ofldaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.8(a). 
166. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.8(a) Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz 
and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. had a duty to advise and give Counterclaimants and give 
reasonable opportunity to obtain independent legal counsel, to inform Counterclaimants 
in writing of the essential terms of the transaction, including but not limited to whether 
Counterdefendants were representing Counterclaimants in the transaction. 
167. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. breached their duty to 
advise Counterclaimants to obtain independent legal counsel. 
168. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. fraudulently and 
knowingly concealed the material misrepresentations described herein. 
169. Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. engaged in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 8.4. 
170. Counterdefendants had a duty to notify Counterclaimants of the receipt of funds which 
Counterclaimants had an interest in. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.15(a). 
171. Counterdefendants breached their duty to notify Counterclaimants of the receipt of funds 
which Counterclaimants had an interest in. This breach was a violation of Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.15( a). 
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172. After a reasonable request, Counterdefendants had a duty to provide an accounting for 
fees and costs claimed or previously collected. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.5(f). 
1 73. Counterdefendants breached their duty to provide an accounting for fees and costs 
claimed or previously collected. 
174. This failure to provide an accounting for fees and costs was a violation of Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct l .5(f). 
175. Counterdefendants had a duty of competent and diligent representation as well as 
adequate communication. See Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4. 
176. Counterdefendants breached their duties of competent and diligent representation as well 
as adequate communication by the actions described herein. 
177. To the extent Counterdefendants contend any of the funds or items of personal property 
mentioned herein were gifts from Counterclaimants, Counterdefendants had a duty not to 
solicit substantial gifts from Counterclaimants. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.8(c). 
178. To the extent Counterdefendants contend any of the funds or items of personal property 
mentioned herein were gifts from Counterclaimants, Counterdefendants breached their 
duty to not solicit substantial gifts from Counterclaimants and violated Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1. 8( c ). 
179. Counterdefendants had a duty not to engage in a conflict of interest transaction which 
there was a significant risk the representation of Counterclaimants was materially limited 
by Counterdefendants' responsibilities to other clients as well as Counterdefendants' own 
self interest. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(2) 
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180. Counterdefendants breached this duty and engaged in a conflict of interest transaction 
which there was a significant risk the representation of Counterclaimants was materially 
limited by Counterdefendants' responsibilities to other clients as well as 
Counterdefendants' own self interest. 
181. If this Court determines the statute of limitations has run on any of the counterclaims 
asserted herein, as a retained attorney, Counterdefendants had a duty to advise 
Counterclaimants as to the statute of limitations on said claims. 
182. Counterdefendants breached their duty to advise Counterclaimants of the statute of 
limitations on said claims. 
183. By reason of the foregoing negligent actions, Counterclaimants have suffered general and 
special damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact including but not limited to 
the following damages: 
a. Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $50,000 in attorney's fees as a 
direct and proximate result of the negligent, willful, and malicious actions 
described herein. Those fees continue to accrue. 
b. Counterclaimants executed promissory notes in favor of Counterdefendant Dennis 
Sallaz for the principal amount of $20,800 and interest at 12% per annum. 
c. Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items taken by 
Counterdefendants for which legal services were not performed. 
d. Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of 
the Sumner Matter. 
e. Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of punitive damages pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 6-1604 for Defendants' conduct related to the Sumner Matter. 
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184. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover its attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNTV 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
185. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
186. An attorney-client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
187. Counterdefendants had fiduciary duties to Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice 
in connection with the legal representation and business transactions described herein. 
188. These fiduciary duties include but are not limited to the duty of loyalty, the duty to avoid 
self dealing, the duty to avoid comingling assets, the duty to keep and render accounts, 
the duty to furnish information, the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill, and the 
duty to take and keep control. 
189. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants were negligent, willful, reckless, 
outrageous, malicious and fraudulent and therefore breached said fiduciary duties. 
190. Counterdefendants negligently, fraudulently, and willfully concealed their deceitful and 
wrongful actions from Counterclaimants. 
191. By reason of the foregoing negligent, willful, and malicious actions, Counterclaimants 
have suffered general and special, damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact 
including but not limited to: 
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a) Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $50,000 in attorney's fees as a 
direct and proximate result of the negligent, willful, and malicious actions 
described herein. Those fees continue to accrue. 
b) Counterclaimants executed promissory notes in favor of Counterdefendant Dennis 
Sallaz for the principal amount of $20,800 and interest at 12% per annum. 
c) Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items taken by 
Counterdefendants for which legal services were not performed. 
d) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of 
the Sumner Matter. 
192. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VI 
FRAUD 
193. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
194. A longstanding attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and 
Counterdefendants Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz Law, Chtd. and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
which entitled Roy Rice to rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
195. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice inducing Roy Rice to loan 
funds to Mr. Sallaz's client, Steve Sumner. 
196. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
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197. Mr. Sallaz intended that Roy Rice act on this misrepresentation. 
198. Mr. Rice agreed to make a loan of approximately $40,000 to Steve Sumner based on Mr. 
Sallaz's assurances that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz would prepare the documents 
securing said loan. 
199. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
200. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
201. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that he would prepare 
documents, as Mr. Rice's attorney, providing Roy Rice security for his loan to Steve 
Sumner. 
202. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
203. Mr. Sallaz intended that Roy Rice act on this misrepresentation. 
204. Mr. Rice agreed to loan to Steve Sumner approximately $40,000 based on Mr. Sallaz's 
assurances that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. Sallaz prepared documents adequately 
securing said loan. 
205. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
206. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
207. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice regarding Roy Rice's security 
interest, in the form of stock, in certain radio stations. 
208. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
209. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by believing for many years that he had 
adequate security for his loans to Steve Sumner, that were increasing in value due to the 
accrual of interest thereon, in the form of stock certificates prepared by Dennis Sallaz. 
210. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
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211. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
212. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that, as Mr. Rice's attorney, Mr. 
Sallaz was representing Roy Rice's interest in recovering the principal and interest due 
on said loans to Steve Sumner by litigating Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest 
Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
213. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
214. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney to secure a resolution 
to or assert any claims necessary in Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest 
Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812 that would protect Mr. Rice's interest in the 
loan he had made to Mr. Sallaz's client, Steve Sumner. 
215. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
216. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
217. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice that Sawtooth Energy Reserves, 
Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812 was still in litigation when in 
fact it had settled. 
218. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
219. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing an 
independent case against Steve Sumner. 
220. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis Sallaz. 
221. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
222. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 29 
001126
• 
223. Mr. Sallaz made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice by failing to notify Roy Rice 
that Mr. Sallaz had received approximately $387,000 as the settlement of Sawtooth 
Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 96812. 
224. Mr. Sallaz knew these representations were false. 
225. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing an 
independent case against Steve Sumner. 
226. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis Sallaz. 
227. As Mr. Sallaz's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on Mr. Sallaz's assertions. 
228. Mr. Rice did not know that Mr. Sallaz's representations were false. 
229. Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. made material misrepresentations to Roy Rice when Roy 
Rice learned of the settlement and inquired as to the status of the funds Roy Rice believed 
he was owed, and Sallaz and Gatewood tried to convince him not to file suit and refused 
to provide further information to Mr. Rice. 
230. Counterdefendants knew these representations were false. 
231. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by trusting in his attorney and not filing an 
independent case against Steve Sumner. 
232. Mr. Rice acted on this misrepresentation by not initiating a suit against Dennis Sallaz. 
233. As Mr. Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood's client, Mr. Rice had the right to and did rely on 
Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. 's assertions. 
234. Mr. Rice did not know that Counterdefendant's representations were false. 
235. Counterdefendants have made material misrepresentations in their discovery responses 
herein which have made it difficult for Mr. Rice to learn the full nature of the wrongful 
actions of Counterdefendants. 
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236. Counterdefendants knew these representations were false. 
23 7. Mr. Rice acted on these misrepresentations and was unable to amend his counterclaim 
until such time as Mr. Sallaz was compelled and sanctioned to produce certain documents 
from Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Northwest Broadcasting, Inc., et al, Case No 
96812 in this case and Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
238. As a party to litigation wherein the opposing party is to truthfully respond to discovery, 
especially where the opposing party is an actively practicing attorney, Mr. Rice had the 
right to rely on Counterdefendants to truthfully respond to discovery. 
239. Mr. Rice did not know the true nature of the fraudulent actions of Counterdefendants 
until Mr. Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood were compelled by Court Orders to produce 
certain documents. 
240. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants were willful, reckless, outrageous, malicious 
and fraudulent. 
241. By reason of the foregoing Counterclaimants have suffered the damages including but not 
limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants have expended in excess of $50,000 in attorney's fees as a 
direct and proximate result of the negligent, willful, and malicious actions 
described herein. Those fees continue to accrue. 
b) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of 
the Sumner matter. 
c) Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of punitive damages pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 6-1604 for Defendants' conduct related to the Sumner Matter. 
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242. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services oflegal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VII 
CONVERSION 
243. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
244. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 
Y arnaha and a 1998 Yamaha, and an A TV trailer which are owned by Counterclaimants. 
The Bill of Sale for said A TV's and ATV trailer is attached hereto as "Exhibit F." 
245. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said ATVs and ATV trailer to 
Counterclaimant Eugene Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See deposition of Dennis 
Sallaz pp 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." See also Husband's Property and 
Debt Schedule at 11 attached hereto as "Exhibit O." 
246. Accordingly, the Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Sallaz v. 
Sallaz divorce awarded the proceeds of this sale to Dennis Sallaz. 
247. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is or was in possession of a Winnebago Motorhome VIN 
10BKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien holder on. 
The title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
248. Counterdefendants are in possession of funds described herein which are due and owing 
to Counterclaimants. 
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249. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz has not extinguished Counterclaimant's lien on said 
Motorhome. See also Husband's Property and Debt Schedule at 9 attached hereto as 
"Exhibit O." 
250. Counterdefendants wrongfully refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted 
wrongful dominion over said funds, ATVs, trailer, and Motorhome. 
251. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said funds, ATVs, trailer, 
and Motorhome and for general and special damages incurred by reason of said wrongful 
possession. 
252. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT VIII 
CLAIM AND DELIVERY 
253. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
254. Counterdefendant Sallaz is in possession of two All Terrain Vehicles, a 2002 Yamaha 
and a 1998 Yamaha, and an ATV trailer which are owned by Counterclaimants. The Bill 
of Sale for said A TV's and ATV trailer is attached hereto as "Exhibit F." 
255. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz testified that he had sold said ATVs and ATV trailer to 
Counterclaimant Eugene Rice in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. See deposition of Dennis 
Sallaz pp 468 - 471 attached hereto as "Exhibit G." 
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256. Prior to filing this complaint, demand has been made by counsel for Counterclaimant for 
the return of said ATVs and ATV trailer. 
257. Counterdefendants refuse to surrender possession of and have asserted wrongful 
dominion over said ATVs and A TV trailer. 
258. Counterclaimants are entitled to immediate possession and control of said ATVs, and 
ATV trailer. 
259. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said ATVs and ATV trailer 
and for general and special damages incurred by reason of said wrongful possession. 
260. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT IX 
FORECLOSURE OF LIEN 
261. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
262. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz is or was in possession of a Winnebago Motorhome VIN 
1GBKP37W5K3302440 which Counterclaimant Eugene Rice is the first lien holder on. 
The title for said Motorhome is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
263. Prior to filing this complaint, demand has been made by counsel for Counterclaimant for 
the return of said Motorhome. 
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264. Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz has not extinguished Counterclaimant's lien of $8,500 
on said Motorhome. See also Husband's Property and Debt Schedule at 9 attached hereto 
as "Exhibit O." 
265. Counterdefendants refuse to surrender possess10n of and have asserted wrongful 
dominion over said Motorhome. 
266. Counterclaimants are entitled to immediate possession and control of said Motorhome. 
267. Alternatively, Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of damages of $8,500 plus pre 
and post-judgment interest. 
268. Counterclaimants request an Order compelling the return of said Motorhome and for 
general and special damages, including but not limited to pre and post-judgment interest, 
incurred by reason of said wrongful possession and failure to satisfy said $8,500 lien. 
269. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNTX 
AIDING AND ABETTING IN THE COMISSION OF A TORTIOUS ACT 
270. Counterclaimants Eugene Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
271. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimant and Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz. 
272. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendant Sallaz were willful, reckless, outrageous, 
malicious, fraudulent, and tortious. 
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273. Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and fraudulently and wrongfully withheld 
information regarding their willful, negligent, and fraudulent actions described herein. 
274. Counterdefendants Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Sallaz Law, Chtd., and Sallaz and 
Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC aided and abetted in the commission of said willful, 
reckless, outrageous, malicious, fraudulent, and tortious acts. 
275. As a result of the foregoing, Counterclaimants suffered and are entitled to an award of 
general and special damages in an amount to be proven by the trier of fact. 
276. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3) and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT XI 
VIOLATION OF THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
I.C. § 48-601 et seq. 
277. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
278. An attorney client relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
279. Counterdefendants concealed, misrepresented, and fraudulently and wrongfully withheld 
information regarding their willful, negligent, and fraudulent actions described herein. 
280. The foregoing actions by Counterdefendants violated provisions of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act I.C. 48-601 et seq including but not limited to: 
a) Passing off goods or services as those of another; 
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b) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, 
sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods; 
c) Causing likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation, 
connection, or association with, or certification by, another; 
d) Engaging in acts or practices which is otherwise misleading, false, or 
deceptive to the consumer; and 
e) Engaging in any unconscionable method, act or practice in the conduct of 
trade or commerce as provided in LC. 48-603(c); 
281. As a result of the foregoing, Counterclaimants suffered and are entitled to an award of 
general and special damages in an amount to be proven by the trier of fact. 
282. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services of legal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
XII 
CIVIL RACEKTEERING (VIOLATION OF I.C. § 18-7805) 
283. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
284. The actions described herein constitute a pattern of criminal behavior including but not 
limited to violations of LC. §§ 18-2403(2)(d)(l) (Theft by False Promise); 18-
2403(2)(b) (Theft by Trick); 18-2407 (Grand Theft); 18-1905 (Falsification of Corporate 
Records); 18-4501 (Perjury); 18-4510 (Subornation of Perjury); 18-3601(Forgery); 49-
518(Forgery of Lien Cancelation on Vehicle Title); 30-14-501(Securities Fraud). 
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285. Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. is an enterprise under LC.§ 18-7803(c). 
286. Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices PLLC is an enterprise under LC.§ 18-7803(c). 
287. Sallaz Law Chtd. is an enterprise under LC. § 18-7803( c ). 
288. The estate of Bessie B. Matcham is an enterprise under LC. 18-7803(c). 
289. The pattern of criminal behavior is ongoing including most recently perjury, forgery, 
grand theft of the A TV's, trailer, and Motorhome, and the forgery of Mr. Rice's signature 
allegedly releasing the lien on the title certificate Mr. Sallaz is utilizing for his claim and 
delivery cause of action. 
290. Counterdefendants caused the signature of Janet Rice to be forged on the certificate of 
title of a 1979 Mercedes Convertible VIN 10704412049659, which was owned by 
Counterclaimants, and utilized unlawful means to have the Idaho Department of 
Transportation issue a certificate of title in the name of involuntary Plaintiff, Marcy Fox. 
291. Counterdefendants caused a lien to be recorded on the certificate of title of the 1979 
Mercedes Convertible in favor of National Financial Services. 
292. National Financial Services is an enterprise under LC.§ 18-7803(c). 
293. By reason of the foregoing willful, criminal, and malicious actions, Counterclaimants 
have suffered general and special, damages in amount to be proven by the trier of fact 
including but not limited to: 
a) Counterclaimants executed promissory notes in favor of Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz for the principal amount of $20,800 and interest at 12% per 
annum. 
b) Counterclaimants are owed $61,000 for the value of the items taken by 
Counterdefendants for which legal services were not performed. 
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c) Counterclaimants are owed $387,000 plus interest as a result of the 
settlement of the Sumner Matter. 
d) Counterclaimants are owed $7,500 as a result of Counterdefendants 
refusal to surrender the ATVs and Trailer and $8,500 for 
Counterdefendants refusal to surrender the Winnebago motorhome. 
294. Pursuant to Idaho Code 18-7805(a) Counterclaimants are entitled to treble damages and 
the cost of suit including reasonable attorney's fees. 
295. This Court should immediately invoke its power under Idaho Code 18-7805(c) and order 
the production of the ATV's, trailer, Mercedes, and Winnebago motorhome described 
herein. 
296. This Court should invoke its powers under Idaho Code 18-7805( d) and a) Impose 
reasonable restrictions on the future activities of Dennis Sallaz, Sallaz Law, Chtd., Sallaz 
& Gatewood Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC including but not 
limited to their ability to transfer, assign, or conceal assets to avoid satisfying any 
judgment rendered herein and b) Order the suspension or revocation of Mr. Sallaz's 
license to practice law. 
COUNT XIII 
QUIET TITLE 
297. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
298. Eugene "Roy" Rice was the first lien holder on a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VIN 
546265334 which was owned by Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz. 
299. Said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado is the same Cadillac Eldorado that 1s the subject of 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
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300. Dennis Sallaz failed to satisfy said lien on the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
301. In January or February, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice lawfully repossessed 
the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
302. On or about February 1, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice was issued a 
Certificate of Title by the Idaho Department of Transportation for the 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado which is attached hereto as "Exhibit Y." 
303. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is the lawful owner of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
304. Dennis Sallaz attached a false certificate of title for said Cadillac Eldorado to his Verified 
Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
305. Dennis Sallaz or his agent forged the signature of Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice 
on said false certificate of title in purporting to release said lien. 
306. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice did not release his lien in favor of Dennis Sallaz. 
307. On or about January 4, 2011 Dennis Sallaz purported to assign whatever interest he 
allegedly had to "Marcy Fox" by way of an Assignment of Title on the false title attached 
to Dennis Sallaz's Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
308. On or about March 20, 2011 Dennis Sallaz filed an application for Title Stop stating "My 
car was stolen out of a locked storage lot within the last 20 days and a duplicate title was 
forged and filed with the Idaho Department of Transportation in the name of Eugene 
Leroy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice on February 1, 2011 (see attached). The original title 
was never lost. The application for duplicate title was fraudulent and there was not any 
valid debt owed at the time of theft and no repossession has been done and it is 
imperative that this title be frozen pending the filing of a theft report and court action." 
309. The representations in the application for title stop were false. 
CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, P. 40 
001137
310. Dennis Sallaz has filed a Complaint for claim and delivery and obtained a Temporary 
Restraining Order preventing Counterclaimants from disposing of said 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado. 
311. The above referenced actions by Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz have created a cloud on 
the title of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and prevented Counterclaimants from disposing 
of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
312. By reason of the foregoing claimants have suffered general and special damages and are 
entitled to an order quieting title for said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado in the name of Eugene 
"Roy" Rice. 
313. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services oflegal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
COUNT XIV 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
314. Counterclaimants Eugene "Roy" Rice and Janet Rice restate and re-allege the preceding 
paragraphs and incorporate them herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
315. Eugene "Roy" Rice was the first lien holder on a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado VIN 
546265334 which was owned by Counterclaimant Dennis Sallaz. 
316. Said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado is the same Cadillac Eldorado that 1s the subject of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
317. Dennis Sallaz failed to satisfy said lien on the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
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318. In January or February, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice lawfully repossessed 
the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
319. On or about February 1, 2011 Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice was issued a 
Certificate of Title by the Idaho Department of Transportation for the 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado which is attached hereto as "Exhibit Y." 
320. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice is the lawful owner of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
321. Dennis Sallaz attached a false certificate of title for said Cadillac Eldorado to his Verified 
Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
322. Dennis Sallaz or his agent forged the signature of Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice 
on said false certificate of title in purporting to release said lien. 
323. Counterclaimant Eugene "Roy" Rice did not release his lien in favor of Dennis Sallaz: 
324. On or about January 4, 2011 Dennis Sallaz purported to assign whatever interest he 
allegedly had to "Marcy Fox" by way of an Assignment of Title on the false title attached 
to Dennis Sallaz's Verified Complaint as "Exhibit A." 
325. On or about March 20, 2011 Dennis Sallaz filed an application for Title Stop stating "My 
car was stolen out of a locked storage lot within the last 20 days and a duplicate title was 
forged and filed with the Idaho Department of Transportation in the name of Eugene 
Leroy Rice or Rose Jeanette Rice on February 1, 2011 (see attached). The original title 
was q.ever lost. The application for duplicate title was fraudulent and there was not any 
valid debt owed at the time of theft and no repossession has been done and it is 
imperative that this title be frozen pending the filing of a theft report and court action." 
326. The representations in the application for title stop were false. 
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327. Dennis Sallaz has filed a Complaint for claim and delivery and obtained a Temporary 
Restraining Order preventing Counterclaimants from disposing of said 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado. 
328. The above referenced malicious actions by Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz have created 
a cloud on the title of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado and prevented Counterclaimants from 
disposing of said 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. 
329. By reason of the foregoing malicious actions and Counterdefendant's slander of title 
claimants have suffered general and special damages. 
330. As a result of the above recited circumstances and events, Counterclaimants Eugene and 
Janet Rice have been forced to retain the services oflegal counsel in connection with this 
matter and are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and cost of suit pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Should 
this matter be resolved by default, those costs are $5,000. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
331. Counterdefendants by their conduct, have engaged m an extreme deviation from 
reasonable standards of conduct, and have engaged in gross, willful, outrageous, 
malicious, wrongful and wanton conduct, and, therefore, this Court having Granted 
Counterclaimant 's Renewed Motion for Leave to Add Claims for Punitive Damages, 
Counterclaimants seek the recovery of punitive damages against Counterdefendants on 
their claims of legal malpractice, unjust enrichment, and fraud for Defendants' conduct 
related to the Sumner Matter and in such amounts as will be proven at trial. 
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WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants pray that this Court: 
A. That Counterdefendants be restrained by Injunction from disposing of, injuring, or 
concealing the said funds, Motorhome, A TV's and A TV trailer from 
Counterclaimant. 
B. That an Order be issued requmng Counterdefendants to return said funds, 
Motorhome, A TV's and ATV trailer to Counterclaimants. 
C. That in the event Counterdefendants have lost, concealed, or refuse to return said 
funds, Motorhome, ATV's and ATV trailer to Counterclaimant that an Order be 
issued that Counterclaimants be awarded $7,500 for said ATVs and ATV trailer, 
$8,500 for said Motorhome, and $480,000 plus pre and post judgment interest. 
D. That Counterclaimants be awarded general and special damages against 
Counterdefendants jointly and severally. 
E. Counterclaimants pray that this Court enter judgment against Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz for the principal and interest due on the two promissory notes; 
F. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for sums due and owning 
from Counterclaimants' trust account. 
G. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of unjust 
enrichment against Counterdefendants; 
H. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of legal 
malpractice against Counterdefendants; 
I. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of breach 
of fiduciary duties against Counterdefendants; 
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J. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of fraud 
against Counterdefendants; 
K. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of 
Conversion against Counterdefendants; 
L. Award Counterclaimants general damages for their claims of Claim and Delivery 
against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
M. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claim to foreclose 
on their lien against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz; 
N. A ward Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of aiding 
and abetting the commission of a tortious act against Counterdefendant Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd.; 
0. Award Counterclaimants general and special damages for their claims of violation 
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act against Counterdefendants; 
P. Award Counterclaimants treble damages for their claims of violation of the 
Racketeering Act, Idaho Code 18-7805(a). 
Q. Award Counterclaimants punitive damages on their claims for fraud, unjust 
enrichment, and legal malpractice for claims relating to the Sumner matter. 
R. Award Counterclaimants their costs and attorney's fees in connection with this 
action; and 
S. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, costs and fees under and pursuant to 
Idaho law, from the date of entry of judgment in this matter until full satisfaction 
of the judgment. 
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T. Award Counterclaimants any other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
DATED this \\_ day of May 2014. 
·homey for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this Jl_ day of May 2014, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM was served 
upon counsel as follows: 
William Fuhrman 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman & Gourley 
225 N. 9th St., Ste 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
V. K. Smith 
1900W. Main 
Boise, ID 83702 
Gabriel McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St. #302 
Boise, ID 83 702 
US Mail 
_x_ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
US Mail 
X Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
US Mail I Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
.-· . KAHLE BECKER y· Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
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r=~CLES OF ORGluYtZa.noN 
.~m. 
j l, 1 / ... , 1 '""!'"?-D LI .JI ~h I' 1·=:y i"" .. I"', l ! ?"' • l ,-, ; 
j .,1, ... ,) : J-~' I~ Q :a~ .:L ' . ~ ., }i3j -~ .. ~r~' ,., l ' ·-~· ,/ i 1..~ '-· ..... ,. ,,, J ..., ..,;].,. J., •• .1J 1 
~ Tc the Sectetal'y ct 3late cf MEho 
V · CcrporEtfons Dfvjsion 
,(,1, 700 West Jefferson Reem 203 v'< ·: ~ P. 0. Bex 83720 • 8cise, iO 83720-CC80 
~· 
! fr'/~ . 
I r..:. ~ ·~~ ,JI ~€ n2!1!e ofthe limited liability company is: __ R_e_a_l_E_:c_rr._e_s_L_.L_··_c_. __ . _______ _ -~ -....:..---'---------------------------------
2:. ,$; Th.ejlddr2.ss cf the initial registerad offie2 is: __ 1_o_o_o_s_·._R_:no_sc:_~1_1e_l_t_st_. -------
,;;.- C:: · (nee 1 ?O ~x) 
Eoise, ID 83705 
--------------------- ar;d the name of the initial registered 
agent at that address is: ____ D_e_ru_ri_i""_~_J_._s_a_ll_a_z _________________ _ 
Signatura cf registered agent: ------------------------,--




4. is management of the limited liability company vested in a manager or managers? 
~ Yes D No (r;;-:eck 3~roprma CCX) 
5. If management is vested in one er more manager(.s), list the name(s) and address(es) of at 
least one initial manager. If management is vested in the members, list the name(s) and 
addrass(es) of at least one initial member. 
Name: 
Renee L. Baird 
Address: 
1000 S Roosevelt St Eoise, ID 83705 
01/19/2001 09:90 
CX: 2~ CT: ~~1 ~I 373M-4 





















pie: - C::-1 --- ......... 
an Id"1,o Llmlf:;id Liabi1tty Cor:npa.1y 
. The u..-,d,,r3isi1ed rce:.n~ers,.ceiring to form a. limJ,~d lia.biJiry company uncc.: tb.e: Ichbo 
Lidted Llabi1iry Company Act ~i:he 'j'Act") hereby agree il..'l follows: 
ARTICLE J 
fO.l{.1'£,:1, TIGN 
, NC, 2C5 
LLC. 
1. I' ~- The name oftbe limit:a:d liability ccc,pMy (th~ 1'LLC') i,;R."£.iQ ;fOMES) 
) .2 Ai\rtic!es of Ors-a.nization .. Articles of crg1nizarfo.c ·;:,em fifod -with the Idaho Secri;;C,1.Ty 
of Scar~ on .January 191 200 L . -:----:--: 
1.3 rnncinaJ- Pf.,,ce ~f Busi:.e$.tt: The principal cfrice cfth= 1-LC si'l.'111 initfajfy be located 
at' J 000 S .. Roosevclr Street, :Bpise, 1dJho 83 705. Tile membera p,ay relocat~ ~e pri.cc;p;u crffice or 
e.;;ta&lisb adcii.ional o.ffic~s from rL.'U.e tq rime in their discr~tion_ . 
1 .4 ReaGte;ed Office an'd :Reci.stered Aze.nt. Tbe LL C's lnitiaJ i~cisrered affi~"' shall be 
2r 1000 S. Rco.~evelr Streei:, Boise, Id.aha ·8310 5, and the na..~e ofit.:, initial re~fat$Ted agentat such 
a·ddrcss shall be-De~s 1. ;sanaz .. The member:. r;rIBy change the regfatcred o:ffic.:! and regis;:eri'!d 
agent fro8 timi! to time in their discretion. · · · · 
. l.5 _fuc~ Pun,c". Th7 l .tc is orsanized to.~P.'.;_- .,,f,_, ..? L~ 
ii.:id t.c .engage m any other Iawfb! busni.es.:,. . · . ~~~- · 9 
l.6 Al!reemen,;, Tbe membcr:i. e;<ecuti.ng the Operating Agn:sment' .hereby agrc~ ta the 
te·rms ?,Gd condit:iorn ofthe Operacing Agreement, as it may from time to time l?e amended according 
to it~: terms. To the e:n~n!: any provision of the Operaft1J:g Agreement is prohfoited or ineffective 
under tht Act, r:hc Ooe,ra1L1g'Ag,~erncnt sha.!J be comida~d an.:iended to th~ smallest degr~e passib)e 
in order ro make the Operntjng Agreement effective under ch~ A.ct. In tbc et;enr tlte Ac.t is. 
sub:=icqucotly a....rnen~ed or intCT;)f<!tt;d i,n sue.,~ a w,1y r~ make vafid a.l7J provi&ion cf rhc Ope,~ting 
Agreement t11at WaS'·fonne:rly invdid, such pr0vision 3haJI be can~id~r~r:l ~o b~ valid from the 
efcctive date of such i.ricerpreration ·or iuoendment. Further, ii:' is the express intention of che 
me.r,iben, rhat the LLC be treat~p as o. partnership for purp,ose;i of fode.r-il and 1rn.re taxarj.on. The 
members· agre~ to take SlJci1 actions a0d make such eJecrions as may be nece3Sary or conveui~~t to 
cn.mre i:b,it the LLC be tre;i,ted as a partner3Np. If fr is derermined th,s.r Cfic LLC 1., 01; "rvi]J not be 
c/assi.ticd. ,11s a pamiersJ-cip under the Jnterm1J Revenue Code (r.he "C'.'de''), tben the· Opera.ting 
Alfrecrn91t .;hall be: considered amended to rh.e smal.lest tjegn::q p,o,.1si~le in wh"t~er i:na.rmer · 
riece.'.l!ary co er.SI.ire thar the LLC is or sh.tll be lnmted'as a pa.rnershlp under tbc Code for purposes 





N.£Ei.vL'3:SRS, CO:NTRIBOTIONS. A~D INTE.;\ESTS 
1.1 N°?1De1_ .A.dd.re~.c..es andJpi}icl Com:rib.1~:t:t2.!l~. -.r:he nirucs an.d addrc:S3-e!! of tlre fairia~ 
members qf the LLC, md roe ·agnied value ofthei,r resp~ctive i.'1itiaJ cap-il:al cern.tricudcns and icitia.l 
perce.1t~gc O'llneNTiip lnrere:rts in tqe LLC (the ''Sharing F2dos'') ar~a_s a~~.-::~d .in t~e chart ~clow, 
av.bjecr ro the adjuatment ;:is provided L11 tbi.s A'n~le 2. Each of the memb,en, as his initial 
contribution h~ comributed hj~ un.1fr<,-;ded one.-ha.!f (%) interi;fit in and: p th91:e cem.h: t"No parcels 
of ccmmer~ia! re:u/ esure, morn putic>Jla:Jy described on Exhiq-it A arrn.ched hereto, togei:!rer with 
. aj~ appurte:·nanc.e;i, and a,,y e:ds::ing Jease!ll contract.~; ar agre2meni:5 ~ciating the.r;;;to. 
;I. co,-l'U-1 cc ''b'•' , _gr. __ .., , d.JUe 01 on.tn 1.t1011 • Si1_.a..-n..,_")Q; E..atio 1 . . ' 
~~nee Baird 
l 000 S. Ro o,:;eve!t 
Bols:e_, IdaJ10 83705 
$50,000 
Lirrritato n cf Li_abili~,. .Each mcmb er} s ]iabilitv shall be lifitlted to- the max:imtlrn : ,: . . . 2.2 
CX:enr pc:-m.it:ed by applicable law. Th~. fa..i.Jur~ of the LLC to observe a.ny fo0r:nallcies ~ 
requirements- relating to d1e exercise of it~ p9wers er management ofits bu::,iness or a.ffatrn ~b.al1 n~f 
be grounds for impmi.ng per;;,onal li~bility on the mcmbern of tbe Ii~bilities of the LLC. . (i . 
.. .-, 
·2.J No Lr:i.bi!iL'V for LLC Debts; Persor..2.J Guarantees. ~" member shall not be per:1onaJf/ 
Jiabl~ f'?r /l.ny debts ar Jo;iscs cf Lhe LLC b-~,and hia respectiv~ cap(i:al com;-ihutjoru, except ~l 
ather:wi.,1-: r~ufred. by bw. Notwitb5ta.r.ding tne for~gaing, the m.2mbers .shall execute persori1l 
gui.!.rin~ee~ fer Joa.us ma.d-2: to che l.LC as and only w we extent require:9 by fo:ture lendi,'!r-s.. · 
. . ., . 
2.4 Other J3usfocsa of }-ferd;,ers, Exi::ep~ as may be otherwis,e pro-.rideq in agrecrr;eOJ3·; 
amcr,g tbe members :ind the LLC, nny member m;iy engage indcppi.denrly or -r;-lllth ocher3 ln ot};er 
busiaes:;; and iovcstGetir verrr.ur~3 of cery nature a:nd description and .mall have no oblig:ttion to 
acco1.,11t to t1·19 LLC for sucb business or investments ar .for busine.~s or iuvest.,.-nen c oppo·~.lJJ.ities: 
2.5 Addi;ionGl "Me.mbe,s. Additional membcru shail not be adrn.itted except upou a 
1.mrmimmH vote ofrb.e .rr.cmcen, 
2.6 AddhionaJ CwiL,J. 
2.6.1 Additiaru:d Contrfoutiom. Exc8pt ~ set forr.,1 in this Section .2.6, no member 
sba:JJ ~e r.~iufred or permitted to mct.ke a.1y capital comributlbna. In tbe event char Ir! any ti.me, 
purauanr. to a tmlnimous yotc of chc meq7b-!r:-, the me.ubers dcter:min.e that additional funrfa Dre 
req'ui.red oy rbc. LLC for its besines~ or any of its obliga.p.ona, c;::pen.ses., costs, liabilities or 
ocpc.nditures, the r.iembt!rs 0iaU be required to contribute s.ucb addition,iJ funds in proportion co thrcfr 
Sharing R.a.tios, l.lllle3~ tho members elect by rn~jmit:y vote to ha:ve the 11..C f?cn:ow the a.rnount <?f 









I ! ~I a.dpi_iicnai capir?J ~r.mibuticn pur:uarit to the Section 2.6, Land a m~ber (ails to rna!Q ii:.:; required 
P9r'~on of ~be ad~1tiorpJ c~pila.J conttibu.ricn (a "Ncn-Co~rributingMcmber"), rhen those: mer.iber., 
rnak:m~ .~he:r reqmred por.1~n of rhe additicD:a.f capira( comriburion f'Conmb17ting Mcmbe:r:3'') m~y 
elect _c1t~~r of 0-e fc.Rov,.1.;1g; 0) i:o ildju,sr the SJ1a,-fog Ratio.s of the Com.'11Jwriag. t11.1d· Non-
Ccnn::bu,:ng ~!embers by incre33fog c.he ~'iharing'lt!rios of the Nr)n-Cootributi.ng Membe~ .,; or (ii) 
0e_ Co.r.tnou~_ng Memhe;.:s D'lc!Y~ in adqjtion co !1-IlY otb?t )e&11 ~emt:~ies ayaj)abie, in proporrio.n co __ . 
thc:1r Owner:uup Inrcres;.1 er a.'.l otherwise ~grcc:d by the Contribcting Member.:, conr:fbutc: additiou~. 
I 
~--· 
• d I 
.iun s to ~c:ver sucll a;nrn..:I!t !hat ha,s :.ot been conpibur~d. 
2,6.2 _A_d_i1~J-~'lt=m=e_n"'"t-"-to-=--.coS=h=a.."1=·n"-'-=£·--=:P""",a:;c::n;..:,·o=~· The S,/:ai.ng .Ratios r;lf each Con.tributing 
Member sb.aH be ine.ea,,;ed by Adju.stment Pe;~ntage X1 whi~h shall be calcuiat:!d for eacb 
Com:riboti.ng Membe, according to the formula .4~t forth bel9w. ·For purposes of thls for:nula,· rbe 
phrase "Addhio.nai Capital Conti9ution" shall tl.ean the addfrional capi..aJ conm1:mtion.3 II1Bdc, by 
each Comrikting Memb~r pi.;r.<J.ua.11 io. a capital ~al/ under ~cctio~ 2.S.'1. The Tor.al Capi'"i.al 
ConrributioP.s of all .Members to Date shaU· /i.nc1udc the agreed value of tbe fr,Jt:ia.r capital 
·ccctrioutions a.s se~ forth in .Section 2.1 above. i 
Adjustmeat =o 
Perr.:e::irage X A,Jlourrt of A.5iillticnaJ Canitai Contribution . 
Total Capital Comdl;utiorni + Sum of All f...d<litiomtl 
of ~J Me."'l!.b~1"3 to Date Capir.:il Contn"botions 
Tbe rc,specti"{e S,1aring P-..ltios of the Non-Co:ot..ibuting fyfe~be.:-3 ;;h,ill be: decr~sed 
(bur nm below zero) by each such member3 Dro rnta .'lbarc (ba.:Jed on che rot;!] Sha:ing R.2.tios of the 
I . No.i-C?nt,ibut~g Member:,) ofAdjustmerrt Percentage X 
2./'J.J Ccntribmiorr of Addhional Fund.3 .. If a Contt10~,rng Member eler:1:s lo . · 
cootribute addition~] funds to c--wer such ~mount that haJ net· been. contributed by a Non:-
Coutn1iiutin,g Member.,. the advance shall be deer.ned a demand )o:in by the Ccnmnuting Member or 
Member~ 'ro \be Non-Comribut~ng Member beasing inter~st a; rhe r.a,a ofr::;i;c/ye percem (12%) per 
annum from che dg.te: the .i.dvaJ1r.;~ ill mad~. To tbe exk,nt of suc.h ndva:.:ce plus interest, any 
di.-rtributio.n..s or.herwisi.! du~ to the Non-Contributing Member 3hall, Lnstead be pald !O the 
Contributing Mcp1ber or Me::::-,ber:i (pro rata with the e,mounts adv~ccd by e.1ch Contributing 
Member) who made such ·comnbution. 
· 2. 7 Jflt,,3st 011 CE.oir:i.l Cor.trfoutien~. E~cept a., pro1.,ided in Sectio.n .?.. 5.3, no br.~n:sL 
sbaU be pcid on capital conrribut.iom . 
. 2. 8 .Lo.,;.m. The LLC may boi'TOW rnor.ey from any member of third pa.riies upon such 
cor.1m~rcfal1y rea.;oneble terms and co.qditif?r..3 .;a: may be approved by the. memben. 
2.9 Rig/,r;, ofI11dem.,i.fi.c2.tion. The LLC, or iB receiver a; rrustcc, sha)l·indemn~:,,·, held 
hnrmless, und p~.y'a11 judg:nc.rmi and c.li3.i.rns a.a?Jn~t each mc!T'.ber for aJJ co~.u, loi;.~es, Ha:bUines and 
dan:)agcs pt1id or ~ccrued· by ~ucb meci.be.T' by ru.son of any act performed or omi~4ed t~· be 
perfonned by s1Jch membo-, [n ·c~I:I1ecton wltb the busine.s.s 'of th L-LC, to the fuJ_li;;st C';c":eo.t pro,r.d~d 













-----.--------,. .. "","°-~1) DVTIES OF MEM:EERS 
. ' . . ' . . 
3. l 1-Gm.gcmcnt 11,1d Voting FJghr.o::-. A1J member:; ~ho have noc .Dissociated -~h;ili be 
_ea.urJe_d to vote an any matte- sl,lbmin~d to a vote of die Mernbcn. ;101"?~:~,1 As-Signees 3lJaJI not 
oe ~tJtled to yate on any maners. 
. _. 3. i .1 ActJ Recuirmg a Msi grity Vore, .Excep~ .aa o thcnvi;,:e prov~dcd )n Article 
"I J 2 ,t.. '• • ,I.' 0 • A JJ d • ,· ~ ' • ' d ' .,. . or O,i~erwi.:ie IJl 1-1LtS penm.ng ... .greement, au ete,rru:r:et1cm wec.31,ons approva,.s a,, aGt:Ion.s • • . l , 
affe::tin& thi LLC and it:; business and affairs si>all be detarmlncd, 11Jade, appfOVcd, or authorized . 
9rJy.,by the affirmative vote of a N.hjority of the ~embers, ~xcfoding a.1y intefe::ted Member and 
eXduding ·a.i-iy Assignee. 
' . 
3. I.2 Act3 .R.eguirim~ Unanimous Vdt,:. Norwithst.1.ndi.ng Anicfe 3 .1.1, the 
folJoWing matTefS-, pccisJons and actions sha[J not 01:J' ffi;illC Of tal{e:n without the t.Jla:UIT.OUS Vote Of 
all of r~e Members, excludfog any Lrrr.cr~ted Mcmbf and ~ch.idiug any A.'l.:lignce: 
. . 
(a) any il..'"llendme:i.: to th.fa Operating Ag:ri!etr.ieni tbat cb;,i.nges the 
purnber of"./Dtc:s er degree of consznt rcquir:;d co approve or d"isa.pprovc 1ll]J inat:er~ that n~qui:re voce 
or coo sent; e.nd . 
(p) ;1.ny ~mendment to Article 6 or .ArJ;iQJe. 7 of this Operating 
Agn,:::-men~. 
J .2 .Authoritv ofMeaibers to Bind r~e .f..Jd:. The Member;;: hereby ag;-ec rlrnt oo 
one Membe.r shall have the aurharity cu milke rr;present.1ii;rrJ or wa.-antie:1, or ~ter into canciacts 
on be!u.Jf of ell~ LLC, fa.l..e any action :u ru111genc for the. llC, or oth~.f"',vfae bi.'1d the LLC: F-3.t'i~r •. · 
~Mnjonty shill be required to mak-e repres~mations or warra.ntie~, or enter into can.tracts on be~alf . 
ofi:be LLC, tc1h uny ~ctiou as an agcot for the LLC, pr othe:rm,g~ biad the LLC ro Persqn:c: ba;mg 
knowledge. of mch d etermirmioil. Ti:ic foJJo,..i1iI1g ru:tioo.9, without limitation, .shaU requi.;-e a J,,l'...-ij orit'J 
vate: 
' 
3 .2.1 the fo.\titution, prasecm:ion nnd' d.:fonae ofar.y proct".ed.ing in the LLS-:'s nilil'l.e; ,., 
.3.2, 2 the pt.}rchase, recei!n. Jc3.9e or other a:cguisitioo, o,VT',ers.h.ip, holding, 
inrnrovement, use and ocher deaf111g wirh Property wherever located; .. . 






. 1 ,Z.4 c/10 e:.::.:2nn.g ~to ·con~ni.cts and gtiamrties-; incllrring of !ia"biiities~ bcrrowing 
money, Js~arice of notes~ bond;;, and orl1er obli'gatic_n.:c:; a:rd ~he: securing afauy of.its obligarions by 
morrgage or pledge cr-2ny -ofir:; P,0perr,; or ibcorne; · 
. . . 
J.2.5 r.he .!etidi~g.of rnoneyi ir.vescrncr;t ai1d rci1111estment oftb.e LLC'3 fund3, a.1.d 
Ti'!C:~ipt a-ni:i holding of Property as a~curii:y for repayment, including, \'.V)tb'out liD.1.itation, the .loani."TJg 
ofrnon~'y to, a~d otber.vi.9e belpirig Members, ofJk&s, em.ploye.es, a,nd agents; 
. 3. 2.6 che conduct of ,he I .. LC.s busi.ne.'Js, rhc eJt.ablisI-,me::!i of UC oEi ce:,, and cbe 
exercise of [he powen of the Uc within or i.;,.it.lmm the Srate; . · 
3 .2. 7 the appointment of employe-as ,'Wd ng2ct:; of the ILC,_tb.e defining ofthe:ir 
duties, the _e..stab1istrmen.t of ¢cir ~cmpensation; 
3.2.8" the: pa.J,ment of pen:i.ions r.Jld ea~~blisbmem of pe!}g_ion lJla.ns, pension tmst:;, 
profit .:,haf,ng. phms, and benefit .and· jncem5ve p)az1:i for aII or 111'.7 of the cu.-Te.:Jt or fo,--mer 1v!emben, 
employees, and agent:, of t~e UC; · 
~.2.9 ib.e making of d.onatioru to the public ·welfue or for rcfigious c.harit...0J;Le, 
sckntiEc; lirerar; OT educational purpose:,; 
oftheLLC; 3 .Z,10 the paymam or dona.pan, or i1:ny other act tba.t furthers r!Je business and 11ffoir.:; 
3.2.11 ~ p:1yme11t cf co~pensation, ar·additiona.l cc,m;i:rnnsar1on to any or ill 
M~mber:., i.Uld e{Tlployee2 cin a.ccounr of Jervicaa previou.~Jy rendered r.o tbe Hmiced lia.bifr.y 
compn.ny, whether or not an a.s:,ecrr.ie:ir to pay .such compensation was made bcfoce ruch !'services 
were rendered; · · · 
J .2.12 the purchase ofi,w.;ra.ace Of.] tb<! life of~ny ofl,s M~w3()•:.r:,, or'cmploy~s for 
rhe benefit of tbe LLC; 
3.2. D the particip2.rion in pa.rmenlup agn~ements, joint venrures, or other 
as:iociation.s af any kfod ivfrh any pcr-s-0,1 or per:mns; 
J. 2.14 the inqem.rific.arion of.Members or ,my other P.:non. 
3.J Mai o_r:i_tf.. ·V{heaever any matter i:J required or allowed tci be approv~<l by a Majorir; 
of the i:v-fo.rnbers o,a M.a.jm:iry of the rcrnainir.rrr Memb~r:; undc,,}79 Ac, o;-thc- Opcrat.Jng Agreeme-rr.:, 
such ma.h:er ahatl b9 conaid.2:,ed approved or conse:it~tj to upon r..he receipt of the a:ffirma:rive a.pprov,=i.I 





1.0;:35 r IONER -,. -1 -11.:= -'-. ~ ,c-- ~:-•,.;..5481.Z 
( a.ll the irfruib~, entit.1ed co vqte an a particular me.Ger. :For this o~roo1ie, the Shs...--in:'g Ratios cf ~1 
~fr:mb~.? 3ha~ ?e considered i-;i. d.ete:rmirJng whether a Majoric;/hB.,;e ·vcied In favo; cf an action, 
11'.'espect..i~ or. whether or not ·1 M~mbcr panicips.rns in 3\..lCb vote. A..,si~~e11 an~ in the case of 
appm"ra.ls to wr0drawaJ where cons enc oftb,e r~maining I'tfomberJ is required, dissociating Meµ:ibera 
shall noc be co~s1dcred} .. fembe:d .e\1,titled to vote for the purpcae of ~etc~inirig a }4ajorit'/. In che 
cas~ e.f a M~BWcr wh,a ba.s .dispos~d of th.!t Me:;:,b~'.!! .~nnre ~e~b~1:3Jtlp .l;nccr--c::.rt to p.'1 .As~iguee, 
but na.s Mt oeen remove.d ll.'l e. Member, the Sharing Rstio of roch A9signe:: iilii!.!J '6e ·consi.'derei:! in 
det~rrrJt1ing a 1-f.ajority llild such Memb~r·s voce or ~::msem shall be det::rmfocd b? s=ucb Shar...n!?: 
RAdo. ~ . · · - -
ARTIC~B4 
i\AEETJNG AN]? ALvfENDlvfENT 
4.1 Gerte:-.aj. Action.~ a11d d~cisia~s requfrbg the c1pp,roval of the M._ember.,· pur.:;uant 
co any pro:isio" 6ftbj~ Operating Agreement may_be atlthori.zed·or made cither by vote of the 
r~quired 11.11mber i;:if Member~ ca~en ate meeting of the Memb~s,· or by une.t'j,!Xlous v.ntten · 
c~nscut i.vichout a. rneetfog. In s.ddr.ian, · emergenG"j actioru i:na.y be taket1 in ]iccorda,.'1ce 'With the 
pr6vfaions of Article 4,6 hereof. 
' ,. 
4.2 Me~tin2:s. Any Me."rnber rna.y r:::a.lJ a. meetfog i:a cop.sid;r approval of an a~loi:i or 
decision tJ.ndet any p.ro'visfou aft.his Operai:iug Agre~·ment by de.livering to each otber·Membernotic~ · 
of rhe rime a..lld purpo~e of such meef..'1.g ac Tea.st five: (5) bosines3 days before the .day of suc/i. 
mee.tfug. A .Mtmber m!!Y waj-ye the ~c·quinmenr of .notice of a qieetfog ei~1.er by attending such 
meerili_g ~re.-.,:ecufo1g a wriru:n wai•1i:r before or·after such m~tfog. Any such meeting shall be he!d 
during 'the LLC,s norma:l busines3 h9un:; at its principru ple.ce qf bul>inMs tin less all o.f th.e other 
Mep,}Jets conser;t in :writing i,r by their ati:e.adance aI &ac:h meeting to its be.ing hcld a.t Ailaili,er 
locaci'pn or time. No1.wi-rhstandiag l'..!lY 1?ther pri::rvi.iion of this Op~rating Agrec.qJem, if all the 
membe115 hold a me',!ting at any time and place, auch 111c21:ing shnll be.va!1,d wi:-i..llOUt calf or notice 
and any la.v,.'ftll. acticn ta k:en <'.? such meedng shall be the acti~n of t.b.c member;;. · .. . . . 
4,3 Meetinas !),J Tcleuhone. M·~eti11g.1 of ,.be members may be hdd by ccnfc(':::'OCC 
telephone O·I." by a..'ly ot'ller mc3:ns of cJJm,.rnunicarion by which aJl P?-rticipa~ts can he.3.J' c.~.cb. other 
s[muf~eau~ly during the me.eting, and sucb panlc.ipac-ion .~ha.!J cor..1dtu!e presence ,L, pen on a;: tbe 
rn~ring. 
. . . . 
4.4 :Umi1i:mc-us Con.sent Any ?vfomber m.ay.propose that r}ie LLC a-uthor.zo an ~ct~on 
or decision pursu?,nt to iwy provision of this Ope,aring Agrc.~ment by unanimous writt~o c.?nsem of 
ali Merooer:. in" lieu of a meeting. A ?Aember's writre.n conse.,.t may be eyiqencc;~ by his signatnr~ 
on a coun~c9art of tbe praposaJ or by a sepfl.(l.U .. writing (including facsunile) t.i'\at ide.n:rifie.s r ..he 
proposal wifa reai.ooable speci5:ci,y and ~.titles that .such ~.(ember consencs io su~ii prbpcsal 
... 
4.5 Vg;~ bv Proz::y, i,.._ M-e:mbcr may vo~e ( or cx~cucc a wnrt...:n'canse:nt) by pro;;; glvc-n 
to a.r1y other Ivfomber. Any such proxy must be 111 writi:ng-·P<nd muat identt.J.1y the specific rneet1ng·or 
macrcr co which the pr.c;r"J apI}lics or sr2..~e. that it a:pp)ies to all 01:itter.3 (SL!_bject ·w speci.£ed 
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reservaria0s, if 2.:Jy) c::imi.ng befqrz i:be LJ . .,C [or' approval b.nder any provisicn of uib Operating 
Agrec.m.::m prior to 9-. S1]ecified date (which 3hal! not be later ttan the fint ar..c..ru'1cr--vary of the date on 
which .such PrDX'f is givw). Any such proxy ~hall be revocab[~ ai any rime and shall not be ef.fectfva· 
11! a.ny o,eerlng ar which tbe Memb'3r giving such prox-J ia in artend:mc:!. 
·· ·· 4.6 · .t:r:nemcr.cY Procedures. Natwizhs:andiug 3.11] oth~r p,n:~vi~ipl)S .~ei:c__?f: in .~e. ever.,; 
that fyfep1bers who cnu!d authorize: a LLC actico or decision at a duly ~aUed rne~ring reasonably 
dei.e.rnrin.e, in ~v.riting, rbat r.he LLC is faeing a. aig.n.ific;a:rtt business emergency that requiies · 
imme~ia:te aqion., such Memben may, without c_omp]ying witJ;t gane~Uy applicable proce-tlures for 
rr:c:cti-i:ig~ or actions b.7 unanimou~ .cnnseu~ ai.Jthocize any action or decisico cbat .rhey deem 
reasonably ~cceciser; ro a.JJow the LLC to ~en.e:fir .fro1n. a :iignmcMt op porn.mi r;J or rn proccct the ~LC 
from signi:B.cant Jos.:; er darr..age, pro"<i'"ided u1at they m~e reasonable efforts ui:ider the circu'm$mces 
to co~n:aci consu..lr a~J Member;; .concerning :.1uch ?-r::ti~n or dacisicn and i:J1e r~~on why such action 
or dec~:;Jon mst ·be made without ob.:1erving genernl.ly applicable pr::icedurc:s. 
_ .4: 1 R~cords. The UC shall mai.,,,tili,, permaneut r~~r.dg of ail actiom rak~'l by the 
Me.-nbers pursua.1r to a...y provisron · of this Operating ~-racrnent, inc!c.dir.g minutes- of all LLC 
me~i~g~ copi~ of all action& tiken by consenr of t..'1.c Membe~1 a.."'1d copie$ of.0.Il pro~.ies pup_la.."l.t 
to \1i"hich one Me.raber vmcs or execmes a coris.enc on behalf of another. 
t/.,8 Qoeradng Anf' .... ':U1en.r l\,fav Be ~Mod.i:6ed. This OP,eruti.n.g A,s?feern.cnt m.ay be 
mcdifietl or s.r:1ended from time ta time 1;1oJ:; by a written instmment a.da'ptc:d and ex~cuted by all of 
the Members. 
4.S .. l D~-~igna1.ed Repreie:matives. In ~he caae of a. memb'.!'f chat is a carporaricn, 
pann-::nhip;· limited iiabiEry company, or oth~r organization,' associqjon or e::1.tity (ao "Entity 
Me:noer"), such member shall desigm,.te ·one (1) indi'lidual who alone· shall be entitled ta attend 
me-etings of thl! LLC at::id vat~ sucb member/ s. Sba...-ipg Ratio .. Entity memoer3 m.~.y change their 
designls~ed repre.Setua.tives th;:m~ tL-ne ·co time by providing the llC \¥itb notice of r.m~b change in 
accord;:;:r,ce. Witb the pmvisions oftbis Operating Agreement. Any change. in an Entit'J Mei::iber's 
desigri'arnd represent.it.iv"' s.hall be cffecti•te up.on tbe LLC' s receipt of o otice of:ii.:cb cJ:,.,uigc. 
4.S.2 ·pji;,ht to Relv onPe:sigJJated Rerrr~s:enta!.ive. The LLC, an.d its memben, 
shiill hlive the r:ighl to rely an i:he most recently appointid de.'li·gnaced rcpre.'leu6.fr.rc of an En(ity 
lv.C~mber. ·Ea.ch Enriry .Member sh.ill be liable to ind~.rnrtlf/, defeqd ar:id hold h~e-ss t11e LLC o.qcl 
tJi·~ other memben from all cost, lie.bi.lity and damage;. that any of !luch indern,,ified ,oersor..:5 rr~~Y 
ini:ur (inciudirig, without limJt.:uion., anomeys' fe:::3 and c:xpense1) ari~i.ng frow or reh1t~d to any 
.disprne conceming t~e authorii:y of an Entity Member's d~ignated represen.tadve. 
ARTlCLE 5 
. ACCOU.NT.CNG A.,."{D RECORDS 
5. i ,Scok.s of Acccum. The LLC shall keep ad.equate boob and records a.tit,-
.Principal ple.ce of busi'ness, 5~ttin_g forth JH me a-nd ;,,.ca;.rai:~ accoum cf aU bu.:~~g~ cra,nsactioos 








~fri.ng om. cf :1..'1 din counedon ,with the conducr of the LLC. The Member, agree that Je.ffi-e:; 
W. Cac:ey ::rh:IJl be ti!Sponsible for rli~ b ..,a~3 ar11:i reccrd.s., A . .,.T'J Member or bis design2.red have 
the ri~1t, at any r~sou~hle time, to r.a.ve accc/,-5 ro asid in.meet a;1d coov cbe cements of iuch 
bocb OI records. ,A. • .;-iy Member requesting acce3s to or i.i~uecti~n cf0s;ch boob Of' (l!cords &ball 
P,15.Y the reasonable -:.:ost of such acceSa or inspccrion. ' · 
. ... - . -· ... · .. " ~ 
5.2 Fisc.11 Y:!3f'.; ne fucal :~' of the LLC shcll be the caleodar yea;. 
'V 
5.3 Accaimtiniz Re.'.)cii:s. W"irlun ni.ne~; (90) da:1s after tl,e close of ezch fi.1caJ ye:rri 
cu:cb member shaU reecive an un.2.udited r.epor: of th~ activities of :he LLC for th.c pr~ced.i:ng 
fisc.al year, including a. copy of a balance sheer of the LLC <J.s of the en.cl of sucn yeaI and a 
staremer.r of in cam~ or los:; for sucb year. · 
.. 5.4 Ta;,; R~urns, \Vit/Jjn ninety (90) q;1y~ a.fie. tbe end of each focaJ yes.;-, each 
member s}u]J be .fu.rnishe:d a s-tl1te:mtot suit:iblc fer u3e in the! ,!)fr;pa;ation of the member's 
mcome tax return, showizig ~he a..""Uount3 of any distributions, contributions, gabs, Iosses, pru:fits) 
or credhs al.located to ~1e rnembGr du..ruJg such fiscal year. 
5.5 TJX ~.,f~ners P@er. Reuee 11aid shall he designated to act a.:; rhe tiU 
matter;; partner of the.tLC pt1rsua11.r tq §62J1(a)(7) of the Internal R.evc:aue Code. ArJ.y CJember 
designared ru ra;:;:.matt2n partner sha!I take mcIJ action as maybe pece:J3aty to cawc each ot.iiCl° 
member r.o become a noUce pcrtner ... ithL1 the meaning of §6223 of foe Code, Any m~ber who 
is des.ig:nated ti.x matter panner mp.y not ea..\e a.,,y action ccntcmpta:cd by §§6222 tJirough 6232 
oft.'-i-e Internal R'c.",teQuE.'! Code "Nithout the. cooseoc of the members. · . 
ARTICLE6 
.ALLOCATIONS 
6.1 AJJocat.ions Gener.ally. Exce_pi as othery,rise provided in this Opera-i:ing 
A..greemcnt) all irems of incmue, gain, !033, dcdwction and c,edit oftJie LLC shall b~ ~[QC3.tcd ar;:19og 
all rhr: J:ier,ihc.ru m proport£qn ta rhe.ir Sharing .Rat;os. 
6.2 Lass AI!ocarior,_,. Lm3es of the LLC snail be alloc.atcd to rhe membb":; iu 
pm portion to their Sharing :Kn.J~s, exc.ept thac.in the ca:tc of a las~ rcali::ed on t.he liquidat.100 of the 
LLC u-Jder Article 9 hcreo£: or.e hundred percent (i 00%) of i;uch less shal:J be a,llocaccd to th; 
membe.Js who .have raade ~ash or agreed value capital contributicos to me LLC (in tp1! sa..rric 
,e]atio;,ship as t!1eir r>;;spec,ive: capit~ accourtW h~ve beeo. reduced ~c;:i zero. 
6.3 Nel Prout A)\ocarionR. Net profas from the LLC's operations shall frrrt be 
2.Uocated to t.he.'membCT3 who receive cash or propcrry ilistri.butor.is under Seer ion 7,3 to the extCT?t 
e,(V\.e ca.:,.h di.s"wib~itions received during t.he extent of the casb di5trib.utions rcceiv~d 'during the 
applicabfo f;L)(abk ye; ·c.rrd thw to the members in prnporti.ot1 !o ,;he r2spective Sh~ing .R..-ldo5. · 
6.4 N tr G:un AJloc;,_d_Q~. Her g{ciJ1 fr'om a safo of all ci' .rubst2,r,,i;;1J:,,- .:ill of tl:lt LLC' s 
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~.5 · C2.iJit~J Ac-:oun1s. An irrdi,,1duaJ capitB./ account shall be maintained for e;ic.b 
me,.,ber. &ch !"ember' 5 capha/ ac~mt &hall be 0) c.edired w-ith all capi:-i,a! coTI)l1buticps by roch 
member a.'1d the member.' s disrricutive shar~ of aD income md ga_;u 0:ncluding ariy incm::;1e ex.empt 
from fe:d~rahr:come tax); an.d (ii) ch::jec with the· .:imoum cf all ·cti3tribLi:ians· ta mcb. me.mb6- an.d 
Che member3' 3 distributive shar<! ofhms 3.Ild de<lui:tons. Caoird accou.--1tJ shall be ma.i;Iained in 
accordance v,,.ich federal i;:ico1:1c t,a:t.. ,;icc0unting principles M :!et forth in Treas. Reg. 1-704~ 
J(b)(2)(iv) or any .su~cc3sor provision. · · 
6.6 Cornplfa;;ic.e \l,,ith s~ction 70'i. Tht~ pjovisions ofthis ti.rtic!e 6 a.s rhe-1 relate to th= 
ir,ainrnoance of capii:aJ J.ccou.m.s 8...-<c! in,ensed> a..1d shall be cor.,at..'l.led,. and; if ~eces.sa.ry, modified a~ 
provid-cd ia Anic!e 12, w cause me ~!1oo;:atlon.~ of pra-nt .. '\ losses, i.ncom.o, gaiu IL,d credit pumi;mt 
to .A.rticle 6 to have Sl)b~tiUltial ecooornic .etfuct under (Ile ReeU]arioos pro:nrulga.ted under § §704(b) 
anrf 7D4(c) of the Code, in Jigbc of the distributions made pur:ruam µ') ArJcJe 7 and 9 and the ca-pita.I 
con.ciburi on.s rn ru:ie pur:ma.nc to Mele 2. 
.ARTICLE 7 
DISTRIBUTfONS 
7.1 Digrdbutio,ns ar Members' Disc.~tion. Exdeµt lJ..3. otheri;yfac pro'vided in this 
.Operntiag Agreement, di,rrn-oudons of the LLC's cash s·-mil?,-ble for dfs1ributio11 ah.-;11 be mr:.dc at Teast 
S<!mj-imnuaJiy for ~ach fiscal year. 
7 .2 C:uh Available for"Di:itribution.. for pt.!rprnleJ of t.1.b Ar'Jclc 7 the phra.:1~ '"ca;;b. 
av:til11b1e for disrribu-tion" shall m~n ca:,h of the LLC which th.emem):iers rea!louably determine. rriay 
be dis;ributec! w;thout impairing tbe '!ailrt-; of the llC to .carry out it, purposes, :u"ter r.a..lqng i.cto 
;:iccoum the acri.1.al e.nd .antidpatcd e-,epen.scs oftheLLC and S\lchrec;erves as the m~mben.reasonably 
deem ~d'(i.5ablc to protc:c.t theLLC from future cash si;orµails. Upon dJstribucion i.a accorda.':l.C/! wic.h 
this .Atcicle. tbe cauirnJ aL:COUtJt for eucll member shi1.11 be cbarg)'!d for tl\e /.1.mounc of rbc p;::ymcnt to 
thac rn.emb~. · ,. · · · · · 
7.3 Di:ifribJ.tian Sch~. Distributiont1 ofLl',e LL.C'~ c.a::b. ;J.Y.o..il!lblc for di.s-r...si.bti-tian 
sha.U b,.i made i.n d1e fo!lo,;;,-ing order ofprioricy: 
7.J, I Return ofCaniral. Any caJh o.'r:aJ!able fordfatribution sbalJ be distnoute::l to 
the members until ,.h~ ciembcrs h;we received cash distribution.s which are returns of c.,.i:)ita[ fc,_r rbe 
full ,;,;:Jue of re member.s' ca:ih c( 11grced Yalue capiilll contributi~ns.. · 
7.3.2 . Rema.tning Ca~b. Any cash· a.vaUab!e for dism~~tion ~ern.ainiog aft~ 
sari.,fadon cfr,~e r~tum of capital prcllid-ed in Sect.ion 7.J. l sha)1 be di..mibute-d to th.e member.:, in 
proportion to rbcir rc.;pective Sba.-:o.g Ratio$. 
7.4 ~i\.9.;-c..d Prio,;r_jcs. Tfrbcre is mcr.e thar. a.ne me:m:)er who is entitled to rhc s;irne 
. . 
orng,'\nHa .o...o:<..sm .. c~i,,ff. !r 
·· .. -




~-riorir/. cf di:rtribur:ion and tb.~re is not en,:ugh casb avaiJsble · for diJi:.:ibution to co·1::::t al] · 
msif.buticm in tl-tat pricrity care3cr;, the cash available ior disrribu.cion shall be alloc:2.c;ri ~,d 
<li5:wfouted TO rhc members entfrled to di.rtribmipi-J withiri ;)).3:f pri9ri~~ c~t:.eg~~/ in die re!aciqas.hlp 
which eacb cf the r;-Jember' 3 .r~spcct:ive daiow in that priority ca.ttg9i'/ bear tQ the- ,c;c.1! cJafrns .of .all. 
members rn t.1.'!t priority ca-i:egory. . · . 
- ·~ ·- ... ~, .-
~1<.TICLE 3 . ····-
DISPOSITlON OF MEivD:fERSHIP rrrr--.c.RE~rs 
. . 
. 8.1 Restriccion_.s on Di1suas;tio11. No mernber er ·asaignce sba1} aeI1, cor:;trfo!.f;e, gift, · 
enc;.~t:;ber,. hJpoth.ec~e1 ex-change or otherwise disposi! of( collectively, "Tran.,f~:-") a11 O( any ponicn 
of hrs Shan.ng.Ra.t10 Withot.Jt the expr::ss, pno['Ul)a,nimous v..ritten CDt:?aent of the remaining membf:(S., 
except .as provided i11 Seciioru S..1, 8.2, 9.J, .9.4 and 9.5. Each member berer:;IJ a.c)Qlu'.>,,ledr:rr:.s the 
• ,J ,:;j • 
r:casona.b!enes:. o.f the restrictions Oil di,5pcsiticrn imp,oaed by this Operatir.g Agr~ruent ln vie:w of 
th~ llC's purposes and Ibi!Jcfatiombip 9fthe ;ne:pbera. A.c.cordingly, 01c resi:rkriot:5 on.di~po3ir:ion 
.contained herain sba.11 be specifically enforceable, . . . 
. 8.2 Prohibited Tid.n/d'ers. Any purponed Tn.~fer of ~J or any porti9n ofa Sharing Ra.tio 
rhet does not satisfy the requirements of Sed:io:Il 8.1 i!ba1[ be null aud void ~d of J?O farce or eff.<:.ct 
wfuatrne'IE!r, provided that, if the LLC is requirer! to recogru;.e· a Tr:i.1;tter th,u. does not meet ruch 
rnquirementE ( or if the LLC, L'l it,. sole di.~crdion, elect:3 to n:co,gniz~ e. Transfer thar does nor sati~.fy 
such requirement,:;), ·tJ-ie. Transfo.r;ed 5]1J1.ri.ng Ratio shall be strictly flrnite~ to· i;h~ tra:J.3f~ror's 
economic rights with respeci: to the Tran.sforrcd Sharing ];'..3tio, which economic rigb.rs ma be !!pp tied 
('With'o!-,lt limiting any other legal .or equir:3,ble rights of the LLC) to satisfy any debts., obligacion:5, OF 
lia.bilh;jes for d~ages tbJ.t th(', r.ran3fcror, or &ssigne~ .of such S~aring Rado m:!.J h11ve w the LLC. 
fo the ca.se of a Transfer or a.rrempted Transfer. of a. S,Jaring P,.;3,tio mar does not satisfy such 
r~q11iremerrt3, the pa.des CJJgaging or .11rtempcing to e.;gage. in :1uc:h Transfer shall be Bable ~o 
inde111J1jf_y, <lefr;rtd and hold hannles3 the LLC and the other inember3 from i!-11 cost, 6a.bilii:y, Md 
d.ama:g-! thBt any of sucb indemniJied p~ons may in.;.ll' (hxludiug, 'Vvithout' limitation, mc;c~e:i:;raJ 
t10 li11bility and attamcys) f~~s a.nd expenses) as .1 result of SlLch Tra.is:ter or attempted TJ;:lDsfer a.;;d 
efforts co enforce the inderr.r,J-ry 3ro.nted hereby. · · 
. 8,3 Adr.ni,.,ion ofA,.3Si£nces :as 1v[emben. Subject to che ot1icr provisions ~ftbi.s P--1.-ti.cle. 
i, an :usignee ofa Sh11.ri.ng Rai:io ma:y be adrr.Jt1ed to the LLC as a me.'"Dber ou.ly upon a majacir'.f vo;:e 
of the members aod the sc.tisfacriaa of suc.h other re,rrns o.nd conditions as they shall rquire. 
S.1 Ri12ht3 ofU11admirted A~sicnee:i. A pcrson who acquires a Sharing Ratio .blJi. who 
ls not admitred as a mel"l).ber purs12ar11 to this /',.tticle ff (un "A.s3·(gi,ee") sh.n.H b.e em,itled only to the 
ecooorriii:: rights \0rb ·re~pcct to ,quch tra:n3fcrred Sharing Ratio in accortlanc.e ~"i~.b this Oper.uing 
A~reement, e.nd'shl!U havs no rig!Jt to ·vo;e un any rna.rters a.; a mem,ber, sbo.11 have .noc .right to aµy 
infonnation or aC"counring of.t1e a:tfain of the .LLC, shalt 110, be enricied ro inspect d1e. books. or 
recor~s c;;t'th.a.X.ic, ar.d slial! oot have. a.rry of the rigl-ns of a member under th<! Ac, or Uu.s OperJ.ti.ng 
Agreement. 
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ARTTCLE 9 
Vtf[TrllRA.W AL A.i\JJ) DISSOLUTION 
HG. 2tc 
· 9.1 Virthc.-Lr;,wa!, Each tnember agre..::s not to 'lri,bdraw from the .LLC vlitb.out rbe · 
copse::it of iill other members. A voJ1Jntary ·.11ith~rawaJ in violation of this Section 9 .1. shall b.e 
erTecti?;E'afr~c~·e~ (3) wCi;(}G writ.en ;wtice ~cli,•e;ec:l-t:J th;: menagen, but s-hclJ co.n:;titr.i::e a breach 
of rbis Op~,ing Agreement for ,;vbich the(LLC a.;:id other n-icm.ben :Jhall have aU rcmedi~~ O-f0Y'1ded 
under appJicable fe.w. . . · · · - . . 
9.2 ~ems cf Dbsolution. Except as otherwfaa pro,,ided in thi~ Op(;!ratir.g p._zr:;emenr, 
the LLC :,ha!J· di_g.,~/ye upor, rhe ea.rlicr ·of: (a) d-e:nh, incompetence, dissolticion, r~rminatfon or 
fof;fo:turc! of the right co do bu(illless qf a.n.ErH:ir; Member, bankruptcy on: ... i1}1dra:waJ ofa menber; 
(D) sale of a:11 or subsca.,-itfally a1J ·of rl1c LLC's aBset..<J; (c) a vote of U\e me.mbet:s- holding ai: least 
seveniy-tivc percent (75%) of the Sharing Ratios; or (d) {lpprova/ cf dissolution by an. Ut'l.rmimcus 
Vote of tbe memb~rs. 
:;1.J Et.Tuer. ofDeat.h ofa M1=r.:iber, ln the event cf the death ofa_y,,.fomber, tpe remaking 
Memb'eG may with.in.90 days elect to: 
9.3.1 Ccntinue the LLC and ad111ir the deceased· Member's spau:;e_, cs,ate or other 
bcncfaia,7 as a. Iv:fe.rn&c, in pla.ce of the decr::l!.$Cd Member; or · 
' . 
. . 93 .2 . Continue the LLC ~ong the sun-1ving Membcrn a.nd purc.b.se r]Je; inte1 ....:st 
of rhe dece3.3ej Me.,19er pur:;uant to the prpVI3ions of St!Ccions 9, 8 ~nd 9.9. 
The .elecrion··shall b~ at the sole disc,etion of the s1.1r7iving Membe..s a.,-id shall rcq~ire th<:ir .. 
u~a.r1imou3 consent If the s,1,---, .. ~ving Members do not so elect> the LLCshall ~e dis36lved. . . 
9 .4 E!f'S.g. of Withdnwa) 11r Other Event. Upon th~ ir.ico~petcr,ce, v.ithdrav1al, 
expulsi.on, bankruptcy, or dis:;oludon of a Member, ·che remai.ning Mcmber:5 may witbin'nmcty (90) 
daya, withoi,n w,fr.;.ng my n.:~(odks in i:he case ofvolunrar-J witiidr:i.·~al, elect to com:im.i.e tbe LL.C 
nmo!)g themsetvcs B.IJd to purcha.sc: rhe i.nterest o.f ihe ~ffcctcd Membe:r pu..r:suant to the provisions 
· cf Section;, 9.S and 9.9. The elect.ion shafl be at tl1e sole d.i.scretio:n of.the .remnir.ing Members an~ 
shall require cheir una.n.im0u,\onsent. If the rei.naicing Member~ do nor so elect, the: LLC ~hhlJ be 
d~~~d . . 
9.5 PuUCa[J Offerin5}Jor:icc. Ifa Me:mbetderermines to Dispo::ie i;>t'his Memi:leisr.cip 
Jm~rest fbi: aily reason at any time during the term of r.,'u.s Operating Agreem~nt (the "Icitiaprr_g 
lvkmocr"), such .Member shall give W"iifie.: notiyc°(the.".Puv'C;aJJ Ot:fering Notice'') of intern ro s-r!U 
P.11, but not les., tha.r, all, o.f irs JYf.:!r;,liqship Interest c:1.at .ts Che Offered L,terast co th~. remaining 
M~mbcr (tlie. ".Reapond.i.ng Member"). The ~espo·nd!ng Membdr may \J:/it:bia fifteen (I 5) days of 
receipt of ~h Put/Call Offering Not-tee 11·sk for written clari5~tion as. co any a.spe-cts ofth-~ .Fut/G.\H 
Offering Notice. TJ-ic Iairiating Member $hi\.!! prov1dc !l.Dy· clarit.icario-ns the b..iti?-dng Mcm::X:r c;ie.erns 
, nppropria.te wit,1.dn five (5) d,;.:i.; of r.ccdpt of tbe requesi. for cl.arification~·· 
f"";: 
,"I 
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. . 9. -5. l Pu TIC ail Q_~J.:ce Ii~ Member determines to Di;pose of Jils 
~~b~n111p Int~,~ for any r~:;an et a.riy t!r:nc_ dur;r,g the tc;;:n of this Opeq~i.ng /g::eer.:ient (the 
. irntJa.flng Member ), such Jvfel7Jber .s.hn.U gtve '\\'iihen notice (the 1'Put/Cail Offering Notice") of 
. trite..1~ ~o se!~ a/L buc not less tban aJJ, of /t.3 Mc.moership Inter~st rbat i3 the Offc:r~9 Inrerest to 't..~o. 
... _ ... ·~: _ .. :~T,';3:IIJ.~f ~rmb:.(_the "~zsp_oo~~ 1\,fornb:r'"). The Re~ondmg.M~mber may v-,ithin µfiee:n (15) 
days ~ 1 r -ce,p,_ m tl-ic Put'C.111 Oacr:;~g NoiiC8 a2~ for. wnr.en c1al'li5ra.ti-0ns. as. co ;~TJJ' a.o:pf.!~ts of rl;e-
Put/Call Oue:ing NC?tfo~. The foitia-r11g Me1::1her shall provide·any clerifi.c~niDr::r the· Id:hti1:,g 
M~mber dce"1:; 11ppr°!:ri'2.~a 1,v,;d:i.1 n'Ve (.5) days of r2cdpt of the request for clari:fications. 
..... 
. . · 9.5.1 P1.1.n:h~se Price - Tr.rm.:,;, Th€: Ini.tia.tng lvfonber gr,a]J ;;pcci:fJ iu its Offc:ril.1g _ 
Nutice the purchase pritt and tc.n:M ar which the foifotng Membtr would be i;.'i.lling ro purcb.-as.e 
.a.i.1 undivided one hundred percem (100%) intere:Jt Jn the LLC. 
9.5.j Excrd.,c of?yt/Call_. Upon receipt of the Put/Call Offering N"ocice, the 
Regpondin,g Member shall b;e oblipted either: 
, . (a) To ,dJ ra th~ Irticiating Member in Mcmbersh.ip lnren::sts u:t a p~ce 
and i:enr;s equal to the 31JiOum L1e Responding 7'.,Jember, would have been· en-titled to receive upon. 
cfl.s.;oJution o:f the. LLC pursu.a.."lt fo the· lf qiJidarion dl:rtnffi;<tion prnvi:Jans- ~e<.: for-JJ. i.rJ Section 9.6 as 
if !be LLC had sold rte Property lo a rhfrd party, ut the price a..,.--:id terms set forth m· th Put/CaJ1 
Offering Notic.e, or 
(b) To p1..m:;ha.8c the Membenh:p L1r.er.1si: oftb.e Initiating Mernbcrfqr the 
price a..-id ccrms equal to rbe amou,'1~ the InitiirtiTJg Mem.b<1r would h.;wc been enr:iiJ,-.'4 to receive. upon 
dissofrni.on ofrhe lLC pu~3uant to the Jiguid.arion distribution- provisjornJ ser. forth in Se~don 9.6 as 
if th~ ~Chad sold the. Property ~o a rhlrd p2.ny, at'rh::. price ;rnd ternw set forth in Pu:~Call 0.ffe::i,'1g 
Nc,tice. · · 
9.5.4 Not!.tiqtiQ.n. The_ Re:spondine Member sha.U not[;fy° the fai1fa.cing Member 
of its elec-cion witrun thirty (JO) days after thi;: da,i:-ofr1:;ceipt oft:be.Put!Call Offering: Nouce. Failurt 
to g.iv6 nqrice within· th:: required time period shn!J be deemed .an election by the Re3pc-c.ding 
Memoer not .to porch.8.Sc the Offered Tnte_rest bm rather ro sell frs Member2hip foteresr. ·co rne 
L1.i!:ia.rio.t1 11,fcmber. The rhh-ry (3 0) day period sh all be f!:("!Ci)C:ed for fi.ve (5) da7s if the Respcnding 
Member bas asked for chrif:ica;iot1s ,B set forth abon. 
9.5.5 L2pse of Offer. If the ~spondi11g l'-;fer;-iber fails co respond to r.ie Put/C~ 
Offering Nonce, or followi.ng an d~ciicn by rb~ Rl!sponding Member ta pur_ch3:5e rbe Offered 
Inte.resr, rh~ :Responding Member'fail.s ta con.111;-nITJa.r.e the p1.;rch.ssc of the entire Offered I;.nrera:.t ~ 
· accordance /Jere',;,ith, tben rbe .Rcspo.o.ding Mcrn.ber shaH be obUgated to :;ell ir.s entire: Me-mbewhip 
Imeri::st to the Iniriating .1Vfomber under the sa;ne renns and condi!ions as provide-din rh~ Put/CaJJ 
Offering Norice. · 
9 . .5.6 · L.V.11j,a;:ion err Ex:!rcisc. No(w;t.h:;t;i.,;c:JL.-\g anythillg co the contrary co;,ta.ined 
in rhis f-rtic!e 9-, no :Oisposit.ion of a Membcni'H"p foter~st .~hrti) be perrnirtcd in the f:?Vl!.!1\ ibut su_cb 
Member is a De!i,nquen.t Member or ha3 or.herwise r,,r~c!Jed ~ .• 1y prD'r'i~iq_n of thi:i Operati'ng __ :. ·.: 




. . 9.6 'Di~<.ril:n~icn Ugori Di.sJgJuticn. Up.on diasofutlon of [he LLc· as provided in rhis 
? .. ;,1c!e 9, tbe proceed:,. the;,e.from shall be applied. ~tid d.is:.cibv.td :ip the . f ol.{owing, oder: 
9.6.1 First, ro pay se:cu:-ed debts: ~o third pmie..s and merr.:be.r.:; (e:(e\uding a:iy ci~k, 
to be /lSa!X]e.d )JUJ:,ua,p;t to an aBJet S:ile, if aJiy); dJen . , · ' 
. ' 
9. 6.2· Sccon~.L1 ihc 4\Se of the Ra]~ of.sub.~tanrially all of tbe. LLC, a.,set~, tp pay 
the cast3 of such s~je- iheo · 
. 1 . 
'9. 6,3 Thlrd, to pll.y Un3eClJr~d debt3 of t'he LLC o.:i1ed to c:cditcrs other than 
r.nember:s; r~en 
9.6.4 Fc1.20\ ~o pay 1.ins':3ctlred dsk: of the LLC ow,ed to me.~bcrs; rhcn 
. . 9.6.5. Fdh, to members who l:~ve r.zade ca.5b c!!plt:iJ or agn~::d .. va1ue co.ntribi:-"Jons 
ta the LLC to the e;ctcmt of sµc:1 c:ish cJ.pj,a] or ~-··n:ed value contributioris; then 
Ratios. 
9. 6, 6 Tbe bah.nee, if any, to rnem~er:i in proportion to· their respective Shming 
. 9. 7 Distributions and AJloc2.tioni,:; ln R.e~pE;ct to Dt3uos.'!d of Memben.J,.ip I.r.t'31"2sc:s. 1f 
any Mcr{i.bership Interest is ·sold, as~i gn,;:d., or Dispostd of durf.ng ·any T~bla Yea.di~ .complian~e 
with the provisi~n·s"o.fthi., A.nick 9, Nee Profi:t.s, Net Loa,ses> ea.ch item the.:c~f; anq 3lJ ot!Jer items 
attribumbie: to !he Disposed or~ Membenhip fotere:ir for ;such T~x.J.ble Year ;ihaH be divi1ed and 
!l,Hocat~d be.rweet1 the ,ransferor and the A.ssigne~ by tfiking imo ~ccou11t th";ir var.yi.ng McmberJbip 
.Ir.tercm during such Ta.x:a'ole Yee.r in acc.ordancc with_ co<Je Section 706(d), U8ing any conventions . 
per.rutted by 1a,,.; Md .~eJectc:-J by the Memben. AJl Distributio):)s ov or before the datfl of ;ru;ch 
Disposmon .shill.I b~ ma.de to the tra.nsfrror,and ;ill bHributia'os rb~a..--9:er sbalJ be ma:rb ro che. 
A:..si gnee. Sole/ y fqr purpo5 c:i of 014.king S"Uch a/lo tat i ens md Di 5:trib1..1tion-3. the I..I ,C S]}cll r·eco g..'1ize 
such .Disposition not .later tha:, rhe end of the ciifc..-.,dar mo.m.h during ?Jhich it is given noci.c~ of such 
Dbpio$hion , provided that , if chc LLC i~ giv-en noti cc of a Di3position at I e!Ut cen (l 0) Busuie'.>s 
pay$ prior co che Dbposition the LLC .shll.li recognize such D1s9osition as the dat~ of such 
Disp~shiol1, a11d p,oYjd~d further that, if the I.LC doe~ nor receive. a J.1ocice srating rh.r. d,:,,,e such 
Member:irup fotcre:it was Diapotied cf ftnd su~h other in.forrnition ct.~ the Jv.~e:nbers ma rcasoaabJy 
require within thirty (.30) days afr.cr !he t!)lrJ ofthi;: Ta..xablc Year during 1.Vhich che Disposition .OC0irs, 
t11c11 RJJ such it(!m.s shnll be aDocatcd and c)Jl .Disrri)JutJons ~haJ.l .b'e made, to th, Person who, 
acc~rdiog to the books a.n.d record,~ of tht;: LL(.:, 1Ya.s the. owner ofrb~ ;,.Jember3hip foterest q.n the !t1s~ 
~y of the Tax:abie Y~a..- during ·which rbe Dispos.itian Ciccu,.r.. Ndthe: thB LLC n.or any M,:'!mbe, 
shaJ! incJr nny lfo.bllity fcir· malciug aUocat:iorpi a....-id Disrributior.is in a.,::corda.ncc 'Rith the provisions 
· of Chia t-..:1ic!o 9. 7, w.hethcr ·or u.or .:1ny Member of tht! LLC hes knollliedge:i ~f any disp.csi~oa of , 
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. 9.3 Valua7ic,r1 ofMember1s 1m<.!rest. Upon 8.11 ekction·by cheLLC to purcb.B.se !be 
)nt~cs.: or'a Member pUJ":iU3Jl! to Section 9.J or 9. 4, the value of the atfc:::ted Mer;;ber's inrnrest s.ha.!1 
?e. ?.~~~~e.d b~ a fair market value apprai&al of the A.3aec;c; (tl;o "Appraisal"). T'.ne Ap_pr~sa.J sh:11I 
be ~mplcred by an MAJ de$ignaL"11 ii:'ppr~se(f;ifa.J1[ru- vXth :simiJar·~mmercialp.ro35erc1s;, i.J:,-j¢ said 
appralscr to cie seieeccd by a majority ·of che od112r Member~. The- 'la!ue c.f foe Oymcr:;hip. Int.crest 
shall be d.c:rermined bas.~d on the fajr· market vil!ue a:1 determined by the AppraJsal and apportioned 
a..11005 the Q,~e::JrJp br.cr~sts io acco_rdance 1i"ith the di:miburior:i, pr~viaions. of Section 9.6. Sllch 
e.mount would. be. 0e same arnot!nt attriburable to tbc 33.11).e Owner.'.Ibip Jqterc:st if the As3ers wrr~ 
being sold at the Aooraisal cSLablisbed fui, market vahic and i:h~ r~sultant oracc.cds avoori..ioned a3 
ser oiJt in Section 9·.6. ' · · 
9.9 ~e11r for Mernb-:r1 s Inreresr. The purcha...;e price for a Member's interest 
purchased pursuant to Section 9.3 or 9.4 shall be paid b 5 rub.m'Jltially equal, co.c:I'::rutive annual 
payn:ic:m, iociudiog principal and intc.rcsr. rnt~reac shaJJ sc~rue ~' ilie rafa of ten percent ( 10%) pe:-
,Lnmnn. Th~ fu3t pil:ymenr .sh2.U be made n.t the do:ic ofcJ;e trMsaction and the subscqu_ent p2.yments 
shE.11 be made each year on the anitiver3:J.ry oft.n!J,t diite. TheLLC rnay prepay i.he rcmainlr:g amoum 
of rbe purchll3e price 1u a.1y time. 
9. l O J':ffect o'fPurcbase ofl'vfem.ber'a Tiltereat. A Member a hall cease to be aMembcf upon_ 
the LLC's election to purcb.a.1e the Men:ber's interest pursuant to S.::;ction 9.3 01.9.4. Dur:.ng, the 
period in Vthich rhe LLC ls qia..1<ing payment:, to the fonper Member, th.e for.n<'.ir Membe: sJ'Llll have. 
no righ~s as a M.c:rnber iu th UC. 
. ARTICL¢ iO 
MJSCE.LbA.i'1?.0 US 
I 0.1 Ad.d.irionai Docurrierih. Ea.ch m.ernbei shall exe::1.nc such ·addltlonal-<locum.ents 
.!rnd tab such actions as are re?,sbnabJy requ:!rted in orde,to compfer.'! or confum the traD.S/3.D"Jons 
conte:npla.ted by trJs Oper:ni.111; Agr~emem. · 
10.2 Hsadmc:,. Readings in this Opera,ins Agreef,'.\en.r are for comcni~ric~ orJy 0,.,1dsh.i:.ll 
Mt µ;feet (ts .fI"!earung, 
l 0.3 ~-~v~rabdi,? .. Tk invaJJdlcy o; ur.cnfc.rceability of .1.'1J pro·rision of rhis 0-?e.1tL1g 
Agrcernem shall not a:ffccr the vaiirlity or enfurcc:abilii:y oftb,:, rema~.ni..'lg proyision.s. 
10.4 ]1'3rd-Party Beneficia.ries. Toe pro1.,i3i00.s ofrb.i3 Operaring Agreement are i.n.tc~.ded 
saldy fqr the b.enefa of ch.c members an-d shaU create 110 righLJ or qb!igatioru eofo.rceable by any 
~hi[d pa.t:,>, includi;1g credico,r of ih I.LC, exr:ept :i.s otherwise provided l:ry applicabte Jaw. 
10,5 No 'F'aru1·cr:;hiF. fa tended for Nontax Purna,,jeS. The mf.!mber:, have:: fomied the. LtC 
1 . md-!r ~he At:., an<l e:-cp.rcs3Jy do nor i1tre:nd hereby to form a parrnei:.ship 1.tader ertht:r r.fic Idaho 
. TJru(o1 rn Pari:-1~r:;.hip Act nor rhe Idaho Uniform Limited PRnners.hip Ac1. Tbe meml:?er:; do n~t.' · 






itr:md re ~e_P.'.!G'ler.J cc.e to a::other, Oi par"J1er.:; 2E :ro .tny chird party. To the exc::::m a.riy me.mber, b_y 
word or ac~ion. repre.~ents to e.r,odie pcr,on thm any other rr:~mc~.- is 11 part1e;- or t.1a~ the LlC •is 
ci pa~'?1ership> rhe member mJ..lc.ng iuc~ wl"cng:fuJ represemation .shall be liable i:O any or.he:- membe:.:. 
who 1r,.C'Jr.,p9Gonaf liability 0:1 f2c!SOfl or mch \l?;'onp.1/ r,:;;'pc?.~ent.1tior::. - ' 
10. 6 Par-1rrer~h.ir; luten,3ed foi' Tax :P'Jr:Jos-e;;_ The members·lciave fo.r.ncd the L.LC u:i;:dci:r 
,he Act, a~d e;9res;,:Jy ~o imendh.er:;by to have theLLC cl,mified arid ,;~at.::c forpurpcses offedertl· 
and st~rf! 1nccme raxm1on as a par:IJerahip. . . . 
10, 7 ,Binding Etfec;. Exc~pl as othe;.--,.0/le provided in r~is Operating A.grce.t:ien~ c::ve:r-J 
cavena.,t, rerm and provision of this Op~raring A,gr.?.ement sball be. binding upon and inure fo the 
Dene-fit cf the members a.1.d thefr f8;JDe:;:t)ve hetr3, Jcg. 7ltees /e•:.-rij r2pre3entatwe3 3t!CC.'.!SSOG 
transferees, ;md a.s.,igru. • ' :::J 1 • • 
10. 8 Cans61.1ct.ion Eveiy covcns.nt, tei----;n :< •. nd provi3i Ofl.3 of this Opc~ting Agre~~~t 
shall be construed simply according; to its fa.i:r·.mcaning arid no~ sdctly for or agair1.st any .m.combe.r. 
The tenns oft:ns Opcra~fog Agrecml'.!r.t arr:: [nrende~ to embody the eCD.nprnic reJ.c:ition.:ihip among 
rhc memben and shall nor be subject to modi.ii.cation by, or be confo.rmed ·wjt1:r,. .ai:iy .:tee~c;m~ by the 
Intern a! Re.venue S~rvice except a3 trJ.9 Operati,ng Agre.,etncnt may be e:r.plicitly so a.-nended ar!d. 
except a.s may relate specificaJJy to rbe fi/jJJg of ta.x returns.· · 
10.9 Time. Time is of the cs.<Je;m'! wilh respect to rJ1is Opcradng Ag:-eemer;;:, 
' 10.1 0 ~mi11g Law. The /.1w3 of in e St2.te of JdtJ)o shall govern t.he validity Gf t.bis. 
Opera.ring Ag:re·~meut, t~e construction ofit, knn~, ad rhe interpr.ctatioo ofthE:, rign.tJ and duties of 
t.lic me:rr:bers. 
J 0.1 l \\lc1.i,1er ~f Action for Pa.,cit/on: No Biil fp·r bttrierstip Accc•1uting;. Each of t~e 
mr:mbc:-s irn:vocably v.;,'liv~s a.ny right thac he may have to maintain a'ny action for partition ,,vid.1 
re.3pc'cj to ·a.,y of the coinpany properry. To the fuUest extent pcnn!tted by Jaw, ca.cb member 
cave:i-ilm3 cwt to fi]e a bill for a Jimired liabWry cor::noMy accauntiCTg. 
. '. 
10. [ 2 C.:ouateman: Exccuti,i:c .. This Operating A.iree.ryJent rn.ay be ,e;,cec-:J~ed b·ar,y ilUmber 
of c oun tcrputs 'With the .:ia.mc effect e:; if a.ll of t!cie members had signed the sa.-..ie document.' 1'.Jl 
~oum-::rpm~ spa(} b_::: con5trn~d ragecbcr a..1d sliaU ccnnitutc one agr~ement. 
lo. 1 J Sr,cciflc Perforrn.ance. Each member agrees wW1 the ocher, r,ier'11bers thar the 
mcrnber ~ would be i.m:parab)y damaged if .any' of the provisions of this Opera~L"lg Agreem~ni are .not 
performed in accordance with cb~ir s.peci.fic tmns end th.at !)1onetary dfilT)ag-es would noi provide an 
adcguri.te remedy iM .~ucb eveor. AecorclL1gJy, i,t is agreed that, in at;idition to any ot!J9r remedy to 
\1.·hid cl.1e. non-brc.:ichlng members cu.y be e;icitled, at l11w ot in equity, the flOr:-brMching members 
JhR!J be 1:!n!l\'J:!d ~o injunc::j·.;e, relief to rrevent br~~ches of the p,rovi.sioris of thi:. Opcr.iti...,.,g 
... Agre.:ment .1.11d .spcci..Gt.:.Jl]y co er ... torce rhe. ,erm..s R.11d pro•1isions hc:n:ofin any act:.L?n institµte.d in ~y 
cq,wr; of the U r..ited S~ares or a.,y start then::c.f havlng subject matter jurisdic.1:i.9n- the~a.of. · · . ·, 
1
. ,./ 
. : . 'I,.' 
.... -
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.- 1. 0.14 Hctice. AJJ ,1otice:;, d2r;:,a..""!.ds,· reguem and ether COJ1'-4,11Jni.eqtions rtq1..lred er 
peniitted hercundc.'f aba.11 b-~ ih >1r1JT.:ng a.Dd shall b.e deemed delivered on the e.u-Ji'er cf (i) rhree (J.) 
da.Y3 after cJi~ dat:'! cf P.Osring ?f registcrd or cer.:ified c:isJJ,° ~dc.r;:ssed ro rhe add.res:;ic~ a.tits addres~-
scc fc.r;:h herein or ?[1 SLlch cr.I1er address 2s .s:icb' pan may have specified- then:tof9rc by ootice 
dc!ivered in €1CCord~n.ce'v,-itb this Sc...,'i'ion, (ii) a-rremptd d~livery or r~.fi.1::oal to acce~Jt deli;very i£ senr · 
by G'D-l:!rie; or ·Gtbe;:: pcnc.ncc! deJiycr; scr;:icc., .dt.(iii).,'ic.J.ml rncefpr by tbe ad dr1:11:1*1;e..r~m1.t.dks~ _µf c~e. 
method of givi.ng notice. 'J:bi;: addreJJes oCC fort1 fo: Arride 2, as !l."Jlended frcm''tiir.e r6. time, "sba.JJ 
be t.:Si!d for purpose3 of giving notice: to members. · 
l 0. 15 PJg-hi:s fL!.9 RerndJes Cu~uJr..rive, The rights and rcmed.ies provided by this 
Operating Agr~e.rncm: are cu1m1fatiye nnd tliei' use cf any one right or remedy by any pa.~; shall aoc 
preclude. or waive rhe nghr t;o U&! any or ~JJ other remedies .. Said right;; ar.id remedies e.:re given Lr, 
addition to my o'ther dghts rbe pll.rTies illii )1ffre bey l~i·, statute, orci1nar.ce er ofoern~sl?. 
·10. J 6 We.i'./cr:;, The fail~re of any p2.ny to seek red.ress fur viciatior.i of or to .imist upon 
the ~ct performance of any. cnvenan tor c.ocdido n of tJus Opm,ting Agreement sbaJl ~ot prevent 
.,\.. i..: h 1 ~ , • • , , , , 1 , ' - f a St.:J..JS,::quent act, Wwc wou,d J1;1.ye i)flgmaily ctJustrt'Jted a VJofat1on, froJYl .na'l1.ng tne otrecr o cl.!'"l 
original v101n.tion. 
IO. J 7 Atrornev Fe.e.3, fo rJ,~ ~em any a.:::tion is instirutrd ta enforce. or d'~en:nine r.hc 
p1utie:; 1 ri_ghrs or dudes aris.ing ouc. of the ten,1s of this Operating Agrc=ement, tlre prev1Ji1in.g pm sball 
rbcovt!r reasonable a.c-tomey foes a~d cos1:., thrnug)1 a]J levels of any aqion inCUITcd in such 
p~oceeding. 
A ... ~TICLE l .l 
DE.i:lNITiqNS 
Th,e following teDns ~sed in tr.Jg. ,A~g~cem·ent slwTI have the folJmvj,1g me-s:iogs (unJc~s 
other,Yise e>..lJ:res:sly"j:i'rovidcd" herein)~ 
J l.J Adiust,;~i b~ficit ,gJ1rul me:i..'.i, 1,vi th r~spect to ariy r;-J.ember., tbe deficit ha.lance, if any) , 
i.~ such rocmoer'3 capiul t1.cc:ouµt 11s ofth,; end of the rd~vanc fisc.3/ year, after giving effect to t.h~ 
fo Ur:n.vmg adj:.istm.e,m: . · 
· ] 1. J •. l The- c::lpf raJ accaui:lt shll!J bt inc:;-c:-ased by any amaums wh.i.cb si::;ch member 
is c1bjjgijted ro te~to,e p1.1r:,ua.n't to 3.IJ; provision of th.is .Openi.;;ing Agree.me-r:r or is deemed. r~ he: 
obUgJ.ted r.o restore putmaut co rhe ne:s:t ,;:, ,he liLST se.ntence3 o(R:,gulatio-ns Sectiom 1. 704-2(,gX 1) 
1111d .I. 704-2(i)($); and 
1 J. I 2 The capirnl account shall be decre·~.j~d by the items described in S,~cupns 
J. 704- J (b)(2)(ij)(d)(4), l 704-1 (o)(2)(ji)(d)(5) and J 704-1 (b)(2)(ii)(d)(6) of tho Regulations. 
Tbe fo.-egoiog clcnnition of Adjusted· Deticir is inter.d~~ co cor.1p!y win, tr..e pro·1isions o.f 
.~ccri or. l. 10,i-1 (b)(2)(ii)( d) of the Regt1I atio r,s arid shall be imeiT)rct~d coosis~.e~dy t.h~:?:7:itb.. . . • ..
',;··: : :·· 
001164
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. :- 1 : . 2 D$]r."'ci2.tjg_g shal/ mean, fa, c~c}. focc1/' yesri' an. amcun:: equ.a.i ta the d~fl:!.ci:ui.on. 
€Unor.,zn.t1orr, Of prbe;- cost recovery deducdon tlJowablc W/t.h respect !'O. 2.11 !!35et for SU cl:J fi SC"..J year. . 
,, .. "" 
( j 
"·.~ ... 
. provided., h?wever, that if the Sfo?.s- asse, va)uc of arJ as::;e.c diffgn from its :1dju:;-;;:!d basis fur federJJ 
incom:: ra;( purpoJe.::; at rJ1e ~egimiirg of such focal ye~r, Dcprec;iati9IT 3haU be· an amaµnr w~i~h 
b:ea:rs the 5a.me ratio to suc.h bcginnin8 Grosa Assa Value as the felforaJ incorr:e t.'l;~ deu.recfa.tion, 
a:mortizl!:ticn,. O.f ot.~er cost recover;;,{ de.:iiicciou for 3Uch Es~, Yew p~a,r.s -~'? _S~f:~ begw.nizig. a.dju~ied 
tax bil.!iis; and funher pro1,,ided, howev~,· that if the adjusted basfa for federal ~co~~ cw. pw-posas. 
of H.IJ asset !lI the begiru,ing of such fisccl ye.1r fa zero. Dep.r.~cfatio.n shall be determined \Ttith 
reference to Jt.Jch begjr.cing Gross Asser Value- u.sing any reasof!ab!e met.hod :1teleqed by th~ managers. 
l LJ Gross A.;Jet V2..!.1ie .s)l.l]l mcai:i. a.;1 a;,~?t's adjt.J;;t~d basis for fde;-af income· Cl.I': 
purposes, ex::ept 11s follow.3: 
l 1.J .1 The Initial Gross A.wet Value of any aS.'l<Jt contribut::!d by a mempe: to the 
LLC shall be r:hfcl gross fuir rnM.ket value of .ruch asset, as determi.ned by t.he cont."'fot11ing member; 
. '• 
l l.3.2 Tbe Gross A3set Value:, of all a.~s·ern sbaJJ be a.djuated t<;> equal their 
respective gross fair market VailJes, M derc!Iilir:ed by the ro.~bcn; a3 of tile foll'?wbg times: 
(a) i:he acquit!ition of 11n additional interest in the lLC by any new er 
exlsti-ng member in ·exche.r1ge far more than a de minimfa capitJl contribution; 
[D) the disc:-ibi~tian by !.be LLC to a member of more rhan a de tr.Jnir:::is 
a.•1iounc of pmperty as considcr~tion for i\\11 interen i.'1 the LLC; 2.fld 
·. · ( c} the liquidation of the LLC v,,ithin the meaning ofRegulations Section 
1. 704-J(b)(2)(ii)(g); prnvides however, that a4jusnne,T1.I5 pursua:it to c/aU.'.les (i) t'?ld (ii) abO'V? S-ll.all 
be made ocly if chc members r~ascne.bJy detennibc th~t such adju.stmcnt3 are nect."3.SITT""J or 
Jp.propni!re ro reflect tbc relative Sharing Ratio& ofrJie members; 
11.3 .3 The &.-ass AJsct Value· of il.Ily asset dimibut.e,d to any me:11ber 3ba!J be 
a~u sted .·to eq1.1al t.Jk: gwss fai.I rnaJ:~c:c vnfo<! of such a3.~et on the <;lat.e of distribution as detennL".ed 
by the dlstribut8c D11d t'Jc meG1bers; 
i 1.3.4 The Grn.ss Asset Values of a.'lset3 shaJJ be incrca.o;ed (or decre:1sed) co r~e~t 
a~v-adjus~•.::ats to tbe adjusrerl ba,i .. ~ of rucb assers pur.ruanr co Cade Syctio11 7J 4(b) or Code s·ecrion 
~43 (b)> bJ.Jt only ro th~ ext~m: that such 2:djustments ar~ take.n into accounr fo det.:rmi11~n_g Capital 
ii..ccount.s pur~uant to H.~gufar.io.n .Sec.rion l. 704-l(b)(2)(i·1)(m) h.:rcof; provided:, hovyilYer, ti.,,l.i C--ross 
Asset Vi?J'ue shall noc be a-dju~ed puriiuant to. rhi-~ Section l !.3.4 rn· r~e extent i:he ruc:rnb.ers 
cJctcrrnine th.er an ddjustmenc is ne::2:;:;a·r;, or appropt.iatc [n ccnnectlon \.',i.tb a rraruu:ctfon w\e.t wcuJ.d 
otlicn0~ re.sulc in 1!!l ~dJustrncm pt1rsua:n ro r.r.is S7'ctio.n 11.J .4; en.a 
I e._J.._l• ...)Cj 
·';-1 -·· 
...... --
I I .J .5 Ifihc Gross A3~et Value ofan a-ssec ha.3 beer:. clete....nioed or.adjusted pur:;uant. ,. ,: .·,, ··~ 
. ... . '•. : . ·. -





to Se!:'jon. l} 3 .1, 11.J .2 or J 1 .3. 4 herco~ such Gro2& i'-3set Va.Ju~ shcJl _ihueaitir be adjD~e~ oy tl,e 
Dcprecia-:-:icil tai-,:;_:::, into ~cco,rnt Yvith. r:;spect ro mch as:iet for purposes of com_puting profa3. fl"D.(1 
!osse3, · 
l 1 .4 ,LLC l,.;ur:imur.1 Cr.rin shsJJ mean the ;am('! iB 11par'"<11er3J.ijp.mi.'1mum g;u:~· 1 as set forth 
in S,;ciom 1. 70+2fvJ(2:; a.'ld l.704-.2(d) afthe P..egol2.tion:.! .... ~ .: ... :,. ... . ..... ,. _ 
.t 1.5 Member Hooreccur.,e Debi shall have tbe ,:nee.nL1g se, for.;S in Si::c-::io[) 1. 704-2(b }( 4) 
of the Regulations for "P!?-ftrter nonrt::course debt:· · 
. . . 
· 11.6 M"mber Nof1J::a:,Li,'.:c Debr ,MJ.n.\W:u.m 9:,.i11 silaD rnc;1,1 !L,':, ap,ou.nt, with respect to 
each M..~bcr N~nrecoune Debt, cquaJ. co th LLC Minimum Gain that would result j:f such }rfomber 
Nm1n:cow·.se Debt ,,yerc lTcated o.s.a Nomt;cour;ic Liabiliiy, dct2rr.1it1ed in accprdMce ·.v-ith Scc-rion 
1. 70'4-2(i)(3) af rh.e Regulafons: · 
11. 7 Mer:-1;:er Nanrecour:;e Dedi~ .~hall. bavc ~he meanJng set for.Ji in Sect.ior"'3 l. 704-
20)(1) and I. 704-2-{i)(l) of the R~gulatjona for "parr~er ncnrecourse dcd1..;cti0ns. 11 
J 1. 8 No.n.~cour~~ l)edu.dons sbalJ MV:! rhe meaning ~et fr1nh in $eqion J. 704--2(0 )(1) 
oft.he ReguJ a.tion.i. · 
l l.9 .::t:-!.P~mcLi2bJJir11 shall have tbe meaning .seffon:h in s~ction J.704-2(1::)(J) a~· 
r,~e Re;ul atfo :1.1. · 
1 I. l O R~rz11lations 3JulJ mean propos.ed, ·cempopry and fornl re§:JJariocs prnrJ1.12lgated uuder 
Lhe Code in efftict as of-th~ d1t:: of B!mg the .A .... rticles and the corresponding sections of any 
regufa.tior.:r SuC.Scguc.ntJy iS3U,ed tnn_f '<l.')1.etJ.d or S<.lpenecle ~UCh regu1.atiOCS. . 
order; 
AB, Tf CLE 12 
CERTArN TAXPROVISI01'(S 
12 .. ! .S Q~cia/ AJloca;ioas. Th.e foJJov.-iJJg -,pecia/ allocai:icn.; shall be made .i.c the following 
. 12. l, l · Jvfinimur.1 Gejo Cha;-ceb:i:c~, Except a.:; oiberwise pro1ii1;fod iii .~cc1ion 1. 7~4--
2(1} of rhe Jegu/ation.i promulgated under t.~c Code in.effect !!S oft)1e df!.re of.filing tbc·Ar'4cl.'.:S and 
rhe correspon.dir;g sections of cr.ny reguf arieins sµbsequenfly issued t.~at amend ·or 51.lpersede such 
regulaciaru, norw(r.h~rd.f.ldjng 8.il)' other proyisioo ofthi.~ ArJcle lZ, ifrbere Is a ner rfocn!a.se in .LLC 
lv.JJni'rnu.rn Gn.in durL,g IH,J' facal yea,.·, .each member .shall. be .~pedal!y altocared items of LLC 
-income and gain for such fisc.2.l. year-(a.nd, ifnece~sarJ, s1.1bscqucnr .fiscal years) in an &"Uounc equal 
t<> ·.suc;h inembe.(s share of the net decrease in LLC iv.fin.imum Gain, de:rer;:r,jned in accord2..,1ce ',),~cl, 
l{~gula.tiom Scc,ion I. 704-2(g). ;AJlocadoos pursuant to the pravious ser1!enr;e !'-hall b~ .made i.n 
pro portion to ll-ie respec-tivc ~r.:iounts required io. be alloc.1ti:d co r.:ach member pu'rsi1ant tJ1cr-ero. Th<! 1 
i~e.ms ·co be so s.!locz;:ed shall e determined in .\ccc-rd11;1ce •.vit1, .Sections J, 704-2(f)(6) anJ · 1. 704- · .!:\·· . . .. . : 




20)('.2) of rhe Reg1.1is1ionz. T'.1is Sc:c-;;ia.n 12. l s intended to comply 1,v[rl1 rhc .mird_':Jum gain 
ciw.:rgeba:ckrzguir~~8nt in Se~co.1. 704-2(f; of the R1i.i;.1.lations ;1.,1d ahi!.ll be inter;rete9 cor-,:1iste,-rdy 
there1v1th. · · 
12.1.2 M~rnber),1inimum Gai.n C11ar,2cliad;. Except a., ot.1erwise pro vi deci in 
Seccion 1-·. 704~,1(1)( 4). of cbe-Reg1.Jladon;3, r.oJ;withstan_d-ing an other provision of tfu_,3 Ai.ti.d,e_. P. i;f 
there is a net decrell.3e in Member .Nonre~ourse Debt 1'vfnirnum Gain attributqble to a Memb~ 
Nonrecour:,~ De~ t during a~y fiscal year, each member who bilS a .9h~re ofth.e Member N onreco,ir.'.!e 
Debr Min.imu-~ Gatn a,tibmabk to &Ich Member Non,!':cou:seDcbc1 der,~rmined in accorda.i1.~ -11itb 
Secti1,m l.704-2(j)(5)' of the rcgul..ation~1 sh.tll be specialiy illocated items ofLLC incoine: ~11~ gain 
[CT such fiscal year (and, ifnecessar.y, subsequent fiscal yea;-s) lq an amount equal to such .mcmb-er's 
shiU'e ofo: nei: Jecre-ase fn Mernber Nonrecour,!e Debt .!v.finiu:ium Gain atrriolltable to :ruch Member 
NoJJrec,J\.1r3e Debt, d_etern1wed jn a.ccord.ancc wirh R~gulation:3 Sectjon L 704-2(i)( 4). .6-Jlocations 
pur:ruam to thc prnvi ous 32utence shall be: made in proportJon to the respectiv~ ai7\ouo.ts required to 
be a!Joca;:ed to each member pur~ar:n: thereto. The ite.ra& to be so alloc2.r.ed shall be d~1:ennine.d ~ 
ac:con:b .. 1c~·with ~cciions l.704-2(i)(4) and J.704-2(j)(2) qft..1.e: ReguJ~tions. Thi~ Section 12.1.2 
is intended to cornpty·:-Vith the mL11imt.1m gain cJ,x!,gGbac:k requir,:..T,,;:nr. in Seci:ion 1.704-,-2-((i)( 4) of 
tbe Regulldous apd _sh.al] be i.ate.rprcud consistently rhcrewith. · 
12.1.3 0iB.lif,1cp Income Offset. )'.n rhe event any member uoexpectadly re.c~ves arty 
ui:!juerments, aUoqitions, or di.stribunon3 qescnbC9 in Secuq.n 1. 704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(4), Sectic;m 1. 704-
l(D)(2)(ii)(d)(5) or Sectioa 1. 704~l(o)(2)0i)(d)(6) afthe Regulatio~, h:e.ms o·rl)..,C inca:qie and gain 
shall be o speciaJJy allocated to e.i.ob tmch member in an a.111ount a,,.d m;inn.er sufqcien.t to eliminat:c, 
ta the erte.,11 required by the Regufotion.s tbe Adjusted Deficii: of such mc111bcr as quid··Jy as 
possibie, provided. ~b.ar an. 11lloc;,;doo pu.r~a,~t ;o this S~cci~n 12. l .J shell be rnade o_nly-if and to ihe 
qrcnt that such 1nemb~r Wo'Uld h~vc an Adju3ted Deficjt aft~r a.11 other c.llocaiiol'ls provided for in 
this Alticle 12 ·bave been temarivdy mad~ a::; if this Se-ction J 2.1.3 were not rn \hfa Operatin5 
Agnrcrnent. 
I~-). 4 Gross Inca~@- In th..:J eve::.t any r.nct.iber hs s. de.tidt C.a.pital 
Account 3 i r.pe end of any flscaJ yer.: which is ·111 e;~ces:; of the ~um of: 
(a) t_he ar,;ouM $11.ch member is ob1i6:1:c:d ro .res.~or~ pursuant to an.y 
pro·rfaion ofd1b Opcn1tul;; Ag1c::::m,crJ(, IUJU 
(b) the ?..mount such memb~ i~ deemed w b!! oblig3.te.d to resto,e 
pwsu;,..nt to th¢,ne;G to rhc last ~2.ntences of.Reiu·!a.'.Jon.!1 Sec.tio;;s l. 704-2(g)(1) ar.1d ~- 704-i(i)(5), 
~~ch ruc.:h mer.iber :ihaU be $pe.cial/y ~JJocatod iiern.s 0fLLC income an-6 gai.o iu the 1unou:m ofsuc.b 
excess as quickly a·~ possible, prov-ided th;\! a.n. allc?cadon p·I.Jr.:s~ant fO this Scc'"Jon .l.2.1,.4 shiH l;,c 
· mridc onJy if a.::.:id Cll the c.crent thnr such member woold ?-Ve a d::::ficit capi,aJ accoum: in' excess of.sucq 
11urn afier ell! other alJocadons prov(ded for in this f.rticle· 12 have been made· a.s. if Secticp 1.2: 1.3 
J-,crcofa:,d t)-,js' Section l :;L 1.4 wefc n,1t i.n this Operati..o~·Ag:;e1;mcnr. · 
1_2.1.5 Non.reco1.,Jpr. Deductions .. Noru-e.co.ur3c De.duc::tons for.- aiJy fisc.'.l:I ye-9r sh~l 




1.8:05 NO, 2S6 
l 2.1.6 Member N onreccurge bdu c~iaos. A;i1y Meuiber N or..ra.ccupc Deducdcr-.s for' 
a.1y ~c.cal yeu shall b~ specially alloC:lted to rh.e m£1Dber wba bea::r tbe econcrµ.ic risk c-f:1C?SS wir.:h 
resuect to the Member Nor.recour3e Dci::-i to whicb such Member Nonrc:cour-coe Dedue1:icrrs a.cc 
· attib1.::fab)c.-i~ ·ac.:o,,fance 1~11-i:h .Ragufr.r.hris:s e.c:r:on 1.704-2(i)( 1). , .• _.. . . .. . .. 
12. l. 7 Secticn 7 54. Adju~t_mect::.' To the cxten~ an 2.dju~trr.ent to rhe adj1.m~d cax ba.::is 
of a..n.y LLC asset pur.n;a.ni co Co_ds Section 73 4(b) or Code Section 7 43(b). i, r~quirad, pursuai:rr to 
Regulltiqn$ S2crion i.70:4-J(b)(2){iv)(m)(2) ~r Reg,Jlatious Sectjon l:704-J(b)(2)(iv)(m)(4). To be 
t:a.bn into acccu..1i iir dernrmirJ.ng capital account., as rh.e result. of a dimibution to a ~ember in 
c?mp/ere liquidation of the mern.ber' s Sherin3 Rn.tio [n ~be LLC,. the· omount of fl.lch a:i.j11st.,1e.nt to 
c:apical accouots ~hall be trea-i:ed as an iren-r of gain (iftf;~ adjusmJc."lt increases the f?e.sb of the asse,) 
or !as~ Of the aiijusfi1?eilr inc{~ses the basis ·of the 13,:et) ar t.~e !oss (if the adjus-.ment dcc;r$.t!,es s-.ich 
basis) an.d sc.ch gain· or lqss sha.l! bi! 9pecia!Jy a.l.loc.1t-~d tq the member in· accor-daJJc~ i,;.it.'l their 
Sha.ring.R.atios in theLLCin the e'tcnt th.at Re~arioDl Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(rn)(2) a.pplies, or 
to the mernb'e: .to whom such ·aisnibi..iion was made in the evenr that Regulations Section 1. 704-
J (b)(2)(iv)Cm)(4) appliei. · 
12.2 .J:=µr;itive Allos2tigog. The-allocations s~t forth i.n Scctio:r. s12.l.1 rJiroug~ 12.,i. 7 
hereof (t,b.s ''Regulatcr-1 .t\Jlocationl') arc interid~d to comply wirh certain :requirements. of the 
R::.guiacio.11s. lt_i5 ~be imenr of the member3 tha.t, to the e:ae.nt poMible, all Reg1.1farnry .Alloc.a.dons 
shall be offset eitber with pi.ber R:'._gu[arory r'illcct1icms or with special allc·~::11io,11S or cnhcr items of 
company income,. grun, loss or.deduci:ion pLJnuant to tbfa Section 12.2.. ~crefore, oortVithsta.1,dlng 
any ocher provi..9inn of this Arcicle 12 (other th.an the Rcgulatoq f..llccacion.s), the members shaJI 
make s~~h offsetting special aJJo...-::iriom 6fLLC income, gain., losa or dcducrion in wbareve:rmiUiller 
chcy detcrr..ir,e approprint~ so -chat, a.4.9r such off~ettirig <).l]oC4tjoo,1 arc ma~e, eacl:\ members' capital 
n.ccoum fa, to tlic e-;i..'t<!!flt posstbJe, equal to th~ ca.piWI account ,such member would have ha.cl if the 
Re_rnila.iory Al(ocarions were not pa.,-:c of this O µera ting Agre em em epd al! LLC it~ms were alloc,U::!d 
ourouBJJt to Article 6. Jn exercis::11£; d.iscrct:i.on under th.is Section 12.2, the m~tnbcrs shall take inrn 
~ccounr fiiti..lfe R.eg,.iJatory rJJ.oca.~ions under Secrion l 2. J. 1 and J 2. l .2 tha,, alchougb nr;rt y£t made, 
arc li.k:eiy to off~ct other Re~letor,1 A.l/oc~,ians pr::\i01.;.sly mad~ under Sectic-~s· 12. J .5 a . .id I 2.1.6. 
12.3 Otl1.~r /\llocalfon RTJ!~s. 
l :u .1 Fo, purposes of dcte~ng th~ prnfri;,, lo33cs, or any or.her iter::is sJJoc.wJe 
t/J./!.11:f period, pr:o.fits, Jo.~se.s, :1.1d :t.'ly such other i~ems sh11!1 be ~c::rini.ned_on e. d.2:ily, monthly, or 
other ba.~js, as determined by ~le mcmbc:rs t1sing a.:iy pe·rm.i;sible method under Code Sadori 706 
a.11d die Regu.la.tioiis t;hereun~er. · · · · 
I 2.J .2 The mer:nb(!rn a.re a.wcrn of the iJJcome 'ta;< c9nsequence.s of the aJlocatio ns 
m-'.d e by Article 6 and this .A..nicle 12 ::md ,\~eby n.gre-e to be hn1J.r.d by the provisions of Artide 6 a.!:!d 
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... _ ... 
• • 
: 1.2.3.3 Solely for pllrposes or dct:m-Jn:ing a. mer;:b~r's pr::::portior..ate share cfrli.e 
"e:cces~ non.r.::::ourse'!iabilitie,:/' oft=1eLLC within the meaning ofR,egulatioGs Semo.f.11. 75~-J(a).(J ), . 
the r;,ernber'~ L1ccre..:Hs i.n LLC pmfr,s shcill be in propcrJcri to their- Sharing RB-ios. 
12.J.4 To the e;qe:n: per.mlttc:d by Section l.704-.Z{h)(3) of tbe J<.egulation~, fhe. 
· me;nbers sball endeavor·ro··t._-eat di~tribudon~ of ne; ca3r. from. eperatior.s er net cash from saJes. cc. ., 
net G,1.Sh from re.financing .as havfug peen mil.de .from the proceeds of a Nonrecourse Li.~bility' or a 
M~mbcr Ncnrecaur;;e Debt a.illy ro tI1e e;.::r.em tha, such distributio.ns would cause .er: i:nc:-easc an 
}.r.lj1J~1:ed Deficit for fl.'J)' member . 
. .ADOPTED 2f:fc.:ctive as of tbe (f~d.e.y o.fJanu~ryi 2001, by t.i~e·undc:--,ign~d, con.sricuting ,?..]J the r;;e::'J"lber:; of the LLC: · 
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AMEND-ED AND REST;,\TEC I 
t\RTJCLES OF ORGANJZAT]ON 
LJMJTED LIABILITY COMPANY 
(Instructions on back of application) 
O 3 SEP I 2 PM 3: 33 
SECRET1~HY OF STATE 
STATE OF IDAHB 
'1. The name of the limited liability company is: Real Homes, L.L.C. 
2. lfhe date the articles of organization were fiied was: ---Jam.,1-;;Jah-"'-'fY--J...l o .... ..-, -'2,J.,;o~o"'-1 ____ _ 
The Articles of Organ!zation are amended and restated to read: 
3. The name of the limited liability company is: ____ .L,RJ;;.eJ.La JL_.LH!.1..!'owmec..s.L..-, ..J..!~ ..1...L......:f.l.,._, ~------
4. The latest date certain upon which the limited liability company will dissolve is: 
'January 1, 2011 
. . 
6. The management of the limited liabilit; corT,y,,: 
0 lvlanager(s) 
7. The name and address of at least i manager or member: 
Name: Address: 
Dennis J. Sallaz. 1000 S. Roosevelt Boiae, Idaho ·t'.)101.-s' 
8. Signature of at least one manager, if any, or at least one member. 
Sign~ture ---------
Typ~d Name Dennis J. Sa 11 az 
Secretary al State use only 
I~ ~AAY Cf STATE 
89/12/2003 05:00 
CX: ~ CT: -422H B«: 711m 
1 @ 33. 8e ~ 38, 00 AAACU.C I 2 






S.-\.LU.Z & GATEWOOD U.W e 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
NOTE AMOUNT: $10,800 
~ OOJ 
Boise. Idaho 
Dote: 06/ l 0/05 
I PROMISE TO PAY to the order of ROY RICE, of Boise, Idaho, TEN THOUSAND 
EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS AND N0/100 DOLLARS ($ 10.800.00) payable in lawful 
money of the United States of America, with interest thereon from and ofter June 
10, 2005. until paid, at the rote of TWELVE PERCENT per annum/ l 2%). Principal and 
interest ARE DUE ON DEMAND. 
If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note, I agree to pay such 
sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees. The maker and endorser hereon 
jointly and severally waive presentment for payment. demand. protest and notice 
of protest of non-payment of this note. 






vq1\101;:uuf.i 16:J2 FAX 208 e126J 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD L\' 
PROr111SSORY NOTE 




Date: 09 /2 l /05 
I PROMISE TO PAY to the order of ROY RICE, at Boise, ldoho, TEN THOUSAND 
DOLLARS AND NO/ l 00 DOLLARS{$ l 0,00.00) payable in lawful money of the United 
States of America, with interest thereon from and ofter September 2 J. 2005, until 
paid. at the rote of TWELVE PERCENT per annum {12%). Principal and interest ARE 
DUE ON DEMAND. 
If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note. I agree to pay such 
sums as the Court may affix as attorney's fees. The mc·~er and endorser hereon 
jointly and severally waive presentment for payment. demancl, protest and notice 
of protest of non-payment of this note. 
Doted this 2 J sl doy of September, 2005. 
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BILL OF SALE 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That, DENNIS], SALLAZ, the Party of the First Part, the Seller, for and in consideration of 
the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00), legal mon1:y of the United States of 
America, ro rum in hand paid by ROY RICE, the Party of the Second Parr, as Buyer, the receipt 
whereof is hereby acknowledged, does by these presents grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said 
Pany of the Second Part, the Buyer, his successors and assigns, a]J right, title and interest to the 
following vehicJes/trai)ers, more particularly described below, free and c)e ar of all liens and 
encumbrances, to-wir: 
2002 Yamaha G1izzly 660 A TV, VIN No. 1Y4AM02Y22CD22268; 
1998 Yamaha Grizzly 600 A TV, VIN No. JY 4AJO 1 W AO 110 I 6; 
Tandem Axle 4 Place A TV Trailer 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same unto the said Pany of the Second Part, its successors 
and assigns forever. And does for himself, his heirs, successors and assigns covenant and agree, to and 
with the said Party of the Sec;nd Pa11, its successors and assigns, to warra11t and defend the sale of 
said property, goods and chatrels, hereby made unro the Party of the SeconJ Part, its successors and 
assigns, against ail and every person and persons whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Party of the First Part has hereunto ·;et his hand and seal this 
5th day of May, 2005, at Boise, Idaho. 

















IN THE DISTRICT COORT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MAGISTR~TE DIVISION 




DENNIS J. SALLAZ, 
Defendant. 
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-POSITION OF DEN1'l"1S SP:.LLAZ Condc:nseit"" 
JUNE 15, 2005 
Page 470 I hge d68 
C. Do you '.){ant :o --
A )kay. Debra, whar page ;::; thm? 
J Q I'm just referring to your exhibit. ff you could 
4 identify what items you have sold. 
5 A Sure. 
6 
7 
MR. DEVIS: she's asking about the four wheelers. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
8 MR. BEVIS: r don't know that I've got --
9 
10 
nm WITNESS: okay. Just the two Grizzlies, if you 
found them on your copy. I haven't found that them yet. 
11 
12 
MS. EISMANN: That is number 66 and 67. 
MR. BEVIS: on the left-hand side. 
13 TIIB WITNESS: Yes. 
14 BY MS. EISMANN: 
15 Q Okay. So, those two were sold? 
16 A Those two and the trailer that they are sitting on. 
17 Q You have listed two ATV trailers in Item 68. 
18. A Yes. 
19 Q And so one of the two are sold? 
20 A Yes. It's the one that holds four machines. One 
21. holds two machines and one holds four machines. The 
22 Grizzlies were on the one that holds four machines. 
23 Q And you stated in your description that you own 
24 them 50/50 with Darrel!? 
25 A I do ·· did. 
Page 469 
Q So, did he receive a portion? 
2 A No. He consented to the sale. 
J Q He basicaI1y relinquished his interest in it for 
4 you to sell it? 
5 A I still owe him half a trailer, but he agreed that 
6 1 could sell them. 
7 Q Okay. So, you sold trailer and the two ATY's -· 
A Yes. 
Q -- for those Items 66 and 67? 
A Yes. 
Q You valt.:c at 4,00G Liar,? 
2 A Yes. 't communi y asset. 
3 Q And you have characte.riz.c:d it as a 
4 A Y~ · 
· · -yainaha Griz.zl.y, you 
5 Q And you ·· and item 67, a I999 . , t t? 
01 ty in eres . 
6 valued at 2,500 dollars. That's a co11u1itl 
7 A Yes. 
have stated the 
8 Q And one of the ATV tailers -- you 
9 one that carries four ATV's7 
JO A Yes. 
11 Q That you sold? 
12 
13 
A With the Grizzlies. . te t . ed your 1n res 
Q Okay. Now -- and you charact.er1Z 
14 in the trailer as cmrunµnity7 
15 
16 
A As 50 percent. As community. h 
t ailer w en you 
Q So, the value is -- you valued the r 
17 sold it at what figure? 500 't 
A Well, I had both of them at my half at, t,hBUT75
1 18 
. ,,age 1or e . 
19 was just a package sale. Here is the pac" 
20 There is no breakdown. d ak: di you m ·e your 
21 Q And when did you do that? W11e!l 
22 sale to Roy Rice? t t 
23 A It was the same day that I delivered the p~yidnen °th 
.-v to pm own e 
24 you, would probably be the best way to t,.1 ·· 
25 exact day, because I brought it. 
Page 471 
MR. BEVIS: was mean --
2 THE WITNESS: I brought it straight up here. ki , h' 
. st Joo ng ,or 1s 
3 MS. E!SMA.t"\IN; And that's okay. I'm JU 
4 recollection. 







BY MS. EISMA}/N: __ May l 5th. 
Q So, you're thinking probably May of 
A April or May. 
Q April or May of 20057 
A Yes. 'd 
0u sa1 you 






Q For 7,500 do/Jars? 
A Yes. 
d part rom a . . 
12 paid in two checks, one from Roy Rice an 1 b 1 Id-a may es 1ou 
! J Q To Roy Rjce? 1 J Evans loan. That's what my notes reflect, 5 · 
14 A Yes. 14 clarify. h 
· k r 'd - f i.: b'll r:~oJTl eac 15 Q And we delivered the money to your attorney? 15 A I tlun , pill )0 perc.:nt o rns 1 ' 
16 A ldid. 16 
11 Q Was ·that by your own check or a cbeck from Mr. J 7 
18 Rice? 18 
source. e payment to 
Q I see. And you're referring to the saIY1 
Mr. Bevis? 
A Yes. . ? 
. I3ev1s. 
19 A I believe l had to make it out payable directly to 19 
20 Jim is my recollection. 20 Q And what amount did you pay Jvfr. 
21 1vm.. BEVIS: r don't know. I didn't receive those. 21 A It would have been probably 15,000 even. t M 
f..Tv' o u. 
22 BY MS. EISMANN: 22 Q And that was paid from the sale of the 
23 Q So, you had listed item 66 on Exhibit 201, a 2002 23 Rice? 
24 to Yamaha Grizzly? 24 A Half. 
25 A Yes. 25 Q Half of the 7,500 dollars? 


















$3.50 Fee* NOTICE OF RELEASE OF LIABILITY $3.50 Fee* 
JJ>LE.-\.SE PJUt"iT CLEARLY - ALL rNFOIU[AT!ON MUST BE COMPLETE - NOTfFICATTON BY SELLER/TRANSFEROR IS MAN"DATORY 
'lr Hull fdcmific;iL.ion Numbl!r (VJN or HIN) Y(.:1 r M:th.: Body S1yk Title Numbr.r 
1GBKP37WSK3302440 1989 WINN MH 98909668 
·'s/Iransferor's Full Legal Name(s): Dnycime Phone: 
"'S [d:iho Drivers License Number(s) or Social Security Number(sj: 
.!S : City: Seate: ___ Zip 
l! Ci!r: Selling Price: $ Dare Deli·,ered [O Pure hnser/TrJ ns feree: 
::ise r 'srf ra nsferee's Full Legal Name(sl & [daho Driver's License Number(s): 
;s: Cicv State: Zip: Daytime Phone: 
'¢ hcr.:by 11::qucsr chat the ftbho Tran.,;ponJcion D(!parrmenl mark it,:; records ,a lndic:ire 1h,11 the vchidi: ,1r ·:e:sxcl dtscribcJ Jbove h:.1,; b..:cn 1r:rnsiarcc1. Howc•,cr. 0r/we und!!rso nd t.hat th(. d1k rc:cord 
will rcm:.iin in :n'j/Our nami:(.> .l uncil J new fJallo C.:n ifl.:::111! 1,f Tiili: is lppli,cJ (or :Ind is."iucd, record ing ill, n.im.:1_·;1 \)f 1h<: n,w ,1wn.:rf.'i) . 
X---------------------'l""'--',cv'..+-++-il ·1 e-·=;- j_l . 
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PURCHASE AGRJEJEMENT fO.lR SALJE OF 
INTEJREST IN JRJEAL HOMES, LLC 
@006 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 6th day of January, 2006, by and between 
GLENN TREFREN and DENNIS J. SALLAZ, SELLER, and REAL PROP.ERTJES, LLC, BuYER. 
WIT NE S S ETH: 
WHEREAS, Sel.lers each· hold 100 % ownership interest in Real Homes LLC, which is: all of 
the ownership irnte:rest therein, an LLC formed and recorded with the Idaho Secretary of State on 
January 19, 2001, and 
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties hereto that Sellers shalJ sell to the Buyer all of 
said. Ownership Interest and aH right, title and interest: in and to all real property owned by Real Homes, 
LLC ~s set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements herein 
contained, 
IT JS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties as follows: 
1. -Sellers hereby agre1:s to sell to Buyer and Buyer hereby agrees to purchase from the 
Sellers, aU of said Ownership Interest owned by Sellers,. being all of the Ov.nersbip interest thereof: 
subject to the terms and conditions herein set forth_ 
2. It is understood and agreed that the total purchase pcice for said Ownership lnterest 
shall be the sum of Two Hundred fifty Thousand and no/100 DollaJs (.$250,000), lawful money of the 
United States of America,-to be paid by the Buyer to the Sellcr-s as follows~ 
(a} Buyer shall assume all recorded encumbrances against all real properties owned by 
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Real Homes, LLC; including, but not limited to, D. L. Evan:; Bank, Perry Harding, 
CPA, and Canyon County property taxes and Buyer shall hold Se!lers hannless 
therefrom. 
(b) Said encumbrances include that certain Note and Deed of Trust held by Saxton Fruit 
Farms dated 02/13/2001 which is in default and set for foreclosure sale on January 6, 
2006, and Buyer agrees to pay same in full prior to sale. 
(c) The balance of said purchase price after payment of the title encumbrances shall then 
be paid by Buyer to Sellers in two equal cash shares from th!.! net proceeds from sales, 
foco.me or other disposition of any or all of the said real properties herein. Tn any event 
said payment shall be mcide no later than 24 m·onths from the: date hereof 
(d) Provided, however, that Buyer agrees to give Seller Dennis J'. Sallaz an advance of 
$5,000.00 as a partial payment on his Attorney fees due to Jim Bevis prior ro April 10, 
2006. 
3. Sellers represent, warrant and agree with the Buyer as follows: 
(a) TI1at the Ownership Interest which is being sold herein cons1itutes I 00% of rhe 
Ownership of Real Homes, LLC; 
(b) The Sellers have good and marketable title to s«id Ownership Interest being sold and 
transferred hereunder with absolute right to sell, assign and transfer same to Buyer free 
and clear of all liens, pledges, security interests or encumbrances and without any 
breach of any agreement to which he is a party. 
(c) The Sellers covenant that all real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC and being 
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transferred herein are free and clear of all encumbrances not listed herein. 
(d) Real Homes, (LC has free and clear title to said real properties and Sellers shall 
execute any and all documents requested by Buyer to transfer a!J interest therein to 
Buyer. 
4. Time is agreed to be of the essence of this Agreement and the performance thereof 
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors> 
administrators, personal representatives and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have hereunto ~~t thcfr hands the day and year in 
this Agreement :first above written. 




By Glerm Trefren,Co-ner 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC, P. 3 
001186
10·4/:\/2006 16'" FAX 208 J.'.l6 12SJ 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD U.lV 
X 
PC 3 6773 
K:rltl.bi t: • J\. 
A portion o-f th• BO\l~at Oua:t<ttir o! th& .l'lorthHIJlt Qu,a.rtar oE 
Soation 17, TO'Wnahlp 3 No:z:-th. Jl.angn 3 Wa.ot of th.el Do!aa M•rldilf.tl, 
c~ County, :tdcilio 1111d i.ir ::mo::n patiau.la.rly di!locri.b~ 1,31 1!0'1.l~ 1 
~n:,,o at tho Nortlnnu•t ccxn-c:r ol a-11.id SoutlnroAt o,»..rter of ~ 
Northc.:iwt ~,.,r; t:hmru::• 
South o· JS' .Ii"' lfeat a1ong t.ba 'iit'oot b<::rt,.uul;t.xy of #aid Southwel'Jt 
Qu2U:tei:- of !:ha Nort::haurt Qu;u:to::r: a d:ln:t..no• o:f 1,i5 .1.$ ta>'lt1 t.b.anm, 
llort;l!. e.9• {5' 51" Rast paralld tdth thll North hou:nd.ary ot the 
:northea•t Qwt:.ttm~ ot. sdd BooU.cu 17 a di.i,tllncff of. 40.00 f<)6t ta 
th!!lt nmc ro:or.r OJ! DB'~, th.xwa oonti..Ixttl.ng 
lforth a1• ·B • 5P B:,ul.; pllr.&J.1al with. itoid North boundary a 
d.uat::a.na-c o.f .'.B:9... 00 !-:11ot~ th~a 
South o• 35 • 1-P W~at pa..ro.116). with t.h4 W••t hound.,uy of .said 
Souttn.Mat Qu;a.rt,e,r 0£ 1:11.t N"o:rthoaat Qu.a.rtar .w. d.!ata.ndio 0£ 180 .. Ob 
£~~t1 thkllo~ · 
(It")tt.th O!)• "5' 5.1" i1Mt pll.rallt,l Y:ith tho No;th boundary o:f ,'!lttid 
Hort.rul.ast ~t~:e a. diJSt.atl.orai of l.f.9. DO ta•tr t.hu,nce 
}forth a· 35' 14'" KJ1111t :P,1\-r-t.llGl With tho -Wtt11t boundary of said 
Sout.h..,.at Qun..rta:t- of the Nort.hoa,,t Qullrt4l:" a d:lgt.ance of 180.0() 
fe., t: to· thia ttUE romr o~ ro«JnmDro. 
A· po:t"tic,n of t.h4. Southveat Qua.rt-a:c of th~ Nox-tlum.1.1t QUarter of 
Section 17, '.l.'c,limnh.lp 3 North. Rx.:ug• J Wo~t of th~ Boiu~ M~~!d.:!.tll, 
C.ur'.fVll Couta ty, Tela.ho &ml. i11 JI\O:r:e piu-tlculn.:r; ly duuorihed ~18 follow;tJ 1 
COMKl:NC:tNC at tho N'ortlr'.ffl.at cornar 0£ b4ld Sout.ln<nttt Qu.aJ:-ter of the 
Horth•ut QoJlxtDr/ thmoo · 
South o• JS' H,.. W,o.st along tho South bound.uy of o;,.id 
Ek,U tlnn:u• t Qu.ocrt a.r o t thb N'or t.ruJ lfl..& I;: Quart ar .a di.a t ;1.na • of ·H 5 . :l. 5 
.f-a•t.s th«QQQ 
:!1-:>r~ s.r~4s~ 51• :K.t..:st parallel vlth t1uJ North oom:tdiu;y--ef the 
liort:lusaS1t Qua.rto-X" of s.1dd S(K)tion 17 11. diot.anca of .28.9 .QO t,.rnt to 
tha '.nunr ro:nn OF' mro:rmrnro, theno0 oont.Lnu.i.ng 
North 99• -i5~ 51" .}!~;tt pn.ralld vlth .uid No:i:-th bou:adnry a 
distance of -i.-l9. 9.S :foot to I'\ poilll: on tho cruitarl!nQ of the Bt.u;ri11 
~1f thatJ.dG 
Bo'Qth 45• 39, -u• W••t a.long 1:udd a«ntorlina • di!Jtlln.c:.1111 of 
158.t,~ !oot1 thlllll.lJ• laa-ving add 04!ntedi.tt6 11.lld ~IU"ing 
B0t1tll e~· ,t5 • 5J." Wut parallel v.it.h tb• North boa:Qda:t-y of .mi:1.id 
U'o'rth6llnt Quartar a. di..l'ltanc:e of .266, 8J .taat1 t::.hano• 
North o• J 5' 14 • X1t•t: ~a:.e•ll•l 'V:lth thn Wer.t: bo,~ ot: oudd 
Sauthw••t Quart.ar of th• >torth1u111 t Qu.4.rter ll d.int-.nc• of 1 BO. 00 
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A portion ot t.b:ll S01:.tl:nn11t Qwu-b:t" o.e t.bA liorthMJJt C)..t;u-t:ilr o:f; 
.Soct.ion. 17, TOWU.iihJ.p 3 North, b.ngl) 3 !tl'i&at: of t:hs Ilo!:,o }forld.ia.n, 
Cltnyon County, Id:t.ha and 111 no:r:s P:t:t"-tltJU.1&.rl? ddacrib.acl ~ follCAl'c r 
~l:lKJ ar: th!'! )lort:ln.rllll.xt OOl':D<U" of a:aid B0uthw(..,1t Quuter of the North.1'1ut Qu.u:tsx-1 thonco 
South o• 3S' 14.• Weat •long thn lr4irl: boondu:y of .;tld 9ou~et 
Qwr.rt•r ot l:he ~orth~•t Q'ca.rt111r a d.htll1lo$ o:f 7-iS .15 :Cut, t.hitriito 
~orth 8 .r 4 llJ ' 31 • rt.-u t Pttallllll 1d t0l the Jfartb. bcn:ndu-y o ! th.ti 
lrorthiaa,.t2 Ouut•r o:! ».td--Baotion 1'1 .a. dimt..t.no11 lll "(L Oli !i,H:1 th.no•, . 
80\Lt.h o· .35 1 1-l" WHt p11.:rl'llbl vi.th th, WHt b~~ ot 41111..l<{ 
8out:.m,ut Quut~r ot U.,. lfQrth..u.mt:. Qwul: .. l;" 1111. d!ltlll.o• ot! 110, 00 f•ec to ths ~ PODrT or :arcr,n:nwnra, tbAru:,91 
N'o:r:l:.h e g• -4 :S' 31 • ~.11 t .PU'tll<Sl lfi th t1u. nm: th .bound.try o.t 1J1.:aid 
Nort.hi,aait Owut•:t: at. d:h,unora ot 1S:i .50 f,ut, t.h.tna• 
South o• 35' 1·'.P' Wut p.:a:rallal v-ith t1l.4 W!ll.ot bouadn.ry ot a.tid 
Bou~•t Qwttt,u: o! t.h4,i N'orthu:1.at Qu.uta:z: a di.-ta.n.ci. of 302. IJO flt-4ttJ tlumo,a 
Bou.t.h 8.'r 3.9' JS .. 'lif•st p.a.r,tlhl 'lr.{t.h t:Ji. South.~ o~u'd 
SouthY•ct·Quartor of th• Northoa•t Qu.u:tmr 11. d.L•b.nao ot 1SJ.5D .t~nt:.1 thlJUlOe 
N'ol';'th o• 35' 1·P Rn.at par.aJ.lal with. thse "llerst bounda.:cy of •ai.d. 
Sout.hw,a,rt Qaart~r of th• 2lortheai'Jt ~tu: a d.ist4nce of. 303. 09 t ,..._. t: to tltQ 'I'RUR POINT Ol' Blt£1nm:rNo. 
Jl portion of th• Sou~at Qu.1..rt:,u.· o-! th... N'orthea2l Qrntrt~r ol! 
l1•ot.ion 1T, Tmn::utlt.ip 3 ~orth. ~ 3 N4ut of th• DQian X~r.i.d!~, 
catt.yon Cm:m.ty, Id.u:i.o and in mer-a p.;t~tiau.larly &1,c:::rl.b~ •.s :follOW1f: 
~c:nro ~t th-n Nortlr.h,r.st: caux.i,r of 111aid Sout:Jnreut QtLu-ter ot tru\ 
Nor t:hfll1'.2 t Qt:a:i:-t t,.r 1 ~<:• 
South o· 35' 14."" lh11t atlong tma W..nt hou:ruh:ry ol a.aid Sonl::..briust 
~tor of t.hAI .Ncrt..rua.aat Onartn"T: a d.isb:o.,;,,. o;t 7-45 .1S t'6t1tJ th!Aind41 
lkn-th a,• ,C 5 ' 51 • :b.a t pa.l;itlhl with. trus North b¢tmduy of. t:ho 
lfort:.ho.li!.t QWt:rr: .. r of .1t1,d.d .'JactJ.cu 17 11. di11ta.noo ot to. 00 £•mt; th.c:me11 
Bou th o • 3 5 • 1 i. " W -a 11Z t putt.11 a 1 w:I. th l::lur Wu t b-Ouo.da.ry of 11:xi d 
Sout:h-,.:.,.vt Qo.a..rt..r o:f tM .No.r:th,a,1L1t: Qn&...';tor a.. dli.t-Ul:.J~ of ::..no~ 0-0 
f41•t1 t.h4lnco 
North 119• {5' 51• ~t P<tt•ll~l with th~ North bow:uh.:cy of utld 
Nort:.h4a.st Qru:t.rteu:- a d.i.ubwoa of. 15.J,.50 f'IMt to ~ TRUE \'OI.ll':r OV 
ll~.nro, th•n<:a, oantinu.ing 
lTo-rth a.9· cts• 51• h:ct parallol with md.d lfo:rth .boun.d..uy llll 
d.i.•t:.ni.ca o: 363. :;,2 !Ctot to ..._ point on th• a~nt~rli.t:u1 of th.a Bu.r.r:ilJ 
Can.t.l 1 thmtc:lt 
South 45• 39 • -i a• W<11t1t d01'.l:9 u..id ce:ntttrlbu1 a diaita.nco ot .. -. _ 
43~.9~ !e•t; ~o 
Bouth 119• 39, 25• Wnut ;p4ra.11.•l rlt:h th• Bouth bat.m.d..a:ry o:f •<1id 
80Qth'IM#t: ~tl);r of t:.h.a lrorthfta.at Qu.ttt~ a d!ttti;i.nd• ol 55. 35 :i!•ot:1 th4i:ncri, 
?lo~th. o• 3S• 14"' Ra.ot: p.a.i-,dlal wit::.h th• 1',ooit .bound.ry of •a.id 
Sou~,iist Qu.iu:t:&r of th,ci Northoaat Qlu.rtor 11.. d.iota.nu411 o! JO:l. eo 
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EXHIBIT A 
This parcel is a portion of Lot 14 o{W£STVIEW SUBDIVISION, Canyon County, lclal10
1 
according to the offidal plat thereof, filed in Book 4 of Plats at Page 31, records of said County and 
situated in the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
21, Township 3 North, Range 2 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more 
particularly describe:d as follows:· 
COMMENCING at the Sou th west corner of said Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quaner; thence 
South 89°45' 35n East along the South boundary of said Sourheast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of rbe Northwest Quarter a distance of 396.00 feet thence 
North 00° 02' Jl '' East pa railer wirh lhe West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the North~·est Quarter a distance ofJ0.00 ro the TRUE POlNT OF 
BBGJNNING; thence continuing 
North 00° 02' .31" East parallel with rhe West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Sourhwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarrer a distnnce of254.JO feet; th enc,: 
South 89° 45i 35·• East parallel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of rhe Northwest Quarter a distance of 120,00 feer; thence 
South 00° 02' 31" West para lie) with the West boundary ofs:tid Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwesr Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 254.10 feet; thence 
Noni: 89b45' 3.5" \.Vest parallel with the South boundary of S,li<l Southeast Quarter of the 
Sou thwesr Q uarte:- of the Northwest Quu rf er~ distance of 120.00 feer to the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNTNG. 
This parcel is .subject to :incl includes the use ofa 32.00 foot wide ingress-egress and utiriry 
easement more particuJarly des'°ribed as follows: 
COMMENCING ar rhe Southwest corner of said Southeast Quarter o:· the Soutbwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter; thence 
South 89° '15' 35'" East along the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of rhe 
Southwes1 Quaner of the Norrhwesr Quarter a distance of -184.00 feer; thence 
l\'orth OOQ 02' 31" Easr parallel wirh the West boundary of saicJ Southeast Quarter of the 
Soutlnvesr Quarter of the Norrhwest Quarter a distance ofJ0.00 feet ro rhe TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING; thence 
Norrh 00° 02' 31" East parallel.with the West boundary of said Southeast QtJarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter :1 distance of2S4.IO feet; thenc<· 
Sourh 89° 4:5' 35" East parallel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 32.00 fret; thence 
South 00° 02 • J l'' \Vest parallel with the West boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 254.10 feet; thencl' 
Noi-th 89° 45' J5" West parallel with the South boundary of said Southeast Quarter of the 
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IN THE DlSTRlCT COlJRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
RENEE L. BAJRD-SALLAZ, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 











Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M 
F~1JINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA vV 
Aci'fD ORDER 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on four separate occasions over 
a nine month period. The dates of trial were November 15, 2005, through November 19, 2006; 
. April l 0, 2006, through April 14, 2006; July 17, 2006, through July 21, 2006; and July 27, 2006. 
A total of 16 days were utilized for the trial. There 1,,vere several hundred exhibits admitted into 
evidence - many consisting of a substantial number of pages. 
The Plaintiff vvas present during the trial and represented by Debra L. Eismann, Esq, of 
Nampa, Idaho. The Defendant was also present during trial and represented by James A. Bevis, 
Esq, of Boise, Idaho. There were many pretrial motions that were considered by the Court, as 
well as many motions and litigation issues during the period that this matter was tried. This 
matter 1,vas, at times, highly contentious and the parties and attorneys chalJenged the court's 
schedule for a long period of time. However, the Court wishes to note that both parties were 
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counsel and the parties were all required to exercise a great deal of patience and flexibility in 
order to allow both parties to have a full, fair and complete trial. 
In addition, the Court required an inordinate amount of time to complete the Findings and 
Conclusions below. As indicated in earlier correspondence, this was highly unusual for this 
Court. Part of the delay was due to the large volume of exhibits and the substar1tial time between 
trial days, which required more of the Court's time in reviewing evidence it heard as far back as 
November, 2005. Part of the delay was due to the other circumstances, schedule and demands of 
the Court's time and duties throughout the last year. Finally, part of the delay was due to 
circumstances and demands upon the Court on a personal level, which the Court understands is 
probably not a concern of either party. Regardless of tte causes of the delay, the Court wishes to 
sincerely compliment and thank the parties and their counsel for their patience. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Dennis and Renee were married on July 4, 1996. This action was filed on May 
27, 2004. The parties were divorced by this Court on July 28, 2005, with the issues of property 
and debt division remaining for trial. 
2. Long before the marriage, Dennis represented Steve Sumner and other entities in 
a lawsuit. He began work on this lawsuit in 1985 and was still acting as Sumner's attorney as 
late as August, 1999. In March, 1999, Dennis claimed that he was owed $377,393.60, plus 
interest for his fees and costs advanced and monies loaned to Sumner and his entities. The 
evidence established that as of August 5, 1999, he was owed $351,089.42. At that time, 
$269,204.60 of this \.Vas at ]east 120 days overdue .. There was no documentary evidence to 
establish how much of this was earned prior to July 4, 1996. The balance of $81,984.82 was 
current. 




Boise, Idaho. Dennis has been J licensed and practicing attorney in the State of Idaho since 
1965. On March 15, 2004, Dennis entered into a partnership which consisted of the law firm and 
Scott and Marjorie Gatewood. This resulted in the filing of an Election for Sma!l Business 
Corporation named "Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd.". This election states that Dennis and Renee 
have a 90% ownership and the Gatev,;oods have a 10% ownership in the law firm. 
4. Dennis terminated Renee's employment at the law firm on rvfay 11, 2004. 
5. Prior to the marriage, Dennis acquired a one half interest in real property located 
in Grandview, Idaho. 
6. Prior to the marriage, in 1969, Dennis organized and/or became the owner of a 
corporation known as National Financial Service, Inc. On May 11, 2004, Renee took $3,200.00 
from the account for th.is entity. 
7. Prior to the marriage, Dennis acquired a residence located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, 
Boise, Idaho. Dennis' law office is operated out of this location. There is a mortgage on this 
property in the amount of $272,032.67. The monthly payment on this amount is $2,241.93. 
Dennis also receives rent from the law office in the amount of $3,400.00 per month. Plaintiff has 
abandoned her claim for any improvements to this property during the marriage. 
8. Dennis also acquired 3 properties prior to the marriage in June of 1991 from 
Kendra Bertsch-Sallaz. These are located in Grandview, Smith's Ferry and Ada County, Idaho, 
and are identified in defendant's Exhibits 240, 241 and 242. 
9. There exists a retirement account with Putnam Investments. The client number 
for that account is 0336644339. The balance in that account according to the latest statement in 
evidence is $40,160.99. The account consists of eight (8) separate funds. Only three (3) of the 
separate funds were opened before the marriage. The documentation for these three funds shows 
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:cr..t::but:or.s pr;or to the :712~:c:.ge of $ 1 • '4.67, ~:, l ~0.: 5 and E: ,:95.90, fer .1 '.ot:,J of 
$8,510.92. 
10. Dennis' grandmother, Bessie Matcham, died on March 26, 2000. Prior to that, on 
or about March 20, 2000, Dennis deposited $184,969.37 from her estate into his trust account. 
Between March 20, 2000, and August 15, 2001, all of this money was disbursed to the heirs 
except for $5,625.25. 
11. Dennis did not file an application to be appointed personal representative of his 
grandmother's estate until October 12, 2000. He was appointed on October 19, 2000 .. 
I 2. Dennis prepared and filed an inventory for the estate. However, this inventory 
was not signed by him. Instead, it was signed by Dennis' sister, Chris Snyder. The inventory 
did not list any loans made to any third parties as assets and the value of the estate was placed at 
$103,767.44. 
13. Chris purchased Renee's jeep in April, 2001, for $22,500.00. She used part of the 
monies paid to her out of the estate. The money was deposited into the Real Homes checking 
account. 
14. On June 18, 2003, Dennis signed escrow instructions relating to his receipt of 
payment of a settlement in the Sumner case, along with a confidentiality agreement regarding the 
settlement. 
15. On August 13, 2003, Dennis opened an account for his grandmother's estate at 
D.L. Evans Bank (hereinafter "estate account"). This was approximately 3 years after her death 
and approximately 3 years after he was appointed the Personal Representative of her estate. He 
authorized, in addition to himself, his brother Daryl and his daughter as signatories on this 
account. He also directed all statements and correspondence to be sent to his daughter's address. 




16. C'.1 or ce:cs·e Aug1_2:::t 15, :co: l'ennis rec:::vec $ 1;3:2,C93.JO from the t:"JS~ 
account of Richard Harris. This money was from the settlement of the Sumner litigc1tion. 
However, the check received by Dennis was made payable to "Estate of Bessie B. Matcham" 
(Dennis deceased grandmother). Dennis did not tel1 Renee about this money. He did not deposit 
the check into the law finn trust account. Instead, on August 15, 2003, he deposited the check 
into the account associated with his grandmother's estate. 
17. Dennis received addi tiona1 monies from the Sumner settlement which he did not 
deposit into his trust account and did not tell Renee about at the time. These amounts were 
deposited as follows: $2,000.00 (August 29, 2003), $5,000.00 (September 8, 2003) and 
$198,000.00 (July 13, 2005). 
18. The total received during the marriage by Denn.is from the Sumner settlement, 
was $387.098.00. 
19. Dennis signed Renee's name on a 2003 joint income tax return on October 4, 
2004. This return did not report the income he received from the Sumner case settlement. 
Although Dennis testified in his deposition that he advised Perry Harding, CPA about this and he 
said he 'rvould take care of it, Mr. Harding testified at trial that DeIIDis did not tell him about this 
money and he did not tel1 Dennis he would take care of it. 
20. In addition, Dennis spent a great deal of money from the estate account for 
personal living expenses following the deposit of the settlement monies. DeIIDis testified in his 
deposition that he began ·writing checks on the estate account for his personal use on October 8, 
2003. 
21. Dennis withdrew· $6,000.00 in cash from the estate checking account on August 
29, 2003 .. 
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Je:::1~s ·1,Tote fou:- 3e~ar2tc $40,0C0.\)0 cl!e·:k:: on the est;.ne accou:· · e,n ..:une 8, 
2004. They were payable to DarJl, Chris, Becky and Di.lrj - all relatives of Dennis. It does not 
appear from the terms of the will that Diani is entitled to receive any share of the residue of the 
Matcham estate. These checks were not endorsed and were all run through the bank at the same 
time. Then, they were converted into cashiers checks, which were never endorsed. 
23. On July 13, 2005, Dennis deposited a.11other $198,000.00 from the Sumner 
settlement into the estate checking account. On that same day, he wTote a check in the amount of 
$198,000.00 to D.L. Evans Bank ai1d had his brother Daryl sign the check. Four cashier's 
checks were purchased with this money, each in the amount of $49,500.00, payable to Daryl, 
Chris, Becky and Diani. As noted earlier, Diani is not entitled to receive any of the inheritan.ce 
under the terms of the will. None of the four cashier's checks were endorsed by the payees and 
all four were run through the bank at the same time. 
24. One of the 4 cashier's checks for $49,500.00 was re-deposited into the estate 
checking account on August 25, 2005. Like\.vise, another one of these checks was re-deposited 
into the estate account on October 28, 2005. 
r _). Dennis wrote a $500.00 check from the estate checking account to Tradesman, 
Inc. on August 25, 2005. 
26. Dennis 1,,vrnte another check from the estate account on August 3 1, 2005, in the 
amount of $'.25,807.00 for a closing on real property. This check was payable to Title One. 
27. In January, 2001, Real Homes, LLC was formed (hereinafter "Real Homes"). 
The Articles of Organization for this entity were filed with the Secretary of State on January 19, 
2001. Dennis is listed as the original registered agent and Renee is listed as the Manager. Both 
Parties signed the Articles. 
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- one by Renee and one by Dennis. 
29. The one provided by Renee is dated on its cover and on the signature page 
Januar; 19, 2001, and is signed by Renee only. The testimony established that Dennis prepared 
this document. Tri.is docwnent provides that Renee owns I 00% of the membership of the LLC 
and that it is governed by its members. The document also provides that no additional members 
can be admitted except with a unanimous vote of the members. It also requires a majority vote 
of the members regarding all detenninations, decisions, approvals and actions affecting the 
entity, as well as the business affairs of the LLC. Finally, this Operating Agreement specifically 
prohibit any amendments to the Agreement which change the number of votes or degree of 
consent required to approve or disapprove any matters that require a vote of consent and any 
amendments to provisions for allocations or distributions of profits, losses or cash. 
30. The one provided by Dennis is signed by Dennis and Glen Trefren. However, this 
document is not dated, either by vvay of a stated effective date in the agreement or on the 
signature page. Dennis and Glen Trefren are the stated members of the LLC, with a sharing ratio 
of 50% each. The document also states that both contributed an initial amount of $25,000.00. 
The evidence at trial established that Mr. Trefren did not make such a contribution. 
31. On February 11, 2002, the Annual report for Real Homes was filed with the Idaho 
Secretary of State. This report identifies Renee as the President of Real Homes. On February 
19, 2003, another Annual report was filed with the Secretary of State w'hich also identified Renee 
as the president. The Annual report filed February I 6, 2004, also identifies Renee as the 
president and secretary of real Homes. However, Dennis filed an annual report for Real Homes 
which listed he and Glen Trefren as manager-ovvners. He signed the articles as "co-owner". 
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Organization for Real Homes 1,-vith the Idaho Secretary of State. This document listed him as a 
member and he signed this document as "Owner". 
33. Renee opened a checking account for Real Homes on January 19, 2001. 
34. Renee, signing as President, applied for an Employer Identification Number for 
Real Homes on April 17, 2004. 
35. In January, 2001, Glen Trefren 1,,vas employed as a property "scout" for Real 
Homes, LLC. He was paid $300.00 to $400.00 per week. 
36. On February 15, 2001, Real Homes purchased 5 acres of property from Saxton 
Fruit Farms located on Riverside Blvd., in Caldwell, Idaho (hereinafter "Riverside Property"). A 
deed of trust was executed naming Saxton as beneficiary in the amount of $43,900.00. 
37. The Riverside Property was later divided into 4 lots: lA, lB, 2A and 2B. Renee 
provided a letter to Canyon County authorizing Glen Trefren and a realtor to appear on behalf of 
real Homes regarding the conditional use permit required to divide the this property into the four 
lots. 
38. Renee moved into the Riverside Properiy, Lot lB, in August or September of 
2003, when she moved out of the marital residence, and continues to reside there. 
39. On February l 0, 2004, Real Homes sold Lot l B of the Riverside Property to 
Dennis and Renee for $105,000. This property is also knovvTI as 155 84 Riverside, Caldvvell, 
Idaho. The deed from Real Homes was signed by Renee. This property was appraised on March 
30, 2005 and had a value of $152,000.00. The debt against this property is approximately 
$114,471.90, leaving a net value of $37,528.10. 
40. A.nother appraisal of the 155 84 Property was admitted into evidence in July, 2006. 
This report is dated July 18, 2006, and lists a value of $280,000.00. 
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+ l. On A~gust 16, .200 l, :=-rer:. ~~rc;~·en fonr.-:d bis JWTI LL2 named "Tradesm'"r: 
Contractors & Constrnction". Denn.is prepared the .Articles ofincorporation for him. 
42. On December 20, 2002, Dennis refinanced the property at 1000 S. Roosevelt. 
Some of the community credit card debt was paid off at this time. The total of all the various 
accounts paid was $73,014.85. Although Renee testified that only $17,762.64 of this amount 
should be subject to reimbursement because that amount related to personal credit cards, there 
vvas no evidence that the balance was not also spent on community debt. 
43. Renee entered into a contract with the Hennifers to purchase real property located 
at 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise, Idaho (hereinafter the "Henn.ifer Property"). Renee had been 
pasturing her horses there and the purpose was to acquire the property for the same. However, 
Dennis and Renee could not ultimately qualify for the loa,1. to purchase this property. In order to 
acquire and close on this property, they had to obtain a loan from Dennis' brother, Daryl. Renee 
testified that fol101,ving the closing, Daryl signed a quitclaim deed to them. However, no such 
quitclaim deed was admitted into evidence and there is no evidence of recording of the same. 
44. Daryl testified that he has no out-of-pocket investment in the Hennifer property. 
Renee and Dennis are the only ones who have any such investment. They incurred expenses 
associated with tbe clean-up and remodel of the house on the property. Dennis collects the rent 
and pays the underlying mortgage. He also personally pays any shortfall behveen the rent and 
mortgage. Daryl pays no taxes on this property. In addition, Daryl's testimony at trial regarding 
the arrangement he had with Dennis regarding this property is inconsistent with his testimony at 
his deposition and there is no documentation regarding this arrangement. 
45. On April I 7, 2002, the Buckinghams purchased a strip of property from the 
Hennifer Property for the purpose of enlarging their yard. Renee was listed on the contract as the 
se!ler and the$ l 4,750.00 proceeds from the sale were deposited into the Real Homes account. 




46. Cn th2t s2...rne date, the Campcells 1iso pirrcilased J st:ip of properry frnm the 
Hennifer property. Renee was listed as the seller on that contract and the $12,250.00 proceeds 
from that sale were deposited into the Real Homes account. 
47. The value of the 916 S. Roosevelt (Henn.ifer) property 1s approximately 
$180,000.00, with debt against it of approximately $115,000.00, leaving $65,000.00 in equity. 
48. On October 7, 1002, Real Homes purchased real property located on Smith 
Avenue in Nampa, Idaho (hereinafter "Smith Prope1iy"). There was no secured debt against the 
property at the time of purchase. 
49. Dennis prepared a deed of trnst and promissory note in the an1ount of $15,000.00 
to secure debt that he and Renee owed to Perry Harding, CPA. The note was signed by Renee as 
president of Real Homes, and she and Dennis signed individually. 
50. Dennis testified that he stopped payments to the Saxtons on the debt owed to them 
by Real Homes because he ran out of money. Thus, Real Homes was defaulted on April 15, 
2004, on the underlying deed of trnst. However, the balance in the Real Homes checking 
account as of April 1, 2004, was slightly over $70,000.00 and was almost $68,000.00 as of April 
30, 2004. 
51. $30,686.69 was transferred by Dennis on May 7, 2004, from the Real Homes 
account to pay off a line of credit with D.L. Evans Bank. On that same date, he transferred 
$35,665.94 from the account into a cashier's check. On May 18, 2004, $30,000.00 was 
deposited into the law firm trust account. The balance of$ 5,665.94 has not been accounted for 
by Dennis. 
52. Dennis closed the Real Homes checking account on June 2, 2004. 
53. Dennis tilled out and signed a business credit application for Real Homes v1ith 
D.L. Evans Bank on November 5, 2004. In that application, in which he acknowledged that his 




answe:-3 wee ,nth ... "'11 ci:::d accurate, he states ttat he is l ,jQ% owner. Or. ,\f c;e;:r;ber 3, 2004, he 
completed a financial statement with D.L. Evans regarding his personal guarantee on the loan to 
Real Homes. 
54. On November 15, 2004, Denrjs filled out and signed an Annual Report for the 
Secretary of State for Rea] Homes, vvherein he listed himself as owner-manager and signed as 
"owner". 
55. Also in the fall of 2004, Glen Trefren, through a bid submitted to Dennis, 
estimated the cost of construction work at the Smith Property at $30,950.00. 
56. Dennis signed a promissory note on behalf of Real Homes for $30,475.00 and on 
Fe.brnary 4, 2005, D.L. Evans Bank recorded a deed of trust against the Smith Property to secure 
this amount. 
57. The Saxtons proceeded with a Notice of Trustee's Sale on January 19, 2005, in 
order to foreclose against the Riverside property. The sale was scheduled for May 25, 2005. 
58. Later in February, 2005, Glen Trefren signed a quitclaim deed, as a purported 
member of Real Homes, LLC, granting all real property o\.vned by Real Homes to his LLC 
known as Tradesman, Inc. The deed also included Lot lB of the Riverside property which was 
ovvned by Dennis and Renee, not Real Homes. Dennis testified that he did not know about the 
quitclaim deed, but Mr. Trefren testiJied Dennis prepared it. 
59. There were several collection proceedings against Dennis and Renee in the spring 
of 2005, relating to Dennis' medical bills. It appears that these bills have been paid. 
60. Dennis sold 2 ATVs and a trailer to Roy Rice on May 5, 2005, for $7,500.00 to 
pay his attorney. 
61. On May 25, 2005, Glen Trefren filed a bankruptcy proceeding on behalf of Real 
Homes. He represented himself as an authorized agent. The Petition stated that the assets of 
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R::al I-Iomc; 12d a 1::iue )f LcJ.j)00.00 with oeci.:red c;:ed:.1crs tot::i.lir::g 599,_596.00. The ;etition 
did not list any unsecured creditors. This resulted in the cancelJation of the foreclosure sale by 
the Saxtons. 
62. Renee filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy upon the grounds that i'vlr. Trefren 
was not a member of Real Homes and had no authority to file such a proceeding. The 
bankruptcy court dismissed the proceedings on November 25, 2005. 
63. Glen Trefren then, on June 6, 2005, and on behalf of his LLC (Tradesman), 
recorded a $250,000.00 lien against all real property owned by Real Homes, and the residence 
owned by Dennis and Renee (Lot1B Riverside). 
64. lvir. Trefren recorded t\.,io amended claims of lien on July 22, 2005. One was . 
against the Riverside property, including Lot IB, for $250,000.00. The other was against the 
Smith Property for $35,000.00. 
65. Despite this matter having been pending for over a year before trial was 
completed, Mr. Trefren was unable to provide even a single document to support any of his liens. 
Further, these debts were not listed in the bankruptcy filings he made on behalf of Real Homes. 
In fact, he testified under oath, that his intent in recording the lien was to cloud the title on all the 
real property. 
66. Dennis testified that he turned over all but I 0% of his interest in the law firm 
named Sallaz and Gatewood. He testified that he turned over all his accounts receivable. 
However, there is no documentation regarding any of these facts and the Subchapter S Corporate 
documents from the year 2004 show him as a 90% owner. 
67. Theresa Pulliam, the accountant hired by Renee, valued the accounts receivable 
for Sallaz & Gatewood, as of July 28, 2005, to be$ I 30,744.00. Part of her valuation was based 
upon an accounts receivable aging summary provided by Dennis' law office as of 12:06 p.m. on 




October 25, 2005. That summary orJy lis~ed J accounts between 3 I and 60 days old, totali.ag 
$1,4 l 6. 17, and no other accounts older than 60 days. Tnat summary showed current accoW1ts 
receivable to be $247,689.79 and those between 1 and 30 days to be $9,672.63. 
68. Ms. Pullia.t'11 did not reduce the value of receivables based on taxes that would be 
paid upon receipt or for any payables due at the time. She did note that a reduction could be 
done in the amount of $4,650.00 for the payables and testified that the tax rate would be 25%. 
69. The accountant rured by Dennis, Perry Harding, reviewed Ms. Pulliam's opinion, 
did some independent review, and arrived at a lesser figure of $43,334.15. His valuation was 
based upon a "revised" accounts receivable aging summary, which showed only $15,952.12 as 
current, $27,167.92 from 1 to 30 days old, and the large figure of $179,883.53 as over 90 days 
old. These figures were arrived at after discussions between he and Dennis' office manager. 
70. Despite the figure of $15,952.12 as current, the firm was collecting in excess of 
$30,000.00. 
71. During the summer of 2001, Renee made arrangements through a friend who 
owned a Labrador stud to purchase a yellow puppy from Josh Edwards. 
72. On August 3, 2001, Dennis had semen extracted from his dog named "Vegas" for 
preservation of the bloodline. 
73. Renee picked up the puppy from tvfr. Edwards on October 27, 2001. Renee 
named the dog Smooch. 
74. During the early pendency of this matter, the Court entered an order providing an 
equal sharing of possession of Smooch. This was done because Renee would not allow Dennis 
to take the dog on an annual hunting trip for approximately a week. 
75. For the most part, equal sharing of possession of Smooch has worked fairly well. 
The only problem that has arisen since the initial order was last fall when Renee refused to 
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order allowing Dennis to have possession of the dog on specified dates. 
76. Renee filed this action on May 27, 2004. 
77. Renee's testified that her residence at the Riverside property was broken into on 
May 28 or 29, 2004, and again on July 27, 2004. On both occasions, the only area that was 
disturbed was the office. She testified that the items stolen were the hard drive from her 
computer, her file on Real Homes and the quitclaim deed from Daryl to Dennis and Renee 
regarding the Hennifer property. However, it does not appear that she actively engaged the 
authorities in investigating these incidents to learn who might have done it. 
78. Following the parties' separation, the receipt of the Sumner settlement monies, 
and the disbursement of those monies through the estate account, on January 13, 2004, Dennis 
rented a new safe deposit box at D.L. Evans Bank. While this matter was pending, the Court 
entered an order providing that both parties view and inspect this safe deposit box together to 
confirm and/or determine the contents therein. On July 20, 2005, at approximately 4:33 p.m., 
Dennis and Renee went to the bank and inspected the box. However, on that same day, at 
approximately 3:55 p.m., Dennis went to the bank and accessed the box. Dennis was not truthful 
about this visit about one half hour before he was to meet Renee and further testified that he was 
not carrying anything with him when he accessed the box. However, the surveillance video from 
the bank shows that Dennis was in fact carrying a briefcase when he went into and when he left 
the safe deposit box. \Vb.en the parties met and inspected the box 30 minutes later, there was 
nothing in the box except some silver dollars. 
79. On December 9, 2005, Dennis received written notice through his law office of an 
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale for January 16, 2006. Renee did not receive this notice. 
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Pursuant to the P....rticles of Organization, Dennis is shown to be the registered agent, Janet Rice 
(Roy Rice's wife) is shown to be the manager or member, and Millis Anderson (Denrjs' 
secretary) signed the Articles as a member. 
81. Two days later, on January 6, 2006, Dennis and Trefren entered into a contract 
entitled "Purchase Agreement for Sale of fnterest in Real Homes, LLC". Dennis and Trefren are 
identified as "seller" and Real Properties is identified as "buyer". Roy Rice signed for Real 
Properties as a man.ager. The contract recites that Dennis and Trefren own 100% of Real Homes 
and that they are selling all their ownership interest and all real property w-hich includes all 4 
parcels of the Riverside property (including Lot IB) and the Smith Prnperty to Real Properties 
for the sum of $250,000.00. Dennis and Trefren also warrant I 00% m,vnership of Real Homes 
and "good and marketable title free an clear of all leins, pledges, security interest or 
encumbrances and without any breach of any agreement to which he is a party". 
82. · Trefren recorded a quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, as sole owner, member and 
manager of Tradesman. This deed purported to convey Lots IA, 2A and 2B of the Riverside 
property from his LLC (Tradesman) to Real Properties. This deed was dated January 6, 2006. 
S3. Trefren recorded another quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, as co-owner, member 
and manager of Real Homes, LLC. This deed purported to convey the exact same property as in 
his deed from Tradesman, also to Real Properties. This deed was also dated January 6, 2006. 
84. Trefren recorded a third quitclaim deed on March 2, 2006, v,;hich was also dated 
January 6, 2006, as co-owner, member and manager of Real Homes. This deed purported to 
convey the Smith property from Real Homes to Real Properiies. 




I)_. Cn lvLr ~.1 5, 21X6, Dear.is assignd his ir:.,ere;:;t in :he ;Jrocee~s of the Januar; 6, 
~ ' , 
2006, contract to his counsel in this divorce proceeding by preparing and signing 'vVTitten 
assignment of that purchase and sale agreement. 
86. Neither the JanLary 6, 2006, Purchase and Sale Agreement or the March 6, 2006, 
Assignment thereof were disclosed to Renee or her counsel until April 10, 2006 ( during trial). 
87. The parties acquired a 1989 Chieftan Motorhome during the marriage which is 
worth between $15,000.00 and $16,000.00. The parties do not dispute that this item may be 
awarded to Dennis. It does appear that this item was acquired with funds from a refinance on the 
1000 S. Roosevelt property in the a...111ount of $17,107.00. 
83. Dennis possesses a 1982 Rolls Royce automobile. Renee claims this vvas 
purchased during the man-iage and Dennis claims it is his separate property. The value is 
disputed with Renee claiming it is worth $28,000.00 and Dennis claiming it 1s worth only 
$5,500. The documents pertaining to this vehicle are found in Exhibits 70 and 372. 
89. There exists a 1980 Porsche, the character of vVhich the parties dispute. Renee 
claims it is her separate property, but there is no supporting documentation for this claim. The 
value of this item is $5,500.00. 
90. Dennis acquired a 1954 Cadillac automobile long before the marriage. Renee 
claims that community funds in the amount of $1,750.00 were expended on this vehicle. 
91. Comparing Plaintiffs Exhibit I and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no dispute 
regarding either the character or assignment regarding the following items of property: 12, 14, 
15, 16, 22, 28, 29, 30A, 30B, 31, 32, 44, 44(a), 45, 48.1, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 69, 
69.3, 69.5 - 69.21,. 
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9::::. , ne:-e :.ire 11.oueholc. appliar:.c-::s at the i OGO S. Roosevelt r:ropt.ty which ~he 
parties agree are community (Plaintiffs Ex.hjbit 1, Item 77.1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, Item 
71). The Plaintiff values these at $4,000.00 and the Defendant values them at $3,250. 
93. Nwnerous household items are listed· in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 as nwnbers 77.2 -
77.61. Some of these are in Renee's possession, most are in Dennis' possession. It does not 
appear from Defendant's Exhibit 201, or the evidence, that Dennis objects to either the 
characterization of all these as community property or the proposed division in Plaintiffs Exhibit 
I. 
94. There are several firearms in Dennis' possess10n. Renee claims three were 
acquired during the marriage - the 12 ga. Binelli, worth $1,400.00; the Glock 9mm, worth 
$950.00; and the .22 Ruger, worth $800.00. Dennis agreed in his testimony that the 12 ga. 
Binelli and .22 Ruger were acquired. during the marriage, with values of $450.00 and $125, 
respectively. He testified that the Glock was given to him by a third party. Neither party 
provided any documentation regarding value or dates regarding an.y any of the disputed items. 
95. There is one AQRA. horse and one APHA horse. The parties appear to agree that 
the AQHA horse is a community asset. Ho\.vever, they dispute the character of the APHA horse 
with Renee claiming it "does not belong to the community". However, the Court is unable to 
locate any documentation regarding any third party ownership of this animal. It appears the 
animals are worth approximately $1,500.00 each. The horse tack appears to be gone as a result 
of theft. 
96. There is a 1950 Packard automobile that the parties agree is-owned jointly (50/50) 
by them and Daryl's brother. The value is disputed betvveen $1,500.00 and $3,000.00. 




97. There is a l '}7 s Oab \;, :-litewater boat ,vif1 trJ.iler whi~h che par,ies agree is 
Denrjs' separate property. Renee claims that community funds were expended on a new engine 
and other improvements. However, there was no documentation regarding these improvements. 
98. There is a 1949 Dreamboat Roadster which the parties agree is Dennis' separate 
property. Renee claims that community funds were expended on improvements to this item 
which enhanced the value. However, there was no documentation regarding these improvements 
or amount thereof. 
99. During the pendency of this action, Dennis sold the 2002 and 1998 Yamaha 
ATVs and the trailer for them. He received $7,500.00 for all three items, which the parties agree 
were community property. 
100. Fol101,ving the parties' separation, Renee sold the 1994 Mitsubishi automobile and 
used the proceeds for expenses. 
101. Dennis possesses the 199 5 Chevrolet Suburban, vvhich he claims is not an asset of 
the community. Renee claims it is and argues the value is $9,000.00. 
102. Renee claims that the 1999 Yamaha was given by Dennis to her daughter. Dennis 
claims that Roy Rice owns this ATV. The value of the item is uncertain. 
103. The 1967 Pontiac Firebird is community property. Renee values it at $6,100.00 
and Dennis values it at $1,500.00. There is no documentation regarding value. Dennis has 
possession of this vehicle. This vehicle should be awarded to Dennis arid the Court will assign a 
value of $2,500.00. 
104. There is an account with Capital Educators with a balance of $247.96. There does 
not appear to be a dispute that this is a community asset. 
105. The parties acquired several retirement accounts identified as Items 28 - 34 on 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201. As noted above, the only item that is disputed 
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is #30. Item jQ is a Putnam SEPRA. account} 0336644339. Dennis argues that this account 
was opened by him before the marriage and he claims it as his separate property. The value of 
tJ,Js account, as of December 31, 2005 was $40,160.99. 
106. There was a break in on May, 2004, where a horse trailer and its contents were 
stolen. Dennis and Renee received $14,075.20 in insurance proceeds from Safeco Insurance. 
The contents of the trailer belonged to third parties and not Dennis or Renee. The value of each 
party's stolen items is accurately listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit #1. The Court ordered these 
proceeds to be held in Plaintiffs attorney's trust account, with $1,247.97 to be paid towards a 
community debt on the Riverside property. 
107. Comparing Plaintiff's Exhibit #1 and Defendant's Exhibit #201, there 1s no 
dispute regarding the assignment of the following items of community debt: #82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96A & B, 97, 97.1, 97A, 98, 99, 101 (Plaintiff's Ex. 1), 102 
(all), and 104. 1 
l 08. There is a $30,097.38 community debt to Real Homes, LLC, for monies taken 
from that entity and used for community expenses. 
109. Dennis claims that there exists a community debt to Roy Rice in the amount of 
$44,093.00, which he claims includes $8,500 o\ved on the Chieftan Motorhorne. Dennis and ivfr. 
Rice had an arrangement, for many years, including prior to the marriage, where any family 
member of Dennis' could come into his business and pick out whatever they wanted and he 
would be able to get legal services from Dennis in exchange. There is an exhibit listing items 
and amounts ta.ken from Mr. Rice's business over the years. There is no documentation 
regarding how much, if any, legal services have been provided by dennis against this amount. 
1 [tern IO I on defendant's· Exhibit'.20 I appears to be a debt of the Jaw finn and not the community. 
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l'tfr. Ric~ testified [hat he ar:d Genny have ·'dcr.i: a hell of a lot of business Jv~r the ia:::t 2.:i 
years". Mr. Rice did lend the parties $8,500.00 to acquire the Motorhome. 
110. There is a debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service. The parties agree this is a 
community debt. The amoun.t owed is somewhere between $15,400.00 and $19,347.13. 
111. There is a debt owed to Perry Harding in the amount of $16,000.00. The parties 
dispute the division of this debt. 
112. Items 106.1 through 106.24 in Exhibit #1 identify Renee's separate propertf. 
Dennis does not object to the characterization of these items. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. The parties do not dispute that the property located at 1000 S. Roosevelt, Boise, 
Idaho, was acquired by Dennis prior to the marriage and is therefore his separate property. 
Accordingly, this property should be awarded to him as his sole and separate property. 
2. Likewise, the mortgage associated with the property at l 000 S. Roosevelt is the 
separate debt of Dewjs. However, Dennis' separate estate is entitled to reimbursement, dollar 
for doUar, for the amount of community debt paid off through the refinance of this property in 
2002. See, Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1983); Josephson v. 
Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1989). This amount is $73,014.85. 
3. The three other properties acquired by Dennis from Kendra Bartsch-Sallaz in 
1991, are also his separate property and should be awarded to him as such. 
4. There is a dispute regarding the property located at 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise, 
Idaho. The facts above regarding this property (Hennifer Property), present difficulty for the 
court. Dennis argues that this property is not owned by him and Renee because his brother 
acquired the title when he bailed them out on their obligation. Renee argues that, despite the 
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:aclc of a deed from Daryi back to them, '.his Court should 31:Jl determine that this proI-~rty is 
owned by them because all the other "indicia of ovmership". 
Title by deed is not always the determining factor and there are times when 
circumstances will overcome the presumption of a deed .. In that regard, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has given the following sun1mary: 
Under Idaho law, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the holder of 
title to property is the legal owner of that property. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 
Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994); Russ Ballard & Family Achievement 
Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572, 579, 548 P.2d 72, 79 (1976). 
A rebuttable presumption imposes upon the party against whom it operates the 
burden of going forward with the evidence to rebut the preswnption. I.R.E. 301. 
The magistrate considered the evidence and found that under "all other 
circmnstances and 'indicia' of mvnership", the deed was not controlling ai.1d that 
the corporation did not own the O'Dell property. See Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 
44, 53, 324 P.2d 380, 385 (1958) (''Where title to property is taken in the name of 
one party but the consideration is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor 
of the party who pays the consideration."). 
lvlcA!fee v. ivicAJJee, 132 Idaho 281,971 P.2d 734 (Ct. App 1999). 
Such is the case here. Daryl has title which he obtained when he loaned money to Renee 
and Dennis to close the transaction. However, Daryl has done nothing consistent with ownership 
by him. Instead, Dennis and Renee have made the payments, occupied the premises and made 
improvements on the property. Dennis collects the rent and pays the mortgage, including any 
shortfall between rent and mortgage. Dennis has continued to pay for expenses associated with 
this property. Renee pastured her horses on the property. Daryl pays no taxes on this property. 
Daryl even testified that he did the financing as an accommodation to Denr,Js and Renee. Other 
than loaning Dennis and Renee his name and money, Daryl has done nothing else consistent with 
being the ovmer of this property .. Instead, all indicia of ownership points to Dennis and Renee. 
In addition, the Court is concerned with the evidence regarding the break in at Renee's 
residence. The evidence tends to show that Daryl did sign a deed conveying the property back to 
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~ . d·~ ' h .. ' • h ' d . ' 1 ~· C _)er :11s m · Kcnee, )Ut t ~a.£ 1t was taxen trom er noe1e unrig '.::e ourg ar:1. i ne ourt can or:1y 
speculate why such a deed was not recorded and cannot help wondering why the two burglaries 
were never properly followed up with law enforcement. Nevertheless, the Court does believe it 
is more likely than not that there was a deed back from Daryl which was taken from Renee's 
residence, which made it significantly more difficult to establish that this property is community 
property. 
Based upon the foregoing, Renee has met her burden of rebutting the presumption that 
Daryl is the owner of this property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the 916 S. Roosevelt 
(Hennifer) property is the community property of Dennis and Renee and that they owe Daryl a 
debt of $30,000.00 for the money he loaned them. 
The Cou..rt recognizes that this determination of ownership is not necessarily binding 
upon Daryl as he is not a party to this action. Thus, regardless of whether the Court awards this 
property to one of the parties or that it be sold, one or the other (or both) parties may be involved 
in resolving this issue before title is clear, including further litigation. This Court cannot help 
with that situation which is the result of the parties own actions. 
It is the Court's determination that this property should be sold immediately, that the 
proceeds be applied to all outstanding debt against it, and any equity (approximately $65,000.00 
at the time of divorce) remaining should be awarded to Renee. 
5. There is a dispute between the parties regarding the community interest in Real 
Homes, LLC. Dennis argues, based upon the evidence he produced, that the community only 
has a 50% interest in this entity and its assets and liabilities. Renee argues that the community 
has a 100% interest. If the Court determines that the Operating Agreement introduced by Renee 
is the original document, then she would be correct. If tbe Court believes the Operating 
Agreement produced by Dennis is the original, then Dennis would be correct. 
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In ')rder to n:sc lve this is..;ue, the ':ourt i12s cc,:sidercd thes~ '.wo docur..1ents, t::e 
circumstances and other facts regarding Real Homes, the testimony of the parties and Mr. 
Trefren, and the consistencies and inconsistencies between all of this evidence. This at"'1alysis 
includes, but is not limited to, the following highlights. 
Several of lvfr. Trefren's actions and much of his testimony, were unsubstantiated and 
inconsistent with his clairned 50/50 ownership with Dennis of Real Homes. In particular, his 
signing of a quitclaim deed transferring all of the real property owned by Real Homes to his LLC 
(Tradesman), apparently without Dennis' knowledge or approval, simply does not make sense. 
fo addition, lv.fr. Trefren's recording on June 6, 2005, of his wholly unsupported claim of lien in 
the amount of $250,000.00 against all real property o-wned not only by Real Homes, but also 
Dennis and Renee, seems to this Court to be concocted. In fact, he testified his intent was to 
cloud the title on all the real property! Further, Mr Trefren, apparently to further carry out this 
scheme, recorded amended claims of lien in July, 2005, to include Lot IB of the Riverside 
Property, and the Smith Property for $35,000.00. Again, Mr. Trefren could not produce any 
documents to support his claims on any of the properties. Further, if [\.,fr. Trefren vvas already a 
member of real Homes, LLC, there was little reason for him to form another. Further still, ivfr. · 
Trefren's signing of a quitclaim deed on February 16, 2005, as a member of Real Homes, 
regarding all the property owned by Real Homes, including the Riverside Lot (lB) owned by 
Dennis and Renee, to his own LLC, is highly suspect given all the other documentation and 
efforts to eliminate all real property holdings of Real Homes. This seems particularly evident 
since Mr. Trefren testified that Dennis· prepared the deed, but DeIIDis testified that he was 
unaware of the deed. Finally, as a whole, Mr Trefren's testimony is not credible as much of it 
was either without basis or documentation, contradictory 1,vith itself,. or contradictory with others 
who testified, such as Roy Rice regarding his employment and firing of Mr. Trefren. 




L Jc::wise, Dr:;mis actioc.s, or rn2.ctions, ar..J testimony were also incons:;stent and not 
such as to be expected of a 50/50 ow11er. There is no evidence that rvfr. Trefren objected to 
Dennis' withdrawal of $30,000.00 in May of 2004, as his "personal funds". His testimony at his 
deposition and at trial regarding why j\,Jr. Trefren's name was not on the Operating Agreement 
that Renee produced was contradictory. As well, Dennis' interaction with Mr. Trefren an.d Real 
Homes was not consistent 1,,vith a 50/50 ownership, at least until March, 2005. There 1s no 
evidence that he ever referred to or treated Trefren like an equal partner prior to that date. 
On the other ha_,_'1d, the Operating Agreement introduced by Renee is actually sig,.r1_ed and 
dated. Further, the filings with the Idaho Secretary of State in 2002, 2003 and 2004 (for the 
years 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively), were all filed in February of those years and each 
listed Renee as the President of Real Homes. For some reason, Dennis filed the 2004 annual 
report in November, 2004 - after the firing of Renee and the separation of the parties, and before 
the year had actually ended - and listed himself as "owner". Finally, Renee did engage in 
activities consistent 1,,vith her ownership under the Operating Agreement she introduced into 
evidence. 
Upon consideration of these items, and others contained in the Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that the Operating Agreement which is signed by Renee should govern. That 
Agreement is dated January and designates her as 100% owner. 
As a result, Renee had 100% ownership in Real Homes, LLC when it was formed and 
any changes without her consent or approval were without authority and therefore void. 
Accordingly, the community, through her ownership, retained a 100% interest in Real Homes, 
LLC, including all its assets and liabilities. This includes the Riverside Lots (except for Lot !B) 
and the Smith Property. 
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As with ether properties, the:-:: ar:; potenti::.l issues r-:;ga.rding ~~1irc. 1Jart"; c,arms 
concerning the assets of Re:::.J Homes, LLC. Unfortunately, this Court cannot adjudicate in a way 
that is binding, any claims of third parties. Therefore, the Court concludes that all holdings of 
Real Homes, LLC, should be sold i.rnmediately. Proceeds from the sale of a specific property 
should first be applied to any debt on that property. A.ny remaining proceeds from a specific 
property should be applied to remaining debt on other properties sold.2 
If, after all the assets are liquidated and the proceeds are used to pay debts of the LLC, 
there remains outstanding debt, then that remaining obligation shall be shared equally by the 
parties. If, there is a remaining surplus in proceeds, they shall be distributed first to Renee to 
satisfy any remaining equalization, then shared between the parties equally. 
6. The parties dispute both the character and value of the property located at 15584 
Riverside (Lot 1 B), which is the residence occupied by Renee. 
Although Dennis argues that this property is still treated by Glen Trefren as an asset of 
Real Homes, LLC, there is no credible documentation to support this. As set forth above, it does 
not appear Mr. Trefren is in the legal position he thinks he is. Further, the evidence clearly 
shows that the property was in fact conveyed from Real Homes, LLC, to Dennis and Renee. 
Fina!ly, Dennis has not provided sufficient evidence to refute this. Therefore, the Court 
concludes that this item is commllility property. 
The value of this property as of March, 2005 (about 4 months prior to the date of divorce) 
was approximately $152,000.00. Dennis provided an _appraisal from July, 2006, which indicates 
the property has appreciated substantially after the effective date of divorce. \.Vhile this does 
show the value of this item has increased, the Court is required to value the assets as of the date 
of divorce, not a year later. See, Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 21 P.Jd 918 (2001); 
2 See, Equ~lization Section below. 
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h!cAjfee, suprc.; Desfosses v. Desfosses, l:2.2 :cab.a .534, 8~6 P.2d 1095 (C. App. 1991). Based 
upon the evidence, it appears that the value is likely closer to the figure in March, 2005. The 
Court understands Dennis' argument that the market did jump in 2005. The Court also 
understands that the comparables in the appraisal submitted by Renee are somewhat outdated. 
However, the record does not have sufficient evidence to detennine how much, if any, the value 
jumped between March and July, 2005. To arrive at a different figure would require pure 
speculation by the Court. 3 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the value of this asset, as of the date of divorce, 
,vas $152,000.00, vvith debt of $114,471.90, leaving equity of approximately $37,528.10. It is 
the Court's detennination that this property should be awarded to Renee subject to the debt of 
$114,471.90. 4 
7. With regard to the settlement monies from the Sumner lawsuit received by Dennis 
during the marriage, the Court has carefully review·ed all the facts associated with these monies. 
In Idaho, the character of property as either separate or comnrnnity vests at the time it it 
acquired. Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411 (1983); Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 
555 P. 2d 335 (1976). It is presumed that all property acquired during the marriage is 
commw1ity property. I.C. § 32-906; Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431,860 P.2d 634 (1993); Winn, 
supra. Thus, earnings of the parties during the divorce and up to the date of divorce are 
commUJ1Jty property. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976); Desfosses v. 
Desfosses, supra. 
3 The Curt notes that Defendant had more than ample opportunity to obtain an appraisal at or near the date of the 
divorce, or any time prior thereto while this matter was pending. He did not and chose to wait until a year later. In 
addition, the Court notes that defendant's appraiser did not discount his value back to the date of divorce or 
otherwise offer an opinion in that regard. 
~ By awarding this property to Renee subject to the debt thereon, the Court is not in any way validating any claims 
of lein, etc. by Mr. Trefren and the Court recognizes there main remai.n third party issues. However, those claims 
against this property (and any other properties) will have to be determined in some other action. Further, the Court 
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General]-;, the oa1.cv assertir:2 '.ha[ orooe:rt.r is sec,arn,e has the burden of oroof Wor:ala 
"' .1.. ... '-' "' .i. J r r 
v. fVorza!a, 128 Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (1996). This must be done with reasonable certainty 
and particularity. Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 563, 512 P. 2d 1317 (1973); Barton v. Barton, 
132 Idaho 395, 973 P.2d 746 (1999). This may be done through evidence of direct tracing or 
indirect tracing tfaough an accounting. /v!artsch v. }vlartsch, I 03 Idaho 142, 645 P.2d 882(1982); 
Josephson v. Josephson, supra. 
The Sumner settlement monies were received during the marriage. The total of these 
monies is $387,098.00. Dennis testified that most of this money was earned before the marriage 
and was his separate earnings. Thus, he has the burden of showing, with reasonable certainty 
and particularity, these moneys were not earned during the marriage. The evidence does not 
entirely support Dennis testimony. 
The only documents that arguably support this contention is the Amended Answer and 
Cross Claim he filed on March, 1999, and the summary and aging of the Sumner amounts 
provided at his deposition in August, 1999. However, these documents clearly establish that as 
of August, 1999, at least the current amount of $81,984.82 was earned during the marriage. 
They also establish that the balance of $269,204.60 was earned at least 120 days prior to August, 
1999. Approximately three years of this time was during the marriage (the parties were married 
in July, 1996). No other documentation was provided by Deru1is to show when any of these 
monies were actually earned. Tn fact, there is no accounting or other documentation concerning 
the remaining $35,908.58 of the settlement monies deposited into the estate account. Without 
such accounting evidence, it is impossible for the Court to determine, with reasonable certainty 
or particularity, how much of this amount was earned by him before or during the marriage. 
notes that it does not appear that these claims are legitimate and have not been documented, making it unlikely they 
will be validated. 
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... J acuL:on, t le i.;, ;mce :: ,nc e,ncenc; surrnuncmg t11e wnner mom es aiso uoes not 
help Dennis with bjs burden of proof. First, all the money from the Sun1...ner settlement was 
received after the marriage. Second, he deposited this money into the account for his 
grandmother's estate account instead of his trust account or other appropriate account. Dennis' 
testimony that the reason he deposited this money into the account for his deceased grandmother . 
because she loaned him money in the past is not supported by the evidence. There are no loan 
documents substantiating such a debt and the estate inventory does not list such a debt to Dennis. 
Further, Dennis had already distributed $184,969.37 from his grandmother's estate between 
March, 2000 and August, 2001. If he owed her money for a loan, why did he take his share of 
the estate at that time? Third, he distributed this money to others in his family, including Diani, 
who was not legally entitled to any of the Matcham estate. Finally, all of this was done during 
his marriage to Renee and without her knowledge. 
Based upon the foregoing, Dennis did not meet his burden of proof that all of the Sumner 
settlement monies were earned prior to the marriage. First, the Court concludes that $81,984.82 
was "current" as of August, 1999. Thus, the Court concludes that this amount was earned during 
the marriage and was community property. Second, this leaves a balance of $305,113.18 of the 
total deposited as Sumner monies ($387,098.00 - $81,984.82). Of that amount, $269,204.60 
appears on the aging report in August, 1999. The Court recognizes that this amount is quite 
large to have a!l been earned during the first 3 to 3 Yi years of the marriage and that it is likely 
some of it was earned before. However, there is simply no competent evidence accounting for 
the dates that the monies were earned. Without something, there is no way to arrive at a figure 
with reasonable certainty or particularity. Accordingly, the Court has no alternative but to 
conclude that this money was also community property. Finally, there is no accounting for the 
remaining $35,908.58 deposited into the estate account as settlement monies. Again, without 
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sue!:: e'fider:ce, '.he Ccc.:rc must conclude that this l.'TIOunt was also corrununit; .Jroper:y as i, vV3.S 
acquired during the marriage. 
Consequently, the Court ca.11 only conclude that all the moneys received during the 
marriage from the Sumner settlement were community funds. The total of this amount is 
$387,098.00. 
The evidence further shows that $160,000.00 of this money was distributed to four of 
Dennis' family members on June 8, 2004. Another $198,000.00 was distributed to these same 
people on or about July 13, 2005. Thus, a total of $358,000.00 of the $387,000.00 in settlement 
monies was distributed to persons outside the community. The Court concludes that these 
community funds were expended for purposes unrelated to the community. See, Larson v. 
Larson, 139 Idaho 972, 88 P.Jd 1212 (Ct. App. 2003), not reversed on review, 139 Idaho 970 
(2004). Accordingly, the Court will apportion this amount as part of Dennis' share of the 
community property division. Id,· Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 338, 17 P. 3d 889 (Ct. App. 2001). 
It would appear from the evidence that the balance of the settlement money ($29,000.00) 
! 
was used by Dennis for various personal expenses during the marriage and period of separation 
of the parties and the Court will not deem this as part of division of community property. 
8. The community also has an interest in the accounts receivable of Dennis' law firm 
up to the date of divorce on July 28, 2005. The evidence regarding the value of this asset is in 
conflict. To resolve this conflict, the Court looks at the methodology and detail applied by each 
expert, as well as other factors such as any personal interest in the outcome of this matter. In 
addition, the Court agrees with counsel for Dennis that consideration of taxes once such 
receivables may be paid is appropriate. See, Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 860 P.2d 634 (1993). 
While Ms. Pu1Iiam's review appears to be more extensive and detailed, it does not appear 
that her opinion considers the effect of taxation upon payment of the receivables. Nor does it 
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ciscou.r:.t ;:he value 02sed uoon age of ti1e accounts Also she did not J.dJ·ust for anv payables that ... '-' . .... ) ., 
Dennis would be responsible for, which she noted could be considered and totaled $4,650.00. 
Nfr. Harding did factor in the effect of taxes and did discount for the age of accounts. However, 
he discounted all accounts receivable which were over 90 days old to a uniform value of I 0% 
without any basis for such extreme and uniform discounting. Further, he did so without 
considering the firm's history concerning writing off bad debt, the pay history regarding most of 
the clients and was unaware of any work-in -progress, despite having access to all of the records 
of the firm. Finally, he does bave an interest in the outcome of this matter, having a secured 
interest in real property in dispute in this case. 
Furt1er still, Mr. Harding's valuation was based upon a new set of revised numbers by 
the law firm which 0s. Pulliam did not have initially. This concerns the Court greatly for two 
reasons. First, these new munbers appear to be based upon "discussions" benveen Mr. Harding 
and the office manager and are not supported by documentation. Second, this is a .theme 
throughout tJ:,Js case - there are numerous instances where there exist two documents with the 
same title, but containing different or new information. The best example of this is the two 
versions of the Operating Agreement for Real Homes, discussed above. As with those items, 
orJy one can be correct - one is false or concocted. In the case of the accounts receivable, Renee 
had no access to either of these summary documents and both were provided by Dennis. This 
gives at least the appearance that one of the summaries is concocted. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court believes that both expert's opinions are useful and 
based upon data that they were provided. However, their opinions are only as good as the data. 
On the one hand, it appears that :Wfr. Harding over discounted the value based upon his method of 
aging. fn addition, the summary he used is suspect because it was revised after the first one 
provided to Ivis. Pulliam and there is no supporting documentation. On the other hand, Ms. 
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?ullirun c:id r.ot accu.nt for the e.:fect of caxes and has no a6i:1g discot.:J.t becat:se her data ~id not 
contain any old accounts. 
In an. effort to give due consideration to both opinions, based upon the most credible and 
documented evidence, the Court concludes that the accounts receivable should be valued at 
$130,744.00, less $4,650.00 for payables, for a total of $126,094.00. This amount should be 
further reduced by the 25% tax rate, which would be $31,523.5. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that the value of the accounts receivable assignable to Dennis as of July 28, 2005, is 
$94,570.50. 
9. The evidence was conflicting regarding Dennis' share of the accounts receivable. 
He testified that he turned over all but I 0% of his interest to J\tfr. Gatewood. However, he has 
provided no documentation to support this position. To the contrary, the Subchapter S 
documents in evidence show that he is a 90% owner. Accordingly, the Court concludes that as 
of the time of divorce, Dennis owned 90% of the accounts receivable of Sallaz and Gatewood, 
vvhich was $85,113.45 ($94,570.5 X .90). For practical reasons, this asset should be avvarded to 
Dennis. 
I 0. With regard to the Putnam Investments retirement account, the balance at or near 
the time of divorce was $40,160.89. Dennis argues that the entire balance should be his separate 
property. Renee argues that all of this money is community in nature. The Court disagrees with 
both parties as the evidence does not support either entirely. 
This account is comprised of eight (8) separate funds. The evidence shows that 5 of these 
accounts vvere actually opened after the marriage and three were opened in 1994. However, the 
backup documentation from Dennis only shows a total of $8,510.92 accumulated in those three 
accounts before the marriage. There is no other evidence to support his claim that the rest of the 
funds are his separate properiy. As a result, he has failed in his burden of establishing that aH of 
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tr_:; .:n _n.ey ir. this acc:)unt is his seoarate Jrocertv. .-\ccorcinoh, the Court concludes that 
.... "- J. ., C., 
$31,649.97 is community property and $8,510.92 is the separate property of Dennis. The fund 
should be liquidated, and Dennis should be awarded $8,510.92 as bis separate property, with the 
balance to be awarded to Renee. 
l L After comparison of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no 
dispute regarding either the character, value ( or the value is minimal) or assignment of the 
following items of property: 12, 14, 15, 16, 22, 28, 29, 30A, 30B, 31, 32, 44, 44(a), 45, 43.l, 50, 
51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 69, 69.3, 69.5 - 69.21, As a result each of these items should be 
awarded to the listed party with the values as indicated. There is some discrepancy between the 
values assigned these items by the parties. Using Dennis' values, the division is approximately 
$4,000.00 in favor of Renee ($28,078.48 vs. $23,909.07). Using Renee's values, the division is 
approximately $300.00 in her favor ($29,243.48 vs. $28,454.07). Given these amounts, as a 
whole, the division is substantially equal. 
12. The household furnishings and appliances located at 1000 S. Roosevelt (Item 71 
on Defendant's Exhibit 201 and Item 77.1 on Plaintiff's Exhibit I) are community property. The 
parties agree that these items may be awarded to Dennis, but do not agree on the total value of 
them. The Plaintiff argues the value is $4,000, while the Defendant argues the value is 
$3,250.00. The Court concludes that the total value is $3,500.00 and that these items should be 
awarded to Dennis. 
I J. The household furniture, appliances, etc., listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit as items 
77. l and 77 .2 - 77.61 are community property and should be divided according to the division 
proposed therein, except for the storage shed (Item 77.60). Thus, Renee should be awarded 
items 77. 7, 77.S, 77.9, 77.10, 77.26, 77.34, 77.50, 77.51, 77.56 and 77.58. The total value of the 
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iten.1s awarded to Renee is $3,:~'.25.00. ·::1us, the total value of the items remaining and awarded 
to Dennis is $26,645.00. 
I 4. With regard to the firearms, the Court concludes that all but the 12 ga. Binelli and 
.22 Ruger are the separate property of Dennis. Accordingly, all but these two should be awarded 
to him as his separate property. The Court further concludes that the value of the Binelli is 
$800.00 and the value of the .22 is $350.00. These items should be awarded to Dennis as part of 
the division of community property. 
15. With regard to any horses remaining, it appears that there is only one AQHA 
horse remaining and that it is community property. The parties dispute the characterization of 
the APHA .. horse. The Court does not recall any documentation regarding this animal and will 
conclude that it is community property. The Court further concludes that each horse is worth 
$1,500.00. Both horses should be awarded to Renee as community property. 
I 6. The community has 50% avvnership in the 1950 Packard with Dennis' brother. 
The value of this interest is disputed between $750.00 and $1,500.00. There was no 
documentation regarding the value. The Court concludes that the community interest in this 
vehicle is$ I, I25.00. This item should be awarded to Dennis since his brother is the co-owner. 
17. With regard to the 1978 Oaks Whitewater boat and trailer, it is clear that this is 
Dennis' separate property. Renee claimed there were improvements to this item during the 
marriage, but no documentation was provided. Further, her value of the improvements was 
$9,800.00, vvhile Dennis value of the boat and trailer together was only $9,000.00. It seems 
unlikely that a boat and trailer that is approaching 30 years old is worth much more than this and 
certainly there is value over and above any improvements. Accordingly, the Court cannot find 
that the community is entitled to any reimbursement for improvements to this item, or that the 
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value was er:.h.ar:cec, anc: conclu,~es that it should be awarded tc Dermis as hi3 sole and separate 
property. 
18. Likewise, the I 949 Dreamboat roadster is clearly Denn.is' separate property. 
Renee's claims regarding improvements to this item are undocumented and the Court is therefore 
unable to find that the community is entitled to reimbursement for enhancement. Accordingly, 
this item is awarded to Dennis as his sole and separate property. 
19. The 2002 Yamaha ATV, 1998 Yamaha ATV and ATV trailer were sold to Roy 
Rice for $7,500.00 and the funds were used by Dennis for attorney's fees. Renee claims these 
items are worth more, bui: the Court cannot reach that conclusion. Accordingly, the $7,500.00 
proceeds from the sale of these items should be awarded to Dennis. 
20. With regard to the 1999 Yamaha A TV, Renee claimed it was given by Dennis to 
her daughter. It seems she is asserting ownership of this ATV on behalf of her daughter, despite 
Dennis' position that he did not give it to her daughter. However, ii: does not appear that she is in 
a position to do so. Under Idaho law, a community asset may not be given away without the 
consent of both the husband and wife. See, Estate of Hull, 126 Idaho 437, 885 P.2d 1153 (C.A. 
1994). In addition, as the proponent of this claim, Renee has the burden of proving such gift was 
accomplished. There is insufficient evidence to show that Dennis gave the A TV to her daughter, 
-- including evidence that he did, or now does, consent to such a gift. The Court therefore 
concludes that .this item is community property and that it, or the proceeds from it, should be 
awarded to Dennis. 
21. The 1967 Pontiac Fire bird is in Dennis' possession. Although the parties appear 
to agree that this item may be awarded to Dennis, the value is disputed. The Court concludes the 
value of this asset is $3,500.00 and that it should be awarded to Dennis. 
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With t:go.rd to the 1989 Chieftai: motor.1.ome, the parties ci.,J net dispute :hat this 
is a commu:nity property item and may be awarded to Dennis. The Court will assign a value of 
$15,000.00 to this item, which is the lower amount indicated by Renee. The Court chooses this 
value based upon the age of the vehicle. It also appears that the loan on this vehicle was paid 
with separate funds belonging to Dennis in 1998 when he refinanced the 1000 S. Roosevelt 
property. Therefore, Dennis is entitled to receive reimbursement for his separate property in this 
amount. See, Ustick, supra; Estate of Freeburn, supra; Gavsch, supra. 
23. The character and value of the 1982 Rolls Royce are disputed. Dennis has the 
burden of proving, to a reasonable certainr;, that this item is his separate property. Worzalla, 
supra. 
There is no document in evidence that clearly established when the vehicle was acquired 
by Dennis. The documents within Exhibit 3 72 are dated after the marriage, except for three. 
These three documents establish little, do not clearly relate to this vehicle and do not clearly 
indicate ownership by Dennis. However, Exhibit #70 is from the Idaho Transportation 
Department and does indicate the owner is Empire West, Inc, which is an entity of Dennis'. This 
is sufficient evidence to establish, to a reasonable certainty, that this vehicle is Dennis' separate 
property. Accordingly; the Court concludes that it is his separate property and will award it as 
such to Dennis. 
Since the Court has determined this item to be Dennis' separate property, the Court need 
not address the value. 
24. Likewise, the character of the 1980 Porsche is disputed with Renee. claiming it as 
her separate property without documentation. Based on the same reasoning above, the Court 
concludes that Renee has not sho1,vn, to a reasonable certainty, that this vehicle is her separate 
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prc::;e:1::,,-. Accor'iin.6ly, tl:t Cou..i"i ccncludes it is a corr.,murjt/ a;:;set. The Court will assign the 
value given by Renee of $5,500.00 and vvill award this item to her. 
r _), The 19 54 Cadillac Eldorado was acquired by Dennis long before the marriage. 
Renee claims that the community expended $1,750.00 on improvements to this vehicle. 
However, there is no documentation supporting this claim. Therefore, Renee has not met her 
burden as required to show that community funds were used and that such expenditures 
enhanced the value of the vehicle. See, Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, I 39 Idaho 488, (2003). 
Accordingly, this item is awarded to Dennis as his separate property without reimbursement to 
the community. 
26. The parties do not agree regarding the character, value or disposition of the 1995 
Chevrolet Suburban. Renee argues it is a community asset worth $9,000.00. Dennis argues it is 
not a community asset, but he is in possession of it. He argues it was owned by the law firm and 
then sold to his brother Daryl. There is little documentation in the record to give the Court a 
basis to reach a conclusion regarding Lhe character of this asset. Plaintiff's Exhibit #72A does 
not establish the vehicle was acquired with community funds. It appears that National Financial 
Service, Inc. was involved \.Vith this vehicle. However, as noted else~here, this entity is the 
separate property of Dennis and the Court is unable to unravel the source or use of funds by this 
entity. The Court will conclude that this vehicle is not a community asset. 
27. The entity known as National Financial Service, Inc. was acquired by Dennis as 
early as 1969. Renee claimed this entity was transferred by Dennis'to her. However, the Court 
cannot recall that there is any documentation supporting such a transfer. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that it is Dennis' separate property. 
28. The entity and account for this entity were used by the parties during the marriage 
for various purposes which have not been fully traced. For example, the Ford Excursion was 
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title:: in th.e 12.n:J:;; of :~us entity, but useJ by the part:es. ALc, Renee took $3,.200.00 from the 
account on the day she 1,,vas terminated by Dennis. It is not possible for the Court to sufficiently 
delineate 1,,vhich funds were used by which party, and for what purpose in order to determine how 
much in the account is separate and how much is community. Therefore, the Court concludes 
that Dennis should be awarded this entity and its account as his separate property. 
29. With regard to the Putnam SEPIRA. account# 0336644339, Dennis claims this as 
his separate property. Dennis has the burden of estabiishlng when this account was opened and 
the source of all funds deposited. He refers to Exhibits 210B, 210C and 243 as support for this 
claim. However, those documents do not establish that tliJs was an accolli1t prior to the marriage. 
Without such documentation, bis claim of separate property must fail. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that this account is a community asset with a value of $40,160.99. 
This item should be divided equally between the parties. 
30. There are two community bank accounts which the parties did not agree upon 
regarding balance, character or division. Account # 910403 I 41 at D .L. Evans Bank appears to 
be closed. As a result, there is nothing for the Court to divide. The parties agree that there is a 
balance of $24 7.96 in the Capital Educators account #0000601990. The Court will award the 
balance in this account to Renee. 
3 I. With regard to the Safeco Insurance proceeds, Renee argues that these funds were 
received by the community on behalf of third parties who suffered losses exceeding the 
$14,075.20. The Court agrees. The evidence at trial established that the items stolen were the 
personal property of those parties and not Dennis or Renee. As a result, this money belongs to 
those parties and is in the nature of a community debt to them. The amounts due each are set 
forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit #1. This money should be paid to them according to these amounts. 
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.3ince rher:: will oe a shortfall, they should be paid their proportionate share, with the balance of 
tJ,js "debt" to be assigned to Renee. 
32. After comparison of Plaintiffs Exhibit I and Defendant's Exhibit 201, there is no 
dispute regarding the assignment of the following community debts: #82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96A & B, 97, 97.1, 97A, 99, IOI (Plaintiffs Exhibit #1), 102 (all), and 
104. 5 As a result, each of these items should be awarded to the listed party as their 
responsibility. 6 Essentially, this results in the assignment of all these debts to Dennis, except the 
VISA balance of approximately $2,900.00. Using Dennis' figures, the total he is assigned is 
$153,781.59. Using Renee's figures, the total assigned to Dennis is $146,719.63. The average 
of these two figures. is approximately $150,000.00. From this, and with regard to these items, the 
Court concludes that Dennis is assigned approximately $147,000.00 more of the community debt 
than Renee. 
33. With regard to the IRS debt, the amount is somewhere between $15,400.00 and 
$ I 9,347.13. Dennis proposed that this debt be assigned to him, while Renee proposed it be 
assigned 50% to each. Since Dennis has been assigned substantially more than Renee with 
regard to the items immediately above, the Court concludes that this debt should be assigned 
equally between the parties. 
34. With regard to the $16,000.00 debt owed to Perry Harding, Dennis proposed he 
be assigned $8,000.00 and that Glen Trefren should be responsible for the other $8,000.00. 
However, based upon the Court's determination regarding the Real Homes situation, the Court 
concludes that this entire debt is a community debt to be paid by both parties. Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that each party should be assigned one half ofthis debt. 
5 Item #IOI on Defendant's Exhibit 201 appears to be a debt of the law fmn and not the community. 
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3 5. With regard to the alleged debt to Dennis' brother Daryl for one half of the rents 
collected on the Grandview property, there is insufficient evidence to conclude this debt exists. 
There is no documentation regarding Daryl's ovvnership in that property and he testified in his 
deposition that he never made any claim for such rents. As a result, the Court concludes there is 
no comm units; debt to Daryl for the court to assign. 
36. With regard to the alleged debt to Roy Rice, the Court is uncertain. On the one 
hand, ivfr. Rice provided a list of items and their values that were taken from his business by 
Dennis and/or Renee and/or her daughter. The Court has every reason to believe that this list is 
accurate as Mr. Rice was one of the more credible witnesses in the trial. He came across as a 
very honest, tell-it-like-it-is person, which the Court appreciated. Thus, the Court does not 
question that the members of the community received items of value from Mr. Rice. 
37. However, it was clear that the arrangement was that Dennis did legal work in 
exchange for items taken by his family. But, it was not clear which legal work applied to which 
items - on the list or off - or when legal work was done, etc. It also appeared that this "open 
account" arrangement was in place before the marriage of the parties herein. 
33. This would seem to make it a separate debt of Dennis. In essence, Dennis agreed 
with Mr. Rice, before the marriage, that he or his family members, could obtain items and that 
Dennis would pay him back with legal services. Due to the nature of this arrangement, its 
ongoing nat11re, and the lack of evidence regarding legal services actually provided, the Court 
concludes that the balance owed on this debt, if any, is not a community debt to be shared by the 
parties. Instead, it seems more of a separate debt of Dennis' and the Court will so conclude. 
6 The amount of Dennis medical bills is uncertain. His Exhibit #20 I lists most of them as having a zero balance, 
while Renee's Exhibit# I lists them as unknown. The Court concludes that these bills should be assigned to Dennis 
as he suggested, but the Court finds that none of these have any outstanding balance at chis time. 
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39. The parties did :eceive $3,500.00 fro:c1 Iv£r. Ric~ to acquire the Mccorhome. This 
portion of the claimed debt is a debt of the community and the Court will assign it to Dennis. 
40. With regard to the community debt of $30,097.33 owed to Real Homes, LLC, it 
does appear that this an1ount was ta.1<:en from the Real Homes account and deposited into Dennis' 
personal checking account or sent to the IRS. Exhibit 205 does show where this money was 
spent and many of the items the Court recognizes as debts of the community ( eg. credit cards, 
George Hicks, .. .). The Court concludes that this money was expended on community debts and 
constitutes a debt of the community to Real Homes, LLC. However, the Court need not address 
the assignment of this item due to the determination regarding the ownership of the LLC. 
4 I. The personal property listed as Items # 106. l through # 106.24 should be 
confirmed as Renee's separate property. Any of these items which Dennis has possession of 
should be returned by him to her. If he no longer has possession, then Renee is entitled to a 
judgment for their value. 
42. The Court has struggled greatly with the issues and ultimate award of the parties' 
dog named "Smooch". Much attention has been given to this dog, and required of the Court, by 
the parties. The Court entered an order providing for equal time of possession of Smooch while 
this matter \Vas pending. This was done for more than one reason. First, the Court recognized, 
and could relate to the fact, that this asset was very important to both parties. Second, how the 
parties dealt with the shared time of possession and \Vith each other might shed some light on a 
fair and equitable award of the dog. This did indeed provide useful guidance for the Court. 
Finally, the Court knew that this matter would not be resolved in a short time frame and felt that 
since Smooch would likely be awarded to one party or the other, it would be most fair for them 
to both have as much an opportunity to enjoy him as possible. That time has now come. 
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. DeruJs !las 'lI'JUed :.'1[" the Cour: .5hou1d provide that Smo.Jch be jointly owned by the 
parties, subject to motions in the future if they cannot agree as to times of possession. This 
argument is inviting as the temporary arrangement has actually worl<ed fairly well. Frankly, the 
Court anticipated many more problems due to the parties' antagonism on so many other issues. 
No doubt, Smooch would be fine with such an arrangement - he is a Labrador • Labs love 
everyone. 
However, the Court declines to do as urged by Dennis as it would be contrary to the 
directives of Idaho law to divide all the community property. In addition, the parties do not need 
to be tied together in this fashion from this point forward. Assuredly, they would be back in 
Court again regarding Smooch and they do not need this. So, the Court must make a decision. 
In the pages and paragraphs above, it appears that during the marriage and while this 
matter was pending, Dennis was less than forthright with Renee about finances and assets. The 
Court has addressed those instances above, occasionally determining Dennis' statements or 
evidence to be less credible and often resolving conflicting evidence in favor of Renee, and 
awarding her share of the community estate accordingly. However, with regard to Smooch, 
there is no evidence that Dennis has engaged in similar types of deceit towards Renee. In fact, it 
is he who has been willing all along to share Smooch equally, including on a permanent basis. 
On the other hand, it has been Renee who has been less than cooperative and forthcoming 
regarding Smooch. This required the entry of the temporary order at the outset of this litigation 
and further rulings by the Court when Renee refused to cooperate. This tips the scale ever so 
slightly on this issue. 




• ... ~,iii 
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As a :esult, :he Court c.Jo.cludes that it wou1d ':Je more fair and equitable (0 aw:ird 
Smooch to Dennis at this time. 7 
EQUALIZATION 
The Characterization and division of property and debt above is not equal. It results in an 
award of approximately $260,000.00 of the corrnnunity assets and $114,000.00 of the debt to 
Renee, for a net of approximately $146,000.00. On the other hand, Dennis is awarded 
approximately $501,000.00 in community assets and $155,000.00 of the debt, for a net of 
appro:dmately $346,000.00. This results in Dennis receiving a difference of approximately 
200,000.00 in his favor. The Court felt constrained to do this for two reasons. First, the Sumner 
monies are gone because Dennis gave them to third parties and/or used it himself. Therefore, 
none of these funds are available to be awarded to Renee and must be considered as awarded to 
Dennis. Second, it seemed impractical to award to Renee the accounts receivable at the law 
firm. Thus, the Court is left with this unequal division. 
Reducing the above amount by the amount of reimbursement Dennis is entitled 
($84,000.00 - refinance of 1000 S. Roosevelt and payment on Motorhome), reduces this amount 
to approximately $116,000.00. This is the amount that must be equalized. 
The Court has ordered the assets of Real Homes, LLC to be sold, which includes all the 
real property associated therewith at the time of divorce. Once these properties are sold and the 
debts against them are paid, any surplus proceeds would be available and should be awarded to 
Renee to accomplish the equalization. The Court recognizes that there may not be sufficient 
surplus proceeds, if any, to accomplish this. The Court also recognizes that the sale of the 
properties held by Real Homes, LLC may be problematic due to the transactions by Dennis after 
.7 AJthqugh Smooch is awarded to Dennis and he will be the owner, there is nothing preventing the parties from 
sharing on their own; if they should be able to agree to do so. 
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the cate of civorce. In either of those ever.ts, the equalizatic,1 cai1 only be guaranteed by a 
judgment in favor of Renee against Dennis. 
As a result, the equalization shall be accomplished as follows. Renee shall be entitled to 
a judgment against Dennis in the amount of $180,000.00. Immediately upon the sale of the Real 
Homes community assets set forth above, ai1d after payment of the debts associated with said 
property, any surplus proceeds shall be in1.mediately distributed to Renee and a satisfaction, or 
partial satisfaction, of the judgment shall be entered. If there is any surplus proceeds (which the 
Court recognizes is unlikely), then the proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties. 
ORDER 
Counsel for Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to prepare a Judgment and Decree 
consistent with the foregoing. 
DA TED this Mday of October, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the !iJ day of October, 2007, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Debra L. Eismann, Esq. 
3016 Caldwell Blvd. 
Nampa, ID 83651 
James A. Bevis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 827 
Boise, ID 83701-0827 





1\-Iut;rnJ R:lease and Settlemcni: Agreement 
This Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement is entered into and made effective 
~ .0,:,5i.J 
this Ji_ day o~J12010 between EUGENE RICE AND JANET RICE, husband and wife, 
REAL HOMES L.L.C. an Idaho limited liability company, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company (hereafter the "Plaintiffs") and RENEE BAIRD, an 
individual (hereafter "Defendant"). 
1. The parties acknowledge the purpose of this agreement is to extinguish any 
an rl a'l cla;~s d;S"''ltas a"t1'on" a"rl "O'"'t,.0" 0 ,.s1' 0 s ,,,,,.,.a,-,tlH "' 0 '"'rl1'.,,,. 0" ,,,h;,..h conlrl lLL l Jl.J.l , l J:-IL LI,,,.., , Vt. 1 ,.J HU V 1.L J.. V\,,,1 \... \,.,LUJ.VJ..LL J jJ'-'L.LU J.ll5 .L VY.l.l.1.VU U.tU 
be asserted in the litigation styled Eugene Rice and Janet Rice, husband and wife, 
Real Homes, LL. C. and Real Properties, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company v. 
Renee Baird, Dennis Sallaz, Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction, LLC., an Idaho limited liability company, Case No CV 09-11855 ("the 
subject litigation") pending in the Third Judicial District in and for the County of 
Canyon. The matters of record in the pending litigation are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
2. Reference to the parties and persons in privity with them is meant to include 
but is not limited to the officers, shareholders, directors, employees, agents, insurers 
subsidiaries, partners, customers, suppliers, dealers, distributors, affiliates and 
attorneys of, within, or related to the named party. 
3. The parties executing this agreement warrant and represent they have the 
authority to make and enter into this agreement and that each party is relying upon the 
representations and covenants made herein, all of which are deemed material. 
4. · The parties have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel prior to 
making this agreement and none are operating under duress. 
p - I 
EXHIBIT tS 
001236
5. [n consideration of the mutual covenants agreed to herein and in consideration 
of the deeds exchanged by the parties, whereby Plaintiffs convey Riverside parcel 
IB, Canyon County, Idaho to Defendant, and Defendant conveys Riverside parcels 
IA, 2A, and 2B and a portion of Lot 24 of Westview Subdivision, Canyon County, 
Idaho, and whereby each party releases all Lis Pendens filings and for other good and 
valuable consideration, Plaintiffs agree to release, relinquish, waive, and extinguish 
any and all demands, rights, actions or claims which have been or could be asserted 
against Defendant and any person in privity with Defendant including but not limited 
to her employees, agents, insurers, customers, attorneys and representatives as of the 
effective date of this instrument. Defendant agrees to release, relinquish, waive, and 
extinguish any and all demands, rights, actions or claims 1,,vhich have been or could be 
asserted against Plaintiffs and any person in privity with Plaintiffs including but not 
limited to any officers, directors, employees, agents, insurers, customers, dealers, 
distributors, shareholders, partners, attorneys and representatives as of the effective 
date of this instrument. This release extends to every kind or type of claim related to 
or in any way connected with the facts underlying the subject litigation, including any 
claims known or unlmown, contingent or unliquidated, in contract or tort, or in the 
nature of unfair competition, copyright infringement, deceptive trade practices or 
other forms of liability whether under state or federal law including claims for 
monetary or injunctive relief arising from the beginning of time to the date and time 
of this agreement. 




7. The effective date )I this :elease is :he date upon °,vhich th.:s ir:strumen~ is 
signed by the parties, below. 
8. The Parties authorize their respective counsel to prepare and execute such 
papers as are necessary for dismissal of the pending litigation 1,,vith prejudice upon 
payment of the amounts aforesaid and each party shall bear their own fees and costs. 
The Plaintiffs hereby authorize and direct its counsel to file a dismissal of the above 
mentioned litigation. 
I HA VE READ THE FOREGOING AGREEMENT AND HA VE HAD 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK LEGAL COUNSEL BEFORE 
EXECUTING THIS INSTRUMENT. 
Date: 9.'- 3 ~- /d 
Date: ff~ 3 ·-/ 0 
~AL 'ct~~ ,. 'ifM HOMES, L.L.C. ~ Date: ,9 ... :3 - /!J 
By: Eugene Rice 
Its: Managing Member 
. ..-~----) 
/''7 ..-,!- /··" C"o_./ 
By: '·.;:,./,2-7'1.J..AJ ,/}f:"J:..---·· 
.<-'REAL PROPERTIES, LLC. 
Date: 'if ~J -/() 
'--+'------"------
By: Janet Rice 
Its: Managing Member 
~~ 
RENEE Bf\JRD, individually 




Ioi=IA L. RUNFT I I 






ASSIGNiV:ZNT OF PTJRCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 
INTEREST IN REAL HOMES, LLC 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in consideration of Assignee's continuing his representation, 
the undersigned Assignor does hereby sell and assign to Jim Bevis, Attorney at Law, Assignee, all 
proceeds due Assignor pursuant to that certain Purchase Agreement dated 1-6-06 by and between 
Assignor as Seller and Real Properties, LLC as Buyer, attached hereto as Exhibit "A", sufficient to pay 
any and all attorney fees and costs due Assignee by Assignor related to that certain legal action entitled 
Sallaz v. Sallaz, Case No. CV DR 040 l 075D, filed in Ada County, State of Idaho. The Assignee 
shall have full power and authority to enforce said Purchase Agreement to collect all sums due to him 
hereunder in his name and remit to Assignor any sum remaining therefrom. 
fN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned hereunto executes this Assignment this 61h day of 
March, 2006. 
ASSIGNMENT OF PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF 





• e 02/01/2011 10:00 205 ,~-,2 LONGETEIGLAWTOh .. 
2011-Feb-01 08:28 AM SALLAZ~ GATEWOOD PLLC 2083Jfi12.51 
ASSIGNMENT OF PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR.SALE O)' 
INTEREST IN REAL HOl'vfES, LLC 
FOR V A.LVE RECElf/ED, tha undersigned Aasi_gnor do!'IJ hereby sell a.nd a3sia_n. tP Glen 
T.tSftm\ A$rlgnee, all O'! S3Jlignor's right, titlis and inten,:Jt in !ind·to· al! teal ·eatato set forth in 
Exhibit ''A''. ilttachod hereto and incorporated here!n by t~cc. and to .all pro1;~ gl)l! 
Msfe,nor 1)U1'3ua.nt to that certain Purchase Agraemerit dated 1--6-06 by and between As5igµ.or llll 
Sellu, and Real Prop.mies, uc·aa Buyer, actaohod hereto M Exhlbit'1B" and incol))orated.horain 
by referi:nci,. · 
The AmsSgnaa shall have Mt power and authocity to onfotce said ·Purohtise A~ent to 
collect all ~umq due him hereunder in his name, including lll1}' and all notions neceamuy tQ 
~mforco the ~IUJlO agahu;t any and ·all of the aforerutld real property. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, tha under.signed hor>tunto executes tho A.Bsignment thi3 10~. 







i<.,,/"·~ .•. , ......... ,w.-·~ ... , .. _., F1ll.~"~ .. ·~~.~·-···.,a-.o,,-,,, 
Pro.Se 
fN' THE Df.STRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICfAL DIS/IRIC'F OF 
THB ST.ATE OF IDAFI01 JJN_AND FOR TIFE COEJNTY Of.ADA 
llliN~E L. BAIRD-SALLAZ t Cas.e, No. CV DR 0:4'-· 0 HJ15 D 
NOTICE OF AP-PEAL 
DENNIS J. SA.LJLAZ,. 
Defoudantf'Ap.peHant. 
TO: RENEE L BAIRD. her attorney ,. DEBR.A L.. BJS~LA..N?<fi,, wfa.os.:e addir.ess is 31!:U 6 
Court: 
NOTfCE IS HERE.RY G1¥EN tJiat: 
l. Pnrs:ua:nt to kf.nho Rules of Civil. Pw-cedm:e:,. Rule 8J(f}. the Defenda:r.rt he,reby 
appears· a:gai:Ost tfae ahov.e-.named P.lafotiff,. to tlJe Di:St:rict Court~ from the ~fugistra,tc: Court's 
.A.men<l:e:d Ffan:diings; of Fact, Con.chrsions of La:w-· and, Orde.r;; and. A.men:de;d[ Ffoal Jtiti1gm:ent and 
De·cree: en1te1:e:d' or.11. Januarry 41,. 2Qi 12, 'by Jhe: Honrua:.ble .Da:wfd! C .. Epiis:,. lvfagistrare Jrrdg,e. 
2.. The Defe.:nrlant fuas: the, Eigi1t: fo appeal tn Hie, JD'Lstrict Court :from the &fugistrc1~e 
Comt's: Ante11ded: Finditl;g$. of Fact;. 0:mc:fusions of Law and Order~. and Amended Final 
NOTICE OF APPRM. .. -, ] 
001245
Judgment and Decree, and the same are appealable Order(s} under and pursuant to I.AR. 
1 l(a)(l), and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(a). 
3. The issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to assert in the appeal, are 
as follows: 
a. Did the Plaintiff commit fraud upon the Defendant when she represented 
she, had recorded the Oregon maniage certificate when she new she had. 
1iot, and didPiaintiffcommit fraud 11port the CoLid when she testified she 
was married to the Defendant when she knew she had never recorded the 
Oregon marriage certificate. (Based upon newly discovered evide11ce). 
b. Did the Court. err in awarding properties and monies not specifically 
owned by the parties butwl:uch were separate business entities Defendant 
was engaged in with numerous other joint owners~ and oNer which the 
Cbµrt did not have proper-subject matter ju:risdictfon, including but not 
limited to: 
Real Homes, LLC, 
Daryl Sallaz, 
Glen Trefren and his LLC, 
Natiom1l Financial Ser_vice, Inc., 
Empire West; 
c. Did the Court err in mislabeling and awarding items of Defendant's 
personal property as community property and/or separate property; 
4. No Order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. A Reporter's Transcript is requested on all matters including: 
7/17/2006 Court Trial transcript; 
· 2/13/2007 telephone· conference hearing transcript; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2. 
001246
9/16/2008 heoring transc1ipt; 
10/28/2008 hearing transcript; 
12/16/2008. telephonic hearing transcript; 
2/24/2009 hearing transcript; 
5/19/2009 hearing transcript; 
6. The Appellant requests a complete Clerk's Record pursuant to I.R.C.P~ 8J(n). 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that: 
A. A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named belO\,V in the following Certificate of 
Service; at the address shown a11d by the metliod indicated. 
B. That the Clerk of District Court will be paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the Reporter's Transcript. 
C. That the Appellate filing fee of $53.00 has been paid on this date to the Clerk of 
the District Court. 
D. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
DATED this_:!__ day ofFebruaiy, 2012. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL '" 3 
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CERTlFlCA TE OF SERVIC~ 
I HEREBY CERTlFY that on this~. day of February, 2012,.I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy ofthe foregoingNOTICE OF APP EAL to the following in tl1e manner 
described below 
DE1?RA L. ElS1vIANN, 
Attorney at Law 
JO 16 Caldwel I Blvd., 
Nampa, ldaho .83651 
Honorable David C. Epis 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Raeann Nixon, Transcl'ipts 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W~ Front Street 
Boise; ID 33702 
All other parties 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
~S. MAIL, postage p~epaid 
0 Facsimile to: 
0 eMail: ----------
0 other; 
~~ MAIL postageprepnid 
0 .Facsimile to: 
0 eMail: _________ _ 
0 Other: 
101{S. MAIL postage prepaid 






·(no principal reduction during marriage) 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
Sep. 
I 
Owned by Dennis Sallaz before marriage,248. Weils Fargo loan 
as or 6/15105, 247. 3/98 refy, 248a. Loan proceeds dep to 
Brookslreel, item 28. Renee QC'd 2X 24Bb,c. 2d DofT 1 D/8/99, 









2a - 0 916 S. Roosevelt, Boise. . . - ·-
i i I 
--·-··+------··t-----·-· ----- ---- ----------~-- ·-· -----····- -------·------------··· --·-···--·-···-----······ 
;$30,000 \ : 
iowned by Darryl. Funds paid by Buckingham 
·collected by parties is owed lo Darryl or .. Buckinghams. 
2a(i) 'Liability lo Real Homes or one-half of $17,500 R·eal --
• Homes Lien payment. 





··--- -···1 ·-·---·-· ··-·--· - - -- ---i--. 
\ \ 
($8,750.00}\ 
. 1 1 
ii., - ··tR~~.;;;.;mimiciaim0lo;-cr-;ditcard-paymenls from . : t . i 
i 








-----·-···----------·-··-·--·-··-·- ·--- -- . - i -------\ 
. t 
:248E 
-i 5580 Ri~erslde Road, ·catdweil. io .. THE ONE-- - . 
'RENEE IS LIVING IN. 
--- ----·····-··---'.- -- -------L----------- ·-------- -- ---------·-·· ·'---· .. ·- ··- ·- -- ... ··-· ·-· -. --··---· -- . -------· 
$280,000.00' ($104,140.00l\ $175,860.00 
---- ___ \ 
3 
'(50% Interest bu·1 value stated is whole value) 
..._ Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
V Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
C 
Page 1 or 22 
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POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule e 
................ ·.· ............ •/•········:····<<~>·_:>:<:</:<{: .·. . . 1u6.!iii~0~i{\@81:;;.;;;:. ·*· .;:;: .. i:;::\:k;;.:'.:L;:;:};:;:::1;:;;:J;:;:%;;;:'.9;:;:J;:;:.'.\:P:;.;.:}:;,;)~},:;:;%~}~1;:;::'.$'.:i-l:\¥wwww444444??44ww;:;.:;:;t-----
; 6~iill~~i~~ '\ I JI~~ ;;; ii~ \ i~l~! g~ i0J:iii @it.. LL< k6~~lki~~Ji~iiJ\· /•·>···· ~f1f!' 





. _ J__ . ·-··--··-··------------ .. -·. ··-. ·- -···· --·· -··-· 5 · \ Communily debt owed lo Real Homes (or the net loan 
rroceeds used to pay community debts 
_____ J_. _______ ···-·--·\--------· ··-·····--· - .i--·· 
\ I \ 




I _J_. ___ _ 
I 
$66,000 moved out of business account; $36,000 of that paid on 11· 205 
debt owed by Real H?mes lo DL Evans Bank. remaining $30,000 ,205A 
used to pay community expenses. \ I 
i 
6 ·--·-~ivers1cieR,Cca1i:lw;.u.10 ___ ·-- ···-------------
i(Pa,ce1 #03N03W171509) 
i 
-----------·-·---~-·-·--·----\---------· ---·-·· ···-- ····--··--·--·· t·--···-· -·-·····-· -·-- -----------------·····--·--···-···· ---···-··· -----· ···-·\;~;~~~:l~ 
7--\Riverside Rd-::CaldweiCio····-··-·-·-· ---- ------ -----·. -·----· -·j 
.. ___ i(Parcel No. 03N03W171506) _. 







I __ \(Par.eel No. 03N03W171508) --·-----··--· --·-···--
9 ;real property lax on parcel ... 509 [50% interest but 
\value staled is whole value) 










Saxton debt paid by Rice. Rice owes Dennls/community 
approximalely $60,000. See ilem 19 . 




. -----·-- __ \209 debt_ __ _ 
Renea produced demand from First Am. Real Est. Tax Service tor\ 
reimb. Because they paid Real Homes property ta><as in error.· \ 206 
See Ex. 20S(a)/ Renee's #001046-As of 11/3012004 per ta>< ;206(<>) 
00~ . 
! 
·10· lreai-prop·e~·ie.xciue en parceili:.506 .. - - --·-- -- -- - -· .. 
\ I 




Casa No. CV OR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
I \ 
Page 2 of 22 
Per Tax Assessment Notice Cor 2 years· to be supplemented. 1207 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
9/25/2006;2:55 t'M 
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POST TRIAL EXHlBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
11 ;real property lax due on parcel # ... 508 (50% Interest ; ($1,789.46)\ S ' 
!but value staled Is whole value) I ' 
~ I i 
I I . 
Per Tax Asssmenl Nolce for 2001, 2002, and 2003 lhrough 
11/30/04. \208 
i 
, I \ I 
+---1i(af]viortdSiivings-Paidtax;;on-R-iv-ersic1-.-l-ol_s_a_d_de_d_t_o_ - - -- -- -· r- - --- .. -r---- ----- ·--- -·------ -1:··--------- .. ---· --------------------·- -- ·- '·- -
\\debt secured by item 6• 15580 Riverside. \ 
1 
; First American Roal Estala Tax Service $10,427 for real property l, 206(a) 
\ I \ laxes paid on corporation's behalf lnadvertenlly. \ 
---·------·--··-\nodebl \ -s---------t--· ----··· ------··------·-------- .. ·-·--·-----\ ....... -.. --. 
\ \ Debt owed to Daryl for 1/2 of rental income: See Quitclaim Deed b4o 
\ i Sep. from Kenclra Sue Bertsch-Sallaz, 6121/19511. !2ss 
I \ Shown In prior rior Divorce Decree as Dennis' separate property. \353 Deed 
i \ ': 
-r-----------t---·- --- --- --- ·---------- -i- .. --- --------- - ------·--·----- -·--·--- --·------ _ ..____ .. ----, 
I I, 
\ l \ 1 
• ! See item 7 and Real Homes real property. Sold to Rice. Rice assumed real 1\311 
'\ \ analysis In brief. \ property tax debL ,392 
I \ \ \ -----i-- [$30,475.00)\ - ------r--·---- _______________________ ., ____ ---------·-·-- · -·-t--
1 \ i I Owned by Real Homes LLC. $30,000+ DL Evans construction ;330 ! E 3 D '1331 I \ loan. Ex. 311 is offer to purchase. x. 30 is debl. ebl 
'.392 · paialassumed by Rice. 
i 
' 
·12 - -iGrandview Hause/Real Property JoinUy owned by 





\ ______________ . _________ - ·------·-- --- ... 
!Smith Streel real property in Nampa 
\ 





Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
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POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
14 ; Federal Way Lot 50% interest (other share owned by · i S I ' 
:Jim Scanlin) J / ; 
! i Sep, i Prior Divorce Decree. 255 Quitclaim Deed from Kendra Sue Bertsch-Sallaz, 6/19/1991. 1·242 I I i ! 
,, lli·~;~~~;!t;:~~~~:r~int;r;;st'icilherst;;,~d·--- -------·--·-- i:i, - 11 --- s· ,,, ~:;_·---------11----- ::.=:~::.~::~,::=::~~.:::::=::J,.~2-~5·5·1·-·. 
Prior Divorce Decree 
16- .. +ciear Creek Lot 50% Interest (other share owned by ------- ! ----- - ----!------- ... S . -- - ------r .. ···-------..... ·-·-··---·----------... -·--·-· --------... .. -· ..... __ -.. . ... -·-r·-·- .. 
!. Mike Standley) , , · 
i I ! !239 I I Sep. , See Quitclaim Deed 6/12/91 by Kendra Sue Bertsch-Sallaz. ,255 
17 °1/4 lnteresl In Bessie Matcham Estate (Dennis' 
! Grandmother) Estate, probate not completed. 
I 
I 





1 Real Homes LLC Denny is 50% owner and Glen 
!Trefren owns other 50%. DL Evans Ck. Acct. # .•• 2799 
i opened 2/11/05 with new construction loan proceeds. 
;- Ex. 331 (old DL Evans Acct Stmts. Ex. 375) 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dato of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
' I I i 
-------- - .. :-..... ---- . ---~--------- ·-- s --- ---- -1----· --- ·-- .... ------··-------·------ ·--.. ··---.... ____ --.......... ·-· f--- ... . 
!11 '1 j 
Sep. 
Death Certificate and Estate documents are Ex. 244. 
;244 I i ~ 
-- ----- ~[ _______ _11---------- ____ _J_ __________ ===--==-~-~------------------- ------.L-----
$60,000.00 







1331 Denny's sep. $20,000 on 8/8/01 and $20,000 on 8/3/01 from /332 
Brookslreet._ .. _ -·-·-· ·--·- .... ____ .. _ ------........ _ .. _____ ,375 
Dennis $22,500 reimbursement claim per Ex. 289A, cks 1378, !P's 23A, 
1376. !Bates 
\001455 
• 244 last pg. 




POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
L ! \ $39,000.00 \ Ex. 314 Q, 380, 380A. Testimony of Harding. 
21··_-I\N,;ifonal Fir1ancial·S· ervlces,ln~. ··------- -- \ . t .. -s - -- -- -r------ ---------·-· ·------· .. -l---·- ... 
__ . ···- ··-·---- ----· ---- ·-··. ·-··· ---·--·· -------l--_. ___ .. 1 .... ·- _ Sep. $3,200.00 Renee look money on May 11, 2004. I ~;:(a) 
22 jEmplreWesl 1 ·----- --···---·- ---· -·----·----·-·-----------·- --·--- ·}-·---·--
Sec. of State filings are Ex. 257{a) 
----- -· -·-- -- - ·-
27 RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS/PLANS -· -------i - ------- --- -- -----------·------------------L-----26 j ' 
~ i'irookslreeVRetiremenlAccounl#OHN5790s:i-·- $60,296.02! ($31,123.44) ·12s:i12.sa s-·-· ------1--------------------------·----------·-------- -\;1::--· 





deposited to accL 3/20/1998 from Roosevelt Refy. See Ex. 210A 210_ 2d I 
Separate and Ex. 248a. 8/8/01 $20,000 w/d and 8/3/01 $20,000 w/d went update : I to Real Homes. $40,000 claim appears in item 19. 21uA 
29 1· Reimbursement claim for separate property used ror \ 1-----· -C----+- --- --·--·--·-----·-----·--· __ !7,!a23A \ 
communlty debts. \ I I I 
\
'w,11 supplamenl with back up documents. \\ ($7,500.00)\ Sae Summary of community bllls paid from loan proceeds. l211A 
! I l 1210A 
Casa No. CV OR 04 01075 
Date of Maniage: July 4, 1998 
Paga 5 or 22 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband"s Property and Debt Schedule 
30 I Putnam lnvastmanls SEP/IRA #0336S44339IA79 3 $40,160.99 I $40,160.99 s 
1 I ' l"""'"""W i"" I 
, $ 250 0 Statement dated 1/1/05-6/30/05-2106 update. Account opened In [update/. I 1' .O July 1994 (before marriage). j210 B 
J210C :iffA. Putnam SEP/IRA (Renee's) ) $6,990.00 $6,990.00- -C--. --r4BA ---




32 John Hancock. Venture Annuity (was· Manulife 
Financial) #820741 
. Owner is Dennis; Annuitant is Dennis; Inception Date 
!Is 10/3/1994 (before marr1age) 
I 
I 
Casa No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 




$1,940.96 $1,940.se _s __ _ 
Sep. 
Page 6 of 22 
Stmt Produced by Renee in supplemental response rec'd 
$6,990.00 7//13/05. "lntilial amount Invested 1/26/98" • Supp 7/26/05 




$100.00 See Renee's paystub dated 6/30/05 showing contribution. 
See Renee's Ans. To Interrogatory #16. $9,388 Disclosed 
7/26/05 
















POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
.·. Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
33 \Manulife Financial Venture Annuity duplicate cf #32? J \ 
I See Renee's Ans. Tc Interrogatory #19. $7489 I 
I 
~ Items for Ulese numbers · I 
i~ I ··- ---------,=-,===,,.,,..---•------+t-----1------,--,------+------
39 t INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS/STOCKS 1"' -------------~ --t= ~I 
-----·--41·\uFE INSURANCE (CASH VALUE) ·---- -· --··-r-t-------- ------l-------,_ ----------·--· ---------42 none 
43 CHECKING. SAVINGS, C.D, MONEY MARKET 
ACCOUNTS AND CASH 
1 
44 Bank of the West Checking; Renee Baird -Sallaz; $130.00 $130.00 C \ 212 
$l 30.00 3/10/05 (Ex. 260). 281 \
#211-068497 Plalnlltrs value. agreed. See Balas #000069-0000103. Bal. as cl 280 
------1------1------+--:-::c-:--::-::--,-,:-l·--· ---+----- -------------------------1-----.. ,;;r . """"' "_, ., .... ,;, ,, ... A. i .,, .. ,. i ......... """"· ""'"' ,,. ... ,,,,_, ., •. ".. .. .. ..... i,.,,., 
Casa No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 Page 7 ol 22 




POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
45 ;Personal Account at DL. Evan,, Dennis-J. Sallaz. $3,834.07i I $3,834.07 C ! : 
·1 i Statement dated 7/8/05. '254-2d sup I $3,834.07 ; 2/11/2005-Ex. 254. ;254 
tJoint DL Evans Account No. 910403141 
I 
! 
--·-. 1---· ........ -·· .. -··-· - ·-· .. --· 
4 7 i Safeco Insurance Claim Proceeds 
i 
•. I _____ ·····-···--·----------·--····--·-· 





49. - ryEHICLESNESSELS: .. -- . . - .. 
50 ··· ·12001 Dodge Truck, 3/4 ton 4Wo·-
' 
! Ex. 254 Supp is stmts. 6/04-6/05. (acct opened 5/18/2004) \254 supp 
··--·····-·---·-·-J-···---·---·--l .... ___ . ------ --··--- ·--·--·--··---····+----- ··-·-·-- ··-··· --·------··---------------·-··----------------··-[ ···- ------· · oint account has been closed I ; ; 
II Statements In Renee's possession. See 000104 -000190. Bal. 1
281 1/9/2004 $1,823.11. , 
I ! 
··--·-·-·----,·-·-··-····-------·.l.--·---·-·- -c -···-- -·--·-···-····· ·-+-···-··--·-··--·-· ·-·------------··---··---- ··-···-· ···--··-·-----·-·····1·----$14,075.201 I $14.01s.20 
1 
, 
I ! $l4,075_20 Per Order entered 3/2:2005 the check was to be deposited Jo the j213 [ ! trust account of Pla1nt1ff's attorney. . 
---- .. $247.96!·------·+-··-$247.96 -·--·- ·------·-+···-- . . i 
I ! ' I . 
-~ -. j___ --+ "'"°"° C --- --·-. _t_ _____ :=:~::=--=:==.::.::~~=-==:~~~- : __ 
\ I 
$247.96 
Statements 5/04-6/30/05 • Ex. 302 
:302 
. [ . Stiputalion as Jo value. Renea produced Chrysler Financial ,
336 '[ ! l $?,?OO.OO statement· showing balance owing as of 6/20/05 , 
1 I I : 
" t,OOOForo '='""' - ·-· ,,,, ···- -·-m:oo,.oo[- ""·°'"""'I "'·"'"""' C : • r-· --
! D.L. Evans Bank; auto deducted from bank account-no monthly i:P's Ex. 72. (negative value) statement received. 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
Pagp 8 of 22 
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POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
52 !1989 Chieftain 31' Winnebago MH $15,000.001 ($8,500.00)! $6,500.00 
53 -·-r2 Rolls Royce-··-··-·--·-··-·-· - ·-------
1 
i 
Refy 1998 Ex. 248A paid debt to 1st Sec. Bank. Rice has 
I security interest Debt of approx. $61,570 lo Vista Pawn. $8,500 1
303 
i ' I :::""" Ro~:"" ,, ":''.':' ~-' ·"'.".::' "'."':".."."·" ·~._ I:::, 
! I ~:c:n~!::~l~;le property reimbursement claim of $17,500 [ 
----------·!!, -----1,- ··-·-·-- S --- Sep---··-ri ·- ·- '=~,:~.~:,,~.::::::.:::::~:=:[ 
R~ i 
I 
54 --~P~ractie!iies·-------------· ----··--+·-------ir ·$s.ooo.oo c-- -·------·----···-· ·--·-···---·---------·-··----·-··---~--- -·-·-
' ' 
' I i sell and use proceeds lo pay Dennis testified value was between $4,000 and $5,000. Renee's 
! I I -""" "" """"'""= "·'°'· ' 
55 . ~aguarXKECon°vertlble _______________ -- r I S I -- ---·-------------·--·--- ···-······-··-·-··---·--·-i03 
J J Sep. J Acquired tiUe 7/17191 i
255 
56 ·-r·Jag~;;,c,inveriiiiie-----···----- ----- ~---+--·--·s. --Se-p-.--+---- ------------- -------t 
57 's1f PaclZarci fsoo/.;~.;~;r;;;;-;j;·w11ii" Dary1-101a1 value 
:$1,500) 
i 
· s1so.ooj ·· 
i 
. ·---··-··1·- - $750.00 c .. --· i ! ~ ··--·-- ... . .. ····-··-···-···· -··- -·· .. j 
$750.00' 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
-----
581 
'1 I s ·1 I 
'40 Cadillac Limo 
I I I 1303 
-·--~-- ---~- --- '-· :: _____ J _____ -- ---- -- ----- --- ______ [:~ i 59 [38 Rolls Royce Sport Sedan - · ···-
I I '" I I"' 
------- ------------1-···- s - ------------+---- ------·--------- ·------------------ ··-·-------- ------~----
! 
! ,.. 
60 · ]54 Cadillac Eldorado Convertible 
Ii I !303 I Sep. Acquired tille 2/4/1965, subject to lien 
1255 . I ; I 
--------L---------------------- ----r1 i ---·-s---~---1---------------·------·-·· 
:: :::,~~.::~~: ~~~. '""' ,,.~-·~ . - -- - --,- -- -- C ,,, I _____ ::·~= "~'~ --- ----- - --~'~ -
,,,.,~.,., I 1 ! "·"0·00 "''"""""' ""'' •• """'' • .,. ""'0· 1, "' 
63-\78 Oa-k,-W-h-ite';ater26' in-bo-ard bo~-t w-/-tra-iler ___ -----t----1----- S -· -Se-,---t---------------------------------t~-
------·-··- ---+--- -i--- ' ,,, + --------- -- -. -- --- --- --+--, 64 - -T949 Dreamboat Roadster 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
65 j1953Cadillac4doorsedan $2,500.001 . $2,500.00 SJ! ! 
I 1m3 ., --r"-~ GO~,A~ --- . - ------·- sold ___ ----· L---i~-- ---.. ··--- ··- Sep. -----1------ """'''' '"·::' ------------ [_ 




Yamaha Grizzly i $7,SOO.OO 1, Dennis lestified lhal il was never gifted lo Ashley. There Is no 1
1 ' delivery of lhe supposed gift. 
iia--l;;rv·~~,--.. - - ~---- · ~d----- --- 1---- f----
-e9-l-1s_9_4 ivt'iisutiish'i 2door(pro_c_e_ed_s_tr_omsa-1a-1h-e-,eo-fJ-· -----------,f-------1---- -- ---- -----r------------·-·-------------- --l-
69.2 j Pontiac Firebird • ·-
! 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Data or Marriage: July 4, 1996 
j "·""·"' "'""" •• """• '"" ,,,, •• ,_,_ '" ~w o< ""•-_f _ 
------- -------+-----1---·-- ---1------1 I 
_j_ I_ """-·"""""" I -····-·-·---· --·---- - -----· -·--· -·~---. ·---·-- -·--.. ·--·- ·---·-···-----.... ------.... _ .. _____ .. ,_ .......... ·,----.... - ... 
I ! 
l I I / $1.saa.aa I I 





POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
"·' -~ ... "'" '""''"'""'"' \ - I 
69.4 1999 Yamaha Grizzly A 1Y 
69.5 2002 Kawasaki Prairie A 1Y 




-------e------lo_w_n_e_d_b_y_R_lc_e _____ . _________________ L __ 
"·"°'·°' _, ., """ ... """'""' , .. ~ ···=· ~-•. "::l--. 
I 69.7 2 Kawasaki Prairie 400 A1Ys ~---
'---!-------------- ---ll------1------1------1---l-----+-----.J-o_w_n_ed-by--Ri_c_e_____________ __ I 69.8 1997 Kawasaki 300 
$500.00 
69.9 1 A 1Y 2 place side by side !railer -~ I 
~~---1--r------r--1-~-1----+--69.10 1 A1Y Zieman Trailer l 
69.11 Slide-In Hitch Tilt Trailer/ Rack 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 




Paga 12 of 22 
;1,200.00 In Renee's possession - Renee's value. -------·-- ----· 
Dennis' opinion of value. I 
I 




POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
69.13 !Tan Storage B1n , I 
I • 
69.1·4 IJackonWheels------·-·----... - .•.... --·----- ----·---·-- -----1
1
------- __ x ____ ---!--- -- So,ao, ··------------- -l--- j 
, I , 
j 1X No value. I 
69.15 ~c Changer -------------- -------------1-------- ---::+-------- ---------1----. 
s!i.1ii·lc.afi~ia---------------------- -- ------ -------1---·--· -------~----- ------·------------·------------- ..... ---- ...... r·-------.... 
I I "'·'° I I 
___ i_ ----------------------------------r-------~-------- --------~--- ---------------------.. ---------- -- ----1------"-" "omaoo eom, ! I I 
! l--------~-L- ,o.,,o, ------------t--
::·:--~~~-=·~-- -----=_ L_ -! ----- ~- -~ ------=-~~~~--------- - __ J ____ , 69. 19 i.2 Fial Gas Storage Tanks I _ j I 
I ! 
$10.00 , Dennis' opinion of value. I 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Marriage: July 4, 1996 




POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 




70 HOUSEHOLD GOODS, FURNISHINGS AND 
APPLIANCES 
Belongs to Scott Gatewood 
71 Household furniture, appliances, and furnishings al $3.520.00 $3,520.00 C --~---,.....,.-,-,-,,..--::-----;-;-:-c=::-::--l--..,;;,;;;;-;:;;;1----i-~~~,,---1-----+-----1--------------t-· 
1000 S. Roosevelt I 
1
1 $3,520.00 See Exhibit 321(a). Value stated is total of community Items. 321(a). 
72 Anllque Firearm Collection 




Case No. CV DR 04 01075 






Sell and Use proceeds to pay 
community debL 
2 community guns (Benell! and Ruger) !he values of which are 
included in #71 above. Dennis doesn't have Renee's dad's 20ga. 
Glock was Dennis' sep. property-value $250 •. Certain guns are 
itemized In the divorce Decree from Kendra at page 34. 












POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
, Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
75 I Misc. Tack and Supplies $5.800.00 $5.800.00 C 
I 
I 
" I"'"'''°",,.,,~. ''"""~'·MO,~-·" "'"'"'""""' -Riverside home 
I 
Sell and Use proceeds lo payl' 
community debt Renea claimed Items were stolen. Exhibit 213. 
~-,---._,,_---, __ , ______ ,__,_ 
lo be determined I 
Renee's values for items In her possession: , 
#77.7 $120 #77.26 $500 
$2 505 00 #77.8 $180 #77.50 $300 
' . #77.9 $150 #77.51 $150 
#77.10 $80 #77.56 $725 
-77--1-n-o-it-em_s_rc-o-, l-h-es_a_n_u-m"b·e-r-s--·------I------I-------,-----, --·l------+------·i-----------------------1-l-·---1 
78 I 
79 ·-----l-----+-·---+-----1---,1-----------·1--------·--·------·-------J ___ _ 
#77.58 $300 
BO DEBTS (OTHER THAN ABOVE~--
and not paid lo him. ~"""'~7='----•---1-----1---1,.-1---+-----1-------------if-------l 
1"a,,,.1-+.D=-e7b,-t o-w-e-""°d to Daryl Sallaz for ;12 of rent, collected C 
1
. 
82 I VISA. Ranee Baird, Sallaz. 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 
Dale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
($2,538, 72) 
X Claim not pursued at trial. 
($2,538.72) 7 
·$2,5:JS.OO Slml. Dated 9/20/04 produced by P #000006 
Page 15 of 22 
216 




POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 




~·-~ """'·~· '"'"'"' 
~o;rect ".;,;,.,,., M 
I 
I 
~ Discover Card 
88 Fleet Credit Card/Bank of America 
I 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date or Marriage: July 4, 1995 
{$3,027.69) ($3,027.69) C 
($6,324.84) ($6,324.84) C 
($8,146.77) ($8,146.77 ) C 







Siml. 7rT/05 2172d Supp. 
Def.pd. $1,297 7/29-11/1 
Bal. 11/1 $20,806 
Simt. 7/6/05 2182d supp. 
Def.pd. $433 7/29-11/1; 
Bai.11/1 $7013 
Stml. 6/18/05 219 supp. 
Def.pd $254 7/29-11/1/05 
Bal. 11/1 $2,939 
Stmt. 6/20/05 220 supp. 
Def. pd. $633 7/29-11/10 
Bal.11/10 $6,121 
Slmt. 6/24/05 221 supp 
Def._pd $646 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10 $7,826 
Stml 6/20/05 222 supp. 
Def.pd. $977 7/28•11/10 


































POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
( Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 




91 MBNA # ... 7599 
92 MBNA# ... 1208 ____ _ 
93 Wells Fargo Credit Card 
94 Advanla Credit Card 
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 


















Supp. Is slmls 11/04-1n/05. Balance was transferred la Direct 
Merchant's,· 
Slmt. 6/22/05 Is 224supp. 
Def.pd. $582 7/29-10/14 
Bal. 10/14/05 Is $0.00 (pd. In full) 
Stmt. 6/22/05 is 225 supp. 
Def. pd $2,133 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10/05 $24,807 
Slml. 6/22/05 is 226supp. 
Def.pd. $2,129 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10/05 $27,222 
Slmt. 6/3/05 Is 2272dsupp 
Def.pd $626 7/29-11/10 
Bal. 11/10/05 $6,398 










226 supp .. 
376 · 













POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
95 George Hicks, for Property Oispule. $0.00 $0.00 C 
96 Internal Revenue Service for 2000, 2002, and 2001 
96A Internal Revenue Service for 2003 
968 .. lnlernal Revenue Service and Idaho Slate Tax 
Commission for 2004 
Idaho Slate Tax Commission for 2000, 2002, and 
2003 
Casa No. CV DR 04 01075 
Data of Mamage: July 4, 1996 
($15,400.00) ($15,400.00) C 
Included in #96 C 
($5,938.00) ($5,938.00) C 





Page 1B of 22 
Paid by Defendant - $2,300. 
See I.R.S. Letler/Slalemenl dated 716/2005-Ex. 229A(1). See 
also lax summary; Ex. 229 
Bal. owing as of 7/6/05 shown on Ex. 229(A){1). Estimate 
including interest and penalties. See Ex. 250, $6838 lax due 
Federal Return. See also tax summary Ex. 229. 
Taxes due for 2004. Federal $4,369; State $1,569. 
Dennis paid to avoid Levy, borrowed funds from Roy Rice. 
















POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
----------
"·, ID•o<-a • """''" I "'"·"'°'' '" "·'"'·°'l · ! I 
I 
I I Dennis borrowed Iha funds from Rey Rice lo pay the Idaho Slate I ($lO,BBJ.OO) Tax Commission to avoid a levy. 349 i 
I -------------------~daho Slate Tax Commission for 2004 
i 
I 
I I -- -(S1]6i.oafl ($1,569.00J - c-·- -------1!, ------------------------------------ ·-------------+-
250
(a) - -
Amount shown above in item 968. 1251 
I I I --------- -- .. -.. -- -------r-·----·--r-------- ------- -------------- -t·------------ ---- ----------------------- -- ---- ------ - ----------·-r· -----
1 I . 
I one-half lone-half Tax liability unpaid lhrough date cf divorce. II 
_______ L_ ----------------------· --




98 ferry Harding CPA 
I i I 




--- ------ - ---------- -- --- ----- -1
1
------- -
j Contingent claim owed to Trefren. 
99--lABC Tire and Auto, lnc:--- ·------ ------ ------ ! "'·'°''"'! "'·'"'·'"' ,- -------~-------- ----------------------. ------- ------1-------
i oo :,;,,a e-.0 a,oqoo,;o;Oa.a oo~.; · · · · · · - -- ·- -1- ~---- - C "' '"' '"L- ~=., "":_:_ . ---· ...... -- -..... -f- -I 
! ($44,093.00)/ Includes $8,500 owed lo Rice for Chieftain Molorhome. 1338 I 
Case Ne. CV DR 04 01075 
Data of Marriage: July 4, 1996 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
101 I.R.S. Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing against Sallaz ($34.022.00) ($.34.022.00) j 
Law Offices Chartered I 
102 Dennis' Medical Bills 
102A Anesthesia Associates 
1026 Boise Radiology 
102C Boise Pathology 
1020 Boise Gaslroenlerology 
102E Boise Orthopedic 
102F Cardle. Consullanls 
102G Cardiov. &°Chesl Surgery 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 
Cale of Marriage: July 4, 1996 
($34,022.00) 









Paga 20 of 22 
Notices dated 4128/06, fortax years 1996, 1997, 1999, and 2000; 346A 
certified letter dated 519/06. Total is on Ex. 382 382 
Estimate. Bills not received yet, Insurance not applied yel. To be 
determined. 
As or 2105 had been paid 
As of 1105 had been paid. 
As of 1/05 had been paid. 
As of 5104 the balance of $1,200 had been paid. 
As of 5104 had been paid 
As cf 5/05 had been paid 














102H Greg Flint MD 
1021 Idaho Endoscopy 
POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule 
$0.00 
l-1-0-2J-I--ID_X_P_a_lh-o-lo-gy-------·------- --------l----$-0-.0-0-l----- ---!------'-----·-
102K lnlermounlaln Eye Clinic 
·102L Dr. Johans 
102M Selah Medical Center/Dr. Spencer 
102N Berkey Heart Lab 
1020 Saint Alphonsus RMC 
Case No. CV OR 04 01075 





Page 21 of 22 
Ex. 333 H, 6/30/05 333 H 
\ 
--=--1 As of 5/04 had been paid 
----\ 
As of 5104 had been paid 333J I 
As of 6/04 had been paid 333K 
-·- '--·---
As of 11/03 lhe balance of $2.021 had been paid \333L 
As of 2105 had been paid t33M 
As of 6105 had been paid 333N 
As of stmt. 5/16/05. Tha St. Ala Ambulatory of $525. 79 waa paid, 333 O 
and lhe Lab of $120 was paid. 






POST TRIAL EXHIBIT 201 
Sallaz v. Sallaz 
Husband's Property and Debt Schedule • 
102P I Saint Lukes RMC _ ! 
I 
1 . ,..,.....,,...-c-=,c:--,----=,------,---...,----==c-=-l------1r.-,-----;---:----,-----',-------1----1---------------1-----------------------+------10201Medical Bills from Procedure occurred on 7/11/05. lo be determined 
I 
As of statements printed 3/8/05 and 12/22/04. 
333 P 
Bills no! received yet. 
103 I Debi owed lo Sallaz and Gaiewood by Renea for · 
($181.49) ($181.49) C 1 entering lnlo a SiipulaUon on 2/10/05 in Small Claims I 
[ Court whereby her and/or Ashley's debt for dry 
fcleaning expenses of $161.49 was lo be charged off 
1
237 
iagalnsl a Sallaz and Gatewood Account Receivable. . I 
1~!Aclion Collecilon Service - bill Incurred lo Treasure --------1----:(,:,$3;:-:5:-:1·~.0:-:0~) i----::($-'3"'5,-,.1-=.o""'O) -C-- -------l'-------l------------------- - -------~---- -
J Valley Hospllal {addressed lo "Dear Renee L Sallaz") J 




($lSB,OH.S2) $49,694_68 community assets/debls lo be redistributed lo equalize division 
after Defendant's separate property reimbu~sement. 
11'°"' ""·"'·" "'"·'"·"' ""·"'·" II 
I EQUALIZATION I 
$102.656.15 ($102,856.15) 
109 ,'NETESTATETOEACH t--- --·=-t--
1 ($53,161.47) ($53,161.47) i i 
L_J'-----------------'-------L----.....l.-----'----'------'-----...... ------------- --
Case No. CV DR 04 01075 
Date of Maniage: July 4, 1996 









SALLl7 & GATEWOOD. C2.1D. 
I ODD South Rccsevelt Street 
Pc$ Offlc3Bcx &956 3cise ID 63707 
Telephone ('.zag) 336-1 l 45 
fac:;imi!e (208) .336-1263 
e-Mail: ,alla:@saf!a::law.com 
FACSI1'IILE TRA.NS11ISSION 
_!i_ PAGES INCLUDL'\lG COVER 
FROM: Sall!!Z & Gat::wocd F~ No.: 336·1263 I Ph: 336-1145 
SUBJECT: .I~ R~·,t .. 0;1~ .8.:!,),;/ df/ 
COPYTO: NIA 
T.r1..lS IS T.EB 01'H, Y COE'Y YOU \v1LL RECEIVE c' 
TIIB ORJGINAL IS TO .FOLLOW BYU.S, Y..AIL ---
A COPY WILL FOLLOW BY U.S. 'tvfJ.lL 
Can:ldc:rtJqflty Natico: Toa mntachls wilh this fimlr.i/lc tr.i.,smL"!lcn Ila privat: and c:an/ldcntlll ar.d 12.-1 tho prap<:rty or the 
,.,,,do:, rnc lnfar:nalian in \ha :notarial Le pr!Yll•i;c:! and 11 intandad only for tho Ula of :ha lndlvldUIII(:) or cnlll)'(ias) n,unad &ba~c. 
!fy011 sr: nor :he: lnri:mtcd racipian~ be advbcd thlll any unautllarizi:d disa!a,ure, ccpylnr, dbt;lbutian, or the talc:ni:: at'an)l 4Ctlan 
In ra/lanco OIi lhll conll:l'1t.i if !hi: tlllciccpad lnt'ormaclan Is srrl,11)1 prohJbi11d, Ity,n1 ha,VQ received this rac:;!milo transmissloa Jn 
ar.ci; plciuc lmm;dla.lllly aatii)' u, b;,o tc!9bonc co 4r.111ao t'cr tha r,turn of t~c fcr.vardod documcn!J 10 us. Thank You. 
001273
• 
DEN'NIS and RENZE SA.!..U.Z 
l 000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, Idaho 81707 
RQYRiCE 
dba VISTA PA ,;,wr 
BDise. Id,ah o 
r 
RE: ACCOUNT DUE 7/5/96 • 511/04 
Motor Home · Cash 









2S pc va:iou:; disnoy 
S pc va:iot:s movfos 
Hitachi 10• chop saw 
Xe:ox 4030 printer w/due.! t.,ys 
$ 
L..diBi."'l case, quiver, an:ows-snak:skin 
Pipe, horn, leather s.m:iw heads, feathe;-
Cheyenn~ ash bow., leather sheather, quiYe: 
Mount9in bi!c!'! g:;-ey/black/red 





J1JI:1aca Mi: Tan 
Pe~r mirJ auto collection 
Tools 
Ste:c!o 















To Renee in Portia,,,d 
hie:: (Nicole) 6/98 #1080723-1 
For az,.nive."3ary #1089899-1 
For anniver3lllJ :1089509·1 
For birthday 11090126-2 
~ee's daughter4/9S #39li14-2 
Renee's daughter #1059030-2 





ifJ.5191 f 1070373 
160.00 7/ll/97 A!I070l50 










799 . .98 
2S9.90 
Alhley# 1137121 6 2 















Outdoor ster!o, floor apeeh:, CD, receiver 







Ashleyr #1137l2 ! -2 
Ashley II-13204 
Dai::girt~r /$1135479· I 7 








Mor:goose mountain bike 
VID sy:;te:n controller adapter 
Gold cbafo w/NfoJ.rlrq ruby 
Ri"'.lg 
Men's ring 4, JO dwt 
Chain 
rvc stereo unit w/6 disc CD 
YID Nintendo w controller 
Y arious video glmcs 
Craig CD pl.ayer w/2CD 
Fisher CD player 
Gold 2.30 DWT 
13.90WT 








Kocic1 C:1.""::l e:-a 
Chab 
Twist w/J d.ia 
Ea:::ings 
HP printer d<!.tt jet 
4 pc gr~en outdoor spe.!!..br 
Smith Cor::,na wod processor 
New Yar.k Fur Shop jacbt 
































#1088950-2 De11;1y took 
#!097973-l De.ri,-iy tcok 
#1072306-I Denny took 
#1072151-3 Denny took 
#Ia85642-4 Denny teak 
#!085642-4 De:my tock 
#1135$80-19 Daughter 
# 113361-1 Da:ighte: 
# I-3749 
#105508.S-J DeI:::y 
#105!571 • I 





Shay Car.:c:;r~::- w/eqci;::me::.t 979.90 #! 060521-1 
Printer 90 #1052914-1 
4Cds 20.20 #1052620-4 
CD IO.IO #30070•1 
CD JD.JO C:1057225-1 
2CDs 20.10 1053589-2 
CD 10.10 #1057337-1 
CD 10.10 #1058092-l 
CD 10.10 #1057580-1 
Cds &9.90 #1057599-3 
Fur coat 1,200.00 #10II4--I 
Plumbing bldg mainfe:1tar.ce p<L'1:3 5~7.56 ii 
Fur ccat 1,000.00 #306~6-! 
Blue sapphire ring/baguett!s 6,299.99 R~ne~ #I-4749 
Large marquis ring 6,599.90 Renee #42150-1 
Men's flower 7 diamond rfo.g 699.90 Renee #35484-6 
Triangle l O diamond ring 6,299.90 Renee f.!48934-l 
M:n 's l ct c!olitafre 3,989.90 Rene: f/44602-1 
Men':: 4 diamond band 1,591.90 Renee ~IJ&&-2 
7 Marqui3 ladies ring 999.90 Renee #42211-4 
3 marquise: 2 rear.? 450.DO Renee #1050530-1 
3.10 band 179.90 Rene~ U23500-1 
2.90band 81.90 Renee ~24578-2 
3.00 Band 169.90 Rene: f/39938-2 
3.00 Band 159.90 Renee #34758-2 
L70Band 89.90 Renee #39423-3 
5.10 Band 259.90 Rene:: #26449-1 
1.50 Band 89.90 R!nee #33104-1 
J.!O Band 179.90 Rene:: #J3o91 • I 
2.oBand I 49.80 Ri:nee #'.Z2 82 ! · I 
2.6 Bimd 129.80 Recee 919064-1 
Hea..-t w/diaoond che:n 359.90 Renee #49404-3 
Ring-gquar: top 649.90 R.!ne:: # 1050603~ 1 
Ring, gold w/1 577.90 Renee #20805-! 
Men's ri:::ig whqllilr! design 239.90 R!n~e #44256-1 
TOTAL Du"'E (not b.cluc!ing int.:!mt) $61,5i0.51 




No. 'il1 )A)< 
Return To 
Secretary of St.ata 
Room 203, Statehousa 
Boise, ID 837.20 
• 
'\ 
INSfRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE 
Idaho Corporation Annual Report Form 
Due No Lacer Than November 1, 1 9 Q u 
1. Mailing Address - Please Correct 
R-R INVESTMENTS~ INC. 
f>ENNIS J. SALLAZ 
1000 S. ROOSEVELT 
BOISE ID 83705 
• 
ISSUED: 06-30-1990 
2. Registered Agent and Office 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ 
1000 s. ROOSEVELT 
80ISE IO 
3. Incorporated Under The laws 
of . IO · 
NO: 091268 
~370; 
4. Names and Addresses of Officers ar.d Directors 
t?' .:p 




rn -Boise ID _. 83705 
II II 
Po ,,.,. c..3 ·< 




Roy Rice 523 Vista Avenue 
Dennis J. Sallaz 523 Vista 
P..oy Rice 523 Vista, 
II II 




Boise, ID -4 ~3707 rn 
Janet Rice II 
Dennis J. Sallaz p. o. Box 8956 
Marjorie Leatham P. 0. Box 8956 
5. Nature oi Business 6. I certify that this Annual Reoort hAsc: been examined by me and is to the best of my knowledge 
Real & 
true, correct and...c.., . ,..---. - -
E_)erso~al properq, ~ .;_,_ _ _::.Date 7·-27 90 · 
inves~ments Name~,"' uen,~ w. ::;a.L.Laz Title Secretary 
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ART]CUS OF AM.END1".dfENT 
TO 
R-lR l!NVJESTMENTS, fNC. .,. 3C: :-t"I -:;,,,, 
.:-; 




. 1.1' ---cw 
These A11kJes of Amendment and tJ1e following certificate is hereby made and e.&c~d 
...... <-.C) 
1'11 t.r. 
pmslllant tro Sectim1 30~1-59, Idaiho Cc<le, for the plllrpose of ameooing the Articles of 
]ncorporation of R-R Investments, foe., an {daho cou-poration, and to effect a change of name 
of said corporation to Rem.ails. & Royalties, Inc. 
Thie uooersigIDerl, MICHAEL RICE, President of said corporntion, and RENEE BAIRD, 
Secretary of said corporation, dlo !hereby respectively certify as follows: 
I. 
11/Jat a meeting of a.ii of the stoddm]ders of R-R Investrnems. Inc., an Ddaho corporation, ,/.r 
was behd on Febmar1 21, ]995, at KOO South Roosevelt, Bo-ise, Ada County, l~ho, purs.~t 
to Call and Williver of Notice s.igned by aiH of the s.tockholders and filed in the minute book of 
the corporation. 
fl. 
That at sud meeting, the following resolu;tlion was presenled and upon motion duly made, 
seconded and umnjmousJy carried, the same was adopted: 
BE IT lRJESOL VED, tha.tt Article B of tthe Articles o.f 
h1corporatio11 of R.-R Investments, Inc. be ameooled by dle·leting ~ SECRETARY a= STITTE 
entire first Artide and fo,sert.ing in pface thereof, the fo!Jo,t~t 0000 &ll.123 2 
ex t: 22'300 cum .+ez;.2 
CORP 
.:.U.UO= 
ARTICLES Of AJ\,fENDMENT - 1 
30.00 
#: C 





lflhe name of the corporation is Rentals & Royahies., f nc. • 
BE IT FURlfHJE.R RESOLVED, Thai~ the President and 
Secrewy of the corporation, respect.ively, be, and they are here·by, 
authorized to prepare a certificate of this resolution and 
amendment to the Articles of Bncoqmration of this corporation and 
tto fiJe the saune with the Secretary of State for the Sta:te of Bdlaho, 
aoo to dlo an things. necessary in order to duDy effect the change o.f 
J1JJJIIe of this corporation in accolfmnce wunh this resolution. 
m. 
We further certiffy ttJ;at we are the proper officers to execute this certificate, being the 
Presidentt and Secrenary of said corporattio11, respectively, aoo we therefore execute these ArtPdes 
of Amendment of Incorporation o.f s.Jtid corporadon. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOIF, We have herel.linto set our hands and seals this ,Jj f!!: day 
of Febmary, 1995. 





MJCHAEL RICE,. befog first duly s.worn upon oath, deposes and says: 
Thaitt. I ana a1'lie P1esnd.e:1J1U in tthe above-entitled corporation; that I have read tine within and 
foregoing Articles of Amendment. koow the contents thereof, and that the same is true and 
correct as J verily believe. 
~0d~ 
NOf ARY PUBLIC fa([!$ 
Residing at Boise, Jdaho c q 
My Commission Exp,vres: .d -q- (,q 





CERTIHCATE OF INCORPOAATION 
OJF 
CAJPITAt BROADCASTING INC. 
file niu.mlber C I0?'814, 
h 
I, PETE T. CENA.RRUSA, Set:refrary o.ff State of time Saa:te· of Idaho, herelby re.rtify 
that· dupR.icafe onigimils of Arllides o.f J!nco-rporation fo!i fhe mcorporation of frb.e· above 
na.med co·rporati.on, duly s.ig;ned pursuant fo foe p1rovisfons. of the Idaho B·usmess 
Corporation Act., have heen received in this office and are found to conform to law. 
ACCORDJ1NGL Y and by virhle- of th.e· authority vesffed in me by law, I issue trus 
Cerfjif.icate of J!ncoirpornf]on. and attach hereto a dup&icai.te o·dg.inal of foe Artides of 
focorporaifion. 
Dated: September 2S, 199'4 
~{JI'~ 
SECRETARY OF STA TE 
EXHIBIT N 
001284
00 - 021 =oo·oar ~r 
dH08 
9900., rnro FOO : , io 
2 809ff 0060 S-260'16bi 
3l1J11S .'1 OOBl!CJS EliWl 
• • 
CJBRT'IFICATE OP INCORPO.RA'J10N 
CAP'ITAL BROADCASTING INC. 
A CLOSE CORPORJ.1,.TIOINI 
SH {.~ It 5:t AH '~ 
SUqfTARY OF sn rE 
FIRST. THE NAME OP THE CORPORAT10N IS CAPIT/1..L BRO~DCAS'TING 
INC. 
SECOND. THE PERIOD OP DURATION IS PERPETUAL, 
THIRD. THE NATURE OP THE l!HJS.INESS AND THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSE 
PROPOSED 'rO BE TRANSACTED, PRO.MO'T'ED J!J'W CARBHEJJt ON ARE T'O ENGAGE 
INI ANY LAWFUL ACT OR ACTIVITY FOR WlHC'H CORPORATIONS MAY BE 
INCORPORATED UNIDER THIS A.c'J.. 
FOURTH. THE AMOUN.'.J!' OP THE 'I'OTAL AOTHORHED CAPITAL STOCK OP THE 
CORPORATION IS DIVIDED IN'fO 1000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK OF NO 
PAR VALU'E •. 
FIFTH. ALL OF THE CORPORATIONS ISSUED STOCK SHALL BE HELD BY NOT 
MORE THP..N THIRTY (30} PERSONS. 
SIXTH. ALL OF THE IS.S.UEJDo STOCK OF ALL CLASSES SHALL BE. SUBJECT TO 
THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS ON TRAN SF.EH PERMI'.l!"ll'ED BY SECTION J 0-12 JA 
OP THE CORP-ORATION LAWS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
s·EVENTH ~ EACH ST'OCKHOLDE:R WILL OFF.ER TO THE CORPORATION OR TO THE 
OTHER S.T'OCKHOLDERS· OF Tl-BE CORPORATION A THJ!.RTY (JO} DAY FIRST REFUSAL 
OPTION TO PURCHASE HIS S.'!'OCK SHOULD HE ELECT TO SELL HIS STOCK. THE 
PRICE FOR ALL STOCK SHALL .BE BASED ON THE BOOK VALUE OF THE COMPANY 
AT THE TIME 0-F THE SALE EXCEPT fOR STOCK THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY ST:.:LL. 
EIGHT. CORPORA.'T'IONI SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO F1LE A SUB CHAPTER S AND 
TO USE THE 1244 PROVISION. 
NINTH, THJE CORPORA'll'IONI SllALL MAKE NO OFFERING OF ANY STOCK OF A..l\JY 
CLASS WHICH WOl!JLD CONSTITlJ'1E A PUBLIC Ol-'F'E]UN:G WITHIN THE MEANING 
OJf' THE' UNITED STATES ·SECURIT'IES ACT OF Jt9J;), AS: IT MAY BE AMENDED FROM 
THIE TO TI.ME. CORPORATE OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS SHALL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORA'f'E INTERESTS OR OBLIGATIONS. 
TE'.NTH. THE A.DDRESS OP ITS INITIAL REGISTERED OFFICE IS 503 VISTA 
BOISE, IDAHO 837 05 AN,D THE NAME OF ITS INITIAL REGISTERED 
AGENT AT SUCH ADDRESS rs ROY RICE, 503 VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83.70,5 
E'LEVEJ.li'l'H. THERE SHALL, BE ONE DIRECTOR CONSTI'li'U'll'ING THIE INITIAL. 
BOARD QoF DIRECTORS AND 'FHE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OJ? 'FHE PERSONS TO 
S:ERVE AS. DIRECTORS CJIN'FIL THE FIRST ~NlJIAL MEETING OF' SHAHE HOLDERS 
OR UNTIL THEIR SUCCESS.ORS HE E.l.E:C'TEO AND O,UALIFY. 
ROY RICE, 503 VIS'J!'A, BOISE, IDAHO 83705-
001285
• • 
TWELFTH. THE NIJ.J1E J!_,_.ND ADDRESS OF EACH INCORPORATOR: 
ROY RICE, 503 VISTA, BO][SE, IDAHO 83705 















CERTIFICATE OF INCORPOJRATION 
OF 
WESTERN a!{OA.IXASTING JINC 
file nmnber C lW813' 
I, PETE T. CJENARRVSA, Secrerary of State of the State· of Idlaho, hereby certify 
that dupB.ka,Je migina!s, o.f Arttides of J!m:orporattion frnr th.e mcorporation of the above· 
named corporation, duly s.iig.ned purs.tiu:mtt tto foe provfafons of the Ida.ho· Busmess 
Corporation Ad, have been fe{:eived in this o,tfice and are found to conform to· law. 
ACCORJDJINGL Y and. by virtue of the authority ves,fed in me by law, I issue thls. 
Cerlfficate· oflnco,rporafion and attach her12:it.o a. dupHrate orii.g:mal of f'he Artides of 
focorporation. 
Dated: September 2.8, 1994 
~tft>~ 




oo·oa1 =00·021 8t 
d~O;'.] 
'3980ff usro 100 ::1, ID 
l 61)9U: 0060 ~~'166 l 
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATIONSa, id II 5.t AH '9tJ 
Sf:.CRfl .ifrt t'\, -
WE.STERN BROADCASTING INC. . .I'S IH£ 
31~ij1Ull!'.Ei GWI 
A CLOSE CORPORATION 
f:IRST. THE NA..'<1:E OP THE CORPORATION 1S WESTERN BROADCASTING INC. 
SECOND. THE PERIOD OP DURATION rs PERPETUAL. 
THIRD. THE NATURE: OF TME BUSINESS. AN[} THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSE 
PROPOSED TO BE T.R'A.'JSACTE:D, PROMO'Jl'ED P..ND CARRIED ON ARE TO ENGAGE 
IN ANY LAWFUL ACT OR ACT'IVITY FOR WHICH CORPORATIONS Mi\Y OE 
INCORPOfu'\.TED UNDER THIS ACT, 
FOURTH. THE AMOUNT OF THE TOTAL AUTHORHED CAPITAL STOCK OF THE 
CORPORATION IS DIVIDED DITO 1000 SHARES OF COM.MON STOCK OF NO 
PAR VALUE. 
FIFTH. ALL OF 'l'HE: CORP'ORATTONS ISSUED S'FOCK SHALL BE HELD BY NOT 
MORE THP.J.l THIRTY. (JO) PERSONS.. 
SIXTH. ALL OlF' THE IS.SUED STOCK OP ALL CLASSES SHALL OE SU!3JECT TO 
THE FOLLOWING REST"R:ICT'IONS· ONi TRANSFER PERMITTED BY SECTION J0-12JA 
OF THE CORPORATION LAWS OF T'HE: STATE .OF IDAHO. 
SEVENTH. E.ACH STOCKHOLDER WILL OFFE.JR: TO THE CORPORATION OR TO THE 
OTHER STOCKHOLO-ERS OF THE CORPORATION! A THIRTY (JO} DAY FIRST REI-'USAL 
OPTION TO PURCHASE HIS STOCK SHOULD HE ELECT TO SELL HIS STOCK. THE 
PRICE FOR AL.L STOCK SHALI. BE BASED ON Tl-IE BOOK VALUE OF THE COHPANY 
AT THE TIME OP THE S'AJLE: EXCEPT FOR STOCK THAT THE. PRESIDENT MAY SELL. 
EIGHT, CORPORATION SHALL BE ELIGIBLE. TO ll?ILE A SUB CHAP'fER S .I\ND 
TO us.ETHE 1244 PROVISION. 
NINTH. THE CORP.ORATION SHALL. }!AKE NO OFFERINIG OJF ANY STOCK OF ANY 
CLASS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUT'E A PUBLIC OFFERING WITHIN T'f-!E MEAN ING 
OF THE UNITED STATE'S ·SECURITIES ACT OF 193], AS lT MAY BE AMENDED FROM 
TINE TO TIME. CORP'OHATE OF'FICERS OR DIRECTORS SHALL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE INTE:RESTS OR OBLIGATIONS, 
TENTH. THE ADDRESS OF ITS INITIAL REGISTERED OFFICE IS 503 VISTA 
BOISE IDAHO 3;37 05 AflD 'fttE· NAME OF ITS INITIAL REGISTERED 
AGENT 1AT SUCH ADD>RESS IS ROY RICE 50) VISTA, BOISE, IDAHO 83705 
ELEVENTH. THERE SH,,LL BE ONJE D1RBCTOR CONSTITUTING THE INITIAL 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AJ':-10 THE NA.i~!E:s AND ADORES.SES OF THE PERSONS TO 
SERVE AS DIRECTORS UNTIL THE FIR'S:T ANNUAL ME.ET'ING OF SHAW:: HOLDERS 
OR UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS BE ELEC'fED AND QUALIFY. 




''l"1lELP'FH. THE R<\ME MTD ADDRESS OF EACH INCORF.'OJRATOR: 
ROY RICE, 50,J; VISTA, BOISE, IDA.HO 8:3705 





• • l'i JU ..J""'f'....J..Jt:....,u i "LJC. 
SALLl\Z LAW, CHARTERED 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ 
RAYMOND D. SCHILD 
Vnn Bishop 
Attorney at Law 
603'2mt Street South 
N~pa. ID 33651 
RE: ST.EVE SJJMNE.i{ 
DenrVan: 
Jurte 28, 2000 
1000 sourn ROOSefflLT 
l"05T Ofl'lC.6 60;{ 891111 
JSOIBB, IDJUIO 11:l'jO:/ 
PllCJrlE: (208) .336-1145 
F.JL--c: (1oU) 335-1:zaa 
::.,\ 
In respo~e to yaurfaxe~ .1~.l!.er of today's datei.ftb,n@: :: . . ,. ; ''.fr.U~;ilfii.#.:~:~my . 
po~tio.nregarding the status oft~~.·eu.tire bullshit de~tw.@"fu~l!9.. ::.-'.'J,&~f~.~~~~;f squirm 
• lude the ball - era.wt under his i:ocb Hild tltcn preyaibffldrl?(q:tJlt.O~AA,.IQ~}i~::®A~t.tJ: 
pexpotuato &am.8 is over, as it relates to me and tbose prlvy'fo 'me ... , -. . . 
The: entire settlement oft.Ms ~ase at all times was absolutely mutually il-Wf universally 
agreed by all pnrti~ and attorneys to be a. 3 agreement package on the temis presently set fonh 
therein and with each agreement totally dependent o.n the others. · 
I personally was told by Sumner that .he had :Jigned No. 2 aod J as written and jt would be 
delivered to Runft. Also, Sumner nnd I specifically agreed tl!m: Iwauld adjust any errors in the 
Run:fl: biJJing and Ft.fer agreed to reissign all stock when ha was paid plus ill.') out of pocket costs 
which he reduced to $31000. · 




Letter to Van Bi.shop 
Juoe 2B, 2000 
Page Two 
• • IV 
My word Js absolutely solid gold and after litcm.lly and :tiguritively carrying Sumner for 
12 years - including all attorney fees - cash cost.s· advances - cnsh loans - loan guatlllltees -
redeeming loan deflmlts - eating torn of shit - bleeding profuacly - and then delivering l:he.se radio 
statioru to him, .in spite of himse~ it's over. 
If Sumner wants to question my word now then he better tighten his cinch and grub his 
llS3, beca11se it's gonna be a heH of 11 lotinoretllm1 au 8 aecond ride. 
DJS:da 











• . I 
SALLAZ- LA WOF'.FICES, CI-IARTER;El) 
DI!NNJS f,.$ALL,)Z . . .. 
R,\Uv(OND D. SCHII.D 
July i 0, 2000 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 West 1.f .. Wl Street 
Boise, Idaho 83101. 
Vi.a Facsimile: 34S-l 129 
Re: Sumner/ Sawtooth 
OearYern: 
IU • 
1000 So urn RooSJ:V1i1:r 
Posr Omc.a Bo:;c 6956 
BOLSE, loAf:Io 6370'1 . 
PHONG (208) 336-1145 
FA'C (208) 336,]2o3 
• . ''I ·,i· 
I am very happy that you v.:ere able to arrange the· S~w.t??-~}H~~i:out/ffri@.$0.*J.aif.1-iu~ ,. 
agreement you have worked out witlt Runft fol' all Defend9:pf~P.l§iM1tW1lli;trt·~r:s:u()J~GtJ<11'ffiti ': 
co11fuma.tion of foil owing terms; · ·· · .. · ·· '' ··· 
r,,t:Jc 
1. !'~'.lf:~!1:t¥l~JV£'tl::,1;µ1;§/ ., ,_.,. 
2000 which does not affect the balance still due oil the Stjmner/ National · · ' :1.,., ·· ·" 
.F'.1DJU1cial Service note. 
2. That the ba.lari¢} du() oti the Roy Rice/ Sumner lOllil be specifically included in the 
payment irt the above Defend.ants' Settlement Agree~ent. ·', . 
3. That in return for the assignment or release of all of tbe Fifer/ R&R stock to 
Sumner, Fifer recovers a portion of bis out-of-pocket cost.1 in the sum of $3000.00 
from the above Settlement Agreement. 
' Upon Sumners :iignature hereon I am prepared to execute his new loan documents. 




STEVE SUMNER ·:( . . . ,\. 
.. 
··•·· 
... , :~: ~. 
;~ . 
.• 
·,: .. ( ., 
'•I -~ 










UO/JiJ/V'1. li'bl) i)ll: ::;j ±'.-l.2. • 11q /)ij 
June l 8, 2003 
Mr. Van G. Bishop 
Attorney at Law 
t6 12th A venue South 
Nampa, fD 83651 
Dear Mr. Bishop: 
RE: Escrow Instructions 
El SIIAI'frl LAlf OFF. • 
Acting in your fiduciary capacit-J as Trustee, upon receiving the signed Stipulation and Qrder for 
Dismis,al as to Denni, J, 8 allaz •nd Rental, & Royaltiei, inc., ("R-R) and WilOtlr fii'erajJpWJJriatdy 
si.gi-ied as wri~en,, herfi~after referred as Disniissal, you ~~ail notify Steve Suinn~r of such~ 
{Jpdp reifip(pfth.e funds fr9m tl1e: 9losing ofthe sale: ofl~e assets of Capitaf Wtst., Inc. to 
First Western, Izfo:;~s· ~.t~~ you shall: . . . . 
1. File theDlsmissal as refeu-ed to above with the Court. 
2. [/~JlVet,o.'f.t~hni, I Salfaz C,:,lffied lb;\<1,s in tl\e amount of $150 ,00~,00 payap!e to 
Oeri'nis L Sfi1Jaz,,-or payable as di,rected)'uwriting, by Pen:nis. J. Sallaz 
3. DeiivedoD:eri:rirs J: Sa1iaz ai1 acfditiorial a.niotfutin.certified funds Ol$32,09lLOO for f t.\1~:r~efuta!it!tI::,~~i:tR} payabli to Deiim, J,Sallaz 01 
4. D~hverto De,nnis J. Sallaz the prepaiedPromis.sozy Note in the amount of 
$218,000:oo made pajraqk to De:a,_ii!.r1J:. S~ilaz signed by First W~ste111 Irie . .1nd 
Steve Sumner, g\.laJantor aud secured by 2M assignment of orcirilisso.ry nor.e from 
Educational Media Foundation, a r)oo-p~ofit California ccirporirion. Said as·~ignment 
and security fon::d.s aud documents to be appr~.ved by Dennis J. Sallaz; . 
5. In the event this transaction does not close within 120 days hereof, Sallaz has the 




Approved and agreed: 
Dennis J. Sallaz 
D.J. 
'))., '-l 
~~ \ \ ., 
~t 
1 
-\0 / 1 
\' \ ( 1. ) 
~ooG.s:~s 
lf(!OOi 





IJli/JU/U-1 l\'ED 09: 27 FAJ'. 2•·•1498 E1SruANN LAW OFF. • 
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
Thi~ Covfo:lentiali~ A~eeme,;_t (hereinafter the "A;;:ree~-:ienr") is made this __ :la:,• o[ 
___ ....., 2003, by and between Dennis J. Sallaz, an individual, Rentals & Royalties, fnc. ("R-R"), 
an Idaho corporation (collectively "Sallaz"), and Capital West, Inc., au Idaho corporation ("Capital"), 
and First Western,_ Inc., an Idaho corporation ("First Western"), and Steve Sumner (''Sumner). 
REClTALS 
WHEREAS, Sumner and Capital owes money to Sallaz, and Capital West has signed a 
Promissory Note in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A", which is incorporated herein by this 
reference and restated a.s if set forth in fuIL 
WHEREAS, the fact that Sumner and Capital West, Inc. has signed the note and a.greed to 
make payments and Sallaz has accepted said note, is information that Fi.rst Western, Sumner, Capital 
West and Sallaz would rather not have publicly disseminated; and 
WHEREAS, Sallaz, Sumner, Capital West and First Western in consideration ofthe delivery 
and acceptance of the Promissory Note on the terms thereon, all parties are willing to honor each 
parties' concerns that all of the tmns of this transaction, including the Promissory Note, remain in 
confidence. 
AGREElvfENT 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed between a!J parties as follows: 
I. Recitals. The foregoi og recitals are hereby incorporated by this 
reference and restated as if.set forth in full as part and parcel of this Agreement. 









lg] 00 2 
001299
r, 
06/J0/04 E 1 SMANN Lt\'ii' OFF . • 
2. CoIL.tJdentialit'/, It is understood an.d agreed that tJ1e confidentiality of all 
provisions of this Agreement and the ~on-disclomre and non-publication thereof subsequent to the 
e;ceci.ttion of this Agree::nent is a material part of the consideration recited herein. The parties 
acknowledge that the disclosure, dissemination o.r publication of the provision of this Agreement by 
any of said parties may adversely affect the others. The par6es do further stipulare and agree that 
none of the terms of th.is settlement or any oft.be agreements or payments herein, including the 
aforesaid Promissory Note, req_uire the filing by any of the parties of a federal I 099 fonn Qr any 
other notification either to the United States, or any department thereof or any state or any 
department thereof and none of the parties hereto shaJI make said filing wil'1out the written consent 
of aU parties. The parties acknowledge thar disclosure, dissemination or publication of the 
provisions of this Release, by any of these parties, may adversely affect tJ1e other parties in an 
amount that crumot be presently determined and would be difficult to determine the exact amount of 
damages if disclosure was made. Because of that difficulty it is agreed t11at any parties releasing my 
of said information sh.a.II pay the sum of S25,000.00 as Liquidated damages to the other parties. All 
parties' agreement not to disclose, disseminate, publish or ot1erwise make public information 
concerning.the agreement except and unless written consent of all L'1e parties hereto is obtained and 
except as may be necessary for a particular party to disclose information for his or its individual or 
corporate ta..-x or other court related purposes, shall be binding upon. the paities for a period of thirty 
(30) years from 'the execution hereof and is severable from all other agreements, teims, conditions 
and covenants set out herein, which terms shall remain in full force and effect notwithstanding any 
breach of the terms of this paragraph. 
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT, p.2 
14] OOJ 
001300
06/J0/04 IYED 09: 28 FAX 2'' .4498 EI Sii!ANN LAl7 OFF. • 
CAPITAL WEST, INC. 
President 
FIRST WESTERN, INC. 
President 
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Thi:; :s :: Jummc:ry Appraisal Report which is intended to comp£v wi:h the 
reporting requirements set forth under Standards Rule 2-2(c) of the 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. As such, it presents 
only limited discussions of the data, reasoning, and analyses that were used 
in the appraisal process to develop the appraiser's opinion of value. 
Supporting documentation concerning the data, reasoning, and analyses is 
retained in the appraiser's file. The depth of discussion contained in this 
report is specific to the needs of the client and for the intended use stated 
below. The appraiser is not responsible for unauthorized use of this report. 
Futhermore, in accordance with prior agreement between the client and the 
appraiser, this report is the result of a limited appraisal process in that 
certain allowable departures from specific guidelines of the Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice were invoked The intended 
user of this report is cautioned that the reliability of the value conclusion 
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Bevis, Cameron & Johnson, PA 
960 Broadway A venue 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
W. Bill Basham 
2701 N. 26th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Properties Owned By Real Homes LLC 
Canyon County, Idaho 
PURPOs:if op THE APPRAISAL: To estimate market value as defined 
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency under 12 CFR, Part 
34, Subpart C-Appraisals, 34-42 Definitions (f). 
'·lrl 




For the sole purpose of assisting the client in making a determination as 
to the most probable seUing price for the subject property if it were to 




EFFECTNE DA TE OF VALUE: 
August 30, 2005 
DATE OF THE REPORT: 
October 1, 2005 
ADVALOREM: 
According to the Office of the Canyon County Assessor, valuation of the subject 
properties for purposes of taxation is as follows: 
Parcel #5R161570100 (714 Smith Avenue, Nampa, Idaho) 
Land •.•..••••• , ••.• $32,000 
Improvements ••• $31,300 
Total ................... $63,300 (Year of2005) 
Parcel #SRJ29240120 (lliver..lide Road, CaldweU, Idaho) 
Land ................... $34,005 
Improve'.ments ••• $28,500 
,,,;,,·, . 
I • 
Total.'.~.~ .• '. ............ $62,505 (Year of2006) 
Parcel #5R329240000 (Riverside Road, Caldwell, Idaho) 
,:, 
Laud ........... : ....... $30,270 









Parcel #5R329240.1B (f,:,innide ,'imuJ, CaldwcU, Idaho) 
Land ................... $30,540 
Improvements .•• $5000 
Total ................... $35,540 (Year of2006) 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
For purposes of the Office of the Canyon County Assessor, the properties 
that are the subject of this report are legally described as follows: 
Tax O 1121, of the SWNE, Section l 7-3N-3W (Caldwell) 
Tax 01119, of the SWNE, Section 17-3N-3W (Caldwell) 
Tax O 1122, of the SWNE, Section 17-3N-3W (Caldwell) 
Tax 02625, of Lot 24, Westview Subdivision, Section 21-3N-2W 
(Nampa) 
The appraiser has researched the sales history of the subject parcels over the recent 
past. From within those sources that are readily available and typically considered 
to be reliable, none has not transferred ownenhip during that period of time. 
APPRAISAL DEVELOPMENT AND REPORTING PROCESS: 
The appraiser has made a physical inspection 'of each property, reviewed descriptive 
data that is of public record as found in the Office of the Canyon County Assessor 
- and considered comments provided by knowledgeable penons in the real estate 
industry. Information on similar small acreage properties that have either sold in 
the market -or are currently listed for safo- was gathered and analyzed. The 
sales comparison approach was then utilized to develop an opinion of market value, 
as well as a projection of the length of marketing time that will be required to 
achieve actual sale. 
,, . 
Per agree~~pt '\,Vith the client, the appraiser did not use the income approach (not 
typically considered meaningful for properties of this type), but did utilize the cost 
approach (for, those properties having stmctural improvements). However, under 
certain circumstances, any of these approaches might sometimes be considered 
meaniugful)n appraising properties of thi.~ type; as a consequence, the appraisal 
process did involl'e departure from Standards Rule 1-4(a) and (b)J, ii, iv,v, and vi . 
This limited appraisal report sets forth only a summary of the appraiser's 






DESCR1PTI ON OF RE,-\L EST_\ TE A.?PR. USED: 
The subject properties on River:iide Road, Caldwell, :ire located appro:ximately 3 1/2 
miles southwest of the City of Caldwell' 3 downtown business core district. The 
present profile of the more general neighborhood area is basically that of large 
working agricultural entities, numerous small acreage residential properties, and an 
increa1Ji.ng amount of higher density subdivision development of both entry level and 
''step-up buyer" single family homes. Primary focus is toward reasonably close 
access to major centers for goods, services, educational facilities, employment, etc., 
aJong with the amenities of a semi-rural living atmosphere. Marketing time 
requirements appear to be more or less in line to what is typical to this market area 
i.11 general, the supply-demand relationship for competitively priced properties 
remains basically in balance, and saJeiJ/fuiancing concessions of any meaningful 
degree are not in evidence at this point in time. 
The parcels are not located within a FEMA-identified flood prone area that requires 
special flood insurance participation. Present zoning is designated as rural 
residential (RR), which allows low density single family residential development. 
Public utilities and municipal services generally available include electrical power, 
telephone, and police/fire protection; a community well serves as a domestic wa tcr 
source for each property, however, individual :ieptic systems will be required. 
The configuration of one of the suhject land parcel<J is somewhat irregular 
(mangular), with the other two being of rectangular shape; general topography is 
basically flat to a gradual eastward slope. While two of the building sites are 
immediately adjacent to a paved public arteriaJ (Riverside Road), all will be 
accessed from a gravel surfaced private cul de sac Jane. The site sizes vary, and 
approximate some 1.06, 1.03, and 1.45 acres respectively; general topography 
appears basically level to a graduai easterly slope. 
The subject property addcssed as 714 Smith Avenue, Nampa, Idaho, is located 
approximately 1/2 mile west of the City ofNampa's central business core district-
basically bounded by Midland BJvd./12th Avenue South, and Nampa-Caldwell 
Btvd./Lone Star Road. The present profile of the more general neighborhood area 
appears somewhat m.iJi:ed, including older established subdivisioIDJ of entry level and 
"step-up" single family homes, newer in-fill residential development, and modest 
amounts of light neighborhood commen:iaL Primary focus is toward close 
locational pJiit:tjm.ity relative to major center for goods, services, educational 
facilities, employment, etc. Marketing time requirements appear to be more or less 
in line to ·what is typical to this market area in general, the supply-demand 
relationship for competitively priced properties remains basically in balance, and 
sales/rmantjng concessions of any meaningful degree are not in evidence at this 
point in time. 
This property approximates some 32,00o+ square feet (0. 74 acre) in total size, is of a 




( cc~pthi :Jut ir oa :1lj,wmt to Jn irr;g:nio.11 Jafonl., 'vl,l:iifo m.b ;'.lticr Jidcwalk, 
and .Jl!Y-e·i 3treet :1rteria.ls :in common to th i 3U'70l.lnomg n-dgnhornood areas, the 
Jubjeet froni3 to a portion oi Smith A nnue ,.lun has none >f rhese improvement3 at 
thi.3 point in time. The property is not located within a FEI\,,M.-identilled flood 
prone area that requires special flood insurance participation; present zoning is 
designated as. single family residential (R-S), which allom1 for low density 
development (one residence per 30,000 square feet of land area). While greater 
density might be achievable under the comprehensive plan for future growth, a 
rezone of the parcel would be requiroo (and cannot be viewed ss a certainty). AU 
public utilities and municipal services typically available within the Nampa city 
limits are either immediately available, or in close proximity to the subject parcel. 
' As previously indicated, two of the parcels are basically unimproved (the assessor 
has assigned a token value to a smaJI move-on house on one, however, it has as yet 
not been permanently affixed to the land); the two remaining parcels have had 
concrete foundation systems put in place and older move-on "shell" houses affued 
thereto (Smith Avenue and R.ivenide Road). 
According to public records, title to the 3Ubject properties is in the name of Real 
Homes LLC; no current listings or options to purchase were discovered in the 
cour.ie of this analysis. 
HIGHEST AND BEST USE: 
A.1 Though Vacant: 
The only legally permissable use of the subject properties is residential, and the likelihood 
of a zoning change would appear to be remote at this point in time. The only legally 
permissable use that is also physically possible would be a residential use. Consistent / 
with the legally permissable and pos.'{ible uses, the most viable financially feasible uses 
are judged to be residential, as there arc similar property profiles in the immediate 
neighborhood. The maximally productive highest and best use of the subject sites as 
though vacant, therefore, is judged to be as building lots for single family dwellings 
oriented toward a typical small acreage development profile. 
As Presently Improved: 
As previously.stated, there are no significant improvements to two of the subject 
properties at thl~ point in time; the building "shell" status of the third and fourth 
properties iJjudged to represent a modestly higher return to the land than if the sites were 
v:.icant. · 
S~YOFAi~ALYSISANDVALUATION: 
Following a review of historical market data pertaining to the past 12 months, those 
properties judged to be at least reasonably competitive to each of the subject land parcels 
'·~ 
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Lot 3, Block I, Artist View Subdv. 
28820 Farmway Road 
Goodson Road (Listing #98192473) 
1212 W. Logan 
Lot l, Block 1, Futurity Acres 
(Current Listings) 
Lot 10, Block 1, Hafen Hills Subdv. 
Wander Lane (Listing #98209875) 
16739 Boehner Road 
Goodson Road (Listing #98211056) 
Deer Flat Road (Listing #98188492) 
P1rcd 31::e: Dat! of Sale: Price: 
1.29 Acres 9-2005 $44,000 
l.42Acres 7-2005 $37,000 
1.7 Acres 3-2005 $34,900 
0.75 Acres 7-2005 $37,000 
2 Acres 3-2005 $48,900 
0.75 Acre 6-2005 $39,500 
0.65 Acre 7-2005 $45,000 
0.9 Acre 9-2005 $32,900 
I Acre 7-2005 $49,900 
2 Acres 1-2005 $35,000 
From a review of recent market activity for residential building sites within the subject's 
more general neighborhood marketing area (SW Nampa, SE Nampa, NW Nampa), it is 
apparent that the demand trend has been accelerating -- and most dramatically over the 
past several months. While the supply for such property type has been maintained by 
further subdivision of large agricultural parcels in greater Canyon County --- it would 
appear that those properties located closer-in are going to the higher premium in the 
market. Following a data search of available market information pertaining to the past 12 
months, those properties judged to be at least reasonably competitive to the subject land 
parcel located on Smith Avenue, Nampa, were accorded consideration and appear as 
follows: .•: 
·;',{' 
IdentifieatiJ~: Parcel Size: Date of Sale: Price: 
(Sales) ,. · 
147 Eimore'Aveiiue 
203 Elmore A venue 
,., 
0.32 Acre 9-2005 






·r:.e St~· R ... ·.!li ::.,;.c.'ng 19303323) 
J.73 Acre: 9-:ccs S49,00t, 
Fem 3tre~t 1.Lis[L1g #98193:5.:53) 
0.44 Ac:e 5-2005 $49,900 
Middleton Road {Listing#98137675) 
I.24Acres 8-2005 $56,000 
W. Iowa Avenue (Listing #98194590) 
1.12 Acres 7-2005 $61,500 
N. 4th Street (Listing #98193366) 
1.3 Acres 8-2005 $98,500 
Each of the properties comprising the array as presented above is of a similar locational 
status to that of the subject parcels, and all are judged to be at least reasonably 
competitive in terms of a most probable buyer profile. While some of the comparable 
sales are within platted subdivisions (which differs from the metes and bounds status of 
some of the subject parcels), any benefits of such circumstance is judged to be offset by 
the somewhat confining nature of the subdivision CC & R's. Observation of market 
activity for properties of this nature suggests that this buyer profile tends to more desirous 
of less restriction on how he is able to utilize his property than more, and in fact, may 
actually be willing to pay somewhat of a premium for this status; 
FINAL RECONCILIATION: 
From a review of the foregoing, it would appear that a supportable range in value on a per 
building site basis for those properties located on Riverside Road, Caldwell, would be 
roughly at the level of $33,000 - $48,000 - with the variance primarily a function of 
overall parcel size, locational status, offsite influences (traffic noise, consistency of 
surrounding improvement types, etc.), and site utility (topography/configuration). The 
estfrnate of a. most probabie selling price fur each parcel is as follows: 
Parcel #5R329240120 (1.45 Acres) ........ $45,000 
Parcel #5R329240110 (1.06 Acres) ........ $35,000 
Parcel #5R329240000 (1.03 Acres) ........ $35,000 
With regard tq the Smith Avenue property located in Nampa. Idaho --- under the 
restrictions ~['its'. existing zoning status -- a supportable range in value appears to be at 
the level of.$45,000 - $55,000, with stronger tendency to be toward mid-range. The 
estimate of ii most probable selling price for this parcel then, is as follows: 
Parcel #5.[{161.570100 (0.74 Acre) ......... $50,000 
In terms of the "move-on" shell residential structures that have been put in-place on the 
Smith Avenue site and one of the Riverside Road building sites, while both being of 






'N1Juid cvL :rib: .. ;.; :i:i a. higher .. ·etum to th:; m:dedy~ng lite :hnn .;.f th~ ~~d were y-;;_ :311t a.ac 
'.!va'1'10!'! for ·;,;e. ·vnile ob•.fously aver: subje~:i-t::: l!)prn:i:irnation ofwb.ai 'nc.-::menttl 
pric:! a buye" ;.n rhe ~arket might be willing to pay ior these in-place stru..,;:u..:tl she!l-,jpe 
improvemenrs, value recognition is nonetheless accorded as follows: 
714 Smith Avenue, Nampa ................ $7,000 (roughly approximating $3 per sq. ft.) 
Parcel #5R329240120 ...................... $23,000 (roughly approximating $12 per sq. ft.) 
fa summation, the most probable selling prices of the four properties owned by Real 
Homes LLC as identified within this report -- if marketed individually and under typical 
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::J ta .'1o. ·'2•1E-1.sr.d ,-------------------------------------'-=c~-----~ 
': . !: Z:~Nt; ~~eJrshe::J . · ;uO·ici~~. T8r:<r: ~rt:-._ mo· !1r.i 1;.:· ,:att?f;,:e: .. ; J1inimtcT . .i jire:: ·ec~nt :Gies d .,;roceltif..~ :nc7t -~ir.11[¥ 
Jnff proxi _ ~ :c !he:· -:uL1ect :;rcoer~yt0. ;~;oe~·~1icri: lrn J,e. :c1es; cnrnpn1itc-·.1· 2na1ysf~' ;;r;tf "i:1vc :;i3c·e :1 :i-L. 121 -~/ustmcnr ·Hhen 
1opr- : ';;,.' 'ri ,-e1!ec:, :he :na,ker ,"e2c, ion -c. J1ce ·:;;ms, 0li ,·iiJ~iliwlll ·1aria1ion. 'I, signfHc:mr item in l .:c1,;p;;rJ6i'e p1cper:y 
fs .iucc:ior J, :Jf mo1e, ;avor,abie' tiian;.cr.e ,obj.est :;ro9e1ty;i: have made: a.negaiive. adius1meni io reduc2 the adjusreo sales pric2 
af ihe comparab le Jnd', if 3 signiiicant item iil a comparable: property is inferior to, or less favorable lhan the subject prope1ty, I. 
have made :i positlveadjustmeni'to ir.1crease·the.adjustedl sales, price ofthe comparable. 
2. I. have taken into consideration the:factor:s that have an impact an 'Jalue: in my development of the estimate al market value in 
the appraisal report [ have not knowingly wilhheld.ant significant.information from the appraisal report and I believe, to the best 
of my knowiedge, Iha! all starements and informati@n: in !he appraisal report are true and correct. 
3. I staled, in the appraisal report, only my own:persanal(, unbiased, and professional analysis, opinions, and conclusions, 
which are s1bject only to the contingent and limiting condilionsspecified in !his farm. 
4. I have nn present or prospecfive inlerestin !he proper.ly that is the subject of this report, and I have no present or prospective-
personal in~rest or bias with respect to the participants irn !he, transaction: I did not base, either partially or completely, my, 
analysis and/or the estimate of market value im lhe appraisal rep@rt.on the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, 
or national origin of either the prospective owners or occupants of the subject properly or of the present owners or occupants 
of the properties in the vicinity of the subject p.roperty. 
5. I have- ro present or contemplated. future interest in: the subject: property, and. neither my current or future employment 
nor my corr pensalion: far performing:this'appraisal is conlingenton !he.appraised value of lhe property. 
6. 1, was nc t required to report. a predetermined value or direction: ih: value !hat favors the cause of the client or any related party, 
the amount of the value estimate,. the attainmen!'ofa specific:result, or the occurrence of a subsequent event in order to receive 
my compensation and/or emploY,ment fbr performing: the0appraisaL I did' not base the appraisal report on a requested minimum 
valuation,, a specific valuation, or the, need to approve a; speciH:c mortgage loan. 
7. I performed: this appraisal irn conlor,mily. witb• the: Uniform Stamdards.otPiDfessional Appraisal Practice that were-adopted 
and promul~ated by the Appraisal Stlmdards Board o~ The: Appraisal' foundation and. that were in place as of lhe etlective date of 
this apprais.il, with lhe exception of the, departure provision· ottncsa Standards, which does not apply. I acknowledge that an 
estimate oft l reasonable tiine for eitposure irr the, open mar1iet', is a; camdiliorn ih lhe definition of market value and' the estimate 
I developed is consistent with. the-marl<e!ing; iini:? noted' in. the: neighborhood section: of' this report, unless I have otherwise 
stated !h th: reccrici!iaticn s·action~ .1· 
8. I have p~rsonall.y inspected the: ln.terior and, exterior areas of:tne subject property and the, exterior of alt properties listed as 
comparabl1n in the appraisal, report. I, fur:thercertil.Y: that. rhave·Aated'any apparent or l<nown, adverse conditions fn the subject 
improvement's; an Ifie subject. sile; oran an)f' site witbin: !he, immeuiate: vicinity of.'the subject property of, which I am aware 
and have made adjustments lortllest!,adverse conditions ih; my analysis at the property value to. the extent that I had market 
evidence ta,support them:. I have also; commented aboot:.lhe,eifectof'the adverse conditions on the marketability of !he subject, 
properly. 
9. I personalty prepared all canelusions.andiopinions;abauUhe real estate lhal'were set forth in the appraisal; report: Jr I rclicdafJi 
significant i;rofessional assistance-frnm any ir,Jdh,ridua[ orindividi.Jals in the,p·erfarmance of the appraisal or lhC? preparation of 
theappraisaj! report, I have named such;individual(s}amfdisclosed !he specific tasks:pertarmedby them in the reconciliation 
section of !tis appraisal roport 1·certify that any individual so named is qualified to perform the tasks. I have not authorized 
anyone to wake a chang:e ta·any item in the report·: therefore• it an unau!hor.ized change is made ta the. appraisal report, I will talte 
no responsibility lor it. · 
SlUJIJll!EiJlllliOOJJil'Y JIIJl'll'!l!W$lE:Pd'$ CiEilllt!IF.itl!~lT!@W; !f. a supwi~ory appraiser signed the appraisal report, he oi she certifies and' 
agrees that: t directly supewise lhe appraiser who: prepared the-appraisal-report, have reviewed: the appraisal:repart; agrne with 
the sratemerats and conclustons of· the.appraiser, agieeto be bound/ by the appraise(s certifications numbered 4 through 7 above, 
and am taking, fult resporl§ibilily for the-appraisal, and the appraisal report.. 
!IIDIID~IESS rmlF :Jl'ffi!IDIJl>Eill'IT'f rui"PMIJ$tE!ID: _H_I~9_0~e'ir_el~an~ct~B_lvd='."-, Cil=ld\v~el=f"-, T=da-"-h-"-o"'B3c..c6.c.,;05'--------- ------
Afll'Ml!Sli:!iil: 
Signature: !!.V3 o· ·.~ka4f 
Name: W: Bill Basham 
Date Signed August 18, 200s 
State Certification #: _CAA~·~-~·5=3 _________ _ 
or State Ucens·e #: 
Slate: ~fdah~c~--------------
bplration D,1te:of Certification or License: 4-!Bs20'o6, 
F1oddlt Mac fo1m 439 (&/9!, 1MO) PalJ•·2ol 2' 







Expiration Date of Certifi cation or License: 
0 Did D Did Nat Inspect Property 
fhll lo,m ,,,_, ,cproducod by Unllcd s,,10m,,S0ltwve Comf)3ny (BOO} 969-8727 
faJ111le 1.t1,-Foun 100-0&(Sf.)S) 
,. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 






EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 




DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD Chtd., SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD PLLC, and SALLAZ LAW Chtd. 
and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an 
Idaho Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, 
Chtd, Inc. an Idaho Corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
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DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative capacity of ) 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD Chtd. and SALLAZ ) 
AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
vs. 
EUGENE (Roy) RICE and JANET RICE, 
Husband and wife, 










Defendants/Counterclaimants hereby give notice of errors and corrections m their 
Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim, filed May 12, 2014. 
Number 160, page 22, should read: "Counterclaimants are entitled to an award of 
punitive damages pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-1604 for Counterdefendants' conduct related to the 
Sumner Matter." 
Number 183, section e, page 25, should read: "Counterclaimants are entitled to an award 
of punitive damages pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-1604 for Counterdefendants' conduct related to 
the Sumner Matter." 
Number 241, section c, page 31, should read: "Counterclaimants are entitled to an award 
of punitive damages pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-1604 for Counterdefendants' conduct related to 
the Sumner Matter." 
Number 331, page 43, should read: "Counterclaimants seek the recovery of punitive 
damages against Counterdefendants on their claims of legal malpractice, unjust enrichment, and 
fraud for Counterdefendants' conduct related to the Sumner Matter and in such amounts as will 
be proven at trial." 
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DATED this / J day of May 2014. 
By: C,~~e 
~ J. KA LEBECKER 
:omey for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this _!!__ day of May 2014, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ERRATA SHEET was served upon counsel as follows: 
William Fuhrman 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman & Gourley 
225 N. 9th St., Ste 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
V. K. Smith 
1900 W. Main 
Boise, ID 83702 
Gabriel McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St. #302 
Boise, ID 83 702 





__ Personal Delivery 
_k_ Facsimile 
US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
_K__ Facsimile 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
and Third-Party Defendants 
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Vernon K. Smith (ISB 1365) 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
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JUND I 2014 
QtlblTOflN~A D. AICH, Clerk 
a, ffAOfi LNfflMlY Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129 
William A. Fuhrman (ISB 2932) 
Erika P. Judd (ISB 8241) 
JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 
Post Office Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: 208-331-1170 
Facsimile: 208-331-1529 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 





EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants. 
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DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his ) 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD Chtd. And SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD ) 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional ~ 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ ) 





DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 














EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, ) 





COMES NOW Counterdefendants Dennis J. Sallaz ("Sallaz"), an individual and in his 
representative capacity of Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc., 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sallaz and Gatewood") by and through their counsel of 
record, and pursuant to the Court's (January 24, 2014) Order Setting Proceedings and Trial, 
submits this pretrial memorandum. The parties are meeting for their attorney conference this 
afternoon, June 5, 2014. Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs' Pretrial Witness 
and Exhibit Disclosure is submitted contemporaneous to this Memorandum. It is further 
anticipated that counsel for Plaintiff/Third-Party Plaintiff will be submitting his own Pretrial 
Memorandum. 
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A. DEFENSES OF COUNTERCLAIMANTS' CASE AND ELEMENTS OF 
COUNTERDEFENDANTS'CASE 
Generally speaking, though pled as alternative claims for relief, Counterclaimants' claims 
for (1) unjust enrichment; (2) legal malpractice); and, (3) breach of fiduciary duty all arise out of 
the same allegations and state the same claim for damages - namely, that (unspecified) 
Counterdefendants engaged in conflict of interest transactions (the Real Homes/Real Properties 
transaction), failed to properly account for sums due to the Counterclaimants (the Sumner 
Matter), and/or failed to pay funds due to Counterclaimants (Promissory notes; Vista Pawn, and 
the Sumner Matter). In order of the claims asserted, Counterclaimants plead the following: 
1. Action for Collection on Promissory Notes 
a. $10,800 and $10,000 
2. Unjust Enrichment (Count Three) 1 
a. Promissory Notes - $10,800 and $10,000 
b. Vista Pawn - $61,000 
c. Sumner Matter - $40,000 loan, allegedly giving rise to $387,000 in damages 
d. Punitive Damages as to the Sumner Matter only 
3. Legal Malpractice (Count Four) 
a. Real Homes/Real Properties - unspecified 
b. Sumner Matter- $387,000 
c. Promissory Notes - $20, 800 
1 Summary Judgment was previously entered on Counterclaimants' claims for: Action to Recover Funds 
in Trust Account (Count Two); Legal Malpractice - breach of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Count Four); Conversion -promissory notes (Count Seven); Foreclosure of Lien (Count Nine); Aiding 
and Abetting the Commission of a Tortious Act (Count Ten); Violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act (Count Eleven); Civil Racketeering (Count Twelve). See Amended Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Counterdefendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, June 20, 2013. 
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d. Vista Pawn - $61,000 
e. Punitive Damages as to the Sumner Matter only 
4. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count Five) 
a. (Same as legal malpractice claim) 
5. Fraud (Count Six) 
a. Sumner Matter- $387,000 
b. Punitive Damages 
6. Conversion (Count Seven) 
a. Two All-Terrain Vehicles-2002 Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha 
b. A TV Trailer 
c. Winnebago Motorhome2 
7. Claim and Delivery (Count Eight/ 
a. Two All-Terrain Vehicles - 2002 Yamaha and a 1998 Yamaha 
b. A TV Trailer 
2 The Court did not specifically address this claim in its Amended Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Counterdefendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, June 20, 2013. Summary Judgment was 
sought on the Rices' claims for conversion and for foreclosure of lien on the motorhome. The Court 
specifically granted summary judgment upon the foreclosure oflien claim but omitted a finding on the 
conversion claim. As briefed previously, absent a right to foreclose upon the motorhome, there can be no 
claim that Sallaz, the owner of the motorhome, is wrongfully in possession of the motorhome and Rices' 
claim for conversion must therefore be dismissed. 
3 Counts I, 6, and 7 are personal claims against Dennis Sallaz. Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 all sound in 
professional malpractice and state nearly identical claims for relief, regardless of how titled. As to each 
of these claims, Counterclaimants make general allegations against all Counterdefendants, collectively. 
Given the existence of several legally distinct entities and parties, it is anticipated that this will become an 
issue during trial. 
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Counterdefendants have raised the following defenses and affirmative defenses to 
Counterclaimants' claims: 
1. Counterclaimants' claim for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by set-off 
for various amounts due and owing Counterdefendants. 
2. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by their negligence, fault and legal 
responsibility. 
3. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the negligence, fault or liability of third 
parties for whom Counterdefendants are not legally responsible. 
4. Counterclaimants have failed to mitigate their alleged damages, if any. 
5. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, equitable 
estoppel, and judicial estoppel, and fraud. 
6. Counterclaimants' damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced in that the damages 
sought by Counterclaimants' could have been avoided if Counterclaimants had acted reasonably 
prior to filing their counterclaim. 
7. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by the 
doctrine of unclean hands. 
8. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. 
9. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
10. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
11. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
12. Some or all of Counterclaimants' claims are barred because they should have 
been raised in the pending Canyon County lawsuit, CV 2009-11855. 
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13. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, 
including but not limited to, Idaho Code§§ 5-216, 5-217, 5-219, 5-222, 5-224. 
14. Counterclaimants' claims are barred or reduced by Counterclaimants' own breach 
of the subject agreements which are alleged to have been entered into. 
15. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred by the failure of 
Counterclaimants to substantially perform the terms of the alleged agreements. 
16. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by a failure to provide the consideration 
which forms the basis of certain of the agreements at issue. 
17. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
18. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to post an undertaking required 
by Idaho Code§ 8-303. 
B. CONTESTED FACTS 
Although convoluted by personal feelings between the parties, the facts, or lack thereof, 
supporting this case are relatively straightforward4: When deposed, Mr. Rice was unaware of the 
nature or extent of the claims asserted against Counterdefendants, except that they related to the 
Cadillac. Mr. Rice was unable to provide facts relied upon to support any of the malpractice 
claims and consistently retreated to the refrain "I trusted Denny." Thus, through the course of 
discovery, it became clear that the claims were being driven by counsel and that the Rices were 
ignorant of the claims asserted on their behalf. As far as the facts supporting the claims are 
concerned, nearly all facts are contested by both sides. Generally speaking, Counterdefendant 
Sallaz denies that any consideration was exchanged with respect to the personal property claims 
(the promissory notes, as well as the ATVs and the trailer). Regarding the Vista Pawn debt, 
4 See also Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, attached hereto as Exhibits A and B for the 
convenience of the Court. 
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Counterdefendant Sallaz denies that, with the exception of one ring, he personally obtained 
property from Vista Pawn and that the divorce court's assignment of that debt to him does not 
alter the fundamental lack of a debtor/creditor relationship between Vista Pawn and its debtor, 
Ms. Baird. Moreover, Mr. Sallaz contends that this claim is time barred given the fact that Vista 
Pawn was sold in or around 2003. 
As regards the Sumner Matter, Mr. Sallaz denies that he represented Mr. Rice in 
connection with a loan to Steve Sumner and further denies that he was retained to collect any 
alleged amounts due from Steve Sumner in connection with the Sawtooth Energy Reserves 
matter. Sallaz specifically relies upon all pleadings and the settlement documents from that 
matter wherein it is clear that the amounts recovered by Sallaz were for past-due legal fees owing 
to Mr. Sallaz and his law firm. Mr. Sumner has filed an affidavit that Mr. Rice loaned him 
$10,000 but that it was repaid in or around 1990. Rice however claims that he loaned $40,000 
(the amount claimed has changed over the course of discovery and has never been tied to a 
particular damage claim apart from pleadings generally averring entitlement to the entirety of the 
proceeds obtained by Dennis Sallaz for unpaid legal fees) to Steve Sumner, through Dennis 
Sallaz, and that he understood that Mr. Sallaz was collecting the balance due upon this loan in 
connection with the Sawtooth Energy Reserves Case. Mr. Rice has failed to identify a single 
document to support the existence of this loan, the terms thereof, or any alleged balance due 
upon the same apart from a letter from Mr. Sallaz asking that the Rice loan be included in the 
settlement proceeds from the Sawtooth Energy Reserves case. Mr. Sallaz claims that this request 
was withdrawn once he was informed that the $10,000 loaned to Steve Sumner had already been 
repaid. Again, the statute of limitations remains at play for this claim. See also Memorandum in 
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Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Finally, with respect to the Real Homes/Real Properties Transaction, the factual and legal 
background for this claim was briefed pursuant to Counterdefendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and is incorporated herein by this reference. 
C. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW 
First and foremost, the majority of Counterclaimants' claims are time-barred. 
Counterdefendants' previously sought summary judgment upon Counterclaimants' claims for 
this reason and were granted relief on some, but not all, of Counterclaimants' claims. Instead, 
the court concluded that there were issues of fact on the affirmative defense of estoppel argued 
by Counterclaimants and deferred a ruling upon those claims. This issue remains germane and 
dispositive pending additional proof at the trial of this matter. Absent proof that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel applies, a burden which rests with Counterclaimants, it is undisputed that 
Counterclaimants' claims for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, 
fraud and conversion are untimely and subject to dismissal. 
Moreover, on a substantive basis, Counterclaimants' claims suffer from several glaring 
deficiencies as a matter of law. For instance, the Real Homes/Real Properties legal malpractice 
claim is not brought by the real party in interest, i. e, the party to the real estate purchase and sale 
agreement, Real Properties, LLC. Similarly, the existence and scope of an attorney-client 
relationship with respect to the claims asserted is contested; as are the remainder of the elements 
for each of Counterclaimants' claims - not the least of which being damages. The Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision in Berry v. McFarland, has been relied upon extensively by the Rices 
to assert that a continuing legal relationship existed between the parties, thus tolling the statute of 
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limitations. However, Idaho Code § 5-219 makes clear that the cause of action for professional 
malpractice accrues "as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the 
limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages 
resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the 
injured party and the alleged wrongdoer." LC. § 5-219(4) (emphasis added). See also 
Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 137, 90 P.3d at 887 ("An attorney's duty arises out of the contract 
between the attorney and his or her client." ( citing Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 704, 652 
P.2d 650, 652 (1982) ( "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the 
purposes for which the attorney is retained.")). 
The existence and scope of the attorney client relationship with respect to each of the 
specific claims made remains an issue for the trier of fact but the application of the statute of 
limitations as to each individual claim must be determined by the claim and the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the claim, not by any continuing professional relationship between 
Rice and Sallaz. 
Finally, it is anticipated that despite the entry of summary judgment on nearly half of 
Counterclaimants' claims, Counterclaimants contend that these claims remain at issue for trial 
pursuant to an allegation that Sallaz had a duty to advise the Rices of the statute of limitations 
upon which the claims were dismissed. This argument is without legal or factual support. 
D. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
The evidentiary issues in this matter are numerous and will reqmre considerable 
attention. The evidentiary issues that plague this case include, but are not limited to: 
1. Hearsay - The Rices' depositions illustrate that the Rices have no personal 
knowledge of the facts relied upon to support the majority of the claims asserted in this matter. 
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• 
For instance, with respect to the Cadillac, Mr. Rice did not personally make a loan and has no 
personal knowledge with respect to the underlying claim of lien. Instead, Mr. Rice will attempt 
to rely upon conversations with Michael Rice. Michael Rice is deceased and any reliance upon 
comments and/or information obtained from Michael Rice is inadmissible hearsay. 
2. Lack of Foundation - The Rices seek to rely almost exclusively upon documents 
obtained from Mr. Sallaz. Many of these documents are unsigned and lack foundation, 
regardless of source. 
3. Relevance - there are significant relevance issues with respect to the majority of 
the exhibits currently listed on Defendants/Counterclaimants' exhibit list. For instance, the 
majority of the documents generated or produced during the course of the Sallaz divorce are 
irrelevant to the determination of any issues pending before this Court. In particular, claims in 
regard to the Machem estate, any alleged unsigned (and therefore inadmissible) confidentiality 
agreement, comingling of client trust accounts, issues with the IRS, and claims regarding 
uncharged criminal conduct, i.e., perjury, etc., are irrelevant. 
4. Collateral Matters - As illustrated at the prior hearing on this matter held on May 
29, 2014, counsel for Counterclaimants has a tendency to exaggerate and to make inflammatory 
comments which are unsupported by facts or evidence in the record. Given the lack of proof in 
this case, there is a significant and real concern that counsel intends to make this case about 
argument, rather than evidence. Judge Wilper previously expressed a similar concern, as well, 
during the status conference conducted on June 4, 2013, at which time he referenced a mistrial in 
a case recently conducted before Judge Hansen and noted a concern, particularly with respect to 
Mr. Becker, regarding the line between zealous advocacy and unfairly prejudicial comments and 
innuendo. Consequently, the Court warned Mr. Becker that comments regarding stalking, 
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e 
surveillance, murder, and other innuendo would not be tolerated and would be grounds for a 
mistrial. Similar concerns remain at this time, especially in light of the inflammatory, 
unsupportable, and prejudicial arguments advanced by counsel at the last hearing in this matter. 
Counterdefendants thus seek an in limine order precluding counsel from such diversionary and 
prejudicial tactics during the trial of this case. In particular, any comments (by counsel or by 
witnesses) regarding the Internal Revenue Service, pending investigations by any law 
enforcement entities, prosecutors, or the Idaho State Bar, criminal acts or allegations regarding 
the same, "perjury," comingling of trust accounts that are completely unrelated to the parties to 
this action, and other innuendo should be strictly curtailed. Given the inherent prejudice in these 
kinds of comments, an in limine ruling expressly precluding the same should be once again 
entered. Moreover, in the event these comments continue and a mistrial is warranted, 
Counterdefendants will be seeking an award of attorney fees and costs. 
Along similar lines, it should go without further argument or briefing that any references 
to offers of settlement or liability insurance should be strictly prohibited. I.R.E. 408 and 411. 
E. AGREED OR STIPULATED FACTS 
The parties agree only that Rice and Sallaz were personal friends for many years. 
F. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ON ISSUES OF LA w5 
1. Unjust Enrichment: 
In Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., supra, the Idaho Supreme Court succinctly set 
forth the law in Idaho with regard to a claim for unjust enrichment: 
Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract implied in 
law. Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). "A 
5 See also Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, attached hereto. 
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contract implied in law ... 'is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the 
purpose of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the intent of the agreement of 
the parties .... ' " Id. The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim "is not the actual 
amount of the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it would 
be unjust for one party to retain." Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 
463,466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant 
received a benefit and of proving the amount of the benefit which the defendants unjustly 
retained. Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1017, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.1992). 
147 Idaho at 388-389, 210 P.3d at 73-74. 
A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was a 
benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such 
benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the 
defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. Vanderford 
Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557-558, 165 P.3d 261, 271-272 (2007) (citing Aberdeen-
Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917,923 (1999)). 
2. Legal Malpractice: 
Under Idaho law, the elements of a legal malpractice action are: (1) the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) failure to 
perform the duty; and (4) negligence on the part of the lawyer proximately causing damage to the 
client. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 135, 90 P.3d 884 (2004); Johnson v. Jones, 103 
Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650 (1982). Stated in slightly different terms, the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove: (1) that an attorney has been negligent or failed to act with proper skill and that 
damages resulted therefrom; and (2) that the negligence of the attorney was the proximate cause 
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM -12 
001337
of the client's damage. Johnson, 103 Idaho at 706 (citing Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wn. App. 433, 
437,628 P.2d 1336 (1981)). 
"The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the purposes for 
which the attorney is retained." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845, 243 P.3d 642, 661 
(2010) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702,704,652 P.2d 650,652 (1982)). 
"An action to recover damages for 'professional malpractice' must be commenced within 
two years after the cause of action has accrued." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659, 
201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009) (citing Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 
(2002); LC. §§ 5-201 & 5-219(4)). The cause of action for professional malpractice accrues "as 
of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not 
be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any 
continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged 
wrongdoer." LC.§ 5-219(4). 
"The statute of limitations for professional malpractice does not begin to run until the 
plaintiff would have a cause of action against the professional." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 
Idaho 656, 61, 201 P.3d 629, 34 (2009) (citing Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249,254,678 P.2d 
41, 46 (1984)). 
Id. 
Because some damage is required to have a cause of action for negligence, the 
cause of action cannot accrue until there is some damage. Id. "[S]ome damage is 
required because it would be nonsensical to hold that a cause of action is barred 
by the statute of limitations before that cause of action even accrues." Lapham v. 
Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396, 400 (2002). Negligence that increases 
the risk that a client will be harmed does not trigger the running of the statute of 
limitations until harm actually occurs. Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingill, 140 
Idaho 480, 95 P .3d 631 (2004). In addition, there must be objective proof that 
would support the existence of some actual damage. Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 
Idaho 482,487, 835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992). 
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3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty: 
The allegations and claimed damages for the Rices' claim for breach of fiduciary duty are 
indistinguishable from the claim for legal malpractice. In order "[t]o establish a claim for breach 
of fiduciary duty, [a] plaintiff must establish that defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty and 
that the fiduciary duty was breached." Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 769, 
203 P.3d 694,699 (2009) (citing Tolley v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253,261, 92 P.3d 503, 511 (2004) 
( citation omitted)). 
"Fiduciary relationships are commonly characterized by one party placing 
property or authority in the hands of another, or being authorized to act on behalf 
of the other." Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 603, 150 P.3d 288, 
296 (2006). This Court explored in greater detail the bases of fiduciary 
relationships in Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc.: The term 
fiduciary implies that one party is in a superior position to the other and that such 
a position enables him to exercise influence over one who reposes special trust 
and confidence in him .... As a general rule, mere respect for another's judgment 
or trust in this character is usually not sufficient to establish such a relationship. 
The facts and circumstances must indicate that the one reposing the trust has 
foundation for his belief that the one giving advice or presenting arguments is 
acting not in his own behalf, but in the interests of the other party. 121 Idaho 266, 
278, 824 P.2d 841, 853 (1991) (emphasis in original) (quoting Burwell v. S.C. 
Nat'/ Bank, 288 S.C. 34, 340 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1986)). 
High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. v. Sargent, 149 Idaho 423,428, 234 P.3d 747, 752 (2010). 
4. Fraud: 
The prima facie case of fraud requires: 
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge 
of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; ( 5) his intent that it should be acted on by 
the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance 
of its falsity; (7) his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) his 
consequent and proximate injury. 
Id. The allegations contained in the Amended Counterclaim mimic the language of the elements 
of a claim for fraud and all arise out of the same facts which form the basis for Rices' 
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malpractice claims. Thus, although pled as a claim for fraud, each of the allegations arise out of 
the performance of professional services and are therefore subject to the statute of limitations for 
professional malpractice claims. "The appropriate statute of limitation is determined by the 
substance of the claim, not the form of the action, and the first analytical step is to classify [the] 
cause of action so the applicable statute of limitations can be used to determine whether the 
claim is time barred." McCormack v. Caldwell, 152 Idaho 15, 19, 266 P.3d 490, 94 (Ct. App. 
2011) (internal quotations omitted). 
5. Conversion: 
"A cause of action for conversion accrues as soon as the property is wrongfully taken or 
retained." Freiberger v. Am. Triticale, Inc., 120 Idaho 239, 241, 815 P.2d 437, 439 (1991) (citing 
Davidson v. Davidson, 68 Idaho 58, 63, 188 P.2d 329, 334 (1947); Havird v. Lung, 19 Idaho 790, 115 P. 
930 (1911)). The applicable statute of limitations for conversion is three years. LC. § 5-218 ("an action 
for taking, detaining . . . including actions for the specific recovery of personal property" must be 
commenced within three years.) 
6. Claim and Delivery: 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-218, "an action for taking, detaining ... including actions for the 
specific recovery of personal property" must be commenced within three years. 
G. MISC. ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED: 
As the Court is aware, there are both personal and professional claims asserted against 
Dennis Sallaz, individually, and in his representative capacity of various law firms. Vernon K. 
Smith is counsel for Mr. Sallaz on the personal matters and William A. Fuhrman and Erika P. 
Judd are counsel for Mr. Sallaz and the law firms on the claims that sound in professional 
malpractice. The Court, Judge Wilper, previously entered an Order Regarding Conduct of Trial 
in this matter which Order is attached hereto for the convenience of the Court. Subject to the 
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request for an additional two preemptory challenges for Counterdefendants, this Order remains 
appropriate. In addition, while it is typically the practice that only one attorney per side is 
permitted to inquire of a witness, given how muddled the claims are and the division of parties in 
this case, it is anticipated that, within reason and depending on the witness, Counterdefendants 
may be requesting leave of this general rule. 
Finally, it is anticipated the Court's in limine ruling regarding speaking objections and 
testimonial questions applies equally to counsel for all parties. 
Dated this 5th day of June, 2014. 
JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
By~(t;~~(l_i);..,._____J,,e,,,, ___ - _ 
William A. Fuhrman-Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Counterdefendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of June, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing document was forwarded by the method indicated and to the following: 
J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Gabriel McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St. #302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Vernon K. Smith (ISB 1365) 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
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husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants. 
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DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his ~ 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD Chtd. And SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD ) 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional ) 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ ) 





DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 













EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, ~ . 
husband and wife, ) 
Third-Party Defendants. 
) 
) _______________ ) 
COMES NOW Counterdefendants, Dennis Sallaz in his representative capacity of Sallaz 
and Gatewood Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc., and Sallaz and Gatewood Law 
Offices, PLLC, and Sallaz Law, Chtd. ("Counterdefendants"), by and through their counsel of 
record William A. Fuhrman, of the firm JONES+ GLEDHILL+ FUHRMAN+ GOURLEY, 
P.A., and submits the following memorandum in support of motion for partial summary 
judgment. 




On May 14, 2012, more than a year after this litigation commenced, Counterdefendants 
filed their Motion for Summary Judgment as to the majority of the claims asserted by 
Counterclaimants. The Motion was supported by a memorandum of law and the Affidavit of 
William A. Fuhrman. In response to the motion for summary judgment, Counterclaimants 
submitted the Affidavit of Eugene Rice on May 21, 2012 ("Rice Affidavit"). Based upon 
numerous evidentiary deficiencies, Counterdefendants filed a motion to strike the Rice Affidavit 
on May 30, 2012. 
On June 1, Counterclaimants' filed their objection and response to Counterdefendants' 
motion for summary judgment, together with the Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker. On June 14, 
2012, Counterclaimants filed the Affidavits of Tim Birkle and Skye Hallett in objection and 
response to Counterdefendants' motion for summary judgment. These affidavits were also 
subject to a motion to strike filed by Counterdefendants on or about June 21, 2012. The record 
having been fully submitted, and there being no genuine issue of material fact as to the claims 
upon which summary judgment was requested, , Counterdefendants filed their Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on June 21, 2012. 
Counterdefendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the Hon. 
Michael McLaughlin on June 28, 2012. However, given the procedural posture of the case and 
the Court's decision to permit Counterclaimants to file an amended counterclaim, the Court 
declined to take oral argument or to issue a ruling upon Counterdefendants' motion for summary 
judgment and related motions to strike. 
This matter having been fully briefed previously, Counterdefendants hereby incorporate 
by this reference the entirety of their first Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
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Judgment, together with the Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Moreover, to the extent Counterclaimants seek to take a position and/or allege inconsistent legal 
and/or factual positions than those previously asserted in opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Counterdefendants respectfully submit that the doctrine of estoppel should preclude 
such a change in position. 
Subsequent to the filing of Counterdefendants' (first) motion for summary judgment, on 
July 25, 2012, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision permitting Counterclaimants to file 
their First Amended Counterclaim. Counterclaimants later requested and were granted leave to 
file a Second Amended Counterclaim which was filed on or about January 8, 2013. In 
substance, the Second Amended Counterclaim is similar in material respect to the original 
counterclaim upon which Counterdefendants' previously filed their motion for summary 
judgment, with the addition of a claim for Civil Racketeering in violation of Idaho Code § 18-
7805. In addition, Counterdefendants were permitted leave to add Sallaz Law Chtd. and Sallaz 
and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC, as parties to this action. 1 Finally, Counterdefendants were 
granted leave to pursue a claim for amounts alleged to be due and owing pursuant to an alleged 
trade out agreement between Sallaz and Rice. This claim was previously alleged and pursued in 
Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. The factual allegations supporting this claim were 
previously set forth in the initial counterclaim; the amendment, however, permitted 
Counterclaimants to add this claim to the relief sought herein. 
Pursuant to the Second Amended Counterclaim, Rice alleges a total of fourteen claims 
against Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood. See generally Second Amended Counterclaim. For the 
1 Apart from a claim that Dennis Sallaz was associated with each of these entities at a particular point in 
time, there are no factual allegations of actions taken by, or particular to, any of the named Jaw firms. See generally 
Second Amended Counterclaim. For this reason, the Jaw firms are collectively referred to hereinafter as "Sallaz and 
Gatewood." 
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professional malpractice claims, Rice relies primarily upon two transactions/business dealings 
between Sallaz and Rice: (1) the Real Homes/Real Properties contract for sale executed in 
January, 2006; and, (2) R&R Investments, Inc., and the allegedly related Sumner Matter.2 
In addition to the malpractice claims asserted against Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood, 
Rice has asserted several claims against Sallaz, individually, for (1) collection on two promissory 
notes; (2) conversion of two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), a trailer, a motorhome, and "funds"; (3) 
claim and delivery of the aforementioned ATVs and trailer; (4) foreclosure of lien on the 
motorhome; (5) quiet title to the 1954 Cadillac; and finally, (6) slander of title on the 1954 
Cadillac. 
Now, nearly a year after initially filing the Motion for Summary Judgment, further 
· discovery having been conducted, there remains no genuine issue of material fact as to the 
majority of Counterclaimants' claims and entry of summary judgment as to Counts II, III, N, V, 
VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII of the Second Amended Counterclaim is warranted. 3 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts of this matter are straight forward and, as to · all material factual matters, 
indisputable. Dennis Sallaz and Roy Rice had been close friends for more than 25-years. Over 
the course of their friendship Sallaz, an attorney presently practicing at Sallaz and Gatewood, 
PLLC, occasionally provided legal services at the request of, or on behalf of, Mr. Rice and his 
family, friends, employees, and businesses. Second Amended Counterclaim, ,i,i 14, 23, 24; 
2 See Second Amended Counterclaim, Count II: Action to Recover Sums Deposited in Trust Account; 
Count III: Unjust Enrichment; Count IV: Legal Malpractice and Professional Negligence; Count V: Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty; Count VI: Fraud; Count X: Aid and Abet Commission of a Tortious Act; and, Count XI: Violation 
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Notwithstanding the different titles, each of these claims is premised upon 
the same or substantially similar factual allegations. 
3 See Second Amended Counterclaim (Count II: Action to Recover Sums Deposited in Trust Account; 
Count III: Unjust Enrichment; Count IV: Legal Malpractice and Professional Negligence; Count V: Breach of 
Fiduciary Duties; Count VI: Fraud; Count VII: Conversion; Count VIII: Claim and Delivery; Count IX: Foreclosure 
of Lien; Count X: Aiding and Abetting in the Comission (sic) of a Tortious Act; Count XI: Violation of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act, LC.§ 48-601 et seq.; Count XII: Civil Racketeering (Violation ofl.C. § 18-7805)). 
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Verified Reply to Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
(hereinafter, "Reply to Counterclaim"), iJ5. For instance, and particularly during the early 
1990s, Sallaz assisted Rice with the formation of several entities. Second Amended 
Counterclaim, ,i 23; Second Fuhrman Ajf., Exhibit A.4 In addition, Rice (and/or Janet Rice) at 
times served as an officer or director in several entities in which Sallaz was a shareholder and/or 
owner, including R-R Investments, Inc. See Id.; See also Exhibit 0. Of the ~ntities formed by 
Sallaz for or on behalf of Rice, the vast majority were dissolved or forfeited in the 1990s. See Id. 
Among other business enterprises, Roy Rice and his wife, Janet Rice, were shareholders 
in A Vista Pawn, Inc. Second Fuhrman Ajf., Exhibit B. Prior to its dissolution in 2004, Dennis 
Sallaz maintained an open account with A Vista Pawn, Inc. Id., Exhibit C, p. 9, 11. 3-14; p. 20, 1. 
7 - p. 22, I. 15; Second Amended Counterclaim, ff 27, 28. Pursuant to an agreement between 
Rice and Sallaz, Sallaz was entitled to an offset against amounts owed to A Vista Pawn for legal 
services provided. See Id. However, in or around 2003, Rice sold the pawn shop businesses to a 
third-party, GNP Properties of Idaho, LLC and/or GNP of Idaho, Inc. See Second Fuhrman Ajf., 
Exhibit B; See also Id., Exhibit C, p. 46, -11. 14-\6 (''Now, I have to be honest ~th you. I so~d 
Vista Pawn about-three years ago."). Pursuant to the Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement, GNP 
Properties purchased "all assets" of Vista Pawn, Inc., as defined by the parties' agreements. 
Second Fuhrman Ajf., Exhibit Q; See also Exhibit R (Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement). 
4 Capital Broadcasting, Inc., incorporated 9/28/94 and forfeited 12/2/96; Western Broadcasting, Inc., 
incorporated 9/28/94 and forfeited 12/2/96; Far Less Auto Rental, Inc., incorporated 12/17/91 and forfeited 12/2/96; 
A Fantasy Limos, Inc., incorporated 12/17 /91 and forfeited 12/1/95; B B Auto Sales and Repairs, Inc., incorporated 
12/11/91 and forfeited 12/2/96; Aztec Precast Inc., incorporated 9/20/89 and forfeited 12/3/90; Ultimate Arms, Inc., 
incorporated 8/27/99 and administratively dissolved 11/8/02; Luxury Inc., incorporated 2/21/95 and administratively 
dissolved 2/6/98; Clearwire Wireless Communications, Inc., incorporated 12/30/05 and administratively dissolved 
3/7/08; Advanced Technology Systems, Inc., incorporated 12/19/96 and administratively dissolved 3/8/01; Real 
Properties, LLC was formed 1/4/06 and continues to exist. Rice also claims that Rentals & Royalties, Inc., flea R-R 
Investments, Inc., incorporated 1/19/90 and forfeited 12/2/% was formed on his behalf. See Second Amended 
Counterclaim, ,i 23. As discussed herein, this claim is without merit. 
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The last annual report for A Vista Pawn, Inc., was filed in 2003 and the corporation was 
administratively dissolved as of April 7, 2004. Second Fuhrman Aff., Exhibit B. 
In 2004, Sallaz and his ex-wife, Renee Baird ("Baird"), commenced divorce proceedings, 
Ada County Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M. The divorce matter was litigated over a course of 
three (3) years and was highly contentious, requiring a 16-day trial over a nine-month period. See 
generally, Second Fuhrman Aff., Exhibit D. Although largely irrelevant to the determination of 
the issues presently pending before this court, the divorce between Sallaz and Baird forms the 
basis and provides context for many of the claims asserted by Rice in the present matter. As 
relates to this matter, during the course of the divorce proceedings, the community ownership 
interest in Real Homes, LLC, an entity formed in 2001, was a significant point of contention 
between Sallaz and Baird. See Id. Real Homes, LLC, owned several parcels of real property and 
was a relatively substantial asset in the divorce. See Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit D. Sallaz 
argued that the community had only a 50% interest in the entity and its assets and liabilities, 
together with Glen Trefren, who owned the other 50% interest. In the middle of the trial 
proceedings, and prior to the Court's entry of findings, Real Homes, LLC was sold to Real 
Properties, LLC on January 6, 2006. See Second Amended Counterclaim, Exhibit I. Real 
Properties, LLC, was formed on January 4, 2006. Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit A. Roy and 
Janet Rice are members of Real Properties, LLC. See Id., Exhibit C at p. 30, 1. 5-11. On July 21, 
2006, Roy Rice testified in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce and was questioned extensively regarding 
his knowledge of the adverse claim to title on properties owned by Real Homes, LLC. 5 At the 
5 THE COURT: What about the preparation of the legal documents for the exchange of the property? 
THE WITNESS: They were all done by his assistant, Scott. 
THE COURT: And do you -
THE WITNESS: And we won. So they want a judgment on those for attorney fees. 
THE COURT: I mean, on the - where you bought the real estate from Real Homes, do you feel that you 
owe Denny a debt for the legal services in connection with that? 
THE WITNESS: I would imagine I would. 
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same time, Rice testified that he was aware of the divorce action when he executed the purchase 
agreement; that he was "waiting for all of the dust to clear and everything else;" and, that given 
the opportunity, he would not rescind the Real Homes/Real Properties sale because it was a 
"very, very good business venture." See Second Fuhrman A.If., Exhibit C, p. 29, 1. 25 - p. 30, 1. 
4; p. 38, 11. 3-8; p. 39, 1. 16 - p. 42, 1. 8.6 
On July 25, 2006, Baird filed a lis pendens with the Canyon County Recorder against two 
properties purportedly conveyed to Real Properties, LLC, 15584 Riverside and 714 Smith Road, 
Nampa, Idaho. Second Fuhrman A.If., Exhibits E and F. Thereafter, in its findings issued on or 
about October 30, 2007, the court held that the marital community owned a 100% interest in 
Real Homes, LLC. See Id., Exhibit D, pgs. 22-25. 
On November 6, 2009, Rice, Real Homes, LLC, and Real Properties LLC filed a 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Quiet Title, and Unjust Enrichment and Alternative 
THE COURT: That would offset those amounts [allegedly due to A Vista Pawn]. 
THE WITNESS: You have to understand that this happened within, I mean, about a half-hour period. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
THE WITNESS: I mean, it was either close this thing or lose it. I mean, it was a good business _opportunity 
and it was - I'm sorry. I sound like a dummy on this; I know. 
THE COURT: Along those lines, did you ever get a title report before you -
THE WITNESS: Oh, yes. Uh-huh. . 
THE COURT: Did the title report reveal to you that they may be some other owners of this property 
besides Real Homes. 
THE WITNESS: Everything was researched by D.L. Evans Banlc. 
THE COURT: And did you look at the title report before you bought it? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Were you aware that some - one of the lots may have belonged to somebody else besides 
Real Homes? 
THE WITNESS: No. I did not. 
THE COURT: What did you - who did you rely on in determining whether Real Homes had the property, 
or not, in their name? 
THE WITNESS: Jim Ronnell ofD.L. Evans Banlc. 
Second Fuhrman Ajf., Exhibit C, p. 66, I. 13 - p. 68, I. 1; See also Id. at p. 29, I. 1 - p. 32, I. 22; p. 38, I. 3 - p. 40, I. 
8. 
6 "If you were paid back the sums that you have paid out, would you be willing to rescind the sale? [Rice] 
No, simply because this was done as a business thing. This was not done as a loan. This was done as a business 
venture. Now if it would have been done as a loan, then I would have considered that. But I done this as a business 
venture; and it is a very, very good business venture." Id., at p. 39, I. 20 - p. 40, I. 2. 
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Complaint for Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment against Renee Baird, Dennis Sallaz, 
Glenn Trefren, and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC in Canyon County, Case No. 
CV 2009-11855. See Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Motion to Consolidate Pursuant 
to Rule 42(a), Exhibit C. The Canyon County matter is still pending against all parties other than 
Renee Baird who was dismissed pursuant to a settlement of claims between Baird and Rice. In 
the present matter however, Rice alleges that Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood failed to inform 
Rice of the disputed ownership claim to Real Homes, LLC and to certain real properties owned 
or allegedly owned by Real Homes, LLC, and that, as a result, they have suffered damages in the 
form of attorney fees. 
Also at issue in the divorce proceedings, and recently made to be an issue by Rice in the 
filing of the counterclaims, was the character of funds obtained by Sallaz in the settlement of the 
matter entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves Inc., v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, initially 
filed in Twin Falls County but transferred to Ada County, Case No. 96812 (hereinafter, the 
"Sumner Matter"). Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit G. In that case, Sallaz and Sallaz Doolittle 
Chtd., were named as Defendants and subsequently be~e Cross-claimants in a claim against 
Steve Sumner for past-due legal fees. See Id., Exhibit H. Rentals & Royalties, Inc., and its then 
President, Wilbur Fifer, were also named as Defendants and were represented by Wes Wilhite. 
See Id., Exhibit I. Following seven-years of litigation, on May 25, 2000, the court issued its 
Memorandum Opinion upon, among other things, the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment. See Id., Exhibit J. The case was ultimately resolved by settlement and a settlement 
stipulation was filed with the court. See Id., Exhibit K. The court entered its Final Order adopting 
the settlement stipulation and settling all matters in the litigation on July 12, 2000. See Id., 
Exhibit L. 
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The character of the funds ultimately obtained in the settlement of the Sumner Matter for 
past-due legal fees was contested during the divorce and was found by the divorce court to be 
community property based upon the court's conclusion that the majority, if not all, of the money 
received in the settlement was for legal fees earned in the marriage. See Second Fuhrman Aff., 
Exhibit D, pgs. 26-29. Rice, who also testified during the divorce, now claims an interest in the 
entirety of the settlement proceeds from the Sumner Matter. See Second Amended Counterclaim. 
In addition to the legal malpractice claims set forth above, Rice alleges multiple claims 
against Dennis Sallaz, individually, for collection on two promissory notes, both purportedly 
executed in 2005, and for conversion of two ATVs and a trailer he alleges were sold to him, also 
in 2005, and for foreclosure on a lien on a Winnebago motorhome that secures what is alleged to 
be a $8,500 debt incurred sometime prior to 2003. See Second Amended Counterclaim. Exhibits 
D, E, F, and H. Each of these alleged debts were addressed in the divorce proceedings in or 
around 2005-2006. See Second Fuhrman Ajf., Exhibit D. Notwithstanding the factual dispute as 
to the validity of the debts, there can be no factual dispute that the claims are time-barred and 
that summary judgment upon these claims is appropriate. 
Il. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Judgment Standards Generally. 
Rule 56(b) provides that a party against whom a claim is asserted may, at any time, 
move, with or without supporting affidavits, for a summary judgment in that party's favor as to 
all or any part thereof. See I.R.C.P. 56(b). Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides, in part, that upon the filing of a motion for summary judgment: 
the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
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I.R.C.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate where a non-moving party fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case when it bears the 
burden of proof. Harris v. State Department of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,298,857 P.2d 
1156, 1159 (1992). A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on 
its pleadings, but when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come 
forward by way of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the 
existence of material issues of fact which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Podolan 
v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,854 P.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The non-moving party must respond to the summary judgment motion with the specific 
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 
150,868 P.2d 473,478 (1994). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is 
not enough to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment. Harpoole v. State, 131 
Idaho 437,439, 958 P.2d 594, 596 (1998). Thus, even if disputed facts exist, summary judgment 
is nonetheless appropriate when a directed verdict would be warranted or when reasonable 
persons could not reach a different conclusion from the record presented. First Sec. Bank of 
Idaho v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664 P.2d 281, 284-85 (1983). 
"A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's 
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins. 
Co., 136 Idaho 39, 42, 28 P.3d 380,383 (2001). 
B. Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's Claims for Legal 
Malpractice, Count IV. 
Rice asserts that Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood committed professional malpractice in 
relation to two separate legal matters ( 1) the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction; and (2) the 
Sumner Matter. See Second Amended Counterclaim, ,i,i 161-183. In addition, Rice contends that 
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Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood committed professional malpractice when they breached their 
duty under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct not to solicit substantial gifts from Rice and 
when they engaged in a(n undefined) conflict of interest transaction. See Second Amended 
Counterclaim, ,r,r 176-179. For their damages, Rice asserts that "by reason of the foregoing 
negligent actions" they have suffered damages of $50,000 in attorney fees; $20,800 for the two 
promissory notes; $387,000 plus interest as a result of the settlement of the Sumner Matter; and 
$61,000 for the value of items taken from Vista Pawn. See Id., ,r 182. 
Under Idaho law, the elements of a legal malpractice action are: (1) the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) failure to 
perform the duty; and ( 4) negligence on the part of the lawyer proximately causing damage to the 
client. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 135, 90 P.3d 884 (2004); Johnson v. Jones, 103 
Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650 (1982). Stated in slightly different terms, the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove: (1) that an attorney has been negligent or failed to act with proper skill and that 
damages resulted therefrom; and (2) that the negligence of the attorney was the proximate cause 
of the client's damage. Johnson, 1°03 Idaho at 706 (citing Sherry v. Diercks, 29 ·wri. App. 433, . ·. 
437,628 P.2d 1336 (1981)). 
(1) Real Homes/Real Properties: 
The Real Homes/Real Properties transaction involved a sale of Real Homes, LLC to Real 
Properties, LLC and is the subject of the lawsuit currently pending in Canyon County. See 
Second Amended Counterclaim, Exhibit I. Toe purchase agreement was drafted by Sallaz and 
signed by Roy Rice, as manager for Real Properties, LLC, and by Glen Trefren and Dennis 
Sallaz as co-owners of Real Homes, LLC. For their malpractice claim against Sallaz and Sallaz 
and Gatewood, Rice contends that Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood breached their duty to advise 
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Rice to obtain independent legal counsel and further "fraudulently and knowingly concealed the 
material misrepresentations described herein." Second Amended Counterclaim, ,i 162-168. 
Neither Real Homes, LLC nor Real Properties, LLC, are parties to this lawsuit. "Contract 
actions are created to protect the interest in having promises performed. Contract obligations are 
imposed because of conduct of the parties manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific 
individuals named in the contract." Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 
P .2d 997, 1003 ( 1978) ( citing W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, s 92 at 613 ( 4th ed. 
1971)). It is undisputed that Real Properties, LLC, and not Rice, individually, was a party to the 
contract for the sale of Real Homes, LLC. Thus, any damages allegedly suffered as a result of a 
breach of the contract for the sale of Real Homes, LLC, were suffered by, and may only be 
asserted by, the buyer, Real Properties, LLC.7 
In addition, even assuming Rice, as opposed to Real Properties, LLC, was damaged, any 
alleged claims for legal malpractice arising out of the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction 
are time-barred. See I.C. §5-219(4). "An action to recover damages for 'professional 
. . . 
malpractice' must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued." City of 
McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,659,201 P.3d 629,632 (2009) (citing Lapham v. Stewart, 137 
Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002); LC. §§ 5-201 & 5-219(4)). The cause of action for 
professional malpractice accrues "as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained 
of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by rea~on of any continuing consequences or 
damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between 
the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer." LC.§ 5-219(4). 
7 Real Properties, LLC, is a Plaintiff in the Canyon County Matter where it is pursuing a breach of contract 
claim against Sallaz, individually, and Glen Trefren. See Affidavit of J. Kahle Becker in Support of Motion to 
Consolidate Pursuant to Rule 42(a), Exhibit C. 
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"The statute of limitations for professional malpractice does not begin to run until the 
plaintiff would have a cause of action against the professional." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 
Idaho 656, 61, 201 P.3d 629, 34 (2009) (citing Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249,254,678 P.2d 
41, 46 (1984)). 
Id. 
Because some damage is required to have a cause of action for negligence, the 
cause of action cannot accrue until there is some damage. Id. "[S]ome damage is 
required because it would be nonsensical to hold that a cause of action is barred 
by the statute of limitations before that cause of action even accrues." Lapham v. 
Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396, 400 (2002). Negligence that increases 
the risk that a client will be harmed does not trigger the running of the statute of 
limitations until harm actually occurs. Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingi/l, 140 
Idaho 480, 95 P.3d 631 (2004). In addition, there must be objective proof that 
would support the existence of some actual damage. Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 
Idaho 482,487,835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992). 
The Real Homes/Real Properties contract was executed on January 6, 2006. See Second 
Amended Counterclaim, Exhibit I. Any duty to advise Rice to seek advice from independent 
counsel and any duty to disclose a potential adverse claim to the ownership interest in Real 
Homes, LLC and/or real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC, arose prior to January 6, 2006. 
See City of McCall, 146 I~o at 659, 201 P.3d at 632. Viewing all inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party, even assuming that the duty to disclose was breached, Rice was aware of, or 
reasonably should have been aware of, an adverse claim to title of real property owned by Real 
Homes/Real Properties prior to purchasing Real Homes, LLC and no later than July 21, 2006, 
when Rice testified in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce action and was questioned oy the Court 
regarding his knowledge of Baird's claim of ownership. See Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit C, p. 
66, 1. 13 - p. 68, 1. 1 (quoted above). 
What is more, on July 25, 2006, Baird filed a lis pendens against two parcels of real 
property purportedly conveyed to Real Properties, LLC. See Id., Exhibits E, F. The lis pendens 
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filed in 2006 constitutes "some damage" for the purpose of invoking the statute of limitation for 
claims against Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood arising out of an alleged failure to disclose 
adverse property interests prior to the sale of Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC. See 
Jerry J Joseph C.L. U. Ins. Associates, Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 557, 789 P.2d 1146, 1148 
(Ct. App. 1990) ("A lis pendens is a notice to the world of the existence of a claim affecting 
certain real property." Id. at 557, 789 P.2d at 1148 (citing I.C. § 5-505; Suitts v. First Security 
Bank of Idaho, N.A., 100 Idaho 555,559,602 P.2d 53, 57 (1979)). 
Finally, in addition to the Court's questioning and the lis pendens, the record is 
indisputable that Rice had knowledge of a potentially adverse claim to ownership of Real Homes 
no later than August, 2007. See Second Fuhrman A.ff, Exhibit M. It is readily apparent from the 
email correspondence and billing records between Rice and Steven Palleson that Rice was aware 
that there was a dispute over ownership of Real Homes, LLC and certain real properties owned 
or allegedly owned by Real Homes, LLC. See Id. In addition, Rice contends that the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce action, Ada County Case No. 
CV-DR-04-1075, entered and fifod·ofpublic record on October 30, 2007, created a "cloud" on 
the title of the properties purportedly transferred to Real Properties, LLC. See Second Amended 
Counterclaim, ,i 69. 
Despite all of this, Rice failed to take any action against Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood 
for an alleged failure to disclose such an adverse interest until April 28, 2011 when they filed 
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their counterclaim in this matter. 8 Regardless of the date upon which Rice seeks to rely as the 
date of damage, i.e., the sale date, the lis pendens filed by Baird, August 2007, or January 2009, 
there can be no dispute that the claim for legal malpractice is barred by the statute of limitation 
and must be dismissed. 
Finally, and even assuming that the claims were not time-barred, it is undisputed that 
Rice was not damaged as a result of any alleged failure to disclose potentially adverse interests in 
the real property because Rice relied upon a third-party, and not Sallaz or Sallaz and Gatewood, 
to inform him as to the condition of the property. See Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 13 7, 90 P .3d at 
887 ("An attorney's duty arises out of the contract between the attorney and his or her client." 
( citing Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 704, 652 P .2d 650, 652 (1982) ( "The scope of an 
attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is 
retained.")). The record in this case establishes that Rice obtained a title report for the real 
property owned by Real Homes, LLC and that he relied upon the title company and his banker, 
Jim Ronnell of D.L. Evans Bank to discover any alleged deficiencies in title to the real property. 
Second Fuhrman Ajf., Exhibit C, p. 66, 1. 14 - p. 68, 1. 25; See also p. 38, L 3 - p. 42, I. 8. The 
burden rests with Rice to show that the negligence of Sallaz was a proximate cause of the 
Counterclaimant's damage. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 136, 90 P.3d at 886. Even under the liberal 
standard afforded to the non-moving party, summary judgment must be granted where, as here, 
8 It is anticipated that Counterclaimants will take the position that Counterdefendants should be equitably 
estopped from relying upon the statute of limitations as a bar to the claims asserted by Counterclaimants. See 
Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleisen & Slavin, 113 Idaho 822, 748 P.2d 406 (Ct. App., 1987) ("a defendant may be 
estopped to assert the statute of limitation as a defense if his statements or conduct induced the plaintiff to refrain 
from prosecuting his action during the statutory limitation period." Id. at 825, 748 P.2d at 409 (citations omitted)). 
A review of the evidentiary record reveals no evidence that Sallaz or Sallaz and Gatewood made any statements or 
took any action in an effort to induce Counterclaimants to delay in bringing suit. Instead, the record is clear that no 
later than January, 2009, Sallaz actually encouraged Counterclaimants to employ another attorney, John Runft, to 
pursue any claims related to the Real Homes/Real Properties purchase. See Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit N. Thus, 
any claim that Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood should be estopped to assert the statute of limitation defense is 
without merit. 
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Rice cannot establish an essential element of their case for legal malpractice. See McGilvray, 136 
Idaho at 42, 28 P.3d at 383. 
(2) Sumner Matter 
With respect the Sumner Matter, Rice contends that Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood 
wrongfully failed to notify Rice of the receipt of funds which Rice had an interest in. See Second 
Amended Counterclaim, ,r,r 169-173. The record is clear and undisputed that Rice was not a 
party to the Sumner Matter.9 See Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibits G-L, inclusive. Rather, Sallaz 
and his law firm filed a Counterclaim "for legal fees and prejudgment interest in the amount of 
$377,398.60." See Id., Exhibit Hat pg. 15, ,r VI; See also Exhibit D, pgs. 26-29. 
While it is also true that Rentals & Royalties, Inc. was a party to the Sumner Matter, it is 
likewise undisputed that Rentals & Royalties, Inc., was represented by its own attorney, Wes 
Wilhite, and not Sallaz. See Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit H. Thus, apart from vague allegations 
that Rice had an ownership interest in Rentals & Royalties, Inc. at one time, there is no evidence 
to support a claim for legal malpractice against Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood with respect to 
the Sumner Matter. 10 
9 Rice contends that the Sumner Matter involved loans to Steve Sumner, made by Rice through entities 
owned by Rice, Capital Broadcasting, Inc., W estem Broadcasting Inc., and/or R/R Investments, Inc. However, only 
Rentals and Royalties, Inc., fka R-R Investments, Inc., and its then President, Wilbur Fifer, was a named party to the 
Sumner Matter. 
10 Rice contends that he was the owner of R-R Investments, Inc. and that Sallaz forged the signature of 
Michael Rice to amend the articles of R-R Investments Inc. However, the amendment to the articles was notarized 
and there is no evidentiary support for this meritless claim. See Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit 0. Rice relies 
exclusively upon the 1990 annual report for R-R Investments, Inc., as the basis for the claim that Rice was the owner 
of R-R Investments, Inc. However, the law in Idaho is clear that "[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt 
as to the facts is not enough to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment." Harpoole v. State, 131 
Idaho 437,439,958 P.2d 594,596 (1998). Viewing all inferences in favor of Rice, Counterclaimants Roy Rice and 
Janet Rice were President and/or Directors of R-R Investments, in or around I 990. See Second Fuhrman A.ff., 
Exhibit 0. However, there is no evidence that Counterclaimants Roy or Janet Rice were shareholders with any 
ownership interest in R-R Investments, Inc. Rather, the Articles of Incorporation list only one shareholder, Dennis 
Sallaz. See Id. Moreover, apart from the annual report filed in I 990, all subsequent annual reports or documents 
filed with the Secretary of state do not reference Rice as having fil!i'. relationship with R-R Investments, Inc. See Id. 
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Second, even assuming arguendo that Rice had, at one time or another, an ownership 
interest in R-R Investments, Inc., or any related or unrelated interest in the Sumner Matter, any 
claims, regardless of form or title, have long since been barred by the statute of limitation. See 
City of McCall, 146 Idaho at 659, 201 P.3d at 632. As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 179, 706 P.2d 63, 68 (1985): 
It is eminently clear that statutes of limitation were intended to prevent the 
unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which persons interested have 
been thrown off their guard for want of reasonable prosecution. They are, to be 
sure, a bane to those who are neglectful or dilatory in the prosecution of their 
legal rights. 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, § 4, p. 8. As a statute of repose, they 
afford parties needed protection against the necessity of defending claims which, 
because of their antiquity, would place the defendant at a grave disadvantage. In 
such cases how resolutely unfair it would be to award one who has wilfully or 
carelessly slept on his leg&l rights an opportunity to enforce an unfresh claim 
against a party who is left to shield himself from liability with nothing more than 
tattered or faded memories, misplaced or discarded records, and missing or 
deceased witnesses. 
Id. at 179, 706 P.2d at 68 (quoting Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 838, 475 P.2d 530, 532 
(1970)). The policy considerations recognized by the Court in Strieb are exemplified by the facts 
of this case: there can be no legal or factual justification for why Rice waited more than 20 years 
to assert that there was wrong-doing of any kind by Sallaz or his law firms with respect to R-R 
. Investments, Inc., or the allegedly related Sumner Matter. The last annual report for Rentals & 
Royalties, Inc., was filed in 1995; the majority of the surviving records for the Sumner Matter 
exist only in the official court file; and, several key witnesses are now unfortunately deceased 
(Wilbur Fifer and Millis Anderson). 
It is equally unclear, apart from vague allegations that Sallaz misrepresented the status of 
the Sumner Matter, what, if any, factual basis exists for a finding that Sallaz was retained by 
Rice with respect to the Sumner matter in the first instance or that Rice proximately suffered 
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damages as a result of Sallaz's [undefined in nature and scope] representation. 11 What is more, 
Rice does not allege or provide any proof of a default upon any alleged loan to Sumner. See 
Second Fuhrman Alf., Exhibit S; See also Affidavit of Steve Sumner. In short, there is simply no 
evidence that Rice had any legal interest in the settlement proceeds from the Sumner Matter or 
that Sallaz wrongfully retained any such interest. 12 Finally, regardless of any claimed interest, 
any such claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 
(3) Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct - Promissory Notes 
Finally, Rice contends that Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood had a duty, pursuant to the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, not to solicit substantial gifts from Rice and that Sallaz and 
Sallaz and Gatewood had a duty not to engage in an undefined conflict of interest transaction. It 
is unclear what, if any, transaction Rice relies upon to support either of the above claims. The 
damage claim suggests that Rice relies upon the promissory notes and the aforementioned Real 
Homes/Real Properties transaction to support this claim. Assuming arguendo that Sallaz did, in 
fact, violate a rule(s) of professional conduct, the burden remains with Rice to prove each of the 
elements, including damages, for their professional malpractice claims. 
11 See also Second Fuhrman Ajf., Exhibit C ("THE COURT: Do you feel that you owe him any debt for 
legal services that he has provided in exchange? THE WITNESS: Not at this time. We haven't had any kind of court 
transaction or any kind of court thing that has happened. One of his attorneys just settled a case that was, probably, 
four years old. We won." Id. at p. 66, 11. 6-12; "And this 338 - 338A the amount of money that you have offset by 
the legal services that Denny has provided? A. No. No. We really haven't had many- many situations that I needed 
an attorney. Q. Is this sum still due to you then? A. Yes. Uh-huh. Q. Why? A. Because, like I said, we haven't had 
many- many situations that I needed an attorney." Id. at p. 22, 11. 5-15). 
12 To be fair, the district court's Memorandum Opinion includes reference that "[a]t some point in 1994, 
866 shares were also pledged to Vista Pawn to secure a $10,000 loan. No stock certificates were delivered to Vista 
Pawn, though." See Second Fuhrman Ajf., Exhibit J, pg. 4. There is no citation to the record to support this finding 
and apart from this one sentence, the no further mention of the alleged Vista Pawn loan in the 47-page memorandum 
opinion. See generally, Id. Notwithstanding this reference, and all inferences drawn in favor of Rice, Vista Pawn, 
Inc., and not Rice individually, may have loaned $10,000 to Steve Sumner. However, there is no evidence of a 
default on the $10,000 loan and no evidence that collection of the loan was ever at issue in the Sumner Matter. 
Rather, the evidence before the Court establishes that any loan between Rice and Sumner was paid in full. Affidavit 
of Steve Sumner, ,r,r 3-6. Moreover, Rice does not have standing to assert any claims on behalf of Vista Pawn, a 
corporation administratively dissolved in 2004, and any such claims are likewise time-barred. 
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The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct "are not designed to be a basis for civil 
liability. 13" See IRPC, Scope, § 20. They do not create any statutory liability, do not give rise to 
a cause of action against a lawyer, and do not create any presumption that a legal duty has been 
breached. Id.; See also High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. v. Sargent, 149 Idaho 423, 429-30, 234 P.3d 
747, 753-54 (2010). 
As noted above, Rice's claims related to the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction, as 
well as the Sumner Matter, lack support in the evidentiary record and are time-barred. With 
respect to the promissory notes, it is clear that Rice does not suggest that the notes are 
"substantial gifts" as Rice has filed a counterclaim for the sums allegedly advanced as 
consideration for the notes. Rice's claims for legal malpractice are without legal or factual merit 
and must be dismissed. 
C. Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's Claim for Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty, Count V. 
The allegations in support of Rice's claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Count V, are 
indistinguishable from the claim for professional negligence. "The appropriate statute of 
limitation is determined by the substance of the claim, not the form of the action, and '[t]he first 
analytical step is to classify [the] cause of action so the applicable statute of limitations can be 
used to determine whether the claim is time barred.' "McCormack v. Caldwell, 152 Idaho 15, 
266 P.3d 490, 494 (Ct. App., 2011) (quoting Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 
140 Idaho 144, 148, 90 P.3d 894, 898 (2004)). Thus, based upon the analysis set forth with 
13 The Scope of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct provides, at§ 20, "Violation ofa Rule should not 
itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal 
duty has been breached .... The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for 
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. . .. 
Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be 
evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct." 
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respect to Rice's claims for malpractice, summary judgment upon Rice's claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty is warranted. 
D. Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's Claim for Fraud, Count 
VI. 
In support of the claim that Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood committed fraud, Rice's 
Second Amended Counterclaim, though more artfully crafted than the version contained in 
Rice's initial counterclaim, still fails to state a claim for relief. C.f Answer, Counterclaim, and 
Joinder of a Party, ,r 154-158; Second Amended Counterclaim, ,r,r 192-241. Counterdefendants' 
first motion for summary judgment was predicated upon a complete failure to plead the elements 
of fraud with requisite particularity: Now, despite adding more than 30 allegations, Rice's fraud 
claim remains fatally deficient. 
"Fraud must be pleaded with particularity." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845, 
243 P.3d 642, 661 (2010) (citing Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 832, 172 P.3d 1104, 
1107 (2007)). "That is, the alleging party must specify what factual circumstances constituted 
the fraud." Id. (citations omitted). The primafacie case of fraud requires: 
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge 
of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by 
the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance 
of its falsity; (7) his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) his 
consequent and proximate injury. 
Id. The allegations contained in Rice's Second Amended Counterclaim do little more than 
mimic the language of the elements of a claim for fraud. See Second Amended Counterclaim, ,r,r 
192-241. Critically, as to each of the alleged misrepresentations, Rice fails to address the 
"consequent and proximate injury" for any such alleged misrepresentation. See Id. Rather, Rice 
again incorporates the same damage claim asserted with respect to the majority of the claims 
asserted, i.e., the entirety of the proceeds obtained in the settlement of the Sumner Matter. For 
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this reason alone, Rice has failed to plead a fraud claim with requisite particularity and 
Counterdefendants are entitled to summary judgment upon this claim. 
In addition, each and every one of the allegations relates to, or arises out of, Rice's claim 
that Mr. Sallaz was acting as their attorney for the purposes of the Sumner Matter and/or a loan 
to Steve Sumner, and that in the course and scope of the attorney-client relationship, Mr. Sallaz 
failed to provide competent legal representation to Rice. See Id. See Second Amended 
Counterclaim, ,r,r 192-241. Thus, although pled as a claim for fraud, each of the allegations arise 
out of the performance of professional services and are therefore subject to the statute of 
limitations for professional malpractice claims. Again, "[t]he appropriate statute of limitation is 
determined by the substance of the claim, not the form of the action, and the first analytical step 
is to classify [the] cause of action so the applicable statute of limitations can be used to 
determine whether the claim is time barred." McCormack, 152 Idaho at_, 266 P.3d at 494 
(internal quotations omitted). For the same reason that these same facts do not give rise to a 
cognizable claim for professional malpractice as asserted in Counts IV (professional malpractice) 
or V (breach of fiduciary duty), Rice has failed to state a claim for relief for :fraud.14 
E. Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's Claim for Aiding and 
Abetting the Commission ofa Tortious Act. 
Count X of the Counterclaim alleges that Sallaz and Gatewood, Sallaz Law Chtd., and 
Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC, aided and abetted in the commission of Sallaz's 
"willful, reckless, outrageous, malicious, fraudulent, and tortious" actions." The law is clear that 
"where several people actively participate in any manner in the commission of a tort, not only 
14 Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims for 
fraud pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-218 were the applicable standard, Rice has nonetheless failed to plead a viable 
claim for fraud. In particular, it is undisputed that as to each of the alleged "representations" that Rice knew, or 
through reasonable diligence, could have discovered the facts Rice now claims constitute fraud nearly 20 years ago. 
See Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 150, 90 P.3d 894, 900 (2004); DBSIITRI v. 
Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 807, 948 P .2d 151, 162 (1997). 
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the actual actor or assailant is liable but all others who aid, abet, counsel or encourage the 
wrongdoer by words, gestures, looks or signs are equally liable with him to the injured person." 
Todd v. Sullivan Const. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 125, 191 P.3d 196, 203 (2008). What is less clear 
is any basis for a finding that any of the named entities, aided and abetted any actions 
complained of by Rice. 15 Rice has failed to plead a claim upon which relief may be granted and 
summary judgment with respect to Count X, aiding and abetting commission of a tortious act, is 
warranted. 
F. Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's Claims for Civil 
Racketeering, Count XII. 
Rice's claim for racketeering was added pursuant to the First Amended Counterclaim. 
The allegations in support of this claim can only be characterized as vague, ambiguous, and far 
from lacking in any factual support. See Second Amended Counterclaim, ,r,r 283-291. To state a 
claim for relief under the Racketeering Act, Idaho Code § 18-7803, Rice must prove both the 
existence of an "enterprise" and a connected "pattern of criminal activity." See Mannos v. Moss, 
143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007) (citing State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 17, 981 
P.2d 738, 742 (1999)). An "enterprise" is defined as "any sole proprietorship, partnership, 
corporation, business, labor union, association or other legal entity or any group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities." LC. § 
18-7803( c ). A "pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two incidents of 
racketeering conduct, such as fraud, "that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, 
victims or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics 
15 If, as the case appears to be, Rice simply seeks to hold any of these three entities vicariously liable for 
Sallaz' alleged malpractice, Sallaz and Gatewood will concede that Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., would be liable for 
the negligent acts of Sallaz if they were committed while performing acts within the course and scope of his 
employment with the law firm. 
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and are not isolated incidents .... ". I.C. § 18-7803(d); Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,408, 848 
P.2d 984, 992 (Ct. App., 1992). 
Of the enumerated list of predicate acts constituting racketeering, Rice alleges in his 
Second Amended Counterclaim that Sallaz engaged in multiple actions including but not limited 
to theft, perjury, forgery, and securities fraud. See Second Amended Counterclaim, ,i,i 283-291. 
In an effort to establish the existence of an enterprise, Rice's counterclaim alleges that various 
entities with which Mr. Sallaz has been associated as "enterprises" as defined by the Code. 
However, Rice has never alleged, nor produced any evidence establishing that any of the entities 
listed "associated or agreed to engage in any of the predicate acts, nor that they shared a common 
purpose to engage in a predicate act." Mannas, 143 Idaho at 936, 155 P.3d at 1175 (citing U.S. 
Turkette, 452 576, 583, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2528 (1981)). Consequently, the counterclaim does not 
allege the existence of an enterprise sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code § 18-
7804(c). 
In addition, Rice cannot demonstrate either continuity of racketeering activity, or the 
threat of such continuity. See Eliopulos, 123 Idaho at 408, 848 P.2d at 992 ("The Eliopuloses 
have failed to come forward with evidence, or even to plead facts, that demonstrate the requisite 
pattern of racketeering activity as defined by the state statute. Summary judgment dismissing this 
claim therefore was proper." Id. (internal citations omitted)). Rice has thus failed to plead a 
valid claim for racketeering and summary judgment as to this claim is necessary and appropriate. 
G. Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's Claim for Violation of 
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Count XL 
"In order to have standing under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICP A), LC. § 48-
601, et seq., the aggrieved party must have been in a contractual relationship with the party 
alleged to have acted unfairly or deceptively." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846, 243 
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P.3d 642, 662 (2010) (citing I.C. § 48-608(1) ("Any person who purchases or leases goods or 
services and thereby suffers ... "); Haskin v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785, 788, 640 P.2d 1186, 1189 
(Ct.App.1982) (holding "that a claim under the ICP A must be based upon a contract.") Any 
claim for violation of the consumer protection act must be brought within two years after the 
cause of action accrues. See I.C. § 48-619. Thus, for the same reasons that the claims for legal 
malpractice are time-barred, the claims for violation of the consumer protection act are likewise 
subject to summary dismissal. 
H. Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's Claims to Recover Sums 
Deposited in Trust Account, Count II, and Unjust Enrichment, Count III. 
Apart from the approximately $60,000 alleged to be due and owing to A Vista Pawn for 
items that were taken from A Vista Pawn, Inc., and the Sumner settlement, there is no allegation 
that Sallaz and Gatewood is in receipt of "funds" owing to the Counterclaimants. In order to 
prevail on Count II of the Counterclaim entitled "Action to Recover Sums Deposited in Trust 
Account," Rice is required to establish that Sallaz and Gatewood is holding funds to which Rice 
is entitled. See Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 657 P.2d 1102 (Ct. App., 1983) (" 
... it appears to be well established that an attorney-client relationship generally. imposes upon 
the law firm a contractual obligation, analogous to that of an agent or trustee, to account for 
funds received in the course of legal representation and to pay the client any sums to which he 
may be entitled.") Id. at 236,657 P.2d at 1104 (citation omitted). 
There is no evidence to support a claim that Sallaz and Gatewood is in receipt of any 
funds to which Rice may be entitled. First, as set forth above, Rice was not a party to the 
Sumner Matter and has no legal entitlement to any settlement obtained by Sallaz. Second, the 
allegations in support of Count II total 34 paragraphs and cover more than five pages. These 
allegations are more accurately characterized as claims for legal malpractice and were treated 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 25 
001367
-· -· 
accordingly in the analysis of the legal malpractice claim in section B, above. For the reasons 
previously stated, the entirety of the allegations in Count II lack legal or evidentiary support, are 
time-barred, and must be dismissed. 
Moreover, to the extent Rice has asserted a claim for relief based upon amounts alleged 
to be due and owing pursuant to a trade out agreement between Sallaz and RiceNista Pawn, Rice 
has failed to identify a single, cognizable claim for recovery. Instead, Rice includes the debt 
alleged to be due to a Vista Pawn Inc., as an element of damage on no fewer than four of the 
claims for relief: (1) action to recover sums in trust account (Count II); legal malpractice (Count 
IV); breach of fiduciary duty (Count V); and civil racketeering (Count XIQ. See Second 
Amended Counterclaim. Rice has now filed their own motion for partial summary judgment 
claiming that this amount was held "in trust" and as a "retainer." For the reasons discussed 
herein, Rice's motion for partial summary judgment as to amounts alleged to be held in "trust" is 
without merit and must be denied. 
Regardless of the legal theory relied upon to support this claim, Rice's claim has at least 
two (2) fatal deficiencies: First, the items were alleged to have been obtained by Sallaz and/or 
persons associated with Sallaz from A Vista Pawn, Inc., not from Rice, individually. As Rice 
previously alleged in the verified complaint filed in Canyon County to recover these sums from 
Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird, "A Vista Pawn, Inc. was dissolved on April 7, 2005 and all 
accounts then due and owing became property of Roy and Janet Rice." Affidavit of J. Kahle 
Becker in Support of Motion to Consolidate Pursuant to Rule 42(a), Exhibit C, pgs. 13-14. 
However, there is no evidence before the Court that Rice retained an interest in accounts 
receivable upon the sale of Vista Pawn, Inc., and its assets to GNP Properties in 2003. In fact, the 
evidence establishes just the contrary. See Second Fuhrman Ajf., Exhibit Q. Moreover, it is 
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likewise undisputed that the amount claimed to be due and owing has been outstanding, without 
a single payment made, since at least 2006. See Second Amended Counterclaim, Exhibit P. Rice 
has not applied a single credit to, or against, the amount claimed to be due and owing to him or 
to Vista Pawn on this alleged trade out agreement. See Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit S, Resp. to 
Interrogatory No. 34. 
Despite the inconsistent factual and legal positions taken with regard to this sum, it is 
undisputed that any amounts claimed to be due and owing pursuant to the alleged trade out 
agreement have been claimed to be due and owing since no later than 2006 and are therefore 
time-barred. See Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit C. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-222, "an action 
brought to recover a balance due on a mutual, open and current account, where there have been 
reciprocal demands between the parties, [ ] is deemed to have accrued from the time of the last 
item proved in the account on either side." The amount presently claimed by Rice for the alleged 
"trade out" agreement is evidenced by Exhibit P to the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
Although Counterdefendants dispute that the amount claimed is consistent with Mr. Rice's 
testimony upon the subject in 2006 as reflected in Exhibit 338A ($44,093.23, including $8,500 
alleged to be owed for a loan on the purchase of the Winnebago), the fact remains that Rice 
relies upon an Exhibit that was utilized in 2006, for which no credits or deductions have been 
applied since 2006. See Second Amended Counterclaim, Exhibit P; Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit 
C., at pp. 49, 1. 9 - p. 54, 1. 16. 
To the extent Rice claims this amount in the claim for professional malpractice, Rice has 
failed or plead or even to identify a legal basis for a claim that the non-payment of this alleged 
debt is a cognizable claim for legal malpractice. Similarly, the inclusion of this amount as part 
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of the claim for breach of fiduciary duty and for racketeering is legally and factually unfounded 
and unsupported. 
For these same reasons the claim for unjust enrichment, Count III, is without merit and 
must be dismissed. In Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., supra, the Idaho Supreme Court 
succinctly set forth the law in Idaho with regard to a claim for unjust enrichment: 
Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract 
implied in law. Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 
440, 447 (2004). "A contract implied in law ... 'is not a contract at all, but an 
obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity 
without reference to the intent of the agreement of the parties .... ' " Id. The 
measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim "is not the actual amount of 
the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it 
would be unjust for one party to retain." Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving 
Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The plaintiff has the 
burden of proving that the defendant received a benefit and of proving the amount 
of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. Blaser v. Cameron, 121 
Idaho 1012, 1017, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.1992). 
147 Idaho at 388-389, 210 P.3d at 73-74. A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of 
three elements: (1) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) 
appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under 
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment 
to the plaintiff for the value thereof. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557-558, 
165 P.3d 261, 271-272 (2007) (citing Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 
88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999)). 
In support of their claim for unjust enrichment, Rice alleges that it would be unjust for 
Counterdefendants to retain the sums and property obtained from Rice and that the court should 
issue an order of restitution. However, whether styled as an action to recover sums deposited in 
trust account, legal malpractice, or breach of a fiduciary duty, there is no legal or evidentiary 
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support for a claim that Sallaz or Sallaz and Gatewood are in receipt of funds to which Rice is 
entitled. Thus, summary judgment must be granted where, as here, there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact, and that Sallaz and Sallaz and Gatewood are entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law on all malpractice claims, regardless of title. 
L Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's Claims for Conversion, 
Claim and Delivery, and For Foreclosure of Lien, Counts VII, VIII, and IX. 
"A cause of action for conversion accrues as soon as the property is wrongfully taken or 
retained." Freiberger v. Am. Tritica/e, Inc., 120 Idaho 239,241, 815 P.2d 437,439 (1991) (citing 
Davidson v. Davidson, 68 Idaho 58, 63, 188 P.2d 329,334 (1947); Havird v. Lung, 19 Idaho 790, 
115 P. 930 (1911)). The applicable statute of limitations for conversion is three years. LC. § 5-
218 ("an action for taking, detaining . . . including actions for the specific recovery of personal 
property'' must be commenced within three years.) Here, Rice contends that Sallaz is wrongfully 
in possession of two ATVs and a trailer which are owned by Rice pursuant to a Bill of Sale, 
executed on or about May 5, 2005, and attached as Exhibit F to the Counterclaim. 
Notwithstanding the dispute as to the validity of the Bill of Sale, there can be no dispute that any 
claim premised upon a failure to deliver the A TVs accrued in 2005 and is barred by the statute of 
limitations. Similarly, the action for claim and delivery is barred by the statute oflimitations and 
must be dismissed. LC. § 5-218 ("an action for taking, detaining ... including actions for the 
specific recovery of personal property" must be commenced within three years.) 
Second, Rice alleges that Counterdefendants are in possession of "funds" described 
herein and for which Rice has included in the claim for conversion. However, as noted by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010) "'conversion 
for misappropriation of money does not lie unless it can be described or identified as a specific 
chattel." Id. at 846, 243 P.3d at 662 (citations omitted). Nothing in Rice's counterclaim suggests 
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that the "funds" allegedly held by Sallaz or Sallaz and Gatewood could be described or identified 
as specific chattel and summary judgment upon this claim is appropriate. 
Finally, Rice seeks to foreclose upon a lien on a motorhome. The lien purportedly secures 
a debt of $8,500 owed to Rice pursuant to an oral agreement between Rice and Dennis Sallaz and 
Renee Baird.16 However, and despite submitting a Verified Counterclaim stating otherwise, the 
record reveals that Rice transferred any lien interests he maintained in the Winnebago 
motorhome in or about the fall of 2010. Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit T. Thus, the present claim 
that Rice is entitled to foreclose upon a lien which he transferred prior to filing the Verified 
Counterclaim on April 28, 2011 is patently without legal or evidentiary support. 
Moreover, and even assuming arguendo that Rice maintained a lien interest in the 
Winnebago at one time and which Rice retains standing to pursue, an action upon an oral 
contract, obligation, or liability must be commenced within four years. I.C. § 5-217. Here, the 
loan obligation was entered into sometime prior to 2003. See Second Fuhrman A.ff., Exhibit C, p. 
10, 1. 22 - p. 13, 1. 15. A lien cannot exist without an underlying debt. Comstock Inv. Corp. v. 
!aniksu Resort, 117 ~daho 99~, 994, 793 P.2d 222, 226 (Ct. App. 1990). the statute of 
limitatio~ to collect upon the underlying debt expired in or around 2007. Absent a valid 
underlying contractual obligation, the lien is invalid and the action to foreclose upon the lien is 
barred. Similarly, the security interest in the motorhome only gave Rice the right to foreclosure 
upon the motorhome upon a default of the underlying loan; it did not create an ownership interest 
in the motorhome. Absent a right to foreclose upon the motorhome, there can be no claim that 
Sallaz, the owner of the motorhome, is wrongfully in possession of the motorhome and Rice's 
claim for conversion must therefore be dismissed. 
16 The loan debt was assigned to Dennis Sallaz in the course of the divorce proceedings. See Second 
Fuhrman Afl., Exhibit D at pg. 40 . 




For the foregoing reasons, Counterdefendants respectfully request the Court grant its 
motion for partial summary judgment dismissing Counts II though XII, inclusive, of the 
Counterclaim. 
DATED this { ( day of March, 2013. 
JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
By~JJ:3.~ 
Attorneys for Counterdefendants 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 11, 2013, Counterdefendants filed their motion for summary judgment, 
supported by two affidavits and citations to the evidentiary record, which established that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact. In response, Counterclaimants Eugene and Janet Rice 
(hereinafter "Rice" or "Counterclaimants"), engage in speculation and conjecture in an 
incoherent and unsupported attempt to suggest that there is a genuine issue of fact (let alone 
material fact) which precludes entry of summary judgment. See generally Counterclaimant 's 
(sic) Objection and Response to Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood 's Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Rice Objection"). Rather than rely upon evidence, Rice confuses what is a 
straightforward motion for summary judgment, supported by the record - and not inadmissible 
affidavits or allegations in a counterclaim - and instead relies upon perception, speculation, and 
unsupported legal theories that are irrelevant and lack merit. Summary judgment in favor of 
Counterdefendants is necessary and appropriate. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In this case, Rice's objection to the pending motion for summary judgment is supported 
by several inadmissible affidavits, namely the Affidavits of Eugene Rice, Skye Hallett, and Tim 
Birkle. 1 As noted by the Supreme Court Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 
(2006): 
Moreover, an affidavit under Rule 56( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
must be made on personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in 
evidence, and affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify as to the 
1 Each of these affidavits are properly subject to motions to strike which were initially filed on May 30, 
2012, and June 21, 2012 respectively. See Motion to Strike Affidavit of Eugene Rice in Support of Objection and 
Response to Counterdefendant 's (sic) Motion for Summary Judgment (May 30, 2012); Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Tim Birk/e in Support of Objection and Response to Counterdefendant 's (sic) Motion for Summary Judgment (June 
21, 2012); Motion to Strike Affidavit of Skye Hallett in Support of Objection and Response to Counterdefendant 's 
(sic) Motion for Summary Judgment (June 21, 2012); See also Affidavit of William A. Fuhrman in Support of 
Motions to Strike ("Fuhrman Aff. re: Strike") (March 26, 2013). 
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matters contained in the affidavit. I.R.C.P. 56(e). When an affidavit is presented 
by a party opposing a motion for summary judgment, the affidavit "must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. Also, the party 
opposing summary judgment must show that the affidavit is based upon the 
witness's personal knowledge and that it sets forth facts as would be admissible in 
evidence. Kolin, 130 Idaho at 331, 940 P .2d at 1150. "The party offering the 
evidence must also affirmatively show that the witness is competent to testify 
about the matters stated in his testimony." Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 
820. 
Id. at 876, 136 P.3d at 347. 
The lack of admissible affidavits having been previously raised and commented on by 
Judge McLaughlin, Rice, although still relying upon the Rice Affidavit, now cites to allegations 
contained in the Second Amended Counterclaim as "evidence" in an apparent attempt to get 
around the inadmissibility of the Rice Affidavit. See Fuhrman A.ff re: Strike, Ex. 1. However, 
allegations in the counterclaim, absent evidence to support them, are not evidence and most 
certainly cannot be utilized to create a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. 
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A. Summary Judgment with Respect to all Claims Sounding in Legal Malpractice is 
Necessary and Appropriate. 
Rice has asserted a total of 7 claims which are properly characterized as claims for 
professional malpractice. See Second Amended Counterclaim, Count II: Action to Recover Sums 
Deposited in Trust Account; Count III: Unjust Enrichment; Count IV: Legal Malpractice and 
Professional Negligence; Count V: Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Count VI: Fraud; Count X: Aid 
and Abet Commission of a Tortious Act; and, Count XI: Violation of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. Notwithstanding the different titles, each of these claims is premised upon the 
same or substantially similar factual allegations, each of which arise out of the performance of 
professional services. Each of these claims are untimely and subject to the pending motion for 
summary judgment. 
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By the response to the motion for summary judgment upon all claims sounding in 
professional malpractice, Rice spends pages and pages of briefing to assert that there was an 
attorney-client relationship between Rice and Mr. Sallaz. Counterdefendants do not dispute that, 
at times, Rice retained Mr. Sallaz to perform legal services for various entities and/or persons 
associated with Mr. Rice.2 That Rice seeks to focus nearly 32-pages of briefing upon the concept 
that Rice was Mr. Sallaz's client is clear. However, a legal malpractice claim requires more than 
the existence of an attorney client relationship. Thus, although Rice asserts that Berry v. 
McFarland, 153 Idaho 5, 278 P.3d 407 (2012), is the lynchpin to the malpractice claims asserted, 
the Court's decision in Berry is inapposite. 
Again, under Idaho law, the elements of a legal malpractice action are: (1) the existence 
of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) failure 
to perform the duty; and (4) negligence on the part of the lawyer proximately causing damage to 
the client. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 135, 90 P.3d 884 (2004); Johnson v. Jones, 
103 Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650 (1982) (emphasis added). Stated in slightly different terms, 
the burden is on Rice to prove: ( 1) that an attorney has been negligent or failed to act with proper 
skill and that damages resulted therefrom; and (2) that the negligence of the attorney was the 
proximate cause of the Rice's damage. Johnson, 103 Idaho at 706 ( citation omitted). 
Although Rice's briefing suggests otherwise, the law is clear that Rice's claims do not 
rise and fall upon the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Thus, although Rice seeks to 
focus the court's attention on this element, presumably because it is the only element of a claim 
for professional malpractice upon which Rice can actually raise an issue of fact, the other three 
elements go without mention, evidence, or support. "A complete failure of proof concerning an 
2 It is also undisputed that Rice did not actually pay for the vast majority of the legal services which Rice 
now contends give rise to claims for legal malpractice. 
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essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." 
McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39, 42, 28 P.3d 380, 383 (2001). 
Thus, and regardless of the existence of an attorney-client relationship, summary judgment is 
appropriate where, as here Rice completely fails to address three of the elements of their 
malpractice claim. 
Finally, and even assuming Rice could establish the other elements to their professional 
malpractice claims, the claims are not timely. "An action to recover damages for 'professional 
malpractice' must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued." City of 
McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,659,201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009) (citing Lapham v. Stewart, 137 
Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002); I.C. §§ 5-201 & 5-219(4)). The cause of action for 
professional malpractice accrues "as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained 
of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or 
damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between 
the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer." I.C. § 5-219(4). Thus, although the attorney-client 
relationship may have existed until 2009, the law is clear that the existence of a continuing 
relationship does not extend the statute of limitations. 
Next, and assuming without any proof, the existence of a cognizable claim for legal 
malpractice in the first place, Rice asserts that "Mr. Sallaz's concealment of his wrong-doing, 
combined with the fiduciary obligations of the attorney-client relationship prevent Mr. Sallaz 
from asserting the statute of limitations." Rice Objection, pg. 12. This statement combines 3 
distinct legal theories: the application of Idaho Code § 5-219( 4); common law breach of 
fiduciary duty claims; and equitable estoppel. Rice confuses and misapplies all three of these 
theories in an incoherent attempt to assert that Mr. Sallaz is a liar who took advantage of Mr. 
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Rice and that Mr. Rice, a sophisticated businessman who retained no fewer than 3 other lawyers, 
(Mr. Runft, Mr. Becker and, as Counterdefendants recently discovered, Spink Butler, LLP), was 
without the means or ability to learn of the truth of matters which were of public record since 
2000 and 2006-08 respectively and which Rice concedes he became aware of no later than 2008. 
As Rice concedes, "[t]o be fair, Mr. Rice learned that Mr. Sallaz had received settlement 
proceeds from the Sumner Matter when he read the judgment from the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce in 
late 2008." Rice Objection, pg. 27 (emphasis added); Rice Affidavit, iJ 33. 
With respect to the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction, it has only recently come to 
the attention of Counterdefendants that no later than June, 2007, Rice retained Spink Butler, 
LLP, to investigate the circumstances surrounding the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction. 
See Third Fuhrman Affidavit in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1. In 
addition to retaining Spink Butler, LLP, and Steven Pallesen, Rice also retained Alex Lopez to 
"assist Roy Rice and Janet Rice with the Real-Estate problems to clear ownership on the Smith, 
River and Melba Properties" in connection with the sale of Nu-Comm/New Communications in 
or about October, 2006. See Id, Exhibit 2. Despite this, Rice spends nearly 10 pages of a 32-
page brief to suggest that Sallaz prevented him from timely asserting their claims. See Rice 
Objection, pgs 12-22. This is absurd and disingenuous in light of the recently discovered 
evidence. Even if one were willing to accept the tenuous proposition that Sallaz was the 
puppeteer for Steven Pallesen and Mr. Runft, there is no evidence and no argument that Spink 
Butler, LLP or Alex Lopez were subject to Mr. Sallaz's influence. See Rice Objection, pg. 19. 
Thus, despite strenuously relying upon the repeated assertion that Rice was relying solely 
upon Sallaz to inform him as to his rights and obligations as to any number of issues over the last 
25 years, actual evidence establishes otherwise. This evidence now having been produced by 
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Rice only after two years of litigation of this matter commenced and a motion to compel renders 
this "estoppel" theory insincere. Moreover, it is rather axiomatic that the party who is asserting 
that Sallaz has stymied discovery efforts has neglected to mention that they, themselves, appear 
to be withholding facts and evidence from Sallaz. It is not at all insignificant that Rice retained 
counsel nearly six years ago to investigate matters which they consistently claim Mr. Sallaz 
failed to properly disclose to them. 
Finally, and to be clear, there is not a single statement, fact, or piece of evidence that 
exists to support an estoppel theory. However, as asserted previously, "Counterclaimants will 
concede that, by and large, the majority of their case for legal malpractice rises or falls based 
upon this Court's application of the doctrine of estoppel." Counterclaimant's (sic) Objection and 
Response to Counterdefendant Sallaz & Gatewood's Motion for Summary Judgment, (filed June 
1, 2012), at pg. 27. Rice now appears to have abandoned this assertion and instead relies upon 
the alleged lack of "damage" until some unstated date at which point Rice became aware of the 
"damage." However, merely asserting that Rice did not suffer "damage" until Mr. Becker 
enlightened him to his claims, is not a factually or legally viable argument. See Rice A.ff., ,i 42. 
Assuming arguendo that Rice could establish all 4 elements to a professional malpractice 
claim, Rice suffered some ascertainable damage when the funds he contends he was owed by 
Sumner were not included in the settlement of the Sumner Matter, of public record, in 2000. 
Moreover, with respect to the Real Homes/Real Properties claims, assuming arguendo that Rice 
even had standing to pursue these claims, Rice suffered some ascertainable damage when Ms. 
Baird filed the lis pendens on the properties in 2006. 
As Rice concedes, there is no broad "discovery" exception to the statue of limitations on 
a claim for professional malpractice. See Rice Objection, pg. I 2. As noted by Rice, Idaho Code 
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§ 5-219( 4) specifically contemplates only two exceptions to the accrual-on-occurrence rule: the 
first of which is inapplicable; the second contemplates evidence of fraudulent concealment: 
[T]he fact of damage has, for the purpose of escaping responsibility therefor, been 
fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the injured party by an alleged 
wrongdoer standing at the time of the wrongful act, neglect or breach in a 
professional or commercial relationship with the injured party [and] shall be 
deemed to accrue when the injured party knows or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or matter 
complained of ... and, provided further, that an action within the foregoing foreign 
object or fraudulent concealment exceptions must be commenced within one 
(1) year following the date of accrual as aforesaid. 
I.C. § 5-219(4) (emphasis added). 
Apart from acknowledging this standard, Rice fails to provide any evidence in support of 
an argument that Mr. Rice timely filed his claims for legal malpractice, which include Rice's 
claims to recover sums deposited in trust account, claims for unjust enrichment, breach of 
fiduciary duties, fraud, aiding and abetting the commission of a tortious act, and violation of the 
consumer protection act. It is undisputed that Rice retained independent counsel, Spink Butler, 
LLP, in 2007 with respect to the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction. It is likewise 
undisputed that Rice became aware of the settlement of the Sumner Matter no later than 2008, 
and likely much, much earlier. Even assuming fraudulent concealment applied,. Rice failed to 
timely assert these claims. No amount of "contends," "appears," "suggests," "implicates," or 
"believes" can change these undisputed facts. 
To the extent Rice is still claiming that equitable estoppel is applicable under the facts of 
this case, Rice has the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative defense on a motion for 
summary judgment. See Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215 P.3d 485, 491 (2009). 
Rice has failed to meet this burden, or even to make an effort to address the elements of the 
claimed affirmative defense. Consequently, any reliance upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
is unsupportable. Moreover, Rice's reliance upon Estate of Amaro v. Cit)/ o/ Ok/and, 653 P.3d 
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808, 813 (9th Cir. 2011), is misplaced.3 The law in Idaho with respect to the affirmative defense 
of equitable estoppel is clear: 
The elements of equitable estoppel are, ( 1) a false representation or concealment 
of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth, (2) the party 
asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth, (3) the false 
representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon and 
(4) the person to whom the representation was made or from whom the facts were 
concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his 
prejudice. 
Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 22,644 P.2d 341,344 (1982). 
"[U]nder Idaho law, a defendant may be estopped from asserting a statute of limitation 
defense if he says something or does something which causes the plaintiff to delay filing suit. 
Such conduct may consist of concealing a known fact of injury, or a danger of injury to the 
plaintiff." Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleisen & Slavin, 113 Idaho 822, 825, 748 P.2d 406,409 (Ct. 
App. 1987). Zumwalt is particularly instructive in the case at bar. Therein, the court noted: 
In the present case, the record would support a reasonable inference that attorney 
Slavin knew of the injury caused to Zumwalt when the property was conveyed to 
the bona fide purchaser. Slavin failed to disclose this information despite a duty to 
speak in th_e attorney-client relationship. Consequently, Slavin would be estopped 
to assert a statute of limitation defense to the extent that Zumwalt's delay in filing 
suit was attributable to Slavin's failure to disclose the fact of injury. 
However, it is undisputed that Zumwalt became independently aware of the fact 
of injury no later than July 14, 1979. Consequently, even if he had two years 
thereafter to file suit, his complaint on August 3, 1981, was untimely unless the 
delay in filing suit after July 14, 1979, was caused by some additional conduct of 
Slavin. We do not find such additional conduct in the record. It appears that the 
3 The court in Amaro specifically noted that "Montoya diligently investigated her son's arrest and death 
within the limitations period and believed she had a claim against the Department." Amaro, 653 F.3d at 814. 
There is no evidence that Rice diligently investigated anything in this matter. There is not a single piece of 
evidence to support a claim that Rice made a demand for information upon Sallaz, or that Sallaz thereafter made any 
effort to conceal any evidence from Rice. Moreover, it is unclear what Rice actually contends Sallaz concealed. 
Regardless, Rice was fully apprised of the circumstances surrounding the settlement of the Sumner Matter no later 
than late 2008. Consequently, the assertion that he was unaware of the "full" facts and circumstances surrounding 
the present claim is patently without support. The "full" circumstances are that Rice did not get paid from the 
settlement proceeds which Rice contends he was entitled to be paid. Any additional "discovery" of what Sallaz did 
with the proceeds and when is entirely irrelevant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9 
001383
• 
only contact between Zumwalt and Slavin after July 14, 1979, was a meeting in 
which Zumwalt told Slavin he had discovered that the property had been sold. 
Slavin simply replied, "Well, I'll look into it." He apparently did or said nothing 
further. Soon thereafter, Zumwalt changed attorneys. 
Slavin's offer to "look into it" did not withhold or attempt to conceal any fact of 
injury to Zumwalt. At most, viewing Slavin's comment in the best light to 
Zumwalt, it might be characterized as a faint expression of hope that something 
still could be done to rectify the damage. We are not convinced that such an 
expression would create an estoppel even if Zumwalt relied upon it. In any event, 
the record does not indicate such reliance. Rather, Zumwalt's own explanation for 
his delay in filing suit is that attorneys other than Slavin later advised him that he 
might be better off to file a quiet title action or a damage action against a title 
company. These actions might "render any suit against Mr. Slavin for malpractice 
academic .... " Thus, there was no showing of reliance by Zumwalt on Slavin's 
representation, to his detriment, which could give rise to an estoppel against later 
asserting the statute oflimitation after the time period had expired. 
Id. at 825-26, 748 P.2d at 409-10 (emphasis added). 
Apart from repeatedly questioning Mr. Sallaz's credibility, Rice has failed to introduce 
even a scintilla of proof that equitable estoppel is applicable under the facts and circumstances of 
this case. First and foremost, while Rice repeatedly asserts that they did not know of certain facts 
and were relying up their attorney, Mr. Sallaz, the undisputed evidence establishes otherwise. 
Summary judgment upon all professional malpractice claims is appropriate. 
Each and every claim that relates to the Sumner Matter was known to Rice no later than 
late 2008. 4 As with Zumwalt, Rice became independently aware of the fact of injury no later 
4 Viewing all inferences in favor of Rice, the Jetter attached as Exhibit P to the Becker Affidavit and relied 
extensively in Rice's Objection, is evidence that, at one time during the Sumner Matter, Sallaz made a request that 
the Rice loan of$10,000 be included in the settlement of the Sumner Matter. See Becker Affidavit, Exhibit P; Second 
Fuhrman Ajf., Exhibit J, pg. 4. The fact that this Rice/Sumner loan was not included in the settlement ofa case to 
which Rice was not even a party is explained by the Sumner Affidavit: the Joan had already been repaid. 
Consequently, Sumner would not agree to include it in the settlement. See Sumner A.f/idavit; Objection to Motion to 
Strike Affidavit of Steve Sumner. It is undisputed that the Rice loan was not included in the Settlement Agreement. 
See Second Fuhrman Ajf., Ex K. Rice has, at best, created an issue of fact (not of material fact) as to whether Sallaz 
did, in fact, represent Rice in the collection ofa loan to Steve Sumner. However, as noted previously, "[a] complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial." McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39. 42, 28 P.3d 380, 383 (2001 ). Rice has 
failed to support any of the other elements for a malprnctice claim with respect to the Sumner Matter, especially in 
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than late 2008 and likely much, much sooner. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that the 
fraudulent concealment exception applied, Idaho Code § 5-219( 4) specifically required Rice to 
bring their claims within one year from the date that Rice "knows or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or matter complained of," i.e., if 
not significantly sooner, late 2008. LC. § 5-219(4) (emphasis added). 5 As with Zumwalt, Rice 
does not allege, and has presented no admissible evidence to support a claim that Sallaz took any 
action to dissuade Rice from taking any action with respect to the Sumner Matter following 
Rice's receipt of the Judgment in late 2008. See Zumwalt, 113 Idaho 825, 748 P.2d at 409. In 
fact, although almost entirely inadmissible, even the Rice Affidavit is demonstrably silent upon 
this issue. Consequently~ any argument that the claims asserted with respect to the Sumner 
Matter were timely pursued is unavailing. Summary judgment with respect to all claims asserted 
in regard to the Sumner Matter is therefore appropriate. 
Similarly, with respect to the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction, Rice had every 
opportunity to timely assert a claim against Counterdefendants, sought out independent counsel 
to do so as early as 2007, and nevertheless failed to bring a timely claim. As evident by the 
court's reasoning in Zumwalt, Rice's present claims for legal malpractice are untimely. The 
light of the uncontroverted affidavit of Steve Sumner stating that the $10,000 loan was repaid. Moreover, Rice has 
failed to present any evidence to raise even the slightest doubt that the claims for legal malpractice arising out of the 
Sumner Matter are timely. See Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P .2d 416 ( 1996); Tri-State 
Nat. Bank v. Western Gateway Storage Co., 92 Idaho 543,447 P.2d 409 ( 1968) (holding that a party opposing 
summary judgment must do more than raise "the slightest doubt" as to the facts to defeat summary judgment.) 
5 While Rice may plead ignorance of certain correspondence or details which he now relies upon to support 
his claim, Rice was aware of a pending litigation involving Steve Sumner and the case was settled of public record 
in 2000. Moreover, Rice fails to provide any evidence that the correspondence relied upon is, in any way, relevant 
to a claim that Rice was not aware of the settlement of the Sumner Matter and the ultimate disposition of the entirety 
of the proceeds based upon his review of the Sallaz v. Sallaz judgment in late 2008. These same findings include 
substantial analysis of the settlement proceeds obtained from the Sumner Matter, including the amount, the nature 
and character of the funds, and the ultimate disposition of the proceeds. Despite this knowledge, Rice failed to take 
any action upon this alleged claim until April, 2011. when he filed his Counterclaim in this matter. notwithstanding 
the fact that he previously initiated a lawsuit against Mr. Sallaz in Canyon County in 2009. 
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present attempt to assert either the doctrine of equitable estoppel or the fraudulent concealment 
exception under these undisputed facts and circumstances is therefore unavailing. 
B. Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's Claim for Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty, Count V; Fraud, Count VI; Aiding and Abetting the 
Commission of a Tortious Act, Count X; Violation of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act, Count XI; and Claims to Recover Sums Deposited in Trust Account, 
Count II, and Unjust Enrichment, Count III. 
Rice has failed to address or to provide any evidence in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment upon these claims. Each of these claims arise out of the same facts and 
transactions that form the basis for the legal malpractice claims and are merely the same claims 
pursued under different legal theories. For the reasons discussed above, summary judgment 
upon each of these claims is necessary and appropriate. 
C. Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's RICO claims. 
In opposition to the pending motion for summary judgment upon this claim, Rice again 
reverts to his oft-stated yet evidentiary lacking claim that Mr. Sallaz is a liar and that he refuses 
to assist the Rices with educating them as to the basis for their claims against him. However, 
regardless of Rice's refrain, claims require proof in order to survive summary judgment. Rice has 
none. Instead, the allegations in support of this claim can only be characterized as vague, 
ambiguous, and far from lacking in any factual support. See Second Amended Counterclaim, ,i,i 
283-291. As noted previously, and conspicuously absent from the Rice Objection, to state a 
claim for relief under the Racketeering Act, Idaho Code § 18-7803, Rice must prove both the 
existence of an "enterprise" and a connected ''pattern of criminal activity." See Mannas v. Moss, 
143 Idaho 927,935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007) (citing State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 17,981 
P.2d 738, 742 (1999)). Rice has failed to meet either of these prongs. 
In particular, Rice has never alleged, nor produced any evidence establishing that any of 
the entities listed "associated or agreed to engage in any of the predicate acts, nor that they 
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shared a common purpose to engage in a predicate act." Mannas, 143 Idaho at 936, 155 P.3d at 
1175 ( citing US. Turkette, 452 576, 583, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2528 ( 1981 )). Consequently, the 
counterclaim does not allege the existence of an enterprise sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of Idaho Code § 18-7804( c ). 
Moreover, Rice cannot demonstrate either continuity of racketeering activity, or the 
threat of such continuity. See Eliopulos, 123 Idaho at 408, 848 P.2d at 992. Instead, Rice 
engages in speculation and conjecture to assert that documents "implicate Mr. Sallaz and his 
firm(s)," which "indicate that Mr. Sallaz comingles his own funds with his client's trust account 
balance," that the "Rices contend Mr. Sallaz and his three law firms ... are all one in the same," 
"the Rices contend Mr. Sallaz is providing perjured testimony and manufactured documents," 
and "Mr. Sallaz's own Affidavit indicates," and "the Rices contend the evidence indicates." As 
Rice is aware, however, Rice as the non-moving party must respond to the summary judgment 
motion with the specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Tuttle v. Sudenga 
Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150, 868 P.2d 473, 478 (1994). A mere scintilla of evidence or 
only slight doubt as to the facts is not enough to creat_e a genuine issue for purpo~es of-summary 
judgment. Harpoole v. State, 131 Idaho 437,439, 958 P.2d 594, 596 (1998). Rice's allegations 
in the brief and in the Second Amended Counterclaim are grossly insufficient to sustain this 
burden. Rice has thus failed to plead a valid claim for racketeering and summary judgment as to 
this claim is necessary and appropriate. 
D. Counterdefendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Rice's Claims for 
Conversion, Claim and Delivery, and For Foreclosure of Lien, Counts VII, VIII, 
and IX. 
Rice asserts, without evidence or legal support, that Rice ''did not suffer an 'injury' on 
their claims related to the promissory notes, the A TVs and other items of personal property until 
shortly before this litigation ensued." Rice Objection, pg. 7. In support, Rice blends multiple 
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legal theories to conclude that the statute of limitations has not yet run because Sallaz's 
possession of Rice's property was not adverse or wrongful until Rice demanded its return. A 
conversion claim is a conversion claim - not a fraud claim and not an amorphous "trust" claim. 
This kind of musical-chairs approach to legal theories is, again, unavailing. 
First, Rice does not respond to the motion for summary judgment with respect to the 
alleged conversion of "funds." Summary judgment upon this claim is warranted. Second, the 
ATV, Winnebago, and promissory note claims are personal to Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Rice and have 
nothing to do with Mr. Sallaz's position as an attorney. Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Rice were close 
personal friends for 25 years. During that time, and viewing all inferences in favor of Rice, Mr. 
Sallaz purportedly sold, but did not transfer possession of, certain personal property. "A cause of 
action for conversion accrues as soon as the property is wrongfully taken or retained." 
Freiberger v. Am. Triticale, Inc., 120 Idaho 239, 241, 815 P.2d 437,439 (1991) (citing Davidson 
v. Davidson, 68 Idaho 58, 63, 188 P.2d 329, 334 (1947); Havird v. Lung, 19 Idaho 790, 115 P. 
930 (1911)). The applicable statute of limitations for conversion is three years. I.C. § 5-218. 
The Bill of Sale _Rice relies upon to establish a claim to ownership in the subject ATVs was 
executed on or about May 5, 2005. See Second Amended Counterclaim, Exhibit F. 
Notwithstanding the dispute as to the validity of the Bill of Sale, there can be no dispute that any 
claim premised upon a failure to deliver the A TVs accrued in 2005 and is barred by the statute of 
limitations. Similarly, the action for claim and delivery is barred by the statute of limitations and 
must be dismissed. I.C. § 5-218. 
With respect to the Winnebago, Rice does not respond to the motion for summary 
judgment as to the validity of the under) ying lien, which is a prerequisite to a conversion and/or 
foreclosure action with respect to the same. Instead, in the face of documents filed with the 
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Idaho Department of Transportation releasing his "lien" to Michael Rice, Rice asserts that he is 
the "legal lienholder." This assertion is legally and factually untenable in light of the evidence. 
In addition, merely asserting that is the "legal lienholder" misses the mark and is insufficient 
withstand a motion for summary judgment. Rice does not claim, nor is there is evidence to 
support a valid underlying debt. See Comstock Inv. Corp. v. Kaniksu Resort, 117 Idaho 990, 994, 
793 P.2d 222, 226 (Ct. App. 1990). Similarly, the security interest in the motorhome only gave 
Rice the right to foreclosure upon the motorhome upon a default of the underlying loan. Absent 
a right to foreclose upon the motorhome, there can be no claim that Sallaz, the owner of the 
motorhome, is wrongfully in possession of the motorhome and Rice's claim for conversion must 
therefore be dismissed. No evidence, not even a mere scintilla, has been produced to the 
contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Counterdefendants respectfully request the Court grant its 
motion for partial summary judgment dismissing Counts II though XII, inclusive, of the Second 
Amended Counterclaim. 
DATED this L day of April, 2013. 
JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
Attorneys for Counterdefendants 
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I 020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 [><J. Facsimile 343-3246 
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DENNIS SALLAZ, in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
CHTD., and SALLAZ AND 




EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
3 /7 e 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(i)(2) and Idaho Rule of Evidence 611, the 
Court enters the following order regarding the conduct of the trial of this matter. 
This order is necessary to give guidance to counsel for the parties. To the extent that this 
order contradicts any of the instructions the Court gave to counsel at the pretrial conference held on 
17 




LENGTH OF VOIR DIRE AND OPENING STATEMENTS 
Mr. Smith, representing Mr. Sallaz in his individual capacity, will be allotted 30 minutes to 
22 conduct voir dire. 
23 
Mr. Fuhrman, representing Mr. Sallaz in his individual and representative capacities on the 
24 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, will be allotted 60 minutes to conduct his voir dire. 
25 
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Mr. Becker, representing the Rices as Defendants and Counterclaimants, will be allotted 60 
minutes to conduct voir dire. 
Mr. Smith will be allotted no more than 15 minutes to present his opening statement. 
Mr. Fuhrman will be allotted no more than 30 minutes to present his opening statement. 
Mr. Becker will be allotted no more than 30 minutes to present his opening statement. 
ALTERNATE JURORS, PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND STRUCK PANEL 
The Court intends to seat 15 jurors, including 3 alternate jurors. 
Counsel representing Sallaz in any capacity will be allotted 6 peremptory challenges. They 
may be distributed between Mr. Smith and Mr. Fuhnnan as the attorneys see fit. If there is a dispute 
between Mr. Smith and Mr. Fuhrman with respect to the exercise of peremptory challenges, the 
12 
13 
dispute will be settled by the Court in favor of granting 4 peremptory challenges to Mr. Fuhrman and 








Mr. Becker, representing the Rices, will be allotted 6 peremptory challenges. 
There will be 27 jurors in the struck panel. 
ORDER OF PROOF 
The Court has determined that the order of proof will be as follows: 
First, Mr. Smith will present proof of the original claim regarding the Cadillac. Mr. Fuhrman 
may then present his proof regarding the Third-Party claim. 
22 
23 
Next, Mr. Becker will present his defense of the Sallaz claim regarding the Cadillac as well 
24 as his defense regarding the Third-Party claim. Mr. Becker will then present evidence in support of 
25 all counterclaims. To the extent that Mr. Becker's defense of the claim involving the Cadillac and 
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his defense involving the Third-Party claim would be more logically presented in the context of 
presentation of the Counterclaim, Mr. Becker will be free to do so. After Mr. Becker has presented 
all the evidence in support of his Counterclaims, Mr. Fuhrman will be given an opportunity to 
present his evidence in defense of the Counterclaims. 
Rebuttal evidence, if any, may be presented by Mr. Smith and Mr. Fuhrman. Finally, 
rebuttal evidence, if any, may be presented by Mr. Becker in rebuttal to the defense of the 
Counterclaims. 
TRIAL SCHEDULE 
The Court will give the jury panel the following introductory instruction during the court's 
voir dire: 
"This trial may last for one month. The Court and the attorneys expect the trial to conclude 
on or before July 19. However, we will not be in trial every week day and we will recess each day at 
2:00 p.m. We will never be in trial on Tuesdays. We will not be in trial on Thursday July 4th nor on 
Friday July 51h. 
The trial may conclude by Friday July 12'h, however if it isn 't finished by then we will not be 
18 
in trial on July 151h, 1 rf1 or J 7'h. In that case, we will come back to conclude the trial on Thursday 
19 








The trial will be conducted beginning at 9:00 a.m. each trial day and conclude each day at 
2:00 p.m. We will not take a lunch break, but we will take a short recess each morning and each 
afternoon. " 
The Court will then question the panel to determine if the trial as scheduled will cause an 
undue hardship for any of the potential jurors. 
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The Court intends to enforce this schedule to avoid delays. Counsel for the parties must plan 
accordingly so that all evidence will have been presented before July 19th so the post proof jury 
instructions may be given and closing arguments be made no later than July 19th. 
By this Order, the Court does not intend to deny counsel for both sides from making any 





















All attorneys are encouraged to present their evidence and testimony efficiently. The Court 
hereby directs counsel to meet and confer about scheduling witnesses, marking exhibits, and 
stipulating to uncontested matters prior to trial. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this i1_1;;;of June 2013. 
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The Court has requested a pretrial memorandum, to include various elements of concern 
as identified by the court in its January 24, 2014 amended Order. 
Plaintiff, Dennis J. Sallaz, involuntary Plaintiff, Marcy Fox and third party Plaintiffs, 
being the various law firms of Mr. Sallaz, submit this Memoranda, in conjunction with that 
Memoranda submitted by Plaintiff (s), identified as Counter Defendants in this case, through the 
Law offices of Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman and Gourley. 
These parties have been in a constant state of contention and dispute for years, so it 
would be reasonable to assume that all facts, by all parties, will be contested and disputed, and 
there will be no stipulated facts to present to the court, or any agreement as to the admission of 
any evidence or evidentiary agreements. 
Nature of Action 
The original Complaint filed in this case began as a claim and delivery action for the 
return of the 1954 Eldorado Cadillac owned by Mr. Sallaz. The action was originally filed by 
Iver J. Longeteig, but due to health concerns, he ultimately withdrew from the case, leaving other 
counsel to proceed with trial or resolution of the matter. At the show cause proceedings, the court 
allowed Mr. Rice to retain possession of the vehicle, as he held the "last" title issued, but the 
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vehicles "whereabouts" was to be communicated to Plaintiff and counsel, and was to be stored 
and maintained for safekeeping until such time ownership was determined at trial. Subsequent to 
that proceeding, Mr. Rice sold the vehicle and has refused to produce the location or accurate 
information to enable the recovery and return of the vehicle to Idaho. This court, through Judge 
Wilper, thereafter entered an order that prohibited any title transfer, and placed a "stop order" on 
any attempt to re-title the vehicle until further order of the court. A series of claims and amended 
counterclaims were filed in this case on behalf of the Rices, alleging various acts of malpractice, 
fraud and misrepresentation against Mr. Sallaz, and alleging claims for repayment of promissory 
notes, recovery on ATVs, and a composite of other miscellaneous assertions and claims, portions 
of which have been dismissed in summary proceedings. Mr. Sallaz, through his various law firm 
entities, thereafter filed a third party complaint for recovery on the outstanding balances owed to 
his firms on accruing attorney fees for the legal services performed for the Rices, amounting to 
sums in excess of $300,000,00. 
Statement of Facts 
As a supplement to what will be presented by co-counsel, Mr. Fuhrman and Ms. Judd, 
some background history will prove to be important in the Court's ability to understand the 
interrelationship between these Parties, and how it came about to have two different lawsuits 
filed by these Parties, one filed in Ada County in 2011 (being this one), and the other case, which 
has seemed to have caused the filing of this case, which fueled or ignited their animosities, the 
Canyon County case, filed in 2009. Dennis J. Sallaz, who everyone knows, is a local longtime 
Boise attorney, and with respect to the initial Complaint filed in Ada County, we go back in time, 
when, many years ago in the mid 1960's, during his college and law school days, Mr. Sallaz 
acquired a 1954 Eldorado Cadillac, and that vehicle he always had possession of title and 
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vehicle, until the vehicle was taken in 2011, under the direction of Roy Rice. As further 
background, we find that in 1991, a good friend and client of Mr. Sallaz, Eugene "Roy" Rice, 
had proposed to loan a small sum of money to complete a pending transaction that Mr. Sallaz 
wanted to address, and in anticipation this loan would occur, Mr. Sallaz took his Cadillac title to 
the Department of Motor Vehicles, and had them put Mr. Rice on the title as a "lien holder", so 
Mr. Sallaz could expedite that intended transaction, assuming Mr. Rice produced the funds. Mr. 
Rice, however, never came through with the funds as he had promised for the transaction, so Mr. 
Sallaz made other arrangements, and simply retained the title in his desk drawer. In 1995, while 
Mr. Sallaz was reviewing some of his vehicle titles, he saw where it still showed Mr. Rice to be a 
lienholder on his Cadillac title. He called Mr. Rice and met him, and Mr. Rice signed off and 
released the lien, which Mr. Rice did voluntarily, as there was no basis for him not to. Not 
another word was mentioned about a "lien" or a "loan" over this Cadillac, as obviously no loan 
never happened, and no lien ever came about to affect this Cadillac. Time marches on, and 
eleven (11) years later, in 2006, Messers. Rice, Sallaz, and a Sallaz business partner, named Glen 
Trefren, decide to enter into a development venture, which involved two LLCs, namely Real 
Homes, LLC, owned by Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren, and Real Properties, LLC, owned by Rice. 
Their "Purchase and Sale Agreement", hereafter referred to as "Agreement", concerned the 
transfer of membership interests Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren had in Real Homes, and there would 
be the transfer of certain parcels of real property that Real Homes before had titled to, but then 
were being held in one of Trefren's personal LLCs, namely Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction LLC. The parcels of property had been transferred to Tradesman so as to protect 
the properties from what Mr. Sallaz would describe to be a rather deceptive and greedy minded 
woman, Renee Baird, the woman he was then involved with in a "divorce" from her, but as it he 
PLAINTIFF-INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFF AND THIRD PARTY PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDA. 
P.4 
001400
later discovered, there never was a marriage, as there never was a marriage license, and because 
that fact was discovered in 2012, that dispute is now at the Idaho Supreme Court, which is 
scheduled for oral arraignment on August 24, 2014. 
The transaction involving this "Agreement" between Sallaz, Trefren, Rice, and the LLCs 
took place on January 6, 2006. Under the terms of that Agreement, Real Properties, LLC was to 
pay Sallaz and Trefren a purchase price sum of $250,000.00, with certain adjustments made with 
obligations to be assumed under the Agreement. Mr. Rice insisted he be given a period of two 
years to pay that purchase price. Mr. Sallaz had become entrenched in his "divorce" case, which 
actually began in 2004, and once Renee Baird heard trial testimony in July, 2006, this Agreement 
had taken place, she recorded a lis pendens against the properties, claiming, in addition to 
"ownership" of the properties, that she was the "sole member" of Real Homes, LLC, through a 
"operating agreement" she had created, using the original formatted document contained on the 
Sallaz office computer, which computer and other electronic devices and files she took with her 
from the Sallaz-Gatewood, Chtd law firm when she was "fired" by the law office staff on May 7, 
2004. She altered the true document, printed it off, changing it in three primary areas from what 
it was when drafted originally by Mr. Sallaz, and she used that fictitious document to cause 
subsequent problems. Consequently, her bogus claims to derail the "Agreement" caused need 
for a quiet title action to be undertaken regarding the subject matter of the Agreement, and with 
the assistance of Mr. Sallaz, it was decided to use the services of his longtime friend and 
personal attorney, John L. Runft, and his new associate, J. Kahle Becker. That quiet title action 
was filed in Canyon County in 2009, and since the purchase price was to have been paid by 
January, 2008, Sallaz had "politely" been requesting payment from Mr. Rice, but because the 
residential market had deteriorated and almost disappeared, Mr. Rice was unwilling to pay with 
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funds other than with funds generated from a re-sale of these parcels as developed properties, 
which had not taken place because of both the crash of the housing market, and Ms. Baird's 
outstanding cloud on the title. 
Mr. Rice had possession and control of the properties, as the title had been conveyed to 
Real Properties, LLC, owned by Mr. Rice. He later pledged these properties to D.L. Evans Bank 
to secure hundreds of thousands of dollars he borrowed to buy other properties with the money in 
2006. The actual target in the quiet title action was Renee Baird, as the objective was to remove 
the lis pendens filed by Renee Baird, as the "divorce" Ms. Baird had dragged on, and did not 
come to final judgment until 2012. In addition to this title cloud, Ms. Baird was still claiming to 
be the sole member of Real Homes, LLC, pursuant to the operating agreement she made up and 
used in the divorce court. In the divorce, she was claiming Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren had no 
authority to enter into that agreement with Real Properties. On February 28, 2014, the Canyon 
County District Court ruled that Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren were the only members of real 
homes, LLC, and Ms. Baird was not, and she had no authority or interest in it or its assets. 
However, during the divorce process, Ms. Baird successfully caused criminal charges to be filed 
against Mr. Sallaz for a horse trailer, which she falsely accused him of taking and hiding during 
the divorce proceedings. This charge was eventually dismissed with prejudice, and the various 
website repository domains were eradicated. As to be expected, along with Ms. Baird's false 
theft charge, she plotted to have him charged with burglary over her "burglary" report, claiming 
Mr. Sallaz had stolen back his computers, from within the residence where she resided, which 
truly belonged to Real Homes, though she had refused to vacate the premises. The computers 
and other law office items have never been seen since she removed them from the office in 2004. 
The only items she listed to have been "stolen" from the house were the exact items taken from 
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the office. Her burglary report was clearly seen to be a staged event, as the law office, through 
Scott Gatewood, had made demand upon her for the return of the items she took, and she had 
been put on notice. The firm (Sallaz-Gatewood, Chart'd) would take legal action against her if 
the items were not returned. The "burglary" was her response to demand for return, and after the 
"burglary" was investigated, the case was closed, as there was no supporting basis to even 
demonstrate a crime had been committed, let alone involved Mr. Sallaz, whose firm owned all 
the items, and nothing has ever been recovered. 
The "divorce" was contentious and appeared to complicate the joint efforts of Messrs. 
Rice and Sallaz to proceed against Ms. Baird. That suit was structured by Messrs. Runft and 
Becker, and they had decided to list Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren as Defendants in the action, 
instead of listing them as Involuntary Plaintiffs, stating the presentation of evidence would flow 
better that way, and additional counts were added to show and support the posture of a 
Defendant. Unknown to Mr. Sallaz, however, Mr. Runft then entered into a settlement with Ms. 
Baird, for the benefit of Mr. Rice, on August 2 or 3, 2010, but Mr. Runft later stated that Rice 
had actually "backstabbed" both Runft and Sallaz, as characterized by John L. Runft and his 
associate counsel, Mr. Becker, who was representing the mutual interests of the parties against 
Ms. Baird. Mr. Runft then announced he must withdraw from the case, acknowledging he had a 
conflict of interest, as he could not pursue any action adverse to Mr. Sallaz and his interests, and 
Mr. Runft also stated that his associate would need to withdraw as well, but instead J. Kahle 
Becker proceeded to represent the interests of the Rices and Real Properties, LLC, but now 
instead of being aligned with Sallaz, and the target being Ms. Baird, it was now against Sallaz 
and Trefren, and it later turned out to be their theory and testimony that Rice never entered into 
the "Agreement", despite the fact he dictated the terms within it, and had possession and control 




of all of the parcels of real property that were transferred to Real Properties, LLC, back in 2006. 
The Decision was recently rendered on February 28 2014, and the Court found that in 
fact there was a contract; that it was breached by Real Properties, LLC in that it failed to pay the 
purchase price, but at the same time, the true members of Real Homes, LLC, Messrs. Sallaz and 
Trefren, were also in a state of breach, because not only they conveyed their membership 
interests in Real Homes, LLC, but also conveyed all or substantially all of what before were its 
assets, thereby "triggering" a dissolution provision in the Operating Agreement, thereby 
defeating the fundamental purpose of the contract, rendering the contract to become 
"unenforceable" as to all parties, and the Court dismissed all claims of the parties with prejudice. 
The court was asked by Sallaz, Trefren, and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC, to 
award a recovery upon a theory of unjust enrichment, under the theory of implied contract in 
law, because of the ''unenf orceability" of the contract, but despite the fact the court found the 
contract to be unenforceable, the court declined to award unjust enrichment, raised in their 
counterclaim, and that issue is on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
After Mr. Runft made Rices' settlement with Ms. Baird in August 2 or 3, 2010, Mr. Runft 
continued to conceal from Mr. Sallaz the fact he had created and entered into the settlement, as 
Runft knew Sallaz would never agree to it, because of the animosity he had towards Ms. Baird, 
and rightfully so, since her behavior had become most despicable, and the developing dislike 
between them growing more intense, and for a multitude of reasons, the quiet title action needed 
to eliminate not only her false claim with the lis pendens, but also recovery of the parcel that Ms. 
Baird had obtained under another false pretense, when she got her name on one parcel of 
property, 15584 Riverside, after acquiring the interest by a quitclaim deed, when the property 
was transferred temporarily from Real Homes, LLC, to Mr. Sallaz, so he could obtain a loan, 




using his credit to generate funds to proceed with the development of the properties back in 
February, 2004. That 15584 Riverside parcel was then used as collateral to obtain the loan, and 
the parcel was to be held in trust for Real Homes, but when Ms. Baird got her name on the 
quitclaim deed, upon the pretense they were married, she later refused to deed it back to Real 
Homes, and instead filed for "divorce" in June 2004. Even though Mr. Sallaz wanted that parcel 
back into Real Homes, Mr. Rice didn't want it back, even though it was intended by Mr. Sallaz 
to go in the transfer to Real Properties. Br. Rice thought it was not worth the bother, and he felt 
the outstanding loan on it exceeded its resale value in any final development project. 
With Mr. Runft's 2010 settlement with Ms. Baird, she released any claim to any parcels, 
and Mr. Rice allowed her to keep the parcel listed on the quitclaim deed, as Rice never wanted 
that parcel to begin with. With clear title now to the parcels he wanted, Mr. Rice decided to turn 
against Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren (for reasons the parties perceive as disputed), and the case 
continues on, as Mr. Sallaz would never endorse the settlement agreement, and despite the 
conflict, Mr. Becker stays in, and pursues the matter against Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren. It was 
then Mr. Becker who told Mr. Rice to go take the Sallaz Cadillac, because Mr. Sallaz had never 
taken his title down to DMV to get a new title that would eliminate reference to the 1991 "lien" 
that appeared on the title. 
With the turn of events in Canyon County, Mr. Sallaz was openly irritated with Mr. Rice, 
for doing the settlement with Baird, and then, by all appearances, refusing to pay what was owed, 
while having both possession and clear title to the properties, and then "stealing" his Cadillac 
with the use of fraudulent documents. Further indications made it apparent Renee Baird was 
now seeking to "poison" the friendship of Sallaz and Rice, filling him with false and foolish 
ideas. She had been doing what malicious acts she could do in causing huge financial 
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complications for Mr. Sallaz. 
Mr. Sumner back in 1990 or 1991, had borrowed $10,000 from Mr. Rice, but Mr. Sumner 
specifically told Mr. Sallaz, Vernon K. Smith and John L. Runft, back in 2000, that he had repaid 
that loan he had with Mr. Rice, and nothing else was borrowed and nothing was now owed to 
Mr. Rice, and none of his settlement proceeds was to be used in the Sawtooth Energy case for 
him. Sumner confirmed the loan had been paid back, explaining it had been paid partly in cash, 
and the balance in Mexican radio station advertisements that Mr. Rice wanted broadcast for the 
benefit of Rices' pawnshop's ads. 
A brief description of the events of that lawsuit filed against Mr. Sumner and his business 
entities is important at this point, as it becomes wrongfully incorporated as a principal basis of 
the malpractice action. The "Sumner" litigation was a collection action by Sawtooth Energy, and 
Mr. Sallaz was brought into the suit, as he had a security interest that Mr. Sumner had given him 
in radio station stock, and Sawtooth was after that, so Mr. Sallaz joined in the suit to protect his 
interests, as it was his security for payment of his accumulation of attorney fees owed to him by 
Mr. Sumner over the years. In that lawsuit, Vernon K. Smith represented Mr. Sumner, and John 
L. Runft represented Mr. Sallaz. Mr. Runft knew no money was owing to Rice, as he put the 
entire settlement together in that case, and had talked to Mr. Sumner, and Messrs. Smith and 
Sallaz, about the baseless suggestion Mr. Rice still had an outstanding loan with Mr. Sumner. 
In 2011, almost 12 years later, since Mr. Rice has already "appropriated" the Sallaz 
Cadillac, and was in the process of trying to keep properties he had yet to pay for, and figured he 
had now burned all bridges with one of his last and true friends, saw the opportunity to make a 
claim against Sallaz, using some documents, including a letter that was written by Mr. Sallaz in 
2000, sent to Vernon K. Smith, inquiring about the "fmal terms." of the Sumner settlement, and 




wanting Smith to make sure Sumner took care of any "loan" that may still be outstanding to 
Rice, and to have the funds paid through that settlement, if anything was owing. Mr. Sallaz had 
been good friends and represented both Messrs. Sumner and Rice at those times, and he wanted 
peace among his clients, so he wanted any outstanding loans resolved, since there were funds 
available from the sale of Sumner's Radio stations. Mr. Sallaz had not been informed that 
Sumner had paid that $10,000 loan off, and Sumner was loud and clear on the point, when 
Messrs. Smith and Sallaz spoke to him in response to the Sallaz letter, as Smith had advised 
Sumner about the letter in 2000. That settlement closed in 2000; the people who were to be paid 
got paid, and there was nothing for Rice, as nothing was ever due or owed to him after Mr. Sallaz 
was made aware of the situation by Mr. Sumner. Mr. Rice was not a party in the case and never 
asserted a debt was owed to him. To this day, Mr. Rice has produced nothing to support a "loan" 
he claims he made to Sumner, and Mr. Sumner has submitted his affidavit to confirm he owed 
Mr. Rice nothing. 
Now, with the "divorce" raging, and the battle brewing in Canyon County over the non-
payment under the Agreement, and Mr. Rice trying to walk off with the property, together with 
the unacceptable settlement with Baird, along with Rice orchestrating the removal of the 
Cadillac, and dispute over the settlement proceeds in the Sumner matter that occurred over 12 
years before, the animosities were becoming more intensified. Mr. Becker wanted Messrs. Sallaz 
and Trefren to simply walk away, and forget their payment under the Agreement. Nallaz and 
Trefren wanted the property back, or the agreed price paid, but for Rice to steal the property, that 
was never an option. 
The dispute thickened as Messrs. Becker and Rice then created the idea, as announced in 
the Rice depositions, that Rice had "loaned" Sumner $40,000, to claim an offset to what Mr. 




Rice owed Mr. Sallaz and had taken the money to the Sallaz law office, and that's when we hear 
the repeated statement he "trusted Denny" to protect him on the "loan", and they were using this 
fabricated claim, both to avoid paying the obligation under the Agreement, as well as attempting 
to avoid paying Rices' accumulated attorney fees owed to the Sallaz law offices over the years. 
Mr. Rice had greatly aggravated Sallaz by absconding with the 1954 Eldorado Cadillac, claiming 
he had made a "loan" 20 years ago, though it never occurred. 
Mr. Rice had his adopted son, Michael Rice (now deceased), take the vehicle from the 
place where it was being stored on Sallaz' brother's property, and then concealed its 
whereabouts. Mr. Sallaz had stored this Cadillac on his brother's premises for some time, and 
Mr. Rice knew that. The way Mr. Rice chose to accomplish this conversion was to first go to 
Mountain Home, Idaho and submit an application for a duplicate title which the Elmore County 
Motor Vehicle Department, upon the pretense the title had been "lost" or "stolen". Obviously, 
that was a fraudulent application, as Mr. Rice well knew Mr. Sallaz always had possession of the 
title and the vehicle. Mr. Rice was a licensed vehicle dealer as he before owned several 
pawnshops and dealt routinely with the Elmore County Department of Motor Vehicles. The 
Department issued a duplicate title, which still showed the "lien holder" interest placed upon the 
title in 1991, as Mr. Sallaz had never taken his title down (with the release signed in 1995) as he 
had no intentions of ever selling his Cadillac, Mr. Rice then filed an application with DMV, 
claiming he now had "repossessed" the Cadillac, pursuant to the nonpayment of the loan (which 
never occurred), and that too was false and fraudulent, and there were no documents in existence, 
as there was no security interest, no conditional sales contract, no financing statement, no loan 
and no debt ever existed, not to mention the fact that it was 20 years ago, and there was no basis 
of any enforceable claim. His application was processed, unknown to Mr. Sallaz, and the new 
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title was issued to Mr. Rice, and once he got the clear title, he then undertook to "sell" the 
vehicle for what he represents to be the sum of $25,000.00. When Mr. Sallaz discovered his 
Cadillac had been stolen from his brother's premises, he filed a police report for vehicle theft, 
only to discover the investigation revealed Mr. Rice had taken the vehicle, claiming he had title. 
Mr. Sallaz filed this claim and delivery action for recovery of his vehicle, which then brought 
about the counterclaims and various claims in the nature of a malpractice action. 
Following the counterclaim, Mr. Sallaz initiated the third-party complaint, seeking 
recovery of attorney fees owed on the various accounts, where some payments may have 
arguably been applied on what is described in one of the accounts to be an old pawn shop trade 
account, supposedly arranged between Sallaz and Rice, back in Rice's pawnshop days in the 
1990's, before Mr. Rice sold the pawnshops in 2004. This pawnshop trade account is identified 
in the counterclaim, to be between $40,000.00 to $60,000.00 worth of items, that, if actually 
obtained, would have been obtained by Renee Baird and her daughter over those years, probably 
15 to 20 years before the counterclaim was filed by Mr. Rice. 
Marcy Fox, who is identified as an involuntary plaintiff in this Ada County case, had 
taken an assignment of the Cadillac from Mr. Sallaz previously, for security purposes, and she 
and Mr. Sallaz had also executed simultaneous powers of attorney, and it was upon that power of 
attorney Mr. Sallaz initiated the claim and delivery action to recover the Cadillac. 
The court before "froze" any further applications for transfer of ownership of the Cadillac 
and of interest; there have been no applications for a new title from any person purportedly 
having purchased the Cadillac from Mr. Rice for $25,000.00. It was purportedly sold around 
March 2012. Who legitimately would pay $25,000.00 for a vehicle, and not get a title issued in 
their name, is an issue for a jury to ponder. Mr. Rice claims it was a vehicle dealer who bought it, 
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and they don't transfer titles until the vehicle is sold to a customer. His deposition testimony 
suggests he cannot remember who it was that actually bought it, where he was from, what his 
(real) phone number was, or any other pertinent information that would enable Mr. Sallaz to seek 
recovery of the vehicle. The "first" telephone number Mr. Rice gave in his deposition was a 
nonworking number; the "second" number he gave in a deposition went to an answering machine 
that never went anywhere, as repeated messages were left and there were no return phone calls. 
Mr. Rice has repeatedly deceived us about his lack of knowledge of this information, as we have 
discovered he has had communication with the individual who does possesses the Cadillac, and 
we have correspondence showing Mr. Becker knows of the communications, but to date, they 
prefer not to disclose the information pertinent to the Cadillac that would enable us to take 
immediate action to recover possession of it. Mr. Rice has stated in his depositions that he 
accepted the first offer he received when he "sold" the Cadillac for $25,000 to the person he 
seems to have no recollection about. 
By virtue of the third-party complaint, Mr. Sallaz and his law firms seek recovery for the 
accruing unpaid accounts, presently now being well in excess of $350,000.00 with accruing 
interest. 
The Rices have taken the position they "own" the vehicle, stemming from what Mr. Rice 
said in his deposition that "if you are a lien holder, you are the owner of the vehicle". That is the 
way in which he has justified his fraudulent behavior in acquiring title, recognizing throughout 
his deposition that he cannot refer to or identify any loan, any loan amount, by whom a loan was 
made, or in what amount, if any, a loan was ever made over 20 years ago in 1991, and cannot 
produce anything required under the statute upon which a "repossession" of a vehicle could be 
authorized. Mr. Rice now claims it was Mr. Becker who instructed him to take the vehicle, and 
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it was Mr. Becker who told him to sell it as quickly as possible to someone out of state, as Mr. 
Becker received a $25,000.00 payment on his attorney fees, and both Messrs. Becker and Rice 
claim that sum came from the sale of the Cadillac. 
Mr. Rice claims he is owed on two notes, but Mr. Sallaz claims he returned the funds on 
the first note, and that provided funds for the second note, which was satisfied through other 
arrangements between them before the January 6, 2006 Agreement came about. The issue of the 
ATVs is a relatively insignificant debate, as regardless who prevails on the issue of ownership; 
they have no market value because of their age and condition from deterioration. Mr. Rice claims 
an unpaid balance on the pawnshop trade accounts, somewhere between $40,000.00 and 
$60,000.00 claimed to be owed for items claimed to have been obtained by Renee Baird, or her 
daughter from the pawn shop. The pawn shop was sold by or before 2004, and all assets were 
conveyed to the new buyer in that transaction, and supposedly nothing was retained by Mr. Rice 
upon which he could pursue a claim on an outstanding unpaid account. Furthermore, the "debt" 
or account was never signed by Mr. Sallaz as such, but rather the transaction(s) were identified in 
"ledger entries" in a little red book, that no one seems to have. There is no doubt Renee Baird 
and her daughter got items from the pawn shop, and it remains our belief the "debtor" of that 
account would be Ms. Baird, as Mr. Sallaz has not seen any evidence he ever assumed that trade 
account debt, but recognized the trade account existed by virtue of transactions undertaken by 
Renee Baird and her daughter. Mr. Sallaz recalls he received a ring, that Ms. Baird gave him 
from her dealings with this pawn shop. It remains a legal defense this pawn shop trade account is 
uncollectible for a variety of reasons. It was never retained by Mr. Rice when the assets of the 
pawnshop were sold, although they now claim it was retained, or assigned back to Mr. Rice, 
although that also contradicts the actual sale's documents; the contract identifies the sale of all 
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assets, including all accounts, and nothing was reserved for Mr. Rice to take action upon, and in 
any event, they failed to bring their claim against the real party of interest, the true debtor who 
got the items on the account, Renee Baird. 
The malpractice claims, asserted by Rice are addressed in detail by Mr. Fuhrman and Ms. 
Judd, but in summary fashion, it appears the claim basically arises out of a general contention 
that Mr. Sallaz had breached a duty regarding the Agreement involving the Canyon County 
property transaction, because, they claim, he might not have told Rice to get outside counsel to 
review and get advice about the contents of the proposed agreement. Despite that claim, the fact 
is Mr. Rice was told to get an attorney to draft the agreement. Mr. Rice would not go pay another 
attorney, and it was Mr. Rice telling Mr. Sallaz what the contents of that Agreement would be, 
including the exclusion of any personal guarantee from Rice to Sallaz and Trefren, and the 
inclusion of a two year period, before payment was due. He read the document each time he 
read the drafts which contained his dictated terms, despite the fact in his depositions and at trial 
in Canyon County, he never read the document, just signed the last page, never even given the 
other pages to read, and never agreed to the terms in it, and denied paying the $5,000.00 as a 
contract payment, but then says, if given to Mr. Sallaz, it must have been a "loan". The 
remaining guts of the malpractice claim is now this non-existent $40,000.00 "loan" that he seeks 
to relate to the "Sumner litigation" that was initiated in 1996, by Sawtooth Energy against Steve 
Sumner and his corporate entities. We now have Mr. Rice claiming a $40,000.00 loan made 
some 20 years ago, where he has nothing to demonstrate it ever occurred. This claim is like the 
non-existent Cadillac loan, and he says Sallaz was responsible for it not being paid or collected. 
A review of the letters before attached to an Affidavit of Vernon K. Smith, identify 
factual aspects of the dispute, as well as the more recent and developing tum of events that has 
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brought about the revelation of certain admissions against interest and some awful misconduct, 
that has really become of interest to Mr. Sallaz, as he now better understands the misconduct and 
ethical breaches of John L. Runft. These letters before presented to the court are dated December 
31, 2013, April 19, 2014, April 28, 2014 and May 10, 2014. 
Neither party can reasonably expect to see any cooperation in bringing about any 
resolution, as the hostilities are so entrenched they transcend any form of economic logic. It 
remains our belief it was because of the Canyon County dispute that Mr. Becker filed the 
malpractice claim. He saw no way there would ever be a cooperative resolution as it was no 
doubt clear to him Mr. Rice wanted to steal the real property assets, and Mr. Sallaz refused to let 
that occur. It was for that reason Mr. Becker told Scott Gatewood and Vernon K. Smith he 
would go after a "deep pocket", and that's why we have this malpractice claim and the stolen 
Cadillac. Because of the inability to resolve the Canyon County case, Rices' unwillingness to 
pay what was owed under the Agreement, it left no choice but to litigate the dispute in Canyon 
County to obtain payment or return of the property. As it currently stands in Canyon County, all 
claims in that case have been dismissed by the court, yet Mr. Rice holds clear title and 
possession of the parcels of property, in one of his LLCs, namely Ada Properties, LLC, having 
transferred the property out of Real properties into Ada properties in 2010. These parcels of 
property were worth not less than $680,000 in 2006, and Mr. Rice has paid approximately 
$63,000 on one assumed debt, and paid $5,000 to Sallaz under the terms of the purchase price in 
April, 2006. Consequently, Mr. Rice holds over $600,000 in property equity, stole the Cadillac 
and collected $25,000 from the sale of it. The direction of the Canyon County case is on appeal 
to address the the court's failure to grant relief under unjust enrichment, when declaring the 
contract to be unenforceable, and to also file a suit for declaratory relief, constructive trust or a 
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claim to recover the Real Homes' membership rights back, and recover the parcels of real 
property, as the conveyance of the parcels of real property to Real properties, LLC came from 
Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC, and the consideration that was to be received by 
it was the purchase price identified in the Agreement, which has not been paid. 
From an economic standpoint, undoubtedly, Mr. Rice would like to recover the huge 
outlay of cash he has paid for Mr. Becker's fees, about which he is sorely irritated, and his recent 
revelations have surfaced, as he revealed his frustrations to Patrick Oar, a close friend of both 
these parties. He explained there are intense internal hostilities within Rices' ranks, for a variety 
of reasons, and to a limited degree, we have gained some awareness of these mounting new 
issues and how they have come about, and much of that is addressed in our latest letter to Mr. 
Becker, May 10, 2014 before submitted to the Court. It is unlikely this feud will end, as the 
situation mandates additional claims will be advanced by Mr. Sallaz against several other 
individuals, for the revelation of what has recently been made public. 
Each of these parties has serious health issues. Sallaz recently had heart surgery. Rice has 
repeatedly claimed he is dying from C.0.P.D., and other serious injuries from a plane accident. 
Janet Rice has been described to have serious health complications. There are better ways to 
spend the autumn years of your life than being consumed in litigation, but remember, one is a 
lawyer who devoted 25 years to help resolve Mr. Rice's many legal problems, and the other is a 
pawnshop broker, who is also a used car dealer who did title loans, with the sole objective to 
repossess the vehicle upon the moment of default, and grab what equity could be gleaned. This is 
a man who absolutely believes if you can somehow get your name on a vehicle title, as a 
lienholder, you ARE the owner of that vehicle. That explains his mindset, and he has lived his 
whole life for the sake of getting his hands on money, and his tenacity is based on his greed to 




The conflicts are intensely fueled with the hostilities and animosities of the parties, as 
well as among some of counsels. The letters before submitted to the court give a basic insight 
and introduction into these aspects and the frustration over the generally deceptive nature of Mr. 
Rice, and the outrageous insults Mr. Becker has elected to cast towards Mr. Sallaz, and the 
course of conduct we have been exposed to endure through both of these cases. 
The issues to be decided at trial include: 
1.) The lawful owner of the 1954 Eldorado Cadillac. 
2.) Return of the Cadillac, or compensation for its reasonable value as a result of the 
conversion. 
3.) Who owns the ATVs. 
4.) Whether either of the two alleged notes, roughly $10,000.00 each, are owing, or 
whether the funds on one note were returned to Mr. Rice in 2005 (it is believed it was generated 
in the form of a cashier's check) and those funds later used to create the basis of the second note, 
and whether Mr. Sallaz settled the second note with accounts before the Agreement had been 
entered into on January 6, 2006. 
5.) Whether the malpractice claims have any merit, or are unfounded in fact and law. 
6.) Whether there is any obligation owed by Mr. Sallaz on a pawn shop trade account. 
7.) Whether Rices owe Sallaz and his law offices the accruing balance for attorney fees 
on the open accounts, now well in excess of $350,000.00 principal and interest. 
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8.) Whether any party is entitled to 
· Vernon K. Smith 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DENNIS J. SALLAZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Counterclaimants, 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 1107253 
) 
) 
) REPLY TO CORRECTED THIRD 
) AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND 
) THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND 















DENNIS SALLAZ an individual, DENNIS 
SALLAZ in his representative capacity of 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD Chtd. and 









Idaho Corporation, SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an ) 
Idaho Professional Limited Liability Company, ) 




) ________________ ) 
DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 


















COMES NOW Counterdefendants, Dennis Sallaz in his representative capacity of Sallaz 
and Gatewood Chtd., and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc., and Sallaz and Gatewood Law 
Offices, PLLC, and Sallaz Law, Chtd. ("Counterdefendants"), by and through their counsel of 
record William A. Fuhrman, of the firm JONES+ GLEDHILL+ FUHRMAN+ GOURLEY, P.A., 
and, in reply to Defendants' /Counterclaimants' ("Counterclaimants") Corrected Third Amended 
Counterclaim, admit, deny, and affirmatively allege as follows: 
I. 
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FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Some or all of Counterclaimants' counterclaims may fail to state proper claims for 
relief and should be dismissed. 
2. Counterdefendants deny each and every allegation in Counterclaimants' Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim unless specifically admitted in this Reply to Corrected Third 
Amended Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial. 
II. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
3. Paragraphs 1 through 4 of the Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim are admitted. 
4. Paragraph 5 is admitted to the extent Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered is an Idaho 
corporation. 
5. Paragraph 6 is admitted. 
6. Paragraph 7 is admitted only to the extent that Sallaz Law, Chartered is an Idaho 
corporation. 
7. In answer to paragraph 8, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz is a licensed attorney 
who currently practices at Sallaz & Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC, a professional limited liability 
corporation which has a principal place of business at 1000 S. Roosevelt St., Boise, Idaho 83705. 
Sallaz and Gatewood, Chartered and Sallaz Law, Chartered are inactive corporations. It is 
affirmatively alleged that Dennis Sallaz ceased practicing law through Sallaz Law, Chartered in 
approximately 2003, and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chartered, in approximately 2009. 
8. Paragraphs 9 and 10 are admitted. 
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9. In answer to paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, it is admitted only that this court has 
jurisdiction and that venue is appropriate in Ada County. It is denied that Counterclaimants were 
damaged in excess of $50,000. 
10. In answer to paragraph 14, it is admitted only that, at various times, Dennis Sallaz 
provided legal services to Counterclaimants. 
11. Paragraph 15 is denied. 
12. In answer to paragraph 16, it is admitted only that Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
was one of numerous firms which provided legal services to Counterclaimants. 
13. Paragraph 17 is denied. 
14. In answer to paragraph 18, it is admitted only that, at times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
15. In answer to paragraph 19, it is admitted only that, at times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd. 
16. Paragraphs 20, 21, 22 are denied. 
17. Paragraph 23 is denied. 
18. Paragraph 24 is denied. 
19. Paragraph 25 is admitted on information and belief. 
20. Paragraph 26 is denied on the basis that it is unduly vague. 
21. In answer to paragraph 27, it is admitted only that as part owner in A Vista Pawn, 
Dennis Sallaz received certain goods from that entity. 
22. Paragraph 28 is denied. 
23. Paragraph 29 is denied. 
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24. In answer to paragraph 30, it is admitted only that a copy of the Articles of 
Organization of Real Homes, L.L.C. is attached as "Exhibit A" to the Corrected Third Amended 
Counterclaim and that it was filed with the Secretary of State on January 19, 2001. It is denied 
that "Exhibit B" is a true and correct copy of the original Operating Agreement of Real Homes, 
L.L.C. 
25. In answer to paragraph 31, it is admitted only that Renee Baird was listed as a 
manager of Real Homes, L.L.C., in the Articles of Organization filed on January 19, 2001 and in 
the Operating Agreement. 
26. Paragraph 32 is admitted. 
27. Paragraph 33 is admitted. 
28. Paragraph 34 is denied. 
29. Paragraph 35 is admitted. 
30. Paragraph 36 is admitted and it is affirmatively alleged that Glen Trefren was also 
an owner of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
31. Paragraph 37 is admitted. 
32. Paragraph 38 is denied. 
33. Paragraph 39 is denied. 
34. In answer to paragraph 40, it is admitted only that Real Homes, L.L.C. conveyed 
15584 Riverside Rd., Canyon County, ID to Dennis and Renee Sallaz for $105,000 to be held in 
trust for Real Homes, L.L.C. 
35. Paragraph 41 is denied. 
36. Paragraph 42 is admitted. 
37. Paragraph 43 is denied on the basis that it is unduly vague. 
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38. Paragraph 44 is denied. 
39. Paragraph 45 is admitted. It is affirmatively alleged that Counterclaimant Roy 
Rice never loaned the funds represented in the two promissory notes to Dennis Sallaz. 
40. Paragraph 46 is denied except to the extent that it is admitted that a purported Bill 
of Sale for the ATVs and trailer is attached to the Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim as 
"Exhibit F." 
41. In answer to paragraph 4 7, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the Corrected Third Amended 
Counterclaim. It is affirmatively alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said SUV s to Rice 
but that Rice never paid for said SUV s and the sale was never completed. 
42. In answer to paragraph 48, it is admitted only that a copy of the title of the 
motorhome is attached as "Exhibit H." It is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Motorhome. 
43. Paragraphs 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, and 54 are denied. 
44. In answer to Paragraph 55, it is admitted only that the document attached as 
"Exhibit Z" to the Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim speaks for itself. 
45. In answer to paragraph 56, it is admitted only that the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement is attached as "Exhibit I." 
46. Paragraph 57 is admitted. 
47. In answer to paragraph 58, it is admitted only that the terms of the purchase 
agreement for sale of interest in Real Homes, L.L.C. speak for themselves. 
48. Paragraph 59 is admitted. 
49. Paragraph 60 is denied. 
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50. Paragraph 61 is denied. 
51. Paragraph 62 is denied. 
52. Paragraph 63 is denied. 
53. Paragraph 64 is admitted only to the extent that Real Properties, LLC, made an 
advance payment of$5,000. 
54. Paragraph 65 is denied on the basis of a lack of sufficient information to form a 
belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein. 
55. Paragraph 66 is admitted. 
56. Paragraph 67 is admitted but it is affirmatively alleged that the Magistrate Judge 
did not have jurisdiction to make the ruling he did. 
57. Paragraph 68 is denied. 
58. In answer to paragraphs 69 and 70, it is admitted only that Renee Baird's claim of 
ownership in some or all of Real Homes, LLC and/or Real Properties, LLC, and/or their assets, 
was known to Counterclaimant Roy Rice at the time he entered into the Purchase Agreement for 
the Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC. 
59. In answer to paragraph 71, it is admitted only that on or about November 4, 2009 
Eugene "Roy" and Janet Rice filed an action to quiet title in Canyon County as Case No. CV 09-
11855. 
60. Paragraphs 72 and 73 are denied. 
Paragraph 74 is admitted. 61. 
62. In answer to paragraph 75, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was included as a 
defendant in Canyon County Case No. CV 09-11855. 
63. Paragraph 76 is denied. 
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64. In answer to paragraph 77, it is admitted only that "Exhibit K" appears to be a 
copy of a Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement, and denied as to the remainder on the basis 
of lack of information to form a belief as to its truth. 
65. In answer to paragraph 78, it is admitted only that the Mutual Release and 
Settlement Agreement attached as Exhibit K speaks for itself and is denied as to the remainder. 
66. In answer to paragraph 79, it is denied that Counterdefendants committed nay 
fraudulent, malicious, negligent, and/or wrongful acts. 
67. Paragraphs 80 and 81 are denied on the basis of lack of information to form a 
belief as to their truth. 
68. Paragraph 82 is denied. 
69. Paragraph 83 is denied. 
70. Paragraph 84 is admitted. 
71. In response to paragraph 85, it is admitted only that the Assignment of Purchase 
Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC attached as "Exhibit L" and "Exhibit M" to 
the Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim speak for themselves. 
72. Paragraph 86 is denied. 
73. Paragraph 87 is admitted. 
74. In response to paragraph 88, it is admitted only that the Notice of Appeal attached 
as "Exhibit N" speaks for itself. 
75. Paragraph 89 is denied on the basis oflack of information to form a belief as to its 
truth. It is denied that the appeal is a tactic to delay this litigation or to prevent Counterclaimants 
from asserting the doctrines of collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, or res judicata. 
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76. In answer to paragraph 90, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to Corrected Third 
Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
77. Paragraph 91 is admitted but it is affirmatively alleged that Counterclaimant Roy 
Rice never loaned the funds represented by the two promissory notes to Counterdefendant 
Dennis Sallaz. 
78. Paragraphs 92, 93, 94, and 95 are denied. 
79. Paragraph 96 is admitted. 
80. Paragraph 97 is denied. 
81. In answer to paragraph 98, it is admitted only that the terms of the promissory 
notes speak for themselves. 
82. Paragraphs 99, 100, and 101 are denied. 
83. In answer to paragraph 102, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
84. Paragraphs 103 and 104 are denied. 
85. Paragraphs 105 and 106 are denied. 
86. Paragraph 107 is denied. 
87. In answer to paragraph 108 it is admitted only that the Court's Order attached as 
"Exhibit J" to the Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim speaks for itself. 
88. In answer to paragraph 109, it is admitted only that the documents attached as 
"Exhibit O" and "Exhibit P" speak for themselves. 
89. In answer to paragraph 110, it is admitted only that the document attached as 
"Exhibit Q" to the Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim speaks for itself. 
90. Paragraph 111 is denied. 
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91. Paragraph 112 is admitted only to the extent that, for a limited time, Dennis Sallaz 
provided legal advice in forming, and was the registered agent for, "R-R Investments, Inc." 
92. Paragraphs 113, 114, 115, 116, and 117 are denied. 
93. Paragraph 118 is admitted only to the extent that Steve Sumner was once a client 
of Dennis Sallaz. 
94. Paragraphs 119, 120, 121, 122, and 123 are denied. 
95. In answer to paragraph 124, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was involved in 
litigation against Steve Sumner over unpaid legal fees which resulted in a settlement in 2003, the 
matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case 
No. 96812, the pleadings of which speak for themselves. 
96. Paragraph 125 is denied. 
97. In answer to paragraphs 126 and 127, it is admitted only that the pleadings filed in 
Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case No. 96812, speak for 
themselves. 
98. Paragraph 128 is denied. 
99. Paragraph 129 is admitted. 
100. Paragraph 130 is denied. 
101. In answer to paragraphs 131 and 132, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was 
involved in litigation against Steve Sumner over unpaid legal fees which resulted in a settlement 
in 2003, the matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., 
et al, Case No. 96812, the pleadings of which speak for themselves. The other allegations of 
these paragraphs are denied. It is further affirmatively alleged that the settlement funds obtained 
in the matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, 
REPLY TO CORRECTED THIRD AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM - 10 
001426
e 
Case No. 96812, were for unpaid legal fees, the nature and character of which being a contested 
issue in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce action, Ada County Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M, and were 
expressly included in the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order that was filed 
of public record on or about October 30, 2007. 
102. In answer to paragraph 133, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz deposited 
settlement funds representing unpaid legal fees obtained in the settlement of the matter being 
entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case No. 96812, 
the pleadings of which speak for themselves, into a bank account for the Estate of Bessie B. 
Matcham. 
103. Paragraph 134 is denied on the basis of lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. It is further denied that Counterclaimants were entitled to any settlement proceeds from 
Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., et al, Case No. 96812, and that 
the pleadings filed in that case speak for themselves. 
104. In answer to paragraphs 135 and 136, it is admitted only that Dennis Sallaz was 
involved in litigation against Steve Sumner over unpaid legal fees which resulted in a settlement 
in 2003, the matter being entitled Sawtooth Energy Reserves, Inc v. Northwest Broadcasting Inc., 
et al, Case No. 96812, the pleadings of which speak for themselves. 
105. Paragraph 137 is denied. 
106. Paragraph 138 is denied. 
107. Paragraphs 139, 140, 141, 142, and 143 are denied. 
108. In answer to paragraph 144 and 145 it is admitted that Dennis Sallaz was the 
personal representative for his grandmother's estate and that he deposited portions of the 
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settlement funds into his grandmother's estate. It is denied that any of the settlement funds were 
due to Counterclaimants. 
109. Paragraph 146 is denied. 
110. Paragraph 147 is denied on the basis of lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
111. In answer to paragraphs 148 and 149, it is admitted only that Roy Rice requested 
that Tom Henry steal documents from the Sallaz and Gatewood law office which request was 
denied. All remaining allegations in paragraphs 148 and 149 are denied. 
112. Paragraph 150 is denied. 
113. Paragraphs 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, and 156 are denied. 
114. In answer to paragraph 157, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
115. Paragraphs 158, 159, and 160, and 161 are denied. 
116. In answer to paragraph 162, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
117. Paragraph 163 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants. 
118. Paragraph 164 is denied. 
119. Paragraph 165 is denied. 
120. In answer to paragraph 166, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
121. Paragraphs 167, 168, 169 are denied. 
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122. In answer to paragraph 170, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
123. Paragraph 171 is denied. 
124. In answer to paragraph 172, is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
125. Paragraphs 173 and 17 4 are denied. 
126. In answer to paragraph 175, it is admitted only that the terms of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
127. Paragraph 176 is denied. 
128. In answer to paragraph 177, it IS admitted only that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
129. Paragraph 178 is denied. 
130. In answer to paragraph 179, it IS admitted only that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. 
131. Paragraphs 180, 181, 182, 183, and 184 are denied. 
132. In answer to paragraph 185, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
133. Paragraph 186 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
134. In answer to paragraphs 187 and 188, it is admitted only that any fiduciary duties 
owed by Dennis Sallaz to Counterclaimants are those provided for by Idaho law. 
135. Paragraphs 189, 190, 191, and 192 are denied. 
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136. In answer to paragraph 193, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
13 7. Paragraph 194 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz, denied as to the remainder. 
138. Paragraphs 195,196,197,198,199,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,207,208, 
209,210,211,212,213,214,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227, 
228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241, and 242 are denied. 
139. In answer to paragraph 243, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
140. Paragraph 244 is denied. 
141. In answer to paragraph 245, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the counterclaim. It is affirmatively 
alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said A TVs to Rice but that Rice never paid for said 
A TVs and the sale was never completed. 
142. In answer to Paragraph 246, the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
speak for themselves. 
143. In answer to paragraph 247, it is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Winnebago, and it is admitted that a copy of the title for the Winnebago is attached as "Exhibit 
H." It is further denied that Counterclaimants have a valid interest or claim against said 
Winnebago as any debt has previously been paid. 
144. Paragraphs 248, 249, and 250 are denied. 
145. Paragraph 251 is denied on the basis of lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
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146. Paragraph 252 is denied. 
147. In answer to paragraph 253, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
148. Paragraph 254 is denied. 
149. In answer to paragraph 255, it is admitted only that a copy of a portion of the 
deposition of Dennis Sallaz is attached as "Exhibit G" to the Corrected Third Amended 
Counterclaim. It is affirmatively alleged that Dennis Sallaz attempted to sell said A TVs to Rice 
but that Rice never paid for said A TVs and the sale was never completed. 
150. In answer to paragraph 256, it is admitted only that a demand was made for the 
return of said A TVs and ATV trailer. 
151. Paragraphs 257 and 258 are denied. 
152. Paragraph 259 is denied on the basis of lack of information to form a belief as to 
its truth. 
153. Paragraph 260 is denied. 
154. In answer to paragraph 261, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
155. In answer to paragraph 262, it is denied that Dennis Sallaz is in possession of said 
Winnebago, and it is admitted that a copy of the title for the Winnebago is attached as "Exhibit 
H." It is further denied that Counterclaimants have a valid interest or claim against said 
Winnebago as any debt has previously been paid. 
156. In answer to paragraph 263, it is only admitted that a demand was made by 
counsel for Counterclaimants for the return of the Winnebago. 
157. Paragraphs 264,265,266,267,268, and 269 are denied. 
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158. In answer to paragraph 270, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
159. Paragraph 271 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
160. Paragraphs 272, 273, 274, 275, and 276 are denied. 
161. In answer to paragraph 277, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
162. Paragraph 278 is admitted to the extent that, at various times, an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Counterclaimants and Dennis Sallaz. 
163. Paragraphs 279,280,281, and 282 are denied. 
164. In answer to paragraph 283, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
165. Paragraph 284 is denied. 
166. In answer to paragraphs 285, 286, 287, and 288 it is admitted only that Idaho 
Code § 18-7803( c) speaks for itself and denied as to the remainder. 
167. Paragraphs 289,290, and 291 are denied. 
168. In answer to paragraph 292, it is admitted only that Idaho Code § 18-7803( c) 
speaks for itself and denied as to the remainder. 
169. Paragraphs 293,294,295, and 296 are denied. 
170. In answer to paragraph 297, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
171. Paragraph 298 is denied. 
172. Paragraph 299 is admitted. 
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173. Paragraphs 300 and 301 are denied. 
174. In answer to paragraph 302, it is admitted that Rice is purported, by fraud, to have 
been issued a Certificate of Title for the Cadillac, but the copy which is attached as "Exhibit Y" 
is illegible. It is affirmatively alleged that the Certification of Title for the Cadillac which is 
attached as "Exhibit Y" is invalid as a result of Rice's fraudulent acts. 
175. Paragraphs 303, 304, 305, and 306 are denied. 
176. In answer to paragraph 307, it is admitted only that the document attached as 
"Exhibit A" to the Verified Complaint speaks for itself. 
177. In answer to paragraph 308, it is admitted only that the application for Title Stop 
speaks for itself. 
178. Paragraph 309 is denied. 
179. Paragraph 310 is admitted. 
180. Paragraphs 311, 312, and 313 are denied. 
181. In answer to paragraph 314, the prior paragraphs of this Reply to the Corrected 
Third Amended Counterclaim are realleged as if stated in full. 
182. Paragraph 315 is denied. 
183. Paragraph 316 is admitted. 
184. Paragraphs 317 and 318 are denied. 
185. In answer to paragraph 319, it is admitted only that Rice sought to have issued a 
Certificate of Title for the Cadillac but the copy which is attached as "Exhibit Y" is illegible. It 
is affirmatively alleged that the Certification of Title for the Cadillac which is attached as 
"Exhibit Y" is invalid as a result of Rice's fraudulent acts. 
186. Paragraphs 320, 321, 322, and 323 are denied. 
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187. In answer to paragraph 324, it is admitted only that the document attached as 
"Exhibit A" to the Verified Complaint speaks for itself. 
188. In answer to paragraph 325, it is admitted only that the application for Title Stop 
speaks for itself. 
189. Paragraph 326 is denied. 
190. Paragraph 327 is admitted. 
191. Paragraphs 328, 329, and 330 are denied. 
192. Paragraph 331 is denied. 
193. The remaining paragraphs of Counterclaimants' Corrected Third Amended 
Counterclaim are requests for relief to which no answer is required. To the extent further answer 
is required, Counterdefendants deny the same. 
III. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
194. Counterclaimants' claim for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by set-off 
for various amounts due and owing Counterdefendants. 
195. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by their negligence, fault and legal 
responsibility. 
196. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the negligence, fault or liability of third 
parties for whom Counterdefendants are not legally responsible. 
197. Counterclaimants have failed to mitigate their alleged damages, if any. 
198. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, equitable 
estoppel, and judicial estoppel, and fraud. 
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199. Counterclaimants' damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced in that the damages 
sought by Counterclaimants' could have been avoided if Counterclaimants had acted reasonably 
prior to filing their counterclaim. 
200. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred and/or reduced by the 
doctrine of unclean hands. 
201. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. 
202. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
203. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
204. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
205. Some or all of Counterclaimants' claims are barred because they should have been 
raised in the pending Canyon County lawsuit, CV 2009-11855. 
206. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, 
including but not limited to, Idaho Code§§ 5-216, 5-217, 5-219, 5-222, 5-224. 
207. Counterclaimants' claims are barred or reduced by Counterclaimants' own breach 
of the subject agreements which are alleged to have been entered into. 
208. Counterclaimants' claims for damages, if any, are barred by the failure of 
Counterclaimants to substantially perform the terms of the alleged agreements. 
209. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by a failure to provide the consideration 
which forms the basis of certain of the agreements at issue. 
210. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
211. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to post an undertaking required 
by Idaho Code§ 8-303. 
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212. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to satisfy the pleading 
requirements ofldaho Code§ 18-7801 et seq. 
213. Counterclaimants' claims are barred by the failure to plead predicate acts 
constituting a pattern of racketeering. 
214. Counterclaimants' claims or some of them are barred and/or set off based upon 
the decision entered in Canyon County Case No. CV 2009-11855. 
215. Counterclaimants or some of them, may not be the real party in interest with 
respect to some or all of the claims asserted in Counterclaimants' Corrected Third Amended 
Counterclaim. 
216. Counterclaimants' claims or some of them are barred for lack of consideration. 
217. This action has just commenced and discovery has not yet taken place. 
Counterdefendants reserve the right to amend, modify and supplement their affirmative defenses as 
the action progresses. 
IV. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Counterdefendants have been required to retain the services of legal counsel to defend this 
action and they are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code§§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
V. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Counterdefendants hereby demand a trial by jury of not fewer than twelve ( 12) persons. 




PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, having fully responded to the Counterclaimants' Corrected Third Amended 
Counterclaim, Counterdefendants pray for judgment against Counterclaimants as follows: 
1. That Counterclaimants' Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim, and each cause of 
action and/or claim stated therein, be dismissed with prejudice, with Counterclaimants 
taking nothing thereby. 
2. That the Court award to Counterdefendants their costs and attorney fees incurred herein. 
3. That the Court award to Counterdefendants such other and additional relief as to the 
Court deems just and appropriate. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 2014. 
JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A. 
By~-~~W~i~ll~~~m~A:,..._.~~~hrm~~a~~~-~o~· f t~h-e~F=irm===-=-::::,,,,..._~ 
Attorneys for Counterdefendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of June, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing document was forwarded by the method indicated and to the following: 
J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Gabriel McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St. #302 



















William A. Fuhrman 
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JUL 2 1 201~ 
CM~~ ._ O.IIIQ.f c,.,_ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT or.~ASsorr ' . 






EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in 
his representative capacity of SALLAZ 
AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., and SALLAZ 




Case No. CV OC 1107253 
ORDER 
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DENNIS SALLAZ, in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Third Party Defendants. 
The jury's verdict was rendered on July 18, 2014. Counterclaims Eugene (Roy) Rice and 
Janet Rice recovered (i) $20,800 on claims for breach of two promissory notes, (ii) $3,200 on 
claims for conversion of two all-terrain vehicles and a utility trailer, and (iii) $8,500 on a claim 
for breach of a loan of money to purchase a Winnebago motor home. Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz 
recovered nothing, and Third-Party Plaintiff Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. recovered nothing. 
Before trial, the Court entered summary judgment against the Rices' claim for breach of 
the Winnebago loan because the claim is time-barred. At the outset of trial, however, the Court 
permitted the Rices to pursue the Winnebago loan issue as a potential offset to any liability they 
might be found to have to Sallaz. Since the jury's verdict includes no award to Sallaz, there is 
nothing to offset Sallaz's $8,500 Winnebago loan liability against. Accordingly, the award on 
the Winnebago loan is essentially a nullity. It will not be reflected in the judgment entered for 
the Rices based on the verdict, given the grant of summary judgment against the Rices' 
Winnebago loan claim. 
ORDER- PAGE 2 
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Consequently, the Court will enter judgment for the Rices in the total amount of 
$24,000-the sum of items (i) and (ii) above. In addition, based on the jury's verdict that Sallaz 
and Fox failed to prove their claim against the Rices for conversion of the 1954 Cadillac 
Eldorado, the judgment will quiet title in the Cadillac in the Rices' favor. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
Dated this~ day of July 2014. 
ORDER- PAGE 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ~day of July 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
William A. Fuhrman 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, PA 
225 N 9th St, Ste 820 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
PO Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 331-1529 
Vernon K. Smith Jr. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 WMain 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
J. Kahle Becker 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1020 W Main St, Ste 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Gabriel J. McCarthy 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
401 W Front St, Ste 302 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Fax: (208) 345-9982 
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9Q Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
¥Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
9<J. Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
9<t Facsimile 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 






EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in 
his representative capacity of SALLAZ 
AND GATEWOOD, Chtd., and SALLAZ 




Case No. CV OC 1107253 
JUDGMENT 
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DENNIS SALLAZ, in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET 
RICE, husband and wife, 
Third Party Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
• 
Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz's and Plaintiff Marcy Fox's claims are dismissed with prejudice, 
with no award to either Sallaz or Fox. 
Counterclaimants Eugene (Roy) Rice and Janet Rice are awarded a judgment of 
$24,000.00 on their counterclaims against Dennis Sallaz. In addition, as between the Rices and 
Sallaz, title to the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado, VIN 546265334, is quieted in the Rices. The Rices' 
counterclaims against Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc., Sallaz and 
Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC, and Sallaz Law, Chtd., Inc. are dismissed with prejudice, with no 
award to the Rices. 
Third-Party Plaintiff Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd.'s and Third-Party Plaintiff Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd., Inc.'s claims are dismissed with prejudice, with no award to either of them. 
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Post-judgment interest at the legal rate shall accrue on the judgment in favor of the Rices 
from the date of this judgment's entry. 
ft\ 
Dated this~ day of July 2014. 
JUDGMENT-PAGE 3 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ?J!day of July 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
William A. Fuhrman 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, PA 
225 N 9th St, Ste 820 
PO Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 331-1529 
Vernon K. Smith Jr. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W Main 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
J. Kahle Becker 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1020 W Main St, Ste 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Gabriel J. McCarthy 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
401 W Front St, Ste 302 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Fax: (208) 345-9982 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
~) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail f) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
~Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Electronic Mail 
~ Facsimile 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
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JUL 2 1 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SABRINA STOKES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his ) 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD Chtd. And SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD ) 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional ~ 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ ) 









DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
























Members of the jury, now that you have heard all the evidence, it is my duty to instruct 
you on the law that applies to this case. You will take a copy of these instructions with you to 
the jury room to consult if you find it necessary. 
It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will 
apply the law as I give it to you. You must follow the law as I give it to you whether you agree 
with it or not. You must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices, 
or sympathy. That means that you must decide the case solely on the evidence before you. You 
will recall that you took an oath promising to do so at the beginning of the case. 
In following my instructions, you must follow all of them and not single out some and 
ignore others; they are all equally important. You must not read into these instructions or into 
anything the court may have said or done any suggestion as to what verdict you should return-
that is a matter entirely up to you. 
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Instruction No. 2 
The evidence from which you are to decide what the facts are consists of: 
1. the sworn testimony of any witness; 
2. the exhibits which have been received into evidence; and 
3. any facts to which the lawyers have agreed or stipulated. 
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Instruction No. 3 
In reaching your verdict, you may consider only the testimony and exhibits received into 
evidence. Certain things are not evidence, and you may not consider them in deciding what the 
facts are. I will list them for you: 
1. Arguments and statements by lawyers are not evidence. The lawyers are not 
witnesses. What they have said in their opening statements, will say in their closing arguments, 
and at other times is intended to help you interpret the evidence, but it is not evidence. If the 
facts as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them, your memory of 
them controls. 
2. Questions and objections by lawyers are not evidence. Attorneys have a duty to 
their clients to object when they believe a question is improper under the rules of evidence. You 
should not be influenced by the objection or by the court's ruling on it. 
3. Testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or that you have been instructed to 
disregard, is not evidence and must not be considered. In addition some testimony and exhibits 
have been received only for a limited purpose; where I have given a limiting instruction, you 
must follow it. 
4. Anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session is not 
evidence. You are to decide the case solely on the evidence received at the trial. 
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Instruction No. 4 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly 
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one 
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree 
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for 
such convincing force as it may carry. 
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Instruction No. 5 
In deciding the facts in this case, you may have to decide which testimony to believe and 
which testimony not to believe. You may believe everything a witness says, or part of it, or none 
ofit. 
In considering the testimony of any witness, you may ask yourself the following 
questions: 
1. What opportunity and ability did the witness have to see or hear or know the 
things testified to? 
2. How good was the witness's memory? 
3. What was the witness's manner or demeanor while testifying? 
4. Does the witness have some interest in the outcome of the case or any bias or 
prejudice for or against one of the parties? 
5. Did other evidence, including the witness's prior testimony, contradict the 
witness's trial testimony? 
6. How reasonable was the witness's testimony in light of all the evidence?; and 
7. Are there other factors suggesting to you that the witness was or was not 
believable? 
The weight of the evidence as to a fact does not necessarily depend on the number of 
witnesses who testify. 
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Instruction No. 6 
Some witnesses, because of education or experience, are permitted to state opinions and 
the reasons for those opinions. 
Opinion testimony should be judged just like any other testimony. You may accept it or 
reject it, and give it as much weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness's education 
and experience, the reasons given for the opinion, and all the other evidence in the case. 
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Instruction 7 
The law firms involved in this case are entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced 
treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances. You should decide this case 
with the same impartiality that you would use in deciding a case that involves only individuals. 
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Instruction 8 
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to decide. 
You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance. 
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Instruction 9 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if you 
find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
true than not true. 
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Instruction 10 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or probable 
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need not be the only 
cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is 
not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the conduct of two or 
more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an 
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
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Instruction 11 
With respect to their claim for conversion of the 1954 Cadillac, Dennis Sallaz and Marcy 
Fox have the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. That the Rices took the 1954 Cadillac without a right to do so; 
2. The nature and extent of the damages to Dennis Sallaz and Marcy Fox and the 
amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that both of these propositions 
have been proved, then your verdict should be for Dennis Sallaz and Marcy Fox. If you find 
from your consideration of all the evidence that either of these propositions has not been proved, 
then your verdict should be for the Rices. 
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Instruction 12 
With respect to its claim for breach of contract relating to payment for legal services, 
Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. A contract existed between Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. and the Rices; 
2. The Rices breached the contract; 
3. Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. has been proved, then your verdict should be for Sallaz 
and Gatewood Chtd. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the 




A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do something that is 
supported by consideration. 
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four 
elements. The four elements are: 
1. Competent parties; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. Valid consideration; and 




A contract may consist of an off er by one party that is accepted by another party. 
An offer is any proposal that is intended to become binding upon the party making the 
offer if it is accepted by the party to whom it is directed. 
An acceptance of an offer is an expression by the party to whom the offer was directed 
that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of the offer. 
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Instruction 15 
Silence does not operate as acceptance of an offer unless: 
1. The silent party accepts services from the offering party, after a reasonable 
opportunity to reject, with knowledge that the offering party expects compensation; or 
2. Because of the past dealings of the parties, it is reasonable that the silent party 
should notify the offering party that the silent party does not accept; or 
3. The offering party has notified the silent party that the offer could be accepted by 
silence, and the silent party does intend to accept the off er by silence. 
If you find any of these circumstances exist, silence is an acceptance of the offer. 
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Instruction 16 
A contract may be written or oral, or may contain both written terms and oral terms. So 




Where a contract does not specify a time for performance, the law will imply a 
requirement that it be performed within a reasonable time, as is determined by the subject matter 
of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the nature of the performance required. In such 
case, it is for the jury to determine what a reasonable time would be under the circumstances, 
given all of the evidence in the case. 
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Instruction 18 
An implied-in-fact contract is a contract where the terms and existence of the contract are 
demonstrated by the conduct of the parties, with the request of one party and the performance by 
the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. To find an 
implied-in-fact contract, the facts must be such that the intent of the parties to make a contract 
can be inferred from their conduct. An implied-in-fact contract is given the same legal effect as 
any other contract. 
To establish an implied-in-fact contract, Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. has the burden of 
proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The circumstances imply a request by the Rices for performance by Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd.; and 
2. The circumstances imply a promise by the Rices to compensate Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd. for such performance; and 
3. Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. performed as requested. 
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Instruction 19 
With respect to their claims for breach of contract, the Rices have the burden of proving 
each of the following propositions: 
1. A contract existed between the Rices and Dennis Sallaz; 
2. Dennis Sallaz breached the contract; 
3. The Rices have been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of the Rices has been proved, then your verdict should be for the Rices. If you find 
from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not 
been proved, then your verdict should be for Dennis Sallaz. 
001467
Instruction 20 
In this case, Dennis Sallaz has asserted the affirmative defense of waiver to the Rices' 
claims for breach of contracts in the form of promissory notes. On this affirmative defense, 
Dennis Sallaz has the burden of proving a voluntary relinquishment by the Rices of a known 
right. The voluntary relinquishment of a known right may be evidenced by conduct, by words, 
or by acquiescence. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Dennis Sallaz has so proved, 
your verdict should be for Dennis Sallaz on the affirmative defense of waiver. 
001468
Instruction 21 
In this case, Dennis Sallaz has asserted the affirmative defense of abandonment to the 
Rices' claims for breach of contracts in the form of promissory notes. On this affirmative 
defense, Dennis Sallaz has the burden of proving that both parties expressly abandoned the 
contract or that one party acted in a manner indicating an intention to abandon the contract, or in 
a manner inconsistent with the continuation of the contract, and the other party acquiesces 
therein. Abandonment of a contract is a question of intent. It may be implied from the parties' 
actions. If the contract is abandoned, the law leaves the parties where it finds them. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Dennis Sallaz has so proved, 
your verdict should be for Dennis Sallaz on the affirmative defense of abandonment. 
001469
Instruction 22 
With respect to their claim for conversion relating to two Yamaha all-terrain vehicles and 
a utility trailer, the Rices have the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
l. That Dennis Sallaz kept the Rices' property without a right to do so; 
2. The nature and extent of the damages to the Rices and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that both of these propositions 
have been proved, then your verdict should be for the Rices. If you find from your consideration 
of all the evidence that either of these propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should 




With respect to their claims for unjust enrichment, the Rices have the burden of proving 
each of the following propositions: 
1. The Rices provided a benefit to Dennis Sallaz; 
2. Dennis Sallaz accepted the benefit; and 
3. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for Dennis Sallaz to retain the benefit 
without compensating the Rices for its value. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, then your verdict should be for the Rices. If you find from your consideration of all 




With respect to their claims for legal malpractice, the Rices have the burden of proving 
each of the following propositions: 
1. The existence of an attorney-client relationship; 
2. The existence of a duty on the part of Dennis Sallaz; 
3. Dennis Sallaz's breach of the duty; 
4. The breach of duty proximately caused damage to the Rices; and 
5 The nature and extent of the damages to the Rices, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, then your verdict should be for the Rices. If you find from your consideration of all 





As a general rule, no attorney-client relationship exists absent an agreement between the 
client and the attorney. If the attorney agrees to provide assistance, or engages in conduct that 
could reasonably be construed as so agreeing, then there is an attorney-client relationship. The 
scope of the attorney's duty to the client depends on what the attorney has agreed to do. 
An attorney-client relationship also exists if, under the circumstances, a person 
reasonably believes the attorney is representing that person's interests and the attorney fails to 
indicate otherwise. Thus, an attorney-client relationship exists if the attorney has represented the 
client in a variety of matters over a period of time and the attorney is asked to perform services 
in connection with a matter in which the client is involved, unless the attorney clearly informs 
the client that the attorney is not representing the client with respect to that matter. 
001473
Instruction 26 
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are designed for the purpose of helping the 
Idaho State Bar to regulate the conduct of attorneys. They are not designed to be a basis for 
imposing liability on attorneys in civil lawsuits. Thus, if an attorney violates the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct, the fact of a rule violation does not establish that the attorney breached a 
duty to the client, but a rule violation may be evidence of a breach of duty. 
001474
Instruction 27 
With respect to their claims for breach of fiduciary duty, the Rices have the burden of 
proving each of the following propositions: 
1. Dennis Sallaz owed a fiduciary duty to the Rices; 
2. Dennis Sallaz breached a fiduciary duty to the Rices; and 
3. The breach of fiduciary duty proximately caused damages to the Rices; and 
4. The nature and extent of the damages to the Rices, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, then your verdict should be for the Rices on this issue. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has not been proved, then 
your verdict should be for Dennis Sallaz. 
001475
Instruction 28 
A "fiduciary" is a party who is in a superior position to another party that has reposed 
special trust and confidence in him, in circumstances indicating that the one reposing the special 
trust and confidence has foundation for believing the fiduciary is acting in that other person's 
interests, not in the fiduciary's own interests. A fiduciary owes a duty to act in the other person's 
interests on matters within the scope of the fiduciary relationship, setting aside the fiduciary's 
own interests and the interests of third parties. 
An attorney owes a fiduciary duty to his client with respect to matters within the scope of 
the attorney-client relationship. 




By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to 




If you decide a party is entitled to recover on a claim for conversion, you must award that 
party the amount you find is the fair market value of the item taken or kept without a right to do 
so. 
"Fair market value" means the amount of money a willing buyer would pay and a willing 
seller would accept for the item in question in an open marketplace, in the item's condition as it 




If you decide Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. is entitled to recover on its claim for breach of a 
contract requiring payment for legal services, you must award Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. as 
damages the amounts you find are owed according to the terms of the contract. 
It is necessary for you to make a separate finding as to the amount owed with respect to 
the charges set forth in the "Quickbooks" category listed in Exhibit 569A. Accordingly, you will 
be asked on the Special Verdict Form to make a finding as to the total amount Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd. is owed under the contract, and then to make a separate finding as to how much 
of the total amount awarded is attributable to the charges set forth in the "Quickbooks" category. 
001479
Instruction 32 
If you decide the Rices are entitled to recover on a claim for breach of a contract in the 
form of a promissory note, you must award the Rices as damages the amount stated on the face 
of the promissory note, minus the amount of any payments you find Dennis Sallaz made on the 
promissory note. Your award must not include interest or attorney fees. 
001480
Instruction 33 
If you decide the Rices are entitled to recover on their claim for breach of a contract for 
the loan of money to purchase a Winnebago motor home, you must award the Rices as damages 
the amount you find was loaned to Dennis Sallaz, minus the amount of any payments you find 
Dennis Sallaz made on the loan. Your award must not include interest or attorney fees. 
001481
Instruction 34 
If you decide the Rices are entitled to recover on a claim for legal malpractice, you must 
award them as damages the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate them 
for the measurable losses of money you find were proximately caused by the legal malpractice. 
001482
Instruction 3 5 
If you decide the Rices are entitled to recover on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, you 
must award them as damages the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate 




If you decide the Rices are entitled to recover on a claim for unjust enrichment, you must 
award them the amount by which you find Dennis Sallaz was unjustly enriched. 
001484
Instruction 3 7 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage 
and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be 
recovered. 
001485
Instruction 3 8 
Damages need not be proved with mathematical exactitude, but any award of damages 
must be based upon evidence and not upon speculation, guesswork or conjecture 
001486
Instruction 39 
In this case, you will be given a Special Verdict Form to use in returning your verdict. 
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to 
you now. 
[Read the verdict form in its entirety, including all instructions, and 
explain the signature block for the foreperson and the signature 
lines for the individual jurors.] 
We will now hear the closing arguments of counsel, afk~r which I will give you a few 
brief closing instructions. 
001487
Instruction A 
I will remind you that the arguments and statements by lawyers are not evidence. The 
lawyers are not witnesses. What they have said in their opening statements, closing arguments, 
and at other times is intended to help you interpret the evidence, but it is not evidence. If the 




In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide 
any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are 
to be awarded, you may not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's 




I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding 
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes 
counsel will present their closing arguments to you, and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the 
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense 
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that 
it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as 
for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with each another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself, but you should do so only after a discussion and 




If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send 
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me 
by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of 




On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside 
over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with my instructions as to the 
law. Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you 
by the instructions on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of the jury, or, in other words, by nine of you. 
As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the 
verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same 
nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if 
nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who 




I will now draw the name of the alternate juror, to whom I apologize in advance. 
I will advise the alternate juror that it is still possible, should some problem arise, that 
you could be recalled and the jury instructed to begin its deliberations anew with your 
participation. For that reason, you are admonished not to discuss this case with other 
jurors or anyone else, nor to form an opinion as to the merits of the case. 
Please leave your name and telephone number with the bailiff. My staff will call 
you to let you know when any verdict is reached and what that verdict may be, or to 
advise you if, for any reason, you must return to court to participate in deliberations. 
Thank you for your service. 
"" Dated this J.:!.__ day of July, 2014. 
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DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his ) 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD Chtd. And SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD ) 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional ~ 
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DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 

















We, the jury, find as follows: 
1954 Cadillac 
Question 1. Did Dennis Sallaz and Marcy Fox prove their claim for conversion of the 
1954 Cadillac? 
Answer: Yes 
Next, answer Question 2. 
orNo / 
Question 2. What is the fair market value of the 1954 Cadillac? 
Answer: $ 2.:S-. () () f) . 
Next, answer Question 3. 
Legal Services 
Question 3. Did Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. prove its claim for breach of a contract 
requiring payment for legal services? 
Answer: Yes __ or No __L 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 3, answer Question 4. If you answered "No" to 
Question 3, skip Questions 4 and 5 and then answer Question 6. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 2 
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Question 4. How much money do the Rices owe Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. under the 
contract? 
Answer: $ -------
Next, answer Question 5. 
Question 5. How much of the amount you awarded in your answer to Question 4 is 
attributable to the charges reflected in the "Quickbooks" category listed on Exhibit 569A? 
Answer: $ -------
Next, answer Question 6. 
Pawnshop Items 
Question 6. Did the Rices prove their claim for unjust enrichment in connection with 
items received by Dennis Sallaz or his family from Vista Pawn? 
Answer: Yes __ or No ___L 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 6, answer Question 7. If you answered "No" to 
Question 6, skip Question 7 and then answer Question 8. 
Question 7. What is the amount by which Dennis Sallaz was unjustly enriched in 
connection with his or his family's receipt of items from Vista Pawn? 
Answer: $ -------
Next, answer Question 8. 
Promissory Notes 
Question 8. Leaving aside for purposes of this question Dennis Sallaz's affirmative 
defenses of waiver and abandonment, did the Rices prove their claim that Dennis Sallaz 
breached a contract in the form of a $10,800 promissory note? 
Answer: YesLorNo __ 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 8, answer Question 9. If you answered "No" to 
Question 8, skip Questions 9, 10, and 11 and then answer Question 12. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 3 
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Question 9. Did Dennis Sallaz prove his affirmative defense of waiver with respect to 
$10,800 promissory note? 
Answer: Yes 
Next, answer Question 10. 
or No / 
Question 10. Did Dennis Sallaz prove his affirmative defense of abandonment with 
respect to $10,800 promissory note? 
Answer: Yes orNo / 
If you answered "No" to both of Questions 9 and 10, answer Question 11. If you 
answered "Yes" to either Question 9 or 10, skip Question 11 and answer Question 12. 
Question 11. How much money does Dennis Sallaz owe on the $10,800 promissory 
note? 
Answer: $ 1 0 <J O 0 --~,-.=---
Next, answer Question 12. 
Question 12. Leaving aside for purposes of this question Dennis Sallaz's affirmative 
defenses of waiver and abandonment, did the Rices prove their claim that Dennis Sallaz 
breached a contract in the form of a $10,000 promissory note? 
Answer: Yes / orNo 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 12, answer Question 13. If you answered "No" to 
Question 12, skip Questions 13, 14, and 15 and then answer Question 16. 
Question 13. Did Dennis Sallaz prove his affirmative defense of waiver with respect to 
$10,000 promissory note? 
Answer: Yes 
Next, answer Question 14. 
or No v 
Question 14. Did Dennis Sallaz prove his affirmative defense of abandonment with 
respect to $10,000 promissory note? 
Answer: Yes or No ./ 
If you answered "No" to both of Questions 13 and 14, answer Question 15. If you 
answered "Yes" to either Question 13 or 14, skip Question 15 and answer Question 16. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 4 
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Question 15. How much money does Dennis Sallaz owe on the $10,000 promissory 
note? 
Answer: $ __ 1_()_,_.,_<!J_<1_0_ 
Next, answer Question 16. 
Winnebago 
Question 16. Did the Rices prove their claim that Dennis Sallaz breached a contract for 
a loan of money to purchase a Winnebago motor home? 
Answer: Yes_LorNo __ 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 16, answer Question 17. If you answered "No" to 
Question 16, skip Question 17 and then answer Question 18. 
Question 17. How much money does Dennis Sallaz owe on the Winnebago loan? 
Answer: $ ~5"00 
Next, answer Question 18. 
All-Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) and Trailer 
Question 18. Did the Rices prove their claim for conversion of the 1998 Yamaha ATV? 
Answer: Yes / or No 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 18, answer Question 19. If you answered "No" to 
Question 18, skip Question 19 and then answer Question 20. 
Question 19. What is the fair market value of the 1998 Yamaha ATV? 
Answer: $~~,5j~()'--"f)~~-
Next, answer Question 20. 
Question 20. Did the Rices prove their claim for conversion of the 2002 Yamaha A TV? 
Answer: Yes ../ or No 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 20, answer Question 21. If you answered "No" to 
Question 20, skip Question 21 and then answer Question 22. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 5 
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Question 21. What is the fair market value of the 2002 Yamaha ATV? 
Answer: $ 17 &O -------
Next, answer Question 22. 
Question 22. Did the Rices prove their claim for conversion of the trailer? 
Answer: Yes ./ or No 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 22, answer Question 23. If you answered "No" to 
Question 22, skip Question 23 and then answer Question 24. 
Question 23. W4at is the fair market value of the trailer? 
Answer: $ i 000 ------'~-=------c~--
Next, answer Question 24. 
Real Homes/Real Properties Transaction 
Question 24. Did Dennis Sallaz act as the Rices' lawyer in connection with the Real 
Homes/Real Properties transaction? ./ 
Answer: Yes or No 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 24, answer Question 25. If you answered "No" to 
Question 24, skip Questions 25, 26, 27, and 28 and then answer Question 29. 
Question 25. Was Dennis Sallaz acting within the scope of his duties for Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd. with respect to the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction? · 
Answer: Yes ./ or No 
Next, answer Question 26. 
Question 26. Was Dennis Sallaz acting within the scope of his duties for Sallaz and 
Gatewood PLLC with respect to the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction? 
Answer: Yes or No V 
Next, answer Question 27. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 6 
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Question 27. Was Dennis Sallaz acting within the scope of his duties for Sallaz Law, 
Chtd. with respect to the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction? 
Answer: Yes ,v' or No 
Next, answer Question 28. 
Question 28. Did the Rices prove their claim for legal malpractice in connection with 
the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction? 
Answer: Yes _L_ or No __ 
Next, answer Question 29. 
Question 29. Did the Rices prove their claim for breach of fiduciary duty in connection 
with the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction? 
Answer: Yes / or No 
If you answered "Yes" to one or both of Questions 28 and 29, answer Question 30. If 
you answered ''No" to both of Questions 28 and 29, skip Questions 30 and 31 and then answer 
Question 32. 
Question 30. What amount of damages to the Rices was proximately caused by legal 
malpractice and/or breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Real Homes/Real Properties 
transaction? 
Answer: $ 0 
Next, answer Question 31. 
Question 31. When did the Rices know, or when in the exercise of reasonable care 
should they have known, that they had suffered some damage as a result of legal malpractice 
and/or breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Real Homes/Real Properties transaction? 
Answer: ~007 
Next, answer Question 32. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 7 
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Sumner Matter 
Question 32. Did Dennis Sallaz act as the Rices' lawyer in connection with the Sumner 
matter? 
Answer: Yes _L__ or No __ 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 32, answer Question 33. If you answered "No" to 
Question 32, skip Questions 33, 34, 35, and 36 and then answer Question 37. 
Question 33. Was Dennis Sallaz acting within the scope of his duties for Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd. with respect to the Sumner matter? 
Answer: Yes __ orNo_L 
Next, answer Question 34. 
Question 34. Was Dennis Sallaz acting within the scope of his duties for Sallaz and 
Gatewood PLLC with respect to the Sumner matter? 
orNo / Answer: Yes 
Next, answer Question 35. 
Question 35. Was Dennis Sallaz acting within the scope of his duties for Sallaz Law, 
Chtd. with respect to the Sumner matter? / 
Answer: Yes _Lor No 
Next, answer Question 36. 
Question 36. Did the Rices prove their claim for legal malpractice in connection with 
the Sumner matter? 
Answer: Yes 
Next, answer Question 37. 
or No / 
Question 37. Did the Rices prove their claim for breach of fiduciary duty in connection 
with the Sumner matter? 
Answer: Yes or No / 
If you answered "Yes" to either of Questions 36 and 37, answer Question 38. If you 
answered "No" to both of Questions 36 and 37, skip Question 38 and then answer Question 39. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 8 
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Question 38. What amount of damages to the Rices was proximately caused by legal 
malpractice and/or breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Sumner matter? 
Answer: $ -------
Next, answer Question 39. 
Question 39. Did the Rices prove their claim for unjust enrichment in connection with 
the Sumner matter? 
Answer: Yes or No / 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 39, answer Question 40. If you answered "No" to 
Question 39, skip Question 40 and follow the instructions that immediately precede Question 41. 
Question 40. What is the amount by which Dennis Sallaz was unjustly enriched in 
connection with the Sumner matter? 
Answer: $ --------
If you answered "Yes" to any of Questions 36, 37, or 39, answer Question 41. If you 
answered "No" to each of Questions 36, 37, and 39, skip Question 41, sign and date this Special 
Verdict Form, and tell the bailiff you have completed your deliberations. 
Question 41. When did the Rices know, or when in the exercise ofreasonable care 
should they have known, that they had suffered some damage as a result of legal malpractice 
and/or breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Sumner matter? 
Answer: 
Sign and date this Special Verdict Form, and tell the bailiff you have completed your 
deliberations. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 9 
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EUGENE (ROY) IUCE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants. 




DENNIS SALLAZ an individnal and in bis 
tep.resentative capacity of SALLAZ AND 






























Case No. CV OC 110'.7253 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
FOR PLAINTIFF-INVOLUNTARY 
PLAINTIFF, NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
JURY VERDICT 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF-INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFF, 
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GATEWOOD, Chui, Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Cowrter Defendants. 
DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
Chui, and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chld., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 




















Comes now the Plaintift Dennis J. Sallaz, and the Involuntacy Plaintiff, Marcy Fox, 
by and through their cowisel record, V em.on K Smith, and do move this court, pursuant to 
Rule 50(b) lR.C.P., for entry or judgment, notwithstanding the jury verdict, as entered of 
record by the jury on July 21, 2014, regarding the conversion of the 1954 Cadillac. 
Introduction 
At the close of presentation of Defendant Rices' case, presented along with the 
presentation of their counterclaim, Plaintiff-Involuntary Plaintiff moved for directed verdict 
on certain matters, pursuant to Rule 50(a) I.R.C.P. regarding the lack of any enforceability 
or right of action to advance the validity of these alleged "lienholdef' interests, one 
purportedly established back in 1991 in the 1954 Eldorado Cadillac convertible, and the 
other pwportedly claimed as remaiDing of record in the Wmnebago motorho:mc, as Rices, in 
their counterclaim. were claiming a "lienholder'' interest in that motomome as well, as a lien 
MOTION FOREN1RY OF JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF-INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFF, 
NO'IWJTBSTANDING THE .JURY VERDICT P. 2 
001505
07/25/2014 12:47 208345ie VERNON K SMITH~ PAGE 04/10 
' 
was still shown on the title to the 1989 Winnebago motorhome, despite the fact the advance 
of the $8,500.00 cash payment, tendered by Rices to Sallaz, while they were in Portland on 
a trip, used by Sallaz to purchase the motorhome while they were all there in Portland, was 
later returned to Rice in the form of a check for that amount, issued on the Sallaz checking 
account in use at the time, signed by Renee Baird, and delivered to Roy Rice at the Vista 
Pawn facility by Kelli Waltz, where she left the check with Rice's pawn shop manager, 
which event was believed to have taken place sometime before 2003, as Ms. Waltz so 
explained and testified to the fact in Court. With respect to each of these vehicles, however, 
the application of law has affected each of the alleged underlying debts, whether or not ever 
owning, whether or not ever even existing, and whether or not ever was re-paid, as one of 
the several statutes of limitations had rendered each such claimed debt, upon any such 
claimed loan, to be no longer actionable, as a matter of law, and the legal effect of such 
statutes :means the debt has become deemed to no longer exist, as it bad "expired" under the 
law, by virtue of the implications and effects of one of these various applicable statutes of 
limitations. Once a debt is rendered. to be no longer actionable, it then becomes 
uncollectable and unenforceable, as Idaho follows the vast majority regarding this line of 
authority on the effects of statutory voidance. 
With respect to the Winnebago motorhome, this District Court had before declared 
the underlying "claim" of that existing debt t.o be null and void, as a result of the application 
of the Statute of limitations- as detennined by the Court in those summary proceedings and 
that summary judgment entered by the Court in reference thereto. The "claim'', however, 
was allowed to go to the jury, solely for its potential as an "offset,, effect, as thel'e was an 
anay of various potentially time-ban-ed claims being advanced by both parties. 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF-INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFF, 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY VERDICT P. 3 
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The authorities earlier present.ed by Sallaz-Fox, supporting their Motion for directed 
verdict, WM set forth with some detail, and contained within the Memorandum of case law, 
the authority that confinned Idaho follows the vast majority on that line of authority that 
unconditionally holds a "lien" against personal property cannot exist without the existence 
of an enforceable and actionable right able to be taken on the underlying "debt". That 
Memorandum of authority WM filed (lodged) with the Court's Clerk on July 17, 2014. 
That Memorandum was submitted, as this Court had requested c.ounsel for Sallaz~ 
Fox to submit authority which supports the basis for the Court to grant the requested 
disposition upon the motion for directed verdict, but as it then became a practical issue of 
timing, and given the time needed to :6nalire various issues and concerns over jury 
instructions, and given need for adequate time to fully review the issue of Idaho's position 
on the question regarding a lienholder's claim to an interest in personal property that is 
being asserted on an expired debt, it became a need to preserve the issue for consideration 
following entry of the jury verdict, in the context of this motion for entry of judgment, 
notwithstanding the jmy verdict, to resolve the issue and provide the basis for an amended 
judgment. The jury rendered its verdict on July 21, 2014, the effect ·Of which had granted 
enforcement of each of these claims to a lienholder interest in these two vehicles, the effect 
of which requires this Court to now fully address this issue, now in the context of a Rule 
50(b) motion, rather than Rule 50(a), I.RC.P.. The jury concluded that Plaintiff ~ 
Involuntary Plaintiff failed to meet their burden to prove the issue of conversion of the 1954 
Eldorado Cadillac, presumably for the reason the cadillac had become titled in the name of 
the Rices, pursuant to their application for a duplicate title, and then their affidavit of 
repossessi®,. follovving receipt of a duplicate title upon their application for a duplicate title, 
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all of which occurred upon the sole pretense they were shown as a lieoholder on that 
Cadillac title, extending back to 1991, when it was placed thereon and shown of record with 
the Department of Transportation, motor vehicle division, and recorded July 22, 1991. That 
''lien" had never overridden with 1he muan.ce of a new title, which would have removed the 
lien, had the title reflecting the release of the lien, signed by Rice on July 20, 1995, been 
submitted to DMV for issuance of a new title. Absent the presence of that claimed 
lienholder interest, only upon which an application for a duplicate title and an affidavit of 
repossession could be pursued by the Rices, the act of conversion, as a matter of law, took 
place, as the convemion was the result of the act of approprlatlng the Cadillac, that 
l.Uldisputably took place on or aboutJsnumy 17, 2011, when Rices, along with their agents, 
entered upon private property, without authorization, and despite their confronting a locked 
gate, with a chain and padlock securing the latch, along with the further presence of two 
signs displaying the statement "no trespassing"; and despite their complete awareness of no 
right of entry, we are left with the Rices choosing to unlawfully enter into this restricted 
are@, without permission, without a writ of possession, an~ with.out giving any notice of 
even the hint of a claim to an interest in this Cadillac, and took possession of the vehicle, in 
. total disregard of all property rights and in violation of the UCC, and all aspects of Article 9, 
which mandates in what manner seemed transactions. under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
may be processed under Idaho law .. Consequently, the underlying issue presented both in 
the Motion for directed verdict, pursuant to Rule SO(a) LR.C.P., and now again presented in 
our Motion for entry of judgment, notwithstanding the jmy verdict, pursuant to Rule SO(b), 
I.R.C.P., remains before the Court: whether, as a matter of law, a olaimed "'lienholder'' 
interest in a motor vehicle, based upon an alleged "loan" made 20 years ago, can ever 
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constitute a lawful basis to claim a ''valid" and "enforceable" right to exercise a default and 
repossession upon that lien against the title to that vehicle, from which you are then lawfully 
allowed to enforceability claim a default and effectuate a "repossessiorr' of that vehicle 
under Article 9 of the UCC, when the underlying basis of the lien was a ·~ loan" or ''debt'' 
.admittedly created 20 years ago, and consequently had long ago expired as a matter oflaw, 
and no longer actionable pursuant to the applicable effects of these Statutes of limitations. 
Statement of Facts 
The statement of facts remain the same as they were presented to the Court, pursuant 
to our Motion for Directed Verdict, all of which is contained within the Memorandum 
previously presented. to the court. 
With respect to the 1989 Winnebago motorhome, this court has already addressed 
that issue under its theory of a setoff, which the Court preserved for the potential benefit of 
the Def~ should Plaintiff otherwise in;evail on any other of their claims asserted in this 
action. The Court having found there existed no award by the jury to Plaintiff-Involuntary 
Plaintiff-Tbkd Party Plaintiff from which any basis for a "setofl'' coul4 apply, did, upon its 
own assessment, nullify the jury verdict with respect to the $8,500 "debt'' that was awarded 
to Rices µnder the Winnebago •'Lien" claim. and this Court did confirm the lien and debt to 
be void and tmenforceable, and that resolved the issue with respect to the Winnebago 
motorhome. Accordingly, that sum contained hl the jmy verdict ($8,500.00) was properly 
deducted, leaving the award in place regarding the promissory notes and value assessed for 
the two A TV's and trailer to remain, resulting in a money Judgment entered by the Court for 
a total of $24,000.00 in favor of the Rices. 
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What now remains for the Court t.o decide is a similar detennination with respect to 
the lien claimed against the 1954 Cadillac, as it, too, is subject to the same application of the 
Statute of Limitations; and the underlying debt, if it ever existed, has been rendered void, 
and unenforceable, as no action can be taken upon that "'fanthom" debt, so the c~ lien-
holder interest being asserted in relation to that expired debt, is also rendered non actionable, 
unenforceable, and invalid, as a result of the nullification effects of the Statute of 
Limitations that took effect upon what.ever oral a.mmgements or oral contract may have been 
made regarding the Cadillac in 1991, assuming any loan or debt ever even existed, but 
consequently expired pursuant to Idaho's four year Statute of Limitations, causing that 
"debt" to have rendered void and expired as of no latel' than July 23, 1995, coincidentally 3 
days after the "lien" was actually released by Mr. Rice on July 20, 1995. The authority 
confirming the non~actionability; the unenforceability, and the invalidity of an alleged lien 
holder interest, upon an expired, non-actionable, unenforceable, and invalid debt which has 
been rendered such by the Statute of Limitations, has been submitted to this Court in our 
previous Memorandum, and that authority is incorporated herein by our referen~ thereto, 
and that Memorandum is being submitted as the supporting authority for this Motion, 
presented to the Court under Rule 50(b) JR.C.P., for entry of judgment, notwithstanding the 
jury verdict entered July 21, 2014. 
The effect of granting this Motion will result in an amended judgment entered by the 
Court, cancelling out the initial judgment awarded to the Rices for $24,000.00, and 
awarding the Plaintiff-Involuntary Plaio:tiff a net money judgment award of $1000.00. 
Plaintiff -Involuntary Plaintiff reserves the right to further supplement their 
Memorandum of Authority, should it become necessary to be addressed at a later date, and 
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presented to the Court under Rule SO(b) LR. C.P.. for entry of judgment, notwithstanding the 
jury verdict entered July 21, 2014. The effect of granting this Motion will result in an 
amended judgment entered by the Court, awarding Plaintiff-Involuntary Plaintiff a judgment 
against Rices for $1.000.00, and cancelling out the initial judgment awarded to the Rices for 
$24,000.00. 
Plaintiff-Involuntary Plaintiff reserves the right to further supplement that 
Memorandum of Authority, should it become necessary 
does request hearing and oral argument upon . Motion for judgment, notwithstanding the 
proceedings, to be scheduled at the conven1 
Dated this 25th day of July, 2014. 
Vern.on K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. Involuntary Plaintiffs, 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
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EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, 
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DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his ) 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD Chtd. And SALLAZ AND ~ 
GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD ) 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional ) 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ ~ 







DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative ) 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD ~ 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, Chtd.) 
Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 



















COMES NOW the above named Parties, Dennis J. Sallaz, Plaintiff, and the 
Involuntary Plaintiff, Marcy Fox, hereinafter referred to individually, or as either 
"Sallaz-Fox" or "Plaintiff(s)", represented by and through their attorney of record, Vernon 
K. Smith, and do submit this Reply Memorandum in response to 
Defendants'/Counterclaimants' objection, hereafter referred to generally as "Rices." 
This Reply Memorandum is offered in further support of Plaintiff(s) pending Motion for 
entry of judgment, notwithstanding the jury verdict, seeking the appropriate 
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substitution of the Court's earlier judgment, entered July 21, 2014, with an amended 
judgment in accordance with Plaintiff(s) Motion, as was supported by the facts 
presented at trial, as within the record established in this case. 
Historical Background and Trial Proceedings 
The events concerning the 1954 Cadillac El Dorado's removal and retention by 
the Rices is what led this case to being filed on April 11, 2011. This action was 
undertaken by Dennis J. Sallaz, on behalf of Marcy Fox's interest, pursuant to his power 
of attorney, as she was deemed by him to be the rightful claim holder due to her 
executed assignment of the certificate of title to the vehicle, as given to her on January 
1,2011. 
This suit presented an action for conversion and for claim and delivery in respect 
to the Cadillac vehicle. These claims arose as a result of its removal from Mr. Sallaz' 
dominion and control, and the issuance of a new title to Rices, as a result of the actions 
taken by Rices in Elmore County. The evidence presented at trial has confirmed the 
objective of the Rices was to mis-appropriate this vehicle and to then exercise dominion 
and control over it long enough to then sell it out of state. In order to accomplish that 
objective required the removal of the vehicle from posted private property, where it was 
stored behind a set of locked gates, clearly displaying "no trespassing" signs on both 
gates. 
Rice committed these acts after becoming aware that the certificate of title to this 
vehicle in Mr. Sallaz' possession continued to indicate a released lien interest once held 
by Rice that which not been replaced with a clean title from the Idaho Department of 
Motor Vehicles. The undisputed testimony at trial confirmed that this the lien had 
been placed on this title when Mr. Sallaz anticipated a joint venture would take place 
between him and Mr. Rice in 1991. That title issuance in 1991 was the last recorded 
title activity to occur in reference to this vehicle, until 2011. 
Ever since 1964, the title and vehicle had remained in Mr. Sallaz' possession, and 
the title never had been lost or stolen, but rather kept in his office desk drawer, with his 
other personal title documents, certificates, and records. In 1995, Mr. Sallaz had Mr. 
Rice release the lien he had placed on it in 1991. This lien release, as testified-to by 
Mr. Sallaz at the trial of this matter, was not refuted or challenged by the Rices. Upon 
receiving the lien release from Mr. Rice, Mr. Sallaz did not take the title to the 
Department to have it re-issued, as he had no intention to either sell the vehicle, or 
obtain a commercial loan, where he would need clear title if he intended to again use 
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the vehicle as collateral for such a loan. From the time of the lien release in1995, and 
until late 2010, Mr. Rice and Mr. Sallaz remained the best of friends. 
1. The Plaintiffs Proved Their Prima Facie Case Of Conversion 
The issues of ownership and conversion of the Cadillac did not need to be submitted to the 
jury. In opposing the Plaintiffs' claim for conversion, the Rices failed to create any issue of fact 
for the jury to decide. When the Rices failed to prove any lawful interest in the Cadillac, their 
claim to any rightful possession of that vehicle failed, and as a result, the totality of their 
underlying actions constituted conversion - as a matter of law - of the Cadillac. 
The Plaintiffs proved the basis for their ownership interest in the Cadillac ( 4 7 years of 
uninterrupted titled ownership), and the Rices failed to produce any proof to challenge that 
ownership, or that in any way justified their actions in undertaking an unlawful repossession of the 
Cadillac. Consequently, the Rices' actions fo exercising dominion over the Cadillac was simply a 
wrongful exercise of control over Sallaz's personal property, both in denial of, and inconsistent 
with, a lawful owners' rights therein; a classic definition of the act of conversion. 
Therefore, on this motion, it simply is not just a question of what the Plaintiffs did prove at trial 
by their testimony and presentation of documentary evidence, but also an issue concerning the 
consequences of the Rices' abandonment of their counterclaims. Because in doing so, they 
eliminated any means of establishing the required proof that was necessary to establish both 
ownership and a lawful repossession of the Cadillac, which was essential to their defense of the 
Plaintiffs' claim of ownership on its conversion claim. The questions the Court must consider 
here are, exactly what is the evidence that the Rices produced to prove their alleged "lawful 
interest" and "lawful claim" to the Cadillac? Where is the evidence they produced to prove their 
alleged "lawful repossession" of the Cadillac? 
As to the alleged underlying lien interest, the Rices had to prove a valid, enforceable 
and actionable debt. They alleged it, but failed to prove it. The Rices had to prove a 
valid, enforceable and actionable lien. They alleged it, but failed to prove it. The 
Rices had to prove they possessed instruments (documents which they relied upon) that 
entitled them to claim an interest) to conduct an act of repossession (§49-514, Idaho 
Code), and that such required documents existed when they filed the Affidavit of 
Repossession. They alleged there was a lawful repossession of the Cadillac, but failed to 
prove it because it was not true. Rices were required to demonstrate compliance with 
all statutory requirements on foreclosure upon collateral, as it is fundamental to a .lawful 
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repossession, and compliance with notices to a titled owner before any attempt to 
terminate, by default and forfeiture, imposed as a result of any act of repossession, and 
required to demonstrate statutory compliance of what constitutes a "lawful 
repossession," which they alleged in both Counts, but failed to prove any of the statute's 
requirements in Article 9, (Chapter 9, Secured Transactions, Part 2 & 6, U.C.C.). They 
failed to prove any notices, be it the alleged default, the rights to redemption, or the 
statutory methods of sale. The Rices simply failed to prove anything on any aspect of 
either of their Cadillac claims. 
In the absence of such proof, the Rices had no right to possession or ownership of 
the Cadillac. In the absence of such right, the Plaintiffs claim of conversion was 
established as a matter of law. The Rices' claim has been a shame; their proof has 
been no-existent, and nothing short of a directed verdict was warranted. It simply 
amounts to the same story that arose in the Canyon County case in the Contract 
dispute. This Court now has one last opportunity to "revisit" this matter, and grant the 
appropriate relief required by virtue of the existing record and the authority existing 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of this case. This Court has to go no farther than 
to review the record of the Rices' failure to offer proof to a lawful claim of interest, or to 
prove a right to conduct a repossession of the Cadillac, and their lack of testimony or 
documentary evidence to refute the facts establishing rights of ownership and interests 
by Plaintiffs. 
2. What Constitutes The Rices' Obiection To The Plaintiffs' JNOV Motion? 
Before we discuss the framework of the Rices objection, it is important to understand 
their pleadings and what they abandoned by way of their required proof. As 
Defendants, Rices denied they converted the Cadillac. They deny any remaining 
ownership of Sallaz by virtue of the "lienholder" interest and the alleged "repossession" 
they claim they "lawfully" undertook in the Counterclaim. Those matters are 
delineated at length in their Counterclaim. 
The Rices contend their lien was valid because of a loan in 1991 (though no loan 
was ever shown, let alone even an attempt to prove to exist at trial) and by virtue of that 
loan, they claim they were secured by the lien because the loan remained unpaid 
(something they also failed to prove or attempt to even identify at trial). They claim 
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the lien had remained on the title of record with DMV (though complete silence why it 
was shown there for 20 years) alleging it was never released (claiming the lien release 
signature was forged), and alleged a right to foreclose upon the owner's interest by a 
lawful repossession of that vehicle, as so alleged and identified in each of those matters 
in their two Cadillac Counts. 
As their Counterclaims are structured, Rices asserted these two counts as a quiet 
title and slander to title with respect to the Cadillac. In the QUIET TITLE claim, 
contained in Count XIII of the Corrected Third Amended Counterclaim, pp.39-41, it starts 
out re-alleging all 296 preceding paragraphs of their bundled theories of malpractice 
allegations, and then follows with Rices' assertion they had a first and valid lienholder 
interest in the Cadillac; that Sallaz owned it; that Sallaz failed to satisfy the lien; that in 
January or February, 2011, Rices lawfully repossessed the Cadillac; that on or about 
February 1, 2011, Rices were issued a certificate of title to the Cadillac; that Rices are the 
lawful owner of the Cadillac; that Sallaz attached a false certificate of title to his 
complaint; that Sallaz forged Rice's signature contained on the release of lien of the 
Sallaz title; that Sallaz assigned his interest in the title around January 4, 2011; that Sallaz 
sought and obtained a title stop; that representations in the title stop were false; that 
Sallaz filed suit, sought and secured a temporary restraining order, preventing 
disposition of the vehicle; that Sallaz created a cloud on the title and by that, prevented 
disposition of the Cadillac; that damages have been suffered, and Rices want an order 
quieting title to the Cadillac. and an award of attorney fees. 
At trial no attempt was made by Rices to PROVE a "valid lien holder interest"; or 
that a loan was made by anyone to anyone; or that any loan amount was ever identified 
or established, that anyone was ever proven to be a "borrower" or a "lender" regarding 
any money, in any amount, at any time, for any time period, with any terms of payment, 
or interest, or a time note, or a demand note, or anything; or that any underlying "debt" 
was identified, or shown to exist, or represented to be unpaid, let alone actionable, 
collectable, and enforceable under Idaho law; or PROVE that any act of "default," 
"foreclosure, or "lawful repossession" occurred in accordance with the mandates under 
Idaho law, §49-514 Idaho Code, or demonstrate how a "lawful repossession" took place, 
including all of those statutory NOTICES, which by statutory definition requires 
compliance with Article 9, (Chapter 9, Secured Transactions, Part 2&6, U.C. C.) relating to 
vehicle default proceedings and vehicle repossessions; or PROVE damages had been 
suffered by any lawful stop orders, ·be it imposed by DMV or by the Court, all of which 
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was alleged in their PLEADINGS. NOTHING was proved by Rices, and the record is 
clear Mr. Sallaz was the "titled owner" before any of Rices' actions took place. If Rices 
cannot PROVE a superior right to own this vehicle, then Mr. Sallaz, the former titled 
owner of the vehicle, is to have his titled ownership restored, and remove the wrongful 
Rices' title, issued upon their false and now UNPROVEN allegations of "ownership" and 
UNPROVEN allegations a "lawful repossession." 
Had there been a valid debt, and a valid lien could somehow exist after 20 YEARS, 
the Rices must prove Mr. Sallaz received all NOTICES to correct any alleged deficiency 
owing on this debt, and these NOTICES included notice of any debt deficiency, properly 
given by statute before any taking occurs; notice of right to contest claim of deficiency, 
notice of right to contest intent to take; notice of right to challenge physical taking; 
notice of right to satisfy claimed deficiency, notice of right of redemption, the right to 
redeem and regain possession of the property; and notice of any statutorily authorized 
sale of the secured collateral, and that all requirements regarding a "lawfully 
repossessed" item of property has been statutorily met. This is REQUIRED, and must 
be accomplished before any sale. The Rices failed to prove any of those critical factual 
and legal matters, each of which is a pre-requisite to establish the basis of a QUIET TITLE 
ACTION on a secured item, seeking a superior right over Mr. Sallaz, and a right to retain 
the title, and secure a court order awarding them the superior title to the Cadillac. The 
Rices failed to carry their burden, and the court needed to instruct the jury as to this 
burden of proof, as was requested during the discussions regarding preparation of jury 
instructions. That burden of Counterclaimants to prove their allegations was 
fundamental to their case, but failure to instruct, just as failing to grant the Directed 
Verdict, will be harmless error, once the Motion for JNOV is granted, and an amended 
judgment is entered. 
The second Cadillac count, alleged as a SLANDER TO TITLE action, has the same 
defective results. It is contained in Count XIV of the Corrected Third Amended 
Counterclaim, pp.41-43, wherein they re-alleged all of the preceding paragraphs, 
including their bundled theories of malpractice allegations, and now bundling with it the 
guiet title action, to now include the preceding 313 paragraphs. This Count asserts 
Rice the first lienholder on the Cadillac, again admitting Sallaz owned it; that Sallaz 
failed to satisfy the lien: that in January or February, 2011, Rice lawfully repossessed the 
Cadillac; that on or about February 1, 2011, Rice was issued a certificate of title; that Rice 
is the lawful owner of the Cadillac; that Sallaz attached a false certificate of title to his 
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complaint; that Sallaz forged Rice's signature on the release of lien; that Sallaz assigned 
his interest in the title around January 4, 2011; that Sallaz sought and obtained a title 
stop; that representations in the title stop were false: that Sallaz filed suit and sought a 
temporary restraining order, preventing disposition of the vehicle; that Sallaz created a 
cloud on the title and prevented disposition; that these malicious actions and slander to 
title caused damages to be suffered, and Rices want unspecified relief, along with an 
award of attorney fees. 
Just as it was with the allegations contained in their first integrated Cadillac 
Count XIII, there was NO evidence presented to address any of the elements alleged in 
Count XIV of their Counterclaim; no evidence to prove the fundamental elements of the 
alleged "lienholder interest" being valid, or that it has a lawful basis, we again must 
conclude Rices have failed to prove they complied with the repossession requirements 
under Idaho law as addressed above. Rices could not establish an existing debt, 
therefore cannot establish an ownership interest in the Cadillac, and if they cannot 
establish compliance with the procedural requirements relating to defaults, foreclosures, 
· and repossessions, matters statutorily regulated under §49-514, Idaho Code and Article 
9, then even their alleged "lawful repossession" is flawed, unenforceable, and void. 
Rices have failed to carry their burden to establish "slander to title," let alone carry th~ir 
burden to establish a right of a "quiet title," action regarding any claimed "ownership 
interest" in the Cadillac. 
Rices knew they could never carry their burden to prove allegations of being a 
lawful owner and having lawfully repossessed the vehicle, when no facts existed to 
confirm either. That's precisely why this case had became so contentious, and there h~s 
been no merit in Rices' advancement of their Cadillac claims, yet they would not return 
the Cadillac, and logically, that leaves only one conclusion: spite, animosity and a desire 
to unethically churn this inequitable behavior, and Rices should never be allowed to 
recover any relief in this litigation whatsoever. 
Their argument on this issue of conversion is intertwined throughout their 
response. The fundamental issue of conversion, as a matter of law, is defined as beirig 
a wrongful exercise of dominion or control over the property of another. Plaintiff~s) 
demonstrated that fact in their testimony and documentary proof, and Rices remainJd 
absolutely silent on that presentation, as well as on their burden to establish a lawful 
right to the vehicle, and right to exercise a "lawful repossession" of property claimed to 
be collateral, without establishing an actionable debt, that is valid and enforceablle 
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under the law. Rices failed to show a valid interest in the vehicle, as they could not 
establish there ever was a debt, let alone a valid and enforceable debt from which to act 
upon, as none ever existed. That was their first hurdle; impossible to establish, so they 
abandoned it. 
Their second hurdle was to demonstrate their "acts of repossession" were 
properly executed under Idaho law. That was abandoned, as that too was impossible 
to prove, so Rices ignored that burden, as they knew there was no LAWFUL basis for 
doing any of what they did. Consequently, Rices actions were categorically 
WRONGFUL and UNLAWFUL from the inception, and that presents the classic basis for 
the definition of what constitutes conversion. With Rices avoidance and abandonment 
of their burden of proof, and with the uncontroverted testimony and documentary 
evidence presented by Plaintiff(s), the idea of conversion was not an issue required to be 
considered by the jury, as the Court was with discretionary authority to have determined 
Rices failed to establish a lawful interest in the Cadillac, or the lawfulness of Rices' 
"repossession" of the vehicle, and therefore, the title Rices relied upon from DMV was 
without any factual or legal basis for issuance of the title. Rices simply abandoned 
their counterclaim regarding Counts XIII and XIV at trial, and failed to prove the 
elements in those allegations of their pleadings, and should have been non-suited by 
the Court with entry of the directed verdict. 
Consequently no basis for a collateral interest was shown to exist, as Rices 
declined to prove they had any right of action upon which any act of enforcement of a 
lien could be pursued. Rices' simply relied upon the idea they possessed the last issued 
title, and for them, they were unable to do anything else, so that was the only story they 
were able to tell. Their logic is misplaced, as the issue at trial for determination was who 
had lawful claim to have ownership of the vehicle, as the title issuance was challenged, 
and constituted the essence of the entire dispute: ergo-the title freeze by DMV, and 
the Order of the Court on May 16, 2013, preventing any title transfers until the lawful 
ownership of the vehicle is decided by the Court. The question of rightful ownership 
was the issue, as the status of the conflicting titles was the very allegations in the 
pleadings. 
The District Court had the factual and legal basis to take each of the issues of 
delivery and conversion from the jury, and order either of the Plaintiff(s) the lawful 
owners of the Cadillac, as a matter of law, given Rices failures. Rices didn't even try to 
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prove a lawful interest, as they knew they could not, and therefore could not have any 
lawful interest. 
Had the Court granted Plaintiff(s) Motion for Directed Verdict, title would have 
been "quieted" in Plaintiff(s) name, with the remaining issue being determination of 
market value of the Cadillac. The jury verdict on the value would have resulted in an 
offset on the notes and ATVs, and given the jury's value, based apparently upon the 
"divorce" reference worth in 2006, or what Roy "sold" it for, or the reported value 
identified in the theft report, that $25,000.00 constitutes the amount of the setoff, 
generating a net recovery to Plaintiff(s) in the amount of $1,000.00, eliminating any 
claim for recovery of interest or attorney fees asserted by Rices, under their flawed 
theory of describing themselves to be "prevailing parties." 
The applicable authority regarding the legal basis to grant either motion was 
presented in sufficient detail in the Memorandum of Case Law lodged with the court by 
Plaintiff(s) when requested, and was initially presented to support the Motion for 
Directed Verdict. The general rule was announced in Corpus Juris Secundum (CJS), and 
cited in the Memorandum, along with other states' authority. For Mr. Becker to suggest 
the Motion for Directed Verdict was "unsuccessful," because it was not granted by the 
Court at that stage, serves to misunderstand the Court's right of reservation to act upon 
the motion upon a further request under Rule SO(b). Mr. Becker is not willing to 
recognize (at least in his response) the Court's cautionary concerns to have the 
opportunity to review the authority to address stale and void liens, created without a 
security agreement, and liens relating to expired debts by virtue of the statute of 
limitations. The Court has been given the opportunity to review how security 
agreements and default provisions under secured transactions are required. Authority 
has been provided, and this Reply Memorandum will assist the Court even further on 
the substance of these matters. 
As addressed above, the Court cannot effectively sidestep a conversion claim. 
Given the state of the facts and law of the case, title to the Cadillac is to be quieted in 
the name of Dennis J. Sallaz, as he was the last lawfully titled owner of the vehicle, and 
once the fraudulent disruption to the title is removed and lawful title restored to the 
lawfully titled owner, the Court will then find the conversion and damages as a result of 
the actions of the Rices. Because Rices had no factual basis or lawful right to take the 
action they did in acquiring possession of the vehicle, their actions constitute 
conversion, and the recovery sought for their acts of conversion are asserted in the 
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claim being advanced by Mr. Sallaz, who took that action for the benefit of the assignee 
of the certificate of title, Ms. Fox, under his power of attorney. It remains a fact Mr. 
Sallaz assigned his interest in the Cadillac to Ms. Fox, and the title endorsement to 
effectuate that assignment was completed before it was removed and stolen, unknown 
to either of them what was about to occur. Neither Mr. Sallaz nor Ms. Fox were 
required to record the assignment of the certificate of title, bearing the release of lien of 
Rice, as it was neither necessary nor required by law, as there had been no intent to 
transfer vehicle possession from Mr. Sallaz to Ms. Fox, at the time the assignment of 
certificate was endorsed. The requirement for title re-issuance comes only after 
possession of the vehicle has been transferred to a new owner. 
Mr. Becker may misunderstand the law on that point, or else he simply seeks to 
misrepresent the law or facts, or both, in his historical and statutory references (see 
Res. & Obj., PS, footnote 3). A title transfer, from an old to a new owner, follows only 
from the TRANSFER OF POSSESSION of the vehicle from the previous owner to the new 
owner. It is not triggered in any way by the assignment of the certificate, or even from 
delivery of the title certificate with the assignment and release affixed to it. The 
application for a title transfer is not required to take place until transfer of possession of 
the vehicle, and that was never intended to take place between Mr. Sallaz and Ms. Fox, 
until the day of Denny's eventual death. (see LC. §49-504 et seq, relating to transfer of 
vehicle possession). A 30 day period comes into effect AFTER the vehicle delivery has 
been completed. Even if you go beyond that 30 day timeframe to make application for a 
new title, it has no effect on the validity of the certificate contents, as the only 
consequence is an administrative transfer fee of an additional $20.00; the passage of 
time in no way affects any rights relating to that certificate of title, the release, or the 
subsequent transfer. 
Mr. Becker apparently infers that failing to make application within 30 days of the 
certificate assignment somehow impairs the lawful basis of the certificate of title or the 
right to transfer the interest. If that is what he is attempting to say about the 30 day 
provision, and if that is what he want to suggest is a legal consequence resulting from a 
late filing for any transfer, his assessment of the law is not only misplaced, but 
deliberately and wrongfully being portrayed, and he does so in such a manner as to 
infer there is some loss, such as estoppel or waiver resulting to Ms. Fox, as she never 
filed for a transfer of title after she received the assignment of the certificate to the 
Cadillac on January 1, 2011. The statute specifically states there shall be no waiver or 
REPLY MEMORANDUM· 11 
001523
estoppel applied against any assignee of a title certificate. Mr. Sallaz always retained 
possession of the Cadillac in any event, either at his residence or in storage at his 
brother's place, two blocks away. Ms. Fox was a household member, who at times had 
moments of constructive possession, and did exercise periodic and temporary 
possession of the vehicle on limited occasions, such as when she and Denny's daughter 
might go on a drive or ride in it, but it was always with Mr. Sallaz' knowledge and 
consent. Placing the name of an assignee on the title does NOTrequire recording that 
certificate of assignment with the Department, and the same is true with respect to an 
executed lien release on a certificate of title. There is no statutory requirement placed 
on the owner or assignee of a title certificate to record the lien release with DMV (again 
see §49-511, Idaho Code). The intended notification of any lien release is placed solely 
upon the lienholder, and that is the only statutory duty about the requirement to notify 
DMV of that event. Roy Rice knew Mr. Sallaz had no need to obtain a new title at the 
time, as he had no intent to ever sell his Cadillac, and Roy was willing to gamble the 
Elmore County licensing bureau would not disrupt his efforts to "repossess" a vehicle, 
despite the fact he had no lawful interest or basis to lawfully repossess the vehicle. 
Mr. Becker has also chosen to disregard the fact once it was discovered Rices had 
taken the vehicle and caused title to be transferred into their names, that precluded any 
transfer by Mr. Sallaz or Ms. Fox, and with the various DMV stops and title freeze orders 
put into effect on this Cadillac (the last being entered by Judge Wilper on May 16, 2013), 
it required a court order to establish who is the lawful owner before any further transfers 
can take place. 
Although possession of the Cadillac is no longer a possibility for Mr. Sallaz to 
recover, due to Rices' refusal to disclose the true location of the vehicle, it remains 
undisputed a valid assignment of the certificate of title of this vehicle was executed for 
the benefit of Ms. Fox, by "assignment of certificate of title" on January 1, 2011. DMV 
could properly authorize a title transfer to her, upon her assignment, at such time she 
has acquired possession of the vehicle, pursuant to her assignment. It remains unlikely 
any possibility of vehicle possession will ever occur as the vehicle location has been a 
mystery. Ms. Fox, pursuant to the language of the statute, is one "having possession 
of a certificate of title," as well as an "assignment of the certificate of the vehicle," and 
the statute states "there shall be no waiver or estoppel to operate against a person 
having possession of a certificate of title or an assignment of the certificate of the 
vehicle (see §49-503, Idaho Code). The difficulty, of course, is that without possession 
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of the vehicle, an assignment of the certificate and a new title transfer becomes 
meaningless. Therefore, it remains the law that Mr. Sallaz is the lawful claimholder of the 
conversion claim, and he was the last person to have the lawful title and possession of 
the vehicle, and he shall be the Plaintiff entitled to receive the damage award. 
The conversion claim of a vehicle belongs to the "lawfully" titled owner who 
possessed the vehicle at the time the conversion occurred. That is Mr. Sallaz, as he 
was the "lawful recorded title owner" of record when the unlawful title transfer occurred, 
and the vehicle was wrongfully removed from his possession, at his place and choice of 
storage on January 17, 2011. Of interest, Mr. Becker argued to the court, during the 
settling of the jury instructions, that Mr. Sallaz must be considered the one who owned 
the conversion claim, and suggested Ms. Fox did not, because of his assessment of § 
49-503, Idaho Code, which says: "no person acquiring a vehicle from the owner shall 
acquire any right, title, claim or interest .... until he has issued to him a certificate of title 
to that vehicle." Mr. Sallaz had such an issued title; Ms. Fox did acquire an assignment 
of the vehicle's ownership from the owner, but did not acquire the vehicle itself, as she 
was not placed with possession of the vehicle. Under that limited statutory language, 
Mr. Sallaz would qualify as the rightful holder of the claim. Mr. Becker saw merit in 
advancing that argument, as he wanted to avoid an award in favor of Ms. Fox, and be 
unable to retain a right to claim a setoff, should that become a need in light of the 
unpredictable nature of the claims and defenses, in the off chance they prevailed on any 
of their convoluted claims of their malpractice theories of damage, but forced to 
address any adverse decisions on those claims advanced against Rices. In light of Mr. 
Becker's argument, the court elected to satisfy both approaches to the Cadillac claim 
ownership, and established its "joint" reference to the conversion claim, which then 
became the "Sallaz-Fox" conversion claim. 
Since the jury has rendered its verdict, Mr. Becker appears now to prefer to argue 
the matter differently, and may now wish to call it the "Fox conversion claim," hoping by 
doing so to keep his idea of pre-judgment interest and claim for attorney fees a viable 
claim, in an effort to increase their note-ATV award, instead of suffering the effects of a 
setoff against that recovery allowed to Mr. Sallaz. Not only does the law regarding the 
recorded owner of the last lawfully issued title expressed in the statute appear to control 
that determination, but as to Mr. Becker's position taken at the close of the evidence, 
the very doctrine of Judicial estoppel would preclude Mr. Becker's attempt to change his 
position at this late stage. 
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That being said, even though the statute would confirm the issued title 
eQtablishes the right, title, claim or interest as expressed in §49-503, Idaho Code, and 
therefore a conversion claim does belong to Mr. Sallaz, there is language thereafter in 
that statute confirming there shall be no waiver or estoppel operating against a person 
hl!ving possession of a certificate of title or an assignment of the certificate of the 
v~hic/e, for a valuable consideration. Ms. Fox had the assignment before the vehicle 
was removed, and there was valid consideration, be it in the form of gift consideration, 
' 
arid there has been no challenge to the issue of consideration raised by Rices, and by 
th!e statutory language, Ms. Fox may make the argument she could qualify to make a 
claim of conversion as well, as the statute allows her to assert a claim of ownership, even 
o-Jer the lawful claim of Mr. Sallaz, by the expressed reference of her ability to prevent 
any affirmative defense of waiver or estoppel applied against her in the definition. 
H<Pwever, there will not be such an argument, as there is accord on the side of the 
Plaintiff(s), and Mr. Sallaz shall be entitled to claim and prevail upon the issue of the 
cdnversion ownership. 
With this issue now settled by application of statute, court interpretation, and the 
agreement of Ms. Fox, the award belongs to Mr. Sallaz, and that results would establish 
' 
a ~etoff against Rices' $24,000.00 judgment, leaving a net $1,000.00 money judgment 
' 
awarded to Mr. Sallaz. This offset renders Mr. Sallaz the undisputed "prevailing party" 
in: all of the individual claims between Rices and Sallaz, and eliminates any claims Rices 
now seeks for pre-judgment interest and attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court must amend its judgment, to conform to the evidence presented, and 
conversion of the vehicle becomes a matter of law, as Rices had no interest in the 
Cadillac, knowingly so, as they abandoned their burden of proof as to all allegations of 
their Cadillac Counterclaims. When they cannot prove ownership, they have no right 
to. be shown as such on the title, and consequently the title cannot be "quieted" to 
th~m, just because a jury was uncertain if the LIVING Rices were the ones who had 
ac~ually been the ones who converted it. The jury might have concluded in their mind 
that it was Michael Rice who had actually converted it, and Sallaz-Fox were not able to 
I 
colnvince them that it was Roy and Janet who did the dastardly deed, but rather it was 
Michael who did it. Whether Sallaz-Fox did or did not prove someone did or did not 
colnvert the Cadillac, that is a separate issue to the CLAIMS MADE BY THE RICES that 
thby were the lawful owners and lawfully repossessed the vehicle, when no such 
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e\Aidence is anywhere in this record. The issue of conversion can be reached as a 
matter of law, as the acts of Michael were undertaken by him pursuant to the agency he 
had with Janet and Roy Rice, and the Rices, as the principal in the relationship, are 
vicariously responsible, and jointly and severally liable for the conversion that took 
place, and the ownership allegations and lawful repossession allegations were theirs to 
prove, not Michael, and until they prove their allegations in Counts XIII and XIV, as 
required under the law, they cannot qualify any claim to ownership under the title 
statutes, and consequently, because they failed to prove any enforceable and actionable 
loan or debt, the purported "lien" is void, and this Court is left to conclude there could 
be no lawful repossession without satisfactory proof of ownership and right to 
repossess, showing documents and instruments that establish that interest and right. 
The law requires the court to declare title is restored to Mr. Sallaz, given the evidence 
and record in this case. Irrespective of the jury verdict on the issue of conversion, as a 
matter of law the effect of Rices' conduct, upon their failure to prove a lawful interest 
and lawful repossession of the vehicle, leaves the court to conclude Rices' act of taking 
the vehicle was an act of conversion, as a matter of law, and Dennis J. Sallaz owns that 
claim of conversion, and is entitled to the setoff against the $24,000.00 award given to 
the Rices. 
In closing it remains important to focus upon Rices' complete failure to prove any 
allegations of their Cadillac Claims, and no competent evidence was produced to 
suggest Rices' acts were anything other than the fraudulent acts they were intended to 
be, starting with the misrepresentation of a "lost" title in the application to obtain a 
duplicate title, to the misrepresentations in both the first and second affidavits of 
repossession, each filed upon a fabricated pretense that certain documents existed to 
bestow a right to repossess a vehicle, as statutorily required under §49-514, Idaho Code, 
knowing no such documents ever existed. It was all a falsehood; premised upon spite 
and malice. 
There has been no showing of an interest established by Rices to authorize this 
Court to quiet title to them in the Cadillac, and there can be no slander to title from 
which any damage can result, as alleged, as Rices not only abandoned their burdens of 
proof, but as importantly, have presented their allegations within their Counterclaims 
upon knowingly false pretenses. The charade of any more "title applications" was 
halted, firstly by DMV, who froze it with their stops, and then by the Court itself, as 
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OWNERSHIP was the issue to be JUDICIALLY decided by the court upon the factual 
merits of this case, and not a matter to be ADMINISTRATIVELY determined upon any . 
action by DMV, despite the uneventful attempt by Plaintiff(s) to encourage DMV to 
consider Rices' fraud and revoke the title issued to Rices administratively. Mr. Becker 
has attempted to represent to this court an administrative process has decided this 
dispute because of Plaintiff(s) petition that sought to bring this matter to their attention 
to revoke the title unlawfully issued to the Rices. His attempts to suggest the defenses 
of judicial estoppel, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, in his attempt to prevent this 
Court's exercise of its exclusive right of judicial intervention into this matter is yet 
another example of his flawed analysis and a_Q · erception of the Court's 
jurisdictional right to exercise its autho,:i-tf'as .. t-~-original subject matte . risdiction over 
the ownership dispute regarding t 1s Cadillac and personal jurisdiction over 
within this action to resolve who as the lawful ownership interest in this vehicle. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd a 
REPLY MEMORANDUM· 16 
001528
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ...-i ay of September, 2014, a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing documen as forwarded by the method indicated 
and to the following: 
J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Gabriel McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St. #302 
Boise, ID 83702 
William A. Fuhrman 
Erika P. Judd 
JONES+ GLEDHILL+ FU 
GOURLEY, P.A. 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 
Post Office Box 1097 · 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
REPLY MEMORANDUM- 17 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-delivered 





• • • 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 














EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, ) 






EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband j 








DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his ) 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD Chtd. And SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD ~ 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional ~ 
Limited Liability Company, and SA~LAZ j 
LAW, Chtd., Inc., an ldaho Corporation, ) 
Counterdefendants. 
) 
) ____ ) ·----~--- ·---
Case No. CV OC 1107253 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS - 1 
001530
. t • 
DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 


















EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
After three years of litigation, spanning the retirements of two different presiding judges 
( along with the recusals of four other judges and the disqualification without cause of one more), 
this bitterly contested case was tried to a jury over the course of 11 trial days in June and July of 
2014. It originated as a dispute about whether a lawyer's client acted lawfully in taking the 
lawyer's prized vintage Cadillac, but it quickly expanded into a broad inquiry concerning the 
propriety of the lawyer's various personal and professional dealings with the client throughout 
their relationship of some 25 years. With two rather minor exceptions, the jury sent the parties 
away without relief. After a judgment was entered on the jury's verdict, the parties filed several 
post-trial motions. Those motions were argued and taken under advisement on September 30, 
2014. This is the Court's decision on them. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz, a longtime Boise lawyer, used to count Defendant Eugene (Roy) 
Rice as one of his close friends, as a client, and as a business associate. Their relationship is 
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measured in decades, not merely years. Roy Rice and his wife, Defendant Janet Rice, formerly 
owned some pawnshops, including Vista Pawn in Boise. Sallaz provided legal services to the 
Rices over the years. Sallaz and the Rices appear to have had an arrangement in which Sallaz's 
legal services were traded for items from the Rices' pawnshops. 
In 1964, Sallaz acquired a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado. He kept it as a prized possession for 
nearly 50 years, until the event in 2011 that precipitated this case's filing. Sallaz granted Roy 
Rice a lien on the Cadillac in 1991. The trial record reveals a difference of opinion as to why 
Sallaz granted Rice the lien. Sallaz testified that he and Rice were going to do some business 
deal together and that Sallaz was posting the Cadillac as his half of the deal, but the deal never 
came together so the basis for the lien never truly existed. Rice was not healthy enough to testify 
in person at trial, 1 but his deposition testimony was played at trial. He testified that he had 
loaned Sallaz some amount of money, probably $1,000, and that loan was the basis for the lien. 
Sallaz introduced evidence that Rice signed a lien release in 1995, but Sallaz kept the lien 
release in his desk drawer instead of recording it with the Idaho Department of Motor Vehicles. 
Rice contended the lien was never released because the $1,000 loan was never repaid. He 
contended his signature on the release was forged by Sallaz. 
After coming to the conclusion that Sallaz had misled him and treated him unfairly over 
the years, Rice decided to take advantage of his rights as an alleged lienholder. He arranged for 
the Cadillac to be taken from Sallaz (i.e., repossessed) while Sallaz was away on vacation in 
early 2011. According to Sallaz, the Cadillac was taken by breaching a lock on a gate at Sallaz's 
1 In fact, during the hearing on post-trial motions, the Court was told that Rice recently passed 
away. At this point, no one is seeking substitution of Rice's estate for Rice as a party. Such a 
substitution of parties undoubtedly would be permissible if sought before a notice of appeal is 
filed, see LR.C.P. 25(a)(l), (e), but the Court does not intend to order it sua sponte. 
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brother's home, where Sallaz stored the Cadillac. The Court understands the Rices dispute that 
breaching a lock was necessary to take the Cadillac, though the Court does not believe the Rices 
offered evidence at trial on that point. Regardless, Rice took the Cadillac without demanding 
payment of the alleged $1,000 loan. His goal was not collecting the alleged loan; it was getting 
even with Sallaz for Sallaz' s perceived wrongdoing. 
Not long before Rice arranged to take the Cadillac, Sallaz had signed over its title to 
Marcy Fox, his longtime fiancee. But that document also was not filed with the Idaho 
Department of Motor Vehicles. 
In any event, after realizing the Cadillac was missing and figuring out who had taken it, 
Sallaz filed this case to get his Cadillac back. Specifically, he asserted a claim-and-delivery 
cause of action, as well as an alternative claim for conversion in case Rice had disposed of the 
Cadiilac and could not return it. Some early litigation of Sallaz's claim to the Cadillac failed to 
yield, as Sallaz had hoped, an order requiring Rice to return the Cadillac to Sallaz. Then, during 
a mediation that occurred well into the litigation, Rice informed Sallaz that he had sold the 
Cadillac to an unidentified third party for $25,000. 
Rice's sale of the Cadillac apparently ignored the notice requirements Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Moreover, Rice never accounted to Sallaz for the excess of the 
$25,000 sale price over the amount of the underlying alleged debt ($1,000 plus interest), as 
Article 9 required. See LC.§ 28-9-615(d)(l). But Sallaz never sought permission to amend his 
complaint to assert Article 9 claims. Instead, he stuck with his initially pleaded conversion 
claim, to which Fox ultimately was joined as an involuntary plaintiff at the Rices' request, in 
light of Sallaz's attempt to make a gift of the Cadillac to her. 
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The conversion claim proceeded to trial, along with the rest of the case, in the summer of 
2014. The jury found that Sallaz and Fox failed to prove the Rices converted the Cadillac, 
evidently believing the Rices' assertion that Sallaz had received and never repaid a $1,000 loan 
that was secured by the Cadillac. The jury received standard jury instructions for a conversion 
claim. No instructions relating to the requirements of Article 9 were ever proposed by Sallaz, 
and none were given.2 
The case was not, however, confined to Sallaz's efforts to get back his Cadillac, or at 
least its value. The Rices filed a broad array of counterclaims against Sallaz, as well as against 
four law firms with which they believed Sallaz had been associated at various times: (i) Sallaz 
and Gatewood Chtd., (ii) Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc., (iii) Sallaz and Gatewood PLLC, and 
(iv) Sallaz Law, Chtd., Inc. (Although the claims against the law firms were denominated 
"counterclaims," the law firms had not by that point made any claims against the Rices.) All 
told, the Rices eventually asserted a total of 14 counterclaims. 
Against Sallaz only, they asserted a claim for breach of two promissory notes executed 
by Sallaz in 2005, a claim for conversion of two Yamaha all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and a 
trailer, a claim-and-delivery cause of action with respect to the allegedly converted A TVs and 
trailer, a claim for foreclosure of a lien Sallaz granted them on a Winnebago motor home, a 
claim for qmet title to the Cadillac, and a claim for slander of title with respect to the Cadillac. 
Against both Sallaz and the four law firms, they asserted a claim to recover amounts in 
law firm trust accounts, a claim for unjust enrichment, a claim for legal malpractice, a claim for 
2 The Court's recollection is that Vernon K. Smith, who represented Sallaz in connection with 
the Cadillac dispute, made a generalized request during trial that the jury be instructed on some 
requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code, that in response the Court invited Smith to 
propose specific instructions, and that Smith never proposed specific instructions. Had specific 
instructions been proposed, the Court would have considered them. 




breach of fiduciary duty, a claim for fraud, a claim that the law firms aided and abetted in 
tortious actions by Sallaz, a claim for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and a 
racketeering claim. The shared alleged factual underpinnings of many of these claims were that 
Sallaz deceived the Rices in a land transaction called the "Real Homes/Real Properties 
transaction" and, in a loan transaction called the "Sumner matter," misled the Rices into 
believing they had acquired radio stations. 
Summary judgment was granted against the Rices' counterclaims to recover amounts in 
law firm trust accounts, for foreclosure of the Winnebago lien, for aiding and abetting the 
commission of tortious acts, for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and for 
racketeering. The Rices apparently abandoned their counterclaim for claim and delivery of the 
ATVs and the trailer, as well as their slander-of-title counterclaim. The remaining counterclaims 
were pursued at trial. In addition, the Court. also permitted the Rices to pursue a request for 
punitive damages at trial in connection with certain claims premised on the Sumner matter. 
At trial, the Court granted a directed verdict against the Rices' fraud claim, as well as 
against their request for punitive damages. The Court's reasoning was stated on the record. In 
sum, though, the Court concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to permit a reasonable jury 
to conclude that the Rices had proved-by clear and convincing evidence-that Sallaz or the law 
firms had committed fraud or other malfeasance in connection with the Sumner matter. The 
Court also granted a directed verdict in some other, limited respects, but the jury was permitted 
··. ' ~ .. ... . . to ·consider the counterclaim 'theories of breach of the notes, conversion of the ATVs and the 
trailer, unjust enrichment, legal malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, despite 
,/ 
the grant of summary judgment against the claim for foreclosure of the Winnebago lien, the jury 
was permitted to consider whether Sallaz owed an underlying loan. If so, the loan liability could 
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be offset against any liability the Rices had to Sallaz, despite that the statute of limitations barred 
them from pursuing collection of the alleged Winnebago loan as an affirmative claim. 
The jury found for the Rices in three respects. First, it determined that Sallaz had 
breached his obligation to repay the notes. The jury awarded them the face amount of the notes 
($20,800) as a result. (Interest on the notes was not permitted to be awarded for reasons 
discussed later in this decision.) The jury also determined that Sallaz had converted the ATVs 
and the trailer and awarded them $3,200 as a result. Finally, the jury found that Sallaz owed 
$8,500 on the Winnebago loan. As already noted, however, the Winnebago loan liability could 
be used only as an offset. Since Sallaz did not receive any monetary award, there was nothing to 
offset the Winnebago loan liability against, rendering it essentially a nullity. Consequently, the 
jury's total effective award to the Rices was $24,000-the sum of its awards for breach of the 
notes and for conversion of the ATVs and the trailer. The jury rejected all other counterclaims 
advanced by the Rices, including all counterclaims based on alleged professional liability 
(though it did find for the Rices on the liability aspect, but not on the damages aspect, of their 
claims for malpractice and a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Real Homes/Real 
Properties transaction). 
Two of the four law firms, Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., 
Inc., filed a third-party complaint against the Rices for breach of an alleged contract requiring 
payment for legal services. That claim also was tried to the jury. The Court granted a directed 
verdict against most of the claim because it was time-barred. Nevertheless, the Court allowed 
the jury to consider the entire claim because, as with the time-barred Winnebago loan liability, 
any time-barred liability for legal bills potentially could serve as an offset. The law firms asked 
the jury for a verdict of about $450,000. The jury, however, rejected the claim in its entirety. 
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On July 21, 2014,judgment was entered. The Rices received an award of$24,000. In 
addition, because the jury had concluded that the Rices did not commit conversion of the 
Cadillac, the Court granted the Rices quiet title to the Cadillac, as they had requested in one of 
their counterclaims. No other affirmative relief, beyond dismissal of the unsuccessful claims, 
was granted to any party. 
The Rices filed two timely post-trial motions. One seeks an award of prejudgment 
interest in connection with their claim for Sallaz's breach of the notes. The other seeks an award 
of costs and attorney fees as a result of having prevailed on that claim. 
Sallaz filed a timely motion for judgment as a matter of law on his claim for conversion 
of the Cadillac. The primary theory behind his motion is that the alleged $1,000 loan giving rise 
to Roy Rice's lien on the Cadillac was time-barred, rendering the repossession of the Cadillac 
unlawful and an act of conversion. This theory was discussed by the Court and counsel as trial 
neared its conclusion, but its validity ( or lack thereof) was not resolved during trial. The Court 
asked the jury to determine the value of the Cadillac even if the jury found Sallaz and Fox had 
failed to prove the conversion claim. The Court did so in case Sallaz pursued, and the Court 
accepted, this theory on post-trial motions. That way, the value of the Cadillac, and therefore the 
resulting award of damages for conversion, would be known, obviating any need for a second 
trial concerning the Cadillac's value. The jury determined the Cadillac's value to be $25,000. 
Finally, Sallaz and the four law firms filed a timely request for costs and attorney fees in 
connection with their successful defense of the Rices' professional-liability-oriented 
counterclaims. William Fuhrman and Erika Judd of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
represented Sallaz and the law firms in defending against those particular counterclaims. The 
request for costs and attorney fees pertains only to the costs and attorney fees incurred or charged 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS - 8 
001537
' \ 
by the Jones Gledhill firm. As to the claims and counterclaims that are personal (rather than 
professional) in nature, Sallaz was represented by Vernon K. Smith. Smith also represented the 
two law firms in claiming the Rices breached a contract for payment of legal bills. No request 
was made for the costs and attorney fees incurred or charged by Smith. 
These four post-trial motions are now ready for decision. 
In addition, during the hearing on post-trial motions, the Court identified a concern 
separate from those raised by the parties: the propriety of the Court's disposition of the Rices' 
counterclaim for quiet title to the Cadillac, which is equitable in nature and was not presented to 
the jury for determination. As already noted, the Court quieted title in the Rices. The Court did 
so based simply on the jury's rejection of the Sallaz/Fox claim for conversion of the Cadillac 
(from which one can infer the jury concluded the Rices had the right to take and sell the 
Cadillac), without making an independent determination and issuing supporting findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. During the hearing, the Court stated that its approach failed to satisfy 
I.R.C.P. 52(a), which requires findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. The Court asked the 
parties, however, whether the quiet-title counterclaim is moot, and therefore should not be 
adjudicated at all, given that the trial evidence indicated that the Rices had sold the Cadillac to an 
unidentified buyer and that its location is unknown. 
The Rices' counsel agreed their quiet-title counterclaim is moot. Sallaz did not pursue a 
quiet-title claim himself, but his personal counsel, Smith, suggested there is reason to adjudicate 
the Rices' counterclaim in that the Idaho Department of Motor Vehicles, which has frozen the 
title, needs guidance from the Court. He also stated, however, that he understands the Cadillac 
may have gone to Germany and been sold for parts. 
The proper disposition of the quiet-title counterclaim also is addressed in this decision. 




A. Sallaz's motion for judgment as a matter of law 
Sallaz, along with Fox as an involuntary plaintiff, pursued a claim that the Rices 
converted the 1954 Cadillac Eldorado that Sallaz had owned since 1964 and had tried to gift to 
Fox at the very beginning of 2011. A few weeks into 2011, Roy Rice arranged for the Cadillac 
to be taken from Sallaz's brother's home, where, according to the trial testimony of Sallaz and 
Fox, it was kept behind a padlocked gate. Rice took the Cadillac because, according to him, it 
had been pledged as collateral for a small-dollar loan, possibly in the amount of $1,000, made to 
Sallaz in 1991 and never repaid. No evidence was offered at trial that the Rices ever demanded 
repayment of the alleged loan, either before or after repossessing the Cadillac. Sallaz admitted at 
trial that he had granted Rice a lien against the Cadillac in 1991 in connection with a planned 
business deal that never came together. He denied ever receiving the alleged $1,000 loan from 
the Rices. In any event, during the course of litigation Rice sold the Cadillac to a third party for 
$25,000, without notice to Sallaz and without accounting to Sallaz for the excess of the sale 
proceeds over the amount of the alleged loan. 
The jury found against Sallaz and Fox, evidently believing Rice's testimony about the 
$1,000 loan. The jury set the Cadillac's value at $25,000, having been instructed to determine its 
value regardless of the conversion claim's outcome. Sallaz asks the Court to grant him judgment 
as a matter oflaw on the conversion claim and award him $25,000 in damages.3 The theory on 
which judgment as a matter of law is sought is that the Rices had no right to repossess the 
3 Despite Sallaz's attempted gift of the Cadillac to her, Fox agrees that the conversion claim 
should belong to Sallaz. She has no objection to a damages award being made only to him, 
should the Court enter judgment as a matter of law. 
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Cadillac because the loan was too stale to enforce. Additionally, Sallaz argues that the 
Cadillac's repossession and sale were not carried out in accordance with the requirements of 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Beginning with the argument that the alleged loan was too stale to enforce by 
repossessing and selling the loan collateral, the Court notes that the alleged $1,000 loan was 
made in 1991, there was no evidence of an agreed repayment timetable, and there was no 
evidence that any partial payments or payment demands were ever made. When a contract fails 
to specify the time for performance, the law requires performance within a reasonable time. See, 
e.g., IDJI 6.14.1. A reasonable timetable for repaying a small-dollar loan like this one almost 
certainly would not be more than a few years, if that. From whatever point payment came due, 
Idaho's statute of limitations for actions for breach of contract began to run. The limitations 
period was either five years or four years in length, depending on whether the alleged loan was 
written or oral. I.C. §§ 5-216, -217. Twenty years, however, passed between the making of the 
alleged loan in 1991 and the "repossession" of the Cadillac in 2011. Thus, it seems clear that the 
alleged loan was time-barred and could not have been enforced in court at the time the Cadillac 
was repossessed. 
Sallaz argues that the Cadillac lien originating in 1991 by virtue of the alleged loan 
became void, or otherwise was rendered flatly unenforceable, at whatever point the statute of 
limitations would have barred an action to collect the alleged loan. Consequently, as his 
argument goes, the Rices had no right to repossess the Cadillac in 2011, even assuming they did 
have that right before the statute of limitations expired. The problem the argument faces is that 
Sallaz has not supported it with case law demonstrating that liens become void or otherwise 
unenforceable for all purposes once the statute of limitations on the underlying obligation 
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expires. Yes, they become unenforceable in court, but unenforceability in court does not 
establish, ipso facto, voidness or unenforceability by self-help. 
Idaho's statutes oflimitation bar judicial remedies. E.g., Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed 
Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680,683, 760 P.2d 19, 22 (1988) ("Statutes of limitation are limitations 
on a party's right to bring an action."); see also I.C. § 5-201 ("Civil actions can only be 
commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter .... "). By contrast, they are "not 
implicated" by self-help remedies that "do[ ] not require any court action to accomplish." Id 
Thus, in Smith, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a credit union validly exercised the self-help 
remedy of applying funds in a borrower's deposit account against the borrower's unpaid loans, 
despite the expiration of the statute of limitations for filing an action to enforce the loans. Id at 
683-84, 760 P.2d at 22-23. That setting might be analogized to this one; the Rices collected the 
alleged loan (by repossessing collateral) without need for help from the courts, much like the 
credit union did (by setting off accounts) in Smith. 
In fact, under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured creditor has the right, 
after the borrower defaults, to repossess its loan collateral through self-help, provided it can do 
so without breaching the peace. See LC. § 28-9-609(b )(2). Although Smith is not a repossession 
case, the general rule set forth in Smith suggests this self-help remedy remains available to an 
unsecured creditor even after the expiration of the statute of limitations for filing an action to 
enforce an underlying loan. Sallaz never argued that a breach of the peace occurred here. 
Moreover, he did not ask the Court to instruct the jury to determine whether the Cadillac's 
repossession was unlawful as a breach of the peace. Consequently, the Court cannot help but 
conclude that the Rices' exercise of the self-help repossession remedy available under Article 9 
was not unlawful simply in that the statute of limitations barred an action to collect the 
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underlying loan the jury evidently believed they had made to Sallaz. If the law compels the 
contrary holding for which Sallaz argues-that a lien on loan collateral is automatically voided 
upon expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to an action to collect the underlying 
loan-it would have to be some source of law other than that identified in Sallaz's briefing. The 
authorities he cites do not establish his side of the fine point at issue here. 
Turning to Sallaz's argument that the Cadillac's repossession and sale failed to comply 
with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Court first notes the absence of much doubt 
that the Rices violated Article 9. At a minimum, they almost certainly failed to follow the notice 
requirements applicable to the sale, as well as the requirement to account to Sallaz for the excess 
of the $25,000 sale price over the amount of the underlying alleged debt ($1,000 plus interest). 
See I.C. § 28-9-615(d)(l). Selling the Cadillac in disregard of these legal requirements may well 
constitute conversion as a theoretical matter. But that does not mean Sallaz is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Sallaz proposed a substantial array of jury instructions before trial began. None of them, 
however, had to do with Article 9. During trial, Sallaz's personal counsel, Vernon K. Smith, 
broached the subject of instructing the jury on Article 9 requirements. As the Court recalls, he 
summarily listed a number of Article 9 obligations allegedly breached by the Rices and made a 
generalized request for corresponding jury instructions. As the Court further recalls, Smith was 
invited to submit particular proposed instructions in writing for the Court's consideration. But 
no Article 9 instructions were ever submitted. 
The rules require the parties to propose the instructions they want given to the jury, and 
they relieve courts of the obligation to give instructions that are not properly proposed: 
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No later than five (5) days before the commencement of any trial by jury, any 
party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in 
such request, and such requested instructions must be served upon and received by all 
parties to the action at least five (5) days before the commencement of the trial. The 
court shall not be required to consider any requested instructions not filed and served 
upon the parties as required by this rule, but the court may reasonably permit any party 
to file and serve written requests for instructions at any time up to and including the 
close of the evidence at the trial upon the grounds that such requested instructions 
concern matters arising during the trial of the action which could not reasonably have 
been anticipated by the party requesting such instructions or were overlooked in the 
original requested instructions. 
I.R.C.P. 51(a)(l) (emphasis added). In light of Sallaz's failure to propose Article 9 instructions, 
the Court was not obligated to devise and give any on its own initiative. See, e.g., Weinstein v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,336,233 P.3d 1221, 1258 (2010) (affirming 
the district court's decision not to give an instruction not requested in timely fashion). 
Considering whether the verdict would have or should have been different, had the jury 
been instructed on applicable Article 9 requirements, is not a useful exercise. Even assuming it 
to be true that proper Article 9 instructions inevitably would have led the jury to render a verdict 
that the Rices converted the Cadillac, judgment as a matter of law is unwarranted. 
The Court is not unmindful of a seeming unfairness in the overall result here. If, as the 
jury apparently found, the Rices made a $1,000 loan to Sallaz in 1991, in return for which Sallaz 
granted them a lien on the Cadillac, the loan entitles the Rices to collect only the loaned amount, 
plus interest. But the Rices have collected $25,000-far more than the loaned amount, plus 
interest at any reasonable rate-by virtue of repossessing and selling the Cadillac and then 
failing to satisfy their Article 9 duty to account to Sallaz for the excess sale proceeds. The law 
does not require this unfair result. It grants Sallaz a remedy, namely a cause of action for failure 
to satisfy the duty to account for the excess sale proceeds. See I.C. § 28-9-625(b ). Another 
possible remedy would be a claim for conversion of the excess sale proceeds. But Sallaz did not 
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bring either sort of claim. And, as already discussed, he did not properly request jury 
instructions on the requirements of Article 9, so that the jury could take them into account in 
determining whether the Rices' actions with respect to the Cadillac amounted to conversion. So, 
while there is a seeming unfairness to the result here, avenues by which to avoid it were available 
to Sallaz. 
Judgment as a matter of law is impermissible when reasonable minds, taking the 
nonmovant's evidence as true and drawing in the nonmovant's favor all reasonable inferences 
arising from the evidence, could view the evidence as sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 
E.g., Berkshire Invs., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 80,278 P.3d 943, 950 (2012). A reasonable 
jury, instructed as this one was instructed, could have reasonably found against Sallaz and Fox 
on the conversion claim. The motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied. 
B. Disposition of the Rices' claim for quiet title to the 1954 Cadillac 
The Rices asserted a counterclaim for quiet title to the 1954 Cadillac. When they first 
asserted the counterclaim, they had possession of the Cadillac. During the course of litigation, 
however, they sold it for $25,000. Roy Rice so testified in deposition excerpts that were 
presented at trial. He also testified that he does not recall and has no record of the buyer's 
identity. No contrary evidence-meaning, no evidence suggesting the Cadillac was not actually 
sold or that the buyer could be identified-was offered at trial. Accordingly, it appears from the 
evidence at trial that the Cadillac is gone, without any identifiable reason to believe the parties 
will ever locate it. 
As already discussed, the jury was asked to determine whether Sallaz and Fox proved 
their claim that the Rices converted the Cadillac. The jury resolved that claim against Sallaz and 
Fox, evidently concluding Sallaz and Fox failed to prove the Rices had no right to take and sell 
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the Cadillac. The Court inappropriately treated the jury's conclusion in that regard as dispositive 
of the Rices' quiet-title counterclaim, entering a judgment of quiet title in the Rices' favor 
without engaging in any analysis beyond observing that the jury had decided the Sallaz/Fox 
conversion claim in the Rices' favor. The Court instead should have entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law resolving the quiet-title claim based on its own view of the evidence. In other 
words, the Court should have complied with I.R.C.P. 52(a), which requires findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on issues tried to the Court. 
Although no party challenged the Court's approach in a post-trial motion, the Court 
raised the issue on its own initiative during the hearing on post-trial motions. The Court told the 
parties of its concern that it had failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 52(a). The Court then asked the 
parties whether the quiet-title counterclaim presented a live dispute at the time of trial, as 
opposed to having been rendered moot by the Rices' sale of the Cadillac (whose whereabouts are 
unknown) to an unidentified buyer (whose whereabouts also are unknown). Despite that the 
Rices brought the counterclaim, never formally abandoned it, and received a judgment in their 
favor on it, the Rices' counsel agreed it is moot. Sallaz's personal counsel (Smith) disagreed, 
citing a perceived need to advise the Idaho Department of Motor Vehicles as to whose title claim 
is paramount, given an apparent title freeze with respect to the vehicle. At the same time, 
though, Smith said he understood the Cadillac may be in Germany and may have been sold for 
parts. If there is any reason to think the parties will ever see the Cadillac again, it was not 
brought out, either at trial or during the hearing on post-trial motions. 
That preface having been stated, the Court now enters its findings of fact and conclusions 
oflaw, as required by I.R.C.P. 52(a), with respect to the quiet-title counterclaim. 
Based on the trial evidence, the Court finds the following facts: 
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1. Dennis Sallaz owned and possessed a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado from approximately 
1964 until early 2011, when Roy Rice arranged for its "repossession" in reliance on the 
Cadillac's status as the collateral for a small-dollar loan allegedly made to Sallaz in 1991 and 
never repaid by him. 
2. After the repossession, Sallaz filed this action to get the Cadillac back. He also 
pursued an alternative claim for conversion of the Cadillac. 
3. During the course of litigation, Rice sold the Cadillac to a third party for $25,000. 
The jury nevertheless found that Sallaz (and Marcy Fox, to whom Sallaz had attempted to gift 
the Cadillac) failed to prove conversion of the Cadillac. 
4. No party to this action knows or recalls the buyer's identity or knows the 
Cadillac's present location. 
5. No facts admitted into evidence at trial suggest there is reason to believe the 
Cadillac will be located in the future. 
Based on these findings of fact, the Court enters the following conclusions of law: 
1. "The issue of mootness can be raised at any time." Edwards v. MERS, 154 Idaho 
511,515,300 P.3d 43, 47 (2013). Further, if a case is moot, the Court has a duty to raise the 
issue itself, as jurisdiction is lacking when a case is moot. E.g., Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 
Idaho 734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2012). 
2. The doctrine of mootness "applies when a favorable judicial decision would not 
result in any relief." Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 779, 133 P.3d 1240, 1244 (2006). In other 
words, '" a case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will 
have no practical effect upon the outcome."' Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 
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521,528,248 P.3d 1256, 1263 (2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting Goodson v. Nez Perce County 
Bd of County Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 851,853,993 P.2d 614,616 (2000)). 
3. Similarly, an action for declaratory judgment-a type of action analogous to a 
quiet-title action-is moot '"where the judgment, if granted, would have no effect either directly 
or collaterally on the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable to obtain further relief based on the 
judgment and no other relief is sought in the action."' Wylie v. Idaho Transp. Bd, 151 Idaho 26, 
32, 253 P.3d 700, 706 (2011) (quoting Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State 
Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276,282,912 P.2d 644,650 (1996)). 
4. Moot claims may only be adjudicated "(1) when there is the possibility of 
collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged 
conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an 
otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest." Id. 
5. Under the legal standards set forth above, the mootness doctrine focuses on 
whether granting the requested relief would provide a real remedy to the claimant. A judgment 
for quiet title to the Cadillac would have no practical impact on the Rices. They have sold the 
Cadillac to a third party, and the jury has exonerated them from the claim that their taking and 
sale of the Cadillac was an unlawful conversion of the Cadillac, leaving them without an 
identifiable need for a judicial determination that their already-relinquished claim to the Cadillac 
is superior to Sallaz's claim to it. Consequently, the Rices' quiet-title counterclaim is moot-a 
conclusion that can be reached without need to consider whether a judgment refusing, rather than 
granting, the requested relief would have practical significance. 
6. Regardless, a judgment that the Rices failed to prove their quiet-title counterclaim 
likewise would have no practical impact on the Rices. 
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7. A judgment that the Rices failed to prove their quiet-title counterclaim would 
have no practical impact on Sallaz either. It would not establish an obligation on the Rices' part 
to attempt to recover the Cadillac from the third party to which it was sold and restore possession 
of it to Sallaz. Moreover, there is no reason to believe the Cadillac can be located, even 
assuming Sallaz would have the right to recover it from the third party ( or whomever now 
possesses it) if the Rices are not adjudged to have a superior claim to it. 
8. For these reasons, the Rices' quiet-title counterclaim is moot (a proposition with 
which their counsel agreed during the hearing on post-trial motions). 
9. No exception to the mootness doctrine applies. 
Accordingly, the Court withdraws its original grant of judgment of quiet title in the 
Rices' favor. That original grant of relief was infirm because it was granted based on an 
inadequate analysis, as well as because it failed to take into account the fact that an adjudication 
of the claim would not result, under the circumstances, in any effective relief. 
C. The Rices' motion for prejudgment interest 
At trial, the Rices pursued a counterclaim for breach of two promissory notes-one in the 
face amount of $10,800 and the other in the face amount of $10,000-that Sallaz executed in 
their favor in 2005. Both notes provide for interest at 12% per year from their respective 
inception dates. The Rices did not, however, offer evidence at trial of the amount of accrued 
interest. For that reason, the Court precluded the Rices from asking for interest during their 
closing argument and instructed the jury not to award interest if it found for the Rices. The jury 
did find for the Rices and, consistent with that instruction, awarded them only the notes' 
respective face amounts. 
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The Rices filed a timely post-trial motion for prejudgment interest on the notes' 
respective face amounts, calculated at 12% per year from the notes' respective inception dates 
through July 21, 2014 (the date on which judgment was entered based on the jury's verdict). The 
motion is made under subparts 1 and 2 ofl.C. § 28-22-104(1) (Aff. Amount Due & Appl. 
Prejudgment Interest, 9), which provide for prejudgment interest on, respectively, "[m]oney due 
by express contract" and "[m]oney after the same becomes due." I.C. § 28-22-104(1). These 
subparts, if applied, would necessitate determining when payment came "due"; the measure of 
prejudgment interest permitted under them does not begin accruing until then. This is 
problematic because the notes are demand notes-meaning, they provide that payment is due on 
demand-and it is unclear from the record when the Rices made a payment demand. 
Subpart 3 of section 28-22-104(1 ), however, provides for prejudgment interest on 
"[m]oney lent." Id. It aptly applies here. The notes represent loans (i.e., "[m]oney lent"). 
Under subpart 3, there is no need to consider when payment of the notes is "due," as there is 
under subparts 1 and 2, because the notes provide ( as is customary for loans) that interest begins 
accruing immediately. Although the Rices did not expressly invoke subpart 3, their method of 
calculating prejudgment interest is consistent with subpart 3, in that they began accruing interest 
on the notes' respective inception dates, despite that payment was not yet "due" on those dates 
(unless payment of the loans embodied by the notes was demanded immediately). According to 
the Rices' calculation, from those dates through July 21, 2014 (when judgment was entered), 
$11,809.30 in interest accrued on the $10,800 note and $10,596.63 in interest accrued on the 
$10,000 note, for a total interest accrual of $22,405.93. 
This is a simple calculation, and Sallaz does not challenge it. He makes only one 
argument against awarding prejudgment interest as the Rices request. He argues that 
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prejudgment interest should not be awarded at all because the Rices' award of the notes' 
respective face amounts, combined with the award they received for conversion of the ATVs and 
trailer, is smaller than the $25,000 award he says he should receive once he is granted judgment 
as a matter of law on his claim for conversion of the 1954 Cadillac. As discussed above, 
however, Sallaz is not entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw on that claim. Moreover, even if 
judgment as a matter of law were granted to him, the Rices' right to prejudgment interest in 
connection with their counterclaim for breach of the notes is not contingent on their achieving 
"prevailing party" status in this case as a whole. There is no legal basis for netting the Rices' 
actual awards against Sallaz's hypothetical conversion award in determining whether the Rices 
are entitled to prejudgment interest. 
For these reasons, the Court does not accept Sallaz's argument. Prejudgment interest in 
the requested amount of $22,405.93 is awarded to the Rices. 
D. The Rices' request for costs and attorney fees 
The Rices seek costs, as well as attorney fees under I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, in 
connection with prevailing on their counterclaim for breach of the notes. To be entitled to 
recover costs, or attorney fees under those statutes, the Rices would have to be the "prevailing 
party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B); I.C. §§ 12-120(3), -121. Specifically, they would have to be the 
"prevailing party" vis-a-vis Sallaz, the only party against whom they pursued the counterclaim 
for breach of the notes. "Prevailing party" status must be determined, however, by considering 
the case as a whole, not the counterclaim for breach of the notes in isolation. See, e.g., Idaho 
Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,630,329 P.3d 1072, 1078 (2014) ("The 
prevailing party question is examined from an overall view of the action, not a claim-by-claim 
analysis.") (brackets and quotation marks omitted). The Court therefore will determine whether 
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the Rices are the "prevailing party" in light of the outcome of the case as a whole, with "case as a 
whole" meaning, in this context, all claims and counterclaims pitting the Rices against Sallaz. 
This "prevailing party" determination is a matter of discretion. E.g., id. at 629, 329 P.3d at 1077. 
The Rices won the counterclaim for breach of the notes and their counterclaim for 
conversion of the ATVs and the trailer. These wins earned them a total award of $46,205.93, 
taking prejudgment interest into account. They also successfully defended against Sallaz's claim 
for conversion of the 1954 Cadillac. That was an important win because of both the intensity of 
the parties' dispute over the Cadillac and Sallaz's contention at trial that the Cadillac was worth 
more than $100,000. But the Rices unsuccessfully pursued numerous counterclaims against 
Sallaz, including counterclaims that placed more money at stake than did the combination of 
Sallaz's claim for conversion of the Cadillac and the counterclaims on which Rices succeeded. 
Given the Rices' lack of success on key counterclaims, the Court concludes in its discretion that 
the Rices are not the "prevailing party" vis-a-vis Sallaz. Consequently, they are not entitled to 
recover costs, nor are they entitled to recover attorney fees under LC.§§ 12-120(3) or 12-121. 
Alternatively, the Rices seek attorney fees under the terms of the notes themselves. The 
notes provide as follows: "If action is commenced to enforce payment of this note, I agree to 
pay such sums as the Court may affix as attorney fees." (Trial Exs. 14(a), 14(b).) This provision 
does not flatly entitle the Rices to attorney fees if they sue to enforce the notes, even if the 
enforcement litigation is successful. Instead, it merely amounts to an agreement on Sallaz's part 
to pay attorney fees in enforcement litigation if a court so orders. Thus, the provision does no 
more than facilitate a discretionary judicial grant of attorney fees to the Rices in enforcement 
litigation. The Court will exercise this contractual grant of discretion by denying the Rices' 
request for attorney fees. The claim for breach of the notes played a small part in this case, and, 
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as such, the Court finds it more equitable to award attorney fees (or not award them) based on 
the outcome of the case as a whole, as opposed to making a discretionary award of attorney fees 
based on the outcome of a single claim in isolation. 
For these reasons, the Rices' request for costs and attorney fees is denied. 
E. Sallaz's and the law firms' request for costs and attorney fees 
Sallaz and four law firms bearing his name are parties to this case. They were 
represented by two different sets of counsel throughout the case and at trial, each one having a 
distinct scope of responsibility. William Fuhrman and Erika Judd of the Jones Gledhill firm 
represented Sallaz and the four law firms insofar as they were accused by the Rices of legal 
malpractice or other professional malfeasance. Vernon K. Smith represented Sallaz insofar as 
his disputes with the Rices might be termed "personal" rather than professional in nature (such as 
the dispute with respect to the 1954 Cadillac). Additionally, Smith represented two of the four 
law firms in claiming the Rices breached a contract for payment of legal bills. 
After the entry of judgment, the Jones Gledhill firm requested costs and attorney fees on 
behalf of Sallaz and the law firms for successfully defending against the professional-liability-
oriented counterclaims. Smith did not make a similar request. 
As already noted in discussing the Rices' request for costs and attorney fees, costs and 
attorney fees are not available to a party unless it is determined in the Court's discretion, 
considering the outcome of the case as a whole, to be a "prevailing party." E.g., Idaho Military 
Historical Soc'y, 156 Idaho at 629-30, 329 P.3d at 1077-78. The question therefore is whether 
any of the Jones Gledhill firm's clients-Sallaz and the four law firms-qualifies as a 
"prevailing party." This determination must be made as to each of those clients individually, as 
it is theoretically possible that none, one, more than one, or all of them could qualify as a 




"prevailing party." In making the determination, the Court will take into account all claims each 
of them pursued or defended against, including not only the claims with respect to which the 
Jones Gledhill firm provided representation but also the claims with respect to which Smith 
provided representation. That approach is in keeping with the Idaho Supreme Court's command 
to identify any "prevailing party" in light of the outcome of a case as a whole, rather than by 
isolated consideration of its constituent parts. 
The Jones Gledhill firm successfully defended Sallaz against all professional-liability-
oriented counterclaims. Smith successfully defended Sallaz against some of the personal 
counterclaims. But the other personal counterclaims against Sallaz-namely those for breach of 
the notes and for conversion of the ATVs and the trailer-succeeded, resulting in a money 
judgment for the Rices of $46,205.93. In addition, Sallaz was unsuccessful in his claim for 
conversion of the 1954 Cadillac. As already noted, that claim was very important to the parties. 
It placed a significant amount of money at stake, given Sallaz's contention at trial that the 
Cadillac's value exceeded $100,000. Moreover, it drove the litigation. Sallaz's emotional 
investment in its outcome appeared to be high, and his insistence on pursuing it appeared to be 
the main-if not the only-reason the Rices filed and then pursued their counterclaims. 
Consequently, the outcome of the case as a whole cannot reasonably be seen as better than a 
mixed bag from Sallaz's perspective. He was exonerated from professional liability, but he did 
not recover his prized Cadillac or its value and he owes the Rices a not-insubstantial money 
judgment. In an appropriate case, the district court may declare the outcome of the case as a 
whole to be, in blackjack terms, a "push" In other words, there need not be any "prevailing 
party." E.g., Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536,539,224 P.3d 1125, 1128 (2010). This is 
such a case. The Court determines in its discretion that Sallaz is not, on the whole, a "prevailing 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS· 24 
001553
party," just as it determined above the Rices are not "prevailing parties." Sallaz therefore is not 
entitled to costs and attorney fees. 
Two of the four law firms-Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. and Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., 
Inc.-successfully defended against the Rices' professional-liability-oriented counterclaims but 
unsuccessfully pursued third-party claims against the Rices for breach of an alleged contract for 
payment of legal fees. 4 The Court granted the Rices' motion for a directed verdict against the 
unpaid-attorney-fees claim of Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc. based on the failure of evidence 
that any entity by that name even existed, much less had a contractual right to payment from the 
Rices. The Rices' motion for a directed verdict against the unpaid-attorney-fees claim of Sallaz 
and Gatewood Chtd. was granted in part. Specifically, the Court determined based on the trial 
evidence that the bulk of the claimed $450,000 in unpaid legal fees was time-barred. The Court 
nevertheless allowed the jury to consider the entirety of the claim because even the time-barred 
portion could serve as an offset if Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. were found to have liability on the 
Rices' professional-liability-oriented counterclaims. The jury, however, found against Sallaz 
and Gatewood Chtd. on its unpaid-attorney-fees claim. 
Although the unpaid-attorney-fees claim pursued by Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. and 
Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc. against the Rices was much simpler and less costly to litigate 
than were the Rices' counterclaims against them, the stakes and the outcomes were comparable. 
Each side sought hundreds of thousands of dollars from the other, and each side came away with 
4 The "counterclaims" against the law firms are not true counterclaims, given that the law firms 
had not asserted any claims against the Rices when the "counterclaims" were filed. Similarly, 
the "third-party claims" asserted by the law firms are not true third-party claims; they do not 
involve derivative liability. See I.R.C.P. 14(a). The "counterclaims" and "third-party claims" 
involving the law firms were litigated to a conclusion, without objection to the apparent technical 
defects in the manner of their initiation. The practical reality-that the law firms are aligned 
with Sallaz as plaintiffs-is simpler than the impression created by the case caption. 
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nothing. The Court therefore determines in its discretion that Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. and 
Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Inc. are not "prevailing parties," even though their victories against 
the Rices were more expensive to attain than were the Rices' victories against them. See 
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho at 539,224 P.3d at 1128 (affirming the district court's 
decision to consider the defendants' unsuccessful pursuit of counterclaims in determining that 
there was no "prevailing party," despite that they had successfully defended against the bulk of 
the plaintiffs claims). They are not entitled to costs and attorney fees. 
The other two law firms-Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC and Sallaz Law 
Chtd., Inc.---did not pursue an unpaid-attorney-fees claim against the Rices. Accordingly, their 
record in this case is essentially unblemished, having successfully defended against the only 
claims to which they were parties. They therefore might aptly be called "prevailing parties." 
But they nevertheless are not entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees for the simple reason 
that the record fails to demonstrate that any costs or attorney fees were incurred in their defense 
beyond those that were incurred anyway in defending Sallaz and the other two law firms, none of 
which qualifies as a "prevailing party." The Rices' uncertainty as to the name of the law firm or 
law firms for which Sallaz was working while he represented them over the years accounts for 
the multiplicity of law-firm counterdefendants. The fact that the Rices named four law-firm 
counterdefendants, as opposed to just the two that later pursued and lost an unpaid-attorney-fees 
claim against the Rices, has not been shown to have resulted in an overall increase in defense 
costs. The Court sees no requirement, nor any good reason, for subjecting the Rices to a 
judgment for costs and attorney fees in favor of Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC and 
Sallaz Law Chtd., Inc. when the record does not demonstrate that defense costs were incurred on 
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behalf of those two law firms beyond the same defense costs incurred on behalf of other litigants 
(Sallaz and the other two law firms) that fail to qualify as "prevailing parties." 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Sallaz's motion for judgment as a matter oflaw is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment previously entered for the Rices on their 
counterclaim for quiet title to the Cadillac is withdrawn. That counterclaim is deemed moot. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Rices' motion for prejudgment interest is granted. 
$22,405.93 in prejudgment interest is awarded to the Rices in connection with their counterclaim 
for breach of the notes. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Rices' request for costs and attorney fees is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sallaz's and the four law firms' request for costs and 
attorney fees is denied. 
An amended judgment will be entered to effectuate these orders. 
-Vr 
Dated this~ day of October 2014. 
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Gabriel J. McCarthy 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
401 W Front St, Ste 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
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f' Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
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( ) Hand Delivered 
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DENNIS SALLAZ an individual and in his ) 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD Chtd. And SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD, Chtd., Inc., an Idaho ) 
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DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative 
capacity of SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD 
Chtd., and SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 


















JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Plaintiff Dennis Sallaz's and Involuntary Plaintiff Marcy Fox's claims are dismissed with 
prejudice, with no award to either of them. 
Counterclaimants Eugene (Roy) Rice and Janet Rice are awarded the total amount of 
$46,405.93 against Counterdefendant Dennis Sallaz. That total award consists of (i) $43,205.93 
on the Rices' counterclaim for breach of two promissory notes (including $22,405.93 in 
prejudgment interest), and (ii) $3,200 on their counterclaim for conversion of two all-terrain 
vehicles and a trailer. Post-judgment interest at the legal rate shall accrue on the total award of 
$46,405.93 from the original Judgment's entry on July 21, 2014. 
The Rices' counterclaim for quiet title to the disputed 1954 Cadillac Eldorado, VIN 
546265334, is dismissed as moot, with no award to the Rices. 
The Rices' other counterclaims against Sallaz are dismissed with prejudice, with no 
award to the Rices. 
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The Rices' counterclaims against Counterdefendants Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd., Sallaz 
and Gatewood Chtd., Inc., Sallaz and Gatewood Law Offices, PLLC, and Sallaz Law, Chtd., Inc. 
are dismissed with prejudice, with no award to the Rices. 
Third-Party Plaintiff Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd.'s and Third-Party Plaintiff Sallaz and 
Gatewood Chtd., Inc.' s claims are dismissed with prejudice, with no award to either of them. 
No award of costs or attorney fees is made to any party. 
~ 
Dated this J_§__ day of October, 2014. 
Jas D. Scott 
DIS RICT JUDGE 
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DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in his ) 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND ) 
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GATEWOOD CHTD., and SALLAZ AND ) 
GATEWOOD, CHTD., INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD ) 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional ) 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, ) 
Chtd., Inc., an Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, EUGENE (ROY) RICE, JANET RICE, 
and MICHAEL RICE, and their attorneys ofrecord, J. KAHLE BECKER, 1020 W. Main St., Ste. 
400, Boise, Idaho 83702, and GABRIEL J. McCARTHY, 401 W. Front St., Ste. 302, Boise, Idaho 
83702, and the Clerk of the above-entitled court. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Dennis J. Sallaz, appeals against the above-named 
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Amended Judgement entered on October 16, 2014, 
following the issuance of the Memorandum Decision and Order on Post Trial Motions issued by the 
Court in the above-entitled action, the Honorable Jason D. Scott, District Judge, presiding, and all 
interlocutory or final judgments related to that Amended Judgment, as provided by Idaho Appellate 
Rule 17(e)(l). 
2. That the above-named appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(l). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which the appellant intends to assert 
in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal: 
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a. Did the evidence support the existence of a $1,000 loan obligation upon 
which Sallaz was in default, and upon which Rice was entitled to exercise his 
lien rights in the 1954 Cadillac? 
b. Did the evidence establish that Rice wrongfully repossessed the 1954 
Cadillac? 
c. Was Sallaz entitled to damages for Rice's conversion of the 1954 Cadillac? 
d. Was Sallaz entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees? 
e. Did the Court err in not granting Plaintiffs Motion for Directed Verdict 
based upon the evidence presented? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5. 
If so, what portion? None. 
a. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
b. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
standard reporter's transcript under I.A.R. 25(c): 
1. 6/30/14 Jury Trial started 15 days Re: Defendants/Counterclaimants' 
Motion in Limine Re; Exclusion of Certain Plaintiff/ 
Counterdefendants' exhibits & motion for protective order. 
2. 7/1/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
3. 7/2/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
4. 7/7/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
5. 7 /8/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
6. 7 /9/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
7. 7/10/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
8. 7/14/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
9. 7/15/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
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10. 7/16/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
11. 7/17/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
12. 7/21/14 Jury Trial (200 transcript pages). 
6. In addition to the Standard Record provided by I.A.R. 28(b )(1 ), the Appellant requests 
the following additional documents to be included in the clerk's record on this appeal. 
a. The Counterdefendants' Pretrial Memorandum (6/5/14). 
b. Plaintiff-Involuntary Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum (6/5/14). 
c. Motion for Entry of Judgment for Plaintiff-Involuntary Plaintiff, 
Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict (7/25/14). 
d. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs-Involuntary Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Entry of Judgment Notwithstanding Jury Verdict (9/23/14). 
e. Memorandum Decision and Order on Post-Trial Motions (10/16/14). 
7. I certify: 
(a) that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and address: Diane Cromwell 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Name and address: Tiffany Fisher 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(b) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
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(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, LA.R. 
Dated this~ day of November, 2014. 
i3v(flJ. Mt..1 --~ ._ !... 
,C-o~.· Vedion K. Smith~ (/-
Attorney for the Appellant 
Dennis J. Sallaz 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this;i,th day of November, 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following in the manner described below: 
William A. Fuhrman 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, PA 
225 N. 9th St., Ste. 820 




J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 




Gabriel J. McCarthy 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. Front St., Ste. 302 





200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tiffany Fisher 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 


























M : Vernon K. Smith 
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VERNON K. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main Street 
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GATEWOOD CHTD., and SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD, CHTD., INC., an Idaho 




LAW OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional ) 
Limited Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, ) 




TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, EUGENE (ROY) RICE, JANET RICE, 
and MICHAEL RICE, and their attorneys of record, J. KAHLE BECKER, 1020 W. Main St., 
Ste. 400, Boise, Idaho 83702, and GABRIEL J. McCARTHY, 401 W. Front St., Ste. 302, Boise, 
Idaho 83702, and the Clerk of the above-entitled court. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. . The above named Appellant, Dennis J. Sallaz, has heretofore appealed against the 
above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Amended Judgment entered on 
October 16, 2014, following the issuance of the Memorandum Decision and Order on Post Trial 
Motions issued by the Court in the above entitled action, the Honorable Jason D. Scott, District 
Judge, presiding, and all interlocutory or final judgments related to that Amended Judgment, as 
provided by Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(l), and said Appellant does now herewith supplement 
and amend that Notice of Appeal to expand the substance of that appeal as taken against the 
above-named Respondents in the above entitled appeal , so as to now also include the appeal of 
each and every interloc1,1tory order that has been entered after entry of that final Amended 
Judgment, as was filed in this matter by the District Court, and this Amended Notice of Appeal 
does now include, but is not limited to, that subsequent Order entered by the District Court, 
concerning the allowed execution on the cash bond belonging to a non-party to the case, as 
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entered December 16, 2014; the further surrender and distribution of Funds paid by a non-party 
under §10-1115, Idaho Code, in satisfaction of the final amended judgment, as entered and filed 
of record on June 10, 2015, and that subsequent Order entered by the District Court, concerning 
the denial of Appellant Sallaz motion to reconsider the Court's release and surrender of those 
funds in satisfaction of the final Amended Judgment, as entered and filed of record on June 12, 
2015, each of which orders were issued by the District Court in the above-entitled action, the 
Honorable Jason D. Scott, District Judge, presiding, and said Appellant does provide notice that 
Appellant does appeal from those subsequent interlocutory orders or subsequent judgments as 
may be or have been entered after the entry of that final Amended Judgment, as above identified, 
for which the appeal is provided for by Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(l). 
2. That the above-named Appellant has the right to appeal these further orders to the 
Idaho Supreme Court, as the subsequent judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are 
part of the appealable matters, orders, and judgment on appeal under and pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(l). 
3. A preliminary statement as to the initial issues of concern on appeal have before 
been identified in the original Notice of Appeal, and does now include these subsequent Orders 
as entered by the District Court, as they have been erroneously entered by the Court and are 
inconsistent with and contrary to what is believed to be the existing law, and appear to be based 
upon a false perception and application of the controlling law and rules of civil and appellate 
procedure, as further identified in the Briefing to be submitted to this Court. The initial list of 
issues on appeal were identified in the original Notice of Appeal, but the contents thereof shall 
not prevent this Appellant from asserting all material and relevant issues that are capable of 
being addressed in this appeal. 
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4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? Not to 
Appellant's knowledge regarding this requested record. 
5. 
If so, what portion? None to Appellant's knowledge. 
a. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes, it was previously requested. 
b. By virtue of this Amended and Supplemental Notice of Appeal, this 
Appellant does further request, in addition to what was requested in the 
original Notice of Appeal, the preparation of the following additional 
portions of a reporter's transcript: 
1. The Hearing conducted on December 16, 2014 upon Motion for 
Execution on Bond posted by Dennis J. Sallaz. 
2. The Hearing conducted on February 23, 2015 upon Motion to 
Quash Subpoenas and Vacate Depositions. 
3. The Hearing conducted on February 23, 2015 upon Motion to 
Disqualify J. Kahle Becker and Set Aside Judgment. 
4. The Hearing conducted on April 6, 2015 upon those motions heard 
at that scheduled hearing. 
5. The Hearing conducted on April 30, 2015 upon those motions 
heard at that scheduled hearing. 
6. The Hearing conducted on May 26, 2015 upon those motions 
heard at that scheduled hearing. 
7. The Hearing conducted on June 8, 2015 upon those motions heard 
at that scheduled hearing. . 
8. The Hearing conducted on June 9, 2015 upon those motions heard 
at that scheduled hearing. 
6. By virtue of this Amended and Supplemental Notice of Appeal, this Appellant 
does further request, in addition to what was requested in the original Notice of Appeal, 
the following additional documents to be included in the clerk's record on this appeal. 
a. The Motion regarding execution upon bond placed by Dennis J. Sallaz, 
filed October 16, 2014. 
b. The Objection to that Motion regarding execution on the cash bond, filed 
November 10, 2014. 
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c. . The Motion seeking the return of the cash undertaking before posted by 
· Daryl S. Sallaz, filed November 17, 2014. 
d. The Affidavit of Daryl S. Sallaz, filed in Support of Motion for the return 
of the Cash Undertaking Posted by Daryl S. Sallaz, filed November 17, 
2014. 
e. The Order granting Execution on the cash Bond, filed December 18, 
2014. 
f. The Motion to quash Subpoenas and Vacate Depositions, filed February_ 
· 23, 2015. 
g. The Motion to Disqualify J. Kahle Becker and set aside Judgment, filed 
February 23, 2015. 
h. The Objection to Motion to Disqualify and Set Aside Judgment, and the 
affidavit in support ,each filed February 24, 2015. 
1. The Motion, filed by non-party, Raymond Schild, For Entry Of 
Satisfaction Of Judgment, filed by Mr. Clark on June 4, 2015. 
J. The Order For Surrender Of Funds, filed June 10, 2015. 
k. The Motion for the Court to Reconsider its analysis as to the Final 
Judgment On Appeal, filed Junel 1, 2015. 
1. The Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider, filed June 12, 2015. 
7. I certify: 
(a) that a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter 
of whom'. a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and address: Diane Cromwell 
200 W. Front Street · 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Name and address: . Tiffany Fisher 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(b) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
original estimated fee for preparation of the initial request regarding the 
reporter's transcript, and will pay any subsequent estimated fees, upon receipt of 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -PAGE 5 
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such request. The original estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record had 
been paid, and will pay any subsequent estimated fees upon receipt of such 
request. 
( c) That the appellate filing fee in the initial appeal process has been paid. 
( d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, I.A.R. 
Dated this 22nd day of July, 2015. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -PAGE 6 
Attorney for the 
Appellant Dennis J. 
Sallaz 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day ofJuly, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following in the manner described 
below: · 
-
William A. Fuhrman 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, PA _JL 
225 N. 9th St., Ste. 820 




J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law ~ 
1020 W. Main St., Ste. 400 




Gabriel J. McCarthy 
Attorney at Law ~ 
401 W. Front St., Ste. 302 



















Diane Cromwell U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
200 W. Front Street $ Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83702 -::::::--c,ve~~Mail 
Tiffany Fisher 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
HandDelive 
Vernon K. Smith 






SEP 10 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D 
By KELLE WEG:NICH, Clerk 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of Supreme-Court· 
451 W State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
In re:, Sallaz v. Rice, Docket No. 42698 
DEPUTY ER 
Notice is hereby given that on Thursday, September 3, 2015, I lodged.a 
transcript of 1994 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with 
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
The following files were lodged: 
Proceeding 04/06/2015, Proce~ding 04/30/2015, Proceeding 
05/26/2015, Proceeding 06/08/2015, Proceeding 06/30/2014, 
Proceeding 07/01/2014, Proceeding 07/02/2014, Proceeding 
07/07/2014, Proceeding 07/08/2014, Proceeding 07/09/2014, 
Proceeding 07/10/2014, Proceeding 07/14/2014, Proceeding 
07/15/2014, Proceeding 07/16/2014, Proceeding 07/21/2014 and 
Proceeding 12/16/2014 
David Cromwell 
· Tucker & Associates 
cc: sctfilings@idcourts.net 
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, · 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD CHTD. and SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD, CHTD., INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD LAW 
OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional Limited 
Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, CHTD., 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative capacity of 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, CHTD., and 




EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42698 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: · 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. It should be noted, however, that the following 
exhibits will be retained at the District Court clerk's office and will be made available for 
viewing upon request. 
1. Plaintiffs Exhibit D - Chain in Envelope. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 10th day of September, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
,,, ......... , 
,,, JU ,,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. DT~. ti.'n-l D1c1 ''1, 
-'-'~:~ •••••••• ·1 .... Clerk of the District f~~···· • ... < 0 \ .. U: ~\\'E. STATE•.~'!, 
t_ W 
€ E-, ; 0~ ~ ~ : 
• u • - oF- : ~ : 
By ~ :n: .. . .. ....., : 
Deputy Clerk .• ~ $ 
-:. (? •• •• .;;- .. 
, .... 4 ••••••••• <:::,,:::, ...... ,, 1, C ,, 
,,., ,t'D FOR AU:,. ,,, ,, ,,, .......... , 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUDGE MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN 
Deputy Clerk: Cindy Ho 
Type of Hearing: Order to Show Cause 
April 29, 2011 
DENNIS J SALLAZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




- MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendant. 
Appearances: 
Iver J Longeteig 




















Counsel for Plaintiff 
Counsel for Defendant 
DESCRIPTION 
Copy of Title 
Copy Power of Attorney 
Photo (2) 
Chain in Envelope 
Envelope for D.O.T. Certified Packet 
D.O.T. Certified Packet 
Copy of Certificate of Title 
Exhibit L from Counter Claim 
Exhibit M from Counter Claim 
Copy of Ex #70 from Divorce 
Business Card of Doug Eisenberg 
Deed of Trust 
Final Judgment and Decree 
Promissory Note $10,000.00 
Promissory Note $10,800.00 
Bill of Sale 
Page 468-471 ofDeoosition of Dennis Sallaz 


















.. ·.O 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF JUL 2 1 2014 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By SABRINA STOKES 
HONORABLE JASON D. SCOTT 
CLERK: SABRINA STOKES 
June 30, 2014 - July 21, 2014 
CT REPTR: Dianne Cromwell 
DENNIS SALLAZ, et al 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 











) _______________ ) 
Counsel for Plaintiffs: V K SMITH 




Counsel for Defendants: J KAHLE BECKER 
GABRIEL MCCARTHY 
' PLAINTIFF'S {SALLAZ) EXHIBITS ADMITTED 
700. Cadillac Certificate of Title (recorded 7/17/91) 

















Application for Certificate of Title for Roy Rice by Michael Rice 
Affidavit of Repossession 
Application for Certificate of Title dtd 1/24/11 
Five color photographs - Cadillac 
Photograph of Cadillac 
Sallaz & Gatewood Bills for Legal ~ervice 
·summary of Bills 
Lis Pendens - Real Homes dtd 12/21/09 
Real Properties: Title commitment dtd 9/15/06 
Spink Butler documents · 
Ada Properties LLC - current tax values 
Michael Rice: Airman Pawn dtd 1/8/94 












Ada Properties LLC - SOS documents - 5 pages 
SOS: Capital Broadcasing & Western Broadcasting 
Settlement Stipulation and Order dtd 7/10/00 
Final Order dtd 7/12/00 
Articles of Incorporation 
Legal Support Services - Statement 
SOS - Capital Broadcasting 
SOS - Capital Broadcasting 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS 
213(a). Petition for Contested Case Hearing 
123(a). Sallaz v Sallaz Husband's Property and Debt Schedule pg. 7 only 
138. Request for Public Record/DR#l03-204 dtd 4/28/11 
22(b). Certified ITO Vehicle History of 1954 Cadillac 
4. Facsimile from Sallaz to Runft dtd 5/26/09 
5. Letter from Sallaz to Runft dtd 8/20/09 
121. AR Aging Summary for 7/28/05 
123(b). Sallaz v Sallaz Post Trial Exhibit 201 pg. 5 only 
9. Response·letter from Sallaz to Becker dtd 2/16/11 
170. Affidavit of Dennis Sallaz in Opposition to Summary Judgment 
114. Bank statement of Eugene Rice dtd 1/23/06 
260(a). Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement 
259. Lis Pendens dtd 5/8/13 
8. Request for accounting from Becker to- Sallaz dtd 1/14/11 
18. Copy of cashier's check $10,883.06 
14(b). Piomissory Note signed by Sallaz dtd 6/10/05 
17. Copy of cashier's check $10,072.32 
14(a). Promissory Note signed by Sallaz dtd 9/21/05 
15. Copy of check - Rice to Salla~ for $2,500.00 
16. Copy of check - Rice to Sallaz for $4,000.00 
266. Documents provided in Ex 2 to Deposition of Roy Rice 
l(a). Purchase agreement for sale of interest in Real Homes 
109. Summary Appraisal Report 
1. Letter from Sallaz to Runft dtd 1/8/09 
27. Certificate of Title on 1989 Winnebago 
14. Bill of Sale - ATVs 
13. Response letter re: demand of property dtd 4/25/11 
88. Letter from Sallaz to Van Bishop 
55. Photocopy of sticky note on file DJS deed of trust to Rice 
56. Deed of Trust between Sallaz and Rice dtd 7/1/91 
89. · Letter from Sallaz to Smith dtd 7/10/00 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, · 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD CHTD. and SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD, CHTD., INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD LAW 
OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional Limited 
Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, CHTD., 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative capacity of 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, CHTD., and 




EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42698 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRJPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: SEP l O 20l5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J. KAHLE BECKER 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
,,, ......... . 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC!i~'; !\'TH lUl);,11,,, 




,: ,.. <:Y • • • • ("' ,:. 
.. 'v • • .. 
~ f.... : 0~ ·nm srArs·· o :. \r J : . . ,..... . 
By L-LA_.e~ rn § 
Deputy Clerk :. 0IDAHO l D : -9-•. • :, .. ':..,.-;•• ···~1 ...... "*,, ••••••••• .,"'i;,"' ...... .... ·1,tL) e,IJ" .. 
~,,,, FOR AD~ ,,,,, ., ........ ,,, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and MICHAEL RICE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 




DENNIS SALLAZ, an individual and in his 
representative capacity of SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD CHTD. and SALLAZ AND 
GATEWOOD, CHTD., INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD LAW 
OFFICES, PLLC, an Idaho Professional Limited 
Liability Company, and SALLAZ LAW, CHTD., 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Counterdefendants. 
DENNIS SALLAZ in his representative capacity of 
SALLAZ AND GATEWOOD, CHTD., and 




EUGENE (ROY) RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
Supreme Court Case No. 42698 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
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I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
26th day of November 2014. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
,,, ......... . ,, ,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIQ}('\ t\'YH lU/)1:.',,, 
,;:,..:.,'-,~ ••••••• 1.../ .. . Clerk of the District C.0~- •• • •••• 1.,,. .. . 
~ u.. . ~ ~ 
~ r::. • ~ 1\-\E STArr,•• d ~ 
.. c-, • QI' <; • ,..... .. 
W 
•r,• •Cll• -~. -
. ;(_~F- :~: By • • - .. 
Deputy Clerk ~AHO : !) $ 
- r::,. •• •• :, ... ~....... .. . ~ ~ 
.... , "1,-,,, •••••••••• .,+~ .... . , ·11)~ e,r::)" .. . 
,,,,, FOR AD;.. ,,, .. ,,,,,, .... ,,,, 
